Germany, a leader in
the development of landmines since the Second World War, began a shift in policy
in 1994 to work toward a ban on antipersonnel mines, largely because of enormous
public pressure from NGOs and engaged citizens. Its first step was a unilateral
export moratorium on AP mines that year; in January 1996 the government
prolonged the moratorium indefinitely; in April 1996 the Federal Armed Forces
(FAF) renounced the use of AP mines and in December 1997 the last AP mine
stockpiles were
eliminated.[1]
While taking these steps domestically, initially Germany favored
international negotiations toward a ban within the framework of the Conference
on Disarmament and Convention on Conventional Weapons over the Ottawa Process.
The government believed that negotiating within the CD and CCW would result in
agreements of a more binding character and force internationally because all the
main producers of landmines and superpower nations (i.e., USA, Russia, and
China) were convened in these
bodies.[2]
With the lack of movement in the CD in Geneva in 1996, Germany warmed to the
initiative of Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy to force the negotiation
of a treaty banning AP mines outside normal UN
procedures.[3] In ban
negotiations, Germany sought the inclusion of strong verification mechanisms and
to make the definition of AP mines as narrow as possible to exclude AT mines and
other mine-like weapons. Germany hosted an Ottawa Process-related conference
near Bonn on 24-25 April 1997, the focus of which was discussions of
verification measures in the context of an international treaty banning AP
mines.
7-Point Action Plan
Prior to the beginning of the Ottawa Process, on 18 July 1996, then Minister
of Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel presented the government’s "Seven-Point
Action Program on Antipersonnel
Mines.”[4] He noted that,
“The Federal Government has taken action. In January 1996 it imposed a
unilateral unlimited moratorium on all exports of anti-personnel mines. In April
1996 the Federal Armed Forces relinquished totally and unconditionally the use
of anti-personnel mines. Existing stocks will be destroyed. The conference to
review the UN Conventional Weapons Convention which ended on 3 May 1996 agreed
on more extensive prohibitions and restrictions on landmines. This was not
enough. I therefore propose a seven-point action program on antipersonnel
mines."[5]
The essential elements of the action program included: 1. a call for an
international ban on AP mines; 2. a summary of German efforts to help with mine
clearance; 3. an outline of the contribution of the Federal Armed Forces (FAF)
toward training experts in mine detection and clearance; 4. a request that NATO
and WEU support efforts to clear mines; 5. a call for the speediest and widest
possible application of the revised Mine Protocol adopted on 3 May 1996; 6.
establishing that contributions of mine-afflicted countries to resolve their
mine problems would be a criterion for support from German financial and
technical cooperation programs; and 7. urging the United Nations to make mine
clearance part of UN peace-keeping
missions.[6]
This program demonstrated that the requests of many NGOs and of the mine
afflicted countries influenced the policies of the government and it focused not
only on the disarmament aspect of a ban on AP mines but also on humanitarian
mine action.[7]
Ratification and Implementation Laws
Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. On this
occasion in his speech to the delegates, then Foreign Minister Kinkel noted that
the verification mechanism of the Mine Ban Treaty was a ”great
improvement.”[8] He also
announced that Germany would hold a conference on modern demining technology in
June 1998.[9] In concluding, he
reflected on the post war situation in Europe after the Second World War, when
“80 % of the scattered mines were cleared after a few years, because there
was the political good will and financial
resources.”[10]
Within a week after signing the German parliament debated the ban
treaty.[11] All parliamentary
parties agreed that the ban of AP mines is an important step toward a more
humane world and that the parliament had to ratify the convention before summer
of 1998.[12] But differences
arose as to the nature of the role Germany had played within the Ottawa Process.
The Green Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism deputies disputed that the
German government had played a leadership role since the government coalition
parties - Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Liberal
Democratic Party had failed to do anything about AT
mines.[13] Both deputies also
pointed out that the decisive pressure group for a ban of mines had been the NGO
community, especially the German Initiative to Ban
Landmines.[14] In contrast the
deputies of Christian Democratic Union and Liberal Democratic Party stressed
German efforts to ban AP mines since 1993: with the establishment of a mine
documentary center followed by stopping all exports of AP mines in
1994.[15] Neither saw any chance
to ban AT mines, as there is no international consensus to stop using AT mines,
given their military utility. They concluded that, if at all, a ban of AT mines
would be a long term
goal.[16]
Another issue at question was if the government had provided enough funds to
aid landmine survivors and for mine action. The deputies of governmental parties
argued that the government had been spending a sufficient amount for these
issues, including the provision of military demining
technology.[17] But the deputies
of the Green Party and Party of Democratic Socialism noted the difference
between military and humanitarian demining and that the Government should focus
its efforts on humanitarian mine action and decrease allocations for research
and development of mines and military mine clearance
technology.[18]
The suggestion of the deputy of Social Democratic Party to suspend all
support to those states who are not willing to sign the convention met with
approval of the government
coalition.[19] This means that
in support of the efforts of Germany to establish a strong verification
mechanism within the treaty, German policy reserves the right to stop support
for mine clearance and survivor assistance if a state does not sign the ban
treaty or violates its treaty obligations.
Finally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs summed up the government’s
view of next steps: 1. To ratify the Convention as soon as possible and to urge
non-signatories to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty; 2. to support more mine
awareness in the afflicted countries; 3. to offer extensive aid to the landmine
survivors from the provision of prostheses to medical and social care; and 4. to
intensify the research on demining
technology.[20] The deputy of
the Green Party outlined the demands of the party as follows: 1. To prohibit
worldwide development, production and export of mines, including technology
transfer of mines with self-destruct mechanisms; 2. to make public all research
projects and exports, all military mission plans and all stockpiles within
Germany; and 3. to be transparent in the destruction of all existing
mines.[21]
Germany ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in several phases. The first phase was
the transformation of the Mine Ban Treaty into national law on 12 May
1998.[22] The second phase was
the development of implementing
legislation.[23] The third phase
was the deposit of the instruments of ratification at the United Nations in New
York on 27 July 1998. Apparently, there was no vote against the ratification of
the ban treaty.[24]
Memorandum of Understanding
The government bill presented to the Upper House contains a remarkable
memorandum,[25] representing the
official and binding policy of the German government and comments in detail on
each article of the Mine Ban Treaty. Generally the treaty is assessed “to
establish new standards within international law as there is set a sweeping
prohibition of all types of AP mines accompanied by humanitarian
measures.”[26] Of
concern is the memorandum’s language on the treaty’s Article 1:
“The commitments of the Convention concerns all AP mines of a State Party.
In addition to this are also AP mines which are stored within foreign territory.
A state party is possibly not accountable for those AP mines which another state
keeps within the territory of a state party. If these AP mines are not under its
authority and control, then the state party is not bound by law to destroy
them.”[27] This argument
is taken up again in the interpretation of treaty Article 4: “Stocks from
foreign armed forces do not come under definition of article 4 if they are not
under one's authority and control of a State
Party.”[28] These
interpretations are clearly intended to address U.S./NATO mines on German
soil.
With regard to the treaty’s Article 6 on international cooperation, the
memorandum states: “Article 6 contains essential provisions of the treaty.
Their inclusion was decisive to get approval of many African and Latin American
states to join the Convention. Furthermore the regulation expresses one of the
crucial requests of nongovernmental organizations.... Getting this passage NGOs
and Third World Countries had their way above all. Donor countries - among them
the Federal Republic of Germany - made their countermove to demand not to impose
inappropriate restrictions on provision of equipment and information for
humanitarian purposes (paragraph
8).”[29] The memorandum
also notes, “From the beginning the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany took the view that the Convention...has important disarmament-oriented
meaning and therefore verification has to be a central aspect to prohibit these
weapons.”[30]
The implementing legislation of the Mine Ban Treaty (phase 2) was
accomplished without any vote against it (according to available
sources)[31] and came into force
at 6 July 1998.[32] One notable
provision is the breadth of application: "Offenses out of the territory of this
law...count as offenses irrespective of the national law of the scene of the
crime...if the perpetrator is
German."[33]
Ratification documents were deposited at the UN on 23 July
1998.[34] With this the process
of ratification was completed. One day after deposit, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issued a press release which emphasized,“One priority of German
efforts within this issue [mine clearance] is the support of mechanical demining
technology to clear mines faster and safer than before. It is absurd that
humankind is able to fly to the moon while clearance of huge mine fields still
is done by manual
work!”[35]
CCW and CD
Germany ratified revised Protocol II of the CCW on 23 April 1997 and
deposited its instruments of ratification on 2 May
1997.[36] Germany was one of the
first states to do so, but on the occasion then-Foreign Minister Kinkel
remarked that the Protocol is unsatisfactory as it does not include a general
ban on AP mines
worldwide.[37]
Germany’s Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Dr
Rüdiger Hartmann, clearly summed up his government’s position on the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 30 July 1998: "The primordial task is now
to make acceptance of the Ottawa Convention or its objectives as universal as
possible. We are aware that a number of states, including some large military
powers and major regional powers with huge APL stockpiles and significant
production capabilities, have decided not to adhere to the Ottawa Convention
immediately. Many of them, however, have expressed their willingness to
contribute to the resolution of the humanitarian aims of the Ottawa Convention
by banning APL transfers. Germany therefore strongly supports the establishment
of an Ad Hoc Committee on APL by the CD and an early start to negotiations on a
universal ban on APL transfers. We should like to emphasize here that this
agreement will have to be fully compatible with the Ottawa Convention and that
it must not detract from its
objectives."[38] This statement
was renewed by Ambassador Hartmann in 25 March
1999.[39]
Antitank Mine Ban
The German ban campaign has long called for a ban on all landmines, both
antitank and antipersonnel. The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka
Fischer has asked for the possibility of a ban of antitank mines, but the
Federal Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping signaled that the Federal Armed
Forces are not willing to give up the use of antitank
mines.[40] Over 700,000 people
in Germany have signed the demand to ban all landmines without
exceptions.[41]
In the late 1950s, the Armed Forces began to procure their first AP and AT
mines, under license from foreign
countries.[43] Germany has
procured five types of antipersonnel mines: DM-11, DM-31, DM-51, DM-39, and
MUSPA. The government does not categorize the DM-51, DM-39, or MUSPA as
antipersonnel mines. It has procured eight types of antitank mines: DM-21,
AT-1, At-2, DM-31, PARM-1, PARM-2, COBRA, and MIFF.
Antipersonnel Mines
The DM-11 was the first AP mine produced by Germany. It was a product of the
Swedish company LIAB - a metal-free blast mine whose explosive charge is strong
enough to damage vehicles.[44]
This landmine was produced under license by Diehl, a German company with
headquarters in Nürnberg/Röthenbach, in its factory of Mariahütte
(Saarland). According to government sources, the FAF bought a huge number of
these landmines until 1964 at a cost of 19.2 million DEM (U.S. $10.9
million).[45] Specific data is
classified even though these landmines were removed from stockpiles in 1994. It
is estimated, though, that the total number of procured mines could be three
million.[46]
The DM-31 AP mine was produced from 1962-1967 by the company Industriewerke
Karlsruhe (later: Industriewerke Karlsruhe Augsburg, IWKA) for the Federal Armed
Forces. This mine is a bounding device which, upon explosion of its bursting
charge, showers the surrounding area with small fragments of chopped steel
rod.[47] According to government
sources these procurements cost 49.2 million DEM (U.S.$ 27.9
million).[48] The German
government keeps the number of procured mines secret.
[49] It has been estimated that
the the total number of procured mines could be between one and one and a half
million mines.[50] According to
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense 3,000 DM-31 mines have been
retained for training purposes by the Federal Armed
Forces.[51]
In the early 1990s, the DM-51 AP mines were acquired from the disintegrated
Armed Forces of Former East Germany. With this mine the Federal Republic of
Germany gained a so-called Claymore mine for the first time. According to
government sources, some 33,000 mines were inherited from the former East
Germany.[52] The DM-51 is based
on the Russian MON-50 AP mine. It has a plastic body with rows of imbedded
fragments on the side facing the target. On the top center of the mine is a peep
sight with a fuse well on either side. These fuse wells will accommodate a
variety of fuses, including tripwire, breakwire, and command
detonation.[53] Although there
is no independent verification, it has been assumed that they were eliminated in
December 1997.
The Armed Forces also has DM-39s, which it calls "explosive charges"
("Sprengkörper"). However, other sources, including the U.S. Department of
Defense, classify the DM-39 as an antipersonnel
mine.[54] DM-39 are designed to
protect DM-11 and DM-21 AT mines from neutralization. In other words, this
"explosive charge" is used as an
anti-handling-device.[55] If
anybody tries to clear an AT mine fitted with a DM-39, a pressure release fuse
is activated, causing an explosion powerful enough to detonate the AT
mine.[56] The plastic-bodied
DM-39 is available in a sheet-metal version, the
DM-39A1.[57] The costs and
number of these devices are unknown.
The MUSPA is made by Rheinmetall/Daimler Benz
Aerospace/Thomson-Dasa-Wirksysteme. Even though the Ministry of Defense and its
producers consider MUSPA to be a ”submunition,” the U.S. Department
of Defense classifies the weapon as an AP mine: "The MUSPA is an
antimaterial/antipersonnel fragmentation minelet dispensed as a submunition from
the former West German MW-1 weapon system. The mine is a heavy fragmentation
munition with 2,100 steel pellets as the primary lethal mechanism. Once it has
been parachute delivered, the MUSPA self-rights and arms. An acoustic sensor
then actively senses for an aircraft engine signature. A nearly identical
submunition, the MUSA, differs only in that no fuse is present; instead it
self-destructs at a preset
time."[58] Remotely deliverable
with fighter jets or dispenser systems, MUSPA can be deployed by the thousands
and extremely quickly over long ranges, greatly enhancing the offensive aspect
of mine warfare. The number of MUSPAs in stock is
classified.[59] According to
reliable estimates the number of procured MUSPA is 90,000, at a cost of around
210 million DEM (U.S. $119.3
million).[60]
Antitank Mines and Delivery Systems
The company Industriewerke Karlsruhe (IWK, later: IWKA) developed for
production a new, improved German AT mine, called the "Panzermine II." This
metal bodied mine weighs less than 10
kilograms[61] and is scatterable
by helicopter. An ignition canal exists at the bottom of the mine, which is
able to be connected with DM-31 anti-handling
devices.[62] IWK sold it
facilities to Diehl, which produced this mine for the FAF under the designation
DM-21 from 1980-1982.[63]
According to government sources, the cost of procurement amounted to 88.1
million DEM (U.S. $50
million[64]).[65]
The number of mines has been estimated at 150,000.
In 1970 , the FAF introduced the LARS (Light Artillery Rocket System -
Leichte Artillerie Raketen System) rocket launcher, which also could be used to
scatter AT-1 mines.[66] From
1970 to 1972 the Federal Armed Forces procured 209 of these landmine delivery
systems, at a cost of 72.2 million
DEM.[67] According to
government sources, between 1978 and 1980, 108.6 million DEM were spent to buy
15,000 LARS each fitted with eight AT-1
mines.[68] Approximately 65 of
these mine delivery systems are still in
use.[69]
AT-1 antitank mines were procured by the Federal Armed Forces in about 1978.
The AT-1 is first generation scatterable mine. It is a plastic stake mine with
a mechanical vibration fuse which responds to sustained pressure driving over
it. The mine is equipped with an antihandling device and a self-destruct
mechanism.[70] Approximately
120,000 AT-1 were procured at a cost of DEM 108.6 million (U.S. $61.7).
According to government sources these mines were transformed to rockets for
exercise purposes between 1990 and
1993.[71]
The AT-2 antitank mine was introduced in the
1980s.[72] The AT-2 is an
armor-penetrating belly-attack mine that uses a shaped-charge of pressed
RDX/TNT. In addition to the explosive train, the system includes an impact
sensor, fuse, timer, and lithium battery. Six selectable self-destruct times are
available.[73] Government
sources indicate that between 1981 and 1986, 564.7 million DEM were spent on
AT-2 mines, designed to be scattered by the LARS mine
layer.[74] These acquisitions
included 60,000 LARS each fitted with five AT-2 mines from Dynamit Nobel for a
total of 300,000 mines.[75]
Between 1984 and 1992, 763 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines usable with the
”Skorpion” mine layer system from Dynamit Nobel, as
well.[76] At least 32,000
magazines of mines were procured each consisting of twenty AT-2 mines for a
total of 640,000 mines.[77] And
finally between 1993 and 1995, 783.6 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines usable
with the MARS/MRLS rocket
launcher.[78] For this the
Federal Armed Forces bought 9,360 rockets each consisting of twenty-eight AT-2
mines, for a total of 262,080
mines.[79] This means from
1981 until 1995 a total of more than 2.11 billion DEM (U.S.$1.2 billion) were
spent for more than 1.2 million AT-2 mines.
From 1985 on the FAF procured the mechanical mine delivery system 85. It is a
trailer with an integrated plough developed in Sweden, which allows the laying
of the DM-31 AT mine on the surface or under the ground. The DM-31 was produced
in Sweden by the company FFV. The DM-31 is a shaped charge ATM with a magnetic
fuse. The fuse contains 2 magnetized balls that sit in a path under the edge of
the mine lid functioning as an antilift device. The DM-31 can be laid
mechanically or by hand.[80]
Government sources indicate 125,000 mines were procured between 1988 and 1992.
[81] Information on the cost of
these procurements is inconsistent. In information given to the parliament the
Ministry of Defense specified the costs at 160 million DEM in 1995 , while in
the media the costs were quoted as 182.2 million DEM. Finally, at the time of
order in 1985, the costs were calculated to be merely at 141.2 million
DEM.[82]
From 1996 to 1998, the PARM 1 anti-armor system was offered by Daimler Benz
Aerospace together with THOMSON (France) by joint venture with Thomson-DASA
Armaments or
Thomson-Dasa-Wirksysteme.[83]
Government sources indicated that 12,000 PARM-1s had been procured at a cost of
99.6 million DEM (U.S.$56.6 million) by
1998.[84] This figures differs
from the information provided by DASA, which indicated a cost of 100.5 million
DEM.[85] The PARM-1 stand on an
adjustable tripod, with 360 degrees of movement and an elevation of -45 to +90
degrees. A reel of fiber-optic cable is laid along the aimed line of sight, the
timer is activated, and the mine is armed following a 5-minute delay. When the
PARM 1 warhead is fired, a counterweight is ejected out the back and stabilizing
fins extend to guide the warhead to the target. The warhead contains a
shaped-charge lethal mechanism that penetrates the target with an impact of up
to 40 km/h.[86] After public
pressure generated by shareholders of Daimler-Benz, the Director of Daimler Benz
Jurgen Schrempp announced in late 1998 that production of PARM-1 would be
stopped by the end of the year as well as the development of
PARM-2.[87] About 50,000 DEM
was planned to be allocated to PARM-2 and a total of DEM 278.0 (U.S. $157.9) for
its research and development.
But similar new high-tech mines are still under development in other European
joint-ventures – such as the ARGES, developed by Dynamit Nobel
(Germany)/Honeywell (Germany)/GIAT (France)/Hunting (Great Britain). It is a
rival product of the PARM-2 and one of the most modern off-route mines offered
to the European market. The one mine costs approximately 12,000 DEM. ARGES will
be used as a standard NATO weapon, but is not expected to be introduced before
2000. ARGES, like the PARM 2, is an autonomous, sensor-controlled anti-armor
weapon, which destroys the target from the side with a hollow charge warhead.
The acoustic alarm sensor of the ARGES mine, which can make out close- and
long-range targets, can “hear around corners” and therefore also be
deployed in confined areas. A microprocessor calculates the distance, direction,
speed and the length of the target vehicle. The length of the vehicle is crucial
in deciding whether it is a combat target or not. There is the obvious question
of how capable the system will be at differentiation of civilian and military
vehicles.
Area defense mines, such as the COBRA area-defense mine from Rheinmetall
Industrie, constitute another example in high-tech mine category. Government
sources indicate that 310 million DEM (U.S. $176.1) are projected to be spent on
the system over the next few years and 45 million DEM has already been
spent.[88] This autonomous,
“intelligent” mine symbolizes the future technology of European
high-tech mines Equipped with the Smart 155 munitions from the German companies
Rheinmetall Industrie and Diehl, the COBRA is a ”top attack” weapon.
The target is recognized through seismic and acoustic sensors and the mine when
activated is fired to a height of approximately 150 meters. There, suspended
from a parachute, it searches, finds and finally fires the sensor fused
munitions on the target over a radius of more than 300 meters. "False targets,
e.g. light commercial vehicles, can therefore be reliably identified and not
targeted" assure official sources. No comment is forthcoming on how the mine
reacts to large commercial vehicles. Military publications report that warnings
should be issued against the current risks associated with this development,
especially with remote delivery by
missile.[89]
Another antitank mine is the MIFF, which can be used with an antihandling
device. Some 125,000 were procured. These are stockpiled but their status is
unknown.
Provision of funds for landmines and landmine dispenser systems are subject
to a cycle of research and development followed by procurement. For example in
1990-1995 a total amount of 2,367.6 million DEM (US$1,345.2 million) was spent
for the procurement of landmines, while in the same period an amount of 34.5
million DEM (US$19.6 million) was allocated for research and development of
landmines. From 1996-1998 ”just” an amount of 107.0 million DEM
(US$60.8 million) was spent for the procurement of landmines, while 67.7 million
DEM (US$38.5 million) was spent on research and development. This means at the
present, Germany is in a phase of research and development of new landmines
(especially the area defense mines COBRA and ARGES) and it is foreseeable that
an extensive procurement will follow in the near
future.[90]
Mine Status
AP
DM-11 Destroyed
DM31 Destroyed (3,000 stored for training purposes)
DM-51 (Claymore) Destroyed
DM-39 (antihandling device) Stockpiled
MUSPA (“submunition”) Stockpiled
AT
DM-21 (AHD poss) Stockpiled
AT-1 (AHD poss) Changed into warheads for exercise purposes
PARM-2 under development but stopped since end of
1998[92]
COBRA (Surface defense mine) under development
MIFF (AHD is possible) Stockpiled
Transfer
German landmine exports are classified, so
verifying them is difficult. One official document contained detailed
information on just one sale: twenty AP-2 antitank mines to the Armed Forces of
the Netherlands on 17 September
1993.[93] Other official
information indicates: between 1985 and 1990 three authorizations for a total of
262 landmines; between 1991 and 31 July 1995 ten authorizations for a total of
45,139 landmines.[94] According
to the magazine ”Wehrdienst,” 87,024 AT-2s were delivered to United
Kingdom in 1995.[95]
In spite of the difficulties in obtaining data on exports of landmines, the
following transfers of landmines seem certain:
1. Until 1994 Italy received MIFF, MUSPA and MUSA mines, together with one
hundred MW 1 submunition dispensers for the combat aircraft Tornado;
2. In 1994 Finland got probably more than 100,000 TM-62 antitank mines from
the stockpiles of the former Armed Forces of East Germany;
3. At the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991, the United Kingdom obtained four
Skorpion mine delivery systems and 15,000 AT-2 mines as German military support
for the Gulf War. These weapons were returned after the war;
4. Also during Gulf War, Israel got around one hundred of several types of
landmines from stockpiles of the former Armed Forces of East Germany to use for
research;
5. In the same context and for the same purposes, the United States obtained
552 PMP 2, TM 46 and TM 63 mines (all from the Former East Germany). Later,
additional mines were provided;
6. Saudi Arabia received twenty antitank mines in
1996;[96]
7. In 1997 Norway procured 468 Mars rocket launchers fitted with AT-2 mines
from Germany;[97]
German mines have been found elsewhere, including conflict zones. In answer
to the question of how DM-11 antitank mines could have shown up in Somalia and
DM-31 antipersonnel mines in Angola, the German government answered on 5
September 1995, that no permission for such transfers had been given, so they do
not know how these transfers could have taken
place.[98] This demonstrates the
difficulties of enforcing national prohibitions of weapons if the arms are
developed and produced by multilateral joint ventures, and is something that
needs to be addressed.[99]
Known mine transfer from Former West
Germany:[100]
DM-11 AP - France and Somalia;
DM-31 AP - Sweden, Angola, Zambia;
AT-2 (AHD is possible) - United Kingdom, France, Italy and
Norway;[101]
MUSPA AP (submunitions) - Italy;
MIFF AT (AHD is possible) - Italy;
PARM-1 Off-route AT - Sweden.
Known mine transfer from Former East
Germany:[102]
PMP 71 AP mine - Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia;
POMZ-2 AP mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Cuba,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Former Soviet Union, Iraq, Libya,
Nicaragua, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Vietnam, Zambia,
Zimbabwe;
POMZ-2M AP mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China,
Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Former Soviet Union, Iraq,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, North Korea, South Africa, Vietnam, Zambia,
Zimbabwe;
PPM-2 AP mine - Angola, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Former East Germany, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa,
Zambia;
PM 60 AT mine - Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia;
TM-46 / AT mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Former Soviet Union, Former East Germany, Iraq, Israel, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nicaragua, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Cambodia, Zambia;
TM-62P3 AT mine - Egypt, Former Soviet Union, Poland;
TMN-46 AT mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former Soviet Union, Former East Germany, Iraq, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nicaragua, Poland, South Africa, Somalia, Zambia.
Stockpiling
According to official information from the
government, the Federal Armed Forces finished the elimination of all of their AP
mines in December 1997, destroying about 1.7 million antipersonnel
mines.[103] The destruction
was carried out by private companies, observing environmental standards, at a
cost of 4.2 million DEM.[104]
The exact names of the companies, their methods of destruction or their kinds of
environmental standards are not available.
A total of 3,000 DM-31 antipersonnel mines are being retained, under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, to train demining personnel and to test
demining technology.[105]
On one controversial issue, stockpiling and transfers of U.S. antipersonnel
mines are still allowed within Germany. The German government argues that
according to the “Status on Forces Agreement” (SOFA), weapons of
foreign forces within Germany are not covered by German law and
control.[106]
Use
The German campaign is concerned that use of
MUSPA, DM-39, and antitank mines with antihandling devices, such as the AT-2,
may not be consistent with the Mine Ban Treaty. Furthermore the area defense
mine COBRA is still under development, and will be fitted with antihandling
devices.[107] The diplomatic
record of the Oslo treaty negotiations shows that governments consider that such
devices, if they explode from innocent, unintentional acts, are considered to be
APMs and thus, illegal under the Mine Ban
Treaty.[108]
Mine Action Funding
Funding for mine action programs comes from
different ministries. The principal budget for mine action is under the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. The projects it supports include the following:
- concrete projects of mine and UXO's clearance;
- training of local demining personnel;
- strengthening national mine clearance structures with the support of German
experts;
- testing of modern mine clearance technology and detection/sensor
technology;
- procurement of technical equipment for mine clearance;
- supporting of mine awareness projects within afflicted communities.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the lead role in funding for
humanitarian demining, while the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and
Development takes the lead on funds for survivor
assistance.[109] These measures
are concentrated on physical and psychological therapy as well as orthopedics
and fitting of prostheses.[110]
In its assistance for landmine survivors, the Ministry for Economic Co-operation
and Development favors efforts to reintegrate landmine survivors into social and
economic structures and to support the acceptance of landmine survivors within
the society.[111]
Support for humanitarian mine action is concentrated on the technical aspects
of mine clearance and on mine awareness of the afflicted communities. In
comparison with this, survivor assistance and development-oriented mine action
have less support. Between 1993 and 1998 the Ministry for Economic Co-operation
and Development support amounted to around 31.22 million DEM (around US$17.94
million), while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated approximately 51.28
million DEM (around US$29.47 million) over the same period.
Ministry of Foreign affairs (AA) Mine Action Funding
1992-1998[112]
TOTAL from 1993 - 1998: DEM 58,311,787 (U.S. $33,878,902)
In addition, between 1993 and 1998, the Ministry for Economic Co-operation
and Development spent DEM 31,223,233 (U.S. $17,944,386) on mine action in
countries including Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique and Vietnam. This was
spent on activities including survivor assistance, mine clearance and training
and reconstruction.
One of the important goals of the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is support for the development of modern mine clearance technology to speed up
mine clearance operations.[113]
The Foreign Ministry also supports the use of dogs to detect mines in some
regions. This technique, according to the Foreign Ministry, is very effective
and cheap. Therefore they would like to strengthen mine detection by using dogs
in Afghanistan and other suitable
regions.[114]
Funding for procurement and development of mines and mine clearance
technology continues to dwarf that for humanitarian mine action-- 60 million DEM
versus 20 million DEM in the draft 1999 budget. From 1993 to 1998, the
goverment spent 1,207 million DEM (US$686 million) on procurement, research and
development of landmines;[115]
250 million DEM (US$142 million) on
mine clearance and dismantling frontier fortifications at the former
German-German frontier;[116] and
82.5 million DEM (US$47 million) on humanitarian mine
action.[117]
The German ban campaign has expressed concern over support to companies which
have been involved in mine production. In particular, it has noted that in 1997
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the field testing of
“Rhino” in
Cambodia.[118] This mine
clearance device has been developed by the company MAK-System, which belongs to
the joint-stock company ”Rheinmetall
Industrie,”[119] which is
the former producer of MUSPA and a developer of the new COBRA area defense mine.
A second example is the mine clearance device “Minebreaker 2000,”
whose field trial in Bosnia-Herzegovina was supported by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1998. ”Minebreaker 2000” was developed by Flensburger
Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG), which belongs to the armament company
Diehl.[120] The German campaign
has said these are examples of ”double dipping,” in which landmine
producers want to make profit twice – to make money on the problem they
helped create.
Mine Clearance
From 1961 until 1985 the Former German Democratic
Republic laid approximately 1,322,700 mines along the German-German frontier. In
1985 Former East German leader Erich Honecker agreed to clear the mines in
return for a financial aid package from West Germany. These mines would be
cleared by soldiers of the GDR from 1985 on, but after reunification of Germany
the scrutiny of the mine protocols showed that the elimination of 33,864 mines
had not been verified. Since 1995, some 943 of these mines were found by German
mine detection teams. It is estimated that 17,992 of the mines, which are shown
to have been laid but not verified as having been cleared, are so called wood
box mines, PMD-6 (”Holzkastenminen”). As it is likely that most of
them deteriorated completely, there is currently no search underway for these
mines. Regarding the rest of the 17,992 mines which were not founded, it is
believed that most of them have been triggered by weather influences or game and
that in fact they are already cleared and the documentation of the soldiers of
Former East Germany was
deficient.[121]
By 30 March 1995, 83.1 million DEM (around US$47.76 million) had been
earmarked for the mine detection of the former German-German frontier in
1994-1995.[122] On 5 December
1995, a press release of the Federal Ministry of Defense announced that all mine
affected areas on the old east-west divide had been cleared and that the last
zone, near the Bavarian town of Hof, was reopened to the public. In the press
release the total cost for mine clearance as well as for dismantling former
frontier fortifications was put at more than US$142.04
million.[123]
Note to readers: A longer, more detailed version of this report is
available from Landmine Monitor and can also be found at www.landmine.de
[1]Auswärtiges Amt,
Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of
Public Relations), Weltweite Ächtung von Antipersonenminen. Der Vertrag von
Ottawa - Eine Herausforderung für die Zukunft (Worldwide Ban on AP Mines
– the Treaty of Ottawa - A Challenge for the Future), June 1998, pp.
55.
[4]www.auswaertiges-amt.de,
Seven-Point Action Program on AP Mines, presented by Federal Minister of Foreign
Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel (English Version), Bonn, 18. July 1996.
[7]Please find an assessment
of these efforts in the Mine Action section.
[8]Speech on the occasion of
Signing Conference of ,Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling,
production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction, Speech
of Federal Minster of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, 3. December 1997; p. 1.
www.auswaertiges-amt.de
[11]DIP - Das
Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System
on Parliamentary Proceedings), Deutscher Bundestag – 13. Wahlperiode
– 210. Sitzung, Bonn, den 11. Dezember 1997, (Plenary Protocol 13/210,
Bonn, 11 December 1997), pp. 19189.http://dip.bundestag.de
[22]Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II
(Federal Law Gazette, Part II), 11 May 1998, pp. 778, Gesetz vom 30.04.98 (Law
from 30 April 1998).
[23]Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
(Federal Law Gazette, Part I), 09 July 1998, pp. 1778, Ausführungsgesetz
zum Übereinkommen über das Verbot des Einsatzes, der Lagerung, der
Herstellung und der Weitergabe von Antipersonenminen und über deren
Vernichtung vom 3. Dezember 1997 (Law of application of the Convention on the
prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel
mines and on their destruction from 3 December 1997).
[24]DIP - Das
Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System
on Parliamentary Proceedings): Bundesrat Plenarprotokoll (Upper House of the
Federal Parliament, plenary protocol) 721, 06 February 1998, p. 23B, 37C-38D;
Bundestag Plenarprotokoll (Lower House of the Federal Parliament, plenary
protocol) 13/219, 12 February 1998, p. 20061C-D20073C-20077D; Deutscher
Bundestag (Lower House of the Federal Parliament), Document 13/10197, 25 March
1998; Bundesrat Plenarprotokoll (Upper House of the Federal Parliament, plenary
protocol) 723, 27 March 1998, p. 148. http://dip.bundestag.de
[25]Bundesrat, Drucksache
34/98, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung vom 16.01.1998 (Upper House of the
Federal Parliament, Document 34/98, bill of the Federal government from 16
January 1998).http://dip.bundestag.de
[31]DIP - Das
Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System
on Parliamentary Proceedings), Ausführungsgesetz zum Übereinkommen
über das Verbot des Einsatzes, der Lagerung, der Herstellung und der
Weitergabe von Antipersonenminen und über deren Vernichtung vom 3. Dezember
1997 (Law of application of the Convention on the prohibition of the use,
stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their
destruction from 3 December 1997). http://dip.bundestag.de
[32]Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
(Federal Law Gazette, Part I), No. 43, 9 July 1998, pp. 1778.
[34]www.auswaertiges-amt.de,
press release from 24 July 1998, Auswärtiges Amt: Deutsche und
französische Ratifikationsurkunde zum internationalen Übereinkommen
für das Verbot von Antipersonenminen in New York hinterlegt (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs: German and French Ratification document on Conventon on Ban of
AP mines is deposit in New York).
[36]DIP - Das
Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System
on Parliamentary Proceedings), GESTA: XA012, Gesetz zum Protokoll II in der am
3. Mai 1996 geänderten Fassung und zum Protokoll IV vom 13. Oktober 1995
zum VN-Waffenübereinkommen (Law concerning Protocol II, revised version of
03 May 1996 and Protocol IV from 13 October 1995 concerning UN armament
convention). http://dip.bundestag.de
[37]Press release, 2 May
1997.http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de
[38]Third Session of the
Conference on Disarmament 1998, Statement by the Federal Government Commissioner
for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, Geneva,
30 July 1998 (Original version in English), p. 4.
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de
[39]Statement by Ambassador
Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, Commissioner of the Federal Government for Disarmament
and Arms Control, Geneva, 25 March 1999.
[42]There
is currently no detailed information available on production of landmines in
Former East Germany. Therefore the following chapter concentrates on landmines
in the Federal Republic of Germany.
[43]Thomas
Küchenmeister, "Gute Mine" zum bösen Spiel: Landminen made in Germany
(Idstein: KOMZI-Verlag, 1995), p. 30.
[45]Auswärtiges Amt,
Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of
Public Relations), June 1998; Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German
Parliament, Document 13/1473), 22 May 1995, p. 3. Http://dip.bundestag.de
[46]Thomas Küchenmeister
(1995), pp. 30-31; Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament,
Document 13/1473), 22 May 1995, p. 3. Http://dip.bundestag.de
[47]U.S. Department of
Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-31.
[48]Using 1999 exchange rate:
DEM 1.76 = U.S. $ 1.
[49]German Parliament,
Document 13/1473 (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473), pp. 3-4.
[80]U.S. Department of
Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-31 AT.
[81]Federal Ministry of
Defense, letter to Marcel Pott (Journalist), Bonn, undated (May 1995), as cited
in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45
[82]Deutscher Bundestag,
Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4; Federal Ministry
of Defense, letter to Marcel Pott (Journalist), Bonn, undated (May 1995), as
cited in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45, "Wehrdienst" ("Military
Service" - magazine), No. 185, 1985, as cited in Thomas Küchenmeister
(1995), p. 45.
[83]This joint venture ended
in early 1998 and TDW is again 100 % a subsidiary company of DASA (source:
Soldat und Technik (Soldier and Technology), October 1998, p. 654).
[84]Federal Ministry of
Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).
[90]According to a report of
KNA (Catholic News Agency) from 29 May 1998 ARGES will go into production in
2005. But it seems that ARGES is already produced: According to governmental
sources of Norwegian Defense Department a contract was signed for AGRES in 1997.
The contract sum is said to be around 65 million. DEM (around US$ 36.9 million )
(source: odin.dep.no/fd/publ/anskaffelser/eng/contracts.html).
[91]Federal Ministry of
Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).
[92]RIB-Rundbrief (RIB
information letter), No. 21, November 1998.
[93]Bundesdrucksache 13/2252
(German Parliament, Document 13/2252), pp. 3-4.
[94]Bundesdrucksache 13/2432
(German Parliament, Document 13/2432), pp. 1-2.
[95]Wehrdienst
(magazine: Military Service) as cited by Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p.
119.
[96]All data from Thomas
Küchenmeister (1995), p. 119.
[97]Report of international
conventional arms transfers, 1997. www.auswaertiges-amt.de
[98]Bundesdrucksache 13/2252
(German Parliament, Document 13/2252), p. 3.
[99]Auswärtiges Amt,
Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of
Public Relations), June 1998, p. 55.
[100]All data (with one
exception) from U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com.
[101]Report of international
conventional arms transfers, 1997. www.auswaertiges-amt
[102]All data from U.S.
Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com.
[103]Auswärtiges Amt,
Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of
Public Relations), June 1998, p. 57.
[104]Europäische
Sicherheit (European Security), 3/1998, editor: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn
GmbH, p. 5.
[105]Federal Ministry of
Defense, Bonn, 14 February 1997.
[106]Spiegel, 21/1998, p. 20;
see also: Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 02.12.1997; ”Wie alle andern
Waffen unterliegen auch die US Landminen aufgrund obiger Bestimmungen nicht der
Kontrolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” ("Due to regulations mentioned
above [SOFA; M.H.] US landmines like all other weapons do not fall under control
of the Federal Republic of Germany.")
[108]International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic
Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 18 September 1997.
[109]Federal Ministry for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 15. January 1999.
[116]Federal Ministry of
Defense, Press Release, 5 December 1995.
[117]Federal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 22 November 1995; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Bonn, 17. September 1997; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February
1999; Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 15
January 1999.
[118]Federal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February 1999.
[119]www.rheinmetall.com/html/struktur.htm
(promotion of the company itself).
[120]http://www.diehl-gruppe.de/diehl_1.htm;
see also ”Das Geschäft der Allesfresser” (”The deal of
omnivores”), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 November 1998.
[121]http://dip.bundestag.de,
Bundesdrucksache 13/1023 (German Parliament, Document 13/1023), p. 1.
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