Japan signed the 1997
Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa. In his address to the Signing
Conference, then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi announced his government’s
intention to contribute ten billion Japanese yen for mine clearance and victim
assistance projects for five years beginning in
1998.[1] Japan ratified the
treaty on 30 September 1998, becoming the forty-fifth country to do so. Japan
has already passed implementing legislation.
The real commitment by the government of Japan on the landmine issue began
when then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced that Japan would host an
international conference on antipersonnel landmines. At the Lyon Summit in 1996,
he stated Japan’s intention to host “an international conference for
the purpose of strengthening international support for the efforts by the United
Nations to remove mines.... I also mentioned that we have decided recently to
actively support efforts for a total international ban of antipersonnel
mines.”[2] Subsequently,
the government hosted “Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines”
in March 1997.
Japan also reiterated its position in support of a global ban of
antipersonnel mines during UN General Assembly meetings in 1996 and a 1996 UN
resolution urging governments to pursue vigorously an international agreement
banning antipersonnel mines.[3]
Despite its public position, Japan did not express its support for the Mine Ban
Treaty until September 1997, with its decision to participate in the Oslo
negotiations.
The government was reluctant to take a part in the Ottawa Process. Given the
reluctance, the government participated in the Brussels Conference as an
observer and did not sign the Brussels Declaration until its decision on 28
August 1997 to go to Oslo -- after the U.S. government announced that it would
participate in the Oslo Conference. With this linkage, it was not surprising
that the Japanese delegation was an active supporter of the various proposals
the U.S. government put forward which would have seriously undercut the treaty.
It was clear that the government had taken part in the negotiations without
shifting its fundamental policy. It had made no formal statement concerning a
total ban, and the government continued to favor negotiations in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) over the Ottawa Process until the very last minute.
The real shift in the government’s position came after then Foreign
Minister Keizo Obuchi decided to review Japanese policy, on the day he became
Foreign Minister. Obuchi noted that “it would not make sense for Japan to
oppose the Treaty while cooperating in demining activities in
Cambodia.”[4] After
internal discussions among relevant Ministries, the government announced its
decision to sign the treaty on 27 November and the Foreign Minister himself flew
to Ottawa to take part in the signing ceremony on 3 December 1997.
The government’s decision was, for the most part, the result of
external pressures, such as the momentum created by the Ottawa Process, the
tragic death of Princess Diana and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the
ICBL, and had less to do with the role civil society played in Japan. The
pressure from outside Japan forced the government to take heed of international
opinion.
After this policy change, however, there was little movement to rapidly
ratify the Convention. In fact, in meetings with members of the Japanese Diet
during an ICBL trip to Japan, the parliamentarians expressed their belief that
ratification would not happen in
1998.[5] One important reason
for delay of ratification was the nuclear test explosions conducted by India and
Pakistan in May 1998. Because the same section within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is in charge of both landmines and nuclear arms control, most of time
between May to August had been intensely focused on nuclear non-proliferation
efforts.[6]
The Defense Agency had already undertaken research to develop alternatives
for antipersonnel landmines. At a symposium organized by the Japanese Campaign
to Ban Landmines (JCBL) in cooperation with the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo on 15
June 1998, a government official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that
the biggest question for ratification was how to deal with antipersonnel
landmines possessed by U.S. forces in Japan. More specifically: 1) Would it be
necessary to remove APMs at U.S. bases in Japan? 2) Would U.S. forces in Japan
be allowed to use these mines in its military activities in Japan? 3) Would
Japanese personnel be allowed to transport mines from U.S. bases in Japan to,
say, the Korean Peninsula? The government official went on to say that the
government was looking into the possibility of introducing a bill for
ratification in the next Ordinary Diet Session which was scheduled to begin in
early 1999.
After becoming Prime Minister on July 1998, Mr. Obuchi again took hold of
Japan’s landmine policy. He announced in his general-policy speech
delivered at the opening of the Extraordinary Diet Session that: “We will
put every effort to ratify at the earliest possible date so that the Treaty
enters into force
soon.”[7] Mr. Obuchi
apparently pushed somewhat reluctant government officials to ratify the treaty
in time to be one of the first forty countries to make the treaty enter into
force.[8]
The new administration decided to introduce the legislation in the
Extraordinary Session convened in the summer of 1998, instead of waiting until
the Ordinary Session of 1999 as had initially been intended. Members of the JCBL
met the Prime Minister to discuss the ratification issue on 11 September 1998,
during which time 200,000 signatures calling for a ban were handed over to Mr.
Obuchi to demonstrate growing public concern over the landmine crisis.
The Diet passed A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of
Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession on 30
September 1998 to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, and deposited the instrument to
the United Nations on the same day.
Role of NGOs
Unlike in other countries, there was no partnership forged between
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the Japanese government nor did the
government seriously seek to discuss the issue with NGOs. Obuchi himself
admitted that “there was a widely recognized impression in Japan that the
NGOs are not Non-Governmental Organizations but Anti-Governmental
Organizations” and admitted that NGOs were not in the position to
influence the policy-making process.
[9]
Nevertheless, NGOs did play an important role in raising public awareness.
The Association to Aid Refugees (AAR), one of the forerunners in the landmine
campaign in Japan, held a parallel NGO-sponsored landmine conference at the time
of the government conference on demining technology in Tokyo in March 1997. The
NGO conference – the first of its type in Japan -- depicted the suffering
of mine victims and helped to reinforce the need to eradicate landmines; it
received intensive media coverage. AAR also published a picture book titled
Not Mines, But Flowers, which sold over 400,000 copies. AAR’s
commitment to the issue contributed greatly in raising public awareness in
Japan. AAR also invited Chris Moon to run as a flame-bearer during the Nagano
Winter Olympics in February 1998, which helped raise public awareness on the
landmine issue not only in Japan, but also in the world, through live coverage
of the Opening Ceremony.
The JCBL, made up of nearly 40 NGOs, also organized lecture series and
charity events on landmines throughout Japan in collaboration with many of its
member organizations. It worked on petitions and gathered more than 50,000
signatures in a limited period of time. This petition was handed directly to the
Foreign Minister Obuchi by Tun Channareth, landmine survivor and one of the
founders of the Cambodia Campaign, who had been visiting Japan at that time at
the invitation of the JCBL.
CCW and CD
Japan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981 and
ratified it on 9 June 1982. It ratified revised Protocol II on 10 June 1997.
Japan has been a prominent supporter of efforts to address landmines in the
CD, including efforts aimed at a complete ban in 1997 and at a transfer ban in
1998 and 1999. Then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi stated during the signing
conference in Ottawa on 3 December 1997 that: “if we are to aim at a
universal and effective banning for landmines, treaty negotiation should be
started as early as possible at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Serious consideration should be given to an approach to begin such a negotiation
taking up banning of export of landmines as a first
step.”[10] Obuchi, as a
Prime Minister, reiterated this position during hearings held before the
ratification of the Ottawa
Treaty.[11] In February
1999, Japan was one of the twenty-two CD members that jointly called, once
again, for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the
establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a transfer
ban.[12]
Domestic Legislation
The Diet passed A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of
Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession on 30
September 1998. The bill had been presented on 24 September to three Committees
of the House of Representatives for hearings (Foreign Affairs Committee,
National Security Affairs Committee, Commerce and Industry Committee). The
upper house passed the bill on 29 September immediately after which it was
presented to the House of Councilors for an approval. There had been only a
week for entire ratification process, which inevitably left fundamental
questions unclear and sometimes unresolved. It was rushed through the Diet in an
effort for Japan to be among the first 40 ratifications needed for the treaty to
enter into force.
In its analysis of the bill, the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines has raised a
number of concerns. The purpose of the bill is described, in part, to
“regulate possession” of AP
mines.[13] The term
“regulate” contrasts sharply with the term used in ratifying the
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapon Convention. In
both cases, the purpose of the domestic bill is clearly to “prohibit the
development, production and
stockpiling”[14] of either
weapon. The term “possession” also creates a further problem in
that one can argue that production is prohibited only under the current domestic
law and other activities are only “regulated.” During one of the
hearing sessions an official from Ministry of International Trade and Industry
was asked to clarify this point and stated that: “The use is prohibited
under Explosive Control Act and others. The production and development are
banned under current bill. The acquisition, stockpiling and retention are
regulated under ‘possession’ of this bill and transfer is regulated
under this bill as well as under Foreign Exchange and the Foreign Trade
Law.”[15] The government
emphasizes that there is no loophole in the domestic law regarding a total
ban.[16]
In one instance, the domestic bill appears more comprehensive than the Mine
Ban Treaty. The domestic bill has no mention of an exception for antivehicle
mines with antihandling devices. This point was discussed during the Diet
hearings, and the government responded that any mine equipped with an
antihandling device will be considered
illegal.[17] As in the treaty,
however, any command detonated mine will not be considered an antipersonnel
landmine. Thus, the government’s interpretation of the Claymore mine is
that it is considered an antipersonnel landmine when it explodes by the presence
of a person (i.e., when used with a tripwire), but not when it explodes by
remotely controlled detonation through sight
recognition.[18]
The bill does not address the issue of retention of mines for training
purposes, as allowed under the Mine Ban Treaty. It also does not address how,
when, and who will destroy landmines under possession by the Self-Defense
Forces, and contains no provisions regarding international cooperation and
assistance.
U.S. Mines in Japan
Regarding landmines stockpiled on U.S. bases in Japan, an official from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: “Under the treaty, the
obligation as the state party is to undertake measures within the framework of
its jurisdictional authority to cease or deter activities prohibited under the
treaty?thus it continues to be feasible for the U.S. forces to retain any
antipersonnel landmines withheld and stockpiled in the U.S. bases in
Japan.” He also stated that “on the other hand, apart from treaty
obligations, the policy of Japan is to terminate the use of landmines for
defense purposes, and therefore, the government requested the U.S. not to use,
develop or produce landmines within Japanese
territory.”[19]
With regard to the transportation of landmines by US forces stationed in
Japan, it was stated that “in relation to antipersonnel landmines withheld
and stockpiled in the U.S. bases, no Japanese national, whether civilian or
Self-Defense Force, will be allowed to be engaged in transporting such mines
under the treaty.”[20]
Regarding U.S.-Japan joint military exercises, the Vice Minister of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that “it will not be acceptable for
the Defense Force to engage in training which purpose is to use antipersonnel
landmines, whether it be a joint exercise or
not.”[21]
The issue of transit through Japanese territorial waters or land by the US
forces equipped with antipersonnel landmines was also repeatedly raised in the
Diet session. The Vice Minister stated that “because we approve the
possession of landmines by the US forces stationed in Japan, it would not be
necessary to request a prior notification, and thus the government has no
intention of doing
so.”[22]
Production
The Defense Agency continued to purchase
antipersonnel landmines until FY 1996 (procurement budget: 600 million yen).
The Agency had also sought 680 million yen for purchasing AP mines for FY1997
but it was canceled once Japan signed the Ottawa Treaty. This budget line item
has instead been allocated for purchasing
“directional-multiple-shots.”[23]
It is a widely known fact that a single private company, Ishikawa Seisakusho,
assembled all AP mines. Several other companies are also known to have produced
landmine components, but details are not available. The status of programs for
the conversion or de-commissioning of AP mine production facilities is not
clear.
The Japanese Defense Agency is currently developing an alternative weapon
system to antipersonnel landmines. The “Antipersonnel Obstacle
System” combines sensor and remote control, and is detonated by manual
command so that civilians are not targeted
indiscriminately.[24] The Agency
has been seeking budget allocations for this development since FY 1997,
including 20 million yen for development in FY 1997, 20 million yen for
development in FY 1998 and 600 million yen in FY 1999 for purchasing test
models. During the Diet hearing session, the government stated, “We have
asked for funding since FY 1997 and have been considering this. The budget we
have asked for FY 1999 is for purchasing samples to examine in the coming two
years if they actually function after
assembling.”[25]
Until a new alternative system is developed, the Defense Agency will use
directional-multiple-shots as an alternative weapon. The government stated that
“it will take some time for this (new system) to be completed and thus
meanwhile, we will...make sure [the directional-multiple-shot-mine] detonates
only by manual command. Until we develop an alternative system, we will purchase
a small amount of
directional-multiple-shots.”[26]
The Agency has already converted all directional-multiple-shot-mines it
possessed to directional-multiple-shots in FY 1998, and it also has sought
budget allocations for new procurement in FY 1998 (1.4 billion yen) and FY 1999
(400 million yen). However, the number of munitions are not
disclosed.[27]
Transfer
Japan has never exported or imported antipersonnel
landmines. This is forbidden under the Law on Three Principles on Arms
Export. The export of components of landmines, such as fuses and blasting
powder are forbidden under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Law.[28]
Stockpiling
The total number of antipersonnel landmines
possessed by the Self-Defense Force is 1,000,401(as of the end of
1998).[29] The Defense Agency
stated during the Diet hearings that it possessed 999,496
landmines,[30] but later changed
the number to 1,000,401. According to the Agency, this change was due to simple
miscalculation.[31] The type
and number of antipersonnel landmines the Self-Defense Force possesses are:
1) Type-M3 49,974
2) Type-63 28,947
3) Type-67 586,530
4) Type-80 326,514
5) Type-87 scatterable landmines with self-destruct mechanisms 8,436
During the Diet session, an official from the Defense Agency stated that the
government will determine the exact number of antipersonnel landmines to be
retained for development and training purposes during the 180 day period for
reporting to the Secretary General of the UN. However, this official also said,
“We expect to require approximately 15,000 landmines for this exception in
the next ten years.”[33]
The Defense Agency reinforced that “at this point in time, the statement
made during the Diet Session last September is still valid, and we will come up
with the exact figure before 180 days are
over.”[34]
To date, the government has not officially disclosed the contractor or
schedule for destruction of its stockpiled landmines. However, in a response to
a Diet member’s inquiry, the Defense Agency presented the type and cost of
initial destruction as follows:
1) Type M3 16,000
2) Type 63 9,000
3) Type 67 107,000
4) Type 80 87,000
5) Type 87 3,000
Total number: 222,000
The total cost for destroying these 222,000 antipersonnel landmines is 420
million yen, plus 27 million yen for transportation for a total cost of 447
million yen.[35] Thus, the
average cost for destroying one landmine will approximately be 2,014 yen. In
total, Japanese government is expected to spend 2 billion yen to dismantle all
the stockpiled mines. These figures were also confirmed during the Diet hearing
session.[36]
It must be noted that the government uses the word “haiki” as the
translation of the word “destruction.” “Haiki” means
“discard” rather than “destroy.” This point attracted
much attention during the Diet hearing sessions and one Diet member sought to
clarify government’s position, and the response was: “Basically, we
would ask the dealers to dismantle it rather than discard it. Not just removing
the fuse but also blasting powder to deprive its function as a
landmine.”[37] It appears
the government’s interpretation of “discard” is the same as
“dismantle” or “disassemble.” When asked why explosion
or incineration could not be considered as possible options, the government
responded that it did not possess a training field where massive explosions can
take place, and that fragments can disperse which could be harmful and
dangerous.[38]
Actual destruction (or dismantling) may not begin during FY 1999 (April 1999
to March 2000). The only obligation for the Defense Agency in FY 1999 is to
start logistical procedures and conclude contracts with firm(s) to undertake
destruction.[39] The Agency has
not prepared a complete dismantling plan since it believes that the official
format will be discussed during the first conference of state parties in May
1999.[40]
Use
Japan has not used antipersonnel landmines since
the establishment of Defense Force in 1954. However, the government for a long
time took the stance that landmines are an indispensable means in protecting its
long coast lines. Landmines were considered as purely defensive weapons,
appropriate for Japan’s official “Exclusively Defense-Oriented
Policy.”[41]
Mine Action Funding
The Japanese government contributed nearly US$30
million to mine action programs before the end of 1997. The most significant
contributions for mine clearance operations were:
* Afghanistan (UNOCHA), $17 million
* Cambodia (CMAC), $5 million
* Former Yugoslavia, $3 million
* UN Trust Fund, $4 million
* OAS, $2 million
Mine victim assistance programs included support for the establishment of
protheses facilities in Cambodia in 1992, and the establishment of a
rehabilitation center in Cambodia in 1993, as well as assistance through the NGO
Association to Aid Refugees-Japan for vocational training (1994, 1995,
1996).[42]
The government launched a new program to promote further assistance after
signing the Mine Ban Treaty. On 3 December 1997, Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo
Obuchi, having attended and signed the Ottawa Treaty, announced the “Zero
Victim Programs,” a plan to provide 10 billion yen over a five-year period
starting January 1998 for landmine removal and support of mine victim projects.
In March 1998, the Japanese government held the “Tokyo Conference on
Land Mine Issues.” At this meeting, landmines were positioned as
“not only a human rights issue but a barrier to the maintenance of peace
and stability and reconstruction” and guidelines were defined for the
following three areas: activities concerning landmine removal, development of
technology for landmine removal and support for landmine victims. Furthermore,
reducing the number of landmine victims to zero was declared the ultimate
objective of the international community’s efforts on the landmine
issue.
The following the guiding principles were also outlined at this conference:
1) Regarding landmine removal activities, support should be given with an
emphasis on the ownership of the mine-affected country and the partnership of
donor countries, international organizations and NGOs; 2)Pursuit of “even
cheaper, safer and efficient technology” in view of the real needs of
humanitarian mine clearance; and 3) Regarding support for mine victims, the
mine-affected country should determine a comprehensive program that includes
medical service and prosthetics provision service and medical rehabilitation as
well as vocational training, and promote the development of program management
and implementation skills.
The 10 billion yen, five year program is to include the following
elements:
* keeping in mind long term reconstruction, supplies such as mine detecting
and removing equipment, vehicles, grass cutters, wireless transmitters and
batteries are to be donated to the mine affected country, in addition to
enforcing the coordination function of the UN and creating of a technology
registration system with the donations.
* in order for the affected country to acquire the skills to plan and
implement a comprehensive program for the support of landmine victims,
technology cooperation and construction of and provision of equipment for
medical and rehabilitation facilities should be made in the area of artificial
limb production and mental and physical rehabilitation of victims.
* in consideration of the importance of a humanitarian support for landmine
removal activities, the option of providing mine detectors and removal equipment
from other countries should be opened up.
* full support to grassroots NGOs should be provided in the area of
artificial limb production and rehabilitation of
victims.[43]
In 1998 under this new program the Japanese government disbursed 106.16
million yen (US$8.65 million) to landmine-related assistance projects through
multilateral agencies and
NGOs.[44] The government has
also been engaging in a survey to formulate bilateral demining and victim
assistance projects in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The results have not
been made available and the projects have not been initiated yet, but are
expected to begin soon. The Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA)[45] and the Japan
International Cooperation System
(JICS)[46] have undertaken the
survey. Both agencies are governmental organizations that provide grants and
technical assistance to developing countries, but for Bosnia-Herzegovina
project, AAR participated in the local study mission to formulate the
project.
Support to the United Nations and other multilateral organizations has
included: UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance ($2.12 million); OAS Special Fund for
mine clearance, victim assistance, rehabilitation and local mine awareness
education in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica ($45,000 ); and
support for ICRC “Special Appeal for Victim Assistance 1998” medical
treatment and rehabilitation projects including production of prosthesis ($1.47
million).
Japan has supported mine action in the following countries:
Cambodia:
* Assistance to CMAC’s mine clearance activities ($0.9 million)
* Financial contribution in holding Phnom Penh Forum in October 1998,
including travel expenses for participants and logistical expenditures in
holding conference ($0.3 million)
* Victim assistance vocational training through AAR ($0.119
million)[47]
* Medical assistance and rehabilitation assistance through AMDA (Association
for Medical Development in Asia, a Japanese NGO) ($80,000)
* Provision of vehicles to Cambodia Trust
($50,000)[48]
* Provision of tractors for grass cutting to Halo Trust ($98,600)
Bosnia Herzegovina:
* Assistance for establishing Bosnia Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC)
($1 million)
* Assistance to mine awareness program through UNICEF, spent to purchase
educational materials and to distribute them ($0.28)
* Assistance to Slovenia Fund through UNDP for mine clearance and victim
assistance ($1 million)
Mozambique:
* Assistance to demining project in Masinjiru area through UNDP ($1
million)[49]
Rwanda:
* Small scale grant assistance for construction of Kigari rehabilitation
center through Japanese NGO ($67,000)
Nicaragua:
* Small scale grant assistance to Nicaragua Red Cross, for purchasing one
emergency vehicle and construction of local point for the emergency medical team
to stand by ($84,000)
* Small scale grant assistance to mine victim support plan; spent on
purchasing wheel chairs, prosthesis and rehabilitation equipment ($47,000)
To summarize, out of U.S.$8.65 million the government disbursed in 1998, 94%
went to multinational organizations, and 6% to NGOs. Although five states
received country-specific grants, the means for disbursement were nearly all
through multilateral organizations. Financial contributions on landmine-related
projects by the Japanese government have been heavily dependent on the role of
international/multinational organizations. The government has provided little
bilateral assistance or project oriented grants.
[1]Foreign Minister Keizo
Obuchi, Address to the Signing Conference of the Ottawa Convention, Ottawa, 3
December 1997.
[2]Press Conference by Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 29 June 1996.
[3]United Nations, General
Assembly Resolution, (New York: United Nations, 1996), A/51/4.
[4]Asahi Shimbun, 28
September 1997. (All documents, including official hearing records, journals and
interviews utilized in this report are in Japanese, responsibility for any error
in translating into English is that of the JBCL.)
[5]Meeting with over twenty
members of various political parties of the Diet and ICBL representatives,
Tokyo, January/February 1998.
[6]Statement by Nobuyasu Abe,
Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Third NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 28 November
1998, p.36 of the conference report.
[8]On “Zero Victim
Programs,”: International Development Journal, August 1998.
Statement by Tsuneo Nishida, Economic Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, on Tokyo Guideline and International Cooperation Towards Zero Victim,
at the occasion of signing the Ottawa Treaty, 4 December 1997.
[9]Interview with Jody
Williams, Asahi Shimbun, 7 February 1998.
[10]Statement by Keizo
Obuchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997.
[11]Statement by Keizo
Obuchi, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives
Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p.3.
[12]Statement by Bulgarian
Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February
1999.
[13]A Law Concerning the
Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of
their Possession, Article 1, Section 1.
[14]Refers to domestic law
passed in ratifying the Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their
destruction, and the Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction.
[15]Statement by Masatada
Hirose, Bureau Chief, Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of
Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 6.
[16]Interview with Yasunori
Morino, Deputy Director, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Arms Control
and Scientific Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 December 1998.
[17]Statement by Masatada
Hirose, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, p. 2.
[19]Statement by Akio Suda,
Deputy Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Foreign Policy
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of
Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 2.
[21]Statement by Nobutaka
Machimura, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25
September 1998, p. 9.
[23]It is not clear what type
of munition the “directional-multiple-shots” are. The Agency does
not confirm it is a Claymore type munition, but differentiates it from
non-command detonated mines.
[24]Statement by Hiroshi
Kondo, Director of Planning and Programming Division, National Defense Agency,
during 3rd NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 28 November 1998, p.
51 of the conference report.
[25]Statement by Yasunori
Ito, Director General for Facilities, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry
Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, p. 3.
[27]Interview with Atsuo
Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division,
Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.
[28]Yukio Kitazume,
Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of International Trade and Industry also
confirmed on this point during committee hearings, Foreign Affairs Committee,
House of Representatives Proceedings Report No.5, 25 September 1998, p. 10.
[30]Statement by Masakazu
Yamauchi, Director, Weapons and Warships Division, Bureau of Equipment, Defense
Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings
Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 6.
[31]Interview with Atsuo
Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division,
Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.
[32]Information obtained from
International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency,
12 March 12, 1999.
[33]Statement by Ken Sato,
Director General, Bureau of Defense Policy, Defense Agency, Foreign Affairs
Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998,
p. 14.
[34]Interview with Atsuo
Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division,
Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 24 February 1999.
[35]A response by the Defense
Agency to a Diet member, Yukihisa Fujita, 23 December 1998.
[36]Statement by Ken Sato,
House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 28 September 1998, p.6.
[37]Statement by Yasunori
Ito, Director General for Facilities, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry
Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998,
p. 2.
[41]Statement made by Hiroshi
Kondo, Third NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, p. 50 of the
conference report.
[42]Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, United Nations Administrative Division, “The Current Conditions
and Challenges of Landmine Problems,” 10 September 1997.
[43]On “Zero Victim
Programs,”: International Development Journal, August 1998.
Statement by Tsuneo Nishida, Economic Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, on Tokyo Guideline and International Cooperation Towards Zero Victim,
at the occasion of signing the Ottawa Treaty, 4 December 1997.
[44]Progress Report on
Landmine Related Assistance, as of January 1999, by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. (Exchange rate: 1997: 1US$=107 yen; 1998: 1US$=118 yen).
[47]NGO project subsidy is a
program Japanese government begun in FY 1989 to subsidize private nonprofit
organizations involved in international development cooperation. The government
subsidizes one half of the cost of development projects undertaken by Japanese
NGOs in developing countries.
[48]Grant Assistance for
Grassroots Projects is a scheme of assistance begun in 1989. In response to
requests from local governments, research institutions, medical organizations,
NGOs and other organizations working in developing countries, Japanese embassies
and consulate generals take up small-scale projects for assistance (anywhere
between $1,000 to $100,000).
[49]It was reported in the
press that the contractor of this UNDP program in Mozambique is South
Africa’s company, Mechem. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it
financed the UNDP and not to Mechem.
[50]Progress Report on
Landmine Related Assistance, as of January 1999, by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. (Exchange rate: 1997: 1US$=107 yen; 1998: 1US$=118 yen). Some
disbursements include both mine clearance and victim assistance projects. For
the purpose of convenience, the total amount for each project is divided between
mine clearance and victim assistance. Country contributions are not bilateral
assistance but rather through multilateral organizations operating in these
countries.
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