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JAPAN, Landmine Monitor Report 1999


Mine Ban Policy

Japan signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa. In his address to the Signing Conference, then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi announced his government’s intention to contribute ten billion Japanese yen for mine clearance and victim assistance projects for five years beginning in 1998.[1] Japan ratified the treaty on 30 September 1998, becoming the forty-fifth country to do so. Japan has already passed implementing legislation.

The real commitment by the government of Japan on the landmine issue began when then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced that Japan would host an international conference on antipersonnel landmines. At the Lyon Summit in 1996, he stated Japan’s intention to host “an international conference for the purpose of strengthening international support for the efforts by the United Nations to remove mines.... I also mentioned that we have decided recently to actively support efforts for a total international ban of antipersonnel mines.”[2] Subsequently, the government hosted “Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines” in March 1997.

Japan also reiterated its position in support of a global ban of antipersonnel mines during UN General Assembly meetings in 1996 and a 1996 UN resolution urging governments to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines.[3] Despite its public position, Japan did not express its support for the Mine Ban Treaty until September 1997, with its decision to participate in the Oslo negotiations.

The government was reluctant to take a part in the Ottawa Process. Given the reluctance, the government participated in the Brussels Conference as an observer and did not sign the Brussels Declaration until its decision on 28 August 1997 to go to Oslo -- after the U.S. government announced that it would participate in the Oslo Conference. With this linkage, it was not surprising that the Japanese delegation was an active supporter of the various proposals the U.S. government put forward which would have seriously undercut the treaty. It was clear that the government had taken part in the negotiations without shifting its fundamental policy. It had made no formal statement concerning a total ban, and the government continued to favor negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) over the Ottawa Process until the very last minute.

The real shift in the government’s position came after then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi decided to review Japanese policy, on the day he became Foreign Minister. Obuchi noted that “it would not make sense for Japan to oppose the Treaty while cooperating in demining activities in Cambodia.”[4] After internal discussions among relevant Ministries, the government announced its decision to sign the treaty on 27 November and the Foreign Minister himself flew to Ottawa to take part in the signing ceremony on 3 December 1997.

The government’s decision was, for the most part, the result of external pressures, such as the momentum created by the Ottawa Process, the tragic death of Princess Diana and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the ICBL, and had less to do with the role civil society played in Japan. The pressure from outside Japan forced the government to take heed of international opinion.

After this policy change, however, there was little movement to rapidly ratify the Convention. In fact, in meetings with members of the Japanese Diet during an ICBL trip to Japan, the parliamentarians expressed their belief that ratification would not happen in 1998.[5] One important reason for delay of ratification was the nuclear test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. Because the same section within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of both landmines and nuclear arms control, most of time between May to August had been intensely focused on nuclear non-proliferation efforts.[6]

The Defense Agency had already undertaken research to develop alternatives for antipersonnel landmines. At a symposium organized by the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) in cooperation with the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo on 15 June 1998, a government official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the biggest question for ratification was how to deal with antipersonnel landmines possessed by U.S. forces in Japan. More specifically: 1) Would it be necessary to remove APMs at U.S. bases in Japan? 2) Would U.S. forces in Japan be allowed to use these mines in its military activities in Japan? 3) Would Japanese personnel be allowed to transport mines from U.S. bases in Japan to, say, the Korean Peninsula? The government official went on to say that the government was looking into the possibility of introducing a bill for ratification in the next Ordinary Diet Session which was scheduled to begin in early 1999.

After becoming Prime Minister on July 1998, Mr. Obuchi again took hold of Japan’s landmine policy. He announced in his general-policy speech delivered at the opening of the Extraordinary Diet Session that: “We will put every effort to ratify at the earliest possible date so that the Treaty enters into force soon.”[7] Mr. Obuchi apparently pushed somewhat reluctant government officials to ratify the treaty in time to be one of the first forty countries to make the treaty enter into force.[8]

The new administration decided to introduce the legislation in the Extraordinary Session convened in the summer of 1998, instead of waiting until the Ordinary Session of 1999 as had initially been intended. Members of the JCBL met the Prime Minister to discuss the ratification issue on 11 September 1998, during which time 200,000 signatures calling for a ban were handed over to Mr. Obuchi to demonstrate growing public concern over the landmine crisis.

The Diet passed A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession on 30 September 1998 to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, and deposited the instrument to the United Nations on the same day.

Role of NGOs

Unlike in other countries, there was no partnership forged between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the Japanese government nor did the government seriously seek to discuss the issue with NGOs. Obuchi himself admitted that “there was a widely recognized impression in Japan that the NGOs are not Non-Governmental Organizations but Anti-Governmental Organizations” and admitted that NGOs were not in the position to influence the policy-making process. [9]

Nevertheless, NGOs did play an important role in raising public awareness. The Association to Aid Refugees (AAR), one of the forerunners in the landmine campaign in Japan, held a parallel NGO-sponsored landmine conference at the time of the government conference on demining technology in Tokyo in March 1997. The NGO conference – the first of its type in Japan -- depicted the suffering of mine victims and helped to reinforce the need to eradicate landmines; it received intensive media coverage. AAR also published a picture book titled Not Mines, But Flowers, which sold over 400,000 copies. AAR’s commitment to the issue contributed greatly in raising public awareness in Japan. AAR also invited Chris Moon to run as a flame-bearer during the Nagano Winter Olympics in February 1998, which helped raise public awareness on the landmine issue not only in Japan, but also in the world, through live coverage of the Opening Ceremony.

The JCBL, made up of nearly 40 NGOs, also organized lecture series and charity events on landmines throughout Japan in collaboration with many of its member organizations. It worked on petitions and gathered more than 50,000 signatures in a limited period of time. This petition was handed directly to the Foreign Minister Obuchi by Tun Channareth, landmine survivor and one of the founders of the Cambodia Campaign, who had been visiting Japan at that time at the invitation of the JCBL.

CCW and CD

Japan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981 and ratified it on 9 June 1982. It ratified revised Protocol II on 10 June 1997.

Japan has been a prominent supporter of efforts to address landmines in the CD, including efforts aimed at a complete ban in 1997 and at a transfer ban in 1998 and 1999. Then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi stated during the signing conference in Ottawa on 3 December 1997 that: “if we are to aim at a universal and effective banning for landmines, treaty negotiation should be started as early as possible at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Serious consideration should be given to an approach to begin such a negotiation taking up banning of export of landmines as a first step.”[10] Obuchi, as a Prime Minister, reiterated this position during hearings held before the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty.[11] In February 1999, Japan was one of the twenty-two CD members that jointly called, once again, for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a transfer ban.[12]

Domestic Legislation

The Diet passed A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession on 30 September 1998. The bill had been presented on 24 September to three Committees of the House of Representatives for hearings (Foreign Affairs Committee, National Security Affairs Committee, Commerce and Industry Committee). The upper house passed the bill on 29 September immediately after which it was presented to the House of Councilors for an approval. There had been only a week for entire ratification process, which inevitably left fundamental questions unclear and sometimes unresolved. It was rushed through the Diet in an effort for Japan to be among the first 40 ratifications needed for the treaty to enter into force.

In its analysis of the bill, the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines has raised a number of concerns. The purpose of the bill is described, in part, to “regulate possession” of AP mines.[13] The term “regulate” contrasts sharply with the term used in ratifying the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapon Convention. In both cases, the purpose of the domestic bill is clearly to “prohibit the development, production and stockpiling”[14] of either weapon. The term “possession” also creates a further problem in that one can argue that production is prohibited only under the current domestic law and other activities are only “regulated.” During one of the hearing sessions an official from Ministry of International Trade and Industry was asked to clarify this point and stated that: “The use is prohibited under Explosive Control Act and others. The production and development are banned under current bill. The acquisition, stockpiling and retention are regulated under ‘possession’ of this bill and transfer is regulated under this bill as well as under Foreign Exchange and the Foreign Trade Law.”[15] The government emphasizes that there is no loophole in the domestic law regarding a total ban.[16]

In one instance, the domestic bill appears more comprehensive than the Mine Ban Treaty. The domestic bill has no mention of an exception for antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. This point was discussed during the Diet hearings, and the government responded that any mine equipped with an antihandling device will be considered illegal.[17] As in the treaty, however, any command detonated mine will not be considered an antipersonnel landmine. Thus, the government’s interpretation of the Claymore mine is that it is considered an antipersonnel landmine when it explodes by the presence of a person (i.e., when used with a tripwire), but not when it explodes by remotely controlled detonation through sight recognition.[18]

The bill does not address the issue of retention of mines for training purposes, as allowed under the Mine Ban Treaty. It also does not address how, when, and who will destroy landmines under possession by the Self-Defense Forces, and contains no provisions regarding international cooperation and assistance.

U.S. Mines in Japan

Regarding landmines stockpiled on U.S. bases in Japan, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: “Under the treaty, the obligation as the state party is to undertake measures within the framework of its jurisdictional authority to cease or deter activities prohibited under the treaty?thus it continues to be feasible for the U.S. forces to retain any antipersonnel landmines withheld and stockpiled in the U.S. bases in Japan.” He also stated that “on the other hand, apart from treaty obligations, the policy of Japan is to terminate the use of landmines for defense purposes, and therefore, the government requested the U.S. not to use, develop or produce landmines within Japanese territory.”[19]

With regard to the transportation of landmines by US forces stationed in Japan, it was stated that “in relation to antipersonnel landmines withheld and stockpiled in the U.S. bases, no Japanese national, whether civilian or Self-Defense Force, will be allowed to be engaged in transporting such mines under the treaty.”[20]

Regarding U.S.-Japan joint military exercises, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that “it will not be acceptable for the Defense Force to engage in training which purpose is to use antipersonnel landmines, whether it be a joint exercise or not.”[21]

The issue of transit through Japanese territorial waters or land by the US forces equipped with antipersonnel landmines was also repeatedly raised in the Diet session. The Vice Minister stated that “because we approve the possession of landmines by the US forces stationed in Japan, it would not be necessary to request a prior notification, and thus the government has no intention of doing so.”[22]


The Defense Agency continued to purchase antipersonnel landmines until FY 1996 (procurement budget: 600 million yen). The Agency had also sought 680 million yen for purchasing AP mines for FY1997 but it was canceled once Japan signed the Ottawa Treaty. This budget line item has instead been allocated for purchasing “directional-multiple-shots.”[23]

It is a widely known fact that a single private company, Ishikawa Seisakusho, assembled all AP mines. Several other companies are also known to have produced landmine components, but details are not available. The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of AP mine production facilities is not clear.

The Japanese Defense Agency is currently developing an alternative weapon system to antipersonnel landmines. The “Antipersonnel Obstacle System” combines sensor and remote control, and is detonated by manual command so that civilians are not targeted indiscriminately.[24] The Agency has been seeking budget allocations for this development since FY 1997, including 20 million yen for development in FY 1997, 20 million yen for development in FY 1998 and 600 million yen in FY 1999 for purchasing test models. During the Diet hearing session, the government stated, “We have asked for funding since FY 1997 and have been considering this. The budget we have asked for FY 1999 is for purchasing samples to examine in the coming two years if they actually function after assembling.”[25]

Until a new alternative system is developed, the Defense Agency will use directional-multiple-shots as an alternative weapon. The government stated that “it will take some time for this (new system) to be completed and thus meanwhile, we will...make sure [the directional-multiple-shot-mine] detonates only by manual command. Until we develop an alternative system, we will purchase a small amount of directional-multiple-shots.”[26]

The Agency has already converted all directional-multiple-shot-mines it possessed to directional-multiple-shots in FY 1998, and it also has sought budget allocations for new procurement in FY 1998 (1.4 billion yen) and FY 1999 (400 million yen). However, the number of munitions are not disclosed.[27]


Japan has never exported or imported antipersonnel landmines. This is forbidden under the Law on Three Principles on Arms Export. The export of components of landmines, such as fuses and blasting powder are forbidden under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.[28]


The total number of antipersonnel landmines possessed by the Self-Defense Force is 1,000,401 (as of the end of 1998).[29] The Defense Agency stated during the Diet hearings that it possessed 999,496 landmines,[30] but later changed the number to 1,000,401. According to the Agency, this change was due to simple miscalculation.[31] The type and number of antipersonnel landmines the Self-Defense Force possesses are:

1) Type-M3 49,974

2) Type-63 28,947

3) Type-67 586,530

4) Type-80 326,514

5) Type-87 scatterable landmines with self-destruct mechanisms 8,436

Total: 1,000,401[32]

During the Diet session, an official from the Defense Agency stated that the government will determine the exact number of antipersonnel landmines to be retained for development and training purposes during the 180 day period for reporting to the Secretary General of the UN. However, this official also said, “We expect to require approximately 15,000 landmines for this exception in the next ten years.”[33] The Defense Agency reinforced that “at this point in time, the statement made during the Diet Session last September is still valid, and we will come up with the exact figure before 180 days are over.”[34]

To date, the government has not officially disclosed the contractor or schedule for destruction of its stockpiled landmines. However, in a response to a Diet member’s inquiry, the Defense Agency presented the type and cost of initial destruction as follows:

1) Type M3 16,000

2) Type 63 9,000

3) Type 67 107,000

4) Type 80 87,000

5) Type 87 3,000

Total number: 222,000

The total cost for destroying these 222,000 antipersonnel landmines is 420 million yen, plus 27 million yen for transportation for a total cost of 447 million yen.[35] Thus, the average cost for destroying one landmine will approximately be 2,014 yen. In total, Japanese government is expected to spend 2 billion yen to dismantle all the stockpiled mines. These figures were also confirmed during the Diet hearing session.[36]

It must be noted that the government uses the word “haiki” as the translation of the word “destruction.” “Haiki” means “discard” rather than “destroy.” This point attracted much attention during the Diet hearing sessions and one Diet member sought to clarify government’s position, and the response was: “Basically, we would ask the dealers to dismantle it rather than discard it. Not just removing the fuse but also blasting powder to deprive its function as a landmine.”[37] It appears the government’s interpretation of “discard” is the same as “dismantle” or “disassemble.” When asked why explosion or incineration could not be considered as possible options, the government responded that it did not possess a training field where massive explosions can take place, and that fragments can disperse which could be harmful and dangerous.[38]

Actual destruction (or dismantling) may not begin during FY 1999 (April 1999 to March 2000). The only obligation for the Defense Agency in FY 1999 is to start logistical procedures and conclude contracts with firm(s) to undertake destruction.[39] The Agency has not prepared a complete dismantling plan since it believes that the official format will be discussed during the first conference of state parties in May 1999.[40]


Japan has not used antipersonnel landmines since the establishment of Defense Force in 1954. However, the government for a long time took the stance that landmines are an indispensable means in protecting its long coast lines. Landmines were considered as purely defensive weapons, appropriate for Japan’s official “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy.”[41]

Mine Action Funding

The Japanese government contributed nearly US$30 million to mine action programs before the end of 1997. The most significant contributions for mine clearance operations were:

* Afghanistan (UNOCHA), $17 million

* Cambodia (CMAC), $5 million

* Former Yugoslavia, $3 million

* UN Trust Fund, $4 million

* OAS, $2 million

Mine victim assistance programs included support for the establishment of protheses facilities in Cambodia in 1992, and the establishment of a rehabilitation center in Cambodia in 1993, as well as assistance through the NGO Association to Aid Refugees-Japan for vocational training (1994, 1995, 1996).[42]

The government launched a new program to promote further assistance after signing the Mine Ban Treaty. On 3 December 1997, Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, having attended and signed the Ottawa Treaty, announced the “Zero Victim Programs,” a plan to provide 10 billion yen over a five-year period starting January 1998 for landmine removal and support of mine victim projects.

In March 1998, the Japanese government held the “Tokyo Conference on Land Mine Issues.” At this meeting, landmines were positioned as “not only a human rights issue but a barrier to the maintenance of peace and stability and reconstruction” and guidelines were defined for the following three areas: activities concerning landmine removal, development of technology for landmine removal and support for landmine victims. Furthermore, reducing the number of landmine victims to zero was declared the ultimate objective of the international community’s efforts on the landmine issue.

The following the guiding principles were also outlined at this conference: 1) Regarding landmine removal activities, support should be given with an emphasis on the ownership of the mine-affected country and the partnership of donor countries, international organizations and NGOs; 2)Pursuit of “even cheaper, safer and efficient technology” in view of the real needs of humanitarian mine clearance; and 3) Regarding support for mine victims, the mine-affected country should determine a comprehensive program that includes medical service and prosthetics provision service and medical rehabilitation as well as vocational training, and promote the development of program management and implementation skills.

The 10 billion yen, five year program is to include the following elements:

* keeping in mind long term reconstruction, supplies such as mine detecting and removing equipment, vehicles, grass cutters, wireless transmitters and batteries are to be donated to the mine affected country, in addition to enforcing the coordination function of the UN and creating of a technology registration system with the donations.

* in order for the affected country to acquire the skills to plan and implement a comprehensive program for the support of landmine victims, technology cooperation and construction of and provision of equipment for medical and rehabilitation facilities should be made in the area of artificial limb production and mental and physical rehabilitation of victims.

* in consideration of the importance of a humanitarian support for landmine removal activities, the option of providing mine detectors and removal equipment from other countries should be opened up.

* full support to grassroots NGOs should be provided in the area of artificial limb production and rehabilitation of victims.[43]

In 1998 under this new program the Japanese government disbursed 106.16 million yen (US$8.65 million) to landmine-related assistance projects through multilateral agencies and NGOs.[44] The government has also been engaging in a survey to formulate bilateral demining and victim assistance projects in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The results have not been made available and the projects have not been initiated yet, but are expected to begin soon. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)[45] and the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS)[46] have undertaken the survey. Both agencies are governmental organizations that provide grants and technical assistance to developing countries, but for Bosnia-Herzegovina project, AAR participated in the local study mission to formulate the project.

Support to the United Nations and other multilateral organizations has included: UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance ($2.12 million); OAS Special Fund for mine clearance, victim assistance, rehabilitation and local mine awareness education in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica ($45,000 ); and support for ICRC “Special Appeal for Victim Assistance 1998” medical treatment and rehabilitation projects including production of prosthesis ($1.47 million).

Japan has supported mine action in the following countries:


* Assistance to CMAC’s mine clearance activities ($0.9 million)

* Financial contribution in holding Phnom Penh Forum in October 1998, including travel expenses for participants and logistical expenditures in holding conference ($0.3 million)

* Victim assistance vocational training through AAR ($0.119 million)[47]

* Medical assistance and rehabilitation assistance through AMDA (Association for Medical Development in Asia, a Japanese NGO) ($80,000)

* Provision of vehicles to Cambodia Trust ($50,000)[48]

* Provision of tractors for grass cutting to Halo Trust ($98,600)

Bosnia Herzegovina:

* Assistance for establishing Bosnia Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC) ($1 million)

* Assistance to mine awareness program through UNICEF, spent to purchase educational materials and to distribute them ($0.28)

* Assistance to Slovenia Fund through UNDP for mine clearance and victim assistance ($1 million)


* Assistance to demining project in Masinjiru area through UNDP ($1 million)[49]


* Small scale grant assistance for construction of Kigari rehabilitation center through Japanese NGO ($67,000)


* Small scale grant assistance to Nicaragua Red Cross, for purchasing one emergency vehicle and construction of local point for the emergency medical team to stand by ($84,000)

* Small scale grant assistance to mine victim support plan; spent on purchasing wheel chairs, prosthesis and rehabilitation equipment ($47,000)

To summarize, out of U.S.$8.65 million the government disbursed in 1998, 94% went to multinational organizations, and 6% to NGOs. Although five states received country-specific grants, the means for disbursement were nearly all through multilateral organizations. Financial contributions on landmine-related projects by the Japanese government have been heavily dependent on the role of international/multinational organizations. The government has provided little bilateral assistance or project oriented grants.

Contributions by Country and by Sector[50]

By Country

1) Cambodia $1.53 million (18.0%)

2) Bosnia Herzegovina $2.28million (25.3%)

3) Croatia $0.2 million (2.4%)

4) Mozambique $1 million (11.7%)

5) Rwanda $0.075 million (0.8%)

6) Nicaragua $0.13 million (1.5%)

7) Multilateral agencies $3.43 million (40.3%)

By Sector

1) Mine clearance $5.86 million (68.7%)

2) Victim assistance $2.3 million (26.9%)

3) Vocational training $0.14 million (1.4%)

4) Mine awareness $0.3 million (3.0%)


[1]Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, Address to the Signing Conference of the Ottawa Convention, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

[2]Press Conference by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 29 June 1996.

[3]United Nations, General Assembly Resolution, (New York: United Nations, 1996), A/51/4.

[4]Asahi Shimbun, 28 September 1997. (All documents, including official hearing records, journals and interviews utilized in this report are in Japanese, responsibility for any error in translating into English is that of the JBCL.)

[5]Meeting with over twenty members of various political parties of the Diet and ICBL representatives, Tokyo, January/February 1998.

[6]Statement by Nobuyasu Abe, Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Third NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 28 November 1998, p.36 of the conference report.

[7]Asahi Shimbun, 8 August 1998.

[8]On “Zero Victim Programs,”: International Development Journal, August 1998. Statement by Tsuneo Nishida, Economic Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Tokyo Guideline and International Cooperation Towards Zero Victim, at the occasion of signing the Ottawa Treaty, 4 December 1997.

[9]Interview with Jody Williams, Asahi Shimbun, 7 February 1998.

[10]Statement by Keizo Obuchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997.

[11]Statement by Keizo Obuchi, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p.3.

[12]Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.

[13]A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession, Article 1, Section 1.

[14]Refers to domestic law passed in ratifying the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their destruction, and the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction.

[15]Statement by Masatada Hirose, Bureau Chief, Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 6.

[16]Interview with Yasunori Morino, Deputy Director, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 December 1998.

[17]Statement by Masatada Hirose, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, p. 2.


[19]Statement by Akio Suda, Deputy Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 2.


[21]Statement by Nobutaka Machimura, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p. 9.


[23]It is not clear what type of munition the “directional-multiple-shots” are. The Agency does not confirm it is a Claymore type munition, but differentiates it from non-command detonated mines.

[24]Statement by Hiroshi Kondo, Director of Planning and Programming Division, National Defense Agency, during 3rd NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 28 November 1998, p. 51 of the conference report.

[25]Statement by Yasunori Ito, Director General for Facilities, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, p. 3.


[27]Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.

[28]Yukio Kitazume, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of International Trade and Industry also confirmed on this point during committee hearings, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No.5, 25 September 1998, p. 10.

[29]Asahi Shimbun, 23 February 1999.

[30]Statement by Masakazu Yamauchi, Director, Weapons and Warships Division, Bureau of Equipment, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 6.

[31]Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.

[32]Information obtained from International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 12, 1999.

[33]Statement by Ken Sato, Director General, Bureau of Defense Policy, Defense Agency, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p. 14.

[34]Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 24 February 1999.

[35]A response by the Defense Agency to a Diet member, Yukihisa Fujita, 23 December 1998.

[36]Statement by Ken Sato, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 28 September 1998, p.6.

[37]Statement by Yasunori Ito, Director General for Facilities, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p. 2.


[39]Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.


[41]Statement made by Hiroshi Kondo, Third NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, p. 50 of the conference report.

[42]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Nations Administrative Division, “The Current Conditions and Challenges of Landmine Problems,” 10 September 1997.

[43]On “Zero Victim Programs,”: International Development Journal, August 1998. Statement by Tsuneo Nishida, Economic Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Tokyo Guideline and International Cooperation Towards Zero Victim, at the occasion of signing the Ottawa Treaty, 4 December 1997.

[44]Progress Report on Landmine Related Assistance, as of January 1999, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Exchange rate: 1997: 1US$=107 yen; 1998: 1US$=118 yen).

[45]Contact: JICA / Project Formulation Study Department, Shinjuku Maynds Tower BLDG.10thF 1-1 Yoyogi 2, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151-8558, JAPAN, TEL: 81-3-5352-5507; FAX: 81-3-5352-5500.

[46]Contact: JICS / Planning and Survey Division, Shinjuku Sanshin BLDG. 4-9 Yoyogi 2, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151-0053, JAPAN, TEL: 81-3-5352-5962; FAX: 81-3-5352-5993.

[47]NGO project subsidy is a program Japanese government begun in FY 1989 to subsidize private nonprofit organizations involved in international development cooperation. The government subsidizes one half of the cost of development projects undertaken by Japanese NGOs in developing countries.

[48]Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects is a scheme of assistance begun in 1989. In response to requests from local governments, research institutions, medical organizations, NGOs and other organizations working in developing countries, Japanese embassies and consulate generals take up small-scale projects for assistance (anywhere between $1,000 to $100,000).

[49]It was reported in the press that the contractor of this UNDP program in Mozambique is South Africa’s company, Mechem. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it financed the UNDP and not to Mechem.

[50]Progress Report on Landmine Related Assistance, as of January 1999, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Exchange rate: 1997: 1US$=107 yen; 1998: 1US$=118 yen). Some disbursements include both mine clearance and victim assistance projects. For the purpose of convenience, the total amount for each project is divided between mine clearance and victim assistance. Country contributions are not bilateral assistance but rather through multilateral organizations operating in these countries.