The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.
Though the government has been largely silent on the issue, it is clear that
North Korea does not support an international ban on antipersonnel mines, and
continues to believe that they are legitimate and important weapons. North
Korea was one of only ten governments that abstained on United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to
vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines.
North Korea was absent for the votes on the pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1997 and
1998.
North Korea was one of the only countries that did not participate--even as
an observer-- in any of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, or the
treaty negotiations. Even public statements by the government on any aspect of
the landmines issue have been extremely rare. During the treaty negotiations in
Oslo in September 1997, according to the Russian Tass news agency, Mr. Son Song
Pil, the Ambassador of DPRK to Russia, criticized countries like the United
States, South Korea and Japan for calling for an exception for the use of
antipersonnel mines in the Korean Peninsula. In an interview on 14 September
1997, Mr.Son said that should such an exception be permitted, the treaty would
lose its universality and comprehensiveness, and that North Korea is strongly
opposed to any attempts to exempt any region from the mine ban
treaty.[1]
Before the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 1998, Mr. Kim Sam
Jong, the Counselor of the Permanent Mission of DPRK to the UN in New York, made
a short statement on antipersonnel
mines.[2] He said that although
North Korea recognizes antipersonnel landmines as a humanitarian concern, at
this juncture it is impossible for it to join the Mine Ban Treaty owing to the
complicated security situation of the Korean
Peninsula.[3] In a telephone
interview on 24 February 1999, Mr. Kim Sam Jong would only reiterate that that
statement is the current position of North
Korea.[4]
North Korea has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not
a member of the Conference on Disarmament. The Permanent Mission of the DPRK to
the United Nations in Geneva said that DPRK does not take any position on the
negotiations of ban on mine transfers in
CD.[5]
Production
A U.S. government data base indicates that North
Korea produces versions of the Soviet POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M fragmentation stake
mines.[6] Another data base
lists a Model 15, which is described as a stake mine similar in appearance to
the Soviet POMZ-2M.[7] North
Korea may also have produced wooden blast antipersonnel
mines.[8] It appears that
North Korea’s mine production is neither extensive nor sophisticated.
Transfer
North Korea is not known to have exported AP mines
to other countries; North Korean mines have not been found in other
countries.[9] It is assumed
that North Korea has imported antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union, China,
and perhaps others.
Stockpiling
No information is available on the size of North
Korea’s stockpile. It is likely that it consists of domestically produced
mines, mines imported from the Soviet Union, China, and perhaps elsewhere, and
possibly still some U.S. mines. A U.S. Army document indicates that the main
source for landmines for North Korea in the Korean War was captured U.S.
mines.[10]
Use
It is believed that North Korea has planted some
one million dumb mines in the Demilitarized Zone and Military Control Zone
separating North from South.[11]
A similar number are planted on the South side. There is no information that
mines have been used outside of this area by North Korean forces.
Landmine Problem
A North Korean authority has said that, apart from
the border with South Korea, there are no minefields in the DPRK, either left
over from the Korean War or otherwise, and there are no mine problems on the
borders with China or
Russia.[12] Though difficult
to confirm,[13] that appears to
be a reasonable claim. Since1995, reportedly 100,000 people have fled from the
DPRK to China. According to a Buddhist monk whose organization is assisting
North Korean refugees in China and made personal interviews with 1,694 refugees
from 30 September 1997 to 15 September 1998, no refugees mentioned landmines
being present either in the border area or elsewhere in North
Korea.[14] Instead, refugees
and journalists noted that DPRK guards are posted every 50–100
meters.[15] The border area
with Russia was declared a Free Trade Zone, Rajin-Song Bong, in 1991 and no
minefield is suspected.
Occasional injuries due to mines in or near the DMZ and MCZ are likely, as is
the case in the South.
Mine Action
North Korea has not contributed to international
mine clearance. No known mine clearance mine awareness programs have been
conducted. No information is available on mine casualties or survivor
assistance programs.
A request for information for Landmine Monitor was submitted to
P’yongyang through the Central Headquarters of the General Association of
Korean Residents in Japan in January 1999, however, no answer had been received
as of 1 March 1999.
[1] Jiji Press, Geneva,
Sankei Newspaper, 15 September 1997.
[2] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
telephone interview with Mr. Kim Sam Jong, the Counselor, the Permanent Mission
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the UN in New York, 24
February 1999.
[5] Landmine Monitor
telephone interview with Mr.Ri Thae Gun, Counselor of the Permanent Mission of
the DPRK to the UN in Geneva, 1 March 1999.
[6] Mine Web, U.S. Department
of State, at http://www.mineweb.org/mfacts.
[7] Sgt R.A. MacDougall, CD,
the CFSME Mine Database 96.
[8] Human Rights Watch,
Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, p. 470.
[9] Sgt R.A. MacDougall, CD,
the CFSME Mine Database 96, and Mine Web, U.S. Department of State.
[10] Human Rights Watch and
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, “In Its Own Words: The U.S. Army
and Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,” July 1997.
[11] Susan Feeney,
“Deadly Zone,” Dallas Morning News, 1997.
[12] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
telephone interview with a North Korean Official, 26 February 1999.
[13] Requests for information
on landmines in North Korea were made with numerous officials, but all could not
or would not give information. Landmine Monitor/Seoul interview, Seoul, 22
January 1999 and Landmine Monitor/Tokyo telephone interviews with high ranking
official of the Ministry of Unification in ROK, Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, Ministry of National Defense, Yokota Base of the United States, United
Nations command Headquarters in Seoul, and Department of Defense of the United
States, from 19 to 24 February 1999
[14] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
personal interview, with Buddhist monk, Pom Nyung, Chief Executive of Korean
Buddhist Sharing Movement, Tokyo, 21 February 1999.
[15] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
personal interview with Pom Nyung, Tokyo, 21 February 1999; and Landmine
Monitor/Tokyo telephone interviews with Kyodo News Agency, Seoul, Yomiuri News
Paper, Seoul, and Sankei News Paper, Tokyo.