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RUSSIA, Landmine Monitor Report 1999


Mine Ban Policy

The Russian Federation has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. President Boris Yeltsin and other officials have stated Russia’s willingness to sign at some point in the future, but it is clear that the Russian military still considers antipersonnel mines a necessary weapon, and insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines must be in place before Russia can ban the weapon. Russia has also expressed concerns about its financial capacity to destroy its large stockpile within the four years required by the treaty. Russia has stated a strong preference for dealing with controls on antipersonnel mines through the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), rather than the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 10 October 1997, in response to the announcement that the International Campaign to Ban Landmines had won the Nobel Peace Prize, President Yeltsin was widely reported to have said, for the first time, that Russian would sign the ban treaty.[1] A few days later at a joint press conference with French President Jacques Chirac at the European Council Summit in Strasbourg, he reiterated, “We are supporting the idea and will endeavor to take the decision and sign the Convention.”[2] At a regional landmine conference in Budapest, Hungary in March 1998, the Russian representative said, “As it is well known, Russia supports the efforts of the international community to achieve the complete banning and elimination of antipersonnel mines.... President B.I. Yeltsin has declared Russia’s positive approach towards the Ottawa Convention. The representative of Russia reiterated this stand...on December 4, 1997 in Ottawa, emphasizing Russia’s willingness to accede to this instrument in the foreseeable future.”[3]

Russian officials have also highlighted some of the positive steps Russian has taken toward a ban: a moratorium on export of non-detectable and “dumb” antipersonnel mines, a ban on the production of blast mines, the destruction of more than half a million of the stockpiled APMs.[4]

Russia attended all of the treaty preparatory meetings, the Oslo negotiations, and the Ottawa treaty signing conference, but in each case only as an observer. It did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels declaration in June 1997. Russia was one of only ten countries to abstain in the vote on UN General Assembly 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines (passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996). It was also among the few who abstained on the 1997 UNGA Resolution supporting the treaty signing and the 1998 UNGA Resolution welcoming the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting state parties and observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

In February 1999, the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was expressed by Ambassador Boris Schiborin, Chief Counsellor of the Department of Security and Disarmament, and Andrei Malov, Counsellor of the same department: “Russia stresses its positive approach to the Ottawa Convention and its readiness to join the process within reasonable time limits in the future. This time frame will depend on solving a number of technical, financial and other problems stemmed from the Convention stipulations. Among them--the speediest possible preparations for the functional substitutes of APMs.... Russia believes that the goal for a complete APM ban should be achieved stage by stage. It is a process rather than a one-time action.”[5]

The views of the military were expressed by Colonel-General Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, Chief Commander of the Engineer Forces, in an article in Krasnaya Zvezda, a Ministry of Defense newspaper, on the eve of the ban treaty signing. Colonel-General Kuznetsov said Russia could not sign the treaty mainly because there are no “alternative means that could adequately substitute for APMs and fulfill their military task”and because it “requires the destruction of entire stockpiles of APMs within a four-year period,” which he believed Russia could not manage financially.[6]

Conference on Disarmament

Ambassador Schiborin has commented: “It is not a secret that diplomatically and politically Russia is intensively promoting the CD as the main forum for the mine action issue....Russia's initiative to strive for the soonest possible start of the negotiations in the CD on the global ban on the export (and then the transfer) of APMs has been actively supported by a whole range of states.... First, the CD could ensure the universal character of the solution to the problem. The CD is not aimed at splitting the international community into those who have joined the Ottawa Convention and those who have abstained from it (which is the case in the Ottawa process). Second, the CD possesses the experience to deal with such problems. Third, the CD is authorized by the UN Security Council for solving this level of problems. Fourth, almost all states which are mine producers or mine exporters are represented in the CD.”[7]

Russia was one of 22 CD members that in February 1999 jointly called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an export ban.[8]

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Russia is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II on landmines. Russia agreed to the amended Protocol II in May 1996, but has not yet ratified it. According to a Foreign Ministry official, the ratification documents have been prepared,[9] but the government has refrained from submitting them to the parliament for consideration due to financial constraints. Officials from the Ministry of Defense have said, “Russian armed forces have been conducting preparations to fulfill the requirements of the 1996 Protocol II since 1996. Necessary recommendations on the combat use of APMs in compliance with the new requirements have been prepared and released to the related staffs and commanders of military units.”[10] Colonel-General Vladimir P. Kuznetsov has said that revised Protocol II “reflects the agreed upon consensus positions and the interests of the majority of countries, including Russia” and ensures “a reasonable balance of military and humanitarian interests.”[11]


It is believed that since 1992, Russia has been producing at least ten types of antipersonnel mines:[12]

PMN - blast, pressure-type mine;

PMN-2 - blast, pressure-type mine;

PMN-4 - blast, pressure-type mine;

OZM-72 - fragmentation, bounding mine;

MON-50 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

MON-90 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

MON-100 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

MON-200 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

PFM-1S - blast mine (also used in KSF-1S cluster units)

POM-2 - fragmentation mine (also used in KPOM-2 cluster units)[13]

In May 1998 official representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast APMs.[14] While further details have not been provided, it can be assumed this means that the following mines are no longer produced: PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S. The PMN-type mines are, along with the Chinese Type 72, the most widely used throughout the world. The PFM-type (known as the Butterfly or Green Parrot) was used in huge quantities by the USSR in Afghanistan.

Russia has so far produced APMs at state-controlled enterprises only. Research and development on antipersonnel mines was carried out, among other places, at the Balashikha Scientific Research Engineer Institute located about 10 kilometers to the southwest of Moscow. According to research conducted for Landmine Monitor by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War-Russia (IPPNW-Russia), other industrial enterprises that have been involved in the production of mines and/or their components and/or their assembling include:

* Saransky mechanical plant, republic of Mordoviya (PMN-2, PMN-4),

* Chapayevsky experimental plant for measurement instruments, Samara region (PMN,OZM-72)

* Shilovsky plant for synthetic fibres (OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, KSF)

* Saratovsky instrument-mechanical plant (PFM-1, PMN-4)

* Y. Sverdlov plant (POM-2, PMN-4)

* Bryansky chemical plant (PMN, PMN-2).

The production system for landmines now is in transition. The Chief Commander of Russia’s Engineer Forces has said that as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 90% of Russia’s engineer ammunition and armament production facilities were left outside the territory of Russia, and that most of the enterprises that produced mines during Soviet times were located in Ukraine, Belarus and in the Baltic republics of the former USSR.[15] But, within the last three to five years, the military has managed to organize in Russia the production of different modern types of the engineer ammunition, including mines and fuzes, which were previously produced outside its territory.[16] Some plants that have been carrying out assembly of AP mines are now mastering the technology of their destruction.

One particular mine type deserves special mention. It appears that Russia has equipped a MON directional fragmentation mine (Claymore type) with a light sensitive detector. In Chechnya, a soldier from the reconnaissance group of the Sophrino Brigade of the Russian Internal Forces encountered such a mine, which detonated when he pointed his flashlight at it while surveying the basement of a building in Grozny.[17] There are grounds to believe that these APMs are still produced in Russia.

While all AP mines in Russia have been traditionally produced at state enterprises, many experts believe that a small number of landmines are being produced in Russia by private companies for sale on the black market.


The Russian Federation “carries out research to modernize the existing and develop new types of mines as well as to develop alternative types of weaponry.”[18] Research work on alternatives to antipersonnel mines is reportedly under way, but few details are available.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense says that “the development of systems alternative to APMs and accumulation of their minimal stockpiles will take up to ten years.”[20] Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov says, “alternative means able to adequately substitute APMs will be developed and produced in necessary quantities by the years of 2007-2010.”[21]

According to the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, specialists are considering a broad array of alternative means to serve as replacements of AP mines, looking at “improving AP munitions” that are not defined as antipersonnel mines under the ban treaty. Under consideration are AP munitions which are actuated by an operator by radio, wire or automatically after a definite period of time. “The development may proceed along two directions: improvement of fragmentation munitions and creation of new means of control.”[22]

Among the institutions where R&D of AP mines and their alternatives are carried out are: V.V. Kuibishev Military Engineers Academy; Central Research, Development and Test Institute; proving range; Central Design and Technology Bureau and Design-Fortification Bureau; and the State Research and Development Engineer Institute (NIII).[23] NIII has been researching and developing mines, mine-laying systems, as well as means for explosive demining to support Engineer troops for fifty years, and is now conducting research on alternative means to AP mines.

The Science-Research Machinery Building Institute (NIMI) has developed a class of engineer ammunition called “Reactive Systems with Fragmentation Combat Elements (OBE)” for attacking personnel and non-armored material. According to the designers, it could be activated both through remote-control and autonomously (from the target’s sensor), differentiating between people and vehicles. The designers of this new class of engineer ammunition argue that it does not fall under the restrictions of the CCW or the Mine Ban Treaty and thus they express hope that this system would attract attention abroad and would be exported in future.[24]


The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest exporters of antipersonnel mines, and Russia has also exported APMs. Before 1991, Soviet-made AP mines were supplied to dozens of countries.

However, on 1 December 1994 Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of APMs that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. On 1 December 1997 the moratorium was extended for another five years, until December 2002.[25] The moratorium “cannot be revised or revoked until its expiration in accordance with Russia’s law.”[26]

IPPNW-Russia has compiled some random statistics on Soviet AP mine exports:

- Afghanistan: 6,500 MON-50 mines, 90,000 POMZ-2M mines, and 6,000 PMN mines, 1989-91

- Nicaragua: 30,000 mines in 1984; 85,000 in 1988

- Mozambique: 30,000 in 1984; 21,000 in 1986

- Ethiopia: 120,000 in 1983; 152,000 in 1984; 7,500 in 1987

- Angola: 12,000 in 1984; 9,000 in 1983

- Cuba: 10,000 in 1986

Other countries where Soviet mines have been found include Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Vietnam.


There is no official public number of antipersonnel landmines stockpiled by Russia. One published report states that Russia has approximately 60 million landmines which fall under the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty.[27] ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock.

The types in stock are likely to include all of the mines listed in the “Production” section above as being currently or formerly produced by Russia and USSR. Stockpiles of APMs are located in various regions throughout the country: at manufacturing plants (in the cities of Saransk, Bryansk); sites of systematic APM destruction/recycling; within border adjacent territories under supervision of local military command-staff; and presumably at some nuclear facilities of the Russian Ministry of atomic energy--to be used for defense purposes in potential “endangering” situations.[28]


Russia carries out systematic destruction of its older, obsolete APMs. It also recycles them, dismantling the APMs and extracting explosive substances that are further reprocessed and used for civilian purposes like industrial mining. Destruction is accomplished at industrial facilities in the cities of Saransk and Bryansk, at sites of engineer forces, and perhaps other locations.[29]

Some plants that have been carrying out assembly of AP mines are now mastering the technology of their destruction.

Mines currently slated for destruction include not only those obsolete mines and those with an expired period of storage, but also those which are not in compliance with the requirements of CCW Protocol II. Current plans call for destroying non-CCW compliant mines over an eight year period (1998-2005).[30] In 1998, more than 500,000 non-CCW compliant AP mines were destroyed.[31]

The Ministry of Defense has calculated that it will cost 40 billion Roubles (about US$6.4 million) annually to destroy all of its non-CCW compliant mines. The Chief Division of Engineer Forces explained that the cheapest explosive destruction technologies would not be used due to environmental concerns, and instead the much more labor-consuming and hence costly dismantling technologies would be used.[32]

Russian officials have expressed concerns about their financial ability to destroy AP mines in the time frame required by the Mine Ban Treaty (four years), and also about their ability to rapidly create ecologically safe and effective technologies and means for destruction of all APMs.


The sudden influx of ammunition and antipersonnel mines into Russian storage areas from 1989 to 1993 from other former Soviet republics has worsened the conditions of storage of all types of ammunition, including mines. The stockpiles of some military districts, especially those which are now border districts, are overloaded, and the military have to keep ammunition in open places, creating a security and safety problem. Landmines are often stored in poor conditions. The inspection of storage conditions of Army and Navy munitions carried out by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office in late 1997 revealed various violations in 220 inspected military units and bodies of the Ministry of Defense, including the storage facilities of engineer munitions: “In a number of regions munitions stored in unacceptable conditions pose danger not only for environment but also for people’s life.”[33] The Chief Military Prosecutor’s report reveals that many munitions are outdated but haven’t been destroyed or dismantled due to the lack of financial, technological and industrial means.


Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, antipersonnel mines were used most notably along the border with China (especially in the 1960s and 1970s) and during the conflict in Afghanistan (1979-89). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, during the period of disintegration of the Soviet Union, some military units of the Ministry of Defense located on the territories of the former Soviet republics, mainly in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, used antipersonnel mines to protect strategic sites, munition depots and command posts.[34] Mines were also used in the early stages of the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh and during interethnic conflicts in Tajikistan and North Ossetia.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have used APMs most notably during large-scale combat operations in Chechnya from December 1994 until June 1996 (see report on Chechnya). Mines were also used by Russians as part of the CIS peacekeeping contingent in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict starting from June 1994, to protect strategic sites, infrastructure, and command posts, and as part of the peacekeeping contingent in Tajikistan to protect strategic sites and facilities, parts of the Tajik-Afghani border, military depots and posts, as well as for “blocking and isolating the areas occupied by the rebel forces, cutting possible rebel routes through the state (administrative border).”[35]

The AP mines most frequently used by Russian forces have been: PMN, PMN-3; OZM-72; MON-50, -90, -100; KPOM.[36]

Landmine Problem

The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXOs after World War II. The problem was the most serious in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Caucasus. Uncleared mines and UXO from World War II are still a problem in some areas. According to recent reports, mines and UXOs are emerging again as an issue of concern for a number of reasons. The economic development of previously abandoned lands, including former battlefields, that were never previously cleared from UXOs is creating a problem. According to recent estimates, another ten to fifteen years of effort is required to clear these areas.[37] Moreover, previous clearance operations never went deeper than 30-40 cm, while deeply laid UXOs have moved upwards to the surface since the end of the war. Thus, previously cleared territories deemed safe for many years are endangered anew.[38] There is also the danger posed to civilians from recent use of mines in ethnic conflicts.

Today there are requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories where World War II battles took place. Summarized data is given in the following table[39]:


Krasnodarsky territory 40,330

Murmansk region 42,000

Leningrad region 9,634

Novgorod region 60,200

Pskov region 13,836

Tver region 54,000

Voronezh region 48,800

Belgorod region 66,000

Rostov region 83,200

Kursk region 82,000

Total 540,000

Mine Clearance

Russia has not made any donations to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action programs within Russia.

In the post-World War II period, demining operations were carried by the Engineer Forces of the Defense Ministry. There were three stages of mine/UXO clearance. During the first stage (1946-1953), 183,000 square km were cleared and over 56.7 million UXOs removed. During the second stage (1954-1965), only the most infested areas were cleared, i.e. Leningrad, Northern and Baltic regions. Over 12,000 square km were cleared of 10,000 UXOs. During the third stage (1966-1970) over 214,000 square km were cleared from 72 million UXOs.[40]

Today demining operations are the responsibility of three structures in Russia: the Ministry of Defense’s Engineer Forces; the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources’ Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ demining brigades.[41] Demining is also conducted by non-governmental enterprises like the company "Fort" (Moscow), which is carrying out demining in Tver, Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the company "Iskatel" (St.-Petersburg). Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of engineer forces.[42]

The following chart shows total UXOs (including mines) cleared and destroyed in recent years.

1989 131,086

1990 175,808

1991 112,258

1992 112,258

1993 64,411

1994 78,751

1995 35,303

1996 53,872

1997 103,832

The regressive tendency in the early 1990s reflects the worsening economic situation and shrinking of finances for demining purposes in Russia rather than the decrease of the explosive ordnance remaining in the ground.

The Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources has drawn up a draft plan to clear within five years the 540,000 hectares requested for clearance in ten provinces. This covers 30% of the territories that need mine clearance.[43] The Ministry will be responsible for clearance in the Leningrad and Voronezh regions.[44]

Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and regions. According to official data, in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict engineers of the Russian peacekeeping forces searched for mines on more than 250 km of roads and up to 1,000 square km of terrain. As a result, more than 23,000 explosive units were found and destroyed. Russian peacekeepers in Tajikistan found and destroyed more than 18,000 landmines and UXOs. They have destroyed 13,500 landmines and UXOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations won an international tender for carrying out humanitarian demining in Bosnia.[45] Russian deminers began mine clearance operations Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1998. The specialists are to clear forty-five hectares of minefields. According to the Ministry of Disaster Resources data, twenty-three deminers previously working in this area have been killed. In 1998 there were three mine accidents with deminers and two with trained dogs.

Engineers of the Russian Armed Forces have taken part in demining operations in more than 20 countries, e.g. Algeria, Libya and Syria among others. The Draft Presidential Decree and Resolution of the Government on the organization of the participation of the Russian Federation in international projects on humanitarian demining were worked out in order to regulate Russian participation in demining operations beyond the Russian territory. The Russian Ministry of Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is planned and fulfilled within the framework of military-technical co-operation with foreign states via the federal state unitary enterprises GK "Rosvooruzheniye," "Promexport," or on the basis of bilateral agreements between the Russian Ministry of Defense and foreign governments.

Mine Awareness

During Soviet times, dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas was carried out by district military recruiting offices (“voenkomat”).[46] Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas.

After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities have ground to a halt. As a result of secondary education reform, the course on primary military training in secondary schools has been retracted, while district recruiting offices have received neither staff nor finances to continue mine awareness activities.[47]

Landmine Casualties

In Russia, mines continue killing and maiming people more than half a century after WWII ended. In the last seven years, eighty-four cases of mine/UXO incidents have been registered, with 167 people injured, and seventy-nine children killed in Russia and CIS.[48] According to other data, between 1992 and 1998 there were eighty-four accidents within the territories of former Second World War battlefields. Thirty-nine people died and sixty-seven were wounded (50% of the casualties were children). There have been a significant number of mine casualties in other parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya. (See report on Chechnya)

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during the World War II. The National Corps of Catastrophe Medicine Defense was very active in the Chechnya conflict and still continues to render medical aid and carry out rehabilitation programs to mine victims arriving from Chechnya.

Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. In Moscow, there is the Scientific Research Institute of Prostheses, Moscow Prosthetic Plant, and numerous workshops. Forty-eight children from Chechnya got treatment (reconstructive operations) in the Moscow pediatric hospital N 9; thirty-two got prostheses in the Moscow Institute of Prostheses. The federal government paid 60% of their cost and Moscow city government paid 40%.[49] According to the 1995 Federal law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped” an individual rehabilitation and reintegration program is developed and offered for each handicapped person.


[1] New York Times, 11 October 1997.

[2] “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” 14 October 1997.

[3] Statement by Mr. B.A. Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest Seminar, 26-28 March 1998.

[4] See, for example, Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999.

[5] Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999.

[6] Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, "Ottawa Process and Russia's Position," Krasnaya Zvezda Daily, 27 November 1997.

[7] Schiborin and Malov, “Russian and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999.

[8] Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.

[9] Interview with Andrei Malov, Counsellor of the Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999.

[10] Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of RF at the opening of the 1998 Moscow conference “New Steps To a Mine-Free Future,” IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Russia’s Arms Catalogue, Volume 1, Army 1996-1997, published by “Military Parade,” JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, p. 276-83. See also, “Landmines: Outlook from Russia,” Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.

[13] Other notable antipersonnel mines produced by the Soviet Union in the past include PMD type box mines (PMD 6/6M/7/57), POMZ type stake fragmentation mines (POMZ 2/2M), other OZM types (OZM 3/4/160), and the PFM-1 scatterable blast mine.

[14] B. Schiborin, chief counselor of the Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry; presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998. A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.

[15] Mine production technologies and facilities presumably also remained in the Central Asian Republics as well. See, Vladimir Kuznetsov, “S Uchetom Boevogo opyta zivut I uchatsya ingenernie voiska,” Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 16, 1999; A. Raylyan “Like a Phoenix From Its Ashes,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 64-65.

[16] Vladimir Kuznetsov. “Novyi Oblik Ingenernych Voisk” (New outlook of the Engineer Troops), Armeiskii Sbornik (Army’s journal) No.1, 1998, p. 11.

[17] M. Nagorny, Department of the Chief Commander of Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense, verbal statement at the working group meeting on 18 November 1998.

[18] A. Overchenko, “Traditional and New Tasks,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1997.

[19] Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, Moscow, 27 May 1998; A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.

[20] Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, Moscow, 27 May 1998.

[21] Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, Moscow, 25 February 1999.

[22] “Landmines: Outlook from Russia,” report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces.

[23] Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Russia’s Engineer Troops,” p. 31.

[24] V. Kireev, “NIMI: noviye inzhenernyie I artilleriiskie boepripasy (New Engineer and artillery ammunitions)” Voennyi Parad (Military Parade), January 1998, p. 46.

[25] Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.

[26] Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999.

[27] Andrei Korbut, “Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense). Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No.39, 1997, p. 6.

[28] V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Counsellor of the Russian Ministry of Disaster Resources, verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998; B. Schiborin, Russian Foreign Ministry, verbal statement at the working group meeting, 18 November 1998; A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise “Fort”, verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998; N. Shnitkina “Munition Depots Blow Up More And More Often,” Independent Military Review, No. 4, January 1998.

[29] V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998; A. Kostiukov, “Fort,” 10 November 1998; N. Antonenko “Second Wind,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine.

[30] Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999 ; N. Antonenko, “Second Wind,” Armeysky Sborni Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 62-63.

[31] Ibid.


[33] N. Shnitkina “Munition Depots Blow Up More And More Often.”

[34] “Landmines: Outlook from Russia” Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense.

[35]. L. Medlev, L. Gavaza, “Sappers Are Needed By All Power-Enforcement Ministries”, Armeysky Sbornik, No. 1, 1999; .A.V. Nizhalovsky Deputy Chief Commander of Engineer Forces, statement at the 1998 Moscow Conference, 28 May 1998.

[36] IPPNW-Russia, “Materials of the First International Conference on APMs in Russia-CIS, 27-28 May 1998,” Moscow, 1998, p. 30.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] “Landmines: Outlook from Russia,” report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense.

[40] “Landmines: Outlook from Russia” Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense.

[41] Presidential Decree #1010 of November 13, 1995, "On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian Operations."

[42] A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise “Fort”: verbal statement at the working group meeting, November 10, 1998.

[43] S. Kudinov, Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Direct Action: presentation at the Moscow Conference, May 27, 1998.

[44] V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources; statement at the 1998 Moscow conference.

[45] Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, Moscow, 25 February 1999.

[46] The so-called “District Military Committee” – “raivoenkomat.”

[47] V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.

[48] S. Kudinov, Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Direct Action, presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.

[49] V. Rosinov, orthopedic surgeon, All-Russian Center for disaster medicine, presentation at the Moscow Conference, 28 May 1998.