The Russian Federation
has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. President Boris Yeltsin and other
officials have stated Russia’s willingness to sign at some point in the
future, but it is clear that the Russian military still considers antipersonnel
mines a necessary weapon, and insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines
must be in place before Russia can ban the weapon. Russia has also expressed
concerns about its financial capacity to destroy its large stockpile within the
four years required by the treaty. Russia has stated a strong preference for
dealing with controls on antipersonnel mines through the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) and the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), rather than
the Mine Ban Treaty.
On 10 October 1997, in response to the announcement that the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines had won the Nobel Peace Prize, President Yeltsin was
widely reported to have said, for the first time, that Russian would sign the
ban treaty.[1] A few days later
at a joint press conference with French President Jacques Chirac at the European
Council Summit in Strasbourg, he reiterated, “We are supporting the idea
and will endeavor to take the decision and sign the
Convention.”[2] At a
regional landmine conference in Budapest, Hungary in March 1998, the Russian
representative said, “As it is well known, Russia supports the efforts of
the international community to achieve the complete banning and elimination of
antipersonnel mines.... President B.I. Yeltsin has declared Russia’s
positive approach towards the Ottawa Convention. The representative of Russia
reiterated this stand...on December 4, 1997 in Ottawa, emphasizing
Russia’s willingness to accede to this instrument in the foreseeable
future.”[3]
Russian officials have also highlighted some of the positive steps Russian
has taken toward a ban: a moratorium on export of non-detectable and
“dumb” antipersonnel mines, a ban on the production of blast mines,
the destruction of more than half a million of the stockpiled
APMs.[4]
Russia attended all of the treaty preparatory meetings, the Oslo
negotiations, and the Ottawa treaty signing conference, but in each case only as
an observer. It did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels declaration in June
1997. Russia was one of only ten countries to abstain in the vote on UN General
Assembly 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement
banning antipersonnel landmines (passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996). It was also
among the few who abstained on the 1997 UNGA Resolution supporting the treaty
signing and the 1998 UNGA Resolution welcoming the addition of new states to the
Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting state parties and
observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.
In February 1999, the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
was expressed by Ambassador Boris Schiborin, Chief Counsellor of the Department
of Security and Disarmament, and Andrei Malov, Counsellor of the same
department: “Russia stresses its positive approach to the Ottawa
Convention and its readiness to join the process within reasonable time limits
in the future. This time frame will depend on solving a number of technical,
financial and other problems stemmed from the Convention stipulations. Among
them--the speediest possible preparations for the functional substitutes of
APMs.... Russia believes that the goal for a complete APM ban should be
achieved stage by stage. It is a process rather than a one-time
action.”[5]
The views of the military were expressed by Colonel-General Vladimir P.
Kuznetsov, Chief Commander of the Engineer Forces, in an article in Krasnaya
Zvezda, a Ministry of Defense newspaper, on the eve of the ban treaty
signing. Colonel-General Kuznetsov said Russia could not sign the treaty mainly
because there are no “alternative means that could adequately substitute
for APMs and fulfill their military task”and because it “requires
the destruction of entire stockpiles of APMs within a four-year period,”
which he believed Russia could not manage
financially.[6]
Conference on Disarmament
Ambassador Schiborin has commented: “It is not a secret that
diplomatically and politically Russia is intensively promoting the CD as the
main forum for the mine action issue....Russia's initiative to strive for the
soonest possible start of the negotiations in the CD on the global ban on the
export (and then the transfer) of APMs has been actively supported by a whole
range of states.... First, the CD could ensure the universal character of the
solution to the problem. The CD is not aimed at splitting the international
community into those who have joined the Ottawa Convention and those who have
abstained from it (which is the case in the Ottawa process). Second, the CD
possesses the experience to deal with such problems. Third, the CD is authorized
by the UN Security Council for solving this level of problems. Fourth, almost
all states which are mine producers or mine exporters are represented in the
CD.”[7]
Russia was one of 22 CD members that in February 1999 jointly called for the
appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad
Hoc Committee to negotiate an export
ban.[8]
Convention on Conventional Weapons
Russia is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)
and its original Protocol II on landmines. Russia agreed to the amended
Protocol II in May 1996, but has not yet ratified it. According to a Foreign
Ministry official, the ratification documents have been
prepared,[9] but the government
has refrained from submitting them to the parliament for consideration due to
financial constraints. Officials from the Ministry of Defense have said,
“Russian armed forces have been conducting preparations to fulfill the
requirements of the 1996 Protocol II since 1996. Necessary recommendations on
the combat use of APMs in compliance with the new requirements have been
prepared and released to the related staffs and commanders of military
units.”[10]
Colonel-General Vladimir P. Kuznetsov has said that revised Protocol II
“reflects the agreed upon consensus positions and the interests of the
majority of countries, including Russia” and ensures “a reasonable
balance of military and humanitarian
interests.”[11]
Production
It is believed that since 1992, Russia has been
producing at least ten types of antipersonnel
mines:[12]
PMN - blast, pressure-type mine;
PMN-2 - blast, pressure-type mine;
PMN-4 - blast, pressure-type mine;
OZM-72 - fragmentation, bounding mine;
MON-50 - fragmentation (directional) mine;
MON-90 - fragmentation (directional) mine;
MON-100 - fragmentation (directional) mine;
MON-200 - fragmentation (directional) mine;
PFM-1S - blast mine (also used in KSF-1S cluster units)
POM-2 - fragmentation mine (also used in KPOM-2 cluster
units)[13]
In May 1998 official representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast
APMs.[14] While further details
have not been provided, it can be assumed this means that the following mines
are no longer produced: PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S. The PMN-type mines are,
along with the Chinese Type 72, the most widely used throughout the world. The
PFM-type (known as the Butterfly or Green Parrot) was used in huge quantities by
the USSR in Afghanistan.
Russia has so far produced APMs at state-controlled enterprises only.
Research and development on antipersonnel mines was carried out, among other
places, at the Balashikha Scientific Research Engineer Institute located about
10 kilometers to the southwest of Moscow. According to research conducted for
Landmine Monitor by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War-Russia (IPPNW-Russia), other industrial enterprises that have been involved
in the production of mines and/or their components and/or their assembling
include:
* Saransky mechanical plant, republic of Mordoviya (PMN-2, PMN-4),
* Chapayevsky experimental plant for measurement instruments, Samara region
(PMN,OZM-72)
The production system for landmines now is in transition. The Chief
Commander of Russia’s Engineer Forces has said that as a result of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, 90% of Russia’s engineer ammunition
and armament production facilities were left outside the territory of Russia,
and that most of the enterprises that produced mines during Soviet times were
located in Ukraine, Belarus and in the Baltic republics of the former
USSR.[15] But, within the last
three to five years, the military has managed to organize in Russia the
production of different modern types of the engineer ammunition, including mines
and fuzes, which were previously produced outside its
territory.[16] Some plants
that have been carrying out assembly of AP mines are now mastering the
technology of their destruction.
One particular mine type deserves special mention. It appears that Russia
has equipped a MON directional fragmentation mine (Claymore type) with a light
sensitive detector. In Chechnya, a soldier from the reconnaissance group of the
Sophrino Brigade of the Russian Internal Forces encountered such a mine, which
detonated when he pointed his flashlight at it while surveying the basement of a
building in Grozny.[17] There
are grounds to believe that these APMs are still produced in Russia.
While all AP mines in Russia have been traditionally produced at state
enterprises, many experts believe that a small number of landmines are being
produced in Russia by private companies for sale on the black market.
Alternatives
The Russian Federation “carries out research to modernize the existing
and develop new types of mines as well as to develop alternative types of
weaponry.”[18] Research
work on alternatives to antipersonnel mines is reportedly under way, but few
details are available.[19] The
Russian Ministry of Defense says that “the development of systems
alternative to APMs and accumulation of their minimal stockpiles will take up to
ten years.”[20]
Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov says, “alternative means able to adequately
substitute APMs will be developed and produced in necessary quantities by the
years of
2007-2010.”[21]
According to the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, specialists are
considering a broad array of alternative means to serve as replacements of AP
mines, looking at “improving AP munitions” that are not defined as
antipersonnel mines under the ban treaty. Under consideration are AP munitions
which are actuated by an operator by radio, wire or automatically after a
definite period of time. “The development may proceed along two
directions: improvement of fragmentation munitions and creation of new means of
control.”[22]
Among the institutions where R&D of AP mines and their alternatives are
carried out are: V.V. Kuibishev Military Engineers Academy; Central Research,
Development and Test Institute; proving range; Central Design and Technology
Bureau and Design-Fortification Bureau; and the State Research and Development
Engineer Institute (NIII).[23]
NIII has been researching and developing mines, mine-laying systems, as well as
means for explosive demining to support Engineer troops for fifty years, and is
now conducting research on alternative means to AP mines.
The Science-Research Machinery Building Institute (NIMI) has developed a
class of engineer ammunition called “Reactive Systems with Fragmentation
Combat Elements (OBE)” for attacking personnel and non-armored material.
According to the designers, it could be activated both through remote-control
and autonomously (from the target’s sensor), differentiating between
people and vehicles. The designers of this new class of engineer ammunition
argue that it does not fall under the restrictions of the CCW or the Mine Ban
Treaty and thus they express hope that this system would attract attention
abroad and would be exported in
future.[24]
Transfer
The Soviet Union was one of the world’s
largest exporters of antipersonnel mines, and Russia has also exported APMs.
Before 1991, Soviet-made AP mines were supplied to dozens of countries.
However, on 1 December 1994 Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the
export of APMs that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction
devices. On 1 December 1997 the moratorium was extended for another five years,
until December 2002.[25] The
moratorium “cannot be revised or revoked until its expiration in
accordance with Russia’s
law.”[26]
IPPNW-Russia has compiled some random statistics on Soviet AP mine
exports:
- Ethiopia: 120,000 in 1983; 152,000 in 1984; 7,500 in 1987
- Angola: 12,000 in 1984; 9,000 in 1983
- Cuba: 10,000 in 1986
Other countries where Soviet mines have been found include Cambodia, Iran,
Iraq, Laos, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Vietnam.
Stockpiling
There is no official public number of
antipersonnel landmines stockpiled by Russia. One published report states that
Russia has approximately 60 million landmines which fall under the provisions of
the Mine Ban Treaty.[27] ICBL
interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well
as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely
has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock.
The types in stock are likely to include all of the mines listed in the
“Production” section above as being currently or formerly produced
by Russia and USSR. Stockpiles of APMs are located in various regions throughout
the country: at manufacturing plants (in the cities of Saransk, Bryansk); sites
of systematic APM destruction/recycling; within border adjacent territories
under supervision of local military command-staff; and presumably at some
nuclear facilities of the Russian Ministry of atomic energy--to be used for
defense purposes in potential “endangering”
situations.[28]
Destruction
Russia carries out systematic destruction of its older, obsolete APMs. It
also recycles them, dismantling the APMs and extracting explosive substances
that are further reprocessed and used for civilian purposes like industrial
mining. Destruction is accomplished at industrial facilities in the cities of
Saransk and Bryansk, at sites of engineer forces, and perhaps other
locations.[29]
Some plants that have been carrying out assembly of AP mines are now
mastering the technology of their destruction.
Mines currently slated for destruction include not only those obsolete mines
and those with an expired period of storage, but also those which are not in
compliance with the requirements of CCW Protocol II. Current plans call for
destroying non-CCW compliant mines over an eight year period
(1998-2005).[30] In 1998, more
than 500,000 non-CCW compliant AP mines were
destroyed.[31]
The Ministry of Defense has calculated that it will cost 40 billion Roubles
(about US$6.4 million) annually to destroy all of its non-CCW compliant mines.
The Chief Division of Engineer Forces explained that the cheapest explosive
destruction technologies would not be used due to environmental concerns, and
instead the much more labor-consuming and hence costly dismantling technologies
would be used.[32]
Russian officials have expressed concerns about their financial ability to
destroy AP mines in the time frame required by the Mine Ban Treaty (four years),
and also about their ability to rapidly create ecologically safe and effective
technologies and means for destruction of all APMs.
Storage
The sudden influx of ammunition and antipersonnel mines into Russian storage
areas from 1989 to 1993 from other former Soviet republics has worsened the
conditions of storage of all types of ammunition, including mines. The
stockpiles of some military districts, especially those which are now border
districts, are overloaded, and the military have to keep ammunition in open
places, creating a security and safety problem. Landmines are often stored in
poor conditions. The inspection of storage conditions of Army and Navy munitions
carried out by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office in late 1997
revealed various violations in 220 inspected military units and bodies of the
Ministry of Defense, including the storage facilities of engineer munitions:
“In a number of regions munitions stored in unacceptable conditions pose
danger not only for environment but also for people’s
life.”[33] The Chief
Military Prosecutor’s report reveals that many munitions are outdated but
haven’t been destroyed or dismantled due to the lack of financial,
technological and industrial means.
Use
Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
antipersonnel mines were used most notably along the border with China
(especially in the 1960s and 1970s) and during the conflict in Afghanistan
(1979-89). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, during the period of
disintegration of the Soviet Union, some military units of the Ministry of
Defense located on the territories of the former Soviet republics, mainly in
Transcaucasia and Central Asia, used antipersonnel mines to protect strategic
sites, munition depots and command
posts.[34] Mines were also
used in the early stages of the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh and during
interethnic conflicts in Tajikistan and North Ossetia.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have used APMs
most notably during large-scale combat operations in Chechnya from December 1994
until June 1996 (see report on Chechnya). Mines were also used by Russians as
part of the CIS peacekeeping contingent in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict starting
from June 1994, to protect strategic sites, infrastructure, and command posts,
and as part of the peacekeeping contingent in Tajikistan to protect strategic
sites and facilities, parts of the Tajik-Afghani border, military depots and
posts, as well as for “blocking and isolating the areas occupied by the
rebel forces, cutting possible rebel routes through the state (administrative
border).”[35]
The AP mines most frequently used by Russian forces have been: PMN, PMN-3;
OZM-72; MON-50, -90, -100;
KPOM.[36]
Landmine Problem
The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXOs
after World War II. The problem was the most serious in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus
and the Caucasus. Uncleared mines and UXO from World War II are still a problem
in some areas. According to recent reports, mines and UXOs are emerging again
as an issue of concern for a number of reasons. The economic development of
previously abandoned lands, including former battlefields, that were never
previously cleared from UXOs is creating a problem. According to recent
estimates, another ten to fifteen years of effort is required to clear these
areas.[37] Moreover, previous
clearance operations never went deeper than 30-40 cm, while deeply laid UXOs
have moved upwards to the surface since the end of the war. Thus, previously
cleared territories deemed safe for many years are endangered
anew.[38] There is also the
danger posed to civilians from recent use of mines in ethnic conflicts.
Today there are requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories where
World War II battles took place. Summarized data is given in the following
table[39]:
TERRITORY AREA NEEDING CLEARANCE (hectares)
Krasnodarsky territory 40,330
Murmansk region 42,000
Leningrad region 9,634
Novgorod region 60,200
Pskov region 13,836
Tver region 54,000
Voronezh region 48,800
Belgorod region 66,000
Rostov region 83,200
Kursk region 82,000
Total 540,000
Mine Clearance
Russia has not made any donations to the UN
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, nor has it received any
funds for mine action programs within Russia.
In the post-World War II period, demining operations were carried by the
Engineer Forces of the Defense Ministry. There were three stages of mine/UXO
clearance. During the first stage (1946-1953), 183,000 square km were cleared
and over 56.7 million UXOs removed. During the second stage (1954-1965), only
the most infested areas were cleared, i.e. Leningrad, Northern and Baltic
regions. Over 12,000 square km were cleared of 10,000 UXOs. During the third
stage (1966-1970) over 214,000 square km were cleared from 72 million
UXOs.[40]
Today demining operations are the responsibility of three structures in
Russia: the Ministry of Defense’s Engineer Forces; the Ministry for Civil
Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources’ Russian National Corps of
Emergent Humanitarian Operations; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’
demining brigades.[41] Demining
is also conducted by non-governmental enterprises like the company "Fort"
(Moscow), which is carrying out demining in Tver, Moscow and Vladimir regions,
and the company "Iskatel" (St.-Petersburg). Employees of these companies are
mainly retired officers of engineer
forces.[42]
The following chart shows total UXOs (including mines) cleared and destroyed
in recent years.
1989 131,086
1990 175,808
1991 112,258
1992 112,258
1993 64,411
1994 78,751
1995 35,303
1996 53,872
1997 103,832
The regressive tendency in the early 1990s reflects the worsening economic
situation and shrinking of finances for demining purposes in Russia rather than
the decrease of the explosive ordnance remaining in the ground.
The Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources has drawn
up a draft plan to clear within five years the 540,000 hectares requested for
clearance in ten provinces. This covers 30% of the territories that need mine
clearance.[43] The Ministry
will be responsible for clearance in the Leningrad and Voronezh
regions.[44]
Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and
regions. According to official data, in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict
engineers of the Russian peacekeeping forces searched for mines on more than 250
km of roads and up to 1,000 square km of terrain. As a result, more than 23,000
explosive units were found and destroyed. Russian peacekeepers in Tajikistan
found and destroyed more than 18,000 landmines and UXOs. They have destroyed
13,500 landmines and UXOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations won an
international tender for carrying out humanitarian demining in
Bosnia.[45] Russian deminers
began mine clearance operations Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1998. The
specialists are to clear forty-five hectares of minefields. According to the
Ministry of Disaster Resources data, twenty-three deminers previously working in
this area have been killed. In 1998 there were three mine accidents with
deminers and two with trained dogs.
Engineers of the Russian Armed Forces have taken part in demining operations
in more than 20 countries, e.g. Algeria, Libya and Syria among others. The Draft
Presidential Decree and Resolution of the Government on the organization of the
participation of the Russian Federation in international projects on
humanitarian demining were worked out in order to regulate Russian participation
in demining operations beyond the Russian territory. The Russian Ministry of
Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is planned and
fulfilled within the framework of military-technical co-operation with foreign
states via the federal state unitary enterprises GK "Rosvooruzheniye,"
"Promexport," or on the basis of bilateral agreements between the Russian
Ministry of Defense and foreign governments.
Mine Awareness
During Soviet times, dissemination of mine
awareness information in mine-affected areas was carried out by district
military recruiting offices
(“voenkomat”).[46]
Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary
military training providing information on mine danger to students living in
mine-affected areas.
After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these
activities have ground to a halt. As a result of secondary education reform, the
course on primary military training in secondary schools has been retracted,
while district recruiting offices have received neither staff nor finances to
continue mine awareness
activities.[47]
Landmine Casualties
In Russia, mines continue killing and maiming
people more than half a century after WWII ended. In the last seven years,
eighty-four cases of mine/UXO incidents have been registered, with 167 people
injured, and seventy-nine children killed in Russia and
CIS.[48] According to other
data, between 1992 and 1998 there were eighty-four accidents within the
territories of former Second World War battlefields. Thirty-nine people died and
sixty-seven were wounded (50% of the casualties were children). There have been
a significant number of mine casualties in other parts of the Russian
Federation, particularly in Chechnya. (See report on Chechnya)
Survivor Assistance
Russian military medical practice has accumulated
enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during the
World War II. The National Corps of Catastrophe Medicine Defense was very
active in the Chechnya conflict and still continues to render medical aid and
carry out rehabilitation programs to mine victims arriving from Chechnya.
Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration services are
available for landmine survivors in Russia. In Moscow, there is the Scientific
Research Institute of Prostheses, Moscow Prosthetic Plant, and numerous
workshops. Forty-eight children from Chechnya got treatment (reconstructive
operations) in the Moscow pediatric hospital N 9; thirty-two got prostheses in
the Moscow Institute of Prostheses. The federal government paid 60% of their
cost and Moscow city government paid
40%.[49] According to the 1995
Federal law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped” an
individual rehabilitation and reintegration program is developed and offered for
each handicapped person.
[3] Statement by Mr. B.A.
Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest
Seminar, 26-28 March 1998.
[4] See, for example, Boris
Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,”
position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999.
[5] Boris Schiborin and
Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” position paper
prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999.
[6] Vladimir P. Kuznetsov,
"Ottawa Process and Russia's Position," Krasnaya Zvezda Daily, 27
November 1997.
[7] Schiborin and Malov,
“Russian and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999.
[8] Statement by Bulgarian
Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February
1999.
[9] Interview with Andrei
Malov, Counsellor of the Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999.
[10] Press release of the
Chief Division of Engineer Forces of RF at the opening of the 1998 Moscow
conference “New Steps To a Mine-Free Future,” IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May
1998.
[12]Russia’s Arms
Catalogue, Volume 1, Army 1996-1997, published by “Military
Parade,” JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the
Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, p. 276-83. See also, “Landmines:
Outlook from Russia,” Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer
Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.
[13] Other notable
antipersonnel mines produced by the Soviet Union in the past include PMD type
box mines (PMD 6/6M/7/57), POMZ type stake fragmentation mines (POMZ 2/2M),
other OZM types (OZM 3/4/160), and the PFM-1 scatterable blast mine.
[14] B. Schiborin, chief
counselor of the Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry; presentation
at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998. A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of
Engineering Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the
Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.
[15] Mine production
technologies and facilities presumably also remained in the Central Asian
Republics as well. See, Vladimir Kuznetsov, “S Uchetom Boevogo opyta
zivut I uchatsya ingenernie voiska,” Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red
Star), 21 January 1998; interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 16 February 16, 1999; A. Raylyan “Like a Phoenix From Its
Ashes,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 64-65.
[16] Vladimir Kuznetsov.
“Novyi Oblik Ingenernych Voisk” (New outlook of the Engineer
Troops), Armeiskii Sbornik (Army’s journal) No.1, 1998, p. 11.
[17] M. Nagorny, Department
of the Chief Commander of Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense,
verbal statement at the working group meeting on 18 November 1998.
[18] A. Overchenko,
“Traditional and New Tasks,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No.
1, 1997.
[19] Press release of the
Chief Division of Engineer Forces, Moscow, 27 May 1998; A. Nizhalovsky,
deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, presentation at the Moscow Conference,
27 May 1998.
[20] Press release of the
Chief Division of Engineer Forces, Moscow, 27 May 1998.
[21] Interview with
Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, Moscow, 25 February 1999.
[22] “Landmines:
Outlook from Russia,” report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer
Forces.
[23] Vladimir Kuznetsov,
“Russia’s Engineer Troops,” p. 31.
[24] V. Kireev, “NIMI:
noviye inzhenernyie I artilleriiskie boepripasy (New Engineer and artillery
ammunitions)” Voennyi Parad (Military Parade), January 1998, p.
46.
[25] Presidential Decrees No.
2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.
[26] Interview with Andrei
Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999.
[27] Andrei Korbut,
“Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min
znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a
Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense). Nezavisimoe Voennoe
Obozrenie, No.39, 1997, p. 6.
[28] V. Vasiliev,
Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Counsellor of the Russian Ministry of Disaster
Resources, verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998; B.
Schiborin, Russian Foreign Ministry, verbal statement at the working group
meeting, 18 November 1998; A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise
“Fort”, verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November
1998; N. Shnitkina “Munition Depots Blow Up More And More Often,”
Independent Military Review, No. 4, January 1998.
[29] V. Vasiliev,
Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998; A.
Kostiukov, “Fort,” 10 November 1998; N. Antonenko “Second
Wind,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine.
[30] Interview with
Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999 ; N. Antonenko, “Second
Wind,” Armeysky Sborni Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 62-63.
[33] N. Shnitkina
“Munition Depots Blow Up More And More Often.”
[34] “Landmines:
Outlook from Russia” Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer
Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense.
[35]. L. Medlev, L. Gavaza,
“Sappers Are Needed By All Power-Enforcement Ministries”,
Armeysky Sbornik, No. 1, 1999; .A.V. Nizhalovsky Deputy Chief Commander
of Engineer Forces, statement at the 1998 Moscow Conference, 28 May 1998.
[36] IPPNW-Russia,
“Materials of the First International Conference on APMs in Russia-CIS,
27-28 May 1998,” Moscow, 1998, p. 30.