The UK’s position
on antipersonnel landmines (APMs) has progressed significantly since 1994,
culminating in its participation in the Ottawa Process, and the signing and
ratification of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While the UK attended the first
meeting of what became the Ottawa Process in October 1996, it was not part of
the early core group of pro-ban countries. Also in October 1996 the UK signed an
EU Joint Action supporting a comprehensive global ban at the earliest possible
date, supporting mine clearance and implementing a common export moratorium on
all APMs.[1] The UK subsequently
supported the key December 1996 United Nations General Assembly Resolution
51/45S, urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement to ban
landmines, passed by a vote of 156-0, with ten abstentions. Even so, until
after May 1997 British general election, the UK was not fully committed to the
Ottawa Process and a rapid solution to the global landmine crisis.
Immediately after the election of a new (Labor) government in May 1997 a new
UK policy was announced. First, the destruction of all APM stocks and a ban on
their use by 2005 at the latest. Second, a moratorium on use until either 2005
or an “effective international agreement enters into force, whichever
comes first.” Third, to negotiate “constructively” for an
international ban in the Ottawa Process while working in the Conference on
Disarmament for a wider ban. Finally, to retain use in “exceptional
circumstances” authorized by Ministers and reported to Parliament; this
included the potential use of the JP233 airfield denial weapon (containing the
HB876 air-scattered antipersonnel mines), and the L27 antitank
mine.[2]
In a written answer to a Parliamentary Question by Helen Jackson MP,
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Robin Cook said:
We shall implement our manifesto commitment to ban the import, export,
transfer and manufacture of all forms of anti-personnel landmines. We will
accelerate the phasing out of our stocks of anti-personnel landmines and
complete it by 2005 or when an effective international agreement to ban their
use enters into force, whichever comes first. In the meantime we have
introduced a complete moratorium on their operational use, while we participate
constructively in the Ottawa
Process.[3]
This positive change in policy, however, was not fully reflected by the UK
delegation to the Inter-Governmental Conference for a Total Ban on Antipersonnel
Landmines, held in Brussels in June 1997. For example, the UK requested an
exemption from any requirement to clear minefields in the Falklands/Malvinas;
this was sought on the grounds that full clearance may not be economically
viable and that it is of lesser priority than mine clearance in Angola and other
severely affected countries. UK nongovernmental organization (NGO) observers
reported that the UK government delegates were skeptical about the Ottawa
Process and apparently remained convinced of the military utility of
APMs.[4] However, in its
closing statement in Brussels, the UK delegation expressed its hope that more
countries would join the Ottawa Process, and that the Oslo meeting would lead to
an “effective international agreement that we will be able to
sign.”[5]
By the time of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference of September 1997, to negotiate
the final text of the Treaty, the UK was a full participant in the Ottawa
Process. Surprisingly to some NGO observers in Oslo, the UK delegation remained
silent in the face of US proposals that would have seriously undermined the
Treaty – unlike, for example, Spain and Japan, which strongly supported
the US in the negotiations.
On 12 November 1997, Clare Short, Secretary of State for International
Development, announced that she would sign the treaty in Ottawa in December.
I shall proudly sign on behalf of Britain to join the landmine ban. I will
emphasise the Government's commitment to achieving the widest possible support
for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. We shall follow up the Ottawa
Convention in other negotiating bodies. We shall also pursue with vigour our
programme of de-mining. The British delegation will take part in the parallel
round table discussions, which will include discussion of plans to speed up and
coordinate de-mining
internationally.[6]
On 3 December 1997 Clare Short signed the Mine Ban Treaty on behalf of the
United Kingdom.
Ratification and Implementing Legislation
The UK Parliament has no formal, constitutional role in treaty
making.[7] Instead, the power to
make treaties is vested in the executive. It is the practice in the UK for
treaties simply to be laid before Parliament by the executive for at least three
weeks, following which the government can proceed with the deposition of
instruments of ratification with the United Nations. However, Parliament does
have a role when a treaty requires a change in UK law for its implementation.
Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty required the UK to take appropriate
administrative and legal measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions,
to prevent breaches of the treaty’s provisions on UK territory.
Having signed the treaty, the UK government repeatedly stated that the
Parliamentary timetable was too full to provide time for adopting implementing
legislation, and no commitment was made to a future date when such time would be
made available. The government had previously announced that it would be one of
the first forty countries to ratify the Convention. Following public and media
pressure, on 1 July 1998 Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that a bill would
be put before Parliament before its summer recess. On 3 July 1998 a Landmines
Bill was published to bring implementation of the treaty into British law, and
to enable the UK to ratify it. This started the main stages of its passage
through Parliament in the House of Commons a week later. The Landmines Act
received Royal Assent on 28 July and the United Kingdom formally deposited its
instrument of ratification with the United Nations on 31 July 1998, placing it
among the first forty to ratify.
The Landmines Bill was not published without criticism. Among NGOs, including
the UK Working Group on Landmines (UKWGLM), the most important concern was, and
remains, Clause 5, (now Section 5), which the UKWGLM believes is contrary to the
Mine Ban Treaty’s Article 1 prohibitions. The bill created a loophole for
British forces engaged in “international military operations,” such
as NATO operations, with countries not party to the treaty (for example the
U.S.). It provides a defense for people committing an offense relating to
antipersonnel mines when they take part in a military operation, or the planning
of a military operation, which takes place “wholly or mainly outside the
United Kingdom.” In these circumstances the legislation effectively
prohibits only the actual laying of APMs.
Despite political opposition, Clause 5 remained in the Bill passed by
Parliament. The government has made a number statements on the issue, some of
which gave a more positive interpretation of the “US/NATO loophole”
in the Landmines Act than can be read from the wording of the Act itself.
Sections 5(2) and 5(3) provide that in proceedings for an alleged violation,
“it is a defense for the accused to prove that —
(a) the conduct was in the course of, or for the purposes of, a military
operation or the planning of a military operation;
(b) the conduct was not the laying of an antipersonnel mine
(3) This section applies to a military operation if —
(a) it takes place wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom
(c) the operation is one in the course of which there is or may be some
deployment of antipersonnel mines by members of the armed forces of one or more
States that are not parties to the Ottawa Convention, but in the course of which
such mines are not to be laid in contravention of that
Convention.”[8]
The Landmines Act appears to contradict the Mine Ban Treaty by separating the
actual laying of antipersonnel landmines in international military operations
from other prohibited activities such as acquiring, possessing, or transferring
APMs and assisting, encouraging or inducing others to lay them. This
interpretation of the UK legislation suggests that even the planning of a mine
laying operation in international operations is permitted. It is clear,
however, that the Mine Ban Treaty forbids these other activities as absolutely
as it forbids the laying of APMs.
During its Parliamentary passage and since it became law, the Landmines Act
has been the subject of a number of explanatory statements by the government.
These were intended to support the view that the Act does not contradict the
treaty. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told the House of Commons “that the
Bill gives full effect to the provisions of the Ottawa
Convention.”[9] However, a
Defense Minister in the same debate said that clause 5 “enables United
Kingdom service men and women to engage closely in the planning and conduct of
an operation with those who may, lawfully for them, use anti-personnel
landmines.”[10]
At the same time, the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said:
Clause 5 does not provide British servicemen with any loophole to take part
in the deployment of landmines. British forces will be instructed in their rules
of engagement for any exercise or operation that they must not use, possess,
transport or handle landmines. Clause 5 provides British servicemen with a
shield against unreasonable prosecution because they took part in a North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation exercise in which American forces deployed
landmines. Without clause 5, any British Army officer present at a NATO planning
meeting who heard that American forces taking part may possess landmines would
be obliged to say that he must leave the meeting, or would render himself liable
to a prison sentence of 14
years.[11]
When the legislation completed its passage through Parliament, the Foreign
Secretary announced that the government had “[p]laced in the Library the
note accompanying the instrument of ratification, which sets out our
understanding that the mere participation in the planning or execution of
operations, exercises or other military activity by the United Kingdom’s
Armed Forces, or individual United Kingdom nationals, conducted in combination
with armed forces of States not party to the Ottawa Convention, is not, by
itself, assistance, encouragement or inducement for the purposes of Article 1,
paragraph 1(c) of the
Convention.”[12]
UK NGOs, including the UK Working Group on Landmines, argue that it is
difficult to see how “a total ban, without exception” can allow
“the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military
activity by the UK’s armed forces” which involve antipersonnel
landmines. It is also difficult for NGOs to accept that being engaged
“closely in the planning and conduct of an operation with those who may,
lawfully for them, use anti-personnel landmines” amounts to “mere
participation” in such operations.
The UK Working Group on Landmines’ analysis that the Landmines Act does
not faithfully and fully reflect the Mine Ban Treaty is supported by legal
advice on the government’s requirement for the exemption, which was
obtained from a lawyer at the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This
opinion is that:
The UK soldier could not be considered a passive actor if he knows he is
transporting landmines since he is doing a positive act with the intention to do
so, thereby risking a 14-year sentence under the UK legislation. As a result,
the Foreign Office came to the view that a line needed to be drawn for joint
military operations. The draft Bill, in their view, does this by drawing a line
between the prohibition on putting landmines in the ground (still applicable to
UK soldiers involved in joint operations) and all other aspects of assistance
during joint military operations (such as the transport of
landmines).[13]
The UKWGLM was also disturbed when the government described the existing
moratorium on the use of APMs as having become “a total ban, without
exception” on the day that the UK’s instrument of ratification was
deposited with the UN,[14] but
at the same time also announced that it retained the right to use APMs in
“extreme circumstances” until entry into force of the treaty. This
was explained by the Foreign Office in a letter dated 27 April 1998 to the UK
campaign:
The position with regard to use of anti-personnel landmines by UK Forces is
that there is a moratorium in place, which will only be lifted in extreme
circumstances of self-defense, where Ministers consider that the lives of UK
Forces would be jeopardized without the use of such mines. Such circumstances
would be reported to Parliament. The moratorium on use will become a complete
ban when the Ottawa Convention enters into force for
us.[15]
Convention on Conventional Weapons
The Convention on Conventional Weapons was signed by the UK on 10 April 1981,
but not ratified until 13 February 1995. Ratification of the CCW allowed the UK
to participate fully in the Convention’s review conference, which started
in September 1995 and closed in May 1996. The UK’s letter of acceptance
of Amended Protocol II of the CCW was deposited with the UN Secretary General on
11 February 1999.[16]
The UK defined its position for the CCW review conference in February 1995.
First, it supported a ban on non-detectable antipersonnel mines and the
extension of the CCW to cover civil wars and other internal conflicts. Second,
it wanted clear definitions and standards for self-destructing mines,
stipulating when and how minefields should be marked and ensuring mapping.
Third, it called for an international code on the transfer of APMs, but also
argued for such a code to allow for the export and use of self-destructing
mines. Fourth, it sought to secure agreement on the provision of assistance to
humanitarian agencies working in mined
areas.[17]
However, on 22 April 1996, before the final session of the CCW review
conference, the UK government announced a substantive change in policy “in
order to make greater progress in achieving international agreement.” The
main move was to back a total international prohibition on APMs. Meanwhile the
UK would destroy 46 percent of its APM stocks; upgrade the rest of its stocks to
be self-destructing; use APMs only in “exceptional circumstances”
and in accordance with the CCW; and seek alternatives to APMs and if successful
cease to use them and destroy all its stocks. The UK repeated this policy as
its opening statement at the Ottawa Conference in October
1996.[18]
Conference on Disarmament
The UK government’s position at the end of 1996 was that a
comprehensive ban on APMs should be sought in the Conference on Disarmament
(CD). In January 1997 the then government proposed an Ad Hoc Committee “to
negotiate, for conclusion at the earliest possible date, a universal,
effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban
totally the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel
landmines.”[19]
The UK argued in the 1997 session that any agreement on APMs had to include
the major producers, exporters and users of APMs (implicitly arguing –
incorrectly -- that the Ottawa process did not). The UK proposed a phased
approach to banning APMs beginning with a universal ban on transfers with use,
production and stockpiling to be dealt with in the
future.[20]
Following the UK’s signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, the government
announced that it continued to see value in pursuing complementary activity in
the CD, taking “every opportunity to urge as many countries as possible to
sign the Ottawa Convention and [to] press for complementary action, to promote a
global ban on anti-personnel landmines, in international fora, including the
Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva.”[21] This, the
government suggested, will ensure the widest possible participation in a ban of
these weapons.[22] It continues
to follow this policy today.
Production
The UK has been a major past producer and
developer of APMs. Private companies produced antipersonnel mines in the UK,
including the following:
- Thorn EMI Electronics produced the “Ranger” antipersonnel mine
in two forms: a scatterable, plastic APM and an inert practice APM (the
“Ranger Inert”);
- Royal Ordnance produced the No6 blast APM; also the L1E1 PJRAD projected
area defense antipersonnel mines until 1986;
- British Aerospace/Royal Ordnance produced the L9 Bar Mine. This antitank
mine was originally developed with simple single-impulse and double-impulse
fuses, but is apparently “also available with both antitilt and
antidisturbance fuses as part of the Marconi Full Width Attack Mine fusing
program;”[23]
- Hunting Engineering produced the JP233 “Airfield Attack
Weapon,” a cluster bomb that carries two hundred and fifteen HB876 APMs as
well as runway cratering bomblets. Hunting Engineering also produced four
different antitank mines.
In 1995 the Defense Manufacturers Handbook listed British Aerospace Defense,
British Aerospace (Royal Ordnance), Hunting Engineering, and Plalite as having
landmines among their products. However, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated
that “Thorn EMI Electronics, Royal Ordnance and Hunting Engineering are
the only British companies to have produced land mines since 1965.”
Furthermore, MoD was “not aware of any British companies which currently
manufacture components for land
mines.”[24]
British firms have also cooperated with French firms on the production or
development of mines: the APILAS produced by Manurhin, British Aerospace Systems
and Equipment, and Giat; and ARGES (Automatic Rocket Guardian with Electronic
Sensor), a rocket-launched ATM system produced in a consortium of Giat
Industries, Hunting Engineering, Dynamit Nobel and Honeywell
Regelsysteme.[25] The MLRS
(Multiple Launch Rocket System), manufactured by a consortium of European
companies including Hunting Engineering, also has an antitank mine, the German
AT2, with a fuse that UK NGOs believe can be activated by a person.
The UK government reported in 1995 that production of conventional
antipersonnel mines for the Ministry of Defense ceased in 1983, and of antitank
mines in 1991.[26] But according
to later government statements, the most recent MoD order for antipersonnel
mines was placed in
1991.[27]
Thorn EMI provided the UK government with Ranger L10A1 antipersonnel mines,
reportedly in large numbers up to 1986. Royal Ordnance’s L1E1 PJRAD
projected area defense mines were purchased in
1986.[28]
Hunting Engineering produced the HB876, an APM that is contained in the JP233
airfield denial weapon, for the UK government. The government claimed in 1995
that the HB876 mine “is designed specifically to destroy military
airfields and prevent repair” and refused to reclassify the weapon as an
antipersonnel mine. UK NGOs argued that this weapon should be reclassified as an
APM or at the very least as a dual-purpose (antipersonnel and antivehicle)
landmine. Eventually, the government announced that this APM would be destroyed
by 1 January 2000. Ministers accepted in June 1998 that the JP233 fell within
the definition of an antipersonnel mine under the terms of the revised Protocol
2 to the CCW and so was “covered by the moratorium that we have
announced.”[29]
As it will no longer procure any antipersonnel mines, MoD has canceled the
Future Anti-Personnel Scatterable Mine (FAPSM)
project.[30] However, in 1996
the government ordered a replacement for the JP233, the Conventional Armed
Stand-Off Missile (CASOM), which is due to enter service in 2001. More
information about this system is being sought.
Mine components
According to UK Working Group on Landmines research, Hunting Engineering,
Ferranti Instrumentation, Royal Ordnance, Irvin Great Britain, Venture
Technology, ML Aviation Company, and Thorn EMI Electronics all supplied
components of the JP233.[31]
The fuses for antitank Barmine systems were made by Marconi Radar and Control
Systems, a division of General Electric Corporation (GEC), and by Royal
Ordnance. According to GEC, the company ceased the development of mine fuses
“some seven or eight years
ago.”[32] Royal Ordnance
stated in 1996 that it is “not currently procuring landmine components and
has in fact not done so since April 1987.”
Transfer
On 27 July 1994, the government announced a
partial export moratorium, which applied only to conventional
(“dumb”) APMs, in other words those that did not self-destruct or
self-neutralize. The government stated that the UK had not in any case exported
these “for at least the last 10
years.”[33]
This partial export moratorium was extended on 15 March 1995. The government
described the moratorium as “indefinite” and applied it to exports
of all types of APMs to countries not ratifying the CCW, alongside a
“total ban” on the export of any non-detectable mines. The
government subsequently told Parliament in May 1996 that no export licenses had
been applied for, or granted, for antipersonnel landmines or for specially
designed components of such mines since
1990.[34]
Since April 1996 there has been a moratorium on the export of all types of
antipersonnel mines to all
destinations.[35] (Imports of
self-neutralizing or self-destructing mines were not banned until May 1997.)
The export from the UK of all landmines and their designs has been controlled
by Export of Goods (Control) Orders under powers conferred to UK Ministers by
the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defense) Act 1939. The Orders have been
amended and extended in relation to landmines on a number of occasions,
including 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997. For example, following the signing of
the Ottawa Convention by the UK, the Export of Goods (Control) (Amendment No 3)
Order was made, to take effect from 15 December 1997. This removed a 1994 clause
that permitted the export of antipersonnel landmines that had been imported into
the UK for transit, and suggests that imports for re-export were permitted until
that date.
Section 2(1) of the Landmines Act 1998 is now the primary UK legislation
banning the production and transfer of APMs as defined in the Act and Mine Ban
Treaty. The sanction for contravening this ban on exports is 14 years in prison
or a fine or both, on conviction. Section 3 of the Act prohibits UK nationals
from doing anything outside the UK that assists, encourages or induces people to
transfer, produce or possess APMs.
Past exports
In 1993 the US Foreign Science and Technology Center (now known as the
National Ground Intelligence Center) asserted that the UK was in the “top
10 list for sources of landmines found in the ground throughout the world”
until the mid 1980s, and that it was one of the primary export countries of
“advanced mine and countermine technology and equipment.” According
to the UK government, there have been no exports of antipersonnel landmines from
the UK since the late 1980s. Neither the Foreign Office nor the Department for
Trade and Industry, which is responsible for export licenses, has yet released
details of UK arms export licenses. Neither department has yet replied to
NGOs’ detailed questions about export licensing.
There has been conflicting information released by the UK government as to
past exports of landmines. In 1997, a UK government minister told Parliament
that it is “clear from earlier research...that no mines considered to be
anti-personnel mines at the time of export have been exported for over a
decade.”[36] This implied
that mines that are now considered to be antipersonnel mines have been exported
more recently. Previous government statements to Parliament in 1996 had claimed
that antipersonnel mines have not been exported from this country for many
years.
Various sources have reported UK APMs being used in conflicts in Afghanistan,
Mozambique and Somalia.[37] The
No6 blast APM, manufactured by Royal Ordnance, has been reported in Zimbabwe as
well as Mozambique.[38] It is
known that Thorn EMI was active in marketing its Ranger APMs in the 1980s, with
more than one million Rangers sold to overseas clients, including Nigeria in
1981.[39] Thorn EMI has also
exported its Ranger antipersonnel mines to Jordan and at least two other
countries. It is not known whether the mines sold to Nigeria are still in
Nigerian stockpiles or whether they have been re-exported or used. This
transaction with Nigeria appears to be the only APM export to which the UK
government has admitted for the period between 1979 and 1997. However, the
Minister giving this information did not consult the Department of Trade and
Industry (which issues export licenses) before making his statement to
Parliament. He stated that the information on which he based his statement came
only from records available in the Ministry of Defense, which “may not be
definitive.”
Past imports
In 1995, the UK government gave details of mine purchases from overseas
suppliers as follows:
- C3A1 Elsie, purchased between 1965 and 1968 from Canadian Arsenals Ltd;
- M18A1 Claymore between 1965 and 1968, and in 1989 from the U.S. Department
of Defense.
The government told Parliament that there are no records of the cost of these
procurements.[40]
The UK has also imported the L27 off-route antitank mine manufactured by Giat
Industries in France, where it is called the MIACAH F1. In May 1997, the UK
classified this as an antipersonnel mine because it is activated by tripwire.
(See stockpiles below.)
The UK is known to have imported 5,604 antipersonnel mines from the US,
including 5,502 M18A1 Claymores in 1991, twelve M18A1s imported in 1989, and 90
M14s imported in 1973.[41] In
the past, British forces (probably Special Forces) also reportedly possessed the
U.S. Pursuit Deterrent Munition (PDM). Stocks of PDM were said to have been
destroyed after the Gulf War. However, there is no independent evidence of this,
or of the numbers involved.
In December 1995, the UK ordered a Vehicle Launched Scatterable Mine System
(VLSM) from the US firm Alliant Techsystems at a cost of $179 million (£110
million).[42] This system is
known in the UK as Shielder, and although described by the UK government as
antitank, UK NGOs have serious concerns about its antipersonnel characteristics.
The system is to be used on a British vehicle, the Stormer armored personnel
carrier, which has been modified by Alvis Vehicles Ltd. of Coventry. Specific
requests by NGOs for assurances from the government on the fusing and
anti-handling characteristics of Shielder have not yet been answered, despite
statements in Parliament by Ministers that such information has been provided.
Further details of the characteristics of these mines are given below. It is
worth noting that information given above on procurement and imports was
confirmed by a government statement in 1997 that gave details of those companies
that have produced mines for the UK’s Ministry of Defense:
Available records indicate that the following companies/organizations have,
since 1979, met orders from [the MoD] for:
(a) antipersonnel mines: Thorn EMI, Royal Ordnance, the United States
Department of Defense and Alliant Techsystems of the United States
(b) antitank/armored vehicle mines: Royal Ordnance, Hunting Engineering Ltd,
Alliant Techsystems, the MLRS European Production group, and GIAT Industries and
SOFMA of France.[43]
Stockpiling
Currently available information, in detail below,
shows that the UK government still holds stockpiles of APMs, although a large
proportion of stocks have been destroyed. Descriptions of the full range of UK
mine stocks as of July 1998, plus the newly acquired Shielder, are summarized in
Table 1 below.
Although the government has made various announcements on Army stockpiles and
their destruction, these have fallen short of revealing the extent of stocks
held by the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and UK Special Forces. A stockpile
destruction program was to be published, but neither this nor the numbers
involved in destruction have been made public.
Table 1: Types of Mines held by the UK and their Government
classification
(as of July 1998)
- C3A1 Elsie: blast AP mine.
- Ranger: blast AP mine; used with vehicle-mounted firing system.
- Projector Area Defense (PJRAD): fragmentation AP mine.
- M18A1 Claymore: directional fragmentation AP mine; usually command
detonated, but may be target activated; in command detonated mode, not
classified by UK government as a mine.
- L27 Off Route Mine: blast AT mine, classified AP because it is
activated by tripwire; withdrawn from service, to be replaced by ARGES in
2004.
- Mk 7: blast AT mine; two types, standard and waterproofed, to be
phased out in 2000/01.
- Barmine: blast AT mine; several fuse options, including the Anti
Disturbance Double Impulse (ADDI) fuse, and the Full Width Attack Mine
Electronic (FWAM (E)) fuse; the latter has a seismic and magnetic sensor.
- AT2: shaped charge AT mine (scatterable); self-destructing, but
contains integral anti-handling device; dispensed by rocket (MLRS), 28 mines per
rocket, from a maximum range of 39 km; is fully armed within twenty seconds of
landing.
- Shielder Vehicle Launched Scatterable Mine System (new addition to UK
stocks). Vehicle: Alvis Stormer (adapted). Mine laying system: Volcano.
Each vehicle fires 720 L35A1 mines (self-destructing, but with full width attack
with magnetic influence fuses). Moving the mine, once armed, through the
earth’s magnetic field will cause detonation.
The first indication of the numbers held by the UK was given in a statement
to Parliament by Defense Secretary George Robertson. He stated in June 1998 that
438,727 antipersonnel landmines have been destroyed since 1 May 1997,
representing 45.6 per cent of the total number of such landmines held by the
UK.[44] Assuming this figure is
accurate, this suggests a stockpile of about 960,000. However, information
released to Mines Advisory Group at the same time by the Ministry of Defense
suggests that a more accurate estimate was a total stockpile of about 1,250,000,
of which 430,000 had been destroyed by July 1998, with 850,000
remaining.[45] This information
is summarized below.
There is little dispute about the numbers and classification of the Ranger
and Elsie APMs, both of which have had significant proportions destroyed. There
is less information about the numbers and destruction program for the HB876, the
APM that is contained in the JP233 airfield denial weapon. The government
accepted in June 1998 that the JP233 falls within the definition of an
antipersonnel land mine under the terms of the revised Protocol 2 of the CCW and
so it is to be destroyed.
Two other British mines have been re-classified as APMs when used in a
specified fashion: the PJRAD “directional fragmentation mines” and
the US “Claymore” in UK stocks. These are now both classified as
antipersonnel mines when used in automatic (victim-operated)
“stand-alone” mode. But they would not have been considered
antipersonnel mines before mid-1996. The PJRAD was understood to remain in
service in Northern Ireland at least until mid-1998. It is also unclear what the
position is regarding the stockpiles and destruction of these mines.
Table 2: APMs in UK Stockpiles (by type)
Mines classified by Government as APMs:
June 1998
1 March 19991
Elsie C3A1
142,000
0
L10A1 Ranger
1,110,000
0
HB876 (JP233)
est. 25-30,000
All
June 1998
1 March 19991
Mk7
Not known
Not considered APMs by MoD
L1E1 PJRAD
Not known
Not considered APMs by MoD
M18A1
Not known
Not considered APMs by MoD
AT2
Not known
Not considered APMs by MoD
PDM
Not known
Not known
L27
Not known
Not known
Shielder
Not known
Not considered APMs by MoD
1Figures given exclude stocks retained for testing destruction and
detection techniques. There is conflicting information on stocks of PDM and L27:
one source suggests none are held.
Stockpile Destruction
Prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, the government announced that 44 per cent of
APM stocks were to be destroyed, comprising 60 per cent of Elsie stocks and 40
per cent of Ranger APMs. In addition, all L27 ATMs were removed from service
because the government accepted that its fuse makes it
antipersonnel.[46]
January 2000 is the target date set by MoD for the destruction of UK
stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Defense Secretary:
The speed at which this [the destruction of almost all of the APLs in UK
stocks] can be achieved will depend upon a number of factors, including the
capacity of contractors to carry out the destruction, work which involves
careful environmental safeguards. I am please to tell you that we expect that
destruction of the Army’s stocks will be completed two years from now,
well before the deadline of the Ottawa
Convention.[47]
However, as with official information about the size of UK stockpiles, there
was no mention of Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, or Special Forces stocks of
landmines.
Since MoD’s announcement on stockpile destruction in January 1998, no
further details emerged until 22 February 1999, when the Defense Secretary
announced that “all British Army anti-personnel landmines have been
destroyed, yet another demonstration of our commitment to the obligations we
accepted when ratifying the Ottawa Treaty.” The commitment to the total
destruction of APMs by 1 January 2000 was confirmed; the “large Army
capability has now been destroyed, and the supplementary RAF JP233 capability
will be destroyed by this date [1 January 2000], four years earlier than
required under the terms of the Ottawa
Treaty.”[48]
Most destruction of stocks has reportedly been carried out by the use of
explosives on UK military ranges, by the UK military, although the Ministry of
Defense has not confirmed this. The cost of destroying the stockpiles was
expected to be some $8.2 million (£5
million).[49]
APMs for Training
The government announced in April 1998 that the UK will “retain about
4,000 anti-personnel landmines, less than half of one percent of current stocks,
in order to be able to carry out training in
demining.”[50] At
present, there is little information as to APM types being held for training or
their specific uses. One source reports that between 1,000 and 2,000 each of
Ranger and Elsie stocks are being retained to test destruction and detection
techniques, as permitted by Article 3 of the Treaty. It is clear that UK forces
possess “inert” APMs, which are designed for training purposes, and
that the UK does not use live mines for training. In the light of this, and the
training possibilities for UK forces posted overseas in carrying out
humanitarian mine clearance, the UKWGLM believes retention of stocks for
training appears unnecessary.
U.S. APMs
In written answers to questions put to Tony Lloyd, FCO Minister of State, at
a meeting in March 1998, the government stated that “NATO itself does not
have stocks of APL. There are no US stocks in Britain. The question of transit
is being looked at carefully by legal advisers.” Also, according to the UK
government, the UK holds no stocks of antipersonnel mines outside UK
territories.[51] However,
official US sources indicate that the US has thousands of APMs stored on Diego
Garcia, a UK dependent territory in the Indian Ocean. (See U.S. country
report).
Use
At present, there are no reports of use of APMs in
the UK, except for testing purposes as allowed by the Treaty. However, the UK
Working Group on Landmines has expressed concerns about the compatability of
potential use of certain mines with the Mine Ban Treaty, including the Shielder
system mines and AT 2 antitank mines. The magnetic influence fuse on the mine
used by Shielder is reportedly highly
sensitive.[52] Table 2 above
notes the range of mines retained by the UK government, not classified as
antipersonnel but which are known to have antipersonnel effects.
Mine Action Funding
According to the Department for International
Development (DFID), between 1991-1998 the UK had spent about $57 million
(£35 million) on humanitarian
demining.[53] For most of this
period, total funding stood at less than $8.2 million (£5 million) a year.
At the Ottawa Conference in December 1997, the UK confirmed that the annual UK
commitment to demining activities would be doubled over the three years to the
year 2001 to $16.3 million (£10 million). By February 1999, the government
had spent $10.1 million (£6.2 million) on humanitarian mine action in the
1998/99 financial year.[54]
Recent UK government support has been given directly to mine clearance
projects in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Northern Iraq and Mozambique. Directly
supported projects all involve manual clearance methods though some also use
mechanical devices and dogs.[55]
The aim of this support is “to reduce the social and economic impact of
landmines in developing
countries.”[56] The grants
are to be used to support the detection and clearance of antipersonnel landmines
and are to help developing countries implement their obligations under the Mine
Ban Treaty, including stockpile destruction. In 1999, the UK made a contribution
of US$300,000 in support of the ICBL’s Landmine Monitor initiative.
Table 3 gives details of government figures for UK expenditure on mine
clearance projects, including integrated mine awareness activities, by country
for the period April 1992 to November 1998. It shows that twelve countries have
received UK funding since 1992, with a maximum of eight countries receiving
funding in any one year.[57]
Table 3: UK Government expenditure on mine clearance projects, including
integrated mine awareness activities by country (US$)
All DFID-funded activities except for Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
funded activities and value of surplus equipment re-deployed by DFID and MoD to
mine clearance projects.
Further details of mine action expenditure have been made available by the UK
government, showing how much has been spent in the field on different activities
funded principally through the Department for International Development. Table 5
shows that, of the $49.2 million (£30.2 million) of expenditure for which
this information was made available, 94 percent went to humanitarian mine
clearance projects. Of this, some went to integrated mine awareness activities
or the clearance of other unexploded ordnance.
Three and a half percent of these funds went to research and development.
However, as noted below, the Ministry of Defense spends far greater sums on
military demining technology. None of the resources made available by DFID went
to commercial mine clearance.
In-kind contributions
In 1998, surplus equipment valued at $611,250 (£375,000) was donated by
the government for mine clearance, including a gift to the Halo Trust of ten
surplus Volvo medium wheel tractors, valued at $203,750 (£125,000).
Ministers told Parliament that “they will increase considerably the rate
of mine clearance and the safety of operators once the Halo Trust has suitably
armored them.”[58] Mine
detection equipment with a value of $815,000 (£500,000) was provided from
the overseas aid budget in 1996. A further $163,000 (£100,000) for such
equipment was committed in financial year
1997-98.[59]
MoD-funded activity since 1992 has also taken place in Bosnia, as part of the
wider military operation there. These activities have included training and
supervision of mine clearance programs and the provision of mine awareness
training to some 15,000 school children. However, it should be noted that
serving British Army personnel are generally not permitted to work in minefields
in peacetime. In recent years, UK military personnel have been attached to the
Mine Action Center in Kosovo and the UN Mine Action Service in New York. The UK
government announced in October 1997 that additional service manpower would be
assigned to assist with demining programs in Bosnia, Africa and other areas of
the world affected by
landmines.[60]
The Ministry of Defense has apparently also, from the early 1980s, provided
the authorities in Egypt with copies of surviving maps of known minefields and
supporting information on the types of mines laid and the techniques used by the
Commonwealth forces during the war. It is unknown how many minefields had
surviving maps. There have been three visits to Egypt by Royal Ordnance Disposal
officers (in 1981,1984 and 1994). The RAF also conducted reconnaissance flights
over the area in 1984. The Ministry of Defense is currently preparing a new
version of the map and data package that “makes use of advances in
technology where
possible.”[61] It is
believed that Libya has also requested information about minefields or financial
reparations.
An official UK delegate at an Ottawa seminar of March 1998 reportedly claimed
that, according to UK records, 250,000 mines were laid by British troops during
World War II. A German delegate was said to confirm a similar figure. This
contrasts sharply with repeated public statements by the Egyptian government
that many millions of mines are in the ground in Egypt. (The Egyptian government
contends that it cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty because there are no provisions
for requiring those who laid mines to remove them.)
Funding through the EC
The UK has indirectly funded mine clearance through the European Community.
Some $5.5 million (£3.37 million) was contributed to EC activities between
1992 and 1996, and nearly $12.2 million (£7.5 million) for the calendar
year 1996.[62]
In addition, $15.7 million (£9.6 million) for humanitarian mine
clearance was contributed through various UN funds and programs between 1992 and
November 1998. These included the UN Voluntary Trust Fund
($978,000/£600,000); the Sarajevo UN Mine Action Center
($359,000/£220,000); the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance for Afghanistan; and the UN Development Program. The Government of
Egypt received $957,312 directly (£587,308).
More than $28.7 million (£17.6 million) has been allocated in the same
period to NGO agencies including MAG and HALO.
Spending on mine action programs in the UK
The Department for International Development (DFID) funds research and
development of new technologies to improve the safety, efficiency and speed of
humanitarian mine clearance. According to the DFID this funding goes toward
“initiatives to trial new technology and adapt existing technology to the
specific needs of humanitarian mine
clearance.”[63] Although
it is unclear what specific development work is being done, DFID partners in
this program include the UK Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), UK
companies and specialist NGOs. One example of this work given by DFID is support
for building and using armored tractors in Cambodia for removing vegetation
cover, which is said to speed up clearance rates by fifty per cent in some
places. As Table 4 below shows, this source of support for research and
development has been small in scale until recent years.
The Ministry of Defense is also responsible for spending on mine action
programs in the UK. First, it monitors and maintains the minefields in the
Falkland Islands/Malvinas, including the presence of an Explosives Ordnance
Disposal Response Team. The official view is that it has not been possible to
cost this work because it is only one part of the duties of those involved.
Second, MoD has funded applied research into military clearance technology (not
humanitarian mine clearance technology); Ministers state that this funding has
increased significantly over the past three years and is expected to remain high
for the next five years at least. The Department currently spends approximately
$4.9 million (£3 million) per annum on research into counter-mine
technologies, although MoD’s remit is to fund research only into military
operation demining, rather than humanitarian mine clearance. MoD is researching
sensors and countermine technologies, including “Ground Penetrating
Radar,” for military
demining.[64]
Table 4: UK Government grants for research and development (DFID
only)[65]
Year US$ (£)
1992-1993 -
1993-1994 -
1994-1995 171,033 (104,928)
1995-1996 -
1996-1997 -
1997-1998 613,977 (376,673)
1998-1999 893,799 (548,343)
at 30 Nov. 1999 -
Total 1,678,809 (1,029,944)
Details of new MoD assistance to demining were announced by the Secretary of
State for Defense in October 1997. As part of a five-point plan, he announced
that a new military post would be created in MoD to lead inter-departmental
coordination on landmines and that an inter-departmental (MoD/FCO/DFID) working
group on the issue would be formed. A focal point of post-conflict mine
clearance research has been established by MoD at the Defense, Evaluation and
Research Agency’s (DERA) facilities at Chertsey in Surrey to complement
the research being conducted in support of operational mine clearance. The DERA
is to examine the suitability of commercial “off-the-shelf”
equipment for demining and will publicize its findings.
The Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) conducts research into
counter-mine warfare on behalf of the British Government, and makes publicly
available any results relevant to humanitarian de-mining. The Ministry of
Defense and the Department for International Development are also actively
involved in the international exchange of information and co-operation on mine
clearance technologies and will continue to contribute to international work on
humanitarian mine
clearance.[66]
Finally, a new Mine Information and Technology Center at the Royal Engineers
Battlefield Engineering Wing in Minley, Surrey, was also established in November
1997; this provides information on demining operations and offers mines
awareness training to both military and civilian personnel in the UK. However,
despite its broad mandate, MITC has only a small permanent staff consisting of
one captain, one warrant officer and one senior NCO, although it will be able to
draw on expertise from elsewhere in the Army and MoD. It is not yet clear what
program of action MITC is pursuing. The additional annual cost to the defense
budget is $203,750
(£125,000).[67]
Table 5: UK Government grants by activity (US$)
Year
Humanitarian mine clearance1
Military initiative mine clearance2
Mine Awareness
Researcher & development
1992-1993
2,873,000
-
10,500
-
1993-1994
5,138,000
-
-
-
1994-1995
9,558,000
-
-
171,000
1995-1996
7,870,000
-
24,800
-
1996-1997
6,991,000
-
114,000
-
1996-1997
106,0003
-
-
-
1997-1998
6,764,000
-
-
614,000
1997-1998
326,0003
-
408,000
-
1998-1999 at
6,505,000
334,000
-
894,000
30 Nov 1998
407,5003
204,000
-
-
Total
46,538,000
538,000
557,300
1,679,000
Notes:1Includes APMs and other UXO (de facto mines)
clearance, and integrated mine awareness activities except where italicized
2MOD funded: $204,000 (£125,000) (30.11.98) denotes value of
surplus equipment re-deployed
3FCO funded
Survivor assistance
The UK government contributes to international
assistance to landmine survivors through organizations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Health Organization. In
addition, in November 1997, the European Community committed some $9.6 million
(£5.9 million) to the ICRC’s 1997 and 1998 Special Appeals for
Assistance to Mine Victims; the UK share of this assistance was about $1.4
million (£860,000) – or less than ten percent of the
total.[68]
Funds have been raised by charitable organizations in the UK for projects
assisting mine survivors overseas, although details of direct expenditure have,
in many cases, proven difficult to separate from wider programs that may also
assist mine survivors. Incomplete data provided by a small number of UK agencies
suggest that a minimum of $2.9 million (£1,770,000) in charitable funds was
spent on survivor assistance in 1997, and a further $972,000 (£596,000) in
1998. Further work to assess the extent and nature of charitable assistance for
projects for survivors by UK agencies, other than government-funded projects, is
necessary.
In January 1999, The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, set up to
commemorate the Princess of Wales and to support causes with which she was
associated, donated $1.7 million (£1,055,225) to thirteen charitable
organizations working with landmine survivors. These grants are to address
“the problems of people and communities who have been physically, mentally
and economically affected by landmines.” The projects involved are based
in South Sudan, Bosnia Herzogovina, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, Laos, Sri
Lanka, Palestinian Territories, Cambodia and Afghanistan, and are summarized in
Table 6 below.[69]
Table 6: Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund supported projects
(1999)
UK agency
Action on Disability and Development: Working with Sudanese disabled
persons organizations, including landmine survivors: to support meeting
fundamental needs and human rights.
Leonard Cheshire International/Landmine Survivors Network: Landmine
survivor support services, Bosnia Herzegovina: to provide training for
empowerment of landmine survivors who have suffered traumatic injury.
Concern Worldwide: Vocational Training Center, Kuito, Angola teaching
people injured by mines practical skills including carpentry and shoemaking.
The Jaipur Limb Campaign: Working with the Mozambique Red Cross to set
up a rehabilitation center in Manjacaze, Mozambique: to provide social and
economic rehabilitation and local production of mobility appliances.
Motivation: Wheelchairs for El Salvador: to train a team of mostly
disabled trainees in wheel chair production, distribution and education using
locally available materials.
Disability Awareness in Action/Pan African Federation of Disabled
People: Leadership training seminar on landmines and human rights for
disabled people’s organizations in Africa.
POWER: Prosthetics and orthotics fitting, and training local people to
fit them, with Ministry of Public Health and Cambodian School of Prosthetics and
Orthotics. Based in Laos.
Voluntary Services Overseas: Provision of a physiotherapist in Sri
Lanka: to provide therapy, walk-training and to train local physiotherapists and
technicians.
War on Want: Mine action in Palestinian Territories: to provide mine
awareness, support and advocacy for people with disabilities, including support
for legal rights of disabled people.
World Vision: Vocational rehabilitation in Battambang Province,
Cambodia: to provide business management support and loans and business
workshops, including agricultural training for disabled people.
Save the Children Fund: Working with ADEMO in Mozambique, researching
the needs of people with disabilities: to provide advocacy material, raise
awareness and improve opportunities for disabled people.
Tim’s Fund/Christian Aid: With the Afghanistan-Afghan Awareness
Agency: mine awareness and marking minefields.
Landmine Problem
Most of the UK and territories currently under its
administrative authority are not significantly mine-affected or UXO-affected.
There is a particular problem in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, where APMs,
including remotely delivered scatterable mines, were used by British and
Argentine forces in the war of 1982. The Ministry of Defense reported that
“landmines were used in the Falklands by our forces during the 1982
conflict, and in its aftermath. One British anti-personnel landmine remains
unaccounted for although every effort has been made to clear our
devices.”[70] However, no
real in-depth assessment has been made of the extent of the problem remaining,
and available information on figures and locations remain based on estimates
from 1986.
The official UK assessment is that there is “no reliable figure for the
number of Argentine mines in the Falklands. Our best current estimate is that
some 18,000 Argentine mines and similar devices of various types were laid,
including some 14,000 anti-personnel landmines. About 1,400 Argentine mines were
cleared following the conflict, before work was suspended after a number of
serious injuries to clearance personnel.”
Remaining minefields, or areas where it is suspected that mines might be,
have been marked and fenced. These areas are monitored regularly to ensure that
remaining mines present no danger to civilian or military personnel on the
Islands.[71]
Other estimates of the number of APMs remaining range from 14,000 to 40,000;
they have resulted in twenty square kilometers of the islands being fenced off
as being potentially
dangerous.[72] The U.S.
Government Humanitarian Demining Program lists the Falklands/Malvinas as a
mine-affected territory with the quantity of mines estimated at 25,000 to
30,000.
Argentina offered funding for the clearance of an estimated 30,000 mines in
January 1994. These were said to include the Israeli No 4, the Italian SB-33,
the FMK-1 APM, and the FMK-3 ATM. This latter mine uses an APM as a fuse; in
other words, it can be detonated by a
footstep.[73]
Another expert source, a former British army officer involved in the last
minefield clearance in the Falklands/Malvinas in 1986, gave a more comprehensive
listing of the types of mines found there. These are given in Table 7 below. The
minefields are also reportedly very clearly fenced off, but have denied access
to peat cutting areas, for example the main peat cutting area on Stanley Common.
Peat is used as the main fuel for cooking and heating.
Table 7: Mines remaining in the Falklands/Malvinas
[25]Belkacem Elomari and
Bruno Barillot, Le complexe francais de production des mines et systemes
associes (Lyon: Observatoire des Transferts d’Armaments, 1997).
[37]The Arms Project of Human
Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993) pp104, 206, 225.
[38]The Arms Project of Human
Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 1997) p. 199.
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