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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Landmine Monitor Report 1999


Mine Ban Policy

Current U.S. policy, as announced in May 1998, is that by the year 2003 the United States will cease to use antipersonnel mines, except for those contained in mixed munitions,[1] everywhere in the world, except for Korea. By the year 2006, if alternatives have been found, the U.S. will cease the use of all antipersonnel mines, including those in mixed munitions, everywhere in the world, including Korea, and will sign the Mine Ban Treaty. This policy is contained in a Presidential Decision Directive, which is classified, but the elements were made public in a letter from Sandy Berger, the President’s National Security Adviser, to Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont). The letter stated that “the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if we succeed in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our antipersonnel landmines and mixed antitank systems by then.”[2]

This policy announcement was met with mixed reaction. Senator Leahy, the strongest advocate of a ban in the U.S. government, said, “The Administration’s announcement that they will sign the Ottawa landmine treaty when they have alternatives to antipersonnel landmines, and that they will aggressively search for alternatives, is a major step toward the international ban we all seek. While I have long felt that we could and should sign the treaty without further delay, I am greatly encouraged by this decision because I believe there is no longer any doubt that we will sign.”[3] Members of the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) also called the announcement a step in the right direction, but criticized both the distant 2006 target date and the linkage to a successful search for alternatives.[4]

In August 1998, the USCBL sent a lengthy letter to President Clinton thanking him for endorsing the Mine Ban Treaty, but expressing serious concerns with U.S. policy: “First, ...we believe that eight years is too late for the world to wait for U.S. signature on the Mine Ban Treaty.... Second...we are concerned that the U.S. is retaining one million of these deadly ‘dumb’ mines for use in Korea.... Third, we are concerned that the commitment to sign by 2006 is contingent on developing and fielding by that date alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.... Fourth, we are concerned that...the U.S. has pressured its NATO and other allies who have signed the treaty to allow continued U.S. stockpiling of antipersonnel mines on their territories.... Finally, we urge you in the strongest terms to instruct the Pentagon not to go ahead with the proposed...redesign of the remote anti-armor mine (RAAM) system to include ADAM antipersonnel mines.... The proposed redesign conflicts with your stated policy to sign the treaty by 2006.”[5]

Evolution of U.S. Policy

In October 1992, the U.S., at the initiative of Sen. Leahy, enacted a one-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines. The first significant measure by any country to control antipersonnel mines, it gave the newly launched ICBL a tremendous boost. In 1993 the U.S. State Department produced Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, the first comprehensive study of the mines crisis. In September 1994, President Clinton became the first world leader to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines, and the U.S. sponsored a U.N. General Assembly resolution endorsing the eventual elimination of mines which was passed in December 1994. In 1995, the Senate passed an amendment requiring a one-year moratorium on use of antipersonnel mines, except along international borders and demilitarized zones. It was signed into law in February 1996, and was to take effect three years later, but was rendered meaningless in 1998 when Congress gave the President the authority to waive the moratorium.

During 1995 and early 1996, the U.S. turned its attention to the Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol II dealing with restrictions on use of antipersonnel mines. The U.S. emerged as the major promoter of so-called “smart” mines that automatically self-destruct -- and found itself criticized by the ICBL for seeking a technical solution to the mines crisis that fell far short of embracing a comprehensive ban. It was during this period that the “U.S.-UK Control Regime” aimed at emphasizing smart mines rather than dumb mines was developed, floated internationally, and abandoned for lack of support.[6] The CCW review ended on 3 May 1996 with adoption of a revised Protocol II which the ICBL and ICRC strongly criticized, but which U.S. officials hailed as a major accomplishment. By this time, some three dozen governments had publicly expressed support for an immediate, total ban on antipersonnel mines, and the U.S. was finding that it was falling behind many other truly pro-ban governments.

In what was billed as a major landmines policy statement on 16 May 1996, President Clinton said the U.S. would “lead a global effort” to ban mines, and “seek a worldwide agreement as soon as possible to end the use of all antipersonnel landmines.” But his announcement amounted to little more than a disappointing restatement of existing plans and policies. The U.S. would no longer use dumb mines, except on the Korean peninsula. It would no longer produce dumb mines and would destroy most of its stockpile of dumb mines. But it would maintain the right to use smart mines anywhere in the world, until an international ban took effect. The U.S. would also continue producing smart mines without limitation, and would keep all existing stocks of smart mines.[7]

In November 1996 the U.S. introduced a United Nations General Assembly resolution urging nations “to pursue vigorously” an international ban treaty “with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.” The resolution also called on governments unilaterally to implement “bans, moratoria or other restrictions” on production, stockpiling, export and use of antipersonnel mines “at the earliest date possible.”[8] The resolution was passed on 10 December by a vote of 156-0, with ten abstentions. Despite its rhetoric the U.S. was noticeably cool, if not hostile, toward the Ottawa Process that Canada had launched in October 1996 aimed at the development, negotiation, and signing of a ban treaty by the end of 1997.

The next major U.S. policy announcement came on 17 January 1997 when the Clinton Administration announced that, instead of full support for the Ottawa Process, the U.S. would seek negotiations on a worldwide mine ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Switzerland. The decision was criticized by the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines as an effort to avoid rapid progress toward a ban, given the notoriously slow pace of the CD.[9] Other major elements of the policy announcement were that the U.S. would observe a permanent ban on the export of AP mines (moving beyond the existing temporary moratorium), and that the U.S. would cap its antipersonnel landmine stockpile at the current level of inventory.[10]

While action in the CD predictably floundered, the U.S. attended all of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, but in an observer mode with little to no substantive input into the deliberations. In August 1997, just weeks before the treaty negotiations were to start, the U.S. made the surprising announcement that it would in fact come to Oslo as a full participant. However, it also laid out a series of demands, or prerequisites for its support of the treaty. Chief among these were a geographic exception for continued use of antipersonnel mines of all types in Korea; a change in the treaty’s definition of antipersonnel mine so that U.S. antipersonnel mines contained in “mixed” systems with antitank mines would not be banned; and an optional nine-year deferral period for compliance with the treaty’s key prohibitions. During the negotiations these were rejected by the other governments.

On the closing day of the negotiations, 17 September, President Clinton announced from Washington that the U.S. would not be signing the treaty, but then stated that the U.S. would unilaterally stop using antipersonnel mines everywhere but Korea by 2003, and in Korea by 2006. Other officials clarified that this would not apply to antipersonnel mines contained in mixed munitions, because the U.S. no longer considered them to be AP mines, but rather submunitions. Campaigners considered this backsliding in U.S. policy because it meant certain U.S. antipersonnel mines would never be banned. Only with the May 1998 policy announcement was this position reversed.

During 1998, the U.S. again focused its efforts on the Conference on Disarmament, this time attempting to get agreement not to negotiate a total ban, but rather a transfer ban. As in 1997, however, the only progress was the appointment of a special coordinator (Australian Ambassador John Campbell) to examine the possibility of further action, and attempts to get agreement on creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate on mines failed. The ICBL opposes any effort to negotiate a transfer ban, or any other AP mine-related measure in the CD, believing that, regardless of the intention, it could serve to undermine the establishment of the norm completely banning the weapon.[11]

The U.S. was one of the few countries to abstain in the U.N. General Assembly votes in support of the Ottawa Process and ban treaty in 1997 and 1998.

Though the U.S. devoted a tremendous amount of effort to the negotiations of the CCW in 1995 and 1996, the U.S. has yet to ratify amended Protocol II.


The United States has refused to ban—or even formally suspend—the production of antipersonnel mines. From 1985 through 1996, the U.S. produced more than four million new antipersonnel mines. In his May 1996 policy statement, President Clinton said the U.S. would no longer produce dumb mines, but the U.S. maintained the right to produce smart mines.[12]

It does not appear that there has been any production of antipersonnel mines in the U.S. since late 1996 or early 1997 when several large contracts for antipersonnel mines to replace those used in the Persian Gulf War were completed. A 1994 Pentagon document indicated there were no plans for manufacturing new antipersonnel mines for the foreseeable future, at least through 2004.[13] In January 1997, the U.S. announced a cap on its inventory of antipersonnel mines, in theory meaning that no new mines could be produced unless old mines were destroyed.[14]

Historically, the United States has been one of the world’s biggest producers of antipersonnel landmines, producing tens of millions of antipersonnel mines. Until the mid-1970s, these were nearly all dumb mines. Following the disastrous U.S. experience with antipersonnel mines in Vietnam, the Pentagon decided to develop and procure smart mines, the most notable feature of which is a self-destruct mechanism that will cause the mine to automatically blow up after a pre-set period of time (usually four to forty-eight hours). Most of these mines were also designed to be “scattered” (dropped from helicopters or planes, or fired from artillery or other systems) rather than hand-emplaced. Production of dumb mines went into decline and billions of dollars were poured into corporate research and development laboratories in the 1970s and early 1980s to develop smart landmine systems.[15] According to one source, one company—Alliant Techsystems—produced eight million of one type of smart antipersonnel mine—the ADAM—in a fifteen year period.[16] A variety of smart landmines were used during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The U.S. has manufactured at least six types of dumb mines and six types of smart mines. The dumb mines have included M2A1/M2A4, M3, M14, M16/M16A1/M16A2, M18/M18A1 (Claymore), and M26 types. The smart mines have included ADAM M692/M731, Volcano M87/M87A1, GEMSS M74, PDM M86, MOPMS M131, and Gator CBU-89/CBU-78 types.[17]

In the U.S., no single company is responsible for the production of an antipersonnel landmine from beginning to end. The Pentagon will usually award a contract to one large manufacturer, like Alliant Techsystems, which in turn will buy component parts from many other companies. Final assembly of mines is often done in government-owned, contractor-operated factories.

Alliant Techsystems has been the major U.S. mine manufacturer, and was the primary contractor on the two most recent antipersonnel mine contracts for Gator and Volcano mine systems. In August 1996 Alliant CEO Richard Schwartz informed Human Rights Watch: “Since Desert Storm, production of self-destruct, self-deactivating mines has been limited to replenishing inventories used during that conflict, and we anticipate no future production of self-destruct, self-deactivating mines.” He said the Pentagon has requested Alliant to reconfigure the Volcano landmine system solely to an antitank capacity, instead of its current mix of antitank and antipersonnel mines. Production of the Gator system was to be completed in late 1996.[18]

In a 1997 report, Human Rights Watch identified forty-seven U.S. companies that have been involved in the manufacture of antipersonnel mines, their components, or delivery systems--more than twice the number of companies previously acknowledged by the Department of Defense (DoD).[19] The report formed the basis for a "stigmatization" campaign by theUSCBL to press all companies that have been involved in antipersonnel mine production in the past to renounce any future activities related to antipersonnel mine production.

Nineteen of the forty-seven companies agreed to renounce any future involvement in antipersonnel mine production. Motorola was the first, and the most visible, in June 1996. Others include Hughes Aircraft, Olin Ordnance, Kemet, Microsemi, AVX, and Dyno Nobel.

Some of the largest companies that have declined to renounce future involvement in antipersonnel landmine production are General Electric, Alliant Techsystems, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. Some of these companies are now involved in developing technology to detect, remove, and destroy uncleared antipersonnel mines, including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Mohawk, and Ensign-Bickford. Alliant has received a significant contract to help the Pentagon develop alternatives to antipersonnel mines.


In 1999, one of the most contentious issues in the United States with regard to antipersonnel mines is the Pentagon’s plans to produce a new landmine system known as RADAM that contains antipersonnel mines and would therefore be banned under the Mine Ban Treaty. The system would combine existing ADAM antipersonnel mines with existing RAAM antitank mines into a single canister that would be delivered by artillery. By putting them into a new mixed munition, the ADAM mines will not, under U.S. government definitions, be subject to the ban on use outside of Korea to come into effect in 2003.

Plans apparently call for combining approximately 300,000 RAAM antitank mines with 1.2 million ADAM antipersonnel mines (four ADAM for every RAAM in a canister).[20] The estimated cost is $193.7 million. The Pentagon has asked for $48.3 million in the fiscal year 2000 budget, including $8 million for “pre-production activities.”[21] It states, “A decision whether to procure RADAM will be taken in FY 2001 when the United States will assess, among other factors, the progress we have made in our aggressive search for suitable and effective alternatives to APLs and mixed anti-tank systems.”[22]

U.S. campaigners have said that RADAM calls the government’s sincerity about signing the treaty into question. Human Rights Watch criticized the RADAM effort, saying, "The goal of 2006 is already unconscionably distant. But how can we believe the Pentagon is serious about that goal, if it's seeking nearly $50 million from Congress this year for a new mine system that will be banned by the treaty?"[23] If the U.S. signs the treaty, it will be unable to use RADAM after 2006, and will then have to spend money to destroy it.

Research and Development

On January 9, 1997, Assistant Secretary of Defense H. Allen Holmes stated: "At this time, the Department is not conducting any research and development efforts for antipersonnel landmines. In light of the President's direction on antipersonnel landmines, the Department does not envision a need to conduct research and development for antipersonnel landmines in the future."[24]

Licensed production

The U.S. export moratorium in place since 1992 prohibits foreign manufacturing licenses and technical assistance agreements as well as direct exports.[25] The State Department official responsible for enforcing the moratorium stated in 1993 that all licenses had expired long ago and that the last technical assistance agreement, involving an unnamed U.S. company’s support for South Korean mine production, was cancelled immediately after enactment of the restrictions.[26]

U.S. mines have been copied extensively for production by other countries. The Claymore is probably the most widely copied mine in the world. The U.S. non-detectable M14 has been copied by India, Vietnam and others.

Antitank Mines with APM Effects

In July 1997, Human Rights Watch confidentially obtained a draft document from a Pentagon office that expressed concerns about what U.S. munitions might be covered by the Mine Ban Treaty, should the U.S. decide to sign.[27] It separated the munitions into various categories:

(1) Antitank Mines prohibited by the treaty: M15 with M624 fuze and tilt rod; M21 with M604 fuze and tilt rod. These will be exploded by a person “as an unintended consequence of its design” that will cause it to function like an AP mine.

(2) Antitank Mines that may be prohibited by the treaty: RAAM M70/M73 with magnetic influence fuze; Gator AT with magnetic influence fuze; Volcano AT with magnetic influence fuze; MOPMS M76 AT with magnetic influence fuze; GEMSS M75 AT with magnetic influence fuze; SLAM M2/M4 with infrared sensor. These might be exploded by a person “as an unintended consequence of its design” -- “Mine is designed to detonate when straddled by a tank, which interrupts the mine’s magnetic field. A person can walk on it and move it, but if picked up quickly or rotated, it will detonate.”

(3) Antitank Mines not prohibited by the treaty: M15 with antihandling device; M19 with antihandling device; M21 with antihandling device; M93 Wide Area Munition (WAM) with integral antihandling device; RAAM M70/M73 with antihandling device (20% of inventory); GEMSS M75 with antihandling device (20% of inventory). While these have “an intentional secondary design feature” whereby they can be exploded by a person, they are permissible because of the treaty’s explicit exemption for antivehicle mines with anti-handling devices.


“As directed by the President, the Department [of Defense] is undertaking an aggressive search for alternatives to both our antipersonnel landmines as well as our ‘mixed antitank systems’ which contain antipersonnel submunitions that are also banned by the Ottawa Convention. If we are successful in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives by 2006, then the United States would be prepared to sign the Ottawa Treaty.”[28]

According to the Department of Defense, since 1996 the U.S. has spent approximately $5 million investigating alternative concepts. It expects to spend $26 million in fiscal year 1999 and has requested $58.3 million for fiscal year 2000. In total, DoD expects to spend over $300 million for research and development of alternatives.[29]

There does not appear to be much enthusiasm or confidence in the Pentagon, however, about meeting the 2006 deadline. In a recent interview, a key Pentagon official dealing with alternatives said, “2006 is a hard date to achieve” and admitted, “I’m not terribly confident we can meet it.”[30] In a 1 March 1999 press release, Human Rights Watch said, "RADAM is the latest of a growing number of indicators that the Pentagon is not serious about the 2006 deadline, and that it is very unlikely to be met."[31]

Thus far, according to DoD, it has reviewed and evaluated over 20 alternatives concepts, both lethal and non-lethal. Over fifty material concepts have been evaluated, and the DoD has examined non-material alternatives including doctrine, force structure and tactics. DoD says, “We are presently pursuing two complementary approaches to alternatives; a short-term concept to replace present capabilities, and a long term effort which may ultimately eliminate the requirement for mines entirely.”[32]

The Pentagon has largely decided on its approach to alternatives for dumb mines, with the objective of having a system ready for use in Korea by 2006. Contracts were awarded on 3 December 1998 to Alliant Techsystems for one concept, and to Textron Corp. for two concepts. “Each concept is a variation of the ‘man-in-the-loop’ concept. They can be generally described as consisting of three main hardware items: the munition, a repeater, and a controller. When the munition’s sensor is tripped, a signal is sent back through the repeater to the controller. The soldier operating the controller then makes a decision on whether to activate the munition. The contractors are currently working towards a prototype demonstration in early May 1999 and a live field experiment in October 1999.”[33] In an interview, Pentagon officials provided additional details: it is expected to take two and one-half years to engineer and manufacture, with production beginning in fiscal year 2002; costs are estimated at $440 million; options being considered for the munition include using the M-16 mine as the warhead, or the M-16 and a non-lethal component (such as a net), or six grenades. At this stage, the officials expressed frank concern about whether the system will work, and noted possible problems with command and control countermeasures.[34] In the most recent budget (FY 2000), the Pentagon has asked for $18 million for alternatives for dumb mines.

The Pentagon has had very little success thus far in its search for alternatives to the smart mines in mixed munitions, a reflection no doubt of the lack of enthusiasm for the effort and the paucity (by DoD standards) of spending thus far ($5 million). After three years of effort, a DoD official acknowledged “we have not been real successful in identifying concepts.”[35] The Pentagon simply says, “Our plan calls for a comprehensive examination of possible alternatives, including changes in force structure and doctrine, systems currently in development, and new material concepts. We are focusing on concepts that could be developed and fielded by 2006, but also are looking at those post-2006 concepts that could be accelerated with an aggressive development program.”[36] In the most recent budget (FY 2000), the Pentagon has asked for $19 million for alternatives for mixed munitions.

Some of the weapons that the U.S. has been considering as alternatives to mines are also reason for concern, particularly directed energy weapons such as acoustic and microwave weapons.


U.S. officials often state that the U.S. bears no responsibility for the global landmine crisis. As recently as 3 March 1999, a Pentagon paper distributed to Congress said, “The United States is in no way responsible for causing the problem facing many nations due to indiscriminate, uncontrolled placement of mines... Virtually none of the millions of such mines--estimated variously between 60 to 70 million were either manufactured or placed by the United States.”[37] The facts belie such statements.

The U.S. was, in the past, one of the biggest exporters of antipersonnel mines. From 1969 through 1992, the U.S. exported 4.4 million antipersonnel mines to at least thirty-two different countries.[38] A detailed breakdown of U.S. mine exports on a country-by-country, year-by-year, mine-by-mine basis is available from Human Rights Watch.

The biggest recipients included Iran (2.5 million), Cambodia (622,000), Thailand (437,000), Chile (300,000) and El Salvador (102,000). It is also an open secret that in the 1980s the U.S. covertly shipped significant numbers of antipersonnel mines to rebel groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and elsewhere. Other countries and conflicts where U.S. mines have been used – though not necessarily provided directly from the U.S. – include Costa Rica, Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kuwait, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Iraq (including Kurdistan), Malawi, Morocco (including Western Sahara), Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Vietnam, Zambia, and others.

Nearly all of the mines the U.S. exported were M18 Claymore mines and M14 and M16 dumb mines. However, at the time the U.S. enacted its initial export moratorium it appeared that a burgeoning and potentially very lucrative market in smart antipersonnel mines was emerging. From 1985 to 1992 the U.S. sold more than 78,000 Gator and ADAM scatterable smart mines to five countries—Greece, South Korea, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and Turkey— in deals worth more than $25 million.[39]

On 23 October 1992 President George Bush signed into law a one-year moratorium on the export of all antipersonnel mines.[40] The legislation had been introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat from Vermont) and Representative Lane Evans (Democrat from Illinois). This made the U.S. the first country to pass domestic legislation controlling antipersonnel mines, and was a crucial step in promoting the effort to ban mines. The moratorium was subsequently extended several times and is now effective, by law, until the year 2000.[41] In its 17 January 1997 policy announcement, the Clinton Administration declared that henceforth “the United States will observe a permanent ban on export and transfer” of antipersonnel mines.[42] However, binding permanent legislation banning transfer has yet to be passed.

The Pentagon has produced a list of mines prohibited from export. It does include antipersonnel mines in mixed munitions, but not Claymore mines. Included on the list are M2A1/A4; M3; M14; M16/16A1/16A2; M26; ADAM M692/M731; PDM M86; GEMSS M74; Volcano M87/M87A1; MOPMS M131; Gator CBU-89A/B and -89 /B, CBU-78, -78A/B, and -78B/B. Also included are “nonstandard and R&D only” antipersonnel mines (gravel, wide area, and dragon tooth mines).[43]

An issue related to transfer is that of “transit.” The U.S. has been seeking reassurances from its allies that have signed the ban treaty that the U.S. will, in times of combat, be able to move U.S. mines across the land, water, or air space controlled by those governments. The ICBL believes that such permission could constitute a violation of the treaty.


The current U.S. stockpile of antipersonnel mines numbers approximately twelve million. That includes about ten million self-destructing mines, about one million non-self-destructing mines, and about one million Claymore mines. More precisely, according to a 1997 government document, the U.S. antipersonnel mine inventory consists of:[44]

Gator (USAF)
Gator (USN)

In addition, a DoD source puts the number of M-18 Claymore mines at 973,932.[45]

A March 1998 DoD report also indicates that the U.S. has “approximately 9.5 million” ADAM mines, and puts the PDM inventory slightly higher, at 17,600.[46] However, a 3 March 1999 DoD information paper seems to indicate that the number of ADAM mines might be less, and the number of Gator, Volcano and MOPMS mines greater. It stated, “The current U.S. inventory of operational antipersonnel landmines is approximately 11 million in the following categories: 9 million ‘pure’ APL, self-destructing [ADAM and PDM]; 1 million antipersonnel/antitank mines, self-destructing; 1 million non-self-destructing.”[47] The numbers do not include Claymore mines.

It should be noted from the chart above that while U.S. officials invariably say that approximately one million dumb mines are being kept for use in Korea, the actual number appears to be more than 1.2 million. A May 1997 Pentagon report corroborates this, noting that 1,225,404 dumb mines will be retained “for the defense of South Korea” and “a very small number...for countermine and humanitarian demining training.”[48]

The M14 mines are being modified so that they will be consistent with the requirements of the 1996 revised Protocol II of the CCW (which the US has yet to ratify). The M14 is a plastic mine that does not meet the detectability requirements of Protocol II, so metal is being added to each mine.

In January 1997 the U.S. announced that it would be capping its inventory of antipersonnel mines at the current level.[49] Oddly, at the time of the announcement, the DoD was unable, or unwilling, to account for the precise number of antipersonnel mines in its inventories. In announcing the cap both the White House and Pentagon spokespersons would be no more specific than “several million.”[50] However, in April 1997, the Pentagon announced that there were about fourteen million antipersonnel mines in U.S. stockpiles: about ten million self-destructing mines and about four million non-self-destructing mines , including three million slated for destruction.[51] Thus, the inventory cap was set at 11 million. The cap did not apply to Claymore mines which the Pentagon now classified as command-detonated munitions rather than mines.[52] The stockpile number was apparently revealed in response to the landmines resolution adopted by the Organization of American States in June 1996, and endorsed by the U.S., which calls on all states in the hemisphere to make public details of their mine inventories.[53]

Destruction of Mines

The U.S. first announced in May 1996 that the U.S. would, by the end of 1999, destroy all dumb mines not needed for the defense of Korea or for training purposes. At the time it did not publicly reveal either the number that would be destroyed or the number that would be kept. In the January 1997 announcement, it indicated about three million would be destroyed and that about one million would be kept.[54] A Pentagon official told Human Rights Watch at the time that the destruction of these mines would not free up space for new production under the inventory cap; that is, the U.S. would not replace those three million dumb mines with new smart mines.[55]

The U.S. finished the destruction job eighteen months ahead of schedule. The Pentagon has remarked, “The U.S. completed destruction of 3,301,440 non-self-destructing landmines on 30 June 1998 at Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Indiana. This was the entire U.S. inventory of so-called dumb mines, except for those stockpiled in Korea, a small number in Guantanamo, Cuba, (which are still being removed for destruction), and a small number retained for training purposes (approximately 2,000). The mines destroyed were of the following types: M-14 antipersonnel; M-16 antipersonnel.”[56] The destruction of the mines was carried out by the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command.

In March 1998, a Pentagon report indicated that the total cost to destroy the 3.3 million mines would be $3.3 million. It also noted, “Future destruction of the current active inventory of pure APL is anticipated to total approximately $44 million.”[57] Pure APL would include ADAMs and PDMs. Later in the same report the estimate is put at $32-39 million, “contingent on the number of ADAM that might be used in the conversion of RAAM to produce a mixed antitank artillery system, and if any ADAM are used, how many ADAM would be destroyed when the conversion is completed.”[58]

The PDM (Pursuit Deterrent Munition) mines are slated for destruction. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre ordered the PDM program dropped in an October 1997 memorandum.[59] GEMSS mines are apparently also being phased out as obsolete.

However, the Pentagon wants to combine an estimated 1.2 million ADAM antipersonnel mines with approximately 300,000 RAAM antitank mines to create a new “mixed munition.” (See Production section). Under current policy, the U.S. would cease to use the remaining 8 million or so ADAM mines in 2003, but no plans are yet in place for destruction of these ADAM antipersonnel mines. The U.S. would be obliged to destroy them after signing and ratifying the treaty.

Overseas Stockpiles

The United States has antipersonnel mines stockpiled in at least ten countries: seven NATO nations – Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom -- plus Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia. Based on information provided by the U.S. Air Force in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from Human Rights Watch, and other sources, it is believed that the U.S. has approximately 200,000 smart mines stored overseas, in addition to the more than 1.2 million dumb mines for Korea.[60]

In Korea, there are about 40,000 Air Force Gator mines, more than 10,000 Army Volcano mines, a smaller number of MOPMS mines, and presumably, all of the 1.2 million M16 and M14 dumb mines dedicated for conflict on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. has said that it is keeping approximately one million dumb mines stockpiled “on the Korean peninsula for the defense of the Republic of Korea.”[61]

In Saudi Arabia, there are about 49,610 Air Force Gator mines. In Italy, there are 33,000 Air Force Gator mines, and a small number of MOPMS mines. In Germany, there are 14,124 Air Force Gator mines, thousands of Army Volcano mines, and a small number of MOPMS. On Diego Garcia, a United Kingdom possession in the Indian Ocean, there are more than 10,000 Gator, Volcano and MOPMS mines. In Japan, there are 6,600 Air Force Gator mines and several thousand Volcano mines. In Turkey, there are 770 Air Force Gator mines. In Greece there are more than 1,000 Gator mines. According to a press account, the United States has decided to withdraw its stockpile of 2,000 antipersonnel mines from the Rota military base in Spain.[62] The mines are likely all Gators. The Air Force also has Gators on Guam (14,740) and prepositioning ships (Austral Rainbow, 4,400).[63] The U.S. may also have antipersonnel mines stored in Kuwait.

The U.S. has engaged in discussions with the Mine Ban Treaty signatories where U.S. mines are stored (Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom) in an effort to convince them that it is permissible under the treaty to allow the U.S. mines to stay. The ICBL and the USCBL have criticized the U.S. for this, maintaining that it could constitute a violation of the treaty for States Parties. In their bilateral discussions, the U.S. has had varied responses. (See country reports of host nation.)

Human Rights Watch obtained a confidential State Department memorandum dated 6 February 1998 that contained an assessment of the 12-16 January 1998 consultations with five NATO states that host AP mine stockpiles (Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, and UK), and the proposed objectives for a second round of consultations. The memorandum states, “The talks were tough, on both sides.... In varying degrees -- and with the exception of the Germans -- our allies were insistent that they could not allow our mixed munitions to remain indefinitely, as this would put them in violation of the Convention.... Germany has stated that our APL can remain indefinitely.”[64]


Current U.S. policy is to use dumb mines only in Korea, but smart mines everywhere else. By 2003, the U.S. will end the use of “pure” smart mines (i.e., ADAM and PDM) everywhere but Korea, but reserves the right to use smart mines in mixed munitions (i.e., Gator, Volcano, MOPMS, and RADAM if built) anywhere. By 2006, the U.S. will end the use of dumb mines and smart mines in mixed munitions everywhere, including Korea, if suitable alternatives have been found.[65]

The U.S. no longer classifies Claymore mines as antipersonnel mines. Thus, it will continue to use them even after the 2006 deadline for ending all AP mine use. U.S. policy has for a number of years been to only use Claymores in a command detonated mode, and never with a tripwire. However, it is not believed that any steps have been taken to modify Claymores to ensure, or at least facilitate, command detonated only operation.

In 1995, the Senate passed by a vote of 67-27 an amendment offered by Sen. Leahy that would have imposed a one-year moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines by the U.S., except along international borders and demilitarized zones, beginning 12 February 1999. President Clinton signed this provision into law on 12 February 1996.[66] However, in 1998, at the urging of the Pentagon, the Congress provided the President with the authority to waive the moratorium if he sees fit.[67] Sen. Leahy agreed not to oppose the waiver in exchange for the commitments contained in the May policy announcement, particularly the commitment to sign the ban treaty in 2006 if alternatives are found.

The U.S. used antipersonnel landmines extensively in World War II, the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War. They were also employed in Operation Desert Storm. It is not known whether the U.S. used antipersonnel mines in its many smaller military operations and interventions since World War II.

In July 1997 Human Rights Watch and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation released a report, “In Its Own Words,” drawn from a never-before-publicized fifteen volume set of U.S. Army documents on landmine warfare in the Korea and Vietnam conflicts. The report reveals that: one-third of all U.S. Army casualties in Vietnam were caused by mines; more U.S. Army mine casualties in Korea were caused by U.S. defensive minefields than by the enemy’s mines; the main source of landmines for the enemy in both Korea and Vietnam was captured U.S. mines and mine components; by 1969, ninety percent of all component parts in mines used against U.S. troops in Vietnam were U.S.-made; it was the U.S., not North Korea or North Vietnam, which introduced mines en masse into Korea and Vietnam and the U.S. lost control of the weapon shortly thereafter; U.S. minefields were easily breached during the Korean War, sending U.S. troops retreating through their own unmarked minefields.[68]

U.S. Army antipersonnel mines used in the Gulf War include 15,531 M18A1 Claymore mines; 21,200 M16A2 dumb mines; 600 M14 dumb mines; 504 M86 PDMs; and 5,000 M75 GEMSS.[69] No Volcano or MOPMS mines were shipped or used. Air Force Gator mines were undoubtedly the most widely used mine by the U.S., but the number used is not known

According to a paper by two Pentagon officials, thirty-four percent of U.S. casualties in Operation Desert Storm were caused by landmines.[70] Timothy Connolly, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, served with the 82nd Airborne Division in the Gulf War and has said, “I was also struck by the fact that U.S. minefields were unmarked; that no minefield maps were available; that the U.S. could not even provide a general area description of where the mines were supposed to have landed, let alone where they actually did.”[71]

Declassified Army documents hint at the problems U.S. scatterable mines caused in 1991 when U.S. troops stormed Iraqi defenses so rapidly that they inadvertently penetrated their own “live” minefields. A U.S. Army memorandum states: “The purpose of this message is to remind all XVIII ABN Corps soldiers to leave unexploded mines alone.... XVIII ABN Corps has suffered several severe injuries as a result of unexploded munitions being disturbed.... Coalition aircraft and enemy AAA have littered Corps area of operations with dangerous unexploded ammunition.... Due to rapid Allied advance, activated Gator minefields could be encountered. Gator mines...have been used to mine airfields, MSRS, approaches and bridges, and assembly areas.... Extreme caution must be exercised in moving/maneuvering through areas where air strikes have been conducted.”[72]

In addition to use in wartime, the U.S. has employed dumb antipersonnel mines around its Guantanamo Bay military base in Cuba. The U.S. began removing those mines in 1996 and has set a deadline of the end of 1999 for complete removal of the dumb mines. There are some indications that the U.S. may have smart antipersonnel landmines stored at Guantanamo Bay for future use. (See Cuba country study.)

The mines that are already in the ground in Korea in the DMZ are considered to be the property of the Republic of Korea, not of the United States. Thus, those mines will have to be removed when the ROK joins the ban treaty, but not when the U.S. does. When the U.S. states that it cannot sign the treaty because of concerns about Korea, it is not referring to removal of existing mines, but rather the desire to be able to lay new mines on the Korean peninsula in any future war. U.S. war plans call for the laying of approximately one million new dumb mines in Korea within a few days at the onset of renewed conflict. These mines will be laid not in the existing Demilitarized Zone, but throughout the 20-mile area between the DMZ and Seoul. Smart mines would presumably be scattered by air, artillery, and vehicles in both South Korea and North Korea.

The U.S. has been engaged in often testy discussions with its military allies that have signed the Mine Ban Treaty regarding the issues of U.S. stockpiling of mines in those nations, and of U.S. right to transit mines across the national territories of treaty-bound nations. If the U.S. goes to war, it wants its ships, planes, and vehicles to be able to move antipersonnel mines across or though nations such as Germany, Italy, Norway, and Japan. Another contentious issue is that of joint operations between the U.S. and the armed forces of treaty States Parties.

Mine Action Funding

The U.S. has provided a significant amount of money for demining and mine awareness programs. It provides demining assistance under the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program which was set up in 1993. According to its own calculations, the U.S. has committed $236 million to this program since its inception.[73] It should be noted, however, that includes $63 million (more than one-fourth of the total) for Pentagon research and development programs for “rapid prototyping and field testing of demining equipment.”[74] It is projected that the U.S. contribution to demining programs will expand to $105 million by FY 2003.[75]

U.S. Funding for Humanitarian Demining[76]

Fiscal Year
Total Spent
Number of Country Programs
$10.2 million
$15.9 million
$39.2 million
$32.8 million
$45.5 million
$66.1-91.8 million[77]
1999 (est.)
$65.8-100 million[78]

Major Recipients FY 1993-1999[79]

$28.7 million
$21.4 million
$20.4 million
$18.4 million
$14.8 million
$14.2 million
Central Am.
$11.0 million
$10.2 million
$9.5 million
$9.1 million
$8.4 million
$4.7 million
$4.1 million
$3.9 million
$3.0 million

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

U.S. demining assistance primarily takes the form of training, with the stated goal of developing an indigenous demining capability. Over 14,000 individuals have been trained in mine clearance techniques, mine awareness, emergency medical care, and how to establish a national mine center. In 1997 alone, some 300 U.S. military and civilian personnel trained more than 1,200 local deminers. The U.S. has helped establish Mine Action Centers in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Cambodia.[80] The U.S. also provides equipment, mine detectors, and in at least one case (Rwanda) mine-sniffing dogs.

While DoD provides training and equipment for demining, Title 10 prohibits U.S. personnel from engaging in the actual removal of landmines: “The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that no member of the armed forces...engages in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a United States military operation.”[81]

U.S. aid is coordinated by the Department of Defense and Department of State. In general, the Department of Defense is responsible for funding the start-up costs of a mine action program and the Department of State is responsible for sustaining it. The key offices are the Office for Humanitarian Assistance and Antipersonnel Landmines Policy in the Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs in the Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs (PM/HDP) in the Department of State. The Office for Humanitarian Assistance and Antipersonnel Landmines Policy is responsible for policy oversight and allows the U.S. military to provide training and equipment. Once an indigenous program is established, PM/HDP provides continued equipment support. Funds for the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program are administered through these offices.[82]

A mine-affected country must request U.S. assistance through the U.S. embassy which then forwards the request to the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Humanitarian Demining. IWG then conducts an assessment of the mine problem and if a program is approved, the U.S. will fund a mine action center, mine awareness programs, and provide demining training until the country becomes self-sufficient and can take over the program, although U.S. funding may still be available for further assistance. [83]

The Department of Defense funds its humanitarian demining programs from its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account under the authority of Title 10, United States Code, Section 401. Funding for the humanitarian demining programs run by the Department of State comes from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related programs (NADR) account. Congress appropriated $20 million in FY 1998 for NADR.[84] NADR funding can be used to support bilateral programs, U.N. programs, non-governmental (NGO) programs, or the Department of State can transfer NADR funds directly to a U.S. embassy which has recommended a demining program.[85]

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright created the Office of Global Humanitarian Demining in 1997 as part of the Demining 2010 Initiative aimed at eliminating all landmines threatening civilians by 2010.[86] The initiative was announced in October 1997, shortly after the U.S. demands for exceptions in the ban treaty were rejected during the Oslo negotiations. Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth was chosen to serve as the first U.S. Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining. Ambassador Donald Steinberg took over the position in December 1998. His role is to increase public and private resources devoted to clearing landmines worldwide, with the goal of achieving $1 billion per year dedicated to demining and mine awareness programs.[87]

The U.S. hosted the Global Humanitarian Demining 2010 Initiative Conference in Washington, DC in May 1998. At the conference, the U.S. and the European Union agreed to establish a joint program to coordinate more effective application of technology to demining.[88]

The Department of Defense chartered the Humanitarian Demining Information Center (HDIC) at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia to gather information on humanitarian demining and support U.S. and international government activities. Its website discusses demining issues and lists relevant governmental and nongovernmental resources. It has also developed medical and mine awareness materials for Cambodia, hosted conferences, and published the online Journal of Humanitarian Demining.[89] At one such HDIC-sponsored symposium on World-Wide Humanitarian Demining in October 1998, Donald Patierno, the Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs at the Department of State outlined DoD and DoS activities. He noted that since FY 1998, NADR funds were no longer restricted to foreign military financing, but over 50% of NADR’s funds were now allocated to NGOs, such as funding for landmine surveys carried out by CARE and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, and mine awareness programs in Vietnam, Angola, and Laos which will be carried out by NGOs.[90]

The U.S. trains deminers at various army bases. The U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, established the Humanitarian Demining Training Center in 1996 to train the U.S. Army in countermine and humanitarian demining operations. In addition, the U.S. Army School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, has a course on humanitarian demining for its Latin American military personnel. [91]

In addition to bilateral demining assistance, the U.S. has donated a total of $2.2 million to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance since 1994.[92]

NGOs and the private sector have also gotten involved in mine action programs. The United Nations Association of the USA created the “Adopt a Minefield” program, which will fund demining efforts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, and Mozambique. So far, 100 community-based organizations in the U.S. have begun raising $25,000 each to support this effort.[93]

Criticisms that have been leveled at U.S. humanitarian mine clearance programs include:

* too focused on military-to-military contacts and training, and not enough involvement of humanitarian non-governmental organizations;

* not cost effective, with few deminers trained for the money spent;

* too much funding for research on futuristic technologies instead of programs on the ground; and,

* while substantial in gross terms, U.S. demining funding lags behind others in terms of spending per capita or as percentage of GNP.

Survivor Assistance

U.S. funding is not targeted specifically toward landmine survivors, although there are U.S. funded programs which include landmine survivors among the beneficiaries. The largest such program is the USAID Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, which provides funding for prosthetic programs for amputees, the majority of which are landmine victims, in developing countries.[94] The fund provided over $50 million dollars to fourteen countries between 1989 and 1998.[95] After holding steady at approximately $5 million for many years, funding was increased to $7.5 million in FY 1998, and Congress recommended increasing funding to $12 million in FY 1999: “The conferees recommend $12,000,000 for medical, orthopedic and related rehabilitative and preventative assistance for war victims, particularly those who have been severely disabled from landmines.”[96] However, $10 million was actually approved.[97]

In addition to the War Victims Fund, in 1998 the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research of the U.S. Department of Education granted $4.25 million over five years for a center in Chicago that would focus on the development of mobility aids for landmine survivors.[98] The Department of Defense has also appropriated small amounts for victim assistance. It appropriated $300,000 for FY 1998 and FY 1999 for medical assistance, primarily surgical training in mine-affected countries.[99]

There are several other smaller DoD sponsored landmine survivor assistance medical programs, including a rehabilitation project in Philadelphia in partnership with the World Health Organization and the UNHCR which trains health care workers dealing with amputees; the Sri Lankan Surgical Rotation in which U.S. military medical specialists assist in the care of landmine victims in Sri Lanka; and the Blast Resuscitation and Victim Assistance program which will ultimately deploy surgical teams to hospitals in mine-affected nations to work with local medical personnel in providing care to mine victims.[100]


[1] A mixed munition contains both antitank and antipersonnel mines. The U.S. has three such systems (Gator, Volcano, MOPMS) and is considering manufacturing a fourth (RADAM). These systems are not permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty.

[2] Letter from Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Senator Patrick Leahy, 15 May 1998.

[3] Statement of U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, The Way to Ottawa, 22 May 1998.

[4] See for example, Human Rights Watch press release, U.S. Move to Sign Mine Ban Treaty: A Step in the Right Direction, 22 May 1998.

[5] Letter to President Clinton from the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines, signed by 70 organizations, 4 August 1998.

[6] The term “smart” mine is often used for APMs that have self-destruct features, that is, they will blow up automatically after a pre-set period of time. The reliability of self-destruct features has been called into question, so the CCW has also required a self-deactivating feature which renders the mine inert (e.g., a battery that will go inevitably go dead). “Dumb” mines are those that do not blow up until a person, military or civilian, triggers them, sometimes decades after conflict ends.

[7] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, 16 May 1996.

[8]U.N. General Assembly resolution 51/45S, 10 December 1996.

[9] USCBL press release, Clinton Announcement Sends Mistaken Signal on Landmines, 17 January 1997.

[10] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Re: Landmines, 17 January 1997

[11] See, ICBL, “Antipersonnel Landmines and the Conference on Disarmament,” February 1999.

[12] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, 16 May 1996.

[13]Letter from George R. Schneiter, Acting Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, Acquisition and Technology, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, to Representative Lane Evans, 27 October 27 1994.

[14] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Re: Landmines, 17 January 1997.

[15]DoD spent $1.68 billion on scatterable landmine systems in 1983-92 (U.S. Army, Information Paper, “Anti-Personnel Land Mine Procurement and Production,” 1992). This figure also includes the antitank mine components of combined antitank/antipersonnel mine systems. It is believed that significant research and development contracts were awarded in the 1970s.

[16]William M. Arkin, “Military Technology and the Banning of Land Mines,” presentation to the 1st International Campaign to Ban Landmines NGO Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, London, 24 May 1993, p. 6.

[17] For detailed descriptions and technical characteristics of these mine types, see Human Rights Watch Arms Project, “Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of Antipersonnel Mines,” April 1997, pp. 43-46. Of the dumb mines, the M2, M3 and M26 are apparently no longer in the active inventory. The M14 is a small, plastic blast mine. The M16 is a bounding fragementation mine. The M18 is the Claymore directional fragmentation mine. Of the smart mines, the PDM and GEMSS are apparently being phased out. The ADAM is an artillery delivered fragmentation mine with sensitive tripwires and can be set to self-destruct in four to 48 hours. Gator mines are released from the air in the form of cluster bombs. The Volcano is an Army system deploying Gator-type mines from vehicles and helicopters. MOPMS mines are packed into a “suitcase” and operated by means of remote control.

[18]Letter from Alliant Techsystems, Inc., President and CEO Richard Schwartz to Human Rights Watch, 22 August 1996.

[19] Human Rights Watch Arms Project, “Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of Antipersonnel Mines,” April 1997.

[20] Confidential communication from U.S. Government source, 4 February 1999.

[21] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999, p. 8.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Human Rights Watch press release, Historic Landmine Treaty Takes Effect, 1 March 1999.

[24]Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict H. Allen Holmes to Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Lane Evans, 9 January 1997.

[25] Federal Register, 25 November 1992, pp. 55614-55615.

[26] Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 76.

[27] Draft “APL and Munitions Categories,” July 1997.

[28] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999, p. 4.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Interview with Pete O’Neill and Deborah Rosenblum, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, Washington, DC, 22 February 1999.

[31] Human Rights Watch press release, “Historic Landmine Ban Treaty Takes Effect,” 1 March 1999.

[32] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999, pp. 4-5.

[33] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999, p. 5.

[34] Interview with Peter O’Neill and Deborah Rosenblum, Washington, DC, 22 February 1999.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999, p. 5.

[37] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999, p. 2.

[38]Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, p. 64. This book contains a chart on U.S. mine exports since 1969. The information is primarily drawn from U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act. This gives a country-by-country, year-by-year, mine-by-mine breakdown of U.S. mine exports.

[39]Human Rights Watch, Landmines: Deadly Legacy, p. 73.

[40]National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Public Law No. 102-484, sec. 1365. The implementing regulations appear at Federal Register, vol. 57 (25 November 1992), p. 228.

[41]Sec. 558 of the FY 1997 Foreign Operations Act, amended Sec. 1365 © of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993.

[42]White House, Statement by the Press Secretary, “United States Announces Next Steps on Anti-Personnel Landmines,” 17 January 1997.

[43] SECDEF Washington DC//USDP:DSAA// message, 151426Z February 1996, Moratorium on Transfers of Antipersonnel Landmines, reprinted in The DISAM Journal, Spring 1996, pp. 139-140.

[44] These figures come from tables provided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (undated, but 1997). Though numbers are unlikely to have changed much since 1997, though the GEMSS figure may be high as it is apparently being phased out.

[45] Harry Hambric and William Schneck, “The Antipersonnel Mine Threat: A Historical Perspective,” Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 12-18 November 1996, p. 29.

[46] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on Use by Armed Forces of Antipersonnel Landmines, March 1998, p. 15.

[47] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999.

[48] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Report to the Secretary of Defense On the Status of DoD’s Implementation of the U.S. Policy on Antipersonnel Landmines, May 1997, p. 6.

[49] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Re: Landmines, 17 January 1997.

[50]Transcript, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing, 17 January 1997; transcript, Pentagon Press Briefing, unnamed senior military official, 17 January 1997.

[51]This information was first provided to Human Rights Watch in a telephone interview with Robert Cowles, Demining Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 8 April 1997.

[52]Claymore mines, when used in a command detonated mode, are not prohibited under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The U.S. states that it only uses Claymore mines in command-detonated mode, never with a tripwire

[53]OAS Resolution AG/RES. 1411 (XXVI-0-96), “Western Hemisphere as an Antipersonnel Landmine Free Zone,” 7 June 1996.

[54]White House and Pentagon press briefings, 17 January 1997.

[55]Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Michael W. Thumm, Technology Transfer Action Center, Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, 14 February 1997.

[56]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Landmines Information Paper, 3 March 1999, p. 4.

[57] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on Use by Armed Forces of Antipersonnel Landmines, March 1998, p. iii.

[58] Ibid, p. 15.

[59] Colin Clark, “Pentagon Edges Forward on Landmine Alternatives,” Defense Week, 29 June 1998, p. 3.

[60] Letter and attached fact sheet from U.S. Department of the Air Force, 11th Wing, to Human Rights Watch, 26 May 1998, provided in response to Freedom of Information Act request; interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials.

[61] U.S. Army, Landmine Ceremony Background Facts, Crane Army Ammunition Activity, 30 June 1998.

[62] M. Gonzalez, El Pais, 8 March 1999, p. 20.

[63] Letter and attached fact sheet from U.S. Department of the Air Force, 11th Wing, to Human Rights Watch, 26 May 1998, provided in response to Freedom of Information Act request.

[64] Department of State/PM memorandum, APL Consultations with NATO Basing Countries, 6 February 1998.

[65] See Berger Letter to Leahy, 15 May 1998, for policy description. In practice, this means the U.S. will stop using ADAM and PDM “free-standing” smart mines in 2003. PDMs are currently slated for destruction. But the U.S. will continue to use the smart antipersonnel mines contained in the Gator, Volcano, and MOPMS systems (and possibly a new RADAM system) until 2006, or later if alternatives are not yet available.

[66] Public Law 104-107, section 580.

[67] Congressional Record, 24 June 1998, p. S6996.

[68] Human Rights Watch and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, “In Its Own Words: The U.S. Army and Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,” July 1997; see also, HRW/VVAF Press Release, “Retired Generals Renew Call for Total Antipersonnel Mine Ban,” 29 July 1997.

[69] U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act.

[70] Harry Hambric and William Schneck, “The Antipersonnel Mine Threat: A Historical Perspective,” Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 12-18 November 1996.

[71] E-mail from Timothy Connolly to Human Rights Watch, 3 March 1997.

[72] Message Information Update, Subject: Unexploded Munitions, ARCENT, XVIII Corps, 28 February 1991.

[73] The United States Humanitarian Demining Program, brochure prepared by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian and Demining Programs, October 1998.

[74] Ibid. Dollar figure from “Demining Program Financing History,” provided to Human Rights Watch by the Office of Humanitarian and Demining Programs, 11January 1999.

[75] Global Demining Initiative, “Demining 2010,” proposal outline. See http://www.demining/brtrc.com/policy/publicpolicy/2010.htm.

[76] “Demining Program Financing History,” provided to Human Rights Watch by the State Department, Office of Humanitarian and Demining Programs, 11 January 1999.

[77] The lower number comes from the “Financing History.” However, the State Department has also reported a total of $91.8 million for 1998. See for example, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. 120. It is unclear why there is a discrepency.
[78] The lower number comes from the “Financing History.” However, U.S. officials have frequently said that spending in 1999 will total $100 million. It is unclear why there is a discrepency.

[79] “Demining Program Financing History.”

[80] U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. 121.

[81] Title 10, United States Code, Section 401 (Includes changes in the FY 1997 DoD Authorization Act, P.L. 104-201), section (a)(4)(A).

[82] The United States Humanitarian Demining Program, brochure prepared by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian and Demining Programs, October 1998.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Press Briefing on Land Mine Policy, Washington, DC, 31 October 1997.

[87] Ibid.

[88] U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. 118.

[89] See: www.hdic.jmu.edu.

[90] Humanitarian Demining Information Center at James Madison University, World-Wide Humanitarian Demining Conference on “Standards and Measures of Success,” conference proceedings, 4-7 October 1998, p. 12.

[91] U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. 122.

[92] Ibid., Annex C.

[93] Ambassador Donald K. Steinberg, Comments to the Mexico City Conference on Landmine Action, 12 January 1999. See also www.unausa.org.

[94] Portfolio Synopsis: Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, United States Agency for International Development, October 1997.

[95] Ibid. Recipient countries during this time period were: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Vietnam.

[96] Congressional Record, Conference Report on H.R. 4328, Making Omnibus Consolidated And Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999, House of Representatives, 19 October 1998, H11356.

[97] Ambassador Donald K. Steinberg, Comments to the Mexico City Conference on Landmine Action, 12 January 1999.

[98] Center for International Rehabilitation fact sheet, provided by the Landmine Survivors Network, Washington, DC.

[99] Information provided by the Landmine Survivors Network.

[100] U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. 123.