Western Sahara is
considered to be one of the most heavily mine-affected regions in the world.
After years of colonial and post-colonial conflict, mines and unexploded
ordnance (UXO) litter the landscape. The sovereignty of the Western Sahara
remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the
Polisario Front (Frente Polisario, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro). Moroccan and Polisario forces fought
intermittently from 1975 to 1991, when a cease-fire went into effect and a
United Nations peacekeeping force, MINURSO, was deployed to the region.
Landmines have been used by both sides, and in particularly large numbers by
Moroccan forces.
At the heart of the peace accord was an agreement to hold a free and fair
referendum on self-determination or integration into the Moroccan Kingdom, but
there have been long delays in the referendum process. The UN has proposed a new
initiative with a referendum date of December 1999. The Polisario Front has
approved, but the UN awaits the Moroccan government's acceptance of the plan. If
implemented, a major task for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) will be the repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees from the
camps south of Tindouf, Algeria, as well as from other neighboring countries.
The repatriation faces two major obstacles; supplying water and avoiding mined
areas. UNHCR reconnaissance trips into the eastern portion of the territory
have discovered numerous mined areas that cross the repatriation
route.[1]
Mine Ban Policy
In 1976, the Polisario Front declared a government
in exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. It was formally seated by the
Organization of African Unity in 1984, and today is recognized by over seventy
nations, mostly in Africa and Asia. However, it is not universally recognized
and has no official representation in the United Nations, and thus was unable to
sign the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa in December 1997. A senior Polisario
official has told Landmine Monitor that the government is in favor of the treaty
and its stipulations, and that the Polisario government would sign and ratify
the treaty, if eligible to do
so.[2] In a statement
released on 1 March 1999, when the ban treaty entered into force, “the
Saharawi government announced its willingness to sign” the Mine Ban Treaty
and “its desire to participate” in the First Meeting of States
Parties to the ban treaty in Maputo in early May
1999.[3] The POLISARIO
government also called on the international community and NGOs mobilized in the
fight against AP mines “to put pressure on Morocco so that the UN mission
tasked with the elimination of mines can do its
work.”[4]
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Considering the possibility of resumed fighting,
the Polisario military has offered no information regarding the number, types or
storage of landmines in its possession. It is difficult to track the source of
Polisario military supplies, though Algeria and at one time Libya have supplied
assistance.[5] Another source
was what the Polisario Army could take from the Moroccans during the conflict.
Western Sahara does not produce its own mines, and is not know to have exported
mines.
Use
The majority of mines in Western Sahara were used
during the conflict that ensued after the departure of Spanish colonial forces
in 1976. The conflict initially included Morocco, Frente Polisario and
Mauritania; in 1979 Mauritania withdrew and made peace with Polisario. The
Mauritanian role in the war left minefields in the southern portion of the
province.[6]
The Moroccan strategy in the armed conflict became one of attrition. In
1981, the Moroccans began construction on the first of six defensive walls,
known as berms. These earthen walls with a height of about three meters were
fortified with antitank and antipersonnel landmines. The first berm was
completed in 1982, effectively closing off the northwestern portion of the
territory. Successive berms were completed in 1984, 1985, and 1987,
consolidating Moroccan held areas from the north to the south with the sixth and
final berm closing off a majority of the southern portion of the
territory.[7]
In addition to the estimated one to two million mines used to fortify the
berm, mines were used by all parties throughout the
conflict.[8] Polisario forces
deployed mines as they retreated in the face of the Moroccan advance leaving
minefields within the area presently under Moroccan
control.[9] The Moroccans also
made advances beyond their present position, leaving mines behind in the area
now under Polisario control.[10]
Polisario deployed its own mines in defense of these Moroccan advances. New
mine usage diminished by 1991 when the cease-fire was signed. Air distributed
munitions, specifically cluster bomb units, were also used during the conflict.
The high rate of failure of these munitions has left extensive areas
contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO), in essence de facto AP
mines.
The Landmine Problem
While Western Sahara is heavily mine-affected, the
exact dimensions of the problem in terms of number of mines, area contaminated
and socio-economic impact are still unknown. Continued delays in a final
settlement between the two warring parties have hindered efforts to gauge and
address the problem.
Estimates on the number of mines in Western Sahara range from 200,000 by the
US Department of State to ten
million.[11] The exact number
and distribution of explosive remnants in the territory is not known, making the
determination of resources needed to address the problem a matter of guess work.
A list of antitank and antipersonnel mines confirmed by MINURSO and Polisario to
exist in the territory includes the following:
[12]
Country
Model-Antitank
Model-Antipersonnel
Former Soviet Union
TM-57, TM-64
POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMD-6, PMD-6M, MON 50, OZM 3,
Germany
DM 31
Spain
C3-A
FAMA
Italy
MATS/2, VS 1.6, VS 2.2, VS 3..3, VS HCT 2, VS HCT 4, SB 81, SB 81 AR
VS 50,VS MK2,Valmara 69, TS 50, SB 33, SB 33 AR,
Greece
EM 20
France
M 52 MACI
MI AP MP M 51, MI AP ID 51, MI AP DV 59, MI AP DV M 61, MI AP DV M 63
PIQ
Belgium
NR 141, NR 201, PRB M3,
PRB M35, PRB 409, NR 413, NR 442
Egypt
PP MI SK, T 78, T 79, U 1 BOUND, U 1 STAKE, U 1 WOOD, U 1 DIR FRAG
USA
M 15, M 19, M6 A2
M 16 A1, M 2 A4, M 18 A1 (Claymore), BLU 61/63 (Cluster bomb units)
Former Czechoslovakia
PT-MI-K
The Berm: The area of the Berm is known to be the most heavily mined area in
the territory. A UN report quotes an un-named Moroccan military official that
between one and two million mines could have been planted in defense of the
Berm.[13] Usually the
minefields extend for 100 meters. They are principally antitank mines with
antipersonnel mines closer to the Berm. Polisario reports that mines along the
Berm are sometimes booby-trapped or reinforced, sometimes with LP gas
bottles.[14] MINURSO enforces a
5 kilometer Buffer Zone east of the Berm, which has been declared off-limits to
all parties and civilians. The area of danger is thought to extend up to 10
kilometers to the east of the Berm in some areas.
Moroccan held territory: The MINURSO report states that Moroccan forces have
removed most of the useless minefields to the west of the berm. Remaining
minefields have been reported to MINURSO and sometimes marked with barbed wire
or stones. However, individual Team Site reports note that Moroccan forces are
not always sure of mines and advise staying to known
tracks.[15] Team Site reports
also state that Moroccan forces conduct clearance in areas after mine accidents
have taken place. The MINURSO report also notes the problems encountered by the
Royal Moroccan Army with old Polisario minefields left as they were retreating,
especially in the southern sector of the Moroccan controlled territory.
Portions of previous Berm sections that now lie behind the present divider are
also regarded as suspect areas by MINURSO Team Site members.
MINURSO Team Sites keep a record of mine accidents in their sector and those
reports are compiled at MINURSO's Mine Action Cell in Layounne. The reports
marked on a map show the greatest percentage of accidents have occurred in the
Polisario held territory. Some Polisario military officials claim the actual
number of accidents in the Moroccan held territory far out paces accidents in
the Polisario held territory, but that it is not in Morocco's best interest to
publicize mine accidents, especially those involving
Saharawis.[16] The MINURSO
reports are not assumed to be comprehensive due to the reliance on local
authorities for reporting and the vastness of the territory.
Polisario held territory: A Polisario Defense official reports that it has
maps of contaminated areas east of the berm exist, but the detail and accuracy
of these maps is unknown. Polisario authorities are thought to know the
location of mined areas, though its knowledge is not comprehensive. Polisario
military in the field admit they are unsure of the placement of Moroccan and
Mauritanian minefields. The location of UXO, which is distributed throughout
former battle zones, is also a matter of speculation. Despite the existence of
mine maps by either side, the desert conditions of sand, wind and occasional
heavy rain make mine shifting a constant phenomena. Likewise, the number of
mine victims is unknown and their access to emergency services, especially in
remote areas, is limited to military medical facilities. All serious injuries
would require evacuation to the Polisario center south of Tindouf, Algeria.
During a recent visit inside the Polisario held territory, accidents were
discussed with military and civilians and it appears that camels are the most
common victim of mines and UXOs as they graze for food.
Mine Awareness
In April 1998, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) began
the first mine awareness project for Saharawis in the refugee camps south of
Tindouf, Algeria. The project was scheduled to run through March 1999 and
provide awareness training to the over 100,000 refugees, mostly women and
children. There are efforts underway to extend the project in the camps and
expand into Mauritania and the Territory where no mine awareness is currently
available.
The mine awareness project has teams consisting of six members each in the
four major refugee camps, Aauin, Awserd, Smara and Dahkla as well as a smaller
camp based at the 27th of February women's training school. The
project employs two expatriate advisors and around fifty local staff as Team
Leaders, instructors and administration. The project's curriculum centers on
mine, UXO and danger area recognition, proper behavior to avoid accidents and
response to mine accidents. To date, the NPA project has provided at least
one-hour of training to over 30,000 Saharawi refugees. A theater group was
recently formed to begin work with children.
Mine Clearance
To date, some clearance has been conducted by
militaries from both sides though it only totals a small percentage of the
problem. Moroccan forces are thought to have lifted most of their
"non-essential" minefields, though no information is given on the number or area
cleared.[17] In late 1997 and
early 1998, the United Nations approached Sweden for a demining capacity for the
MINURSO mission. The Swedish Demining Unit (SDU) arrived in Layounne in May
1998. Although deployed from May until October 1998, the Unit was only
operational for 2 ½ months stemming from problems with Moroccan authorities
allowing the import of essential
equipment.[18] The SDU
concentrated its efforts on areas for establishing or extending MINURSO Team
Sites. Of the limited areas it cleared, the SDU destroyed 534 UXOs and only two
antitank mines. The Unit did not report any antipersonnel mines. Because of
the short period of operation, many of the MINURSO and UNHCR demining requests
were left unfinished, including areas of the repatriation route. In its final
report, the SDU noted that of the tasks it was assigned, there remains four
months work for an EOD team and the need for a permanent EOD capacity for the
life of the UN mission.
Part of the Swedish contingent were officers located in Laayoune at the Mine
Action Cell. The Cell has the responsibility of all mine related matters
concerning the MINURSO mission. After the departure of the Swedish officers,
the MAC was handed over to Pakistani engineers who continue to work in the Cell.
However, with the departure of the SDU, MINURSO is left with no demining
capacity.
Presently, there is a cooperative relationship between Polisario 3rd Regional
Command in Mijek and MINURSO Mijek Team Site in identifying and marking danger
areas along MINURSO patrol routes. The marking system uses red painted stones
to indicate danger. Throughout the Polisario held territory there is a lack of
uniform marking. Depending on the area, stones, tires, sticks, blue sandbags
and wooden signs may be used to indicate danger. Unfortunately, several of
these markers are also used at times to indicate safe routes, opening the
possibility for confusion. The NPA mine awareness project is attempting to
initiate a uniform system with the Polisario military using red stones, which it
will teach to refugees during its mine awareness training.
In the Secretary General's report dated 28 January 1999, he notes the
assignment of the two Pakistani engineers to address mine and UXO related issues
at the Mine Action Cell in
Layounne.[19] The report also
introduces the idea of a pilot demining project presented to both parties to
start marking and destroying mines and UXO. The report notes that this pilot
project would not be a substitute for the demining unit required by MINURSO to
complete the remaining tasks. The pilot project idea was mentioned by MINURSO
Team Site officials in various locations during a recent visit in February.
Under the current Global Landmine Survey initiative spearheaded by the Survey
Working Group, a group of mine action related non-governmental organizations and
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Western Sahara is a top priority
for survey. Proposals are currently being developed to implement a Level 1
Survey to determine the extent and socio-economic impact of mines and UXO in
Western Sahara. An Advance Mission visited the Polisario government south of
Tindouf, Algeria and into the Polisario held territory to assess the feasibility
of a Level 1 Survey in the Territory. Level 1 Surveys are scheduled to take
approximately one year to complete and will provide relevant information on the
extent and the impact of explosive remnants for policy makers and project
implementers to determine follow on Level 2 Survey and clearance requirements.
Landmine Casualties
From the MINURSO mine accident reports and
interviews with military and civilians in the Polisario held territory, mine
accidents are occurring, though not in large numbers. This is partially a
function of the small population that inhabits the territory. The return of
tens of thousands of refugees will increase the number of accidents. Another
possible reason for the low number of accidents is the enforcement by MINURSO of
the five kilometer buffer zone where the greatest concentration of danger
exists.
The Polisario government has no systematic statistics on the number of people
injured by mines.[20] The NPA
mine awareness teams interviewed thirty-seven mine and UXO victims during August
1998. These interviews represent only a sample of the survivors living in the
camps. The most often mentioned problem by survivors was the lack of
prosthetics. Twenty-six of those interviewed were injured during military
operations and of those seven were attempting to remove mines. The other
civilian injuries occurred during travel, herding or had picked up UXO. Six of
those interviewed were under the age of seventeen when they were injured.
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Medical facilities in the Polisario held territory
are very limited. Each of the six military regions only has facilities at its
headquarters to treat injuries. Surgical care is only available in the refugee
camps in Algeria, some six to thirty hours away or more depending on where the
accident occurs and what transportation can be obtained. On some occasions,
MINURSO has provided assistance in treating and transporting mine victims. In
preparation for repatriation, Polisario has constructed two hospitals, one in
Tifiriti in the north and the other in Mijek in the south. However, these
facilities are not yet complete and require equipment and staffing.
In the camps, there are two hospitals. The National Hospital is staffed with
Cuban and Saharawi doctors and has some facilities to treat seriously wounded
patients. The other is the military hospital where the majority of mine
accident patients are treated.
Rehabilitation services are almost non-existent. There is the Military
Rehabilitation and Education Center located in the administrative center of the
camps. The center has patients with a variety of injuries, almost all are
former military. Some of the men have their families with them. The director
listed the three main challenges facing the center as lack of treatment for
curable cases, care for paraplegics and prosthetics for amputees. He also
mentioned that there is a lack of quality food necessary for recuperation. The
Director, himself, walks on an above knee prosthetic device that is twelve years
old. Like others with prosthetics, he received care outside the camps in
Algeria or Spain. Few amputees stay at the center as the level of personal care
they receive at home with their families in the camps is better. Due to a lack
of resources, the center is severely limited in medicines and rehabilitation it
can offer. The physiotherapy room consists of only a padded table, an exercise
bicycle and a rowing machine. In addition to medical services, the school offers
basic courses, as well as some computer instruction, for the patients, most of
who did not have the opportunity to receive education during their military
service.
Recently the Minister of Health signed a cooperative agreement with a group
of Spanish NGOs to provide aid including care for children mine
survivors.[21] The plan will
bring Spanish physicians to the camps to identify patients and then fly the
children to Spain to receive treatment.
[5]Usher, Rod, "A Nation Lost
in the Desert," Time, 1 February 1999. Vol. 153 No. 4, pp. 38-40.
[6]Landmine Monitor interview
with Polisario 1st Regional Command (Dougaj), 4 February 1999.
[7]Landmine Monitor interview
with Saharawi Military Engineers, June 1998.
[8]MINURSO, “Western
Sahara: Updated Mine Situation,” February 1998.
[9]Landmine Monitor interview
with Polisario Military Engineers, June 1998.
[10]Landmine Monitor
interviews with Polisario Regional Commands, February 1999.
[11]U.S. Department of State,
Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. A-2; Norwegian
People's Aid, Western Sahara web page, August 1998. See www.npaid.no.
[12]MINURSO, “Western
Sahara: Updated Mine Situation,” February 1998.
[13]MINURSO, “Western
Sahara: Updated Mine Situation,” February 1998.
[14] Landmine Monitor
interview with Polisario Regional Commands, February 1999.
[16]Landmine Monitor
interview with Polisario Regional Commands, February 1999.
[17]MINURSO, “Western
Sahara: Updated Mine Situation,” February 1998.
[18]“Report on SDU and
MAC Activities May-Nov 1998,” MINURSO Interoffice Memorandum, 10 November
1998.
[19]Report of the
Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, 28 January
1999. See www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s199988.htm. S/1999/88.
[20]Landmine Monitor
interview with Polisario Minister of Health Bachir Seyd. Smara Refugee Camp, 30
January 1999.
[21]Landmine Monitor
interview with Polisario Minister of Health Bachir Seyd. Smara Refugee Camp, 30
January 1999.
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