Zimbabwe signed the Mine
Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 18 June 1998. The country was one
of nine African states attending the October 1996 meeting in Canada to
strategize as to how to reach an international ban treaty. Attended by 50
countries as full participants and 24 observer states, along with NGOs and
international agencies, that historic meeting launched what became known as the
Ottawa Process and gave the world, in little over a year, the Mine Ban Treaty.
Also in October 1996, a group of concerned individuals, NGO workers, academics
and journalists formed the Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Zimbabwe also took pro-ban positions in international fora. On 10 December
1996, along with 155 other states, Zimbabwe voted in the UN General Assembly in
favor of Resolution 51/453, which called for an international agreement to ban
antipersonnel landmines. In 1997, as Chair of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), Zimbabwe helped steer the Continental Resolution DOC CM/2009 (LXVI),
which eventually coalesced the African position on a
ban.[1] The country continued its
commitment to the issue by working with like-minded states within the regional
political and economic grouping of SADC.
The Defense Minister, Moven Mahachi on 15 May 1997 announced that Zimbabwe
had banned antipersonnel landmines. He stated
that:[2] “The Zimbabwean
Armed Forces have never and will never use antipersonnel mines, be they
‘smart’ or ‘dumb’ in the future. Zimbabwe has not
manufactured antipersonnel mines since 1980 and undertakes never to try and
acquire the technology or capacity otherwise to do so in the future. The bulk of
stocks of antipersonnel mines held presently will be destroyed within the next
five years. Only a few will be retained for training purposes and public
awareness campaigns, under the strict and centralized control of a specialized
section of the Ministry of Defense. Zimbabwe will not allow the transfer of
antipersonnel mines into, over or above its territory by any party and will
itself not allow the transfer of mines within its territorial borders except for
purposes of their destruction, for instructional purposes or in relation to
demining operations.” With this unilateral ban, and its signature and
ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, the country has now demonstrated singular
commitment to banning APMs at every level. The ban treaty has been incorporated
within Zimbabwe’s domestic law, but it is unclear if that constitutes
implementation legislation.
There have been allegations of use of mines by Zimbabwean forces operating in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, but the allegations have been vehemently
denied by Zimbabwean officials, and no concrete evidence has been presented.
(See below).
Production
With South African technical assistance the
Rhodesians developed their own landmine manufacturing capacity and began
producing the Rhodesian RAP No.1 (nicknamed Carrot Mine) and RAP No.2 (nicknamed
Adams Grenade). These Rhodesian mines were dangerous to handle and equally
hazardous to produce. Carrot mines were produced by Cobrine Engineering, which
was run by a United States
citizen.[3] The production
process was so dangerous that following a spate of accidents the Rhodesians
closed the operation down and relied on supplies of landmines from South Africa
in the last years of the war. The production of a Claymore type mine, the
PloughShare was more
successful.[4]
The PloughShare command-detonated mines continued to be produced by Zimbabwe
Defense Industries (ZDI) after independence. According to the government,
production stopped sometime between 1990 and
1993[5] “when the call to
ban antipersonnel mines gathered
momentum.”[6] Against
persistent rumors that the country was continuing to produce mines, on 25 March
1997, the ZDI invited the Zimbabwe Campaign to Ban Landmines, foreign military
attaches based in Harare and other diplomats for an on-site inspection at the
ZDI factory in Domboshawa where they were also shown dismantled antipersonnel
mines. Colonel Tshinga Dube told the visitors that ZDI had produced Claymore
mines at the Toolmaking and Engineering factory in Bulawayo until 1991 but had
stopped. Soon afterwards, the Minister of Defense, Moven Mahachi issued a
comprehensive government position on the issue of landmines “to
demonstrate support for the current international efforts and (register)
revulsion towards the use of antipersonnel mines in any type of
warfare.”[7]
Transfer
Concrete evidence of any post-independence export
of Zimbabwean antipersonnel mines is scarce. The Center for Defense Studies at
the University of London reported in 1996 that Zimbabwe supplied landmines to
the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army
(SPLA).[8] Also at
Zimbabwe’s annual International Trade Fair in 1994 in Bulawayo, Zimbabwean
manufactured landmines featured prominently among the products exhibited by the
state-owned ZDI.[9] According to
the U.S. Department of Defense Mines Facts CD-ROM Database, Zimbabwean
PloughShare mines have been found in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia.
RAP-1 mines have been found in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and
Zimbabwe; and RAP-2s in Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia. In addition to its
mines inherited from Rhodesia and those produced domestically, Zimbabwe appears
to have acquired mines from a number of other countries, including the Soviet
Union, Italy, and Portugal. (See below).
The government in 1997 stated that: “Zimbabwe will not allow the
transfer of antipersonnel mines into, over or above its territory by any other
party and will itself not allow the transfer of mines within its territorial
borders except for purposes of their destruction, for instructional purposes or
in relation to demining
operations.”[10]
Stockpiling
The Minister of Defense in 1997 acknowledged that
Zimbabwe had inherited Rhodesian stocks of the “PMD6 World War II type
mines and its related technology.” He said, however, these mines had been
destroyed during the sabotage at Inkomo barracks “carried out on 16 August
1981 and destroyed Z$50 million worth of weapons and
ammunition.”[11]
In 1997, the government committed itself to destroy what antipersonnel mines
it had in stock “within the next five (5) years, with only a few retained
for training and public awareness purposes” to be managed “under the
strict and centralized control of a specialized section of the Ministry of
Defense.”[12] An Army
official told Human Rights Watch (HRW) at that time that Zimbabwe had more than
just PMD6 mines in its stockpile and that there were some 1,000
mines.[13] HRW was told that
there were POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M from Russia, RAP No.1 and RAP No.2 left over from
Rhodesia, Italian VS-50s, Portuguese M969s and Zimbabwean PloughShares (ZAPS) in
the stockpile.[14]
Use
Zimbabwe has deployed combat troops in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since August 1998 in support of the
government of Laurent Kabila. There are a number of allegations that Zimbabwe
has laid landmines in DRC around Mbuji Maya and Cabinda. No concrete evidence
has been presented. A number of Zimbabwean troops have fallen victim to
landmines at the warfront in the
DRC.[15] Contacted by Human
Rights Watch, the Defense Advisor at the Zimbabwean High Commission in London,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ezekiel Zabanyana said, “We do not use landmines in the
DRC. This is improper. We are signatories to the Convention and we abide by our
commitment to this Convention. This is emphatic.” When asked whether this
meant that Zimbabwe refrained from the use of all mines, at home and abroad, the
Lieutenant-Colonel replied, “No. That is
correct.”[16]
As early as 1969 the possibility of nationalist use of landmine warfare
within Rhodesia was discussed at length within Rhodesian military circles. The
first mine incident targeted against the Rhodesian security forces was actually
on Mozambican soil on 27 April 1971 at Mukumbura, killing one Rhodesian soldier.
In July 1971, Rhodesian police uncovered a number of crates of weapons in
Salisbury, including six antipersonnel mines. The weapons were, according to
one author, to have been distributed to secret caches across the country in
preparation for increased nationalist
operations.[17] The first
incident reported on Rhodesian soil followed soon afterwards, in August 1972.
From then on the number of landmine incidents steadily increased.
ZANLA guerrillas favored using Chinese-made TM57s, unmarked TM46 and TMH46s
(with an anti-handling device) and wooden TMD-B mines. POMZ antipersonnel mines
were also used.[18] ZANLA's
strategy was to restrict mobility by liberally mining roads and protecting
approaches to bases. By 1974 the Rhodesian security forces admitted that
insurgent landmine warfare was exacting “a heavy toll on vehicles and
lives” and that fifty-seven civilians had been killed, thirty-four of them
Africans.[19]
From December 1972 until January 1980, when the war ended, there would be
2,405 incidents involving vehicles detonating nationalist planted mines,
resulting in 632 dead and 4,410 injured. By 1979 landmine incidents increased
dramatically by 234 per cent, a reflection of the spread of the
war.[20]
In the 1983-1987 conflict in Matebeleland, ZAPU dissidents received from
South African-linked sources forty-seven TM57 Russian anti-vehicle mines between
April and November 1983; at least one was laid in Western Matebeleland that
year. In December 1983, Zimbabwean military officials, with intelligence
gleaned from ZAPU dissidents retrieved several ZAPU dissident caches hidden in
Botswana including “a variety of
mines.”[21] For the rest of
the Matebeleland crisis the dissident groups were poorly armed, mostly
restricted to using AK-47s, but they did also use improvised mine-like devices
in some of their
operations.[22]
Incursions into Zimbabwe along the Eastern Highlands by Mozambique's Renamo
rebels saw the renewed use of landmines on Zimbabwean soil. Incursions began in
June 1987 and continued until December 1990. Several mine incidents in this
period were probably due to Renamo action. The only one to attract
international attention was the maiming and killing of British tourist, David
Pearson, in 1989 while on a family holiday at the Chimanimani National Park on
the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. Although the Zimbabwean authorities described
this as a “freak accident,” there were other mine incidents in the
area before, including one in which one person was killed. Information about
mine incidents during this period was suppressed by local residents, who were
fearful of reprisals by the security
forces.[23] The Zimbabwean
authorities also downplayed this incident because of fear that it would
discourage tourism to Zimbabwe, a lucrative source of foreign exchange.
In October 1995, police detained William Nhamakonha in connection with an
alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Robert Mugabe. According to police,
Nhamakonha was a member of a shadowy Zimbabwean dissident group, the
"Chimwenjes" and was found to be in possession of weapons including a
landmine.[24]
In addition to the recent deployment of troops in the DRC, Zimbabwe deployed
combat troops, in Mozambique between 1985 and 1992. In the war against Renamo
in Mozambique in the 1980s, Renamo alleges that Zimbabwean troops used landmines
against it. This can not be confirmed, but research has shown that in at least
one incident mines were used against orders and those responsible were
disciplined.[25]
Landmine Problem
The Rhodesians boasted that by 1979 their border
minefields were the “Second Largest Man-Made Obstacle in the World,”
after the Great Wall of China.[26]
Whatever the truth of this claim, these border minefields still contain from one
to three million mines and continue to take human, livestock and game victims,
nineteen years after the war ended. Short of soldiers, the Rhodesians felt that
a mined border would address both the manpower shortage as well as the
intensifying military
threat.[27]
Zimbabwe’s landmines problem is well-known and documented. The
government has confirmed that minefield plans were handed over by the Rhodesian
military at independence in
1980.[28] Mine-Tech conducted an
E.U.-financed study of the border minefields in 1994 and 1995 with the objective
of defining the precise location and nature of the minefields, assessing their
socio-economic impact and preparing a costed and prioritized proposal for
clearance. According to the survey, Zimbabwe is host to an estimated 1.5 to 1.8
million antipersonnel mines, and some ten thousand PloughShares (PS) and
Claymores littering over 8,566 sq. km. These remain from an estimated 2,528,800
APMs and 76,600 PloughShares laid between 1974 and 1980. The Mine-Tech survey
also concluded that over ninety percent of the minefields’ protective
fencing had been removed by local people to use as materials around small
patches of vegetable gardens or in the construction of cattle pens. These
“open minefields” were a health hazard to those living nearby.
The EU used the results of this survey as the basis to draw up its terms of
reference for the tendering to clear the Mukumbura
Minefield.[29] However field work
by Martin Rupiya of the ZCBL has identified an undocumented minefield tucked
inside Kariba town.[30] One
wonders how many more of these there are.
The first Rhodesian minefield to be laid was a hectare of 3,000 homemade PMD
box mines around the Kariba Power Station. It was completed on 11 November
1963, a few weeks prior to the formal distribution of federal assets at the
Victoria Falls Butler Conference in December 1963. The minefield was aimed at
hindering any Zambian post-Federal efforts towards gaining control of the
jointly owned
installations.[31]
Only in 1973 with increasing nationalist infiltration did the Rhodesian
authorities consider building new minefields. The decision was finally made in
1974 to build a minefield along the northeastern border, coupled with the
creation of a “no-go” area. Several types of minefields were
examined by the Rhodesians, before a down-graded Israeli system was chosen. Some
Rh$10 million was approved for the minefields, which would include thousands of
mostly Portuguese type M969 antipersonnel mines. The planned density of the
minefield was three blast mines per meter or 5,500 per kilometer. Later other
mines were put into the fields, including South African R2M1 and R2M2 and
Italian VS50 antipersonnel mines. Laying mines in these fields began in May 1974
and continued to 1979.[32]
The early border minefields were constructed in the conventional manner,
demarcated on both sides by security fencing with prominently displayed warning
signs. Later the fence on the hostile side was taken down and maintenance and
care of the minefields declined as the war progressed. Mine laying became
uncontrolled and unrecorded and booby trapping flourished. They also
increasingly included Claymores and
PloughShares.[33] By independence
in 1980, Zimbabwe had seven minefields measuring 766 km located along its
borders with Zambia and Mozambique. An estimated 2. 2 million antipersonnel
blast mines and 22,000 PloughShares were
sowed.[34] These minefields were
the Msengedzi, Mukumbura, Rushinga, Nyamapanda to Ruenya Minefield, stretching
for 359 km constructed from 1974 and took two years to complete. The 50 km
Sheba/Stapleford Forest to Mutare south; the 4 km Burma Valley-Junction Gate
Minefield; the 72 km Junction Gate to Muzite Mission and the 61 km Malvernia
(Songo) to Crooks Corner (Pafuri) Beit-ridge minefields. The last minefield to
be constructed was the 220 km Kazungula, Victoria Falls, Deka to Mlibizi
obstacle.[35]
Mine Action Funding
Since 1980, the Zimbabwean government has regarded
landmines as both a developmental and security issue. In August 1980, then Prime
Minister Robert Mugabe announced in parliament that minefields covered an area
of 2,500 square kilometers along 70 kilometers of Zimbabwe's border and that a
group of soldiers had been assigned to remove the mines as a matter of
urgency.[36]
In 1981, the minefields have been acknowledged as “devastating
(culminating in) the serious breakdown in animal disease control with outbreaks
of tick-bone and foot and mouth occurring in the border regions. An estimated
one million cattle were affected and of this sum over thirty-per cent were from
the Tribal Trust Lands.”[37]
In the ZIMCORD Conference on Reconstruction, Z$1.3 million, spread over the
three years of 1980-83 was sought to compliment local funding for mine clearance
- to provide for salaries, fuel and maintenance of equipment through the Army
Engineers Corp.[38]
The extent and nature of the problem was seriously under-estimated in 1981.
The Government believed that clearing of the minefields had to be done by
military engineers with specialized expertise using special equipment and that
it could be done in three years. In areas not scheduled for immediate clearance
the government said it would replace the lost protective fencing to prevent
accidents and recover for resettlement schemes when it was no longer
needed.[39]
Britain provided Z$461,000 and the United States Z$850,000 for mine
clearance. The then Federal Republic of Germany donated clearance equipment and
by late 1982, Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) Engineers began official clearance
operations. Army operations have since continued with funding from the
government. By 1984, the U.S. had discontinued most of its aid due to the lack
of government money for
demining.[40]
Government funding has continued to be a problem. In an address to
parliament on 6 May 1998, the Minister of Defense, Moven Mahachi reported that
for the financial year ending in December 1998, only Z$155,000 (Z$38 for US$1)
was received from a total bid of $2 million dollars for National Mine Clearance.
This allocation was barely enough to meet procurement of oils and lubricants
for the repair and maintenance of equipment. The National Mine Clearance
Committee based on previous deployments had also quantified costs of clearance.
This showed that nearly $750,000 was required to clear 20 km (twenty) at 1997
prices. Not only have the costs predictably risen in the interim but the
Zimbabwe dollar depreciated by over 60 per cent against major currencies since
August 1998. This has made the cost of clearance almost impossible to
contemplate and make provision for from local resources. The Minister of
Defense publicly called for Members of Parliament and other well wishers to
solicit donor assistance to eradicate the landmines menace.
The European Union, in January 1996, agreed to fund an ECU 10 million program
to clear the Mukumbura minefield, the Cahorra-Bassa to Twenya river minefield, a
length of 335 kilometers. Mukumbura has been made a priority by the Zimbabwean
government because of the need of the local population to gain access to water
resources and reclaim land in the area, but also because the Rhodesian minefield
did not follow the border, making a new de facto border. There is also illegal
gold prospecting in the
area.[41]
A German firm KOCH MINE-SAFE registered under the Company CLAMA Enterprises
won the tender in 1998. KOCH-MUNITIOSBERGUNGS claims it can complete the
contract in eighteen months. GESELLSCHAFE (UXO) Ordnance Mine Clearance Company
is in partnership with the ex-combatants offering them technical assistance and
the Zimbabwean based firm Rom-Tec is also
involved.[42] A 500,000 ECU
Quality Assessor contract was awarded to a British based firm BACTEC
International Limited.
In July 1998, the U.S. military, under the U.S. Humanitarian Demining
Program, started a U.S.$2 million project providing several advisors and
equipment for ZNA mine clearance at Victoria Falls. In March 1999, a team of
U.S. Army officers arrived to train the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in mine
clearance, and the team made a donation of U.S. $756,000 to purchase clearance
equipment for the ZNA.[43]
Mine Awareness
Little has been done to warn border communities
about the dangers of landmines. To prevent continued mine accidents in the
interim, some police and Defense officials claim to be carrying out local mine
awareness campaigns in their border regions. There is need of a sustained mine
awareness program.
Mine Clearance
A National Mine Clearance Committee was formed in
1981 to coordinate and manage mine clearing operations, with representatives
from interested ministries and chaired by the Commander of Engineers. Its duty
was to prioritize projects and administer funds allocated to the program. But
no policy document was ever drawn up and the committee ceased to operate in
December 1985. From then on the Zimbabwean army decided on priorities for mine
clearance.[44] Between 1980 and
1995 the ZNA cleared sixteen areas of
landmines.[45]
These initial mine clearance priorities were primarily areas of economic and
infrastructural interest. The border minefields have generally not been a
government priority due to scarce resources and political commitments elsewhere,
the conflict in Matebeleland, and later the ZNA's involvement in Mozambique.
The Mozambican border minefields were also seen until 1992 as a useful barrier
against Renamo rebel incursions, although they had been easily breached during
Zimbabwe's nationalist struggle.
Although attempts began in 1983 to clear the ninety-seven kilometer minefield
beginning at Victoria Falls and proceeding eastward along Zimbabwe’s
border with Zambia, this is still far from completion. Since 1983, the
Army’s National Army Corp of Engineers has cleared only some 10 per cent
of Zimbabwe’s minefields. They have destroyed only about 12,643
mines.[46] During initial mine
clearing efforts in 1983 Zimbabwe converted British commercial tractors and
bulldozers for the mechanized clearance of the minefields. Although Zimbabwe
produces a mine detector, the NMD-78, most of its equipment dates from
pre-independence. Hand-held clearance techniques have also been used by the
army.
By the early 1990s, only "economic priority zones" were being cleared, with
financial assistance from the U.S. government. Much of the heavy mine clearing
equipment given to Zimbabwe shortly after independence was no longer working
because of a lack of spare parts and maintenance problems. In 1996 the U.S.
military provided a grant of US$500,000 for the training of Zimbabwe National
Army personnel in mine clearance techniques and for the rehabilitation of some
mechanical clearance
equipment.[47]
As a result of the EU survey, the EU announced in January 1996 that it would
donate approximately US$10 million for mine-clearance in north-eastern
Zimbabwe.[48] In February 1996,
the government announced that they expected the EU de-mining contract to begin
operations in 1997. After inaction for one year, government officials said in
January 1997 that tenders would be accepted soon. In February, it was announced
that work would begin in mid-1997, although tendering had not yet been done. In
October 1997, the government's tendering process was about to begin and would
last ab out four months. Only then would the decision-making process commence,
and work should begin some time in 1998.
In April 1998, a Zimbabwean government official announced that the contract
had been awarded to a German firm - one of the few eligible
bids.[49] It was only two months
later that the award was officially announced. In December 1998, KOCH MINE-SAFE
had just begun deploying its trained members onto the Mukumbura Minefield. This
follows a three-month training period for deminers. Six teams were trained,
each comprising fifty men, to begin operations from three sites at Chidodo,
Musengezi and Nyamapanda.[50]
In addition to the EU program, the United States in 1998 began assisting mine
clearance at Victoria Falls under the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Operations.
The U.S. provided two advisors, equipment and funding assistance. According to
the Zimbabwean government US$2 million has been allocated to the Victoria Falls
project.[51] Between July and
October 1998 the program claims to have cleared 166,000 sq.
meters.[52] The project began in
an area where clearance had been attempted three times since independence, by
army shooting at the mines, by burning the undergrowth and by bulldozing.
Bulldozers and a tractor turned into a bulldozer have been used in this project
which by December 1998 had found only two inoperable M 972 mines, mistakenly
identified as R2M2s.
The use of these bulldozers has been slowly made worse by unusually heavy
rains In early 1999 the area around Victoria Falls was declared clear and the
teams set to move out to the rural areas of Deka, Dete, Mlibizi and Binga. The
quality and standards of this clearance operation have been questioned in an
independent inspection. In a confidential report on “Demining incidents in
southern Africa” for the U.S. government’s CECC M NVESD, the report
concludes that “while it may be true that those required by humanitarian
demining this effort is in peace time clearance by personnel supposedly trained
by the U.S. I have never personally seen such a poorly organized apparently
random clearance undertaken in such a careless and unprofessional
manner.” [53] The U.S.
trainers are not allowed into the minefield although it is the training ground
and those inspecting the program found deminers not using protective gear,
cutting safety procedures and using techniques that are not up to humanitarian
standards. As this is a military to military program there is no outside
independent quality assessment.
With the 359-km Mukumbura and the 220-km Victoria Falls Minefields having
found sponsor, this has left five minefields measuring 187-km still waiting
urgent attention.[54] The
government hopes that international donors will funds clearance operations in
the remaining five minefields.
Zimbabwean Mine Clearance Firms
Mine-Tech
Founded in 1992, Mine-Tech is a division of
Stongman Engineering Ltd, based in Harare. The company is directed by Col. (Rtd)
Lionel Dyck, a former commander of Zimbabwe Special Forces who retired from the
army in 1990, and employs demobilized ZNA military personnel. Mine-Tech
conducted the E.U.-financed study of the border minefields in 1994 and 1995
with the objective of defining the precise location and nature of the
minefields. In 1995 and 1996 Mine-Tech engaged in several mine clearance
contracts for local commercial firms. Mine-Tech also conducted mine survey,
awareness and clearance in Mozambique, Somaliland and Bosnia. The company has
not been without controversy, blamed for “double-dipping” because
its management are former Rhodesian soldiers, and also accused of racism in its
staff management.[55] It also
protested at not being awarded the border minefield contract, having been
disqualified because it had conducted the original
survey.[56]
Rom-Tech
This is a small Harare-based firm. It has been trying to develop a mine
resistant vehicle, the Pookie and claims to have developed a detector for
non-metallic mines. It has been sub-contracted by Koch-Mine Safe. It has tried
to undermine Special Clearance Services in
Mozambique.[57]
Special Clearance Services
Special Clearance Services is run by Benrie Auditorie out of Harare. It has
conducted a number of small commercial clearance contracts in Zimbabwe and
Mozambique.[58]
Security Devices
This firm, based at Msasa, Harare, has since 1997 manufactured humanitarian
demining equipment, particularly an early design of AVS/NVESD apron and visor
and genital protection. This production has been assisted by a charitable grant
aimed at getting humanitarian demining equipment to be manufactured near to the
place of use. The U.S. Army is one of the customers, issuing visors, aprons and
genital protectors to the ZNA clearing mines at Victoria Falls. They also
purchased visors and aprons for the Namibian training program. Mine-Tech, MgM in
Angola and HI in Mozambique also use the visors.
Reconstruction & development of cleared areas
The resettlement of people into areas that have
been cleared of landmines or from areas that are contaminated have been marked
by official and unofficial complacency, a lack of planned action or a chaotic
settlement strategy. Above Pafuri, in the southeast of the country, the Dumisa
and Chinotera communities were moved in the war and mines were planted around
the areas vacated. This included the single watering point for both humans and
animals in the normally parched zone. At independence, the communities returned
to their traditional land now infested with mines. They have since become
squatters on the grazing fields of the Mphahle, a situation that has evolved
into constant and bitter fights amongst the community.
The current United States Army and Zimbabwe Engineer Corps initiative in
clearing the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield will benefit the resort town of
Victoria Falls. Owing to increasing tourism, at least two major hotels are
planned to be opened in the next few years. This has created employment
downstream in the services and banking sectors with most of the workers residing
in the Chinotimba African Township. The administrative council has so far
failed to expand housing units and other facilities at the edges of the Town
because of the minefield. Some houses built are barely seven yards from the
edge of the minefield. The sewerage works had also been hemmed in with little
prospect of expansion until the mines had been lifted.
The oldest minefield in the country, around the Kariba Power Station, has
also restricted plans to expand working space. On at least two occasions, the
Company, CAPCO has had to call in the Army Engineers to clear certain patches in
order to add further buildings in order to cope with the increase in
hydro-electric output.
Landmine Casualties
Since independence in 1980 nearly 13,000 landmine
incidents had been recorded countrywide. However, the independent survey by
Mine-Tech and our own fieldwork has revealed that the national statistics are
understated by as much as forty percent. Police Stations and major hospitals
are on average one hundred kilometers from most of the border areas.
Simply reporting landmine incidents to the authorities was until recently
problematic for people living in border areas. Ernest Katoma from Dendera
village, a few hundred meters from the Mozambican border, told a Zimbabwean
magazine in 1994:[59] People are
afraid they will be locked up if they report a landmine incident to the Police.
During the war in Mozambique, villagers would be interrogated by the Zimbabwean
security forces if such incidents were reported to them because they were afraid
people were collaborating with Renamo.
Since the war ended in Mozambique in October 1992, villagers living on the
border remain ambivalent about reporting landmine incidents. They fear that the
police will suspect them of being, or helping, border jumpers from Mozambique,
BJs as they are commonly known.
From the government's statistics, Mine-Tech Survey and our own fieldwork, it
is estimated that 70 people have been killed while over 400 have been maimed by
the landmines. Some of the victims residing near the more active minefields have
had several near escapes. Others had not been so
lucky.[60] These incidents are
far from urban areas and as they do not impact on the elite community are rarely
captured in the news.[61]
Zimbabweans continue to be landmine victims. On 29 January 1999, two children
walking on a path to school in the Chimoyi area adjacent to the Mukumbura
minefield —one stepped on a mine which injured the child and the one
following behind.[62]
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Although social service support for anyone seeking
medical assistance is available subject to passing a stringent and some would
say humiliating means testing, no special funds have been set aside for landmine
victims. The state provides up to fifteen per cent of medical costs to victims
of mines. The individual meets the rest of the cost. An artificial arm is
retailed at Z$15,000 while a foot is Z$ 8,000. The ICRC ran a rehabilitation
program in Zimbabwe from 1985 to 1990 during which 1,400 new prostheses were
manufactured. This program was then handed over to the Ministry of
Health.[63]
Researchers have found numerous cases of victims using sticks as limping aids
or simply hobbling about without artificial limbs because the price of them is
beyond their reach. Local production of limbs is either through a government
prosthetics center or out-contracted to the major private company in Bulawayo.
The period from fitting to delivery was shortened by a donor funded program
which catered for Mozambican refugees in the Mazoe River Bridge and Chambuta
designated locations but this ended in 1993 after the general repatriation of
Mozambican refugees.
Human beings are not the only victims. Over 15,000 cattle have also
perished, especially in the Chisumbanje, Mwenezi area, a major cattle rearing
zone in the country. In the socio-economic environment of southern Africa,
cattle represent a value that cannot be easily quantified. Not only are these
family assets to be passed down from generation to generation but they are also
viewed as a bank, of ceremonial value used to bind marriages, funerals,
celebrating births, graduations or appeasing spirits. In the day-to-day use,
these provide draught power facilitating the movement of heavy loads and other
household materials as well as readily available manure.
In the “open minefields” adjacent Game Parks, unaccountable
numbers of game have also detonated antipersonnel mines. Some of the wounded
beasts then wandered with half-destroyed feet around the villages until put down
by wardens from the National Parks and Wild Life. Tourist groups have witnessed
landmine wounded animals, as most of these incidents are common around the
Hwange National Park near Victoria Falls and the Gona Re Zhou northeast of
Beit-Bridge. The mines in and around the Game Parks pose a serious threat to
the tourist industry.
Commercial acreage of timber has also not been able to be harvested after
maturing in the Eastern Highlands due to landmines. Zimbabwe has losing in
excess of Z$5 million a year in lost earnings from the timber located inside the
minefield.
Economic activity between communities residing on both sides of the borders
of Mozambique and Zimbabwe have also been impacted by landmines. The only
permanent solution is to clear the mines and allow the emergence of healthy and
mutually reinforcing social and economic relations on the borders between
Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
The Zimbabwean minefields are known breeding grounds of Tse-Tse fly which
carries Trypanosomiasis (better known as sleeping sickness). They also
provide sanctuary for large numbers of grain ravaging quela birds and ravenous
locusts. Since the establishment of the landmine obstacle in 1974, Rhodesia
abandoned all pretense of paying attention to regional disease control. After
independence in 1980 the resumption of these efforts has been difficult because
of the threat these mines posed to the teams. Temporary and inadequate measures
have been instituted in the form of opening access corridors but this has not
been enough to contain the hazard. The result has been an unquantifiable
economic loss of cattle, outbreaks of Newcastle disease affecting fowl and Foot
and Mouth disease in sheep, goats and cattle. Requiring the northeastern
regions of Zimbabwe to be placed under quarantine have occurred with disturbing
frequency. Zimbabwe has experienced a number of export bans lasting several
months to export meat to the lucrative European market. In all instances of
outbreaks, the time and effort spent in regaining lost ground before production
and exports are resumed can only be permanently eliminated if the minefields are
all cleared.
[1]“Brief by Minister of
Defense to the House on the Convention Prohibiting the Production, Use,
Stockpiling and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction and
Recommending Ratification,” Debates in Parliament, March 1998.
[2]Press Statement on Zimbabwe
Government Policy on Antipersonnel Landmines, 15 May 1997.
[3]Human Rights Watch Arms
Project, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 1997), p. 158.
[4]Col. T.J. Dube, “4th
International NGO Conference on Landmines: Toward a Mine Free Southern
Africa,” Maputo, 26 February 1997; see also, . Martin Rupiah, “A
Review of Mine-Warfare during Zimbabwe’s War of Independence: November
1963 - April 1980,” ICRC/OAU Regional Seminar, “Antipersonnel
Land-Mines: What Future for Southern Africa,” Harare, 20 to 23 April 1997,
p. 9.
[21]Phyllis Johnson and David
Martin, “Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma,” in P. Johnson and D. Martin
(eds.), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War (Harare: Zimbabwe
Publishing House, 1986), pp.58-60.
[23]Daily Telegraph,
(London), 10 May 1995. Pearson died after an eighteen hour delay in treating
him; the Zimbabwean authorities refused to send a helicopter, fearing the
presence of other antipersonnel mines.
[25]Human Rights Watch Arms
Project, Landmines in Mozambique (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1994).
[26]Human Rights Watch,
Still Killing, pp.152-176.
[27]Zimbabwe Conference on
Reconstruction and Development, Salisbury, 23 to 27 March 1981 (Salisbury:
Government Printer, 1981) p.31, para.50; Jakkie Cilliers, Counter Insurgency
in Rhodesia (London: Croom-Helm, 1985, pp.104-105, 115.
[28]Herald, (Harare), 7
October 1984 citing comments by the commander of ZNA Engineers Squadron.
[29]Project No.7 ACP ZIM 068
EDF VII (ZIM 7004/000) Minefield Clearance in N.E. Zimbabwe Financing Agreement
between The Commission of the European Communities and the Republic of Zimbabwe,
December 1995.
[30]Martin Rupiya, Landmines
in Zimbabwe: a deadly legacy (Harare: SAPES, 1998).
[31]Martin Rupiah “A
Historical Study of Land-Mines in Zimbabwe, 1963-1995,” in, Zambezia ,
vol .XXII, no1 (1995), pp 45-55.
[34]Col. T.J. Dube,
“National Implementation: De-mining in Zimbabwe,” paper presented at
Towards Cost EffectiveDe-Mining: An Evaluation of Experiences and
Technique conference, South African Institute of International Affairs,
Johannesburg, 22-23 April 1998.
[48]Laurie Boulden and Martin
Edmonds, The Politics of De-Mining: Mine Clearance in Southern Africa
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999) p.
123.
[61]Casualties have continued
to be experienced by Zimbabwean forces stepping on landmines while deployed on
Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Angola and recently during military
operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
[62]Police Chief report quoted
as Radio One news item at 11.00 gmt, 1 February 1999.
[63]International Committee of
the Red Cross, ‘Landmines in Africa,’ ICRC, May 1997.
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