Key developments
since March 1999: The renewed conflict since September 1999 has seen
extensive use of mines by Russian and Chechen forces. In April 2000, the
Russian military revealed plans to deploy mines along the southern Chechen
border with Georgia. In December 1999, mine clearance operations by HALO Trust
were suspended. Mine awareness activities also ground to a halt, but by late
spring 2000 had begun again. Many hundreds of new mine victims have already
been identified.
Background
In September 1991, Chechnya proclaimed
independence from Russia, and adopted the full name Chechen Republic Ichkeria.
On 11 December 1994, the Russian Federation sent troops into the Chechen
Republic where mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. In
August 1996, the Khasav-Yurt peace agreements were signed; and a decision on the
Chechen Republic Ichkeria’s status was delayed till 1 January 2001.
Relations remained tense, however, and deteriorated to the point of Russia
sending troops into Dagestan in August 1999 and then into Chechnya in September.
Russian troops first secured the northern section of the country, occupied the
Chechen capital of Grozny, then began pursuit of rebels in mountainous areas in
southern Chechnya. The war, replete with massive violations of human rights and
laws of war including widespread use of mines, continues as Landmine Monitor
2000 goes to print. (See also Landmine Monitor country report on
Russia.)
Mine Ban Policy
Chechnya is not an internationally recognized
sovereign state, and therefore cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. In 1998 then
Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ilias Akhmadov expressed support for the
Mine Ban Treaty and said that the Chechen Republic Ichkeria would be ready to
sign immediately.[1] With the
resumption of the war in 1999, the Chechen position on a mine ban has
reversed.
One Chechen parliamentarian noted that “any questions pertaining to the
antipersonnel mine ban, which may be put by a sovereign state in peacetime to
the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, are unacceptable at the present
time.”[2] Another
government official said, “The question of banning the use of
antipersonnel mines, which we put to some field commanders...caused unconcealed
indignation. We considered it senseless to make further inquiries pertaining to
this theme. The main conclusion made by our representatives is that mines will
not be discarded from general military strategy by either the Russian Army or
the Chechen
detachments.”[3]
Production
It is unclear if, or how much, landmine production
capability was located in Chechnya before the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. It is believed that there had been no domestic production of mines in
Chechnya although some plants have produced military
materiel.[4] An engineer of the
“Krasny Molot” plant said that Chechnya has never manufactured its
own mines and does not produce them at the present
time.[5] He considered that
making improvised explosive devises was not production, as they could not be
made in large numbers.
Transfer
Chechnya has not made an official declaration
regarding its position on the export or import of AP mines, but it is not known
to have exported mines. The landmines in Chechnya were brought in during Soviet
times. During the first war, it appears that Chechens obtained antipersonnel
mines from Russian soldiers and officers, and mines also came from the
Trans-Caucasus, delivered by groups on horseback across the mountains.
A Chechen military officer has said that all mines are remainders of
stockpiles of the Armed Forces of the USSR or mines left by the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation after the first war. He said the only method of
receiving AP mines is through contacts with representatives of the Armed Forces
of the Russian
Federation.[6]
On 13 January 2000, on a trip to the U.S., Chechen Minister of Foreign
Affairs, IliaS Akhmadov stated that Chechens were being provided “arms,
ammunition, including explosives...by Russia.” Earlier that month,
Georgian intelligence services had captured a Russian military vehicle near the
Russian military base in Vaziani, Georgia, attempting to transport weapons to
Chechen militaries.[7] The SSM
(State Security Ministry) of Georgia reported that the evidence of the
trafficking would be submitted by Georgia's Procurator's Office to Russia's
Procurator's Office. Vladimir Andreev, Commander of the Russian Military forces
in Transcaucasus, responded that Georgia’s SSM had forged a film depicting
the illegal trafficking of weapons from
Vaziani.[8]
One Russian report stated that among other things Chechens used “serial
landmines of Western
manufacturing.”[9]
Chechen forces are known to have links with Islamist militant movements in
the region and may also be obtaining military supplies, including landmines,
from these support
networks.[10]
Stockpiling
It is not possible to get accurate information on
the quantity of mines in Chechen stockpiles, but they consist mostly of
Soviet-produced PMN and OZM mines. According to Mr. M. Arsaliev, the chief
deminer of the Chechen Republic, the pre-war arsenal stored in the Chechen
Republic consisted mainly of PMN, OMZ-72, MON-50, MON-90, and MON-100
antipersonnel mines, and TM-62 antitank
mines.[11] During the
fighting, stocks of AP mines, along with other weapons, were moved to secret
camps and bases in mountain regions, especially in southern
Chechnya.[12] A military
official noted that the disproportion of fighting forces in Chechnya makes
stockpile destruction impossible; mines will only be destroyed in the
“natural”
way.[13]
Use
Both sides used mines in the 1994-96 Chechen
conflict.[14] (See Landmine
Monitor Report1999 for details). While some estimates of mines laid
in the first war were over one million, surveys by the British demining
organization HALO Trust found fewer mines than in other parts of the Caucasus.
However, the perceived threat, based on accidents across the territory, resulted
in large tracts of agricultural land not being
used.[15]
In the lull between the wars, there were allegations of continued use of
landmines. In May 1997, HALO Trust said it had seen new minefields laid by
Russian Interior Ministry forces along Chechnya’s borders with Ingushetia
and Dagestan.[16] Mines were
also used by various armed groups and armed robbers.
With the renewed fighting, first in Dagestan in August 1999 and then moving
into Chechnya, where it continues as this edition goes to print, mines have been
used in significant numbers by all armed fighters. Chechens have made
unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the
fighting broke out.[17]
Russian officials admit to the large-scale use of mines throughout the
operations. A government official, describing their use in Dagestan wrote,
“The use of antipersonnel landmines there was nothing less but a
‘dire necessity.’ In Dagestan we had to do everything possible not
only to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but first
and foremost to protect the civilian population from international
terrorists.... The Russian Federation uses antipersonnel landmines only for the
purposes of defense and in the first place to deter terrorists, drug smugglers
and other potential illegal trespassers who wish to penetrate into our
territory.”[18]
Russian troops have used hand-laid mines, air- and artillery-scattered mines,
as well as remotely controlled devices. The main objectives of the initial
stages of the operation were the creation of “security zones,” and a
“sanitary corridor.” The military has said that at that point, only
MVZ mines were used to protect check-points, outposts and temporary positions,
and that the mines were removed whenever the units changed
position.[19] They also said
that the minefields were mapped and the “security zones” were
marked.[20] As operations
expanded, so did the use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Hand-laid mines included OZM-72, and MON-50/90/100
mines.[21]
The Russians also have widely used scatterable mines, mostly dropped from
aircraft, to cut off potential withdrawal routes from Dagestan, against
guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, and to cut off both weapons
supply and guerrilla reinforcement along the Russian-Georgian border. In
December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that such operations had been going on
for two months, and he stated that on one day alone, Russian aircraft scattered
mines along a 20 kilometer stretch in the Chechen border area. He noted that it
is very difficult to precisely locate air-scattered
mines.[22] The most commonly
used mine has been the PFM-1S, which is equipped with a self-destruct
mechanism.[23]
Artillery-delivered mines have also been used, notably in the mining of the
estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to
Alkhan-Kalu.[24] Civilians
returning to their homes have on occasion been injured by booby-traps left
behind by Russian forces.
The Chechens have used mainly PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200,
improvised explosive devices, grenades with trip-wires and to a wide extent
booby traps.[25] A Russian
military officer said that 90% of the mines were Russian-made, left over from
the breakup of the USSR; he also stated that the Chechens used Italian-made
mines.[26] While Russian forces
have used mostly AP mines, Chechens have used mainly antitank mines. According
to one report, “The Chechen rebels use landmines of a wide range types and
modifications, including serial landmines of Western manufacturing, as well as a
wide spectrum of improvised explosives and even devices which to a great extent
complicates mine clearance.” Chechen fighters have used mines to retard
the advance of Russian troops, as well as to complicate rebuilding of
communication infrastructure, and along railroads, electrical supply lines and
other such sites.[27] By the
summer of 2000, it was reported that, “Quite well equipped until recently,
[the rebels] are now experiencing difficulties...in the supply of standard-issue
munitions. Home-made explosive devices are therefore in
use.”[28]
In a radio interview, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov noted that the
decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian
force, and that the use of antipersonnel mines and antitank mines will only
increase with the beginning of the partisan
war.[29] Another report
indicates that for the Russians, in many cases, decisions to use mines were made
at individual command and/or small reconnaissance team and patrol
level.[30]
Much of the Chechen capital of Grozny has been laid to waste in the
fighting.[31] Mines have been
used extensively in the city and have taken their toll on combatants and
civilians alike. In one of the most notorious incidents in the fighting for
Grozny, on 31 January 2000, a column of some 2-3,000 rebels evacuating from
Grozny traveled through a large minefield on the outskirts of the capitol
suffering heavy casualties.[32]
Russians officials claimed they lured the guerrillas into a trap by pretending
to accept a bribe in exchange for safe passage out of Grozny. “Frankly,
we did not expect bandits, especially the key figures, to swallow the
bait,” said Gen. Vladimir
Shamanov.[33]
In one account of the incident, a Chechen fighter said, “I saw dreadful
things during fighting in Grozny, but that massacre was beyond comparison. We
had to walk on our dead comrades” to avoid stepping on unexploded
mines.”[34] Several
hundred fighters were killed or wounded, including rebel commanders such as the
Mayor of Grozny, Lecha Dudayev, who was killed by a mine.[35] One doctor in the nearby
village of Alkhan-Kala said that in two days, he amputated limbs on sixty-seven
mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his right
foot.[36]
Shortly after the incident, the Russian military closed Grozny to returning
civilians. On Russia’s NTV television, Col. Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, a top
Russian commander, said, “As long as the city isn’t cleared of all
mines and shells, and there is a threat of buildings collapsing, civilians are
being banned from entering.” He added, “Under civilian disguise,
militants are trying to return to pick up their
wounded.”[37]
On 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been
“completely cleared of mines.” They did, however, note that the
“city is still unsafe,” charging continued mine use by Chechen
fighters.[38] In May 2000,
Russian authorities began using mines again to protect factories and power
plants in Chechen’s capital, Grozny. The Russian-appointed mayor of the
city, Supyan Mokchayev reported that such mining was necessary to stop “a
plague of looting by their own [Russian]
troops.”[39]
Since evacuating the capitol Grozny in early February, Chechen forces have
resorted to guerilla tactics, mounting dozens of ambushes on Russian forces
throughout Chechen territory. Usually, the ambushes are initiated by the use
of concealed antitank mines that demobilize vehicles in the Russian convoy,
followed by brief ground engagement by Chechen fighters. Such attacks have
inflicted hundreds of Russian casualties and continue
unabated.[40]
In April 2000, it was reported that the “military leadership and border
services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several
stretches of the border” in order to stop the flow of men and materiel
between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen would not
“disclose precisely” the type of mines to be used, noting only that
over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80
kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun
Gorge.[41] There has been
speculation that the mining would be similar to that used in Afghanistan, where
individual stretches of border were mined by sappers and in inaccessible areas,
air-scattered by helicopter. The report also noted that when mines are
air-scattered it is difficult to determine the exact location of the minefields,
which endangers the movement of one’s own
troops.[42] The Georgian
Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated
officially it is “considering the possibility of mining the Chechen
stretch of the Russian-Georgian
border.”[43]
Landmine Problem
With the renewed fighting, it is impossible to get
accurate information about mined areas, but given that very limited mine
clearance took place after the 1994-96 war, the current situation can only be
worse – and the fighting continues. (For details of the mine problem as a
result of the 1994-96 fighting, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p.
844.)
In addition to the mining of Grozny, air-scatterable mines have been used
against guerrilla strongholds in the mountains. Forest ranges adjacent to
villages and towns have also been mined, as have been the “administrative
borders” of Chechnya, along the banks of the Terek
River,[44] the estuary of the
River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to
Alkhan-Kalu.[45]
During May 2000, the Chechen NGO, “Refugees Against Landmines,”
began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Panki Canyon of Akmeta district in
Georgia about their knowledge of the landmine problem in Chechnya and mine
victims. Responses about areas mined included the
following:[46]
male from village on 1 May: fields near Samashky village and the nearby
forests and roads;
male from Urus-Martan on 6 May: arable land of Sovkhoz “Gorets”
of Urus-Martan district by Russian forces;
male from Urus-Martan on 6 May: arable land from Urus-Martan to Tangi-Chu;
cattle pasture between Urus-Martan to Gekhi, near the highway to Baku – it
was all mined in December 1999 and the minefields are not marked;
2 males from Urus-Martan on 6 & 7 May: sowing lands between Urus-Martan
and Tangi-Chu are mined by Russian forces;
male on 6 May: arable lands and fields in Naur district, and the bridge
over the Terek river mined by Russian soldiers;
male on 6 May: almost all civil and administrative buildings in
Grozny.
Many refugees noted that minefields from the 1994-96 war had
not been cleared. As one said, “After the first war, half of Chechnya was
mined and still there are places not cleared yet... we shall see after the
war.”
In July 2000, a Russian television interview with a Russian sapper noted the
following: “In innumerable areas in Chechnya, no man has set foot for
several years now. It is dangerous to walk in woods, which have been mined by
both our forces and the rebels. Since no minefields have been mapped, not even
sappers take the risk. Civilians are blown up and farm animals killed by mines
controlled by tripwires. The lofts and cellars of Grozny ruins are no less of a
danger.”[47]
A Chechen doctor who operated on numerous mine victims said that no single
town or district is without mines, and that even after the war, for ten or
twenty years, mines will still be killing people. “There is no need to
continue the war,” he said, “even if troops leave now half the
population will die.” He believed that mine use in the second war was ten
times greater than the first, and he said that neither side bothered with signs,
marking or fencing.[48]
Mine Action Funding
Even before the renewed war, international funding
for demining had been almost nonexistent. There were no funds in the Chechen
Republic budget for humanitarian demining. According to an agreement between
Chechnya and the Russian Federation, financing of demining programs was to be
carried out by Russia, but because of the financial crisis the program had not
been implemented.
Mine Clearance
HALO Trust conducted a mine assessment mission in
January 1997 and proposed a demining project in cooperation with the Chechen
army.[49] For most of 1998 and
1999, HALO carried out programs in Chechnya. By the time of the 1999 Russian
invasion, HALO had trained both manual and mechanical clearance teams.
Operations were based in southwestern Chechnya. HALO was preparing to hand over
management to Chechen personnel when the fighting began again. Operations were
suspended in December
1999.[50]
In February 2000, Russian military called upon the residents of Avtury to
turn over arms and ammunition, and on behalf of the command of the Internal
Forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya promised "to clear the infested
mined lands by the beginning of the planting
season..."[51] In this vicinity
about 1,500 hectares of land are infested with landmines and UXOs and have been
unable to be farmed since the 1994-96 fighting.
On 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that “160
hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for ploughing in the
Pravoberezhny district. Sappers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the
Urus-Martan
district.”.[52]
Russian military stated, “During only the first week after gaining
control over Grozny, the Russian sappers found in this half-destroyed city more
than 3,000 landmines among other explosive devices, UXOs and ammunition –
the result of surveying hardly one-third of the city. Due to this, the military
command took the decision to suspend until special order entry to the city for
civilians and journalists.[53]
By late February there were reportedly 500 sappers working in
Grozny.[54] On 24 April 2000,
Russia declared the city “completely cleared of mines,” stating that
“[o]ver 177,000 explosive devices and rounds of ammunition were rendered
harmless.”[55]
Mine Awareness
Prior to renewed fighting in 1999, the ICRC and
Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN - a British NGO) had carried out
mine awareness activities.[56]
Just as the fighting has made clearance operations impossible, no mine awareness
activities could be conducted. One Chechen NGO was formulating plans for mine
awareness activities with refugees in Georgia, Ingushetya and Azerbaijan, but
due to lack of resources and logistical constraints at that time, the project
essentially remained a plan for the future. In early 2000, a very bleak picture
of the situation was described:
The entire work carried out by our organization to inform the population of
the danger of antipersonnel mines has been reduced since the beginning of the
war. At the present time it is impossible to move about on the territory of the
Chechen Republic-Ichkeria and even if one reached any populated locality, having
paid for this at every check-post, one would find out that it is a ghost town.
It will be very difficult to work on problems of antipersonnel mines until the
end of the military operations.... Our office in the city of Grozny, which
contained video and photo materials, booklets, placards, warning boards and
other things and equipment, has been completely destroyed.... Neither Russian
nor Chechen military men inform the population about mined territories, moreover
this information is kept
secret.[57]
Representatives from UNHCR reported that the agency plans to carry out mine
awareness activities in Ingushetia/Chechnya and that the Danish Refugee Council
also plans a project to target teachers and schools in
Ingushetia.[58]
By early summer 2000, mine awareness work in Chechnya is increasing.
Movement around the territory is still dangerous and payment at Russian
checkpoints still a necessity to reach communities; but it is possible to begin
some work. A Chechen youth group, Laman Az (Voice of the Mountains), the Centre
for Peacemaking and Community Development, the Chechen Human Rights
Investigation Bureau, and the Danish Refugee Council are now actively involved
in mine awareness activities. UNICEF now has funds to support such
programs.[59]
Landmine Casualties
With the end of the first war in 1996, there were
an estimated 600 to 800 civilian landmine casualties in Chechnya, about half of
whom are children.[60]
Immediately after the war, the number of casualties from mines appeared to
increase as people returned to their homes. Laman Az reported that during this
time period, there were fifty-seven landmine casualties in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky
region, forty-five landmine casualties in the Achoi-Martanovsky region, and
thirty landmine casualties in the Urus-Martanovsky
region.[61]
By the outbreak of the war in 1999, there were approximately 3,500 people
registered by the Ministry of Public Health in the Chechen Republic as needing
artificial limbs. Of those, Chechen Health Ministry officials estimate up to 20
percent were mine victims.[62]
One NGO had begun to compile information on mine victims, working through the
Chechen Ministry of Health. In the spring and summer of 1999, it had compiled a
list of names and addresses of 1,800 people injured by mines and were planning
on cross-checking the information. When work had to stop with the outbreak of
war, northern regions of Naursky, Shelkovsky, and Nadterochny had not yet been
covered.[63]
Officials indicated that the number of injured Chechen refugees in the
republic of Ingushetia since the beginning of the conflict in August 1999 is
347, including 88 children, 89 women and 210 men. The number of persons that
need prostheses is 300, twenty-five of them
critically.[64]
The “Kids of the Chechen War” program of the Children’s
Foundation reported on 250 injured children from Chechnya who applied for
medical assistance; seventy of them are amputees requiring prosthetic
aid.[65] No Ministry of the
Russian government or of the official temporary Chechen administration was able
to provide any information on civilian victims of the current war.
During May 2000, the Chechen NGO “Refugees Against Landmines”
began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Panki Canyon of Akmeta district in
Georgia about their knowledge of the landmine problem in Chechnya and mine
victims.[66] A female from
Urus-Martan on 6 May reported that her brother Ibragin was killed on 14 April
2000 and her nephew, age 13, lost his eyes to a landmine. She also said,
“A girl ran from some men and got killed in a nearby village on a
landmine. These men laughed when they heard the explosion. She was
20-years-old.” A woman, speaking about the casualties of the Chechen
wars, said, “How can we name all of them? There were a lot who lost their
legs and got killed due to these mines.”
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Chechnya has historically been one of the poorest
of the Soviet republics. The health care system was inadequate before the
1994-96 war and even then ill equipped to handle war victims. Two-thirds of
hospitals and clinics were destroyed in that war and those that remained at the
new outbreak of fighting were running at around 30% of their original capacity.
If the medical system was in a crisis state with the first war, now it is
impossible to assess what remains. Currently it is reported that the only place
where a person who has been wounded by antipersonnel mines can receive
assistance is Ingushetia.
[1] Interview with Ilias Akhmadov, Chechen
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 December
1998. [2] Interview with Mr. A. Idigov,
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Chechen
Republic-Ichkeria, Paris, December
1999. [3] Interviews with Kh. Israpilov,
Commander-in Chief, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Grozny, 2-3
January 2000. [4] 1999 interviews with
former chief technologist of Electropribor plant Mr. A.Z. Satuev, laboratory
assistant at Anisimov plant Mr. T. Larsaev, and former engineer at Krasny Molot
plant Mr. T. Akhmetkhanov. [5] Interview
with Mr. M. Isaev, engineer at “Krasny Molot” plant, Grozny,
December 1999. [6] Interview with Col.
M. Arsaliev, engineering service, Chechen military, May
1999. [7] Chechenskaya Pravda, (Chechen
newspaper), 2 January 2000. [8]
“Prime News,” ORT (television daily news, ORT, RTR, NTV transmit to
the entire territory of the former Soviet Union), Tbilisi, 10 February
2000. [9] “Segodnya” (news
program), NTV Russian national television, 11pm, 6 March
2000. [10] There are clear links between
Chechen fighters and Afghan war veterans, as well as Dagestani
Islamists. [11] 1999 interview with Mr.
M. Arsaliev, chief deminer of the Chechen
Republic. [12] M. Khambiev, Minister of
Defense, Ichkeria television, October
1999. [13] Interview with Kh.
Khachukaev, field commander, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria,
Grozny, 24 December 1999. [14] Mines
used by Russians have included OZM-72, MON-50, PMN-2 and PFM-1S, as well as
remote-controlled VKPM-1, BKPM-2, remote controlled UMP-3. Interview with
General Kuznetsov (ret.), Commander of the Russian Engineer troops from
1986-1999, by General Mehov (ret.), Russian Humanitarian Mine Action
Center/RAVUNPM, Moscow, April 2000; IPPNW-Russia, Materials of the First
International Conference on AP Mines in Russia-CIS, 27-28 May 1998, Moscow,
1998, p. 30. Chechens mainly used PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200 and often
grenades with hand-made trip-wires. Landmines: Outlook from Russia,
IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999; also various TV news interviews with Russian
soldiers who participated in Combat in Chechnya, ORT, NTV,
RTR. [15] Richard Boulter,
“Knights in Armored Vehicles – the Halo Trust in the
Caucasus,” JMU Journal, #4.1, at website:
http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/journal/4.1/halo.htm. Site visited 6 June
2000. [16] Carlotta Gall, “Land
Mines, Chechnya’s Hidden Killers,” Moscow Times, 21 May
1997. [17] “Chechens Say Russians
Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June
2000. [18] Letter to ICBL from Mr.
Alexander V. Zmeevski, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations, New York, 22 October 1999, as a follow up to a meeting at the Russian
Mission on 5 October 1999. [19]
Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December
1999. [20]
Ibid. [21] ICBL meeting with Col.
Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Russian Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 December
1999. [22] Lieutenant-General
Nickolaishvili Guram Georgevich, “Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future
Without Landmines,” Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7
December 1999. [23] Ibid. Also, ICBL
meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999. Col
Bobkov said only self-destructing PFMs were used, not older non-self-destructing
ones. [24] Interview with a colonel of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the
interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by
artillery. [25] Landmines: Outlook from
Russia, IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999; also various TV news reports by ORT,
NTV, RTR among others, interviews with Russian soldiers and officers
participating in combat actions in Chechnya, on the route between Rostov-Baku,
18 March 2000. [26] ICBL meeting with
Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December
1999. [27] “Railway Connection
with Chechnya Will Soon Resume,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (weekly)
26 November – 3 December 1999; “The Federal Center is Fully
Determined,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 10-16 December 1999;
“What is Grozny like after the Thunder?” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11
February 2000. [28] “Mine
Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” “Vesti”
newscast, RTR Moscow Russian TV, 5 July 2000, in
FBIS. [29] Chechen President Aslan
Maskhadov, interview to Radio Svoboda, March
2000. [30] “Night Patrol of
‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of
Russian government), 21 January
2000. [31] Daniel Williams,
“Russians Declare Victory, Raise Flag Over Grozny,” Washington Post,
7 February 2000. Regarding the level of destruction in the city, the article
reported that “Gen. Gennady Troshev, one of Russia’s top commanders,
toured the city today and said he had trouble finding intact buildings to use as
command posts. After more than five months of bombing and shelling, ‘the
city is ruined,’ he
said.” [32] “Chechen Rebels
Lured into Minefield,” Segodnya (newscast), Moscow NTV, 3 February 2000;
Daniel Williams, “Grozny Nearly in Russian Forces’ Grasp: Chechen
Rebels Head South After Taking Heavy Losses in Escape from Capital,”
Washington Post, 4 February 2000, p. A.
26. [33] Lyoma Turpalov,
“Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap,”
Associated Press Newswires, (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February
2000. [34]
Ibid. [35]
Ibid. [36] Human Rights Watch interview
with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000. He estimated 300 wounded,
including 50 civilians who fled Grozny with the fighters, plus many killed.
See also, Andrew Kramer, “Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both
Russians and Chechens,” AP, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, “Doctor
Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon,” AFP, 19 February 2000; Dave
Montgomery, “Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing
about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops”, The Dallas Morning
News, 27 February 2000. [37]
“Russia Blocks Civilians From Returning Home to Grozny,” (AP,
Nazran, Russia), Washington Post, 15 February 2000, p.
A.19. [38] Olga Allenova,
“‘Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow
Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.
1. [39] Giles Whittel, “Grozny is
Mined to Stop Troops Looting,” London Times, 13 May
2000. [40] See for example,
“Russian army column attacked near Grozny: reports,” AFP (Moscow),
29 July 2000. [41] Aleksandr Igorev and
Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,”
Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000; “Federals to Mine 80Km
of Chechnya-Georgia Border, AVN, 11 April
2000. [42] Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy
Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” 12 April
2000. [43]
Ibid. [44] Interviews with employees of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia in Chechnya, February
2000. [45] Interview with a colonel of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the
interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by
artillery. [46] “Refugees Against
Landmines” hope to complete interviews of 1,000 refugees. Interviewing
was begun on 1 May and by mid-June, approximately 100 refugees had been
interviewed. The NGO noted the difficult circumstances in attempting to
interview about the ongoing war. Complete information from interviewees is
available. [47] “Mine Clearance
Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” “Vesti” newscast, RTR
Moscow Russian TV, 5 July 2000, in
FBIS. [48] Human Rights Watch interview
with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May
2000. [49] “Landmines in the
former Soviet Union,” p. 10. [50]
Richard Boulter, “Knights in Armored
Vehicles.” [51] “Spring in
Avtury,” Krashaya Zvezda (Ministry of Defence of RF's national daily), 7
February 2000. [52] “Ploughland
Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya,” AVN (Russian Military News
Agency), 3 April 2000. [53]
Colonel-General Viktor Kazantsev, Commander of the United Groupment of Federal
Forces in the North Caucasus, “Zdes I Seychas,” ORT television
program, 15 February 2000. [54]
“When the Thunderstorm Passed Grozny,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25
February 2000. [55] Olga Allenova,
“’Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow
Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000,
p.1. [56] NPA, “Fact Finding
Mission Report, Chechnya,” Annexes A-3 and
A-15. [57] Maia Chovkhalova, Centre for
Peacemaking & Community Development (NGO based in Moscow that works in
Chechnya), draft report for Landmine Monitor
2000. [58] Email memo to Mary Wareham,
Human Rights Watch, from Jon Hoisaeter, Protection Officer, North-Caucasus,
UNHCR, 4 April 2000. [59] Email from
Chris Hunter, Centre for Peacemaking & Community Development, 11 July
2000. [60] Roman Gashaev, Chairman of
the “Laman Az,” Voice of the Mountains Public Organization.
Presented at New Steps for a Mine-Free Future, Report on the First International
Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS, IPPNW-ICBL, Moscow, 27-28 May
1998. [61]
Ibid. [62] 1999 Landmine Monitor
interview. [63] Chris Hunter, Centre for
Peacemaking & Community Development, draft report for Landmine Monitor
2000. [64] Interviews with Minister of
Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minster of Labor and Social Security
Khalifa Zaurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman Arselgov, Chair of the
Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of
the republic of Ingushetia, February 2000. Data received from doctors in
hospitals in Ingushetia indicate more than 220 people lost limbs from August
1999 to March 2000. [65] Lubov
Krzhizhanovskaya, Director, Children Foundation Program “Kids of Chechen
War.” Research groups of the Foundation unofficially estimate the number
of cases approaches 1,000. [66]
“Refugees Against Landmines” hopes to complete interviews of 1,000
refugees. Interviewing was begun on 1 May and by mid-June, approximately 100
refugees had been interviewed. The NGO noted the difficult circumstances in
attempting to interview about the ongoing war. Complete information from
interviewees is available.
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