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Table of Contents
Country Reports
EGYPT, Landmine Monitor Report 2000
LM Report 2000 Full Report   Executive Summary   Key Findings   Key Developments   Translated Country Reports

EGYPT

Key developments since March 1999: In February 2000 Egypt suspended mine clearance operations, citing lack of funding. Also in February 2000, UNMAS conducted an assessment mission in Egypt. Egypt told the UN that it does not produce or export antipersonnel mines. In April 2000, Egypt formed a national committee for mine clearance. The Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines was held in Cairo in April 2000. The Landmines Struggle Center recorded thirty-seven landmine/UXO victims in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Egypt has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Speaking at the UN, an Egyptian representative stated that the treaty “did not take into consideration the legitimate right of States for self-defense, including the use of landmines in certain conditions.”[1] Egypt has objected to the treaty because it does not provide a legally binding obligation on states to remove mines they laid in other states. Egypt also believes that AP mines play an important role in self-defense, protection of borders, defense from terrorist attacks, and in deterring drug smuggling. Egypt states that alternatives to landmines must be in place before consideration of a ban; moreover, it believes that at present alternatives are restricted to those states with advanced military capabilities, thus creating an imbalance in the security requirements of states.[2]

Egypt was one of twenty countries to abstain on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 1999. It had abstained on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Egypt’s opposition to the Mine Ban Treaty surfaced again when it blocked pro-treaty wording contained in the final declaration of the Africa-Europe Summit held in Cairo, 3-4 April 2000. Egypt insisted on the removal of a recommendation for states to join the Mine Ban Treaty and introduced weaker language urging efforts within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), though it is not a state party.[3] A German official told Landmine Monitor, “Germany, like other EU member states, regrets very much the Egyptian stance of denying any form of open dialogue on the subject.”[4]

The Egypt’s anti-Mine Ban Treaty position continued at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines held at the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo 9-11 April 2000. Egypt was successful in insuring that the conference recommendations did not include mention of the Mine Ban Treaty but did include endorsement of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the appropriate forum to negotiate a comprehensive approach to the landmine problem. Members of the ICBL attending this conference were concerned that the views of pro-treaty mine-affected Arab countries like Yemen and regional NGOs in attendance were not recognized in the concluding statement. In a press report of this event, an unnamed Egyptian Foreign Ministry official stated that government had played no part in organizing the conference.[5]

Egypt did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Egypt attended one of the ban treaty intersessional meetings on Technologies for Mine Action in May 2000 in Geneva.

Egypt is not a state party to the CCW, but participated as an observer in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999 in Geneva. Egypt links Protocol II ratification with progress on wider regional disarmament and peace agreements. Egypt claims that minefields in its eastern region comply with the marking and mapping requirements contained in Protocol II, but the mines in the Western Desert would not.[6] In its report on a February 2000 assessment mission to Egypt, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) noted that “minefield marking procedures are limited in terms of warning signs and fencing, particularly in the Western Desert. Safe paths and cleared/suspected areas were not marked effectively in the areas observed.”[7] The UNMAS team was not provided information regarding minefields on Egypt’s borders during the mission.[8]

Production and Transfer

Egypt has in the past been a significant producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines.[9] Since 1997, Egyptian officials have on several occasions, in public fora and in meetings with ban campaigners, maintained that Egypt no longer produces or exports antipersonnel mines. An Egyptian official said to Landmine Monitor in April 2000, “Egypt does not produce nor export antipersonnel landmines.”[10] A UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment mission to Egypt in February 2000 was told, “Egypt does not export or produce [AP mines], a position supported by the Minister of Military Production who stated that exportation ceased in 1984, while production had ceased in 1988.”[11] Despite repeated requests, however, there is no official written policy statement by Egypt declaring that AP mine production and export has ceased.

At the IDEX99 defense fair in the United Arab Emirates, a marketing brochure from the state-run Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries listed several types of mines for sale, including T/78 and T/79 antipersonnel mines. The T/78 and T/79 plastic blast mines were offered in boxes of 100 and 60 respectively.[12] While marketing brochures are not evidence of new production or continued transfer, advertising mines at an international defense fair would appear to represent intention to export the weapon.

Stockpiling

Egypt is assumed to have a large stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but details are not available. An Egyptian official stated that any such information was classified for reasons of military security.[13]

Use

Egypt repeatedly argues that it needs to use mines to defend its borders and to protect against terrorists, smugglers, and other criminal activity. It is unclear, however, if Egypt is actively engaged in mine laying. UNMAS notes, “Unconfirmed reports indicate that landmines have been laid in some other border areas as a result of security concerns and efforts to stop smuggling and other illegal activities.”[14] Egyptian officials stress that all mines laid by Egypt for these purposes met international obligations laid down under the CCW. It is not possible to verify this fact or ascertain the exact location of any newly mined areas. Such information remains classified for reasons of state security.[15]

The Landmine Problem

While Egypt is sometimes described as seriously affected by landmines and UXO, the most seriously affected areas are sparsely populated. However, development plans and expansion of infrastructure will bring the population and tourists into greater proximity to mined areas.[16] The government has claimed that at least 23 million mines have been laid in Egypt, 17.3 to 19.7 million mines in the western region and 5.1 million mines in the eastern region.[17] These numbers are based on statistical extrapolations of previous clearance efforts conducted by the Egyptian Army between 1983 and 1999.[18]

Antipersonnel mines believed to be in the Western Desert include German S-type bounding fragmentation mines and British Mk.2 mines. Antitank mines are thought to include German Riegalmine 43, Tellermine 35, Tellermine 42 and Tellermine 43 mines, Italian B-2 and V-3 mines, and British Mk.5 and Mk.7 mines.[19] UNMAS states, “The level of marking and signposting of minefields and mine suspected areas is extremely limited in the Western Desert area.”[20]

Mines deployed in the Eastern Region include the Russian PMN blast AP mine, the Czech PP-Mi-Sr bounding AP mine, and the Egyptian M/71 AT mine.[21] UNMAS notes that the PMN is the “leading cause of mine accidents.”[22] According to UNMAS, “For the minefields in the Eastern Region laid by the Egyptian armed forces and the Israeli military, reliable minefield records and maps are available. Marking and fencing of the minefields in the Eastern Region, while more visible than in the Western Desert region, is still limited or often in need of repair.”[23]

The huge numbers of mines quoted by Egyptian officials are believed to be inaccurate and greatly exaggerated. A British Ministry of Defense document states that “we consider that the totals - such as the 30 million - cited in the press or in other reports on the mines problem in Egypt are considerable over-estimates.”[24] Officials from Germany have said, “Documents of the German Afrikakorps and likewise documents of the British 8th Army Division lead to the conclusion that about 1.5 to 2 million landmines are to be found in the Western Desert of Egypt.”[25]

The most likely explanation for the disparity in numbers is that when the Egyptian government cites a figure such as 23 million, it is apparently referring to all unexploded ordnance (UXO), not just landmines. An Egyptian military official recently stated at an international meeting that only 20% of explosive devices removed by the Egyptian Army from the Western Desert were mines.[26] The Egyptian government told the UNMAS assessment mission that 25% of the “landmines” in the Western Desert are actual landmines.[27] These percentages are reinforced by photographic and statistical data showing large numbers of UXO removed from the Western Desert.[28] Thus, using the percentages and total numbers provided by Egyptian officials, there would be 3.5 to 5 million landmines in the Western Desert. The number of antipersonnel mines, as opposed to antitank mines, would obviously be much lower.

Survey and Assessment

UNMAS conducted an assessment mission to Egypt between 9-23 February 2000 and published its findings in July 2000. It does not appear that the Egyptian government has conducted a national level survey of the landmine and UXO problem. UNMAS recommends that a combined Level I/Level II Landmine Impact Survey be conducted in the Western desert region.[29] UNMAS notes that a Level I Impact Survey “is not considered appropriate for information collection in the Western Desert region due to the limited population and lack of accurate records relating to the mine/UXO problem.”[30] According to UNMAS, “the vast majority of existing records relating to minefield activities had been provided to the Egyptian Government.”[31]

Mine Action Funding

Egypt has asked for large-scale international financial support to help clear its mines. Egypt has also been critical of the slow response of international donors to offer significant help, especially former Allied and Axis states. One source has stated that the Egyptian government has asked western countries responsible for mines laid at El Alamain to contribute at least $142 million for demining activities.[32] Moreover, in an interview with the Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper, Major General Ahamed Hazem, commander of the engineering corps, stated that “Egypt needs approximately $250 million to remove the 21.9 million mines that are still buried on its territory.”[33] UNMAS noted, “The ongoing statement of a need for $250 million to overcome the problem, without clearer indications of costing breakdowns has also had an effect of alienating some potential donors.”[34] There is no direct UN coordination for mine action funding in Egypt.[35]

The UK government has provided some assistance to Egypt for mine clearance. In 1996, the Department for International Development (DFID) provided $850,000 for the purchase of mine clearance equipment and in 1998 a further $166,000 was provided.[36] The UK has also, upon the request of the Egyptian government, provided all available maps and historical records, as well as technical documents on mine clearance and military doctrine to help identify the location and nature of UK deployed mines.[37] Royal Engineer experts from the Ministry of Defense have conducted visits in 1981, 1984 and 1994 to offer technical advice and assistance. All relevant historical records were also made available to the UNMAS mission and the UK Army Historical Branch is currently in the process of putting all relevant information onto CD-ROM.[38] The UK government admits that historical records on this issue are extremely patchy.

When asked whether the UK would give substantial new funds to mine clearance efforts in the future, the view expressed was that it was unlikely that the UK would wish to provide additional financial assistance on the basis of an Egyptian estimate for the removal of mines. That said, however, it was felt that funds could be available for mine awareness and victim assistance, but that Egypt had not presented any proposals in this area.[39]

The German government has similarly provided maps and historical records, initially in 1982. In 1998, Germany sent mine experts to Egypt for technical assistance and donated 110 Foerter Minex 2 mine detectors, with an estimated value of $411,000.[40] In 1994, Italy provided training for twenty Egyptian deminers.[41]

Egypt has received $1.432 million in U.S. demining assistance to date. Egypt requested U.S. assistance to supplement its national demining efforts in 1997 and was accepted into the U.S. program on 2 September 1998. The U.S. government body that makes demining policy has limited the amount of U.S. funds available to Egypt in light of the $1.3 billion in military aid Egypt receives from the U.S. each year. There is an apparent reluctance on the part of the Egyptians to support its own demining effort with this form of assistance.[42]

Coordination of Mine Action

The Egyptian government determines priorities and coordinates all planning for demining. Current priorities are agrarian, industrial, petroleum and tourist projects.[43] However, UNMAS states, “The linking of mine clearance tasks to with development projects or other activities was not systematised, often resulting in limited coordination in handover of cleared land to follow-on project staff.”[44] Most mine clearance by the Army is accomplished when the national government funds a development project related to the economy. Other factors influencing whether or not demining is accomplished include the nature of the agreement between the government and the landowner and the anticipated total cost of the demining. UNMAS notes, “Current coordination efforts see various concerned ministries and other entities liaising bilaterally with the Ministry of Defense to address needs for mine clearance.”[45]

On 3 April 2000 Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Ebaed issued Decision 750/2000 to form a national committee for mine clearance. Membership in this committee includes fourteen ministries and three regional governorates and three NGOs. Two of these NGOs had not existed prior to this decision and the third does not presently work in the mine action area. The Minister of Planning and International Cooperation heads the committee. Not included in the committee were four mine-affected governorates (Port Saaid, Ismailia, Elseuz, and Red Sea) and the only NGO engaged in mine action in Egypt (Landmines Struggle Center). The mandate of the committee is solely mine clearance.

Egypt does not appear to have developed an integrated humanitarian mine action strategy. Observers have noted that Egypt has not benefited from the recent experiences of the mine clearance community, which has stressed the need to develop mine clearance as a comprehensive strategy involving clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance. A symptom of this may be manifest in Egypt's perception that expensive high technology detection equipment will greatly assist mine clearance operations in the Western Desert and elsewhere.[46]

Mine Clearance

With increasing population pressures along the Nile valley, the Egyptian government stresses the need to develop infrastructure and agriculture in mine-affected areas west of Alexandria. As a result, the government has prioritized four areas of mine clearance, which it hopes to complete by 2002. Depending on greater international donor assistance, a more ambitious target of 2005 has been set to remove all mines from its territory.[47] These four areas include the cities of Burj Al-Arab and Nubariah, a new road linking Alexandria and Matrouh, agricultural areas alongside Tira’t Al-Hamam, Alamain, Ras Al-Hikma, Fouka and Sidi Barani areas, and the development of tourism west of Alexandria, especially in Marsa Matrouh and Ras Al Hikma.[48]

The primary responsibility for mine clearance rests with the Engineering Corps of the Egyptian Army. Approximately 480 army troops are trained in mine clearance, most of whom are deployed in the Western Desert.[49] The Army uses a combination of manual and mechanical demining methods. UNMAS assessed the Army’s clearance capabilities as “well-trained and professional...but by the admission of the Egyptian Government, it is not however capable of clearing the entire landmine problem facing Egypt.”[50]

Commercial companies, mainly petroleum services companies, also engage in demining employing mostly retired military personnel. These companies are registered and working in demining with the permission of the Army and work on the petroleum and tourist projects using only manual methods with Fisher 65 and Fisher Plus mine detectors.

In February 2000, the Army Engineering Corps announced that its demining operations would be stopped because of insufficient funds.[51] Up to 1981, the Egyptian government reports that 11 million mines and UXO were cleared. Between then and 1999, an additional 1.2 million were cleared, 800,000 in the west and 400,000 in the east.[52] Clearance efforts have suffered from financial constraints and have resulted in periodic suspensions of activity. For example, the Army did not demine between 1991-1998.[53]

Mine Awareness

According to UNMAS, “Mine awareness education is undertaken by the military for its Army mine clearance personnel.... Mine awareness education appears extremely limited for the civilian population both in mine affected areas and elsewhere.”[54] Egyptian officials have noted that the mines issue is routinely highlighted in the national media.[55] However, there does not appear to be a government strategy to promote mine awareness, particularly in remote areas or to particularly vulnerable sections of the population, such as the nomadic Bedouin tribes. There is also a shortage of warning signs and fencing in known mined areas.

Landmine Casualties

According to information provided by the Egyptian Army in April 2000, there have been 8,313 landmine victims in Egypt, mostly civilians.

Mine Victims
Injuries
Fatalities
Total:
Military
3018
278
3296
Civilian
4599
418
5017
Total:
7617
696
8313 [56]

The government could not provide information concerning how the statistics on landmine victims are recorded, their types of injuries, or the locations of the incidents. UNMAS notes this is an aspect of the “absence of a coordinated system of data collection.”[57] These figures are essentially the same as those given by the Egyptian government to the UN in 1998 for the years 1945-1996.[58]

Many incidents are likely to go unreported, especially amongst nomadic Bedouin tribes in the Western desert, as well as in the areas where mines have been deployed to protect against drug cultivation and smuggling.

According to a survey conducted by the Cairo-based Landmines Struggle Center (LSC), the number of mine and UXO victims in 1998 was thirty-three and in 1999 was Thirty-seven.[59] In 1998, thirteen people were killed and twenty wounded, including eight children killed and nine wounded. Sixteen people had accidents in the Eastern area, nine in the Western area, five in Behera governorate, and three in Aswan governorate. Two military deminers were wounded during demining operations in the new port of El Aien-El Sokhna in the East region.

In 1999, fourteen people were killed and twenty-three wounded, including four children killed and six children wounded. Twenty-two had accidents in the Eastern area, six in the Western area, four in Giza governorate, three in Menya governorate, one in Daqahlya governorate, and one in Sharqya governorate.

Between 1 January 2000 and 29 February 2000 the Landmine Struggle Center recorded three deaths and one injury due to mines in Elamar village, Ismailia governorate.

Victim Assistance

Emergency equipment and ambulances are scarce in the mine-affected areas. The medical care available at local clinics and hospitals is not sufficient for the trauma of mine incidents. According to UNMAS, “There is an uneven distribution of health services throughout the country, although the services that are available are to a large extent maintained free to the general public.”[60] Additionally, UNMAS notes, “Within the civilian community medical resources for mine injuries did not appear to be as complete throughout the mine affected areas as those for military personnel.”[61] The State provides medical treatment and artificial limbs to mine victims, but most of the assistance offered is geared towards the treatment of military personnel. For example, the Alagouza military hospital provides artificial limbs and more long-term rehabilitation for servicemen and veterans injured by mines. The only other rehabilitation center for disabled people in Egypt is the Veterans Association, another military organization. Military hospitals will provide some civilian victims with treatment, but they have to contribute up to 50% towards the cost of their treatment.[62]

Law 39/1975 (Executive Roll Number 59/1979) states that disabled should receive free medical care, and provides a structure for the care and rehabilitation of disabled people. However, limited financial resources hamper implementation of its provisions. The Ministry of Social Affairs rarely provides pensions to the disabled; recently some landmine victims have been compensated with approximately $45-80. There are no rehabilitation programs existing for mine victims. There is no national body representing the interests of disabled people or mine victims in Egypt.

<BAHRAIN | IRAN>

[1] Statement of UN Ambassador Ahmed Aboulgheit as an explanation of vote at UN General Assembly First Committee meeting, New York, 8 November 1999.
[2] These positions have been expressed frequently. Interview with Alla Issa, Director of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 8 April 2000. Interview with Soliman Awaad, Deputy Assistant Minister, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, March 2000. Interview with UN Ambassador Ahmed Aboulgheit, New York, 5 October 1999. “Explanation of Vote by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Resolution on Anti-Personal Landmines, delivered by Ambassador Dr Mahmoud Karem,” 6 November 1998, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Document, November 1998.
[3] “Cairo Declaration, Africa-Europe Summit,” under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000, paragraphs 76-80. Egyptian officials argue that this strengthened the declaration by making an explicit reference to mine clearance and the duty of those states responsible for laying mines to assist in their removal. Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 8 April 2000.
[4] Letter to Landmine Monitor from the German Embassy in Cairo, 11 April 2000. A diplomat from the UK expressed similar views during a 10 April 2000 interview at the UK Embassy in Cairo.
[5] “Egypt Under Fire Over Anti-Personnel Mine Policy,” Reuters, 11 April 2000.
[6] Interview with Alla Issa, Director of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.
[7] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 23.
[8] Ibid., p. 11.
[9] For details on past production and export, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 877-879. The most recent evidence of export dates to 1992-1993.
[10] Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.
[11] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 21.
[12] The brochure listing AP mines was obtained by an attendee at IDEX 99 held at the Abu Dhabi International Exhibition Center, United Arab Emirates, 14-18 March 1999.
[13] Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.
[14] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 9.
[15] Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.
[16] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 3.
[17] Statement made by General Ahmed Hazem to the National Security Committee of the Egyptian parliament, 5 April 1999.
[18] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 10.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., p. 11.
[21] UN Country report on Egypt; U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999; UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 11.
[22] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 11.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Information supplied by the UK Ministry of Defense correspondence between Harry Cohen MP and Dr John Reid MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, 31 March 1998.
[25] Letter to Landmine Monitor from the German Embassy in Cairo, 11 April 2000.
[26] Statement made during interview with Colonel Dr. Abdel-Hamid Mostafa, Ministry of Defense Egypt. Colonel Dr. Mostafa also cited this percentage in his presentation to the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April 2000.
[27] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, pp. 11-12.
[28] Interviews with and presentation made by Colonel Mostafa, 9-11 April 2000.
[29] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 27.
[30] Ibid., p. 24.
[31] Ibid., p. 11.
[32] U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999.
[33] Amira Ibrahim, “Deadly Legacy,” Al-Ahram weekly, Issue No. 444, 26 August-1 September 1999.
[34] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 17.
[35] Ibid.
[36] “Demining: UK assistance provided to Egypt”, UK Embassy, Cairo, 15 February 2000.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Interviews with UK officials, Cairo, April 2000.
[39] Interview with officials from the UK Embassy in Cairo, April 10, 2000.
[40] Information provided the German Embassy, Cairo, April 2000.
[41] “Egypt’s mine problem in the Western Desert,” paper by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense circulated at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo 9-11 April 2000.
[42] U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999.
[43] Statement by representative of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to UNMAS assessment mission, Cairo, 12 February 2000.
[44] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 21.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Regional and international participants engaged in integrated mine action at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, April 2000, highlighted the limitations of high technology in mine clearance.
[47] “U.S. Combs the World for Deadly Mines,” Tampa Tribune, 19 March 2000.
[48] “Egypt’s mine problem in the Western Desert,” conference paper by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense circulated at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo 9-11 April 2000.
[49] U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999; interview with Colin King, April 2000.
[50] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 3.
[51] Declaration by General Ahmed Hazem to the UNMAS assessment mission, Cairo, 12 February 2000.
[52] Statement by General Ahmed Hazem to the National Security Committee of the Egyptian parliament, 5 April 1999.
[53] Interview with Alla Issa, Foreign Ministry, Cairo, 8 April 2000.
[54] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 18.
[55] Interview with Alla Issa, Cairo, 8 April 2000.
[56] Figures provided by Egyptian government, April 2000. Identical statistics were included in the statement of the Egyptian representative to the Regional Conference on the Menace of Mines, Beirut, 10 February 1999. However, statistics provided to UNMAS in February 2000 indicate 6 fewer fatalities and 6 fewer injuries. UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 12.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ambassador Dr Mahmoud Karem, “Explanation of Vote by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Resolution on Anti-Personal Landmines,” Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Document, November 1998.
[59] All subsequent data in this section is from a survey by the Landmines Struggle Center (Cairo) covering the period of 1 January 1998 to 1 January 2000 in the two main mined areas in Egypt and other governorates next to those areas. This NGO receives news about mine or UXO incidents from media, hospitals, and other local sources. Staff then visits the accident area, interviews the victim or the victim’s family, visits the hospital treating the victim, interviews witnesses and notes other indicators such as warning signs, education, rehabilitation and social care.
[60] UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 8.
[61] Ibid., p. 19.
[62] Information obtained at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April 2000.