Key developments
since March 1999: In February 2000 Egypt suspended mine clearance
operations, citing lack of funding. Also in February 2000, UNMAS conducted an
assessment mission in Egypt. Egypt told the UN that it does not produce or
export antipersonnel mines. In April 2000, Egypt formed a national committee for
mine clearance. The Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines was held in Cairo in
April 2000. The Landmines Struggle Center recorded thirty-seven landmine/UXO
victims in 1999.
Mine Ban Policy
Egypt has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Speaking at the UN, an Egyptian representative stated that the treaty “did
not take into consideration the legitimate right of States for self-defense,
including the use of landmines in certain
conditions.”[1] Egypt has
objected to the treaty because it does not provide a legally binding obligation
on states to remove mines they laid in other states. Egypt also believes that
AP mines play an important role in self-defense, protection of borders, defense
from terrorist attacks, and in deterring drug smuggling. Egypt states that
alternatives to landmines must be in place before consideration of a ban;
moreover, it believes that at present alternatives are restricted to those
states with advanced military capabilities, thus creating an imbalance in the
security requirements of
states.[2]
Egypt was one of twenty countries to abstain on the vote on UN General
Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for the universalization of the Mine Ban
Treaty on 1 December 1999. It had abstained on similar resolutions in 1997 and
1998. Egypt’s opposition to the Mine Ban Treaty surfaced again when it
blocked pro-treaty wording contained in the final declaration of the
Africa-Europe Summit held in Cairo, 3-4 April 2000. Egypt insisted on the
removal of a recommendation for states to join the Mine Ban Treaty and
introduced weaker language urging efforts within the framework of the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW), though it is not a state
party.[3] A German official
told Landmine Monitor, “Germany, like other EU member states, regrets very
much the Egyptian stance of denying any form of open dialogue on the
subject.”[4]
The Egypt’s anti-Mine Ban Treaty position continued at the Arab
Regional Seminar on Landmines held at the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo 9-11
April 2000. Egypt was successful in insuring that the conference
recommendations did not include mention of the Mine Ban Treaty but did include
endorsement of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the appropriate forum to
negotiate a comprehensive approach to the landmine problem. Members of the ICBL
attending this conference were concerned that the views of pro-treaty
mine-affected Arab countries like Yemen and regional NGOs in attendance were not
recognized in the concluding statement. In a press report of this event, an
unnamed Egyptian Foreign Ministry official stated that government had played no
part in organizing the
conference.[5]
Egypt did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Egypt attended one of the
ban treaty intersessional meetings on Technologies for Mine Action in May 2000
in Geneva.
Egypt is not a state party to the CCW, but participated as an observer in the
First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines)
in December 1999 in Geneva. Egypt links Protocol II ratification with progress
on wider regional disarmament and peace agreements. Egypt claims that
minefields in its eastern region comply with the marking and mapping
requirements contained in Protocol II, but the mines in the Western Desert would
not.[6] In its report on a
February 2000 assessment mission to Egypt, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
noted that “minefield marking procedures are limited in terms of warning
signs and fencing, particularly in the Western Desert. Safe paths and
cleared/suspected areas were not marked effectively in the areas
observed.”[7] The UNMAS
team was not provided information regarding minefields on Egypt’s borders
during the mission.[8]
Production and Transfer
Egypt has in the past been a significant producer
and exporter of antipersonnel
mines.[9] Since 1997, Egyptian
officials have on several occasions, in public fora and in meetings with ban
campaigners, maintained that Egypt no longer produces or exports antipersonnel
mines. An Egyptian official said to Landmine Monitor in April 2000, “Egypt
does not produce nor export antipersonnel
landmines.”[10] A UN
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment mission to Egypt in February 2000 was
told, “Egypt does not export or produce [AP mines], a position supported
by the Minister of Military Production who stated that exportation ceased in
1984, while production had ceased in
1988.”[11] Despite
repeated requests, however, there is no official written policy statement by
Egypt declaring that AP mine production and export has ceased.
At the IDEX99 defense fair in the United Arab Emirates, a marketing brochure
from the state-run Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries listed several
types of mines for sale, including T/78 and T/79 antipersonnel mines. The T/78
and T/79 plastic blast mines were offered in boxes of 100 and 60
respectively.[12] While
marketing brochures are not evidence of new production or continued transfer,
advertising mines at an international defense fair would appear to represent
intention to export the weapon.
Stockpiling
Egypt is assumed to have a large stockpile of
antipersonnel mines, but details are not available. An Egyptian official stated
that any such information was classified for reasons of military
security.[13]
Use
Egypt repeatedly argues that it needs to use mines
to defend its borders and to protect against terrorists, smugglers, and other
criminal activity. It is unclear, however, if Egypt is actively engaged in mine
laying. UNMAS notes, “Unconfirmed reports indicate that landmines have
been laid in some other border areas as a result of security concerns and
efforts to stop smuggling and other illegal
activities.”[14] Egyptian
officials stress that all mines laid by Egypt for these purposes met
international obligations laid down under the CCW. It is not possible to verify
this fact or ascertain the exact location of any newly mined areas. Such
information remains classified for reasons of state
security.[15]
The Landmine Problem
While Egypt is sometimes described as seriously
affected by landmines and UXO, the most seriously affected areas are sparsely
populated. However, development plans and expansion of infrastructure will
bring the population and tourists into greater proximity to mined
areas.[16] The government has
claimed that at least 23 million mines have been laid in Egypt, 17.3 to 19.7
million mines in the western region and 5.1 million mines in the eastern
region.[17] These numbers are
based on statistical extrapolations of previous clearance efforts conducted by
the Egyptian Army between 1983 and
1999.[18]
Antipersonnel mines believed to be in the Western Desert include German
S-type bounding fragmentation mines and British Mk.2 mines. Antitank mines are
thought to include German Riegalmine 43, Tellermine 35, Tellermine 42 and
Tellermine 43 mines, Italian B-2 and V-3 mines, and British Mk.5 and Mk.7
mines.[19] UNMAS states,
“The level of marking and signposting of minefields and mine suspected
areas is extremely limited in the Western Desert
area.”[20]
Mines deployed in the Eastern Region include the Russian PMN blast AP mine,
the Czech PP-Mi-Sr bounding AP mine, and the Egyptian M/71 AT
mine.[21] UNMAS notes that the
PMN is the “leading cause of mine
accidents.”[22] According
to UNMAS, “For the minefields in the Eastern Region laid by the Egyptian
armed forces and the Israeli military, reliable minefield records and maps are
available. Marking and fencing of the minefields in the Eastern Region, while
more visible than in the Western Desert region, is still limited or often in
need of repair.”[23]
The huge numbers of mines quoted by Egyptian officials are believed to be
inaccurate and greatly exaggerated. A British Ministry of Defense document
states that “we consider that the totals - such as the 30 million - cited
in the press or in other reports on the mines problem in Egypt are considerable
over-estimates.”[24]
Officials from Germany have said, “Documents of the German Afrikakorps and
likewise documents of the British 8th Army Division lead to the conclusion that
about 1.5 to 2 million landmines are to be found in the Western Desert of
Egypt.”[25]
The most likely explanation for the disparity in numbers is that when the
Egyptian government cites a figure such as 23 million, it is apparently
referring to all unexploded ordnance (UXO), not just landmines. An Egyptian
military official recently stated at an international meeting that only 20% of
explosive devices removed by the Egyptian Army from the Western Desert were
mines.[26] The Egyptian
government told the UNMAS assessment mission that 25% of the
“landmines” in the Western Desert are actual
landmines.[27] These
percentages are reinforced by photographic and statistical data showing large
numbers of UXO removed from the Western
Desert.[28] Thus, using the
percentages and total numbers provided by Egyptian officials, there would be 3.5
to 5 million landmines in the Western Desert. The number of antipersonnel
mines, as opposed to antitank mines, would obviously be much lower.
Survey and Assessment
UNMAS conducted an assessment mission to Egypt
between 9-23 February 2000 and published its findings in July 2000. It does not
appear that the Egyptian government has conducted a national level survey of the
landmine and UXO problem. UNMAS recommends that a combined Level I/Level II
Landmine Impact Survey be conducted in the Western desert
region.[29] UNMAS notes that a
Level I Impact Survey “is not considered appropriate for information
collection in the Western Desert region due to the limited population and lack
of accurate records relating to the mine/UXO
problem.”[30] According to
UNMAS, “the vast majority of existing records relating to minefield
activities had been provided to the Egyptian
Government.”[31]
Mine Action Funding
Egypt has asked for large-scale international
financial support to help clear its mines. Egypt has also been critical of the
slow response of international donors to offer significant help, especially
former Allied and Axis states. One source has stated that the Egyptian
government has asked western countries responsible for mines laid at El Alamain
to contribute at least $142 million for demining
activities.[32] Moreover, in an
interview with the Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper, Major General Ahamed Hazem,
commander of the engineering corps, stated that “Egypt needs approximately
$250 million to remove the 21.9 million mines that are still buried on its
territory.”[33] UNMAS
noted, “The ongoing statement of a need for $250 million to overcome the
problem, without clearer indications of costing breakdowns has also had an
effect of alienating some potential
donors.”[34] There is no
direct UN coordination for mine action funding in
Egypt.[35]
The UK government has provided some assistance to Egypt for mine clearance.
In 1996, the Department for International Development (DFID) provided $850,000
for the purchase of mine clearance equipment and in 1998 a further $166,000 was
provided.[36] The UK has also,
upon the request of the Egyptian government, provided all available maps and
historical records, as well as technical documents on mine clearance and
military doctrine to help identify the location and nature of UK deployed
mines.[37] Royal Engineer
experts from the Ministry of Defense have conducted visits in 1981, 1984 and
1994 to offer technical advice and assistance. All relevant historical records
were also made available to the UNMAS mission and the UK Army Historical Branch
is currently in the process of putting all relevant information onto
CD-ROM.[38] The UK government
admits that historical records on this issue are extremely patchy.
When asked whether the UK would give substantial new funds to mine clearance
efforts in the future, the view expressed was that it was unlikely that the UK
would wish to provide additional financial assistance on the basis of an
Egyptian estimate for the removal of mines. That said, however, it was felt
that funds could be available for mine awareness and victim assistance, but that
Egypt had not presented any proposals in this
area.[39]
The German government has similarly provided maps and historical records,
initially in 1982. In 1998, Germany sent mine experts to Egypt for technical
assistance and donated 110 Foerter Minex 2 mine detectors, with an estimated
value of $411,000.[40] In 1994,
Italy provided training for twenty Egyptian
deminers.[41]
Egypt has received $1.432 million in U.S. demining assistance to date. Egypt
requested U.S. assistance to supplement its national demining efforts in 1997
and was accepted into the U.S. program on 2 September 1998. The U.S. government
body that makes demining policy has limited the amount of U.S. funds available
to Egypt in light of the $1.3 billion in military aid Egypt receives from the
U.S. each year. There is an apparent reluctance on the part of the Egyptians to
support its own demining effort with this form of
assistance.[42]
Coordination of Mine Action
The Egyptian government determines priorities and
coordinates all planning for demining. Current priorities are agrarian,
industrial, petroleum and tourist
projects.[43] However, UNMAS
states, “The linking of mine clearance tasks to with development projects
or other activities was not systematised, often resulting in limited
coordination in handover of cleared land to follow-on project
staff.”[44] Most mine
clearance by the Army is accomplished when the national government funds a
development project related to the economy. Other factors influencing whether
or not demining is accomplished include the nature of the agreement between the
government and the landowner and the anticipated total cost of the demining.
UNMAS notes, “Current coordination efforts see various concerned
ministries and other entities liaising bilaterally with the Ministry of Defense
to address needs for mine
clearance.”[45]
On 3 April 2000 Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Ebaed issued Decision 750/2000
to form a national committee for mine clearance. Membership in this committee
includes fourteen ministries and three regional governorates and three NGOs.
Two of these NGOs had not existed prior to this decision and the third does not
presently work in the mine action area. The Minister of Planning and
International Cooperation heads the committee. Not included in the committee
were four mine-affected governorates (Port Saaid, Ismailia, Elseuz, and Red Sea)
and the only NGO engaged in mine action in Egypt (Landmines Struggle Center).
The mandate of the committee is solely mine clearance.
Egypt does not appear to have developed an integrated humanitarian mine
action strategy. Observers have noted that Egypt has not benefited from the
recent experiences of the mine clearance community, which has stressed the need
to develop mine clearance as a comprehensive strategy involving clearance, mine
awareness and victim assistance. A symptom of this may be manifest in Egypt's
perception that expensive high technology detection equipment will greatly
assist mine clearance operations in the Western Desert and
elsewhere.[46]
Mine Clearance
With increasing population pressures along the
Nile valley, the Egyptian government stresses the need to develop infrastructure
and agriculture in mine-affected areas west of Alexandria. As a result, the
government has prioritized four areas of mine clearance, which it hopes to
complete by 2002. Depending on greater international donor assistance, a more
ambitious target of 2005 has been set to remove all mines from its
territory.[47] These four areas
include the cities of Burj Al-Arab and Nubariah, a new road linking Alexandria
and Matrouh, agricultural areas alongside Tira’t Al-Hamam, Alamain, Ras
Al-Hikma, Fouka and Sidi Barani areas, and the development of tourism west of
Alexandria, especially in Marsa Matrouh and Ras Al
Hikma.[48]
The primary responsibility for mine clearance rests with the Engineering
Corps of the Egyptian Army. Approximately 480 army troops are trained in mine
clearance, most of whom are deployed in the Western
Desert.[49] The Army uses a
combination of manual and mechanical demining methods. UNMAS assessed the
Army’s clearance capabilities as “well-trained and
professional...but by the admission of the Egyptian Government, it is not
however capable of clearing the entire landmine problem facing
Egypt.”[50]
Commercial companies, mainly petroleum services companies, also engage in
demining employing mostly retired military personnel. These companies are
registered and working in demining with the permission of the Army and work on
the petroleum and tourist projects using only manual methods with Fisher 65 and
Fisher Plus mine detectors.
In February 2000, the Army Engineering Corps announced that its demining
operations would be stopped because of insufficient
funds.[51] Up to 1981, the
Egyptian government reports that 11 million mines and UXO were cleared. Between
then and 1999, an additional 1.2 million were cleared, 800,000 in the west and
400,000 in the east.[52]
Clearance efforts have suffered from financial constraints and have resulted in
periodic suspensions of activity. For example, the Army did not demine between
1991-1998.[53]
Mine Awareness
According to UNMAS, “Mine awareness
education is undertaken by the military for its Army mine clearance
personnel.... Mine awareness education appears extremely limited for the
civilian population both in mine affected areas and
elsewhere.”[54] Egyptian
officials have noted that the mines issue is routinely highlighted in the
national media.[55] However,
there does not appear to be a government strategy to promote mine awareness,
particularly in remote areas or to particularly vulnerable sections of the
population, such as the nomadic Bedouin tribes. There is also a shortage of
warning signs and fencing in known mined areas.
Landmine Casualties
According to information provided by the Egyptian
Army in April 2000, there have been 8,313 landmine victims in Egypt, mostly
civilians.
The government could not provide information concerning how the statistics on
landmine victims are recorded, their types of injuries, or the locations of the
incidents. UNMAS notes this is an aspect of the “absence of a coordinated
system of data
collection.”[57] These
figures are essentially the same as those given by the Egyptian government to
the UN in 1998 for the years
1945-1996.[58]
Many incidents are likely to go unreported, especially amongst nomadic
Bedouin tribes in the Western desert, as well as in the areas where mines have
been deployed to protect against drug cultivation and smuggling.
According to a survey conducted by the Cairo-based Landmines Struggle Center
(LSC), the number of mine and UXO victims in 1998 was thirty-three and in 1999
was Thirty-seven.[59] In 1998,
thirteen people were killed and twenty wounded, including eight children
killed and nine wounded. Sixteen people had accidents in the Eastern area, nine
in the Western area, five in Behera governorate, and three in Aswan governorate.
Two military deminers were wounded during demining operations in the new port of
El Aien-El Sokhna in the East region.
In 1999, fourteen people were killed and twenty-three wounded, including four
children killed and six children wounded. Twenty-two had accidents in the
Eastern area, six in the Western area, four in Giza governorate, three in Menya
governorate, one in Daqahlya governorate, and one in Sharqya governorate.
Between 1 January 2000 and 29 February 2000 the Landmine Struggle Center
recorded three deaths and one injury due to mines in Elamar village, Ismailia
governorate.
Victim Assistance
Emergency equipment and ambulances are scarce in
the mine-affected areas. The medical care available at local clinics and
hospitals is not sufficient for the trauma of mine incidents. According to
UNMAS, “There is an uneven distribution of health services throughout the
country, although the services that are available are to a large extent
maintained free to the general
public.”[60]
Additionally, UNMAS notes, “Within the civilian community medical
resources for mine injuries did not appear to be as complete throughout the mine
affected areas as those for military
personnel.”[61] The State
provides medical treatment and artificial limbs to mine victims, but most of the
assistance offered is geared towards the treatment of military personnel. For
example, the Alagouza military hospital provides artificial limbs and more
long-term rehabilitation for servicemen and veterans injured by mines. The only
other rehabilitation center for disabled people in Egypt is the Veterans
Association, another military organization. Military hospitals will provide
some civilian victims with treatment, but they have to contribute up to 50%
towards the cost of their
treatment.[62]
Law 39/1975 (Executive Roll Number 59/1979) states that disabled should
receive free medical care, and provides a structure for the care and
rehabilitation of disabled people. However, limited financial resources hamper
implementation of its provisions. The Ministry of Social Affairs rarely
provides pensions to the disabled; recently some landmine victims have been
compensated with approximately $45-80. There are no rehabilitationprograms existing for mine victims. There is no national body representing
the interests of disabled people or mine victims in Egypt.
[1] Statement of UN Ambassador Ahmed
Aboulgheit as an explanation of vote at UN General Assembly First Committee
meeting, New York, 8 November 1999. [2]
These positions have been expressed frequently. Interview with Alla Issa,
Director of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 8 April
2000. Interview with Soliman Awaad, Deputy Assistant Minister, Egyptian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, March 2000. Interview with UN Ambassador
Ahmed Aboulgheit, New York, 5 October 1999. “Explanation of Vote by the
Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Resolution on Anti-Personal
Landmines, delivered by Ambassador Dr Mahmoud Karem,” 6 November 1998,
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Document, November
1998. [3] “Cairo Declaration,
Africa-Europe Summit,” under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4
April 2000, paragraphs 76-80. Egyptian officials argue that this strengthened
the declaration by making an explicit reference to mine clearance and the duty
of those states responsible for laying mines to assist in their removal.
Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 8 April
2000. [4] Letter to Landmine Monitor
from the German Embassy in Cairo, 11 April 2000. A diplomat from the UK
expressed similar views during a 10 April 2000 interview at the UK Embassy in
Cairo. [5] “Egypt Under Fire Over
Anti-Personnel Mine Policy,” Reuters, 11 April
2000. [6] Interview with Alla Issa,
Director of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April
2000. [7] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
23. [8] Ibid., p.
11. [9] For details on past production
and export, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 877-879. The most recent
evidence of export dates to
1992-1993. [10] Interview with Alla
Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April
2000. [11] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
21. [12] The brochure listing AP mines
was obtained by an attendee at IDEX 99 held at the Abu Dhabi International
Exhibition Center, United Arab Emirates, 14-18 March
1999. [13] Interview with Alla Issa,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April
2000. [14] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
9. [15] Interview with Alla Issa,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April
2000. [16] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
3. [17] Statement made by General Ahmed
Hazem to the National Security Committee of the Egyptian parliament, 5 April
1999. [18] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
10. [19]
Ibid. [20] Ibid., p.
11. [21] UN Country report on Egypt;
U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan
for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999; UNMAS,
“Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,”
July 2000, p. 11. [22] UNMAS,
“Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,”
July 2000, p. 11. [23]
Ibid. [24] Information supplied by the
UK Ministry of Defense correspondence between Harry Cohen MP and Dr John Reid
MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, 31 March
1998. [25] Letter to Landmine Monitor
from the German Embassy in Cairo, 11 April
2000. [26] Statement made during
interview with Colonel Dr. Abdel-Hamid Mostafa, Ministry of Defense Egypt.
Colonel Dr. Mostafa also cited this percentage in his presentation to the Arab
Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April
2000. [27] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, pp.
11-12. [28] Interviews with and
presentation made by Colonel Mostafa, 9-11 April
2000. [29] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
27. [30] Ibid., p.
24. [31] Ibid., p.
11. [32] U.S. Central Command,
“U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic
of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July
1999. [33] Amira Ibrahim, “Deadly
Legacy,” Al-Ahram weekly, Issue No. 444, 26 August-1 September
1999. [34] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
17. [35]
Ibid. [36] “Demining: UK
assistance provided to Egypt”, UK Embassy, Cairo, 15 February
2000. [37]
Ibid. [38] Interviews with UK officials,
Cairo, April 2000. [39] Interview with
officials from the UK Embassy in Cairo, April 10,
2000. [40] Information provided the
German Embassy, Cairo, April 2000. [41]
“Egypt’s mine problem in the Western Desert,” paper by the
Egyptian Ministry of Defense circulated at the Arab Regional Seminar on
Landmines, Cairo 9-11 April 2000. [42]
U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan
for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July
1999. [43] Statement by representative
of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to UNMAS assessment
mission, Cairo, 12 February 2000. [44]
UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of
Egypt,” July 2000, p. 21. [45]
Ibid. [46] Regional and international
participants engaged in integrated mine action at the Arab Regional Seminar on
Landmines, April 2000, highlighted the limitations of high technology in mine
clearance. [47] “U.S. Combs the
World for Deadly Mines,” Tampa Tribune, 19 March
2000. [48] “Egypt’s mine
problem in the Western Desert,” conference paper by the Egyptian Ministry
of Defense circulated at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo 9-11
April 2000. [49] U.S. Central Command,
“U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic
of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999; interview with Colin King,
April 2000. [50] UNMAS, “Mine
Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
3. [51] Declaration by General Ahmed
Hazem to the UNMAS assessment mission, Cairo, 12 February
2000. [52] Statement by General Ahmed
Hazem to the National Security Committee of the Egyptian parliament, 5 April
1999. [53] Interview with Alla Issa,
Foreign Ministry, Cairo, 8 April
2000. [54] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
18. [55] Interview with Alla Issa,
Cairo, 8 April 2000. [56] Figures
provided by Egyptian government, April 2000. Identical statistics were included
in the statement of the Egyptian representative to the Regional Conference on
the Menace of Mines, Beirut, 10 February 1999. However, statistics provided to
UNMAS in February 2000 indicate 6 fewer fatalities and 6 fewer injuries. UNMAS,
“Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,”
July 2000, p. 12. [57]
Ibid. [58] Ambassador Dr Mahmoud Karem,
“Explanation of Vote by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on
the Resolution on Anti-Personal Landmines,” Egyptian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Policy Document, November
1998. [59] All subsequent data in this
section is from a survey by the Landmines Struggle Center (Cairo) covering the
period of 1 January 1998 to 1 January 2000 in the two main mined areas in Egypt
and other governorates next to those areas. This NGO receives news about mine
or UXO incidents from media, hospitals, and other local sources. Staff then
visits the accident area, interviews the victim or the victim’s family,
visits the hospital treating the victim, interviews witnesses and notes other
indicators such as warning signs, education, rehabilitation and social
care. [60] UNMAS, “Mine Action
Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p.
8. [61] Ibid., p.
19. [62] Information obtained at the
Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April 2000.
About Us
Our Research Products