Key developments
since March 1999: Finland contributed US$5 million to mine action programs
in 1999 and deployed mine clearance teams to Kosovo and Mozambique. It
contributed about $1.9 million to mine action January-April 2000. Finland has
carried out destruction of some non-detectable mines, in accordance with Amended
Protocol II. Finland reiterated its goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in
2006.
Mine Ban Policy
Finland is the only country in the European Union
that has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). In part to mitigate its
isolation in the EU in particular, and the wider international community, it has
become Finnish policy to voice support for the total banning of antipersonnel
mines and indicate “readiness” to join the MBT in the
future.[1]
The government formed a working group comprised of officials from the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to consider the AP mine issue. In its
report of December 1997, it declared that Finland was in the process of moving
toward a total ban on AP mines and would be prepared to replace them with other
methods of independent and reliable defense. But the working group insisted
that Finland needed additional money - several million U.S. dollars - for
alternatives to AP mines; even if alternatives and the funds to acquire them
were available the transitional period would take at least ten
years.[2] In December 1999, the
goal of being able to join the MBT by 2006 and replace its mines before the end
of 2010 was reiterated in its report on AP mine policy to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in
Europe.[3] The working group
continues its deliberations.
In March 2000, officials of the Foreign Ministry said that it was not an easy
decision to remain outside the MBT: “The step to take was difficult. We
are not usually outsiders in international politics and disarmament.”[4] The government felt it had to
stay out of the Ottawa Process because it was “not capable of influencing
the end result. We could not join the Ottawa Treaty because of the requirement
to destroy stockpiles in such a short time. We could not do it in four years.
We could, of course, have signed the treaty, but we could not ratify. So we
decided not to sign. We think that it is better that if we are going to sign we
would also be capable to ratify. We decided that we will not take part in the
process. After that Finland found its position
easier.”[5]
Officials consistently point to Finland’s geographical and geopolitical
position, as a large country with a small population bordering on Russia, with
whom it has fought two wars in the last sixty years as a fundamental reason for
staying outside the MBT. Finland wants to have, and to give the signal that it
has, a “strong, credible, independent defense.” In March 2000, an
official from the Ministry of Defense explained: “Antipersonnel landmines
are part of the Finnish defense system. Finland is a country fragmented by the
lake system, full of different areas around the waterways. To defend these kind
of areas Finland needs landmines which fit well and are
essential.”[6] He
repeated the claim often made that the military would need a budget increase of
3-5 Miljard Finnish marks (US$500-800 million) to cover the expenses of
replacing AP mines.[7]
While government and military officials always refer to Russia when
discussing AP mine issues, they deny that Finland is afraid of its neighbor,
saying that a possible attack from Russia is already out of question and
history.[8] This claim seems to
contradict the explanations about the need for strong border defenses. One
military official noted, “Even though Russia is not the threat, it is an
uncertain factor. I think, nobody can really estimate how time and the
situation will change. We have a long border with
Russia.”[9] Defense
officials deny that Finland looked upon any other states as an example not to
sign the MBT, and say that the Ministry of Defense is unanimous in this
decision, which has been taken from a national point of view. They note that
“many Finnish people think that landmines are a very important part of the
defense policy.”[10] In
Finland, war veterans and most of Finnish society defend and support the
priorities and needs of the Defense Forces.
What no government or military official has explained is the real
practicality of relying on AP mines as border-defense against invasion when the
mines are in stockpiles rather than already
deployed.[11] Finland has no
mass-delivery systems,[12] and
would have to rely on hand-emplacement of hundreds of thousands of mines in a
country where the lake systems make travel difficult and slow. It is the view
of the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland that, if the military were to admit
that AP mines are an out-dated form of defense, they would risk discussion of
the relevance of current defense doctrine and planning; this is a discussion the
Finnish defense establishment is not ready to take up.
A member of the Finnish Parliament says that Finnish policy is double-sided.
“Finland is in a way the ‘superpower of disarmament’ but this
is when it is about the strategic weapons of other countries. When the
disarmament concerns the weapons strategically important to Finland we are not
as positive about it. It is embarrassing that we are in the same group with the
United States of America, China and Russia. We have to remember that while
planning to plant antipersonnel landmines around strategic places, these are
also where civilians are in
danger.”[13]
Finland held the presidency of the European Union in the last half of 1999.
Despite being the only European Union member not to have signed the MBT, it was
put in the position at the United Nations of delivering the EU statement in
favor of the implementation of the MBT:
The EU emphasizes the importance of full and speedy implementation of the
Ottawa Convention, including the reporting obligations and the deadlines laid
down in the Convention as to the destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined
areas and in stockpiles as well as assistance to the mine victims. Moreover,
the EU calls upon all States to combine their efforts in order to achieve the
total elimination of antipersonnel mines worldwide. In this context, the
importance of the possibility the Convention offers for States Signatories to
provisionally apply its provisions pending its entry into force should be
stressed. The EU and its Member States will actively participate in the program
of intersessional work adopted at the First Meeting of State
Parties.[14]
At the time of this statement, the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland
pointed out the irony of a country that has not even signed the MBT being able
to give a pro-treaty statement on behalf of EU countries that are signatories,
many of whom have taken key leadership roles in the Ottawa Process which
produced the MBT. Despite the strength of the EU statement, it has been
difficult for the EU to act cohesively in encouraging the signing, ratification
and implementation of the MBT when one of its member countries has not signed
the treaty.
A Finnish member of the European Parliament (MEP) said that in the EU,
Finland does not come under great pressure to join the MBT because its borders
are seen as an independent
problem.[15]
Regionally, the Finnish position has also had a negative influence. An NGO
dealing with issues in the Baltics and based in Riga, Latvia, believes that
Estonia and Latvia are following Finland’s lead on the
MBT.[16]
In the United Nations, Finland has voted for all key resolutions in favor of
banning AP mines, including Resolution 54/54B in December 1999 calling for
universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Finland also attended as an observer
the First Meeting of State Parties in May 1999; the delegation was led by the
Head of the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. Finland has also followed the intersessional work of the MBT,
attending meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts.
Finland has been a core supporter of negotiating landmine issues in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD). It would be happy to see a transfer ban
negotiated in the CD but has been careful to not take any steps or voice its
support for initiatives seen as hostile by countries that support the Ottawa
Process and MBT. Finland sees the different approaches as complementary to each
other.[17]
Finland is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW). Finland participated in the First Conference of States Parties on
Protocol II in December 1999, and submitted its Article 13 report at that
meeting.
Production
Almost all AP mines in stock are Finnish-made
mines, said to be produced between 1945 and 1981. No mines have been produced
since then.[18] From this, the
Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland concludes: “This means that the
majority of the mines in stocks are quite old, some of the oldest have been
given new fuses, or renewed in some other ways, but mainly the stock should
probably be anyway, for military technical reasons, modernized and replaced with
new mines or now after this ban process with something
else.”[19] Finland has
the capability and the know-how to produce AP mines and it is, in principle,
possible to do so as long as there is no legislation that prohibits production.
(For more detail, see Landmine MonitorReport 1999, pp. 786-787.)
Until 1981 several Finnish companies produced components for simple,
“basic” mines that the army assembled as blast-mines,
fragmentation-mines, and some Claymores; however, most of the Claymores in stock
were imported from Austria.[20]
Finland has no mine delivery systems. “APMs are mainly meant to be
delivered by hand, but there are some future delivery development plans for the
new military readiness groups. Using helicopters as a delivery system has been
researched only in a theoretical way. At the moment Finland does not have
technical equipment for delivering
APMs.”[21]
On the question of replacing and finding alternatives for AP mines, the
Defense Ministry said that it "evaluate[s] possibilities in different kinds of
research and follows with the development in other
countries."[22]
Transfer
The Defense Ministry stated in 1998 and again in
1999 that Finland does not export AP
mines.[23] However, in another
interview a Defense Ministry official said that “Finland has exported
components of mines (antitank) but never whole
APMs.”[24] Following
regulations in the CCW Amended Protocol II, which came into force in Finland in
December 1998, Finland does not transfer any AP mine production technology to
any other country.[25] All
exports and transfers of know-how or production licenses of military goods and
components are regulated under arms trade law (which now incorporates the CCW
restrictions) and must be licensed by the Ministry of
Defense.[26]
Finland has imported Claymore-type mines (model VM88) from Austria.
Stockpiling
Finland’s tradition of transparency does not
include military issues, especially if it means disclosing information on
stockpiles and other information that has to do with war plans. But at the CCW
Protocol II meeting in December 1999, Finnish delegates told the ICBL that in
the near future Finland may give information on the number of mines in
stockpiles.[27] At present,
public knowledge of AP mine stockpiles remains as described in the Landmine
Monitor Report 1999: officially numbering hundreds of thousands but less
than a million.[28]
But the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland continues to believe that
“the stated amount is in clear contradiction with statements that APMs are
an essential part of Finland's defense, and especially in consideration of
Finland's long land border and with the statement that it would be very
expensive to consider alternatives and destroy the stocks because Finland has
more landmines on average than other European
countries.”[29] Also, a
government officer, who wishes to remain unnamed, commented that the size of the
stockpile is probably bigger than reported in the Landmine Monitor Report
1999.
Finland will not destroy its mine stockpiles before it finds alternatives to
AP mines for its defense and signs the MBT. However, ratification of the CCW
Amended Protocol II has resulted in destruction of some stocks to be compliant
with the Protocol. It is not known what impact Protocol II has had on the
absolute numbers of mines, but the changes to the composition of the stockpiles
resulting from ratification are clearer. It has been necessary to destroy some
of the older AP mines (types Sakaramiina SM57 and SM61), and adapt others
(Sakaramiina SM65). The SM65 blast-mines do not meet the Amended Protocol II
requirements in terms of being detectable; Finland has decided not to add metal
to the stockpiled mines except when they are used in training, maintaining the
capacity to add the metal if the mines should be taken out from stocks for use.
When this change is made these mines will be called Sakaramiina
65-98.[30] One official said
that they "started to destroy old blast mines already before the end of last
year (1998) and they are already all
destroyed."[31] Some antitank
mines (Pohjamiina PM76) have also been destroyed. The old mines have been
destroyed in Lapland or they have been recycled; for example, all the copper has
been collected for
reuse.[32]
As in other countries, the Finnish Ministry of Defense has renamed its
Claymore mines as directional fragmentation “charges” or
“explosives” as of 3 December 1998. But the Defense Staff has also
stated it will not use the weapon by tripwire-activation: “Finland has
changed and classified all Claymore mines as weapons and they are
command-detonated only.”[33] The name has changed and the policy is to use them only in
command-detonated mode, but no modifications of the weapon have been made:
“[I]t is still possible to trigger them by
tripwires.”[34]
Use
Antipersonnel landmines remain an essential part
of Finnish defense doctrine, and Finland reserves the right to use them and
other weapons that might function as AP mines. But the mines are in stocks and
there are no minefields in peacetime in
Finland.[35]
Finland has reported that it also reserves the right to use explosive booby
traps in population centers under certain conditions. In its Article 13 report
for Amended Protocol II, Finland states: “Use of booby traps is forbidden
in population centers where civilians are still present and fighting has not yet
escalated or it is not expected immediately, except situations where the center
is connected to a military installation or in close proximity. Booby traps may
be used in population centers if dangerous areas are guarded, fenced and
properly signed.”[36]
Mine Action Funding
Since the early 1990s Finland has supported mine
action programs with FIM 103 million (US$16.7 million) in Afghanistan, Angola,
Bosnia, Cambodia, Laos and
Mozambique.[37] The Finnish
contribution includes cash contributions, personnel and in-kind assistance.
For the period 1998-2001 Finland has allocated FIM 120 million (US$19.5
million) for mine action as detailed
below.[38] In connection with
this decision Finland established in June 1998 a Stand-by Unit for Humanitarian
Demining, which consists of twenty to thirty people to be deployed according to
operational needs in assisting demining programs. The Unit has the capacity to
train local deminers and carry out mine awareness training, and includes a
mechanical mine clearance capacity. One expert of the Stand-by Unit
participates in the Western European Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM), which
was deployed in May 1999 to train mine clearance specialists and instructors in
Croatia.
In 1998 a mechanical mine clearance project was also started, in Cambodia,
which involved a six-man team (Finn Flail Team), two Finnish RA-140 DS mine
clearance vehicles and one XA-180 command and control vehicle. These projects
are provided with full support and service packages (vehicles, maintenance,
spare parts, personnel costs). In 1999 mechanical mine clearance teams were
also deployed in Mozambique and Kosovo. The mechanical mine clearance project
in Kosovo is the newest project funded from Finland’s humanitarian aid
budget, at a cost of FIM 18 million (US$3 million) for the first two years.
There are two RA-140 DS (Raisu) clearance vehicles and six persons in the area
of Pejen (Pec) and Deqanin in west Kosovo, clearing or investigating suspected
mined rural fields. This project is carried out in cooperation with Norwegian
People's Aid (NPA).[39] Finland
also supports mine action programs of Finnish nongovernmental organizations,
including the Finnish Red Cross and Finn Church Aid. Finland and South Africa
started cooperating on mine action by signing a Memorandum of Understanding in
Helsinki on 15 March 1999 during the visit of President Nelson Mandela. Within
this framework Finland and South Africa will cooperate on mine clearance, mine
awareness, mine information and victim assistance in southern Africa.
In 1999, the following mine action projects were funded by
Finland:[40]
[1] Council of State, Report to the
Parliament, 17 March 1997. [2] Press
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 352, 16 December 1997;
Jalkaväkimiina -työryhmän raportti (report of the APM-working
group), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 December
1997. [3] Report of the Permanent
Mission of Finland to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2
December 1999, p. 2. [4] Interview with
Counselor Timo Kantola, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March
2000. [5]
Ibid. [6] Interview with Col. Yrjö
Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 2 March
2000. [7]
Ibid. [8]
Ibid. [9] Telephone interview with
Commander GS Henrik Nysten, Ministry of Defense, 4 May
2000. [10] Interview with Col. Kukko,
Ministry of Defense, 2 March 2000. [11]
Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p.
3. [12] Telephone interview with
Commander GS Henrik Nysten, Ministry of Defense, 4 May
2000. [13] Interview with
Parliamentarian Kimmo Kiljunen, Social Democratic Party, 6 April
2000. [14] Statement of Finland on
behalf of the EU to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, New
York, 11 October 1999. [15] Interview
with MEP Heidi Hautala, President of the Green Group in the European Parliament,
31 March 2000. [16] Statement by Dr.
Igors Tipans, Baltic International Center for Human Education, at ICBL seminar
in Brussels, 31 January 2000. [17]
Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p.
2. [18] Interview with Lt. Col. Jaakko
Martikainen, Defence Staff, 5 February 1999; Report to the OSCE, 2 December
1999, p. 3. [19] Laura Lodenius,
Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, 31 January
1999. [20] Telephone interview with Col.
Arto Mikkonen, Defense Staff, 18 February
1999. [21] Telephone interview with
Commander Nysten, 4 May 2000. [22]
Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 12 February
1999. [23] Telephone interview with
Senior Governmental Secretary Jari Takanen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February
1999; Press Release, Defense Force, No. 200, 2 December
1998. [24] Telephone interview with Lt.
Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 12 February
1999. [25] Telephone interview with Lt.
Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 5 February
1999. [26] Telephone interview with
Senior Governmental Secretary Jari Takanen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February
1999. [27] Laura Lodenius, Coordinator,
Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, reported after the CCW First Conference of
States Parties, Geneva, December
1999. [28] Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
p. 789-790. [29] Laura Lodenius,
Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, 31 January
1999. [30] Press Release, Defense Staff,
3 December 1998. See also, Finland’s National Report required by CCW
Amended Protocol II, Article 13, dated 11 November
1999. [31] Telephone interview with L.
Col. Heikki Backstrom, Ministry of Defense, 22 February
1999. [32]
Ibid. [33] Telephone interviews with Lt.
Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense and Lt. Col. Martikainen, Defense Staff, 5
February 1999; and Press Release, Defense Force, Press Release 200, 2 December
1998. [34] Telephone interview with Col.
Mikkonen, Defense Staff, 18 February
1999. [35] Statement of Brigadier
General Kari Rimpi, Defense Staff, Press Release, 2 December
1998. [36] Finland’s Article 13
Report, Amended Protocol II, dated 11 November
1999. [37] Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
p. 790-791; further details are available from the Campaign to Ban Landmines in
Finland. [38] Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka
Similä, First Secretary, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Department for
International Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2000; Report
to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3. [39]
Press release, Department for International Development Cooperation, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, 17 April 2000. [40]
Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka Similä, First Secretary, Unit for Humanitarian
Assistance, Department for International Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, 19 April 2000; Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3; the country
totals do not tally with the total for each funding year due to fluctuation in
the exchange rate during this
period. [41] Abbreviations: UNOCHA - UN
Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, WEUDAM - Western Union Demining
Assistance Mission; UNDP - UN Development Program; NPA - Norwegian
People’s Aid; UNMAS - UN Mine Action Service; HI - Handicap International;
MAG - Mines Advisory Group; ADP – Accelerated Demining Program; ICRC -
International Committee of the Red
Cross. [42] Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka
Simila, 19 April 2000.
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