+   *    +     +     
About Us 
The Issues 
Our Research Products 
Order Publications 
Press Room 
Resources for Monitor Researchers 
Table of Contents
Country Reports
GERMANY, Landmine Monitor Report 2000
LM Report 2000 Full Report   Executive Summary   Key Findings   Key Developments   Translated Country Reports


Key developments since March 1999: In 1999, Germany contributed about US$18.1 million to humanitarian mine action programs, including its share of EU mine action spending. Germany served as the co-rapporteur for the SCE on Technologies for Mine Action.

Mine Ban Policy

Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in Ottawa on 3 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 July 1998. Domestic implementation legislation was enacted on 9 July 1998. Germany was an early supporter of a ban on AP mines. It adopted an export moratorium in 1994, banned use of the weapon in 1996, and completed destruction of its stockpile in December 1997.

Germany participated in the First Meeting of State Parties to the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999, where the State Minister of the German Foreign Office Dr. Ludger Volmer spoke on behalf of the presidency of the European Union (EU). In his statement, he reconfirmed the commitment of the European Union to the goal of the total elimination of antipersonnel mines.[1] It has served as co-rapporteur (with Yemen) of the MBT’s intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Technologies for Mine Action; it has also participated in all the meetings of the other four SCEs in 1999 and 2000. In December 1999, it voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization and full implementation of the MBT, as it had with the previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.

The government submitted its first MBT Article 7 report on 31 August 1999, followed by the second report on 30 April 2000.[2]

On 12 April 2000, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs submitted its 1999 report on disarmament to Parliament in which it outlined the government’s clear steps toward the prohibition of AP mines and reconfirmed its commitment to the disarmament as well as the humanitarian obligations of the MBT. [3] The report states that Germany “regrets the absence of important states like China, Russia and the USA. Their joining would be very important for the desirable universalization of the Ottawa Convention.”[4]

With respect to the issue of joint military operations with a non-signatory to the MBT who uses AP mines, German legislation definitively forbids under any circumstance involvement in AP mine-laying operations whether in Germany or elsewhere.[5] While the government does not want to interfere in the military strategy of another state, it must ensure that German soldiers do not violate the law. The Ministry of Defense says, “[A]s far as joint and combined operations are concerned German soldiers will be in full compliance with the Ottawa Convention and national laws.”[6] How German soldiers would avoid violations if a non-MBT ally were to use AP mines in joint operations has not been explained.

Germany is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and ratified the Amended Protocol II on 2 May 1997. It participated in the May 1999 preparatory meeting for the Conference on Protocol II, submitted its report as required under Article 13 and participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Protocol II in December 1999. The German Initiative to Ban Landmines (GIBL) took particular note of the government’s position in the CCW on AT mines, since this international forum deals also with antitank (antivehicle) mines which cause in the view of the GIBL a similar humanitarian impact to antipersonnel mines. As the German delegation to the Conference stated: "[A] special value of the Amended Protocol II, in our view, is that it addresses problems of weapons not covered by the Ottawa Convention, in particular anti-vehicle mines."[7] Germany called for technical restrictions in order "to minimize the dangers resulting from long-lived or non-detectable mines."[8] The GIBL considers it doubtful that technical restrictions can significantly reduce the effects of antitank mines on civilians.[9]

The German government has also consistently stated that any developments on the AP mine issue in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) must not “fall behind the achievements of the Ottawa Convention” and that it views the Mine Ban Treaty as “the comprehensive legal instrument on the subject of anti-personnel mines which should gain universal acceptance. The CD could contribute to this objective by negotiating solutions to specific areas....”[10]


As reported in the Landmine MonitorReport 1999, Germany no longer produces AP mines.[11] Germany continues to produce and to develop antitank mines[12] and other mine related technology.[13] The government, in a report to Parliament, argues that AT mines enable the military to reduce its personnel costs. It declares that the threat of these mines to civilians is reduced by self-neutralization mechanisms, which are designed to deactivate the mines after a certain time (at the longest, after forty days). [14] However, in the view of the GIBL, since the self-neutralization mechanisms are not one hundred percent reliable, the threat of AT mines to civilians remains.[15]

The ICBL, GIBL, and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have expressed concerns about antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that might function like AP mines -- explode from the unintentional act of a person -- and therefore are banned under the MBT. In its argument for AT mines, the government makes no mention of these particular mines. The GIBL has identified the following mines as those which may be in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty or Amended Protocol II: AT1 because of its built-in antihandling/antidisturbance device; DM1233/AT2 because of its built-in antihandling/antidisturbance device and magnetic fuze; DM-12/PARM-1 because of its built-in breakwire sensor; DM-21 because of its built-in tilt rod; DM 31/FFV 028 SD and MIFF because of their built-in antihandling/antidisturbance-device and magnetic fuze; MUSPA, PM-60/K-1 (ex-GDR), TM-62P3 (ex-GDR) because of their built-in antihandling/antidisturbance-device; COBRA because of its built-in antihandling/antidisturbance device and its penetration warhead; SMART155(AM) because of its fragmentation warhead.[16]

Member organizations of the GIBL published an open letter to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder detailing these concerns,[17] which was widely taken up by the media.[18] The Ministry of Defense responded to assure that the government adheres to the MBT and disputed that the MUSPA targets people, stating that it is not a prohibited weapon.[19] It is interesting to note, however, that in its recent Article 7 report, Italy lists the MUSPA (and the MIFF) as AP mines or weapons that can function like an AP mine.[20]

In November 1999, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that it planned to export 36,000 AT-2 antitank mines to Greece.[21] The AT-2 is an antivehicle mine of concern because of its antihandling features, which might make it act as an AP mine. The government takes the view that the AT-2 mine cannot be detonated by the unintentional act of a person.[22]

Stockpiling and Destruction

Germany states that in December 1997 the destruction of all AP mines of the German Armed Forces including those of the former German Democratic Republic was completed, with the exception of approximately 3,000 AP mines retained for training and technical tests, as permitted under the MBT.[23] In May 2000, the Ministry of Defense clarified that the DM 39, a weapon that seems to be able to serve as either an antihandling device or as an AP mine, is no longer in use, and destruction of stocks should be finished within the year 2000.[24]

While there is no clear requirement under the MBT to report on stockpiles destroyed before entry into force of the treaty, it would be desirable, in the interests of full transparency, for Germany to report on the dismantling methods and types and quantities of AP mines destroyed, as well as information on the conversion of former AP mine production facilities (especially facilities of the Former German Democratic Republic).[25]

The United States has more than 112,000 AP mines stockpiled in Germany, according to Human Rights Watch, including approximately 75,000 U.S. Army ADAM, 16,000 Army GEMSS, 14,000 Air Force Gator, 6,000 Volcano and 1,000 MOPMS AP mines.[26] Germany’s Article 7 reports fail to mention stockpiles of U.S. AP mines in Germany. The government’s position is that under the Status on Foreign Forces Agreement, weapons of foreign forces within Germany are not under German jurisdiction or control,[27] and thus Germany is not obligated to destroy those mines, or to request the U.S. to remove them. This understanding was reiterated by representatives of the Ministry of Defense in March 2000.[28] This position accords with the Memorandum of Understanding issued in January 1998, at the time of Germany’s ratification of the MBT.[29]


In 1994 the government declared a unilateral export moratorium on AP mines, which was prolonged indefinitely in 1996 and then superceded with the total ban under the MBT.[30]

On the related issue of transit – movement of a foreign force’s AP mines across the territory of a state party -- the government has said, "According to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), storage and transport of APM for the purpose of stationed forces is legally permitted, as these weapons do not come under German sovereignty or control."[31]

Mine Action Funding[32]

At the FMSP in May 1999, the State Minister, in speaking on behalf of the presidency of the European Union (EU), highlighted three main points regarding mine action. First, he stressed that "in 1998, total funding by the European Commission and Member States in landmine-related activities amounted to approximately US$95 million," making the EU "the world's major donor in these areas." Second, he emphasized that "the EU will focus its efforts on State Parties, and on signatories who fully observe in practice the principles and objectives laid down in the Convention." Third was the principle that "mine clearance cannot be disconnected from the general development strategy of a state. This raises automatically the questions, which area should be cleared at first, and what should happen with it afterwards.” [33]

The GIBL points out that efforts to concretely describe the relationship between mine clearance and development have primarily come from the NGO community. The fundamental principle is that humanitarian mine action and development require the combination of mine clearance, mine awareness, and mine victim rehabilitation with reconstruction, reconciliation, and peacekeeping/building activities, as laid out comprehensively in NGO-developed guidelines known as the “Bad Honnef Framework.”[34] The GIBL continues to press the government to make all of its funding decisions in such a framework.

In 1999, Germany contributed DM 21.7 million (US$11.4 million) to humanitarian mine action programs, plus another $6.7 million as its share of EU mine action spending. The GIBL commends the German government for its continued spending in this area, even if this was not an increase from the level of 1998.[35]

From 1993-1999, German contributions to humanitarian mine action totaled DM 108 million ($57 million). Programs are funded primarily by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent DM 19.67 million ($10.35 million) on mine action programs, as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1. Funding of humanitarian mine action by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999[36]




Support of mine clearance projects of NGO Menschen gegen Minen in Bengo Province; support of mine clearance projects of the NGO Stiftung Sankt Barbara in Cunene Province
Delivery of mine detectors
Delivery of mine detectors
Support of the UN assessment mission
Provision of a German technical advisor, physician and equipment for national mine clearance agency CND; support of a mine clearance project of NGO Phoenix; support for testing of airborne multisensor mine detector
Support of an level II-survey
Support of UN emergency aid program; support of Afghan NGO Mine Dog Center for education and use of mine tracker dogs; support through experts, provision of 75 detection tools to UNOCHA; support of “Female & Children Mine Awareness’” program and mechanical mine clearance program of Afghan NGO OMAR
Provision of detection tools for increase national mine clearance capacity
Provision of personnel to UN mine clearance program
Support of mine clearance project of NGO Solidaritätsdienst International within resettlement program; support of NGO Potsdam Kommunikation for UXO survey in Hue Province
Support of a project to clear mines and UXOs (with German supervisor of Laos demining teams)
Support of mine clearance project in Siem Reap Province; field testing and operation of Rhino mine clearance technology with Cambodia Mine Action Center
Support of mine/UXO clearance project of HELP; support of UXO clearance project of Potsdam Kommunikation; support of UXO clearance project of Halo Trust; provision of German military experts to MACC; support of the mine awareness project of Handicap International
Provision of DM 1.2 million to Slovenia’s International Trust Fund (ITF) for continuation of projects in 2000
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Support of mine clearance project of HELP in the frame of reconstruction of Stup and Filipovic villages; support of mine clearance project of NGO Köln Franziskaner in the frame of the reconstruction of Kosici village; provision of military mine clearance experts to BHMAC in Banja Luka; support of clearance project of Entity Army through provision of tools and aid for the mine victim fund; integrated mine clearance project of NGO Weltentminungsdienst in Vidovice region
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Provision of DM 0.8 million to the ITF for continuation of projects in 2000
Provision of detection tools to CROMAC; provision of military mine clearance experts to WEU mission; support of mine clearance project of Weltentminungsdienst within reconstruction of Pakrac village

73,905,797 ($38,897,788). The GIBL finds that of this amount only about 8.4% (DM 6.2 million/$3.25 million) went to mine clearance related to development measures, while approximately 89% (DM 65.6 million/$45.5 million) was allocated specifically for mine clearance/mine awareness activities.

Of the DM 73.9 million, 13 % (DM 9.75 million or $5.13 million) was allocated mainly to field-test mine clearance technology in Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Cambodia.[37] In 1999 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent DM 2.55 million ($1.34 million) on a field-test of the Rhino mine clearance machine developed by MAK; this expenditure represents thirteen percent of the 1999 budget for humanitarian mine clearance. The Bad Honnef framework acknowledges the necessity of research and development in mine clearance technology, but stresses that this should “be based on end-user requirements and existing technologies.” The GIBL believes it is doubtful if the technologies promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meet these requirements. An example is the Minebreaker 2000, which has been widely criticized as too costly and inappropriate for many mine affected countries.[38]

Germany contributed DM 129 million ($67.89 million) to the European Commission between 1992-1999, which allocated a total of approximately $236 million to humanitarian mine action in that period.[39]

Mine victim assistance and rehabilitation is the responsibility of the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. In the period 1993-99 a total of DM 34.2 million (around $18 million) was allocated to mine clearance/mine awareness or victim assistance activities (see Table 2) and, in 1999 a total of DM 2.03 million ($1.05 million).[40] The Ministry finances mine-related activities only if they can be integrated as part of broader development projects.[41] The GIBL points out that this is an obstacle for mine action programs applying for funding if those programs are not in countries where Germany runs development projects, but it does ensure that all mine-related activities funded by the German Development Department are part of a broader development strategy – at least theoretically.

Most of these activities are actually implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ – German Company for Technical Co-operation) which follows the policies set out in its program handbook Development-oriented Emergency Aid - Integrated Demining. This handbook describes in detail mine clearance activities which involve mine-affected communities in the demining, but development measures like medical and social rehabilitation are supported only for activities such as collection of data on mine victims, and recommendations.[42] The title - Emergency Aid - indicates that these programs are carried out in emergency situations, so longer-term development measures are left to follow-up programs, which are not part of GTZ mine action.

Table 2. Funding of development-oriented emergency aid (integrated demining) by the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development 1993-99[43]

Total of Funding in the Period 1993-1999
US$ equivalent

Description of assistance
Resources in DM for mine clearance
Resources in DM for victim assistance
1994 – 2000
Technical cooperation/ survivor assistance for physical therapy and rehabilitation center in Luanda
1996 & 1998
Emergency aid/ survivor assistance for rehabilitation center in Luena/Moxico
Not specified
Technical and financial cooperation/ mine clearance: especially for reconstruction of national roads
Not specified
Emergency Aid: rural reconstruction program in Manica and Sofala provinces
Not specified
Community mine awareness
1996 & 1997
Technical and financial cooperation/ mine clearance: e.g. extension of rural paths
1993 & 1997
Technical and financial cooperation/ survivor assistance
1995 – 1997
Financing cooperation/ survivor assistance: reconstruction of the national road, clearing UXO, training demining personnel
1993 – 2000
Technical cooperation / survivor assistance: Center for Orthopedics





Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Yemen, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development is not present in these areas to tackle mine-related development problems. In Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam both ministries funded or still fund mine-related activities, but there is no coordination between them and no link between mine clearance operations funded by the Foreign Ministry and rehabilitation or reconstruction activities funded by the Development Ministry, at least as far as the GIBL could determine.

This lack of coordination, coupled with a strict division of support for mine clearance and development issues, results in funds not being readily available for those trying to turn the concept of an integrated approach into programmatic reality.[44] Different policy priorities, application formats, as well as reporting requirements make it nearly impossible to respond to the mine problem in a comprehensive way. Coordinated, long-term funding commitments are key to making a reality of development-oriented mine action.

NGO activities

There are many NGO initiatives to assist mine victims.[45] Their activities range from mine clearance and mine awareness projects to emergency aid, to physical, psychological and socio-economic rehabilitation of mine victims, their families and communities, in line with the Bad Honnef framework. Member organizations of the GIBL spent approximately DM 20.74 million ($10.91 million) on mine-related activities from 1995-1999.[46] (See Table 3.) Sixty-five percent of these funds were allocated to victim assistance embedded in socio-economic rehabilitation measures or in development/ food/ reconstruction/ resettlement/ peacekeeping activities or in integrated mine action programs which cover mine clearance, mine awareness, physical and psychosocial rehabilitation, socio-economic and cultural rehabilitation as well as political advocacy.[47]

Table 3. NGO Funding of humanitarian mine action 1995-1999[48]

Total amount in DM
Mine clearance & mine awareness activities
Victim assistance (medical treatment, physical rehabilitation)
Victim assistance (psychological + socio-economic rehabilitation)
Victim assistance and development/food/
reconstruction/resettlement/peace-keeping activities
Victim assistance (support of political advocacy)
In percentage
Integrated Mine Action Program (mine clearance, mine awareness, physical & psycho-social rehabilitation, socio-economic and cultural rehabilitation, political advocacy)

The GIBL is encouraged to see that some of these integrated programs are co-financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, yet the programs exist in the absence of a long-term funding commitment by the donors.

At the same time, it is of concern to the GIBL that the efforts to carry out integrated mine action programs decreased last year to twenty-five percent of the total spent on humanitarian mine action, while in 1998 it represented forty-seven percent. It is difficult to identify the reason for this decrease; it might be that the project departments of the NGOs involved are not aware enough of the integrated approach, or that the donor side restricts support to limited activities.

Landmine Problem and Mine Victims

On 5 December 1995, the German government announced that all mine-affected areas on the old east-west divide had been cleared and the last zone, near the Bavarian town of Hof, reopened to the public.[49] However incidents still do occasionally occur. On 16 March 2000, while walking two people found a strange little black box in the ground at the former frontier. As they were kicking it, one of them remembered the lessons he learned in the Army and realized this could be a landmine, which it was.[50] Twenty years after the military of the former German Democratic Republic demined the frontier, probably one of the best recorded minefields in the world, and ten years after private companies undertook a second mine clearance operation in this area,[51] this AP mine still remained in the ground.

German soldiers on peacekeeping operations are also at risk. On 22 September 1999 five German soldiers, part of the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping forces, went into a minefield near the Albanian border. Three of them sustained minor injuries while two of them were seriously injured.[52] According to one report, several German soldiers of the KFOR peacekeeping forces have been killed or injured by landmines since the KFOR operation started in Kosovo/Yugoslavia.[53]


[1] Intervention by State Minister Dr. Ludger Volmer, German Foreign Office, On behalf of the Presidency of the European Union, delivered at the First Meeting of State Parties to the MBT, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; see also, “Europa bleibt treibende Kraft im Ottawa-Prozeß” (“Europe remains a driving force within the Ottawa-process”), press release 4 May 1999, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de.
[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 31 August 1999, covering 1 March 1999-27 August 1999; MBT, Article 7 Report, submitted 30 April 2000, covering 1 January 1999-31 December 1999, available at: http://domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf.
[3] Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp. 17 ff.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I (Federal Law Gazette, Part I), No. 43, 9 July 1998, p. 1778.
[6] Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000.
[7] Statement by the German delegation to the First Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 15-17 December 1999.
[8] Ibid.
[9] For examples of the impact of AT mines see Thomas Küchenmeister, “Antipersonnel Effects of Antivehicle Mines – Why Antivehicle Mines should also be Banned,” German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Berlin, January 2000, available at: http://www.landmine.de.
[10] Reports of the Permanent Delegation of the German Federal Republic to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 25 January and 13 December 1999.
[11] For past production, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 611-613.
[12] “Antivehicle” mine and “antitank” mine are used interchangeably in this report. For past production of antitank mines, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 614-618. In last year’s Landmine Monitor, it was reported that the high-tech COBRA area-denial mine was under development, but on 9 March 2000, officials of the Ministry of Defense said that funds for its development had been suspended; it is not known what the reason is for the suspension or if such “suspension” is permanent.
[13] For information on the concerns of the GIBL regarding this production, in particular mine-related patents held by German companies, see the longer version of this report, available at: http://www.landmine.de.
[14] Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/667, http://www.bundestag.de: "The main task of our armed forces remains the national and alliance defense. Especially in times of decreasing troop strength the Federal Armed Forces need technical aids in order to fulfill their mission. Anti-Tank-Mines belong to those technical aids."
[15] Rae McGrath, Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance - A Resource Book, (London: Sterling, 2000), p. 11. McGrath refers to off-the-record statements of producers and military which estimate the failure rate of correctly deployed self-neutralizing landmines at around ten percent.
[16] See GIBL website at: http://www.landmine.de The ICRC and other members of the ICBL, such as Human Rights Watch, have also developed lists of antivehicle mines of concern. Variations in such lists point to the need for States Parties to clarify the status of such mines.
[17] German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Open Letter to the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Berlin, 11 November 1999.
[18] For example: Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 November 1999; die tageszeitung, 22 November 1999; AFP Agence France-Presse, 22 November 1999; Berliner Morgenpost, 22 November 1999; Sindelfinger Zeitung, 22 November 1999; Berliner Zeitung, 22 November 1999.
[19] die tageszeitung, 22 November 1999; Sindelfinger Zeitung, 22 November 1999.
[20] Italy, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 29 March 2000, Annex B-1.
[21] Associated Press, 3 November 1999, die tageszeitung, 4 November 1999. The GIBL had begun looking into this export, which was widely reported in the German media: die tageszeitung, 3 November 1999, Associated Press, 3 November 1999, Handelsblatt, 3 November 1999, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 November 1999, Südwest Presse, 4 November 1999, Rhein-Zeitung, 4 November 1999, Berliner Zeitung, 4 November 1999, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 November, Freitag, 5 November 1999.
[22] Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 10 February 2000.
[23] Article 7 Reports, Form D, submitted 31 August 1999 and 30 April 2000. Also, interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9 March 2000; Report to the OSCE, 13 December 1999; Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000. Quantities of AP mines destroyed were reported in the Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 620-621. One source has said there is some evidence that some mines, reported as destroyed, had been transferred to other countries prior to the destruction of stocks. Thomas Küchenmeister and Otfried Nassauer, "Gute Mine" zum bösen Spiel: Landminen made in Germany (Idstein: Komzi-Verlag, 1995), p. 119.
[24] Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000. The U.S. Defense Department describes the DM 39 as an antipersonnel mine which is “intended for emplacement under an antitank mine. Its pressure release fuze, with clockwork-regulated arming delay, allows this mine to be used directly in its antilift role safely and without modification” (Mine Facts, Department of Defense, CD-ROM database, undated). The German Ministry of Defense had taken the view that the DM 39 is not an AP mine, rather an explosive charge with a pressure release fuze.
[25] For instance it was reported in the press that the Spreewerk former munitions production factory in Lübben in the German Democratic Republic was converted into a munitions dismantling works. “Im Spreewerk werden 300.000 Landminen zu einem Haufen Asche” (Spreewerk destroys 300,000 landmines into ashes), Die Welt, 8 February 2000.
[26] Data as of 1997. Provided to Human Rights Watch by U.S. government sources in March 1999.
[27] “Tretminen –Verbotene Lagerung” (Pedal Mines – Prohibited Stockpiling), Spiegel, 21, 1998, p. 20: “‘According to the Agreement on the stay of foreign forces and Nato’s Status on foreign Forces Agreement weapons of foreign forces and their stockpiling does not fall under German control,’ argues the spokesperson of the German Ministry of Defense.” Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 2 December 1997: “Wie alle andern Waffen unterliegen auch die US Landminen aufgrund obiger Bestimmungen nicht der Kontrolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” ("Due to regulations mentioned above [SOFA] US landmines like all other weapons do not fall under control of the Federal Republic of Germany."
[28] Interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9 March 2000.
[29] For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 608-609.
[30] For past export, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 618-620.
[31] Letter from the German Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 26 June 2000. Also, interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9 March 2000.
[32] The exchange rate used throughout this report is US$1 = DM 1.9.
[33] Intervention by State Minister Dr. Ludger Volmer, FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; see also, press release 4 May 1999.
[34] In 1997 at a conference held in Bad Honnef, Germany, international experts, those involved in program work in the field, and mine campaigners gathered to develop guidelines for mine action programs from a development-oriented point of view, which became known as the “Bad Honnef Framework.” This was further refined in a second conference held in 1999. See “Mine Action Programs From a Development-Oriented Point of View” (“The Bad Honnef Framework”), the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Revised Version, 1999, available at: http://www.landmine.de. The Bad Honnef Framework is also available in Arabic, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Chinese and Russian. Please contact the GIBL (email: gibl.haake@t-online.de).
[35] For details of German spending on mine action pre-1999, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 621-624, also a longer version of the report on Germany in 1999, available at: http://www.landmine.de.
[36] Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp. 63-65.
[37] Roughly half of this amount (DM 4.88 million, or US$2.57 million) went to companies related to landmine producers--former AP and/or current AT mine producers. It is not possible to specify the exact amount spent on the test trials, because these trials were combined with other activities. Letters from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 22 November 1995, 17 September 1997, 2 February 1999, 3 December 1999; Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp. 63-65.
[38] See, http://www.landmine.de. See also, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 624.
[39] Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p. 19.
[40] Source: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp.18 and 66. The figures in this document are inconsistent: the text indicates a total of DM 21.7 million for both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1999 (which means a total of DM 2.03 million allocated by the Development Department if one subtracts the 1999 total funding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DM 19.67 million), while the Table in the appendix indicates a total of 1999 funding of the Development Department of around DM 2.6 million.
[41] Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p. 18.
[42] Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Enwicklungsorientierte Nothilfe – Integrierte Entminung, Arbeitspapier (Development-oriented Emergency Aid – Integrated Demining, working paper) No. 7, undated, p. 10.
[43] German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 14 April 2000; Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p. 66.
[44] For a discussion of such a program, see Thomas Gebauer, medico international, “Integrated Mine Action Programmes – The Example of the Rehabilitation Centre in Moxico/Angola,” unpublished lecture presented at the Bad Honnef Framework Roundtable, London, 1 March 2000.
[45] These NGO initiatives are too numerous and diverse to describe here; many are small mine-related projects or programs. This report concentrates on the activities of GIBL member organizations: Bread for the World, Christoffel Mission for the Blind, German Justitia et Pax Commission, German Committee for Freedom from Hunger, German Caritas, Social Service Agency of the Evangelical Church in Germany, EIRENE International, Handicap International Germany, Jesuit Refugee Service, Kindernothilfe (Help for Children in Need), medico international, Misereor, OXFAM Germany, Pax Christi, Solidarity Service International, terre des hommes, UNICEF Germany. Projects of the German NGO Help e.V. and Weltentminungsdienst e.V. (World Demining Service) are not considered; they run bigger mine clearance/mine awareness projects partly with reconstruction/resettlement components in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo; see: http://www.help-ev.de/projecte/, http://www.welt-entminungs-hilfe.de/proj.html.
[46] Some of these programs are cofinanced by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Co-operation and Development; their contributions are subtracted from the total in order to show the NGO contribution. Sources: Misereor questionnaire to GIBL member organizations 1995-1998, email from Hein Winnubst, Aachen, 25 November 1999; GIBL questionnaire to member organizations 1999, Markus Haake, Berlin, June 2000.
[47] Nineteen percent of the total was spent on restricted mine clearance and mine awareness programs. Twelve percent of the funds went to restricted victim assistance programs, concentrated on medical treatment and physical rehabilitation of individual mine victims. Five percent of the funds was spent on advocacy work.
[48] Misereor questionnaire to the member organization of the GIBL, 1995-1998, email from Hein Winnubst, Aachen 25 November 1999; GIBL questionnaire 1999 to the member organization of the GIBL, Markus Haake (GIBL), Berlin June 2000.
[49] Press Release, Federal Ministry of Defense, 5 December 1995. For more information, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 624-625.
[50] “Unscheinbar versteckt im Boden” (Inconspicuously hidden in the ground), Volksblatt-Mellrichstadt, 18 March 2000, http://www.volksblatt-wuerzburg.de
[51] As reported in the longer version of the Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for Germany, available at: http://www.landmine.de; see also: Bundesdrucksache (German Parliament Document) 13/1023, p. 1, http://dip.bundestag.de.
[52] Reuters, 23 September 1999, Associated Press, 23 September 1999, Spiegel-online, 23 September 1999.
[53] Spiegel-online, 23 September 1999.