Key developments
since March 1999: In 1999, Germany contributed about US$18.1 million to
humanitarian mine action programs, including its share of EU mine action
spending. Germany served as the co-rapporteur for the SCE on Technologies for
Mine Action.
Mine Ban Policy
Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in Ottawa on 3 December 1997 and
deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 July 1998. Domestic
implementation legislation was enacted on 9 July 1998. Germany was an early
supporter of a ban on AP mines. It adopted an export moratorium in 1994, banned
use of the weapon in 1996, and completed destruction of its stockpile in
December 1997.
Germany participated in the First Meeting of State Parties to the MBT in
Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999, where the State Minister of the German Foreign
Office Dr. Ludger Volmer spoke on behalf of the presidency of the European Union
(EU). In his statement, he reconfirmed the commitment of the European Union to
the goal of the total elimination of antipersonnel
mines.[1] It has served as
co-rapporteur (with Yemen) of the MBT’s intersessional Standing Committee
of Experts on Technologies for Mine Action; it has also participated in all the
meetings of the other four SCEs in 1999 and 2000. In December 1999, it voted in
favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization and
full implementation of the MBT, as it had with the previous pro-ban UNGA
resolutions.
The government submitted its first MBT Article 7 report on 31 August 1999,
followed by the second report on 30 April
2000.[2]
On 12 April 2000, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs submitted its 1999 report
on disarmament to Parliament in which it outlined the government’s clear
steps toward the prohibition of AP mines and reconfirmed its commitment to the
disarmament as well as the humanitarian obligations of the MBT.[3] The report states that Germany
“regrets the absence of important states like China, Russia and the USA.
Their joining would be very important for the desirable universalization of the
Ottawa Convention.”[4]
With respect to the issue of joint military operations with a non-signatory
to the MBT who uses AP mines, German legislation definitively forbids under any
circumstance involvement in AP mine-laying operations whether in Germany or
elsewhere.[5] While the
government does not want to interfere in the military strategy of another state,
it must ensure that German soldiers do not violate the law. The Ministry of
Defense says, “[A]s far as joint and combined operations are concerned
German soldiers will be in full compliance with the Ottawa Convention and
national laws.”[6] How
German soldiers would avoid violations if a non-MBT ally were to use AP mines in
joint operations has not been explained.
Germany is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and
ratified the Amended Protocol II on 2 May 1997. It participated in the May 1999
preparatory meeting for the Conference on Protocol II, submitted its report as
required under Article 13 and participated in the First Annual Conference of
States Parties to Protocol II in December 1999. The German Initiative to Ban
Landmines (GIBL) took particular note of the government’s position in the
CCW on AT mines, since this international forum deals also with antitank
(antivehicle) mines which cause in the view of the GIBL a similar humanitarian
impact to antipersonnel mines. As the German delegation to the Conference
stated: "[A] special value of the Amended Protocol II, in our view, is that it
addresses problems of weapons not covered by the Ottawa Convention, in
particular anti-vehicle
mines."[7] Germany called for
technical restrictions in order "to minimize the dangers resulting from
long-lived or non-detectable
mines."[8] The GIBL considers
it doubtful that technical restrictions can significantly reduce the effects of
antitank mines on
civilians.[9]
The German government has also consistently stated that any developments on
the AP mine issue in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) must not “fall
behind the achievements of the Ottawa Convention” and that it views the
Mine Ban Treaty as “the comprehensive legal instrument on the subject of
anti-personnel mines which should gain universal acceptance. The CD could
contribute to this objective by negotiating solutions to specific
areas....”[10]
Production
As reported in the Landmine MonitorReport
1999, Germany no longer produces AP
mines.[11] Germany continues to
produce and to develop antitank
mines[12] and other mine related
technology.[13] The government,
in a report to Parliament, argues that AT mines enable the military to reduce
its personnel costs. It declares that the threat of these mines to civilians is
reduced by self-neutralization mechanisms, which are designed to deactivate the
mines after a certain time (at the longest, after forty days).[14] However, in the view of the
GIBL, since the self-neutralization mechanisms are not one hundred percent
reliable, the threat of AT mines to civilians
remains.[15]
The ICBL, GIBL, and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have
expressed concerns about antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or
sensitive fuzes that might function like AP mines -- explode from the
unintentional act of a person -- and therefore are banned under the MBT. In its
argument for AT mines, the government makes no mention of these particular
mines. The GIBL has identified the following mines as those which may be in
violation of the Mine Ban Treaty or Amended Protocol II: AT1 because of its
built-in antihandling/antidisturbance device; DM1233/AT2 because of its built-in
antihandling/antidisturbance device and magnetic fuze; DM-12/PARM-1 because of
its built-in breakwire sensor; DM-21 because of its built-in tilt rod; DM 31/FFV
028 SD and MIFF because of their built-in antihandling/antidisturbance-device
and magnetic fuze; MUSPA, PM-60/K-1 (ex-GDR), TM-62P3 (ex-GDR) because of their
built-in antihandling/antidisturbance-device; COBRA because of its built-in
antihandling/antidisturbance device and its penetration warhead; SMART155(AM)
because of its fragmentation
warhead.[16]
Member organizations of the GIBL published an open letter to German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder detailing these
concerns,[17] which was widely
taken up by the media.[18] The
Ministry of Defense responded to assure that the government adheres to the MBT
and disputed that the MUSPA targets people, stating that it is not a prohibited
weapon.[19] It is interesting
to note, however, that in its recent Article 7 report, Italy lists the MUSPA
(and the MIFF) as AP mines or weapons that can function like an AP
mine.[20]
In November 1999, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that it planned to export
36,000 AT-2 antitank mines to
Greece.[21] The AT-2 is an
antivehicle mine of concern because of its antihandling features, which might
make it act as an AP mine. The government takes the view that the AT-2 mine
cannot be detonated by the unintentional act of a
person.[22]
Stockpiling and Destruction
Germany states that in December 1997 the
destruction of all AP mines of the German Armed Forces including those of the
former German Democratic Republic was completed, with the exception of
approximately 3,000 AP mines retained for training and technical tests, as
permitted under the MBT.[23] In
May 2000, the Ministry of Defense clarified that the DM 39, a weapon that seems
to be able to serve as either an antihandling device or as an AP mine, is no
longer in use, and destruction of stocks should be finished within the year
2000.[24]
While there is no clear requirement under the MBT to report on stockpiles
destroyed before entry into force of the treaty, it would be desirable, in the
interests of full transparency, for Germany to report on the dismantling methods
and types and quantities of AP mines destroyed, as well as information on the
conversion of former AP mine production facilities (especially facilities of the
Former German Democratic
Republic).[25]
The United States has more than 112,000 AP mines stockpiled in Germany,
according to Human Rights Watch, including approximately 75,000 U.S. Army ADAM,
16,000 Army GEMSS, 14,000 Air Force Gator, 6,000 Volcano and 1,000 MOPMS AP
mines.[26] Germany’s
Article 7 reports fail to mention stockpiles of U.S. AP mines in Germany. The
government’s position is that under the Status on Foreign Forces
Agreement, weapons of foreign forces within Germany are not under German
jurisdiction or control,[27] and
thus Germany is not obligated to destroy those mines, or to request the U.S. to
remove them. This understanding was reiterated by representatives of the
Ministry of Defense in March
2000.[28] This position accords
with the Memorandum of Understanding issued in January 1998, at the time of
Germany’s ratification of the
MBT.[29]
Transfer
In 1994 the government declared a unilateral
export moratorium on AP mines, which was prolonged indefinitely in 1996 and then
superceded with the total ban under the
MBT.[30]
On the related issue of transit – movement of a foreign force’s
AP mines across the territory of a state party -- the government has said,
"According to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), storage and transport of
APM for the purpose of stationed forces is legally permitted, as these weapons
do not come under German sovereignty or
control."[31]
At the FMSP in May 1999, the State Minister, in
speaking on behalf of the presidency of the European Union (EU), highlighted
three main points regarding mine action. First, he stressed that "in 1998,
total funding by the European Commission and Member States in landmine-related
activities amounted to approximately US$95 million," making the EU "the world's
major donor in these areas." Second, he emphasized that "the EU will focus its
efforts on State Parties, and on signatories who fully observe in practice the
principles and objectives laid down in the Convention." Third was the principle
that "mine clearance cannot be disconnected from the general development
strategy of a state. This raises automatically the questions, which area should
be cleared at first, and what should happen with it afterwards.”[33]
The GIBL points out that efforts to concretely describe the relationship
between mine clearance and development have primarily come from the NGO
community. The fundamental principle is that humanitarian mine action and
development require the combination of mine clearance, mine awareness, and mine
victim rehabilitation with reconstruction, reconciliation, and
peacekeeping/building activities, as laid out comprehensively in NGO-developed
guidelines known as the “Bad Honnef
Framework.”[34] The GIBL
continues to press the government to make all of its funding decisions in such a
framework.
In 1999, Germany contributed DM 21.7 million (US$11.4 million) to
humanitarian mine action programs, plus another $6.7 million as its share of EU
mine action spending. The GIBL commends the German government for its continued
spending in this area, even if this was not an increase from the level of
1998.[35]
From 1993-1999, German contributions to humanitarian mine action totaled DM
108 million ($57 million). Programs are funded primarily by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, but also the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and
Development. In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent DM 19.67 million
($10.35 million) on mine action programs, as detailed in Table 1.
Table 1. Funding of humanitarian mine action by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1999[36]
COUNTRY
TYPE OF ASSISTANCE
DM
US$ EQUIVALENT
Angola
Support of mine clearance projects of NGO Menschen gegen Minen in Bengo
Province; support of mine clearance projects of the NGO Stiftung Sankt Barbara
in Cunene Province
2,210,000
1,163,158
Guinea-Bissau
Delivery of mine detectors
50,000
26,316
Chad
Delivery of mine detectors
110,000
57,895
Zimbabwe
Support of the UN assessment mission
20,000
10,526
Mozambique
Provision of a German technical advisor, physician and equipment for
national mine clearance agency CND; support of a mine clearance project of NGO
Phoenix; support for testing of airborne multisensor mine detector
1,050,000
552,632
Somalia
Support of an level II-survey
200,000
105,263
Afghanistan
Support of UN emergency aid program; support of Afghan NGO Mine Dog Center
for education and use of mine tracker dogs; support through experts, provision
of 75 detection tools to UNOCHA; support of “Female & Children Mine
Awareness’” program and mechanical mine clearance program of Afghan
NGO OMAR
5,430,000
2,857,895
Tadjikistan
Provision of detection tools for increase national mine clearance capacity
80,000
42,105
Yemen
Provision of personnel to UN mine clearance program
80,000
42,105
Vietnam
Support of mine clearance project of NGO Solidaritätsdienst
International within resettlement program; support of NGO Potsdam Kommunikation
for UXO survey in Hue Province
950,000
500,000
Laos
Support of a project to clear mines and UXOs (with German supervisor of
Laos demining teams)
2,170,000
1,142,105
Cambodia
Support of mine clearance project in Siem Reap Province; field testing and
operation of Rhino mine clearance technology with Cambodia Mine Action Center
2,550,000
1,342,105
Kosovo
Support of mine/UXO clearance project of HELP; support of UXO clearance
project of Potsdam Kommunikation; support of UXO clearance project of Halo
Trust; provision of German military experts to MACC; support of the mine
awareness project of Handicap International
1,570,000
826,316
Kosovo
Provision of DM 1.2 million to Slovenia’s International Trust Fund
(ITF) for continuation of projects in 2000
1,200,000
631,579
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Support of mine clearance project of HELP in the frame of reconstruction of
Stup and Filipovic villages; support of mine clearance project of NGO Köln
Franziskaner in the frame of the reconstruction of Kosici village; provision of
military mine clearance experts to BHMAC in Banja Luka; support of clearance
project of Entity Army through provision of tools and aid for the mine victim
fund; integrated mine clearance project of NGO Weltentminungsdienst in Vidovice
region
1,070,000
563,158
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Provision of DM 0.8 million to the ITF for continuation of projects in
2000
800,000
421,053
Croatia
Provision of detection tools to CROMAC; provision of military mine
clearance experts to WEU mission; support of mine clearance project of
Weltentminungsdienst within reconstruction of Pakrac village
130,000
68,421
TOTAL
19,670,000
10,352,632
73,905,797 ($38,897,788). The GIBL finds that of this amount only about 8.4%
(DM 6.2 million/$3.25 million) went to mine clearance related to development
measures, while approximately 89% (DM 65.6 million/$45.5 million) was allocated
specifically for mine clearance/mine awareness activities.
Of the DM 73.9 million, 13 % (DM 9.75 million or $5.13 million) was allocated
mainly to field-test mine clearance technology in Mozambique,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Cambodia.[37] In 1999 the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent DM 2.55 million ($1.34 million) on a
field-test of the Rhino mine clearance machine developed by MAK; this
expenditure represents thirteen percent of the 1999 budget for humanitarian mine
clearance. The Bad Honnef framework acknowledges the necessity of research and
development in mine clearance technology, but stresses that this should
“be based on end-user requirements and existing technologies.” The
GIBL believes it is doubtful if the technologies promoted by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs meet these requirements. An example is the Minebreaker 2000,
which has been widely criticized as too costly and inappropriate for many mine
affected countries.[38]
Germany contributed DM 129 million ($67.89 million) to the European
Commission between 1992-1999, which allocated a total of approximately $236
million to humanitarian mine action in that
period.[39]
Mine victim assistance and rehabilitation is the responsibility of the
Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. In the period 1993-99 a
total of DM 34.2 million (around $18 million) was allocated to mine
clearance/mine awareness or victim assistance activities (see Table 2) and, in
1999 a total of DM 2.03 million ($1.05
million).[40] The Ministry
finances mine-related activities only if they can be integrated as part of
broader development
projects.[41] The GIBL points
out that this is an obstacle for mine action programs applying for funding if
those programs are not in countries where Germany runs development projects, but
it does ensure that all mine-related activities funded by the German Development
Department are part of a broader development strategy – at least
theoretically.
Most of these activities are actually implemented by the Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ – German Company for
Technical Co-operation) which follows the policies set out in its program
handbook Development-oriented Emergency Aid - Integrated Demining. This
handbook describes in detail mine clearance activities which involve
mine-affected communities in the demining, but development measures like medical
and social rehabilitation are supported only for activities such as collection
of data on mine victims, and
recommendations.[42] The title
- Emergency Aid - indicates that these programs are carried out in
emergency situations, so longer-term development measures are left to follow-up
programs, which are not part of GTZ mine action.
Table 2. Funding of development-oriented emergency aid (integrated demining) by
the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
1993-99[43]
Total of Funding in the Period 1993-1999
DM
US$ equivalent
34,228,233
18,014,859
Period
Supported
country
Description of assistance
Resources in DM for mine clearance
US$
equivalent
Resources in DM for victim assistance
US$
equivalent
1994 – 2000
Angola
Technical cooperation/ survivor assistance for physical therapy and
rehabilitation center in Luanda
-
-
13,187,000
6,940,526
1996 & 1998
Angola
Emergency aid/ survivor assistance for rehabilitation center in
Luena/Moxico
250,000
131,579
2,512,000
1,322,105
Not specified
Mozambique
Technical and financial cooperation/ mine clearance: especially for
reconstruction of national roads
2,374,000
1,249,474
-
-
Not specified
Mozambique
Emergency Aid: rural reconstruction program in Manica and Sofala
provinces
1,000,000
526,316
-
-
Not specified
Mozambique
Community mine awareness
600,000
315,789
-
-
1996 & 1997
Cambodia
Technical and financial cooperation/ mine clearance: e.g. extension of
rural paths
2,190,000
1,152,632
-
-
1993 & 1997
Cambodia
Technical and financial cooperation/ survivor assistance
-
-
942,000
495,789
1995 – 1997
Laos
Financing cooperation/ survivor assistance: reconstruction of the national
road, clearing UXO, training demining personnel
773,233
406,965
-
-
1993 – 2000
Vietnam
Technical cooperation / survivor assistance: Center for Orthopedics
-
-
10,400,000
5,473,684
Subtotals
7,187,233
3,782,754
27,041,000
14,232,105
Percentage
21%
79%
Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Yemen,
Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and
Development is not present in these areas to tackle mine-related development
problems. In Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam both ministries
funded or still fund mine-related activities, but there is no coordination
between them and no link between mine clearance operations funded by the Foreign
Ministry and rehabilitation or reconstruction activities funded by the
Development Ministry, at least as far as the GIBL could determine.
This lack of coordination, coupled with a strict division of support for mine
clearance and development issues, results in funds not being readily available
for those trying to turn the concept of an integrated approach into programmatic
reality.[44] Different policy
priorities, application formats, as well as reporting requirements make it
nearly impossible to respond to the mine problem in a comprehensive way.
Coordinated, long-term funding commitments are key to making a reality of
development-oriented mine action.
NGO activities
There are many NGO initiatives to assist mine
victims.[45] Their activities
range from mine clearance and mine awareness projects to emergency aid, to
physical, psychological and socio-economic rehabilitation of mine victims, their
families and communities, in line with the Bad Honnef framework. Member
organizations of the GIBL spent approximately DM 20.74 million ($10.91 million)
on mine-related activities from
1995-1999.[46] (See Table 3.)
Sixty-five percent of these funds were allocated to victim assistance embedded
in socio-economic rehabilitation measures or in development/ food/
reconstruction/ resettlement/ peacekeeping activities or in integrated mine
action programs which cover mine clearance, mine awareness, physical and
psychosocial rehabilitation, socio-economic and cultural rehabilitation as well
as political advocacy.[47]
Table 3. NGO Funding of humanitarian mine action
1995-1999[48]
Integrated Mine Action Program (mine clearance, mine awareness, physical
& psycho-social rehabilitation, socio-economic and cultural rehabilitation,
political advocacy)
-
-
-
1,944,000
2,602,617
4,546,617
Percentage
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
46.95%
24.93%
21.92%
The GIBL is encouraged to see that some of these integrated programs are
co-financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economic
Co-operation and Development, yet the programs exist in the absence of a
long-term funding commitment by the donors.
At the same time, it is of concern to the GIBL that the efforts to carry out
integrated mine action programs decreased last year to twenty-five percent of
the total spent on humanitarian mine action, while in 1998 it represented
forty-seven percent. It is difficult to identify the reason for this decrease;
it might be that the project departments of the NGOs involved are not aware
enough of the integrated approach, or that the donor side restricts support to
limited activities.
Landmine Problem and Mine Victims
On 5 December 1995, the German government
announced that all mine-affected areas on the old east-west divide had been
cleared and the last zone, near the Bavarian town of Hof, reopened to the
public.[49] However incidents
still do occasionally occur. On 16 March 2000, while walking two people found a
strange little black box in the ground at the former frontier. As they were
kicking it, one of them remembered the lessons he learned in the Army and
realized this could be a landmine, which it
was.[50] Twenty years after the
military of the former German Democratic Republic demined the frontier, probably
one of the best recorded minefields in the world, and ten years after private
companies undertook a second mine clearance operation in this
area,[51] this AP mine still
remained in the ground.
German soldiers on peacekeeping operations are also at risk. On 22 September
1999 five German soldiers, part of the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping forces, went
into a minefield near the Albanian border. Three of them sustained minor
injuries while two of them were seriously
injured.[52] According to one
report, several German soldiers of the KFOR peacekeeping forces have been killed
or injured by landmines since the KFOR operation started in
Kosovo/Yugoslavia.[53]
[1] Intervention by State Minister Dr.
Ludger Volmer, German Foreign Office, On behalf of the Presidency of the
European Union, delivered at the First Meeting of State Parties to the MBT,
Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; see also, “Europa bleibt treibende Kraft im
Ottawa-Prozeß” (“Europe remains a driving force within the
Ottawa-process”), press release 4 May 1999, available at:
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de. [2] Mine
Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 31 August 1999, covering 1 March 1999-27
August 1999; MBT, Article 7 Report, submitted 30 April 2000, covering 1 January
1999-31 December 1999, available at:
http://domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf. [3]
Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp. 17
ff. [4]
Ibid. [5] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
(Federal Law Gazette, Part I), No. 43, 9 July 1998, p.
1778. [6] Letter from Ministry of
Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000. [7]
Statement by the German delegation to the First Conference of States Parties to
the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 15-17
December 1999. [8]
Ibid. [9] For examples of the impact of
AT mines see Thomas Küchenmeister, “Antipersonnel Effects of
Antivehicle Mines – Why Antivehicle Mines should also be Banned,”
German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Berlin, January 2000, available at:
http://www.landmine.de. [10] Reports of
the Permanent Delegation of the German Federal Republic to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 25 January and 13 December
1999. [11] For past production, see
Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.
611-613. [12] “Antivehicle”
mine and “antitank” mine are used interchangeably in this report.
For past production of antitank mines, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.
614-618. In last year’s Landmine Monitor, it was reported that the
high-tech COBRA area-denial mine was under development, but on 9 March 2000,
officials of the Ministry of Defense said that funds for its development had
been suspended; it is not known what the reason is for the suspension or if such
“suspension” is
permanent. [13] For information on the
concerns of the GIBL regarding this production, in particular mine-related
patents held by German companies, see the longer version of this report,
available at:
http://www.landmine.de. [14] Deutscher
Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/667,
http://www.bundestag.de: "The main task of
our armed forces remains the national and alliance defense. Especially in times
of decreasing troop strength the Federal Armed Forces need technical aids in
order to fulfill their mission. Anti-Tank-Mines belong to those technical
aids." [15] Rae McGrath, Landmines and
Unexploded Ordnance - A Resource Book, (London: Sterling, 2000), p. 11. McGrath
refers to off-the-record statements of producers and military which estimate the
failure rate of correctly deployed self-neutralizing landmines at around ten
percent. [16] See GIBL website at:
http://www.landmine.de The ICRC and other members of the ICBL, such as Human
Rights Watch, have also developed lists of antivehicle mines of concern.
Variations in such lists point to the need for States Parties to clarify the
status of such mines. [17] German
Initiative to Ban Landmines, Open Letter to the German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder, Berlin, 11 November
1999. [18] For example: Frankfurter
Rundschau, 22 November 1999; die tageszeitung, 22 November 1999; AFP Agence
France-Presse, 22 November 1999; Berliner Morgenpost, 22 November 1999;
Sindelfinger Zeitung, 22 November 1999; Berliner Zeitung, 22 November
1999. [19] die tageszeitung, 22 November
1999; Sindelfinger Zeitung, 22 November
1999. [20] Italy, Mine Ban Treaty
Article 7 Report, submitted 29 March 2000, Annex
B-1. [21] Associated Press, 3 November
1999, die tageszeitung, 4 November 1999. The GIBL had begun looking into this
export, which was widely reported in the German media: die tageszeitung, 3
November 1999, Associated Press, 3 November 1999, Handelsblatt, 3 November 1999,
Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 November 1999, Südwest Presse, 4 November 1999,
Rhein-Zeitung, 4 November 1999, Berliner Zeitung, 4 November 1999,
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 November, Freitag, 5 November
1999. [22] Letter from Ministry of
Defense, Berlin, 10 February 2000. [23]
Article 7 Reports, Form D, submitted 31 August 1999 and 30 April 2000. Also,
interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9
March 2000; Report to the OSCE, 13 December 1999; Letter from Ministry of
Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000. Quantities of AP mines destroyed were reported in
the Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 620-621. One source has said there is
some evidence that some mines, reported as destroyed, had been transferred to
other countries prior to the destruction of stocks. Thomas Küchenmeister
and Otfried Nassauer, "Gute Mine" zum bösen Spiel: Landminen made in
Germany (Idstein: Komzi-Verlag, 1995), p.
119. [24] Letter from Ministry of
Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000. The U.S. Defense Department describes the DM 39
as an antipersonnel mine which is “intended for emplacement under an
antitank mine. Its pressure release fuze, with clockwork-regulated arming delay,
allows this mine to be used directly in its antilift role safely and without
modification” (Mine Facts, Department of Defense, CD-ROM database,
undated). The German Ministry of Defense had taken the view that the DM 39 is
not an AP mine, rather an explosive charge with a pressure release
fuze. [25] For instance it was reported
in the press that the Spreewerk former munitions production factory in
Lübben in the German Democratic Republic was converted into a munitions
dismantling works. “Im Spreewerk werden 300.000 Landminen zu einem Haufen
Asche” (Spreewerk destroys 300,000 landmines into ashes), Die Welt, 8
February 2000. [26] Data as of 1997.
Provided to Human Rights Watch by U.S. government sources in March
1999. [27] “Tretminen
–Verbotene Lagerung” (Pedal Mines – Prohibited Stockpiling),
Spiegel, 21, 1998, p. 20: “‘According to the Agreement on the stay
of foreign forces and Nato’s Status on foreign Forces Agreement weapons of
foreign forces and their stockpiling does not fall under German control,’
argues the spokesperson of the German Ministry of Defense.” Federal
Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 2 December 1997: “Wie alle andern Waffen
unterliegen auch die US Landminen aufgrund obiger Bestimmungen nicht der
Kontrolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” ("Due to regulations mentioned
above [SOFA] US landmines like all other weapons do not fall under control of
the Federal Republic of Germany." [28]
Interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9
March 2000. [29] For details, see
Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.
608-609. [30] For past export, see
Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.
618-620. [31] Letter from the German
Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 26 June 2000. Also, interview with representatives
of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9 March
2000. [32] The exchange rate used
throughout this report is US$1 = DM
1.9. [33] Intervention by State Minister
Dr. Ludger Volmer, FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; see also, press release 4 May
1999. [34] In 1997 at a conference held
in Bad Honnef, Germany, international experts, those involved in program work in
the field, and mine campaigners gathered to develop guidelines for mine action
programs from a development-oriented point of view, which became known as the
“Bad Honnef Framework.” This was further refined in a second
conference held in 1999. See “Mine Action Programs From a
Development-Oriented Point of View” (“The Bad Honnef
Framework”), the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Revised Version,
1999, available at: http://www.landmine.de. The Bad Honnef Framework is also
available in Arabic, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Chinese and Russian.
Please contact the GIBL (email:
gibl.haake@t-online.de). [35] For
details of German spending on mine action pre-1999, see Landmine Monitor Report
1999, pp. 621-624, also a longer version of the report on Germany in 1999,
available at:
http://www.landmine.de. [36] Deutscher
Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp.
63-65. [37] Roughly half of this amount
(DM 4.88 million, or US$2.57 million) went to companies related to landmine
producers--former AP and/or current AT mine producers. It is not possible to
specify the exact amount spent on the test trials, because these trials were
combined with other activities. Letters from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn,
22 November 1995, 17 September 1997, 2 February 1999, 3 December 1999; Deutscher
Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp.
63-65. [38] See, http://www.landmine.de.
See also, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p.
624. [39] Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache
(German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p.
19. [40] Source: Deutscher Bundestag
Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp.18 and 66. The figures in
this document are inconsistent: the text indicates a total of DM 21.7 million
for both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economic
Co-operation and Development in 1999 (which means a total of DM 2.03 million
allocated by the Development Department if one subtracts the 1999 total funding
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DM 19.67 million), while the Table in the
appendix indicates a total of 1999 funding of the Development Department of
around DM 2.6 million. [41] Deutscher
Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p.
18. [42] Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Enwicklungsorientierte Nothilfe –
Integrierte Entminung, Arbeitspapier (Development-oriented Emergency Aid –
Integrated Demining, working paper) No. 7, undated, p.
10. [43] German Ministry for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 14 April 2000; Deutscher Bundestag
Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p.
66. [44] For a discussion of such a
program, see Thomas Gebauer, medico international, “Integrated Mine Action
Programmes – The Example of the Rehabilitation Centre in
Moxico/Angola,” unpublished lecture presented at the Bad Honnef Framework
Roundtable, London, 1 March 2000. [45]
These NGO initiatives are too numerous and diverse to describe here; many are
small mine-related projects or programs. This report concentrates on the
activities of GIBL member organizations: Bread for the World, Christoffel
Mission for the Blind, German Justitia et Pax Commission, German Committee for
Freedom from Hunger, German Caritas, Social Service Agency of the Evangelical
Church in Germany, EIRENE International, Handicap International Germany, Jesuit
Refugee Service, Kindernothilfe (Help for Children in Need), medico
international, Misereor, OXFAM Germany, Pax Christi, Solidarity Service
International, terre des hommes, UNICEF Germany. Projects of the German NGO
Help e.V. and Weltentminungsdienst e.V. (World Demining Service) are not
considered; they run bigger mine clearance/mine awareness projects partly with
reconstruction/resettlement components in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo;
see: http://www.help-ev.de/projecte/,
http://www.welt-entminungs-hilfe.de/proj.html. [46]
Some of these programs are cofinanced by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Economic Co-operation and Development; their contributions are subtracted from
the total in order to show the NGO contribution. Sources: Misereor
questionnaire to GIBL member organizations 1995-1998, email from Hein Winnubst,
Aachen, 25 November 1999; GIBL questionnaire to member organizations 1999,
Markus Haake, Berlin, June 2000. [47]
Nineteen percent of the total was spent on restricted mine clearance and mine
awareness programs. Twelve percent of the funds went to restricted victim
assistance programs, concentrated on medical treatment and physical
rehabilitation of individual mine victims. Five percent of the funds was spent
on advocacy work. [48] Misereor
questionnaire to the member organization of the GIBL, 1995-1998, email from Hein
Winnubst, Aachen 25 November 1999; GIBL questionnaire 1999 to the member
organization of the GIBL, Markus Haake (GIBL), Berlin June
2000. [49] Press Release, Federal
Ministry of Defense, 5 December 1995. For more information, see Landmine
Monitor Report 1999, pp. 624-625. [50]
“Unscheinbar versteckt im Boden” (Inconspicuously hidden in the
ground), Volksblatt-Mellrichstadt, 18 March 2000,
http://www.volksblatt-wuerzburg.de [51]
As reported in the longer version of the Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for
Germany, available at: http://www.landmine.de; see also: Bundesdrucksache
(German Parliament Document) 13/1023, p. 1,
http://dip.bundestag.de. [52] Reuters,
23 September 1999, Associated Press, 23 September 1999, Spiegel-online, 23
September 1999. [53] Spiegel-online, 23
September 1999.
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