One
hundred and thirty-seven countries have signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty
as of 31 July 2000, including two since the publication of Landmine Monitor
Report 1999: Tajikistan (acceded 12 October 1999) and Liberia (acceded 23
December 1999). Tajikistan became the second former Soviet republic to become a
State Party; Liberia the twentieth African nation (now at 27); mines were used
in both countries in the near past. Thirteen other nations have signed or
acceded since the Ottawa signing conference on 3-4 December 1997. Since the
treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply
sign the treaty with intent to ratify at a later date.
Considering the relatively short time that this issue has been before the
international community, the number of signatories – more than two-thirds
of the world’s nations -- is exceptional. This is a clear indication of
the widespread international rejection of any use or possession of antipersonnel
mines.
Every country in the Western Hemisphere has signed except the U.S. and Cuba,
every member of the European Union except Finland, every member of NATO except
the U.S. and Turkey, 41 of the 48 countries in Africa, and key Asian nations
such as Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia. Several of the most heavily
mine-affected countries are States Parties -- Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia, and
Croatia. Several others are signatories – Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Major past producers and exporters are now States Parties, including Belgium,
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United
Kingdom.
Moreover, awareness is clearly growing among non-state actors about the
global movement toward eradication of antipersonnel mines, and several have in
1999 and 2000 unilaterally pledged to discontinue use.
Still, fifty-six countries have not yet signed the treaty. This includes
three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council -- the United
States, Russia, and China. It includes most of the Middle East, most of the
former Soviet republics, and many Asian nations. Major producers such the US,
Russia, China, India and Pakistan are not part of the treaty. Afghanistan,
Somalia, Iraq, and Eritrea are perhaps the most heavily mine-affected countries
that have not signed. For the first two, however, there is no internationally
recognized government capable of signing, and the Taliban in Afghanistan have
unilaterally declared a comprehensive ban.
Virtually all of the non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a
comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines at some point in time, and many have
already at least partially embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. There has been no
change in the ban policies of some of the key states in the past year. U.S.
policy is still aimed at joining the treaty in 2006, if it is successful in
developing alternatives to AP mines. Even though Russia has been using AP mines
in Chechnya, it reiterated in March 2000 that its policy is “aimed at the
banning of landmines.” China has said it supports “the ultimate
objective of comprehensive prohibition” of antipersonnel mines. Likewise,
India re-stated in December 1999 that it “remains committed to the
objective of a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel
mines.”
Universalization clearly remains the biggest challenge facing ban supporters.
The fact that only two new countries have acceded to the treaty since its entry
into force on 1 March 1999, and none have in 2000 (in contrast to the large
number of ratifications by existing signatories), is testament to that.
Ratification
After achieving the required forty ratifications in
September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming
binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry into force
of any major multilateral treaty ever. For a State that ratifies or accedes
now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month
after the date on which that State deposited its instrument of ratification.
That State is then required to make its implementation report to the UN
Secretary-General within 180 days, destroy stockpiled mines within four years,
and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take
appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal
sanctions.
One hundred nations have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31 July 1999 --
more than half the world’s nations and three-quarters of the Mine Ban
Treaty signatories. Twenty-nine governments have ratified since publication of
Landmine Monitor Report 1999. As with the number of signatories, the
number of ratifications is very impressive for the relatively short time the
treaty has been in existence. The milestone of 100 ratifications was a major
objective of -- and cause for coordinated action by -- the ICBL, the ICRC, and
key States Parties.
There is concern that the pace of ratifications has fallen off considerably,
although perhaps a predictable and expected occurrence. There were three
ratifications in December 1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference, 55
in 1998, 32 in 1999, and 10 from January-July 2000. However, there were six
ratifications in June and July 2000, and Landmine Monitor research indicates a
number of other signatories are aiming to deposit their instruments of
ratification with the UN prior to the Second Meeting of States Parties in
September 2000.
Regionally, 27 of 41 signatories in Africa have ratified; 26 of 33 in the
Americas; 11of 18 in Asia/Pacific; 32 of 40 in Europe/Central Asia; and, four of
five in the Middle East/North Africa.
There are 37 governments that have signed but not ratified the Mine Ban
Treaty. Statements and actions on the part of several signatory countries have
raised the possibility that these nations are not committed to ratifying the
treaty in the near future. Among them are: Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia,
Guinea-Bissau, Sudan; Brunei; Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, and Poland.
Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program
At the First Meeting of States Parties, governments
agreed to create an “intersessional” work program to be carried out
during the year between the annual meetings of States
Parties.[3] The purpose is to ensure
swift and effective implementation of the treaty in all its aspects. Five
Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs) were formed: General Status and Operation
of the Convention; Stockpile Destruction; Mine Clearance; Technologies for Mine
Action; and, Victim Assistance. Each SCE met twice to identify areas of concern
and develop plans to ensure effective implementation. Their work has served to
facilitate better coordination and to spur progress globally on the range of
mine issues.
Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines
Perhaps the most disturbing findings of Landmine
Monitor Report 2000 are that:
Angola, a treaty signatory, continues to use antipersonnel mines.
It is likely that Burundi and Sudan, also treaty signatories, have used
antipersonnel mines in 1999 and 2000. Sudan has denied using AP mines. Landmine
Monitor has been unable to get a confirmation or denial from Burundi.
The ICBL condemns any use of AP mines, but is particularly appalled
at these governments’ disregard for their international commitments.
While none of these governments have ratified the treaty, the use of AP mines by
a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “A state is
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty when...it has signed the treaty....” Clearly, new use of mines
defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.
Landmine Monitor is also very concerned about continued allegations of use of
antipersonnel mines by a number of armies in the complicated regional conflict
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including the armies of three Mine
Ban Treaty States Parties: Rwanda,[4]
Uganda, and Zimbabwe. All three of those governments deny use of AP mines, and
Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify who is responsible for laying mines
in the DRC. Uncertainties about who is responsible for use of antipersonnel
mines in the DRC have continued for more than two years now. Landmine Monitor
believes that it has reached the point where States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty should make detailed requests for clarification from Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe, and should make all necessary efforts to establish the facts regarding
mine use in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even if those States Parties have
not used AP mines themselves, they may have engaged in cooperative military
action with armed forces that have laid AP mines, which could also constitute a
treaty violation. (See below under Joint Operations).
There have also been allegations of use by signatory Ethiopia, in its border
conflict with Eritrea. The government of Ethiopia denies using AP mines.
Despite these disturbing findings, as noted in last year’s report, AP
mines are no longer being used on the scale of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s
when millions per year were being emplanted, and when mines were clearly being
laid at a much greater rate than being removed. Today, that is no longer the
case; we have turned the tide in the battle against mines.
In the reporting period for this Landmine Monitor Report, since March 1999,
the heaviest use of mines occurred in Chechnya, by both Russian and Chechen
fighters, and in Kosovo, by both Yugoslav and Kosovo Liberation Army forces.
Although it is impossible to be certain, some reports indicate hundreds of
thousands of mines were used in Chechnya, mostly by Russian forces. Fighting
and mine-laying continue at a diminished level as this report goes to print.
The UN Mine Action Coordination Center in Kosovo estimates about 50,000 mines
were planted during that conflict, nearly all by Yugoslav forces.
It appears likely that since March 1999 there was new use of antipersonnel
mines in the following:
Africa
Angola: government and rebels (UNITA)
Burundi: government
Democratic Republic of Congo: government and rebels
Eritrea: government
Senegal: rebels (MFDC)
Somalia: various factions
Sudan: government and rebels (SPLA)
Uganda: rebels (LRA)
Americas
Colombia: rebel groups (FARC, ELN)
Asia-Pacific
Afghanistan: opposition forces (Northern Alliance)
Burma: government and 10 rebel groups
India/Pakistan (Kashmir): Pakistan government and militants
Nepal: rebels
Philippines: rebel groups (MILF, NPA, Abu Sayyaf)
Sri anka: government and rebels (LTTE)
Europe/Central Asia
Georgia: non-state actors (use in Abkhazia)
Russia: government (in Chechnya, Dagestan) and rebels (Chechnya)
Turkey and Northern Iraq: rebels (PKK)
FR Yugoslavia: government and rebels (KLA)
Middle East/North Africa
Lebanon: Israel and non-state actors in occupied south Lebanon
Thus, Landmine Monitor believes that from early 1999 to mid-2000, it is
likely that antipersonnel mines were used in 20 conflicts. Eleven governments
and at least 30 rebel groups/non-state actors used mines. In two conflicts,
only governments used AP mines; in nine conflicts only rebels/non-state actors
used AP mines; and in nine conflicts both governments and rebels/non-state
actors used AP mines.[5]
Moreover, Uzbekistan, though not actively involved in ongoing conflict, was
reported to have reinforced its border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.
The UN reported that Cyprus, a treaty signatory, engaged in minefield
refurbishment on its side of the cease-fire line. Landmine Monitor is disturbed
that a treaty signatory would engage in such activity. No other signatories are
known to have refurbished existing minefields. It is likely that a number of
non-signatories have done so.
Compared to last year’s Landmine Monitor Report 1999, the above
list includes the addition of use in Chechnya/Dagestan, Kashmir, and the
Philippines due to the outbreak of new conflict. For the other additions to the
list (Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Senegal, Sudan, and Nepal), it is likely in each
case that AP mines were being used in the previous reporting period (December
1997-February 1999) as well, but such use has now been confirmed through
additional research; also, in each case there appears to have been expanded use
of AP mines. Those who were listed as using antipersonnel mines in the first
Landmine Monitor reporting period but not the second include the governments of
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Turkey, and rebels in Djibouti (who apparently used
only antitank mines in 1999-2000).
Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines
Among the developments in the global situation with
respect to antipersonnel mine production since Landmine Monitor Report
1999:
Landmine Monitor research did not uncover any evidence of new production of
antipersonnel mines by treaty State Parties or signatories.
Egypt told a UN assessment mission in February 2000 that it no longer
produces antipersonnel mines, but it is unclear if this is an official policy or
if it constitutes either a moratorium or prohibition on production.
In June 2000, Turkish officials told a representative of the ICBL that
Turkey no longer produces AP mines, but there has been no formal confirmation of
this information.
While Israel has stated frequently since 1997 that it no longer produces AP
mines, an Israeli official told the ICBL in December 1999 that Israel does not
rule out production of AP mines in the future if the situation requires it; it
is not known if this is official policy.
There was one unconfirmed U.S. government report that identified Sudan as a
current producer of landmines, an allegation not seen before.
Singapore and Vietnam both confirmed to Landmine Monitor reseachers that
production of AP mines continues.
In December 1999, Russian military reconfirmed that the Russian Federation
stopped producing blast AP mines.
The U.S. Department of Defense is seeking to produce a new mine system
called RADAM that combines into a single canister existing antipersonnel mines
and antitank mines; such a system would be prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty
that the U.S. aims to join in 2006;
India has stated that its production agencies have been instructed to cease
production of landmines incompatible with CCW Amended Protocol II. India
indicates it will be producing new mines that meet Protocol II standards,
including AP mines with self-destruct and self-deactivation features.
In December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat told the ICBL that new production was
required because of the deteriorating condition of many mines in its stockpile,
both hand-laid mines and remotely-delivered mines. Pakistan has stated that it
has taken steps to produce only detectable AP mines, and mines that meet Amended
Protocol II technical standards.
The South Korean Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that in 1999 its
only produced 1,363 Claymore-type mines.
There is some new evidence that Syria may have been a producer in the past,
which was previously unknown.
The number of AP mine producers has
dropped dramatically in recent years, from 54 to 16. Of the 16 who are still
producers, eight are in Asia (Burma, China, India, North Korea, South Korea,
Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam), three are in Europe (Russia, Turkey, FR
Yugoslavia), three are in the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, Iraq), two are in the
Americas (Cuba, US), and none are in Africa.
The 38 who have stopped production include a majority of the big producers in
the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Eight of the twelve biggest producers and
exporters over the past thirty years are now States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty and have stopped all production and export: Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has a
formal cap on its AP mine inventory, but has refused to announce a moratorium or
ban and explicitly retains the right to produce at any time in the future. The
U.S. banned production of so-called “dumb” mines, those without
self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms, in 1996. Russia in 1998
announced that it had banned production of “blast” mines -- the most
common type of mine that explodes from pressure. This would include the PMN
mine, which, along with the Chinese Type 72, is one of the most frequently
encountered mines around the world. As a result of the new restrictions in
Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), production
of non-detectable mines by CCW States Parties is stopping, which would include
the Type 72 by China.
Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines
Landmine Monitor research did not find evidence of
antipersonnel mine exports or imports by treaty State Parties or signatories,
though some allegations have been made; some concerns have also been raised
about possible transit or trans-shipment of AP mines through treaty nations. In
two incidents that received a good deal of media and diplomatic attention,
attempts were made by Romanian and Pakistani state-owned companies to sell AP
mines. (See country reports for details). Romania, a treaty signatory, said
that the incident was a “regrettable error” on the part of a
low-level company employee and that no AP mines were actually available for
purchase. Pakistan, which has a unilateral export ban in place, offered a
similar explanation.
There are 34 nations that are known to have exported antipersonnel landmines
in the past. Today, all of those nations with the exception of Iraq have at the
least made a formal statement that they are no longer exporting. Twenty-two
have signed the treaty and thus stopped exporting (though many had unilateral
restrictions in place prior to signing). Among non-signatories, one has an
export ban in place (USA), four have a moratorium in place (Israel, Pakistan,
Singapore and Russia), and six have made declaratory statements that they no
longer export (China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Vietnam, FR
Yugoslavia).[6] It is possible, of
course, that some of these nations continue to export AP mines despite their
public policy pronouncements.
Landmine Monitor researchers did not identify a single significant shipment
of antipersonnel mines from one nation to another in 1999 or 2000. This does
not mean that no AP mines have been transferred; there are great difficulties in
tracking mine trade. But the findings (or lack thereof) are consistent with the
observations of military specialists that in fact there have been no major mine
shipments of AP mines dating back some five years. A de facto global ban on
export already seems to be in place; a norm against AP mine supply seems to
already have taken hold.
Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines
Landmine Monitor estimates that there are more than
250 million antipersonnel mines stored in the arsenals of 105 countries. The
largest stockpiles are believed to be held by China (110 million), Russia (60-70
million), Belarus (10-15 million), U.S. (11 million), Ukraine (10 million),
Pakistan (6 million) and India (4-5 million).
Treaty non-signatories have an estimated 225-250 million AP mines in stock,
while treaty signatories and states parties account for an estimated 25-30
million. Landmine Monitor had previously estimated Pakistan’s stockpile at
hundreds of thousands, but discussions with Pakistani officials have resulted in
a drastic upward revision to at least 6 million. Other non-signatories believed
to have large stockpiles are Iran, Iraq, FR Yugoslavia, Egypt, Israel, Vietnam,
and Finland.
In addition to Ukraine (10 million), Mine Ban Treaty signatories with large
stockpiles are likely to be Romania, Greece, Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan. None
of these nations will reveal information about their mine stocks.
According to the latest data made available by them, the biggest stocks among
States Parties are: Italy (4.8 million), Albania (1.6 million), Sweden (1.2
million), Japan (1 million), and Bulgaria (778,455). However, these numbers are
out-of-date, as rapid destruction programs are underway in all these countries,
except Albania which requires financial assistance.
In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines.
Destruction
Landmine Monitor research shows that more than 20 million antipersonnel mines
have been destroyed in recent years by more than 55 nations.
Twenty-one States Parties have completed destruction of stocks, totaling some
10 million AP mines. Six States Parties have completed destruction in this
reporting period (since March 1999): Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark,
France, Hungary, and United Kingdom.
Others that have completed destruction include: Austria, Belgium, Cambodia,
Canada, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand,
Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland. (Note: many of these are
keeping a small number of mines for training, as permitted under the
treaty).
Another twenty-seven States Parties and signatories are in the process of
destruction: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador,
Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia,
Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This represents an additional
nine nations from last year.
States Parties that have not begun the destruction process include:
Argentina, Brazil, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mozambique, Niger, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. Malaysia has developed a plan for destruction.
In addition, several non-signatories have destroyed significant numbers of AP
mines. The United States has destroyed 3.3 million AP mines as part of its
commitment to eliminate use of dumb mines everywhere but Korea. China destroyed
1.7 million mines, and Russian 500,000 mines, and Belarus 5,000 mines, that were
not compliant with CCW requirements. Finland has also destroyed non-CCW
compliant mines, but has not revealed the number.
Mines Retained for Training
During the Oslo negotiations, technical experts from
the ICBL questioned the need for the Article 3 exception permitting retention
(and transfer) of antipersonnel mines “for the development of and training
in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques....” In
its closing statement to the Olso conference, the ICBL noted that “a
number of governments also indicated for the diplomatic record that in Article
3, the ‘minimum number absolutely necessary’ for training mines
should be hundreds or thousands, not tens of thousands or more.”
It appears that the majority of States Parties that have stockpiles of AP
mines are opting to exercise the Article 3 exception. Many intend to keep
between 1,000-5,000 mines. Several intend to keep significantly more: Croatia
17,500; Thailand 15,600; Japan 15,000; Australia 10,000; Peru 9,526; Italy
8,000; Slovakia 7,000; and Slovenia 7,000. Ecuador stated in its Article 7
report that it was going to keep 170,334 mines, but in an SCE meeting indicated
that was a mistake and a true number would be forthcoming.
After the ICBL raised this issue repeatedly in the SCE meetings, a number of
countries have decided to decrease the number of mines kept: Bulgaria from
10,446 to 4,000; Spain from 10,000 to 4,000. Croatia, Thailand, and Slovakia
have indicated they too are re-evaluating their needs.
The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training. The ICBL
believes that it is important not only to have complete transparency on this,
but also to continue to evaluate the necessity for the exception and the
potential need for an absolute numerical limitation.
Special Issues of Concern
Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices (Article 2)
During the Oslo treaty negotiations in 1997, the
ICBL identified as “the major weakness in the treaty” the sentence
in the Article 2.1 definition of antipersonnel mine that exempts antivehicle
mines equipped with antihandling devices: “Mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that
are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines
as a result of being so equipped.” The ICBL expressed its belief that
many antivehicle mines (AVMs) with antihandling devices (AHDs) could function as
antipersonnel mines and pose similar dangers to civilians.
To address this concern, which was shared by many government delegations,
negotiators changed the draft definition of antihandling device (which had been
identical to the one in CCW Protocol II) by adding the words “or otherwise
intentionally disturb”: “‘Anti-handling device’ means a
device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to
or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper
with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”
It was emphasized by Norway, which proposed the language, and others, that
the word “intentionally” was needed to establish that if an AVM with
an AHD explodes from an unintentional act of a person, it is to be considered an
antipersonnel mine, and banned under the treaty. This language was eventually
accepted by all delegations without
dissent.[7]
In Landmine Monitor Report
1999,[8]the ICBL expressed
concern that there had not been adequate recognition by States Parties that AVMs
with AHDs that function like antipersonnel mines are in fact prohibited by the
Mine Ban Treaty, nor discussion of the practical implications of this. Thus, at
the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, and at the meetings
of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the
Convention in January and May 2000, the ICBL called on States Parties to be more
explicit about what types of antivehicle mines and antihandling devices, and
what deployment methods, are permissible and prohibited.
At the January 2000 SCE meeting, there was a lengthy discussion on this
topic. Nine States Parties reiterated that AVMs with AHDs that can explode from
an unintentional act of a person are banned by the treaty. No delegation
disputed that fact. Ireland proposed that the SCE form an informal technical
experts group to look at the issue and help determine which mines and
antihandling devices might fall within the scope of the treaty. It was agreed
that the SCE co-chairs would consult with States Parties on the proposal, but at
the May 200 SCE meeting, the co-chairs reported that there was not a consensus
on the formation of such an experts group. The ICRC then offered to host
technical discussions on the issue, which delegates agreed would be a useful
step forward. The ICRC expects to hold a seminar in early 2001, but is
encouraging States to prepare technical papers on these issues prior to then.
The ICBL supports the ICRC initiative and stresses the importance of thorough
advance preparation by States Parties, in which they determine and make explicit
which AVMs with AHDs in their arsenals are permitted under the treaty and which
are not.
The ICBL has expressed the view that antivehicle mines using tilt rods,
tripwires, or breakwires will explode from an unintentional act by an
individual, and therefore should be considered banned by the treaty. It also
appears that at least some antivehicle mines with certain other sensitive fuzes
might explode from the unintentional act of an individual. This is an issue that
needs to be addressed explicitly and urgently by States Parties.
The ICRC, Human Rights Watch, and the German Initiative to Ban Landmines have
all produced lists and publications regarding antivehicle mines of
concern.[9] Landmine Monitor
researchers have identified such mines in their individual country studies
contained in this report.
The need for clarity on this issue has been underlined by this year’s
Landmine Monitor research. Some States Parties are destroying certain types of
mines classified as antivehicle mines, because the State Party has determined
that they will function as an AP mine. But other States Parties are electing to
keep the same types of mines. For example, Canada destroyed 20,000 M-21 AVMs
with tilt rods; Hungary destroyed 100,000 UKA-63 AVMs with tilt rods, and
Slovakia destroyed all of its PT-Mi-K antivehicle mines with anti-lift firing
mechanisms. Yet the Czech Republic has apparently decided to keep its PT-Mi-K
mines, as well as other AVMs with tilt rod fuzes. Likewise, Sweden apparently
has several types of AVMs with tilt rod fuzes, but has not said if it intends to
destroy them. France reports that it has destroyed a dozen different types of
AVMs with tilt rod fuzes and various antihandling devices, though it is not
known when or why destruction took place.
The ICBL has also expressed concern that the Mine Ban Treaty does not define
“antivehicle mine.” At the least, States Parties should agree on a
minimum amount of pressure necessary to explode a pressure-activated antivehicle
mine.
Joint Operations (Article 1)
In last year’s Landmine Monitor Report, the ICBL raised concerns
about the possible participation of States Parties in joint military operations
with non-States Parties that use antipersonnel landmines. There is serious
concern about the consistency of such operations with the treaty’s Article
1 obligation for a State Party “never under any circumstance...[t]o
assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Such joint operations
at the least would go against the spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all
possession and use of antipersonnel mines.
These concerns were heightened in this reporting period both by the turn of
global events and by information uncovered in the research process. Since the
last report, the NATO alliance was involved in the military conflict in Kosovo
and Yugoslavia. During the conflict the US maintained the right to use AP mines
(though it never did), making concerns about the implications of use of AP mines
by a non-State Party in a joint military operation more immediate and tangible
than before.
Moreover, research shows that some type of joint operation involving AP mines
is already occurring. In May 2000, the UK acknowledged participating in fifteen
joint military operations involving use of AP mines over the last three years,
while stressing that in no instances were UK armed forces responsible for their
use.
This is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. It appears that
a number of States Parties in Africa are engaged in military operations with (or
in support of) armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines. This would
include Namibia (with Angola against UNITA and with DRC government forces
against rebels), Zimbabwe (with DRC government forces), Uganda (with opposition
forces in DRC), and Rwanda (with opposition forces in DRC). Those states should
make clear the nature of their support for other armed forces that may be using
antipersonnel mines, and make clear their views with regard to the legality
under the Mine Ban Treaty of their military operations with these armed forces.
As parties to the treaty, they should state categorically that they will not
participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.
A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom, have adopted legislative provisions or made formal statements
with regard to possible participation of their armed forces in joint military
operations with a treaty non-signatory that may use antipersonnel mines. In
each of these cases, government officials have stated that the intent is to
provide legal protections to their military personnel who participate in joint
operations with a non-signatory who may utilize AP mines. The ICBL does not
cast doubt on the stated motivations of these nations; it does not believe that
these provisions and statements are intended to undermine the core obligations
of the treaty.
However, the ICBL continues to believe that the legality of State Party
participation in joint operations with an armed force that uses antipersonnel
mines is an open question, and that participation in such operations is contrary
to the spirit of the treaty. The ICBL has called on States Parties to insist
that any non-signatories do not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations, and
to refuse to take part in joint operations that involve use of antipersonnel
mines.
As reported in this Landmine Monitor Report, several NATO members have
made strong statements rejecting use of AP mines in NATO operations. In June
1998, the French Minister of Defense said that France had already declared
before the Atlantic Alliance that France will prohibit the planned or actual use
of antipersonnel mines in any military operation whatsoever by its military
personnel. He said that France will refuse to agree to rules of engagement in
any military operation calling for the use of antipersonnel mines, and that this
was made effective in a directive sent out by the Joint Chief of Staff in
November 1998. Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, also said
that official directives forbid any French military personnel to use AP mines,
participate in planning operations implying use of AP mines, or give an
agreement to any document mentioning a possible use.
Foreign Minister J.J. van Aartsen of the Netherlands stated on 23 March 1999
that none of the NATO partners will assist the U.S. or Turkey with the use of AP
mines, or with preparations for use, and will not tolerate the use of AP mines
on their territory. He has also stated that within NATO operations AP mines can
no longer play a role. The Dutch military will not participate in any
preparatory operational activity with the intention to use AP mines. Dutch
soldiers are not allowed to assist with the use of AP mines, nor incite or
request the use of these weapons. The command structure has also been made
subordinate to this policy: a Dutch commander in joint operations will not order
the use of AP mines and Dutch soldiers under U.S. or Turkish command will not
execute any order to use AP mines but look for alternative methods to achieve
the objective.
“Active Assistance”
In this context, the question has been raised as to what “assist”
means in the treaty’s Article 1. A number of governments have interpreted
this to mean “active” or “direct” assistance in actual
laying of mines, and not other types of assistance in joint operations, such as
provision of fuel or security. This narrow interpretation of assistance is of
concern to the ICBL; in keeping with the spirit of a treaty aimed at total
eradication of the weapon, interpretation of assistance should be as broad as
possible.
During the meetings of the SCE on General Status of the Convention, the ICBL
has emphasized the need for States Parties to reach a common understanding of
the term “assist,” especially as it applies to joint military
operations, foreign stockpiling of AP mines, and foreign transit of mines across
the territory of a State Party. Full and effective implementation of the treaty
will be enhanced if States Parties are clear and consistent with regard to what
acts are permitted and what acts are prohibited.
Stockpiling and Transit of Foreign AP Mines (Articles 1, 2, and 4)
The United States has antipersonnel landmines stored
in at least five nations that are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty
(Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and United Kingdom at Diego Garcia), as well as
treaty signatory Greece. The U.S. has engaged in discussions with these
nations in an effort to convince them that it is permissible under the treaty to
allow U.S. mines to stay. The ICBL believes that it certainly would violate the
spirit and likely the letter of the treaty for States Parties to permit the U.S.
(or any other government or entity) to stockpile antipersonnel mines on their
territory.
On a related issue, the United States has also discussed with a number of
treaty States Parties the permissibility of the U.S. transiting mines through
their territory. A debate has emerged over whether the treaty’s
prohibition on “transfer” of AP mines also applies to
“transit,” with some States Parties maintaining that it does not.
This would mean that U.S. (or other) aircraft, ships or vehicles carrying
antipersonnel mines could pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in,
restock in) a State Party on their way to a conflict in which those mines would
be used. The ICBL believes that if a State Party willfully permits transit of
AP mines which are destined for use in combat, that government is certainly
violating the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, is likely violating the Article 1
ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the
Article 1 prohibition on transfer.
The ICRC has also expressed its view that transiting of mines is prohibited
by the treaty. Landmine Monitor research shows that States Parties are of
divided opinion on this. Nations including South Africa, France, Denmark,
Spain, and Slovakia have indicated transit is prohibited, while Canada, Norway
and Germany indicate it is permitted.
Transparency Reporting (Article 7)
To date, 48 reports have been submitted by States
Parties to the United Nations as required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban
Treaty.[10] In general the ICBL has
found that governments have complied admirably with Article 7. A wealth of
information has been put forward, greatly enriching our collective knowledge on
the mines situation and showing a commitment to true transparency on the part of
States Parties. This information will improve the quality of mine action
activities. To be sure, there are concerns about the content of some reports;
such concerns are described in the individual country reports of Landmine
Monitor Report 2000.[11]
At the January and May 2000 meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on
the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the ICBL outlined a number
of overall concerns regarding Article 7
reporting:[12]
Late Reporting. 36 countries are late in submitting their first Article 7
report. These governments have thus far failed to meet a treaty obligation;
Article 7 reporting is not optional and due dates are legal deadlines, not
targets.
Inconsistent reporting. While some reports are very detailed with a good
deal of supplemental information, others have provided a bare minimum. There
should be a mimimum standard, or “best practices” approach
adopted.
Need for Expanded Article 3 reporting. Article 3 reports on mines retained
for training and development should also include the specific anticipated
purpose and then the actual use of any retained mines.
Need for reporting on Victim Assistance programs. Victim assistance
reporting is conspicuously absent from treaty obligations. The SCEs have
recommended remedying this by use of an optional Form for Article 7. The ICBL
strongly encourages all States Parties to adopt this optional Form and utilize
it in the next round of reporting.
Lack of reporting on prohibited AVMs with AHDs. Since some AVMs with AHDs
are prohibited because they function like AP mines, there should be Article 7
reporting on any stockpiling or destruction of such mines.
Lack of reporting on Claymore-type mines. Since use of non-command detonated
directional fragmentation mines is not permitted under the treaty, States
Parties should report on the number of such mines kept in stock, and the steps
that have been taken to ensure that they can be used only in command detonated
mode.
Lack of reporting on foreign stocks. The United States has AP mines
stockpiled in at least five States Parties (Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and
United Kingdom at Diego Garcia). None of those states have reported on the U.S.
stocks, which should be done to be consistent with the spirit if not the letter
of the treaty.
At the May 2000 SCE meeting, the ICBL recommended that States Parties should
develop a reporting guide as a means of increasing the quantity and quality of
reports. The recommendation was favorably received and the ICBL will work with
interested governments to help develop such a guide.
National Implementation Measures (Article 9)
Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty (“National
Implementation Measures”) states “Each State Party shall take all
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition
of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by
the treaty. However, relatively few of the 100 governments that have signed and
ratified the treaty have passed domestic laws implementing the treaty.
The following 20 governments report that they have enacted implementation
legislation: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Macedonia and Sweden report that adequate implementation measures have been
taken. A number of other states indicate that the treaty has been incorporated
into domestic law, or that existing law is adequate, and new, separate
legislation is not needed: Denmark, Ireland, Jordan, Mexico, Namibia, Portugal,
Slovakia, and Yemen.
The following states have drafted legislation, but it has not yet become law:
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and
Trinidad and Tobago. Albania, Iceland, and South Africa report that
preparations are underway.
Some governments have indicated that they do not believe an implementation
law is required, because they have never possessed AP mines and are not
mine-affected, thus, no special action is necessary to fulfill the terms of the
treaty.
The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass
legislation that would impose penal sanctions for any potential future
violations of the treaty, and would provide for full implementation of all
aspects of the convention.
[3] For more information on the intersessional
process and activities of the SCEs, see the reports to Landmine Monitor from the
ICBL and the ICBL Working Groups. [4] Rwanda
ratified the treaty on 8 June 2000. Thus while it has given its consent to be
bound, the treaty will not formally enter into force for Rwanda until 1 December
2000. The treaty entered into force for Zimbabwe on 1 March 1999 and for Uganda
on 1 August 1999. [5] It also appears there
has been mine use since March 1999 by rebels in Djibouti and Ethiopia/Kenya
(OLF), but in both cases may involve only antitank mines, not AP mines. There
have also been allegations of use by rebels in Algeria (GIA). The governments
of India and Armenia have also been accused of mine use in this period, but
Landmine Monitor found no supporting
evidence. [6] Russia’s moratorium and
China’s declaratory policy only apply to export of non-detectable and
non-self-destruct mines, in keeping with CCW restrictions. However, neither
nation is known to have made a significant export since
1995. [7] For a detailed description of the
diplomatic history on this issue, see Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet,
“Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January
2000. [8] See Executive Summary, p.
9. [9] See ICRC, “Information Paper:
Anti-Vehicle Mines Equipped with Anti-Handling Devices,” April 1999; Human
Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling
Devices,” January 2000; and GIBL website at: http://www.landmine.de
[10] Initial Article 7 reports are due 180
days after entry into force of the treaty for that State Party. Thereafter,
annual reports are due by 30 April of each year. Sixteen States Parties have
submitted their second annual report. [11]
See also in the appendices the submission by VERTIC on the United Nations and
Mine Ban Treaty implementation. [12] See
Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Mine Ban Treaty Transparency
Reporting,” January 2000.