Key developments
since March 1999: Both FRY and KLA forces used mines in the fighting that
ended on 9 June 1999. NATO forces dropped cluster bombs in the March-June
bombing campaign. Since June 1999, extensive mine action programs have been
carried out. As of 1 July 2000, sixteen commercial and nongovernmental
organizations are engaged in mine clearance. Approximately 8 million square
meters of land have been cleared, including 4,173 AP mines, 4,175 AT mines,
4,591 cluster bomblets, and 9,412 other UXO. As of 31 May 2000, 463 villages in
high and medium impact areas have been provided mine awareness education; eleven
organizations are engaged in mine awareness programs. From June 1999 to 31 May
2000, there were a total of 492 mine/UXO victims identified in Kosovo.
Background
With the break-up of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992, Kosovo became the southernmost province
of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The FRY has been heavily
dominated by its Serbian majority, while the majority population in Kosovo is
ethnic Albanian. International pressure as a result of escalating conflict
between the FRY armed forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and
increasingly repressive measures against civilians in Kosovo led to negotiations
in Rambouillet, France in February-March 1999. As these talks broke down,
Serbian forces began “ethnic cleansing,” forcing more than 800,000
Kosovars to flee to Albania and
Macedonia.[1] With the stated
objective of halting this process, on 24 March NATO launched a bombing campaign
against the FRY and Serbian forces in Kosovo, which last lasted seventy-eight
days. In the course of this conflict, large areas of Kosovo have been
contaminated with mines and UXO.
In the agreement between the FRY and NATO on 9 June 1999, all FRY forces were
withdrawn from the province and responsibility for the province’s security
was transferred to KFOR. As a province of FRY, Kosovo lacked the administrative
apparatus of government. To provide an interim administration, UN Security
Council Resolution 1244 created the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The ultimate
status of the province remains undecided.
Mine Use by Yugoslav Forces
The FRY has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.
(See report on Yugoslavia.) Historically the SFRY was a major producer of
mines, and it is estimated that the FRY inherited stockpiles of several million
mines in 1992. Many were used in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina from 1992-1995, but it is likely that large stocks remained at the
start of the conflict.
Several Yugoslav armed forces were operating in Kosovo before and during the
NATO air campaign. The Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslovenska, or VJ) and Special
Police forces operated in tandem with Serbian paramilitary forces under the
control of the Serbian Interior Ministry known by the acronym MUP (Ministarstvo
Unutrasnjih Poslova).
The Yugoslav Army laid extensive barrier minefields along its southern
border. These minefields account for 75-80% of the mines laid in Kosovo. The
majority are situated in remote border regions; many of them are
marked.[2] The VJ also laid
unmarked minefields around defensive positions in a wide variety of
locations.[3] On occasion,
Yugoslav forces also used booby-traps to target civilians.
The MUP Special Police and paramilitary forces laid many AP mines in and
around civilian population centers. Evidence of such “nuisance
mining” was found in Sicevo in Pec district, and most frequently in
central Kosovo in Cabic, Donje Obrinje, Glogovac, Potart and Ujmir in Pristina
district, and in Lubizba in Prizren district. “[M]any villages are
afflicted with random mines laid with the sole aim of causing civilian
casualties and thereby discouraging the return of refugees... are causing
significant casualties and are denying access to farm land. This situation is
most prevalent in villages formerly occupied by the MUP.”[4]
Yugoslav forces are reported to have used PMA-1/1A, PMA-2, PMA-3, and PMR-2A
mines. PMA-1/1A mines have been found in many places, such as around the village
of Veliki Krystac in the Prizren district. The PMA-2 was discovered on the
forested paths of Trstenik near Pristina and in the Djakova area, and the PMA-3
in Kotradic in Pec district. Many PMR-2A mines have been found on the outskirts
of Donja Dubnica in the northern Mitrovica
district.[5]
Mine Use by the KLA
In June 1999, KLA leaders said that if the KLA
were in a position to do so, it would sign the Mine Ban
Treaty.[6] KLA use of mines in
the preceding months casts doubt on such a statement. It is unknown where the
KLA obtained its mines, although there had been unsubstantiated allegations that
they obtained weapons from
Albania.[7]
The KLA officially ceased to exist in September 1999 and stocks of weapons
and ammunition, including mines, were handed over to KFOR before that date under
the terms of an agreement for their
demilitarization.[8] The
agreement provided a timetable for the KLA to disarm itself, and contained
specific provisions concerning landmines and related weaponry in which the KLA
agreed not to place any more mines (section 10b), to mark their minefields and
booby traps by 25 June (section 14a), to establish secure weapons storage sites
by 28 June to be registered with and verified by KFOR (section 23a), and to
store in the registered weapons storage sites all prohibited weapons, including
landmines within thirty days or before 20 September (section 23f1).
But it is very likely that mines of all types continue to be held by
individuals and by unofficial Kosovar Albanian and Serbian groups. The number
of mines handed over to KFOR is classified and it is not possible to make any
accurate estimates of that number. In June 2000 two large caches of weapons and
ammunition, including several hundred mines, were discovered in central Kosovo,
in the village of Klecka near a former KLA headquarters. The KLA denied
responsibility.[9]
KLA officials including its chief mine clearance officer, Col. Bardhyl
Tahiri, claimed that it never used AP mines during the
conflict.[10] According to the
Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC), KLA forces did use AP mines
sporadically during the war, mainly nuisance mining, particularly on routes
travelled by VJ forces.[11]
They also laid minefields around their defensive positions, but to a
significantly lesser degree than the VJ, having smaller material resources, less
freedom of movement and being engaged in a more fluid form of warfare. The HALO
Trust found variations of PMR fragmentation mines around the perimeter of a KLA
safe house in the village of Krajkovo in Pristina
district.[12]
The KLA predominantly used antitank
mines.[13] Colonel Tahiri said
that the KLA used antitank mines either captured or recovered from the VJ as
well as AT mines improvised from components including explosive charges removed
from Yugoslav AP mines. Most of the mines laid by the KLA were not properly
recorded and the deaths of the combatants who laid them effectively erased any
knowledge of their location.
According to UN sources, in the first weeks after KFOR entered Kosovo, the
KLA systematically collected military ordnance for possible future use. In
particular, the removal of stake mines from mixed stake and blast minefields
resulted in the creation of some blast mine fields without any form of visible
identification.
In the year since KFOR entered Kosovo in June 1999 there have continued to
be reported and confirmed incidents of new mine use, particularly antitank mine
use, by unknown persons, targeting the remaining Serbian
population.[14] On 2 June 2000
near Preoce about seven kilometers west of Pristina, two people were killed and
three injured in a mine explosion. On 15 June 2000 near Lepina two people were
killed. KFOR now checks many roads and tracks each
day.[15] On 22 March 2000 KFOR
personnel discovered a device constructed from twenty-seven antitank mines on a
road bridge north of Mitrovica, shortly after a railway bridge nearby had been
destroyed by an explosion.[16]
On 29 July 2000, NATO recovered a large cache of weapons, including 80
mines.[17]
NATO Cluster Bomb Use
During the bombing campaign, the U.S. dropped
1,100 cluster bombs of the type CBU-87/B, each containing 202 BLU-97/B bomblets
and the UK dropped 500 RBL/755 cluster bombs, each containing 147 BL-755
bomblets.[18] Thus, a combined
total of 295,700 bomblets were dropped by NATO. Estimates of the “dud
rate” of cluster bombs, that is, the percentage that fail to explode on
contact as intended and thus become de facto antipersonnel mines, run from a
conservative 5% to as high as 30%. Human Rights Watch has criticized NATO for
use of cluster bombs in populated areas and reported that NATO cluster bomb use
can be confirmed in seven incidents resulting in civilian casualties (another
five are possible but unconfirmed); some ninety to 150 civilians died during the
conflict from use of these
weapons.[19]
Landmine Problem
Kosovo was littered with tens of thousands of
antipersonnel landmines, mostly laid by FRY forces. Although it has been
reported that some 500,000 mines were laid, KMACC has told Landmine Monitor that
the actual number is likely to be around
50,000.[20] About eighty
percent of the landmines are concentrated near the southern border, while
nuisance mines are concentrated in the interior of the province. Additionally,
it is estimated that 10-30,000 unexploded cluster bomblets and other UXO were to
be found in the province at the end of the
conflict.[21]Through its
concerted efforts the international community quickly gained a remarkably full
picture of the extent and variety of the mine/UXO problem in Kosovo, although
data continues to be added. This initial information was gained from several
sources.
On 13 June, the UK-based HALO Trust began a ten-week long minefield survey,
in coordination with the KMACC in Pristina, which was completed in August 1999.
The HALO report positively identified 252 areas with mines or unexploded
ordnance (many areas containing multiple minefields), 684 villages which were
found to be free of war debris, as well as 269 villages where it was uncertain
(due to lack of information) whether or not they were
affected.[22]
A second source was the hundreds of maps of known minefields that the VJ
began to provide to KFOR on 19 June 1999, as required under the agreement ending
the war.[23] The first maps
handed over identified 425 distinct minefields, but NATO engineers working under
KFOR soon concluded that although at least eighty percent of the records
coincided with their own ground observations, many of the maps and other
information lacked sufficient detail to be useful. KFOR asked the VJ to revise
the maps, and on 5 August, records marking 616 minefields were provided; one
minefield was a duplicate, leaving the net total number of minefields identified
by the VJ as 615. This has since been amended to
620.[24]
This second set of more comprehensive records showed sixty of the original
425 minefields in different
locations,[25] and KMACC found
gaps in many areas especially in heavily mined areas in the south of the
province near Macedonia and Albania; the quality of the maps was highly
variable.[26] Nevertheless,
this information suggested that the great majority of mines were concentrated in
the south near the borders with Macedonia and Albania. An unknown number of
mines were buried on the Albanian side of the border. (See Landmine
MonitorReport
2000-Albania).[27]
Another source of less complete and reliable information were KLA officers
indicating locations where they had used landmines during the conflict. Colonel
Tahiri reported that the KLA did not have maps of its mines, but had cleared all
the mines that it had used.[28]
He also said the KLA has provided KMACC with complete information about its
clearance activities, yet the KMACC program manager said that the KLA had
reported only a few of their mine clearance activities to his
office,[29] and KFOR officials
said that the KLA had registered relatively few mines with
them.[30]
A fourth source was the mapping coordinates for the areas attacked with
cluster bombs by NATO during the conflict; although initially reluctant to
provide “classified information,” after international pressure the
data was given to KMACC. The records indicated 333 separate targeted
areas.[31] The final ongoing
source of information has been reports being filed daily with KMACC by KFOR
forces, nongovernmental organizations, commercial contractors and others
operating under U.N. auspices in Kosovo.
Mine Action Funding
Funding for mine action in Kosovo has been a
mixture of direct funding to NGOs and commercial companies and the establishment
of a UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for Kosovo. As of 31 May 2000, approximately
$6.83 million had been contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Kosovo,
and an additional $600,000 pledged. Contributions are outlined in the table
below.[32]
Table 1. Contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Kosovo as of 31 May
2000
Date Funds Received
Donor
Amount (US$)
15-Nov-99
Australia
266,910
12-Apr-00
Australia
47,744
19-Aug-99
Belgium
79,321
20-Aug-99
Belgium
185,112
22-Sep-99
Canada
47,500.00
11-Feb-00
Canada
346,265
30-Jul-99
Denmark
211,996
01-Nov-99
European Union
2,525,520
24-Dec-99
European Union
1,015,500
24-Aug-99
France
325,2035
21-Jul-99
Luxembourg
126,186
10-Dec-99
Netherlands
798,375
30-Jun-99
Norway
199,980
25-Apr-00
San Marino
15,000
29-Feb-00
Spain
185,000
19-Jul-99
Switzerland
152,129
30-Jun-99
United Kingdom
300,000
Subtotal
6,827,745
Funds Pledged
12-Aug-99
European Union
600,000
Subtotal
600,000
Total Funds
7,427,745
Table 2. Funding of mine action organizations
1999-2000[33]
Organization
Funding (governmental unless stated otherwise).
BACTEC International Ltd.
U.K. Department for International Development (DFID).
Operating in MNB (N), MNB (C) and MNB (E).
MNB = MultiNational Brigade area)
Danish Church Aid / Action by Churches Together (DCA/ACT)
Denmark. Operating in MNB (W).
Defence Systems Ltd.
U.K. DFID. Senior partner in MNB (S).
EMERCOM (Russia)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
European Landmine Solutions Ltd. (ELS)
UK DFID. Operating in MNB (W) and MNB (S).
HALO Trust
U.K. DFID, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, International
Trust Fund (ITF) using funds from United States, Germany and Czech Republic,
bilateral agreements with AAR of Japan and Pro Victimis.
Operating in MNB (W). Senior Partner in MNB (C).
Handicap International
Operating in MNB (W). Senior Partner for Djakove Municipality.
HELP (Germany)
Germany through the ITF (with matching US funds).
International Demining Alliance of Canada Inc.
Canada
INTERSOS
Italy and ECHO. Operating in MNB (W).
Mines Advisory Group
Manual teams funded by World Vision and ECHO. Flail funded by U.K. DFID.
Senior Partner MNB (N).
MineTech
MACC core assets funded using EU contributions to VTF and donation by
Belgium. Senior Partner MNB (E).
Mine Clear International Ltd
Funded using EU contributions to VTF. MACC core assets operating
Province-wide.
Norwegian People’s Aid
Norway. Flails donated by Finland.
Senior Partner MNB (W).
RONCO
U.S. Operating in MNB (E).
Swiss Federation for Demining
Working in support of ICRC Safer Village Program.
Mine Action Coordination and Planning
UNMIK was mandated to "establish, as soon as
possible, a Mine Action Center to deal with the threat posed to the returnees
and internally displaced persons by landmines and unexploded
ordnance."[34] Accordingly, the
United Nations Mine Action Service established a Mine Action Coordination Center
(KMACC) in Pristina, which became operational on 17 June 1999, five days after
the entry of KFOR into the
province.[35]
Mine action in Kosovo is based on lessons learned in other mine-affected
areas, including Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to John
Flanagan, the Program Manager of KMACC, “[W]e are not reinventing the
wheel. The lessons have been hard learned over time and we cannot ignore
them.”[36]
There are three fundamental aspects of the Mine Action Program (MAP) in
Kosovo. From its inception, KMACC has concentrated on coordination and the
setting and enforcement of standards, without attempting to engage directly in
clearance operations. It has not opened regional offices but has appointed
implementing agencies as “senior partners” in each of the
MultiNational Brigade (MNB) areas. Second, there is a realistic and structured
mine action plan for containing the landmine/UXO problem and then scaling down
international assistance and handing the program over to the local implementing
agency, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Whether or not this happens on time
or without problems remains to be seen, but donors, the UN and international
NGOs have a clear timetable on which to plan. Third, compared with previous
mine action programs, KMACC activities are effectively integrated into the
overall reconstruction plan for Kosovo.
Mine action planning for Kosovo is based on the premise that the problem can
be brought under control through a three-year program. In order to achieve
this, the program has been divided into three distinct phases, the first two of
which have been completed:[37]
Preliminary Phase: key activities in Kosovo included mine awareness
training to refugees in camps before they returned to the mine-affected area,
rapid assessment of the mine/UXO threat, establishment of a Mine Action
Coordination Center in Pristina as the focal point for humanitarian mine action
activities, and establishment of a victim surveillance system. This phase is now
complete.
Emergency Phase: key activities included mined area
verification/survey; Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks; battle area
clearance; mine/UXO clearance of houses, key installations, essential
infrastructure and mined areas; building local capacity; ongoing mine awareness;
and development of victim assistance capacities. This phase was completed on 31
December 1999.
Consolidation Phase: the transition from Emergency to
Consolidation Phase activities in Kosovo involved the development of an
integrated plan for mine action. The plan builds upon the foundation created
during the Emergency Phase, particularly with regard to the local capacity
developed over this period by NGOs. The objectives of this third phase include
the systematic clearance of mines, reduction in casualties through effective
mine awareness, rehabilitation and reintegration assistance to mine victims, and
development of institutional arrangements upon which the medium to long-term
requirements for mine action will be based.
The plan will also
integrate the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) into the Mine Action Program, as the
indigenous organization tasked to assist with mine/UXO clearance. Reliance on
international assistance will decrease in a controlled manner as part of a
deliberate exit strategy, including reduction in the number of local deminers as
mined areas become cleared. This is necessary to ensure that there is a phased
reintegration of personnel into employment outside mine action.
In order to achieve the objective of clearing all high priority areas in
2000, emphasis is placed on the integration of manual teams, mechanical assets
and Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) teams, which greatly increases the efficiency
of clearance operations. This integrated approach will lead to a significant
amount of land being returned to productive use without the necessity for
full-scale manual clearance operations. Level 2 survey activities are being
developed to pinpoint the exact location of the mined areas, prior to beginning
clearance activities at a particular site. The MACC philosophy for Quality
Control is to systematically inspect each clearance site at various stages of
the process. The combination of these checks will constitute a comprehensive
evaluation of the standards to which activities have been completed. KMACC has
contracted the services of an independent QC capacity for this purpose.
Having entered the Consolidation Phase at the start of 2000, the mine action
objectives for this year are the clearance of all high priority mined or
dangerous areas, clearance of all cluster munition sites, the reduction of
casualties through effective mine awareness and support to the existing
prosthetic and rehabilitation capacities in addition to psychosocial and
vocational training activities. For these aims to be attained, KMACC made
several assumptions, that current levels of support would continue with
additional assets as required, and that weather would permit a full work season.
Two other assumptions were that there is no significant increase in reported
dangerous/mined areas, and that all cluster strike areas can be rapidly surveyed
and marked. KFOR units have been assigned responsibility for this latter task.
The success so far of the operation in Kosovo has brought within sight the
broader humanitarian objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty. The KMACC stated,
“Finally, in Kosovo, there is the possibility of fulfilling the
requirements of the Ottawa Treaty, even though the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is not a signatory. By reinforcing the success that has been achieved
to date, this situation could be realised in a period of three years. This would
be a tremendous achievement both symbolically and physically, and the
international community could be justifiably proud of this result. Conversely,
any reduction in effort at this point could mean that this period is measured in
decades, not
years.”[38]
Survey and Prioritization
As noted above, on 13 June 1999, the UK-based HALO
Trust began a ten-week long minefield survey, in coordination with KMACC in
Pristina, which was completed in August 1999. The HALO Trust level 1 survey was
designed to locate battle debris that posed an immediate risk to the civilian
population. Based on interviews with repatriated refugees and other residents,
and assessments by HALO experts in vehicles and on foot, the survey focused on
affected or potentially affected areas in and around populated villages and
towns. Six teams covered every accessible village over a ten-week period
beginning on 13 June, four days after the end of the war. They later provided
1,205 survey reports of specifically affected areas to KMACC. The HALO report
positively identified 252 areas with mines or unexploded ordnance (many areas
containing multiple minefields), 684 villages which were found to be free of war
debris, as well as 269 villages where it was uncertain (due to lack of
information) whether or not they were
affected.[39]
The core tool facilitating coordination and task prioritization is the
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), a mine action management
package developed for the UN by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining in collaboration with UN Mine Action Service. The system has been used
operationally for the first time in Kosovo. It is made up of a database that
holds mine/UXO information and a Geographic Information System to display and
map data, which can be produced on a scale of 1:50,000.
The survey information provided by the HALO Trust was the first data entered
into IMSMA, and gave an initial indication of the location and scale of
contamination. The Survey Action Center (SAC) was then contracted to tailor a
specific software solution to combine data from a wide variety of
sources[40] and the initial HALO
assessment. A socio-economic impact index was created and information
aggregated at the district level for the 320 districts of Kosovo.
Classification of dangerous areas and district remains flexible enough to absorb
reconstruction priorities as they are created.
The methodology has proven to be statistically highly accurate. According to
KMACC, “As a result of the Survey, each district within the Province has
been categorised as having a High, Moderate, Low or Nil impact as the result of
mine/UXO contamination. Furthermore, each individual mined or dangerous area
can be characterised in the same way, based on its effect on agricultural
development, proximity to habitation or lines of communication, and impact on
activities such as firewood collection. Based on these criteria, 760 out of a
total 1,926 recorded dangerous areas have been classified as having a high
impact. This degree of analysis enables a clear definition of priorities for
clearance, as well as identifying where other activities such as mine awareness
must be placed as a minimum
activity....”[41]
Mine/UXO Clearance
As of July 2000, there are sixteen international
commercial and nongovernmental organizations engaged in mine and UXO clearance.
Although KFOR has made some preparations for the return of the VJ to clear mines
as required by the Military Technical Agreement, the decision to implement this
rests with Commander KFOR based on his assessment of the security situation.
The VJ has not returned as yet because of security risks.
Table 3. Organizations engaged in mine and UXO clearance in Kosovo, July
2000[42]
Organization
Capacity
BACTEC International Ltd.
Four CBU clearance teams and two EOD teams.
Danish Church Aid / Action by Churches Together (DCA/ACT)
As with mine survey and clearance, mine awareness
is coordinated through KMACC. After a chaotic start with too many NGOs trying
to implement mine awareness programs with no experience and no attempt at
coordination, KMACC together with UNICEF have been able to coordinate and
rationalise the system.
Mine awareness programs can be designed to target specific groups. As
analysis of mine victim data shows that males between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-five are the most at-risk group of the population, an awareness campaign
targeting this group is currently being implemented. A child orientated
awareness program is being implemented to cover the gap until mine awareness
education becomes part of the school curriculum in November 2000. This activity
will be launched in conjunction with the ongoing Safer Village projects and safe
play area-marking schemes. The Safer Village concept examines the specific
needs of a village and tries to provide alternatives to risk-taking behavior.
This may mean the provision of firewood in winter until forests where wood has
traditionally been collected are cleared on mines. The Child-to-Child program
focuses on the child as a trainer of other children, and on parents in the home
using traditional games and activities to reinforce mine awareness messages over
a longer period of time. An additional benefit has been children using
information gained in this program to report mines and UXO in the locality to
village adults and KFOR personnel.
There are eleven organizations currently carrying out mine awareness programs
in Kosovo, as outlined in the table below. Additional mine awareness capacity
is expected from HMD Response using U.S. government funding through the
International Trust Fund.
Table 4. Organizations currently implementing mine awareness
programs[44]
Organization
Capacity
Remarks
CARITAS
Senior Partner in MNB (S)
HALO Trust
Two mine awareness teams
Bilateral agreement with AAR Japan. Operating in MNB (W).
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Safer Village Community mine awareness teams.
Active in all but four of the twenty-nine municipalities
Islamic Relief Worldwide
Imam and Child to Child Programs
Funded using EU contribution to VTF.
KFOR
Teams from Sweden, Finland and France accredited by the MACC to conduct
mine awareness.
Mines Advisory Group
Seven teams
4 Child to child training.
3 Community-based mine awareness. MNB (N, E, S)
Mines Awareness Trust
Two teams
Operating in MNB (W).
Child to Child and Train the Trainer programs.
MineTech
Community-based mine awareness teams
Operating in support of MineTech
Clearance operations.
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Two mine awareness teams
Operating in MNB (W) in support of NPA clearance operations. Funded using
EU contribution to VTF.
Save the Children
School Curriculum development funded by UNICEF.
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF)
Youth Program
Funded by MACC using EU contribution to VTF.
Note: MNB refers to MultiNational Brigade
Some 1,973 villages have been classified as being in low, medium and high
impact areas. As of 31 May 2000, 209 villages of the 425 in the high impact
areas (49%) had been reached with mine awareness programs. Of the 537 villages
in the medium impact areas, 47%, or 254, had been involved in mine awareness
activities.[45] Mine awareness
efforts by activity are described in the table below.
Table 5. Mine awareness by activity as of 31 May
2000[46]
Activities
Child to Child
Community
Direct
Imam
Youth
Total Activities
Total
141
445
311
20
45
962
High impact
47
164
102
3
18
334
Medium impact
55
155
122
10
15
357
Note: This table describes the number of villages that are either in a Medium
or High Impact area and does not include figures for villages located in Low
Impact areas.
Mine/UXO Casualties
In the five months after the end of the war on 9
June 1999, 800,000 refugees returned to
Kosovo.[47] During this period
there were many mine casualties, despite the fact that mine awareness programs
had been carried out in refugee camps before their return. From 7-14 July 1999,
the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted an assessment of the number of
people injured or killed by mines and UXO in the four weeks following the end of
the conflict, based on data from Kosovo’s six hospitals and the KMACC
database. It estimated that in the four weeks following 13 June 1999, 150
people were maimed or killed by mines and UXO: “[T]his corresponds to a
monthly incidence rate of 10 per 100,00 population (an annualised rate of 120
per 100,000). Seventy-one per cent of the survivors are younger than
twenty-four.... Nineteen per cent of the seventy-five patients interviewed were
injured during demining efforts by the Kosovo Liberation Army. In some areas
35% and 42% of hospital beds in the surgical and orthopaedic wards are occupied
by survivors of explosions of mines or unexploded
ordnance.”[48] WHO
commented that this rate far exceeds that found in many other countries affected
by mines.[49]
Between June 1999 and 31 May 2000, there have been more than 492 people
involved in mine/UXO incidents. Of these, ninety-eight have died and the
remainder have sustained injuries ranging from traumatic loss of limbs to minor
wounds. Following the decline of casualties over winter, the rate of casualties
has risen recently to approximately fifteen per
month.[50] The resources
currently available to deal with the immediate and follow-up specialized
treatment for mine victims are inadequate. Unexploded cluster munitions appear
to pose the greatest threat, particularly to children. As of June 2000, about
80 children (0–18 years) had been killed or injured by these UXO compared
to about 60 child victims from antipersonnel mines.[51]
Since 1 June 1999, the overall victim rate is 15.4 per 100,000 population,
and mortality rate is 4.9 per 100,000 population. Based on mortality data from
1994, mine/UXO injuries represent the fourteenth leading cause of death in
Kosovo. There is one death for every five mine/UXO victims
injured.[52]
There have been ten casualties among mine clearance personnel up to July
2000. Five incidents involved traumatic amputations of the lower leg through
mine blast, two involved blast injuries to one foot (with minor, non-permanent
damage to the foot), two involved blast injuries from close proximity to
mine/UXO detonations (both non-permanent injuries) and one involved minor damage
(non-permanent injury) to the
hand.[53] Numerous casualties
to KFOR personnel have also been reported in the
press.[54]
Survivor Assistance
In Kosovo, the lead agency for victim assistance
is the World Health Organization which, with the ICRC and a number of NGO
partners such as Handicap International and the Mother Theresa Society, are
developing the means to provide comprehensive medical and rehabilitation care to
mine victims. However, this will take some time, as much of the public health
system and services had deteriorated in recent years and will require
considerable effort to be upgraded. By February 2000 Handicap International had
registered 482 amputees (of which, seventy-three percent were adult men, sixteen
percent adult women, eleven percent
children).[55] Not all of these
are mine victims. There is one prosthetics center in Kosovo, in Pristina. In
addition, the International Trust Fund of Slovenia has provided rehabilitation
assistance to a number of mine
victims.[56]
Table 6. Organizations with current victim assistance
programs[57]
[1] Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch
World Report 2000 (Human Rights Watch: New York, December 1999), pp.
314-316. [2] Consolidated Minefield
Survey Results: Kosovo, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August
1999. [3]
Ibid. [4]
Ibid. [5] Ibid.,
p.8. [6] Meeting with representatives of
the military and political sides of the KLA, and ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams
and then-Canadian Landmine Ambassador Jill Sinclair, Pristina, Kosovo, 30 June
1999. [7] Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
p. 829. [8] The Undertaking of
Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK [KLA] was signed on 21 June 1999
by KFOR Commander Lt. Gen. Mike Jackson and KLA Commander-in-Chief, Hashim
Thaci. [9] ”Peacekeepers Seize
Kosovo Weapons Cache,” Reuters and New York Times, 18 June 2000;
“Kosovo Rebel Commander Denies Hiding Weapons,” Baltimore Sun, 19
June 2000; “KFOR Finds Largest Weapons Cache Yet,” European Stars
and Stripes, 20 June 2000, p. 6. [10]
Human Rights Watch interview with the Col. Tahiri, KLA headquarters, Pristina, 1
September 1999; Human Rights Watch interview with Col. Tahiri, Salihu Veseli,
Chief of Demilitarization, and Commandant Remi, KLA headquarters, Pristina, 4
September 1999. [11] Report (untitled),
Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center, UNMIK, August
1999. [12] Consolidated Minefield
Survey, HALO Trust, 24 August 1999, p.
50. [13] KLA officers provided KMACC
officials with some information about their use of antitank mines during the
conflict and their clearance of antipersonnel mines after the war. The
information was incomplete and made only a marginal contribution to the
international community's knowledge about the extent of battle debris left
behind from the war. Human Rights Watch interviews with Lt. Col. John Flanagan,
Program Manager, KMACC, 1 September 1999, and with Col. Bardhyl Tahiri, KLA
chief mine clearance officer with KMACC, 1 and 3 September
1999. [14] Email from KMACC, 30 June
2000; Danica Kirka, “Two Serbs Killed, 3 Injured in Land Mine
Explosion,” Associated Press, 2 June 2000; Threat Factsheet No. 5, KMACC,
(undated). [15] Email to Landmine
Monitor/Kosovo from KMACC, 30 June 2000; Danica Kirka, “Two Serbs Killed,
3 Injured in Land Mine Explosion”, Associated Press, 2 June
2000. [16] Threat Factsheet No. 5,
KMACC, (undated). [17] Eric B. Pilgrim,
“KFOR Seizes Illegal Arsenal,” European Stars and Stripes, 1 August
2000, p. 2. [18] See, Human Rights
Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” February 2000.
See also, HRW, “Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW Delegates,” 16
December 1999, and HRW, “Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster
Munitions in Yugoslavia,” May
1999. [19] HRW, “Civilian
Deaths,” p. 2. [20] Email from Lt.
Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham),
1 August 2000. Landmine Monitor is grateful to John Flanagan for providing
comments on the draft Landmine Monitor
report. [21] KMACC has estimated that
there are up to 30,000 unexploded bomblets in Kosovo. The Mine and UXO Situation
in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000. Human Rights Watch noted a conservative estimate
of 5% would mean 15,000 unexploded bomblets from cluster munitions. See footnote
16. Others give failure rates of ten percent or more. See Rae McGrath,
“Cluster Bombs: The Military Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of
Cluster Munitions,” UK Working Group on Landmines, August 2000. The HALO
Trust estimated 10,000 UXO. Consolidated Minefield Survey Results, 14 August
1999, p. 3. [22] Consolidated Minefield
Survey Results, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August
1999. [23] Military Technical Agreement
Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999, p.
4. [24] Email from Lt. Col. John
Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August
2000. [25] Human Rights Watch interviews
with KMACC and KFOR officials in Pristina, 23-27 August
1999. [26] Human Rights Watch interview
with Chris Clark, Operations Officer, KMACC, 26 August
1999. [27] Human Rights Watch interviews
with KMACC and KFOR officials in Pristina, 23-27 August 1999; HALO Trust Senior
Survey Officer quoted in: “Profiles, Eastern Europe & the Caucasus:
Kosovo,” Journal of Mine Acton, 1, 4.1 (Spring issue), p.
80. [28] Human Rights Watch interview
with Col. Tahiri, KLA, Pristina, 1 September
1999. [29] Human Rights Watch interview
with the Lt. Col. Flanagan, KMACC, Pristina, 1 September
1999. [30] Human Rights Watch interview
with KFOR officers, Pristina, from 24 August to 3 September
1999. [31] Al J. Venter, “The Prom
1: Waiting on the Ground for Deminers in Kosovo,” Journal of Mine Action,
1.4.1 (Spring issue) 2000, pp.
12-16. [32] Mine Action Capacity
Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1
March-31 May 2000, Annex A. [33] Mine
Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC
quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. MNB is MultiNational Brigade
area. [34] UN Security Council Report of
the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Resolution 1244
(1999). [35] Report (untitled), Kosovo
Mine Action Co-ordination Center, UNMIK, August 1999; responsibility for KMACC
was assigned to the office of the Deputy Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General, responsible for Humanitarian Affairs. This office forms the
first pillar of the UNMIK structure, the other three being Civil Administration
(UN), Institutional Building (OSCE) and Reconstruction
(EU). [36] Email from KMACC, 30 June
2000. [37] UNMIK Mine Action Programme,
Operational Plan for Consolidation Phase, Mine/UXO Clearance, KMACC, 13 December
1999. [38] The Mine and UXO Situation in
Kosovo, Public Information document, Kosovo Mine Action Co-ordination Center, 15
June 2000, p. 7. [39] Consolidated
Minefield Survey Results: Kosovo, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August
1999. [40] Sources of data include:
UNMIK, UNHCR, FAO, WFP, IMG, WHO,
ICRC. [41] The Mine and UXO Situation in
Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 5. [42]
Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC
quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. Amendments to MAG section
provided in email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, MAG to Landmine
Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July
2000. [43] The Mine and UXO Situation in
Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 3. [44]
Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC
quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. Amendments to MAG section
provided in email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, MAG to Landmine
Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July
2000. [45]
Ibid. [46] The Mine and UXO Situation in
Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000 p., 4. [47]
Kosovo: Emergency Bulletin 21, Save the Children, November 1999, p. 1; for
details of casualties in Yugoslav minefields over the Albanian border see report
on Albania in Landmine Monitor Report
2000. [48] E. G. Krug and A. Gjini,
“Number of Land Mine Victims in Kosovo in High,” British Medical
Journal, 14 August 1999, p. 450. [49]
WHO Finds Heavy Toll from Land Mines in Kosovo, Press Release, World Health
Organization, 15 July 1999. [50] The
Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p.
4. [51] UNMIK MACC, extrapolated from
IMSMA database, June 2000; original data from the
ICRC. [52] UNMIK MACC, extrapolated from
IMSMA database by Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, June 2000; original data
from ICRC. [53] Email from Lt. Col.
Flanagan, KMACC, 12 July 2000. [54]
“German Soldiers Wounded in Kosovo Minefield,” Reuters, 23 September
1999; “One Peacekeeper Killed, Five injured in Kosovo,” Associated
Press, 23 September 1999; “US Soldier Killed in Mine Explosion in
Kosovo,” FBIS, 16 December 1999; “Soldiers Injured in Kosovo
Landmine Blast,” Financial Times, 30 December
1999. [55] Activity Report on the
Activities of the National Orthoprosthetic Workshop, August 1999-February 2000,
Handicap International, Pristina, undated; Synthesis Report of Operation,
Handicap International, Pristina, January 2000, p.
6. [56] Email from John Flanagan, KMACC,
to Landmine Monitor, 1 August 2000. [57]
Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC
quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A.
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