Pakistan-backed militants, and allegedly Pakistan Army troops, made extensive
use of antipersonnel mines in the conflict in the Kargil area of Kashmir in
mid-1999. It appears the militants in Kashmir obtained and used antipersonnel
mines manufactured by the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF). POF
also offered antipersonnel mines for sale to a journalist posing as a
representative of a private company in Sudan.
Pakistan ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 9 March 1999, exercising the
nine-year deferral period. Landmine Monitor now estimates Pakistan’s
stockpile of AP mines to be at least 6 million, much larger than previously
reported. Pakistan has begun the process of making all of its AP mines
detectable. Pakistan is producing new mines in compliance with Amended Protocol
II. The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines conducted a survey in the Bajaur
area, identifying 405 mine victims. The PCBL believes there may be thousands of
mine victims in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
Mine Ban Policy
Pakistan has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.
Pakistan has been one of the stronger defenders internationally of the continued
possession and use of antipersonnel landmines, indicating that it recognizes the
humanitarian concerns, but believes that security concerns are paramount. Still,
Pakistan has expressed its support for “the objective of the complete
elimination of APLs [antipersonnel landmines]
everywhere.”[1] The
government has said, “While Pakistan remains fully committed to the cause
of eventual elimination of APLs, defence requirements do not allow it to
join the Ottawa Treaty at
present.”[2] A ban is not
possible “till such time as an alternative becomes available to meet its
security requirements, which like all other sovereign states, Pakistan alone
will determine.”[3]
The Pakistan Armed Forces believes that antipersonnel mines are needed both
for potential future conflict with India and for the situation in Jammu and
Kashmir. Pakistan was one of only ten nations to abstain on United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 51/45 (10 December 1996) urging states to vigorously
pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also
among the small number of states to abstain on pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA
resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999.
Pakistan did not attend as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to
the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique. It has participated in
one of the ban treaty intersessional meetings of the Standing Committee of
Experts on mine clearance, held in Geneva in March 2000. Pakistan also sent
representatives to the International Committee of the Red Cross’ South
Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999.
Pakistan favors a consensus-driven approach and considers Protocol II
(Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) as the desirable processes.
Pakistan ratified Amended Protocol II of the CCW on 9 March 1999. In
ratifying, it indicated it would exercise the option to defer implementation of
key provisions for a nine-year period. At the First Annual Conference of states
parties to the amended protocol, held in Geneva in December 1999, Pakistan said
the protocol’s “membership represents a global partnership of those
who have been able to assume obligations to completely prohibit anti-personnel
landmines and others who seek to balance their military and security compulsions
with critical humanitarian
considerations.”[4] It
also said that the protocol represented “an evolving process which if
fully supported, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, will indeed
facilitate the objective of a universally accepted ban on
APLs.”[5]
At the same meeting, Pakistan called on nations to “[e]xplore in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva further measures which would advance the
goal of the ultimate prohibition of APLs. Pakistan was the first country to
propose the appointment of a Special Co-ordinator for this purpose. We can
continue to support negotiations in the CD for a universal instrument banning
transfers.”[6]
Production
Pakistan is a producer of antipersonnel mines.
State-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), founded in 1951, has produced six
types of AP mines. (See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for details).
Pakistan has said that it imposed a moratorium on production during the time
Amended Protocol II was under negotiation, “so that production goals could
be harmonized with an new provisions emerging from the negotiation. Since then
limited production has occurred only in response to a real and finite demand
from the armed forces.”[7]
Pakistan also noted that it “had to eliminate an entire indigenous
programme of self-neutralising mines” because such mines were permissible
under the old protocol but not the
new.[8]
In its first annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II,
Pakistan states that it has taken “[c]omprehensive measures at the
production level to make detectable APLs in future,” that “[m]arking
features have been incorporated in future productions of APLs,” and that
“[s]pecifications for RDMs [remotely delivered mines] have since been
implemented.”[9]
In December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat told the ICBL that all AP mines
produced since 1 January 1997 were detectable. He also said new production was
required because of the deteriorating condition of many mines in the stockpile.
He indicated that new production would include both hand-laid mines (with
sufficient metal content for Protocol II) and remotely-delivered mines with
self-destruct and self-deactivation
features.[10]
Transfer
Pakistan made significant exports of antipersonnel
mines in the past, with Pakistani mines being found in Afghanistan, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Sri Lanka and other locations.
Pakistan announced on 13 March 1997 that it would observe a comprehensive
moratorium of unlimited duration on the export of antipersonnel landmines.
Subsequently, Pakistan strengthened this with a regulation: “As part of
its export control policy, the Government has issued an SRO (Statutory
Regulatory Order) on 25 February 1999, totally banning the export of land
mines.”[11] Pakistan
claims that it has not exported any antipersonnel mines since
1991.[12]
In early November 1999, Azeem Zaki, an attaché at Pakistan’s
High Commission in London offered antipersonnel mines for sale to a British
television journalist posing as a representative of a private company operating
in Sudan.[13] The offer was
filmed and aired on the UK Channel Four Dispatches program on 9 December
1999. The state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories also offered the mines for
sale in a faxed quotation dated 11 November 1999. It lists prices of $2,450 for
100 P-7 MK2 bounding antipersonnel mines and $9,300 for 150 P5A3 Claymore-type
mines.[14]
As described in one press account:
“The [Dispatches] programme makers secretly filmed the Pakistani
diplomat agreeing to sell landmines to the reporter, posing as a British arms
dealer, during a meeting at an hotel in Knightsbridge, Central London....
Representing a fictitious company, Charles Stevens Associates, the Dispatches
reporter was told that, despite the ban on exporting anti-personnel
landmines, Pakistan Ordnance Factories, a state-owned business, was still
producing them ‘for their own need’ and arrangements could be made
to export them. At one point, it is alleged that Mr. Zaki was ready to arrange
the export of anti-personnel landmines to Sudan.... To back up the conversations
at the hotel, Pakistan Ordnance Factories sent a list of weapons that could be
made available, including a P7 mark 2 anti-personnel mine, described as a
‘jumping/bounding type’ that created a ‘better fragmentation
effect’.”[15]
The ICBL stated, “Such a sale would appear to violate the Landmine
Protocol, Pakistan’s domestic law banning mine transfers, and the
UK’s domestic law prohibiting sale, or even the offer of a sale, of mines
in the UK.”[16] The
government of Canada expressed its concerns noting that if true, this would be
“in direct violation of their [Pakistan’s] obligations under the
Amended Protocol II to the CCW.... Canada would welcome clarification of these
issues from Pakistani
authorities.”[17]
In reaction, Pakistani officials stated, “Under existing procedures it
is not possible to effect any international transfer without the express
authority of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign
Affairs.”[18] While
noting that an investigation was underway, a diplomat insisted that no sale was
offered, just discussed, and that the munitions in question were
command-detonated devices, not antipersonnel mines, thus eligible to be
exported.[19] Another Pakistani
diplomat told the ICBL that “quite a few heads will roll” as a
result of the incident, not only Zaki but also POF personnel. He said that the
attaché was a low-level functionary and stressed that the sale would
never have been successfully completed. He also said that while the jumping
mine could be command-detonated, that feature could easily be changed, so that
the mine was a “dangerous thing to be exported” and would be removed
from the export list. He stated that the mine had not been exported in the
past.[20]
It also appears the militants in Kashmir have obtained and used mines
manufactured by the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. During interviews with senior
Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, a Landmine
Monitor researcher was shown and took photographs of recovered mines, both
antipersonnel and antitank, that had the seal of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory
on them.[21] This too would
appear to be a violation of Article 8 of Amended Protocol II, which prohibits
transfers to any recipient other than a state or state agency authorized to
receive such transfers.
There are some allegations that antipersonnel mines, including PMN and PMN-2
mines, are shipped illegally by arms dealers from Afghanistan into the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and possibly to Kashmir militants as
well.[22]
Stockpiling
In response to the requirement in Amended Protocol
II, Pakistan said it “accepted to convert our entire stock of APLs to
detectable mines. This process is well
underway.”[23]
Non-detectable mines in Pakistani stocks include the P2 Mk2 and P4 Mk1 mines.
Pakistan has said the conversion will be completed within the nine-year deferral
period (up to the year 2007).
In Landmine Monitor Report 1999, lacking any official information, it
was guessed that there are hundreds of thousands of landmines stockpiled in
Pakistan.[24] However, in a
meeting with ICBL representatives in December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat stated
that Pakistan had since 1997 already converted 2.5 million antipersonnel mines
to detectable status. He further indicated that at one point in time this
represented about one-third of the total Pakistani stockpile, but now
constituted more than one-third. He noted that the stockpile number is secret,
but is also fluid and could increase in the future. These comments lead to a
Landmine Monitor estimate of at least six million antipersonnel mines in
Pakistan’s
stockpile.[25]
Various irregular armed groups, non-state actors, and tribesmen have
traditionally possessed a wide variety of arms and explosives in the country.
Many such groups are likely to have independent stocks of mines and high quality
modern explosives capable of being made into Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs).[26]
Use
The Pakistani Army used landmines during its three wars with India in 1947,
1965 and 1971. Pakistan has also laid antipersonnel mines in front of its
defended localities in Jammu and
Kashmir.[27] It has plans to lay
mines on the border with India in times of
war.[28]
Armed insurgent groups (often called militants) supported by Pakistan, and
possibly regular Pakistan Army personnel, used antipersonnel mines in the
conflict from May-July 1999 in the Kargil region of
Kashmir.[29] India has charged
that “during the intrusions in India’s Kargil areas large scale and
indiscriminate laying of anti-personnel landmines, including both metallic and
plastic APLs and special snow type devices, was resorted to by the retreating
intruders.”[30] Two types
of plastic mines were used: P2Mk2 in areas not covered by snow and P4Mk2 in
areas covered by snow. A total of 8,804 mines had been recovered as of August
1999.[31]
India has said that the forces were mainly regular Pakistani army troops,
backed by rebels, but Pakistan has insisted that it is only providing moral and
diplomatic support to the
militants.[32]
Asked by Landmine Monitor to confirm or deny allegations of use by Pakistani
troops in 1999 in Kashmir, the government in a letter did not reply specifically
to the allegation, but instead responded that “Pakistan’s record
with respect to the regulated use of landmines is second to none.” It
also noted that it fully abides by the provisions of Amended Protocol
II.[33]
Since the end of the mid-1999 conflict, there continue to be frequent reports
of use of landmines by Pakistan-supported militants in Kashmir. The Indian
government claimed to have seized 200 mines from militants in Kashmir in the
first four months of
2000.[34]
Tribesmen continue to use landmines and IEDs, mostly in personal and
inter-tribal disputes, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan:
Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Kurram Agency, and District Dir.
Landmine Problem
According to its 1999 Annual Report to the CCW,
“there is no problem of uncleared mines in the areas under the
jurisdiction of the government of Pakistan. However, in certain areas adjoining
Afghanistan, there have been instances of the presence of uncleared mines which
were deployed during the period of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its
spill over to our
borders.”[35]
While the government reports no problem with uncleared landmines, Pakistan is
mine-affected in the tribal belt. No assessment or detailed survey has been
made of the extent of the problem of landmines. However, the Pakistan Campaign
to Ban Landmines (PCBL) has carried out a study in the Mamoond Tehsil
(sub-district) of the Bajaur Agency, believed to be one of the most
mine-affected areas in the
country.[36] The PCBL reports
the presence of mines in agricultural lands, roads, pathways, near schools and
other places posing threats to the communities. Of the 405 mine incidents
recorded by PCBL, nearly half (196) took place in agricultural fields.
Mine Action Funding
Pakistan's contribution to mine action has been
in-kind services; it has played a very active role in UN and peacekeeping mine
clearance operations internationally. In 1989, through ‘Operation
Salam’, demining training camps for Afghans were established at Risalpur
and Quetta in Pakistan under UN auspices. From 1989-1995 a total of 17,055 mine
clearance personnel were trained at these camps. Part of Operation Salam’s
agenda was also to impart mine awareness to Afghan refugees to identify mines
and undertake due
precautions.[37]
Pakistani soldiers were also part of the UN demining operations in Cambodia
in 1992-93, in Kuwait in 1991, in Angola from 1995-1998, in eastern Slovenia and
Western Sahara.[38]
In December 1999, Pakistan stated, “We will continue to offer in-kind
contributions to global demining
efforts,”[39] but it is
not known if any operations are currently underway.
Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness
While actively involved internationally, the Army
is not carrying out mine clearance or training operations in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Protocol II Article 13 report details the methods of clearance
and the types of detectors employed by the Pakistani
Army.[40]
According to the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, some of the local people
have purchased mine detectors to try to protect themselves from mines. Local
“clearance” methods often mean throwing stones or firing bullets at
mines.
There are no mine awareness programs in place. The PCBL found tampering with
mines, especially by children, to be common. The PCBL is developing a mine
awareness and risk avoidance education program in the Bajaur Agency.
Landmine Casualties
The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines’
survey in the Bajaur area identified 405 landmine victims. Of that total 261
(64%) were the breadwinners of their families, 144 (36 %) were females, and 109
(27%) were age eighteen or younger. A staggering 41% of the victims died from
their injuries, largely due to lack of or inadequate first aid and medical
facilities. Most of the incidents (260 or 64%) occurred from 1995-1998, with 33
recorded in 1999 and 14 thus far in 2000. The most common activity when mine
incidents occurred was working in a field (26%); the second most common was
walking to work (25%).
PCBL believes that there may be thousands of landmine victims in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Since the landmine-affected areas are far away
from the major cities of Pakistan, even first aid facilities are not available
for landmine victims, let alone advanced facilities. Generally victims are
rushed to hospitals in the big cities. There are no psychological, social and
rehabilitation facilities provided by the government or any national or
international organization. Prosthetic and assistance device facilities are
available in Pakistan but it is beyond the ability of most victims to afford
them.
The PCBL study in the Bajaur area noted inadequate and inefficient medical
infrastructure, lack of first aid facilities, complete absence of emergency
medical care, lack of emergency evacuation capability, severe transportation
constraints, and the inability of victims to pay for treatment or medicines.
There is no government or NGO program for longer-term rehabilitation in the
area.
[1] Statement by the Representative of
Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the
Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p.
5. [2] Letter from Ambassador Inam ul
Haque, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Pakistan Mission to the United
Nations, New York, to Stephen Goose, Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group, 15
November 1999. [3]
Ibid. [4] Statement by the
Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting
Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p.
1. [5] Ibid., pp.
1-2. [6] Ibid., p.
5. [7] Ibid., p.
4. [8] Ibid., p.
3. [9] Pakistan National Annual Report
submitted in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, 25 October 1999,
p. 5. [10] ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz
Hassan Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December
1999. Notes taken by Stephen
Goose. [11] Protocol II Annual Report,
25 October 1999, p. 6. [12] Statement by
the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High
Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p.
4. [13] A good summary of this incident
is UK Working Group on Landmines, “Pakistan and the sales of
anti-personnel mines in the UK,” 9 December
1999. [14] Landmine Monitor has a copy
of the faxed offer. In a letter dated 1 December 1999, POF stated that the
items were not antipersonnel mines, but command-detonated mines, that it was a
routine response to a query, and that export of the items is subject to issuance
of permits by the government. [15]
Michael Evans, “Pakistani ‘in deal for landmines,’” The
Times (London), 7 December 1999. [16]
ICBL Statement to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II,
Geneva, 15 December 1999. [17] Statement
of the Canadian Delegation at the First Annual Conference of States Parties to
Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 15 December
1999. [18] Statement by the
Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting
Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p.
4. [19] Oral statement by Pakistani
representative to the Annual Conference on Protocol II, Geneva, 16 December
1999. See also The News International (national English daily), 2 January
2000. [20] ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz
Hassan Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December
1999. Notes taken by Stephen
Goose. [21] Interviews by Landmine
Monitor/India researcher with senior Border Security Force officials and Army
officials in Kashmir, BSF Camp and Army Headquarters in Sri Nagar, 6-9 January
2000. [22] Interviews by Pakistan
Campaign to Ban Landmines with local communities in the Bajaur Agency,
July-November 1999. [23] Statement by
the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High
Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 3.
See also, Protocol II report, 25 October 1999, p.5, which also states,
“Devices have been developed which will be incorporated to make the
antipersonnel mine
detectable.” [24] Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, p. 497, cited in Banerjee, p.
23. [25] ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz
Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December 1999.
Notes taken by Stephen Goose. [26]
Dipankar Banerjee, then-Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New
Delhi, “South Asian Regional Survey,” prepared for Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, p. 23. Banerjee based this on observations from the South Asian
Regional Landmines Workshop, held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 7-8 December 1998, which
included active duty and retired military officers from
Pakistan. [27] U.S. State Department,
Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 137,
states “there are significant minefields along [Pakistan’s] disputed
border with India in Kashmir. [28]
Banerjee, p. 22. [29] Ghulam Hasnain,
“Under Cover of Night: The presence of Pakistani soldiers deep in enemy
territory disproves Islamabad’s claims of innocence,” Time, 12 July
1999, p. 20-21. Pakistan’s claim has been that the intruders fighting at
Kargil were freedom fighters and the Pakistan Army had nothing to do with
it. [30] India’s Protocol II
Article 13 report, 1 December 1999. [31]
“Mines Used By Pak Intruders,” statistics provided by Ministry of
Defence, Government of India, data as of July
1999. [32] See, for example,
“India Accepts Pakistan Talk Offer as battle rages in Kashmir,”
Agence France-Press, Srinagar, India, 8 June 1999; “Militants Kill 19 in
Kashmir attacks,” Reuters, Jammu, India, 20 July
1999. [33] Letter from Mr. Shahbaz,
Director General (Disarmament), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, to
Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor/HRW, 12 July 2000. Landmine Monitor’s
letter of inquiry was addressed to the Foreign Minister, dated 26 June 2000, and
stated, “We anticipate that Pakistan will be identified in this report as
a government that has used antipersonnel mines since March 1999. This relates,
in particular, to use of mines in the conflict with India in Kashmir. Landmine
Monitor welcomes any comment on this, including a confirmation or
denial....” [34] “Indian
forces say 250 Kashmir militants eliminated in last four months,” BBC
Monitoring of Doordarshan television, New Delhi, 6 May
2000. [35] Protocol II Article 13
report, 25 October 1999, pp. 4-5. [36]
The PCBL conducted interviews at different intervals in 1999 and 2000, but most
were conducted from July to November 1999. Details of the PCBL study are
contained in the full draft version of the Pakistan country report for Landmine
Monitor prepared by the PCBL. It is available to the
public. [37] Protocol II Article 13
report, 25 October 1999, pp. 8-12. [38]
Ibid. [39] Statement by the
Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting
Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p.
4. [40] Protocol II Article 13 report,
25 October 1999, p. 7.
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