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Country Reports
RUSSIA, Landmine Monitor Report 2000
LM Report 2000 Full Report   Executive Summary   Key Findings   Key Developments   Translated Country Reports


Key developments since March 1999: Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan from August 1999 to the present day. In April 2000, Russia announced plans to mine its border with Georgia. CCW Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification in May 2000. Destruction of significant numbers of obsolete and non-Protocol II compliant AP mines has continued.

Mine Ban Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Although government officials and, perhaps most notably, then-President Boris Yeltsin have stated Russia’s willingness to sign at some point in the future,[1] it is clear that the military still considers antipersonnel mines a necessary weapon, as evidenced by its extensive use of the weapon in operations first in Dagestan in August 1999 and then in Chechnya from September 1999 to the present day.

In addition to stating concerns about costs related to implementing the treaty, the military insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines must be in place before Russia can ban the weapon. In its December 1999 response to an OSCE questionnaire on antipersonnel mines, the government stated: “The Russian Federation believes that what is important to solve the ‘mines’ problem is a realistic approach taking into account the interests of all the members of the international community and, first of all, of the states which historically or due to their geostrategic location are compelled to rely on this defensive weapon to ensure their security. The Russian Federation advocates the search for mutually acceptable solutions for anti-personnel mines and opposes the division of the international community into supporters of a hasty ban on anti-personnel mines and those states that are still unable to take this step and propose other ways to meet this goal.”[2]

Although President Vladimir Putin has not made any public statements regarding a mine ban since his election, a government press release in March 2000 spoke of the policy “aimed at banning of landmines,” declared by the president. It noted that the pending ratification of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), would “enable the Russian Federation to carry out a more active role in landmine-related issues in the international political arena.” [3]

Russia attended, as an observer, all of the treaty preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, as well as the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999. It has also participated in many of the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. However, Russia has continuously stated its strong preference for dealing with controls on AP mines through the CCW and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), rather than the Mine Ban Treaty.[4] Russia abstained on the vote on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has every pro-ban resolution since 1996.

At the same time, Russian officials are always quick to point out some of the positive steps Russia has taken toward a ban: a moratorium on export of non-detectable and “dumb” antipersonnel mines, a ban on the production of blast mines, and the destruction of more than half a million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[5]

Conference on Disarmament and Convention on Conventional Weapons

Russia has consistently favored the CD “as the main forum for the mine action issue.”[6] It called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an export ban.[7] Again in December 1999, it stated that it “reiterates its proposal to establish a special committee in the framework of the CD that could deal with the problem of the universal ban on APM transfer.”[8]

Russia is a party to the 1980 CCW and its original Protocol II on landmines. Putin submitted Amended Protocol II (1996) to the State Duma for ratification in early May 2000.[9] Hearings will presumably take place in late June 2000 with fairly good chances for its approval.[10]

A government press release on preparations for the submission for ratification noted that it “complies with the interests of the Russian Federation” because it allows for the destruction of “huge stocks of outdated APMs with expired life-time,” with minimal financial burden, coupled with relative ease in military-technical terms, and for the development of alternatives. It also noted that ratification would not affect Russian defense capacity or security. [11]

For several years the Russian military has stated that steps were already being taken to fulfill requirements of the Amended Protocol: “Necessary recommendations on the combat use of APMs in compliance with the new requirements have been prepared and released to the related staffs and commanders of military units.”[12] At the December 1999 Tbilisi Conference, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Nagorny stated that “the Russian Engineers are fulfilling all requirements of the CCW to a full extent.”[13]

The costs associated with implementing Amended Protocol II are officially budgeted at 3,066,805 rubles (approximately U.S.$109.53 million) over the eight-year period 1998-2005.[14] According to information from the Ministry of Defense obtained by International Physicians to Prevent Nuclear War-Russia, full costs to implement Amended Protocol II are estimated at about U.S.$374.6 million, which includes costs for making some mines compliant with the Protocol, development and production of some alternatives, and destruction of some stocks. A similar estimate of the cost of joining the Mine Ban Treaty is about U.S.$576 million, which includes costs for development and production of alternatives as well as destruction of all stockpiles. Below are two charts illustrating the total estimated cost projections: [15]

Cost estimate of Russia’s joining the MBT prepared by the RF Ministry of Defense for the RF government in 1998:

AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in mln Russian R (as of 1998)

Year by year
1. Development of engineer munitions – alternatives to LM

2. Production & accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of engineer munitions – alternatives to LM
3. LM stockpiles destruction (reprocessing)


Cost estimate of Russia’s meeting the requirements of the CCW and its amended Protocol II:

AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in billions Russian Rubles (as of 1998)

Year by year
1. Modernization of the existing munitions (LMs) and development of new ones (alternatives to LMs), including the preparation of their production

2. Production and accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of new munitions

3. Outdated LM stockpiles destruction (reprocessing)


Russia has been one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of AP mines. It is believed that since 1992, it has been producing at least ten types of antipersonnel mines.[16] In May 1998, representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast AP mines.[17] Russian military reconfirmed this at the Tbilisi landmine conference in December 1999.[18] (For more detail on mines types, production sites, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806.)

In the former USSR there were more than 20 enterprises that either assembled landmines or produced their components. According to the public statements of the Command of the Russian Engineer Forces, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, ninety percent of Russia’s ammunition and armament production facilities were left outside the territory of Russia, namely in Ukraine, Belarus and in the Baltic republics of the former USSR.[19] But, within the last three to five years, the military has managed to begin the production of different modern types of ammunition, including mines and fuses, which were previously produced outside its territory.[20] Some plants that have assembled AP mines are now involved in destruction technology.

According to official sources, it should not be assumed that Russia has increased its production of AP mines as a result of the on-going conflict in Chechnya. They state current stocks of mines compliant with CCW Protocol II are significant -- and will be for quite some time.[21] Instead Russia is increasingly focusing more efforts on research and development of landmine alternatives.[22] In the above charts estimating costs of implementing the MBT, points one and two show costs of development and production, respectively, of alternatives. (For more on alternatives see Landmine Monitor 1999, pp. 807-808.)


The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest exporters of antipersonnel mines. However, on 1 December 1994 it announced a three-year moratorium on the export of AP mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This was extended for another five years on 1 December 1997.[23] Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny of the Russian Engineer Forces stated, “Since 1991 Russia entirely stopped the export of APMs in any countries of the world. The only exception is APMs left behind in the CIS countries according to governmental agreements with the countries in question. Since 1991 no planned transfers of APMs have taken place.”[24] (For more details on transfer, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 808.)

But apparently a black market operates. On 13 January 2000, on a trip to the US, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ilia Akhmadov stated that Chechens were being provided “arms, ammunition, including explosives...by Russia.” Chechen military have said that the only method of receiving and replenishing their AP mines is through contacts with representatives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.[25]


There is no official public number of antipersonnel landmines stockpiled in Russia. One published report states that Russia has approximately 60 million landmines that fall under the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty.[26] ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock. (For information on types and locations of stocks, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809.) Both military officials and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admit that through governmental agreements huge stocks have been left in CIS states, in particular in Belarus and Ukraine, and that certain stockpiles remain at the disposal of Russian military units and contingents presently located in CIS countries.


Russia carries out systematic destruction of its obsolete AP mines as well as mines with an expired shelf life, primarily PMN and PMN-1s. Some mines are recycled, extracting explosives and reprocessing them for civilian use. Mines currently slated for destruction also include those not in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II. In 1998, more than 500,000 such mines were destroyed.[27] According to Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, of the Engineer Forces, the number of mines destroyed will reach 800,000 by the end of 2000.[28] However, General Kuznetsov (ret.), who was the commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, stated that in 1998-1999 alone, 850,000 mines were destroyed.[29] Plans call for destroying non-CCW compliant mines by 2005,[30] but Nagorny said that destruction would not be completed until 2010-2012.[31] The Ministry of Defense has calculated that it will cost about U.S.$6.4 million annually to destroy all of its non-CCW compliant mines.[32]


After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines in 1993 during the conflict in Tajikistan, during large-scale combat operations in Chechnya from December 1994 until June 1996, in military operations against Dagestan in August 1999, and then again on a wide-scale basis in Chechnya since September 1999. Russian forces in CIS peacekeeping operations in Georgia/Abkhazia and perhaps elsewhere have also used mines.

A government official, describing their use in Dagestan wrote, “The use of antipersonnel landmines there was nothing less but a ‘dire necessity.’ In Dagestan we had to do everything possible not only to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but first and foremost to protect the civilian population from international terrorists.... The Russian Federation uses antipersonnel landmines only for the purposes of defense and in the first place to deter terrorists, drug smugglers and other potential illegal trespassers who wish to penetrate into our territory.”[33]

In the renewed fighting in Chechnya, which continues as Landmine Monitor goes to print, mines have been used in significant numbers by all armed fighters, but particularly by Russian forces. Chechens have made unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the fighting broke out.[34] Questions have been raised if the types of mines and methods of mine use have been consistent with CCW Protocol II, as well as its requirements for mapping, marking, and protecting minefields.

Russian officials themselves, including at the highest military levels in the operation in Chechnya, admit the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations. Russian troops have used hand-laid mines, air- and artillery-scattered mines, as well as remotely controlled devices. The main objectives of the initial stages of the operation were the creation of “security zones,” and a “sanitary corridor.” The military has said that at that point, only MVZ mines were used to protect check-points, outposts and temporary positions, and that the mines were removed whenever the units changed position.[35] They also said that the minefields were mapped and the “security zones” were marked.[36] As operations expanded, so did the use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Hand-laid mines included OZM-72, and MON-50/90/100 mines.[37] It is likely that, in many cases, decisions to use mines were made at individual command and/or small reconnaissance team and patrol level.[38]

The Russians also have widely used scatterable mines, mostly dropped from aircraft, to cut off potential withdrawal routes from Dagestan, against guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, and to cut off both weapons supply and guerrilla reinforcement along the Russian-Georgian border. In December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that such operations had been going on for two months, and he stated that on one day alone, Russian aircraft scattered mines along a 20 kilometer stretch in the Chechen border area. He noted that it is very difficult to precisely locate air-scattered mines.[39] The most commonly used mine has been the PFM-1S, which is equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.[40] Artillery-delivered mines have also been used, notably in the mining of the estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu.[41]

Much of the Chechen capital of Grozny has been laid to waste in the fighting.[42] Mines have been used extensively in the city and have taken their toll on combatants and civilians alike. In one of the most notorious incidents in the fighting for Grozny, on 31 January 2000, a column of some 2-3,000 rebels evacuated the city through a minefield, suffering heavy casualties.[43] Russians officials claimed they lured the guerrillas into a trap by pretending to accept a bribe in exchange for safe passage out of Grozny. “Frankly, we did not expect bandits, especially the key figures, to swallow the bait,” said Gen. Vladimir Shamanov.[44] Several hundred fighters were killed or wounded, including rebel commanders. [45] One doctor in the nearby village of Alkhan-Kala said that in two days, he amputated limbs on sixty-seven mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his right foot.[46]

Shortly after the incident, the Russian military closed Grozny to returning civilians. On Russia’s NTV television, Col. Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, a top Russian commander, said, “As long as the city isn’t cleared of all mines and shells, and there is a threat of buildings collapsing, civilians are being banned from entering.” He added, “Under civilian disguise, militants are trying to return to pick up their wounded.”[47]

On 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been “completely cleared of mines.” They did, however, note that the “city is still unsafe,” charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.[48] In May 2000, Russian authorities began using mines again to protect factories and power plants in Chechen’s capital, Grozny. The Russian-appointed mayor of the city, Supyan Mokchayev reported that such mining was necessary to stop “a plague of looting by their own [Russian] troops.”[49]

Russia has also “accidentally” dropped mines on Georgian territory. On 9 August 1999, two Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan, where Russia was fighting against rebels and bombed in and around the village of Zemo Omalo; three people were wounded, one severely.[50] Georgian military were able to identify the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs, containing PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.[51] On 17 August, it was reported that Air Force headquarters would “[o]n behalf of the Russian Defense Ministry...officially apologize to Georgia in the near future for mistakenly dropping mines on Georgian territory 9 August.” The incident had been confirmed by a special commission set up to investigate the incident.[52]

In April 2000, it was reported that the “military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border” in order to stop the flow of men and materiel between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen would not “disclose precisely” the type of mines to be used, noting only that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun Gorge.[53] Russian officials stated that mining would be carried out in compliance with CCW Protocol II, and that the majority of the minefields would be remote controlled which will eliminate the indiscriminate effect of their use.[54] The Georgian Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated officially it is “considering the possibility of mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border.”[55]

Mine Clearance

The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXOs after World War II and they are still a problem in some areas. Today there are requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories in Russia where World War II battles took place. (For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 811-812.)

In the post-World War II period, demining operations were carried out by the Engineer Forces of the Defense Ministry. Today demining operations are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense’s Engineer Forces; the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources’ Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ demining brigades.[56] Demining is also conducted by non-governmental enterprises like the company "Fort" (Moscow), which is carrying out demining in Tver, Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the company "Iskatel" (St.-Petersburg). Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of engineer forces.[57]

Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and regions, as well as taking part in demining operations in more than twenty countries, e.g., Algeria, Bosnia, Libya and Syria. The Russian Ministry of Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is carried out within the framework of military-technical co-operation with foreign governments.

In August 1999 the temporary press service of the Russian “joint grouping” in Dagestan reported finding two depots with mines and other weapons “during an operation to liberate villages in the Botlikh district.” It also reported that Russian troops would carry out demining operations in the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata, and Shodroda, and clear mines from roads....”[58] Demining has also been carried out by Russian soldiers and the Police of Dagestan in Boltlikh and Tsumadinskom.[59] In October-November 1999 a platoon of the Russian Engineer Forces conducted a survey and began clearance of landmines and UXOs in Novolaks district of Dagestan, in the areas where combat actions had taken place. The platoon cleared more than 100 hectares of agricultural land, but had to suspend work due to the beginning of frost.[60]

In Chechnya, on 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that “160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for ploughing in the Pravoberezhny district. Sappers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the Urus-Martan district.”[61] After gaining control of Grozny at the beginning of February, clearance operations began in the city. By late February there were reportedly 500 sappers working in Grozny alone.[62] Shortly thereafter, as noted above, on 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been “completely cleared of mines,” noting, however, that the “city is still unsafe,” charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.[63] (See report on Chechnya.)

From 6 August to 15 November 1999, a demining team of twenty sappers and four mine dogs from the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes conducted a special operation in Kosovo within the framework of a Swiss-Russian humanitarian program. Under the order of the UN Mine Action Coordinating Committee (UNMACC), Russian deminers conducted a mine survey and humanitarian demining of the most dangerous areas, in particular in the vicinity of the town of Glogovac, where the most fierce combat clashes took place and resulted in a large number of mine victims. As a result, 85,309 square meters was surveyed and ten minefields detected. Thirty-name AP mines were cleared, along with other explosive devices and UXOs. Between 23 August and 20 September 20, 1999, the Russians also demined the Yugopetrol oil depot in Pristina.

Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS CPKF has been demining in Abkhazia. Roads, land and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Ingur River have been surveyed and demined by the Russians. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, some 23,000 explosive devices have been cleared since 1994.[64] The British demining organization HALO Trust states that Russian engineers “have undertaken limited clearance of items in Abkhazia,” particularly in Gumista minefields. HALO notes that “some mines were missed and HALO had to re-clear some areas.” HALO states that currently Russian engineers only deal with “increasingly rare” incidents of new use, and check the stretch of M27 between Gali town and Inguri bridge “several times each day.”[65]

Currently the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes is negotiating the participation of its demining units in humanitarian demining operations in Chad. Similar consultations are under way with Egypt, Libya, Angola, and Peru among other countries.

Russia has not made any donations to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action programs within Russia.

Mine Awareness

During the Soviet era, dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas was carried out by district military recruiting offices.[66] Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities ground to a halt, although the secondary school courses have been reinstated.[67]

With the increase of mine danger in a number of areas of the Russian Federation, the lack of mine awareness programs becomes increasingly serious. Currently there are no federal mine awareness activities in the areas of on-going conflict. No mine awareness programs are under way either in Dagestan or Ingushetia.

IPPNW-Russia is launching the broadcast of a series of TV-clips on mine awareness.

Landmine Casualties

There have been a significant number of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999. (For casualties post-WWII, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 814.)

There is no complete official data on mine casualties/incidents among the Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians, available at the moment. Such is not likely to ever be made available. The Russian Armed Forces Command and the governmental officials are objectively not interested in collection of this data, let alone making it public. However, judging by highly fragmentary information coming from the conflict zone, one can estimate a rather high level of mine-caused losses. For example, for the period from the beginning of the combat operation in Chechnya into May 2000, just one hospital of the Ural Military District located in Ekaterinburg has treated 126 mine-wounded soldiers.[68] Another indicator of the scope of the problem is the fact that the MOD’s Military Medical Department ordered seventy-eight prostheses for soldiers, injured in Chechnya for the period 1 August 1999- 1 February 2000, from the RKK "Energiya" only.[69] (See Chechnya report for civilian casualties).

The number of mine-injured in the republic of Ingushetia since the beginning of the last Chechen conflict in August 1999 is 347,[70] including: forty-eight children, eighty-nine women and 210 men. The number of persons that need prosthetics is 300, twenty-five of them critically.[71] There are no prosthetic shops in the republic, but one is to be built in the near future; the project has been approved and funds have already been allocated. The total number of hospitals/medical centers in Ingushetia is 12, including: 1 of Republican-level, 2 of city-level, 4 of territorial/regional level, 1 rural, 2 local and 2 dispensers (1 TB and 1 Dermato-venerologic).

There is the only rehabilitation center, a pediatric center in Troitskaya stanitsa. There are no mine awareness programs, either provided by the republic authorities or NGOs.

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during World War II. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. According to the 1995 Federal law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped” an individual rehabilitation and reintegration program is developed and offered for each handicapped person. Under the existing 1997-2000 Federal program “Social Insurance for Military Handicapped” (1997-2000), a total of 22 million rubles was allocated for 1999.

There are seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the Russian Federation. The total annual need for prosthetic devices is said to be 200,000 pieces, including 120,000 lower limb prostheses and 32,000 upper limb prostheses. In December 1994, “Energiya,” the Russian Space Corporation, began to produce prostheses. At present, it produces more than 200 types of prosthetic modules, reaching 40,000 components per year, which are up to international standards.[72] “Energiya” has developed standardized prosthetic workshops, including mobile ones. Eight experimental mobile workshops vehicles (based on the PAZ-3205 bus) have been produced to provide operative prosthetic aid in the remote areas. Unfortunately, due to constraints of the federal budget, not all elements of its plans have been carried out. It is now planned to consolidate its achievements within the framework of the new 2000-2005 federal program, “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped,” developed in the fall of 1999 and approved in January 2000.

Over the past two years, through the International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, mine victims have been treated by bringing U.S. manufactured prosthetic technology to the Institute where their physicians supply the surgical and rehabilitative component for the most cost-effective delivery of the services. The cost of the procedure in Russia is about $3,500 per person; in the U.S., the same treatment has been estimated at $25,000. In 1998, the program treated four children and three adults.[73] The IPRLS has proposed a St. Petersburg Center for children which, if fully funded, could provide treatment and rehabilitation for up to 500 children who require surgery. The proposal has been accepted by UNICEF and is under consideration by the World Bank.[74]


[1] For examples of statements by Yeltsin and other officials see New York Times, 11 October 1997; New York Times, 11 October 1997; Statement by Mr. B.A. Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest Regional Seminar on Landmines, 26-28 March 1998.
[2] Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-personnel Landmines, Delegation of the Russian Federation on Military Security and Arms Control, FSC. DEL/425/99, 15 December 1999.
[3] Press release, AP RF Division of Governmental Information/Information Analytical Materials, No. 177, 9 March 2000.
[4] For elaboration of these issues, see Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999. See also Col. Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, “Ottawa Process and Russia's Position,” Krasnaya Zvezda (daily newspaper), 27 November 1997.
[5] Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999.
[6] Schiborin and Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999.
[7] Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999 when twenty-two CD members called for a Special Coordinator and an Ad Hoc Committee.
[8] Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-personnel Landmines.
[9] “Putin Urges Ratification of Protocol Limiting Mines,” Itar-Tass, Moscow, 7 May 2000.
[10] Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.
[11] Press release, No.177, 9 March 2000.
[12] Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of RF at the opening of the 1998 Moscow conference “New Steps To a Mine-Free Future,” IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998.
[13] Working Materials, Second International Conference on Landmines in Russia and FSU, IPPNW-Russia, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.
[14] Press Release, No. 177, 9 March 2000. This is the approved interdepartmental/governmental budget that still requires approval of the State Duma.
[15] Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia, report for the Second International Conference in Russia and FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999, p. 63.
[16] Russia’s Arms Catalogue, Army 1996-1997, published by “Military Parade,” JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 276-83. See also, Landmines: Outlook from Russia, report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.
[17] Presentations by B. Schiborin, chief counselor of the Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, at the Moscow Landmine Conference, 27 May 1998.
[18] Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, senior officer, Division of Engineer Forces, 2nd International Conference on Landmines in Russia/FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999. At the CCW Protocol II conference in Geneva on 16 December 1999, Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, also confirmed this, noting that PMN-1 and PMN-2 mines are no longer produced.
[19] Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 16, 1999; Vladimir Kuznetsov, “S Uchetom Boevogo opyta zivut I uchatsya ingenernie voiska,” Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; A. Raylyan, “Like a Phoenix From Its Ashes,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 64-65.
[20] Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Novyi Oblik Ingenernych Voisk,” (New outlook of the Engineer Troops), Armeysky Sbornik (Army’s journal) No.1, 1998, p. 11.
[21] Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affair, 13 May 2000.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.
[24] Lt. Col. Mikhail Nagorny, 2nd International Conference on Landmines, Tblisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.
[25] Interview with Col. M. Arsaliev, engineering service, Chechen military, May 1999.
[26] Andrei Korbut, “Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense). Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 39, p. 6.
[27] Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia, interim report, 1999.
[28] Statement at Tbilisi Landmine Conference, December 1999.
[29] Interview with General Kuznetsov (ret.), Commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, by General Mehov (ret.), Russian Humanitarian Mine Action Center/RAVUNPM, Moscow, April 2000.
[30] Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999; N. Antonenko, “Second Wind,” Armeysky Sbornik, No. 1, 1998, pp. 62-63.
[31] Statement at Tbilisi Landmine Conference.
[32] Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999. The estimate was 40 million rubles, prior to the devaluation of the currency.
[33] Letter to Jody Williams and Stephen Goose from Mr. Alexander V. Zmeevski, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 22 October 1999, as a follow up to a meeting at the Russian Mission on 5 October 1999.
[34] “Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June 2000.
[35] Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999.
[36] Ibid.
[37] ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Russian Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 December 1999.
[38] “Night Patrol of ‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000. In a radio interview, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov noted that the decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian forces. Radio Svoboda, March 2000.
[39] Lieutenant-General Nickolaishvili Guram Georgevich, “Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines,” Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.
[40] Ibid. Also, ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999. Col Bobkov said only self-destructing PFMs were used, not older non-self-destructing ones.
[41] Interview with a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.
[42] Daniel Williams, “Russians Declare Victory, Raise Flag Over Grozny,” Washington Post, 7 February 2000. Regarding the level of destruction in the city, the article reported that “Gen. Gennady Troshev, one of Russia’s top commanders, toured the city today and said he had trouble finding intact buildings to use as command posts. After more than five months of bombing and shelling, ‘the city is ruined,’ he said.”
[43] “Chechen Rebels Lured into Minefield,” Segodnya (newscast), Moscow NTV, 3 February 2000; Daniel Williams, “Grozny Nearly in Russian Forces’ Grasp: Chechen Rebels Head South After Taking Heavy Losses in Escape from Capital,” Washington Post, 4 February 2000, p. A.26.
[44] Lyoma Turpalov, “Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap,” Associated Press, (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February 2000.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000. He estimated 300 wounded, including 50 civilians who fled Grozny with the fighters, plus many killed. See also, Andrew Kramer, “Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both Russians and Chechens,” AP, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, “Doctor Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon,” AFP, 19 February 2000; Dave Montgomery, “Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops,” The Dallas Morning News, 27 February 2000.
[47] “Russia Blocks Civilians From Returning Home to Grozny,” (AP, Nazran, Russia), Washington Post, 15 February 2000, p. A.19.
[48] Olga Allenova, “‘Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.
[49] Giles Whittel, “Grozny is Mined to Stop Troops Looting,” London Times, 13 May 2000.
[50] Prime-News, (television), Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999.
[51] “Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established,” Moscow RIA News Agency, 11 August 1999.
[52] “Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia,” Moscow Interfax, 17 August 1999. A U.S. government official told the ICBL that there was a second incident in which a Russian helicopter dropped mines inside Georgia. ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva, 13 December 1999.
[53] Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000; “Federals to Mine 80Km of Chechnya-Georgia Border, AVN, 11 April 2000.
[54] Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 May 2000.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Presidential Decree #1010 of November 13, 1995, "On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian Operations."
[57] A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise “Fort”: verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998.
[58] “Ministry Confirms Bombing of Chechnya,” Moscow Interfax, 26 August 1999.
[59] Report from Press Center, Police of Russia in Dagestan and Infoart Agency, September 1999, http://www1.infoart.ru/.
[60] Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, Working materials of the Second International Conference on Landmines.
[61] “Ploughland Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya,” AVN (Russian Military News Agency), 3 April 2000.
[62] “When the Thunderstorm Passed Grozny,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25 February 2000.
[63] Olga Allenova, “‘Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.
[64] A.Nizhalovsky, Deputy-Commander of the Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the IPPNW-ICBL Landmine Conference. Moscow. 27 May 1998.
[65] HALO/AMAC, “Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report,” March 2000, p. 26.
[66] The so-called “District Military Committee” – “raivoenkomat.”
[67] Interview with V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.
[68] “When Soldier Is Wounded We All Feel Pain,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (national daily), 5 February 2000.
[69] Military Medical Department, RKK “Energuia” (Russian Space Corporation), 15 March 2000.
[70] Interviews with Minister of Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minster of Labor and Social Security Khalifa Zaurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman Arselgov, Chair of the Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of the Republic of Ingushetia, February 2000.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Landmines: Outlook from Russia, interim report, 1999.
[73] “International Meeting Highlights Aid to Amputee Landmine Survivors,” (Stoughton, MA), 13 July 1999.
[74] Ibid.