Key developments
since March 1999:Russian forces have used antipersonnel
mines extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan from August 1999 to the present day.
In April 2000, Russia announced plans to mine its border with Georgia. CCW
Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification in May
2000. Destruction of significant numbers of obsolete and non-Protocol II
compliant AP mines has continued.
Mine Ban Policy
The Russian Federation has not acceded to the 1997
Mine Ban Treaty. Although government officials and, perhaps most notably,
then-President Boris Yeltsin have stated Russia’s willingness to sign at
some point in the future,[1] it
is clear that the military still considers antipersonnel mines a necessary
weapon, as evidenced by its extensive use of the weapon in operations first in
Dagestan in August 1999 and then in Chechnya from September 1999 to the present
day.
In addition to stating concerns about costs related to implementing the
treaty, the military insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines must be in
place before Russia can ban the weapon. In its December 1999 response to an
OSCE questionnaire on antipersonnel mines, the government stated: “The
Russian Federation believes that what is important to solve the
‘mines’ problem is a realistic approach taking into account the
interests of all the members of the international community and, first of all,
of the states which historically or due to their geostrategic location are
compelled to rely on this defensive weapon to ensure their security. The
Russian Federation advocates the search for mutually acceptable solutions for
anti-personnel mines and opposes the division of the international community
into supporters of a hasty ban on anti-personnel mines and those states that are
still unable to take this step and propose other ways to meet this
goal.”[2]
Although President Vladimir Putin has not made any public statements
regarding a mine ban since his election, a government press release in March
2000 spoke of the policy “aimed at banning of landmines,” declared
by the president. It noted that the pending ratification of Amended Protocol II
of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), would “enable the Russian
Federation to carry out a more active role in landmine-related issues in the
international political arena.”[3]
Russia attended, as an observer, all of the treaty preparatory meetings of
the Ottawa Process, as well as the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique
in May 1999. It has also participated in many of the ban treaty intersessional
Standing Committee of Experts meetings. However, Russia has continuously stated
its strong preference for dealing with controls on AP mines through the CCW and
the Conference on Disarmament (CD), rather than the Mine Ban
Treaty.[4] Russia abstained on
the vote on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the
Mine Ban Treaty, as it has every pro-ban resolution since 1996.
At the same time, Russian officials are always quick to point out some of the
positive steps Russia has taken toward a ban: a moratorium on export of
non-detectable and “dumb” antipersonnel mines, a ban on the
production of blast mines, and the destruction of more than half a million
stockpiled antipersonnel
mines.[5]
Conference on Disarmament and Convention on Conventional Weapons
Russia has consistently favored the CD “as the main forum for the mine
action issue.”[6] It
called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the
establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an export
ban.[7] Again in December 1999,
it stated that it “reiterates its proposal to establish a special
committee in the framework of the CD that could deal with the problem of the
universal ban on APM
transfer.”[8]
Russia is a party to the 1980 CCW and its original Protocol II on landmines.
Putin submitted Amended Protocol II (1996) to the State Duma for ratification in
early May 2000.[9] Hearings will
presumably take place in late June 2000 with fairly good chances for its
approval.[10]
A government press release on preparations for the submission for
ratification noted that it “complies with the interests of the Russian
Federation” because it allows for the destruction of “huge stocks of
outdated APMs with expired life-time,” with minimal financial burden,
coupled with relative ease in military-technical terms, and for the development
of alternatives. It also noted that ratification would not affect Russian
defense capacity or security.[11]
For several years the Russian military has stated that steps were already
being taken to fulfill requirements of the Amended Protocol: “Necessary
recommendations on the combat use of APMs in compliance with the new
requirements have been prepared and released to the related staffs and
commanders of military
units.”[12] At the
December 1999 Tbilisi Conference, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Nagorny stated that
“the Russian Engineers are fulfilling all requirements of the CCW to a
full extent.”[13]
The costs associated with implementing Amended Protocol II are officially
budgeted at 3,066,805 rubles (approximately U.S.$109.53 million) over the
eight-year period 1998-2005.[14]
According to information from the Ministry of Defense obtained by International
Physicians to Prevent Nuclear War-Russia, full costs to implement Amended
Protocol II are estimated at about U.S.$374.6 million, which includes costs for
making some mines compliant with the Protocol, development and production of
some alternatives, and destruction of some stocks. A similar estimate of the
cost of joining the Mine Ban Treaty is about U.S.$576 million, which includes
costs for development and production of alternatives as well as destruction of
all stockpiles. Below are two charts illustrating the total estimated cost
projections:[15]
Cost estimate of Russia’s joining the MBT prepared by the RF Ministry of
Defense for the RF government in 1998:
AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in mln Russian R (as of
1998)
Year by year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Development of engineer munitions – alternatives to LM
210
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
2. Production & accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of
engineer munitions – alternatives to LM
3000
5
10
50
250
300
450
550
650
735
3. LM stockpiles destruction (reprocessing)
390
50
180
80
80
Total:
3600
85
220
160
360
330
480
580
650
735
Cost estimate of Russia’s meeting the requirements of the CCW and its
amended Protocol II:
AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in billions Russian Rubles (as
of 1998)
Year by year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Modernization of the existing munitions (LMs) and development of new
ones (alternatives to LMs), including the preparation of their production
200
80
33
-
44
3
56
28
38
22
27
27
2. Production and accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of new
munitions
Russia has been one of the world’s largest
producers and exporters of AP mines. It is believed that since 1992, it has
been producing at least ten types of antipersonnel
mines.[16] In May 1998,
representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast AP
mines.[17] Russian military
reconfirmed this at the Tbilisi landmine conference in December
1999.[18] (For more detail on
mines types, production sites, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.
805-806.)
In the former USSR there were more than 20 enterprises that either assembled
landmines or produced their components. According to the public statements of
the Command of the Russian Engineer Forces, with the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, ninety percent of Russia’s ammunition and armament
production facilities were left outside the territory of Russia, namely in
Ukraine, Belarus and in the Baltic republics of the former
USSR.[19] But, within the last
three to five years, the military has managed to begin the production of
different modern types of ammunition, including mines and fuses, which were
previously produced outside its
territory.[20] Some plants
that have assembled AP mines are now involved in destruction technology.
According to official sources, it should not be assumed that Russia has
increased its production of AP mines as a result of the on-going conflict in
Chechnya. They state current stocks of mines compliant with CCW Protocol II are
significant -- and will be for quite some
time.[21] Instead Russia is
increasingly focusing more efforts on research and development of landmine
alternatives.[22] In the above
charts estimating costs of implementing the MBT, points one and two show costs
of development and production, respectively, of alternatives. (For more on
alternatives see Landmine Monitor 1999, pp. 807-808.)
Transfer
The Soviet Union was one of the world’s
largest exporters of antipersonnel mines. However, on 1 December 1994 it
announced a three-year moratorium on the export of AP mines that are not
detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This was extended for
another five years on 1 December
1997.[23] Lieutenant-Colonel
Mikhail Nagorny of the Russian Engineer Forces stated, “Since 1991 Russia
entirely stopped the export of APMs in any countries of the world. The only
exception is APMs left behind in the CIS countries according to governmental
agreements with the countries in question. Since 1991 no planned transfers of
APMs have taken
place.”[24] (For more
details on transfer, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 808.)
But apparently a black market operates. On 13 January 2000, on a trip to the
US, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ilia Akhmadov stated that Chechens were
being provided “arms, ammunition, including explosives...by Russia.”
Chechen military have said that the only method of receiving and replenishing
their AP mines is through contacts with representatives of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation.[25]
Stockpiling
There is no official public number of
antipersonnel landmines stockpiled in Russia. One published report states that
Russia has approximately 60 million landmines that fall under the provisions of
the Mine Ban Treaty.[26] ICBL
interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well
as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely
has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock. (For information on types
and locations of stocks, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806,
809.) Both military officials and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs admit that through governmental agreements huge stocks have been left in
CIS states, in particular in Belarus and Ukraine, and that certain stockpiles
remain at the disposal of Russian military units and contingents presently
located in CIS countries.
Destruction
Russia carries out systematic destruction of its obsolete AP mines as well as
mines with an expired shelf life, primarily PMN and PMN-1s. Some mines are
recycled, extracting explosives and reprocessing them for civilian use. Mines
currently slated for destruction also include those not in compliance with CCW
Amended Protocol II. In 1998, more than 500,000 such mines were
destroyed.[27] According to
Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, of the Engineer Forces, the number of mines
destroyed will reach 800,000 by the end of
2000.[28] However, General
Kuznetsov (ret.), who was the commander of the Russian Engineer troops from
1986-1999, stated that in 1998-1999 alone, 850,000 mines were
destroyed.[29] Plans call for
destroying non-CCW compliant mines by
2005,[30] but Nagorny said that
destruction would not be completed until
2010-2012.[31] The Ministry of
Defense has calculated that it will cost about U.S.$6.4 million annually to
destroy all of its non-CCW compliant
mines.[32]
Use
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines in 1993 during the conflict in
Tajikistan, during large-scale combat operations in Chechnya from December 1994
until June 1996, in military operations against Dagestan in August 1999, and
then again on a wide-scale basis in Chechnya since September 1999. Russian
forces in CIS peacekeeping operations in Georgia/Abkhazia and perhaps elsewhere
have also used mines.
A government official, describing their use in Dagestan wrote, “The use
of antipersonnel landmines there was nothing less but a ‘dire
necessity.’ In Dagestan we had to do everything possible not only to
safeguard the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but first and
foremost to protect the civilian population from international terrorists....
The Russian Federation uses antipersonnel landmines only for the purposes of
defense and in the first place to deter terrorists, drug smugglers and other
potential illegal trespassers who wish to penetrate into our
territory.”[33]
In the renewed fighting in Chechnya, which continues as Landmine Monitor goes
to print, mines have been used in significant numbers by all armed fighters, but
particularly by Russian forces. Chechens have made unverifiable claims that
Russia has used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the fighting broke
out.[34] Questions have been
raised if the types of mines and methods of mine use have been consistent with
CCW Protocol II, as well as its requirements for mapping, marking, and
protecting minefields.
Russian officials themselves, including at the highest military levels in the
operation in Chechnya, admit the large-scale use of mines throughout the
operations. Russian troops have used hand-laid mines, air- and
artillery-scattered mines, as well as remotely controlled devices. The main
objectives of the initial stages of the operation were the creation of
“security zones,” and a “sanitary corridor.” The
military has said that at that point, only MVZ mines were used to protect
check-points, outposts and temporary positions, and that the mines were removed
whenever the units changed
position.[35] They also said
that the minefields were mapped and the “security zones” were
marked.[36] As operations
expanded, so did the use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Hand-laid mines included OZM-72, and MON-50/90/100
mines.[37] It is likely that,
in many cases, decisions to use mines were made at individual command and/or
small reconnaissance team and patrol
level.[38]
The Russians also have widely used scatterable mines, mostly dropped from
aircraft, to cut off potential withdrawal routes from Dagestan, against
guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, and to cut off both weapons
supply and guerrilla reinforcement along the Russian-Georgian border. In
December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that such operations had been going on
for two months, and he stated that on one day alone, Russian aircraft scattered
mines along a 20 kilometer stretch in the Chechen border area. He noted that it
is very difficult to precisely locate air-scattered
mines.[39] The most commonly
used mine has been the PFM-1S, which is equipped with a self-destruct
mechanism.[40]
Artillery-delivered mines have also been used, notably in the mining of the
estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to
Alkhan-Kalu.[41]
Much of the Chechen capital of Grozny has been laid to waste in the
fighting.[42] Mines have been
used extensively in the city and have taken their toll on combatants and
civilians alike. In one of the most notorious incidents in the fighting for
Grozny, on 31 January 2000, a column of some 2-3,000 rebels evacuated the city
through a minefield, suffering heavy
casualties.[43] Russians
officials claimed they lured the guerrillas into a trap by pretending to accept
a bribe in exchange for safe passage out of Grozny. “Frankly, we did not
expect bandits, especially the key figures, to swallow the bait,” said
Gen. Vladimir Shamanov.[44]
Several hundred fighters were killed or wounded, including rebel
commanders.[45] One doctor in
the nearby village of Alkhan-Kala said that in two days, he amputated limbs on
sixty-seven mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his
right foot.[46]
Shortly after the incident, the Russian military closed Grozny to returning
civilians. On Russia’s NTV television, Col. Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, a top
Russian commander, said, “As long as the city isn’t cleared of all
mines and shells, and there is a threat of buildings collapsing, civilians are
being banned from entering.” He added, “Under civilian disguise,
militants are trying to return to pick up their
wounded.”[47]
On 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been
“completely cleared of mines.” They did, however, note that the
“city is still unsafe,” charging continued mine use by Chechen
fighters.[48] In May 2000,
Russian authorities began using mines again to protect factories and power
plants in Chechen’s capital, Grozny. The Russian-appointed mayor of the
city, Supyan Mokchayev reported that such mining was necessary to stop “a
plague of looting by their own [Russian]
troops.”[49]
Russia has also “accidentally” dropped mines on Georgian
territory. On 9 August 1999, two Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from
Dagestan, where Russia was fighting against rebels and bombed in and around the
village of Zemo Omalo; three people were wounded, one
severely.[50] Georgian military
were able to identify the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs, containing
PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.[51]
On 17 August, it was reported that Air Force headquarters would “[o]n
behalf of the Russian Defense Ministry...officially apologize to Georgia in the
near future for mistakenly dropping mines on Georgian territory 9 August.”
The incident had been confirmed by a special commission set up to investigate
the incident.[52]
In April 2000, it was reported that the “military leadership and border
services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several
stretches of the border” in order to stop the flow of men and materiel
between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen would not
“disclose precisely” the type of mines to be used, noting only that
over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80
kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun
Gorge.[53] Russian officials
stated that mining would be carried out in compliance with CCW Protocol II, and
that the majority of the minefields would be remote controlled which will
eliminate the indiscriminate effect of their
use.[54] The Georgian
Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated
officially it is “considering the possibility of mining the Chechen
stretch of the Russian-Georgian
border.”[55]
Mine Clearance
The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXOs
after World War II and they are still a problem in some areas. Today there are
requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories in Russia where World War II
battles took place. (For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
pp. 811-812.)
In the post-World War II period, demining operations were carried out by the
Engineer Forces of the Defense Ministry. Today demining operations are the
responsibility of the Ministry of Defense’s Engineer Forces; the Ministry
for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources’ Russian National
Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations; and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs’ demining
brigades.[56] Demining is also
conducted by non-governmental enterprises like the company "Fort" (Moscow),
which is carrying out demining in Tver, Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the
company "Iskatel" (St.-Petersburg). Employees of these companies are mainly
retired officers of engineer
forces.[57]
Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and
regions, as well as taking part in demining operations in more than twenty
countries, e.g., Algeria, Bosnia, Libya and Syria. The Russian Ministry of
Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is carried out
within the framework of military-technical co-operation with foreign
governments.
In August 1999 the temporary press service of the Russian “joint
grouping” in Dagestan reported finding two depots with mines and other
weapons “during an operation to liberate villages in the Botlikh
district.” It also reported that Russian troops would carry out demining
operations in the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata, and Shodroda, and clear mines
from roads....”[58]
Demining has also been carried out by Russian soldiers and the Police of
Dagestan in Boltlikh and
Tsumadinskom.[59] In
October-November 1999 a platoon of the Russian Engineer Forces conducted a
survey and began clearance of landmines and UXOs in Novolaks district of
Dagestan, in the areas where combat actions had taken place. The platoon cleared
more than 100 hectares of agricultural land, but had to suspend work due to the
beginning of frost.[60]
In Chechnya, on 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that
“160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for ploughing
in the Pravoberezhny district. Sappers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in
the Urus-Martan
district.”[61] After
gaining control of Grozny at the beginning of February, clearance operations
began in the city. By late February there were reportedly 500 sappers working
in Grozny alone.[62] Shortly
thereafter, as noted above, on 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the
city had been “completely cleared of mines,” noting, however, that
the “city is still unsafe,” charging continued mine use by Chechen
fighters.[63] (See report on
Chechnya.)
From 6 August to 15 November 1999, a demining team of twenty sappers and
four mine dogs from the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes
conducted a special operation in Kosovo within the framework of a Swiss-Russian
humanitarian program. Under the order of the UN Mine Action Coordinating
Committee (UNMACC), Russian deminers conducted a mine survey and humanitarian
demining of the most dangerous areas, in particular in the vicinity of the town
of Glogovac, where the most fierce combat clashes took place and resulted in a
large number of mine victims. As a result, 85,309 square meters was surveyed and
ten minefields detected. Thirty-name AP mines were cleared, along with other
explosive devices and UXOs. Between 23 August and 20 September 20, 1999, the
Russians also demined the Yugopetrol oil depot in Pristina.
Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense
as a part of the CIS CPKF has been demining in Abkhazia. Roads, land and
infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Ingur River have been
surveyed and demined by the Russians. According to the Russian Ministry of
Defense, some 23,000 explosive devices have been cleared since
1994.[64] The British demining
organization HALO Trust states that Russian engineers “have undertaken
limited clearance of items in Abkhazia,” particularly in Gumista
minefields. HALO notes that “some mines were missed and HALO had to
re-clear some areas.” HALO states that currently Russian engineers only
deal with “increasingly rare” incidents of new use, and check the
stretch of M27 between Gali town and Inguri bridge “several times each
day.”[65]
Currently the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes is negotiating
the participation of its demining units in humanitarian demining operations in
Chad. Similar consultations are under way with Egypt, Libya, Angola, and Peru
among other countries.
Russia has not made any donations to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for
Assistance in Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action
programs within Russia.
Mine Awareness
During the Soviet era, dissemination of mine
awareness information in mine-affected areas was carried out by district
military recruiting offices.[66]
Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary
military training providing information on mine danger to students living in
mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing
economic crisis, these activities ground to a halt, although the secondary
school courses have been
reinstated.[67]
With the increase of mine danger in a number of areas of the Russian
Federation, the lack of mine awareness programs becomes increasingly serious.
Currently there are no federal mine awareness activities in the areas of
on-going conflict. No mine awareness programs are under way either in Dagestan
or Ingushetia.
IPPNW-Russia is launching the broadcast of a series of TV-clips on mine
awareness.
Landmine Casualties
There have been a significant number of mine
casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since
1994 and Dagestan since 1999. (For casualties post-WWII, see Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, p. 814.)
There is no complete official data on mine casualties/incidents among the
Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians, available at the
moment. Such is not likely to ever be made available. The Russian Armed Forces
Command and the governmental officials are objectively not interested in
collection of this data, let alone making it public. However, judging by highly
fragmentary information coming from the conflict zone, one can estimate a rather
high level of mine-caused losses. For example, for the period from the beginning
of the combat operation in Chechnya into May 2000, just one hospital of the Ural
Military District located in Ekaterinburg has treated 126 mine-wounded
soldiers.[68] Another indicator
of the scope of the problem is the fact that the MOD’s Military Medical
Department ordered seventy-eight prostheses for soldiers, injured in Chechnya
for the period 1 August 1999- 1 February 2000, from the RKK "Energiya"
only.[69] (See Chechnya report
for civilian casualties).
The number of mine-injured in the republic of Ingushetia since the beginning
of the last Chechen conflict in August 1999 is
347,[70] including: forty-eight
children, eighty-nine women and 210 men. The number of persons that need
prosthetics is 300, twenty-five of them
critically.[71] There are no
prosthetic shops in the republic, but one is to be built in the near future; the
project has been approved and funds have already been allocated. The total
number of hospitals/medical centers in Ingushetia is 12, including: 1 of
Republican-level, 2 of city-level, 4 of territorial/regional level, 1 rural, 2
local and 2 dispensers (1 TB and 1 Dermato-venerologic).
There is the only rehabilitation center, a pediatric center in Troitskaya
stanitsa. There are no mine awareness programs, either provided by the republic
authorities or NGOs.
Survivor Assistance
Russian military medical practice has accumulated
enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during World
War II. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration
services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. According to the 1995
Federal law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped” an
individual rehabilitation and reintegration program is developed and offered for
each handicapped person. Under the existing 1997-2000 Federal program
“Social Insurance for Military Handicapped” (1997-2000), a total of
22 million rubles was allocated for 1999.
There are seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the
Russian Federation. The total annual need for prosthetic devices is said to be
200,000 pieces, including 120,000 lower limb prostheses and 32,000 upper limb
prostheses. In December 1994, “Energiya,” the Russian Space
Corporation, began to produce prostheses. At present, it produces more than 200
types of prosthetic modules, reaching 40,000 components per year, which are up
to international standards.[72]
“Energiya” has developed standardized prosthetic workshops,
including mobile ones. Eight experimental mobile workshops vehicles (based on
the PAZ-3205 bus) have been produced to provide operative prosthetic aid in the
remote areas. Unfortunately, due to constraints of the federal budget, not all
elements of its plans have been carried out. It is now planned to consolidate
its achievements within the framework of the new 2000-2005 federal program,
“On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped,” developed in the fall
of 1999 and approved in January 2000.
Over the past two years, through the International Institute for the
Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner,
the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, mine victims have been treated by
bringing U.S. manufactured prosthetic technology to the Institute where their
physicians supply the surgical and rehabilitative component for the most
cost-effective delivery of the services. The cost of the procedure in Russia is
about $3,500 per person; in the U.S., the same treatment has been estimated at
$25,000. In 1998, the program treated four children and three
adults.[73]The IPRLS has
proposed a St. Petersburg Center for children which, if fully funded, could
provide treatment and rehabilitation for up to 500 children who require surgery.
The proposal has been accepted by UNICEF and is under consideration by the World
Bank.[74]
[1] For examples of statements by Yeltsin
and other officials see New York Times, 11 October 1997; New York Times, 11
October 1997; Statement by Mr. B.A. Schiborin, Representative of the Russian
Foreign Ministry at the Budapest Regional Seminar on Landmines, 26-28 March
1998. [2] Response to OSCE Questionnaire
on Anti-personnel Landmines, Delegation of the Russian Federation on Military
Security and Arms Control, FSC. DEL/425/99, 15 December
1999. [3] Press release, AP RF Division
of Governmental Information/Information Analytical Materials, No. 177, 9 March
2000. [4] For elaboration of these
issues, see Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel
Mines,” position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999. See
also Col. Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, “Ottawa Process and Russia's
Position,” Krasnaya Zvezda (daily newspaper), 27 November
1997. [5] Boris Schiborin and Andrei
Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February
1999. [6] Schiborin and Malov,
“Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February
1999. [7] Statement by Bulgarian
Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February
1999 when twenty-two CD members called for a Special Coordinator and an Ad Hoc
Committee. [8] Response to OSCE
Questionnaire on Anti-personnel
Landmines. [9] “Putin Urges
Ratification of Protocol Limiting Mines,” Itar-Tass, Moscow, 7 May
2000. [10] Interview with Andrei Malov,
Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and
Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May
2000. [11] Press release, No.177, 9
March 2000. [12] Press release of the
Chief Division of Engineer Forces of RF at the opening of the 1998 Moscow
conference “New Steps To a Mine-Free Future,” IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May
1998. [13] Working Materials, Second
International Conference on Landmines in Russia and FSU, IPPNW-Russia, Tbilisi,
Georgia, 5-7 December 1999. [14] Press
Release, No. 177, 9 March 2000. This is the approved
interdepartmental/governmental budget that still requires approval of the State
Duma. [15] Landmines: Outlook from
Russia, IPPNW-Russia, report for the Second International Conference in Russia
and FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999, p.
63. [16] Russia’s Arms Catalogue,
Army 1996-1997, published by “Military Parade,” JSC, under general
supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow,
1996, Vol. 1, p. 276-83. See also, Landmines: Outlook from Russia, report
prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense
for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999. [17]
Presentations by B. Schiborin, chief counselor of the Disarmament Department,
Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering
Forces, Ministry of Defense, at the Moscow Landmine Conference, 27 May
1998. [18] Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail
Nagorny, senior officer, Division of Engineer Forces, 2nd International
Conference on Landmines in Russia/FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999. At
the CCW Protocol II conference in Geneva on 16 December 1999, Col. Vladimir
Bobkov, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, also confirmed this, noting that PMN-1 and
PMN-2 mines are no longer produced. [19]
Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 16, 1999;
Vladimir Kuznetsov, “S Uchetom Boevogo opyta zivut I uchatsya ingenernie
voiska,” Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; A. Raylyan,
“Like a Phoenix From Its Ashes,” Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1,
1998, pp. 64-65. [20] Vladimir
Kuznetsov, “Novyi Oblik Ingenernych Voisk,” (New outlook of the
Engineer Troops), Armeysky Sbornik (Army’s journal) No.1, 1998, p.
11. [21] Interview with Andrei Malov,
Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and
Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affair, 13 May
2000. [22]
Ibid. [23] Presidential Decrees No. 2094
of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December
1997. [24] Lt. Col. Mikhail Nagorny, 2nd
International Conference on Landmines, Tblisi, Georgia, 5-7 December
1999. [25] Interview with Col. M.
Arsaliev, engineering service, Chechen military, May
1999. [26] Andrei Korbut,
“Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min
znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a
Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense). Nezavisimoe Voennoe
Obozrenie, No. 39, p. 6. [27] Landmines:
Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia, interim report,
1999. [28] Statement at Tbilisi Landmine
Conference, December 1999. [29]
Interview with General Kuznetsov (ret.), Commander of the Russian Engineer
troops from 1986-1999, by General Mehov (ret.), Russian Humanitarian Mine Action
Center/RAVUNPM, Moscow, April 2000. [30]
Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999; N. Antonenko,
“Second Wind,” Armeysky Sbornik, No. 1, 1998, pp.
62-63. [31] Statement at Tbilisi
Landmine Conference. [32] Interview with
Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999. The estimate was 40 million
rubles, prior to the devaluation of the
currency. [33] Letter to Jody Williams
and Stephen Goose from Mr. Alexander V. Zmeevski, Permanent Mission of the
Russian Federation to the United Nations, 22 October 1999, as a follow up to a
meeting at the Russian Mission on 5 October
1999. [34] “Chechens Say Russians
Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June
2000. [35] Interview with
Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December
1999. [36]
Ibid. [37] ICBL meeting with Col.
Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Russian Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 December
1999. [38] “Night Patrol of
‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of
Russian government), 21 January 2000. In a radio interview, Chechen President
Aslan Maskhadov noted that the decision to use mines is taken by junior
commanders, in both Chechen and Russian forces. Radio Svoboda, March
2000. [39] Lieutenant-General
Nickolaishvili Guram Georgevich, “Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future
Without Landmines,” Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7
December 1999. [40] Ibid. Also, ICBL
meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999. Col
Bobkov said only self-destructing PFMs were used, not older non-self-destructing
ones. [41] Interview with a colonel of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the
interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by
artillery. [42] Daniel Williams,
“Russians Declare Victory, Raise Flag Over Grozny,” Washington Post,
7 February 2000. Regarding the level of destruction in the city, the article
reported that “Gen. Gennady Troshev, one of Russia’s top commanders,
toured the city today and said he had trouble finding intact buildings to use as
command posts. After more than five months of bombing and shelling, ‘the
city is ruined,’ he
said.” [43] “Chechen Rebels
Lured into Minefield,” Segodnya (newscast), Moscow NTV, 3 February 2000;
Daniel Williams, “Grozny Nearly in Russian Forces’ Grasp: Chechen
Rebels Head South After Taking Heavy Losses in Escape from Capital,”
Washington Post, 4 February 2000, p.
A.26. [44] Lyoma Turpalov,
“Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap,”
Associated Press, (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February
2000. [45]
Ibid. [46] Human Rights Watch interview
with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000. He estimated 300 wounded,
including 50 civilians who fled Grozny with the fighters, plus many killed.
See also, Andrew Kramer, “Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both
Russians and Chechens,” AP, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, “Doctor
Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon,” AFP, 19 February 2000; Dave
Montgomery, “Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing
about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops,” The Dallas Morning
News, 27 February 2000. [47]
“Russia Blocks Civilians From Returning Home to Grozny,” (AP,
Nazran, Russia), Washington Post, 15 February 2000, p.
A.19. [48] Olga Allenova,
“‘Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow
Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000,
p.1. [49] Giles Whittel, “Grozny
is Mined to Stop Troops Looting,” London Times, 13 May
2000. [50] Prime-News, (television),
Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999. [51]
“Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established,” Moscow RIA
News Agency, 11 August 1999. [52]
“Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia,” Moscow
Interfax, 17 August 1999. A U.S. government official told the ICBL that there
was a second incident in which a Russian helicopter dropped mines inside
Georgia. ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva,
13 December 1999. [53] Aleksandr Igorev
and Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,”
Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000; “Federals to Mine 80Km
of Chechnya-Georgia Border, AVN, 11 April
2000. [54] Interview with Andrei Malov,
Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and
Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 May
2000. [55]
Ibid. [56] Presidential Decree #1010 of
November 13, 1995, "On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian
Operations." [57] A. Kostiukov, demining
commercial enterprise “Fort”: verbal statement at the working group
meeting, 10 November 1998. [58]
“Ministry Confirms Bombing of Chechnya,” Moscow Interfax, 26 August
1999. [59] Report from Press Center,
Police of Russia in Dagestan and Infoart Agency, September 1999,
http://www1.infoart.ru/. [60]
Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, Working materials of the Second
International Conference on
Landmines. [61] “Ploughland
Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya,” AVN (Russian Military News
Agency), 3 April 2000. [62] “When
the Thunderstorm Passed Grozny,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25 February
2000. [63] Olga Allenova,
“‘Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow
Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000,
p.1. [64] A.Nizhalovsky,
Deputy-Commander of the Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense:
presentation at the IPPNW-ICBL Landmine Conference. Moscow. 27 May
1998. [65] HALO/AMAC, “Abkhazia
Minefield Survey Report,” March 2000, p.
26. [66] The so-called “District
Military Committee” –
“raivoenkomat.” [67]
Interview with V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster
Resources, 10 November 1998. [68]
“When Soldier Is Wounded We All Feel Pain,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta
(national daily), 5 February 2000. [69]
Military Medical Department, RKK “Energuia” (Russian Space
Corporation), 15 March 2000. [70]
Interviews with Minister of Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minster of
Labor and Social Security Khalifa Zaurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman
Arselgov, Chair of the Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential
Commission on Human Rights of the Republic of Ingushetia, February
2000. [71]
Ibid. [72] Landmines: Outlook from
Russia, interim report, 1999. [73]
“International Meeting Highlights Aid to Amputee Landmine
Survivors,” (Stoughton, MA), 13 July
1999. [74] Ibid.
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