Mine awareness, one of the five pillars of mine
action,[55] seeks to reduce the
number of mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) casualties through programs of
information, education and community liaison. In general terms, these three
activities can be considered, respectively, as appropriate to three distinct,
though overlapping situations: conflict or immediate post-conflict (emergency);
transitional; and developmental.[56]
This article reviews the current state of mine awareness by reference to these
differing contexts, and seeks to draw out a number of key lessons relevant to
coordination and integration of mine awareness, notably from Cambodia and
Kosovo.
MINE AWARENESS IN EMERGENCIES
In an emergency characterized by conflict,
instability and large-scale population movements, mine awareness can typically
only hope to communicate basic mine safety messages using mass media
techniques[57]—to inform
rather than to educate.[58] In such
a situation, a program is genuinely seeking to raise “awareness,”
particularly among refugees and the internally displaced, of the threat (or
suspected threat)[59] of mines and
UXO.
An initial feasibility study should be conducted prior to initiating
activities, but its compass is likely to be fairly limited and the data gathered
will probably be sketchy, possibly misleading and perhaps even wildly
inaccurate. By the nature of mass media and the emergency context, messages
will be poorly targeted and will need to be constantly reviewed as more and
better information on the contamination and its social and economic impact
becomes available.[60] Equally,
widespread broadcasting of mine awareness messages prior to the return of
communities displaced by conflict is likely at best to have a short-term impact.
Now should begin a monitoring exercise that must continue throughout the program
lifecycle.[61]
MINE AWARENESS IN THE TRANSITIONAL CONTEXT
As the cessation of hostilities and subsequent
peace-building initiatives bring greater stability to a region, so the nature of
mine awareness should change with the surrounding
environment.[62] In a society in
transition from emergency to development, the focus of mine awareness should
quickly shift from one of public information to community-level
education—seeking to educate defined target groups to change their
behavior to minimize risk.
Program planning should encompass a more
comprehensive needs assessment, if those at greatest risk are indeed to be
targeted more effectively.[63] The
assessment should include discussion with a re-emerging civil society, which
will provide a mine awareness program with a locally focused conduit to
strengthen its delivery systems and help make it more responsive to the real
needs of the community.
Further, in the transitional context the
exploitation of media and media
tools[64] comes to the fore.
Carefully assessing available and traditional forms of communication in the
target groups[65] will likely
prevent a headlong rush to print posters that may communicate little apart from
the pride of the donors.[66]
Likewise, T–shirts may be effective incentive items for awareness
instructors—and the community can always use free clothing—but their
pedagogical value is at least debatable.
But whatever the media chosen to
deliver the message, certain, underlying principles (it is too early yet to call
them standards) should apply. For instance, there appears to be widespread
agreement that programs should resist the temptation to adapt materials from
other contexts and in any event not use materials and media that have not been
field tested prior to their active
deployment.[67] How this will play
out in practice, though, is another matter. At least one leading mine awareness
organization has indicated that systematic field-testing of all materials is
“unrealistic.”[68]
In
terms of educational methodology, it is generally agreed that participatory
methods of learning are more
effective[69] than the traditional
“chalk and talk” of
yesteryear.[70] Yet, too often,
mine awareness programs tend to be based on “presentations,” or
worse “lectures,” whereby the “instructors” pass on the
good word to the ostensibly
uninformed.[71] This is not only
disempowering, it also fails to recognize the knowledge and coping skills within
the communities forced to live daily with the mine threat. Often the members of
these communities possess greater expertise around mines than the
self-proclaimed experts.
In addition, mine awareness has still only paid lip
service to the need to draw lessons from other public health and development
education campaigns, such as HIV/AIDS awareness, breastfeeding promotion and
anti-smoking initiatives.[72]
Heavy-handed shock tactics may have a limited effectiveness, and can be
inappropriate in a number of cultures.
MINE AWARENESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
It is, however, probably in the development
context, where the population has had to live longest with mines and UXO that
the greatest changes in mine awareness can be observed. In Cambodia, for
instance, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has begun to distance its operations
from “pure” mine awareness, with the result that information
transfer has taken a back seat to dialogue with the community about, not only
the landmine threat, but also wider developmental
problems.[73]
For in situations
of long-term mine and UXO impact, knowledge of mines and their dangers tends to
be high. Villagers who have lived with a threat for a long while develop coping
mechanisms and try to avoid affected areas to the maximum extent possible; in
these circumstances, standard mine awareness messages such as “Don’t
touch!” are useless to the community. Accidents, though, still occur,
largely because of intentional risk-taking brought about by survival
pressures.[74] The presence of
mines further marginalizes already impoverished post-conflict communities to the
extent that crops have to be sown and gathered and firewood and water collected,
even in cases where the only available land is affected by mines or UXO.
Here, risk-mapping, where community members identify and/or draw out mined
areas or areas contaminated by UXO and associated risk behaviors, can feed in to
the mine marking and clearance priority-setting process. And as a result of its
community focus, mine awareness/community liaison is also well placed to
identify mine survivors who have unmet needs. Although community liaison teams
should not necessarily be expected to have technical expertise in mine survivor
assistance, sometimes amputees are not aware of the existence of prosthetics
clinics, or believe that being fitted with a replacement or even first
artificial limb will be prohibitively expensive. In such a case, the simple
transfer of information—and possibly the provision of transport—can
suffice to make a world of difference to an individual and his/her
family.
Moreover, in certain contexts, for example Laos, for a number of
years now MAG has been taking the logic of community liaison one step further
forward by deploying fully integrated “Mine Action Teams.” Made up
of 10-15 individuals with different mine action expertise, including community
liaison, (largely) manual demining and EOD, survey and mine awareness, they seek
to develop effective, short-term solutions to village-level
contamination.[75]
Of course,
coordinating interventions within a single organization or institution is far
easier than coordinating horizontally across sectors. Although there are
positive indications of progress, it remains to be seen how far mine action will
be able to reach out to other humanitarian actors and effectively integrate its
work within the wider development
world.[76]
COORDINATION WITH MINE CLEARANCE: LESSONS FROM KOSOVO
Indeed, frequent have been the calls for more
coordination in mine awareness, both internationally and at field level. In
Kosovo, so high was the number of different organizations and institutions
involved in mine awareness, the most pressing task was to ensure a coherent
approach to the discipline across the
province.[77] In what was really a
logical step, but one that to many appeared radical and innovative, the UN Mine
Action Coordination Center (MACC) took the “coordination” aspect of
its title seriously in relation to mine awareness.
The model of coordination
first applied was loosely based on that applied to mine clearance. First and
foremost, agencies had to be accredited with the MACC to operate in a mine
awareness context in Kosovo. Accreditation meant presenting to the MACC Public
Information Branch (Mine Awareness Section) the following: evidence of a
curriculum of training; a suitable training methodology; qualified officers
capable of implementing such a program; an indication of a monitoring and
evaluation plan for the project; and evidence of field-testing of any new
material to be used.
Second, the MACC developed a reporting system for mine
awareness, which meant visibility of agency activity by location and particular
activity. The database, which, initially at least, was embraced only reluctantly
by the mine action community, has since been acknowledged as a very effective
coordination tool and adopted as the basic model for the IMSMA (Information
Management System for Mine Action) Mine Awareness Module.
Third, the MACC
established a series of clear guidelines for quality assurance of training in
various methodologies and with different target audiences. Qualified educators
with a sound background in mine action then enforced these guidelines. Agencies
not operating within acceptable standards were requested to retrain their staff
or to reassess the information they were passing or developing. Accreditation
was withdrawn until satisfactory action had taken place.
Fourth, the MACC
established a series of regular (monthly) centralized mine awareness meetings
and (weekly) regional mine action meetings. Mine Awareness agencies were
required to coordinate activities centrally (i.e., where in the province they
would work) and regionally (with whom in their area).
MINE ACTION SUPPORT TEAMS
But it became clear over time that mine clearance
and mine awareness were operating too much in isolation of one another. In one
instance, a mine clearance organization had completed a Level Two (Technical)
Survey on an area—no mines were found and the area was certified clear.
Some months later, however, the community was still under the impression that
there was a mine threat in the area, and the deminers were coming back. The
area had been visited several times by independent mine awareness agencies.
Accordingly, in 2000, guidelines were set out for the establishment of a
Mine Action Support Team (MAST) for each mine or battle area clearance
organization,[78] and mine awareness
agencies were tasked to provide support to every clearance organization where an
integral mine awareness capacity did not already exist. To formalize the
arrangements and to ensure all participants were aware of the degree of
importance the MACC placed on this concept, completed mine awareness
arrangements were included as part of the quality assurance and certification
process of completed clearance tasks.
The MASTs were tasked to support
clearance activities before, during and after a task, through communication and
facilitation between community and clearance organization. These included who
would be working, where, why, for how long, and on what particular threat. It
also included negotiating special needs, such as access to vehicle tracks during
working hours for quick casualty evacuation; negotiating animal access routes to
cross certain areas; and respecting farmers’ property while working in the
area. Deliberate efforts were made to discuss with the community exactly what
mine threat they faced, and what was going to be done about it.
Thus, in one
case, a battle area clearance agency was working in an apple orchard, clearing
cluster munitions. The team leader complained to the MAST leader that the
farmer was constantly interrupting his work by coming to pick apples while his
team was working. The MAST leader went to the farmer and asked why he insisted
on picking now—why couldn’t he wait? The farmer replied that he
wouldn’t need to pick his apples if the deminers would stop eating them!
In another case, a mine clearance organization needed access to a logging
track kept clear while they were demining. This would also allow a clear route
for casualty evacuation if necessary. The loggers constantly blocked access
with their tractors. The MAST leader negotiated that loggers would wait until
after three in the afternoon to collect their logs, thereby leaving the roads
clear during demining hours.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
But in seeking to coordinate and even integrate
with other mine action and development intervention, mine awareness must also do
more to demonstrate its effectiveness (and efficiency) as a means of reducing
casualties. One point that perhaps all mine awareness operators can agree on is
that monitoring and evaluation of the outcome (as opposed to progress in
the implementation) of a program represents a significant
challenge.[79] It is easy enough to
report that a program has “reached” a certain number of men, women
and children in a set of given communities. This, however, does nothing to
indicate whether these individuals and families are safer as a result. Have the
“program beneficiaries” understood the messages communicated? Have
they internalized them? Can they put into practice the techniques they have
been taught?
What is more, other factors such as mine clearance and
population movements may be responsible for a reduction (or even an increase) in
mine and UXO casualties.[80] In the
same way as mine clearance is looking beyond more quantitative measurements of
progress, such as numbers of mines and quantities of square meters of land
cleared, to assess the social and economic impact of its work on
communities,[81] so mine awareness
evaluations must seek to judge success on the basis of more representative proxy
indicators.[82] For, Kosovo
notwithstanding, if a number of mine clearance organizations have in the past
been almost contemptuous of mine awareness, it is partly because mine awareness
operators have not successfully convinced others that the discipline actually
works.[83]
UNICEF has announced
that it is developing guidelines on monitoring and evaluation of mine awareness
programs; the guidelines will be included as a technical annex to the mine
awareness standards it is also
sponsoring.[84] The challenge will
be to develop straightforward methodologies that can be easily put into
practice; otherwise the best may be the enemy of the good.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Over the coming year, mine awareness will have the
opportunity to mature as a discipline. A number of new initiatives provide
concrete evidence of a widespread willingness on the part of a number of mine
awareness actors to learn lessons and gather and share experiences with a view
to improving the quality of programs. Kosovo is probably a unique situation,
but its lessons for mine awareness—good and bad—have general
applicability.
Yet, these combined experiences have also demonstrated that
many operators still face a steep learning curve, notably in trying to
professionalize mine awareness. Staff development, national accreditation and
standardization of curriculum and methodologies, and improved monitoring and
evaluation all represent significant future challenges to the mine awareness
community.
[53] Leonie Barnes is a mine
action consultant in Eritrea. Previously, she was the Chief of Public
Information at the UN Mine Action Coordination Center in Pristina, Kosovo. She
has contributed in particular to the section, “Coordination with Mine
Clearance: Lessons from Kosovo” based on her experiences in the
field.
[54] Stuart Maslen is the
Landmine Monitor thematic researcher for mine awareness. The views expressed in
this article do not necessarily reflect those of Landmine
Monitor.
[55] The other four
“pillars,” or “complementary core components,” are,
respectively, mine survey, marking, clearance and data collection; mine ban
advocacy; mine victim assistance; and stockpile
destruction.
[56] Of course, the
contexts and the accompanying programs are not necessarily linear and uniform
even within a single country or
region.
[57] Thus, for example,
the ICRC reports that in Kisangani, in the east of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, when civilians returned home after the fighting between Rwanda and Uganda
abated, an emergency information campaign was launched through the local radio
to inform the population of the dangers posed by UXO and mines laid by the
parties to the conflict. See Laurence Desvignes, “The International
Committee of the Red Cross Mine/UXO Awareness Programs,” Journal of
Mine Action, Issue 4.3, Fall 2000, p.
8.
[58] See for instance Summary
Report of the International Workshop on the Design of Materials, Resources and
Other Media in Mine Awareness Programs, Rädda Barnen, Beirut, May 2001,
point 6.
[59] Care must therefore
be taken not to create “mine panic,” such as might have occurred in
Kosovo. Remarks by John Flanagan, Program Manager, UN Mine Action Coordination
Center, Pristina, during discussion on mine awareness at the Fourth
International Meeting of Mine Action Program Directors and Advisors, Geneva, 6
February 2001.
[60] They will
also have to be repeated in order to ensure effective internalization. See for
instance Christine Knudsen, “The Challenges for Mine Awareness Education
for Children in Afghanistan,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 4.3,
Fall 2000, p. 11.
[61] See below
for further discussion of the challenges and pitfalls of monitoring and
evaluating mine awareness
programs.
[62] See Laurence
Desvignes, “The International Committee of the Red Cross Mine/UXO
Awareness Programs,” op. cit., p.
7.
[63] Ibid, p.
3.
[64] Here media is used in its
widest sense, to cover all forms of communicating a message, not merely the mass
media, such as radio, television and
newspapers.
[65] The
International Workshop on the Design of Materials, Resources and Other Media in
Mine Awareness Programs, held in Aden, Yemen, in February 2001, concluded among
other things that: “A careful needs assessment should be the basis on
which all tools, media and other resources are elaborated. A needs assessment
is necessary to determine the nature, extent and perception of a mine/unexploded
ordnance problem, the at-risk populations and risk-taking behavior, the existing
resources available to address the problem, and the appropriate mine awareness
messages and their effective delivery. A mine awareness communication strategy
must be underpinned by the findings of the needs assessment and any subsequent
information obtained through formative research and ongoing monitoring.”
Summary Report of the International Workshop on the Design of Materials,
Resources and Other Media in Mine Awareness Programs, Rädda Barnen, Beirut,
May 2001, point 1.
[66] Thus, in
a mine-affected country recently visited by one of the authors, the local office
of a leading mine awareness organization wrote that they did not require a needs
assessment before initiating a mine awareness program, “just some
posters.”
[67] See for
instance Summary Report of the International Workshop on the Design of
Materials, Resources and Other Media in Mine Awareness Programs, Rädda
Barnen, Beirut, May 2001, points 3 &
4.
[68] Remarks made during the
International Workshop on the Design of Materials, Resources and Other Media in
Mine Awareness Programs, Aden, Yemen, 21 February
2001.
[69] And transforming a
society whose teachers have been trained to do the latter is a challenge, albeit
a potentially rewarding one. See for instance Christine Knudsen, “The
Challenges for Mine Awareness Education for Children in Afghanistan,”
Journal of Mine Action, Issue 4.3, Fall 2000, p.
11.
[70] A good example of a mine
awareness activity that could rightly claim to be ‘participatory’ is
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)-sponsored theatre group that
has traveled around Kosovo. A former ICRC mine awareness instructor, in reality
a professional actor, adapted a version of the well-known story, Little Red
Riding Hood, in which our eponymous heroine is threatened by mines as well as by
the wretched wolf. The target audience of children and their parents has to
shout out instructions to Little Red Riding Hood to prevent her being injured.
Using professional actors, the play has entertained as well as educated, thus
facilitating longer retention of the key
messages.
[71] See for instance
Laurence Desvignes, “The International Committee of the Red Cross Mine/UXO
Awareness Programs,” op. cit., p.
2.
[72] See for instance Summary
Report of the International Workshop on the Design of Materials, Resources and
Other Media in Mine Awareness Programs, Rädda Barnen, Beirut, May 2001,
point 5.
[73] Discussion with
Andy Wheatley, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 21 February 2001. See also
Laurence Desvignes, “The International Committee of the Red Cross Mine/UXO
Awareness Programs,” op. cit., p.
3.
[74] See Eric Filippino,
“Implementing Landmine Awareness Programs: Constraints and
Strategies,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 4.3, Fall 2000, p.
22.
[75] Discussion with Andy
Wheatley, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 21 February
2001.
[76] See for instance Ted
Paterson et al., A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine
Action” (Geneva: UN Development Program and Geneva International
Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), pp.
91-96.
[77] In August 1999, 23
agencies were seeking to conduct mine awareness education of one kind in another
in Kosovo. The types of activity ranged from handing out T-shirts and comic
books to training community volunteers. Coordination was difficult, visibility
of activity was impossible and clarity of the messages each agency was promoting
was obscured.
[78] See Chapter 20
of MACC Technical Standards and Guidelines, available at:
<welcome.to/macckosovo>.
[79]
See for instance Laurence Desvignes, “The International Committee of the
Red Cross Mine/UXO Awareness Programs,” op. cit., p.
3.
[80]
Ibid.
[81] See Eric Filippino,
“Implementing Landmine Awareness Programs: Constraints and
Strategies,” op. cit., p. 18; Ted Paterson et al, A Study
of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, op. cit., p.
3.
[82] One example might be the
number of reports of the presence of mines or UXO to the appropriate
authorities—a clear indication that certain key messages have been acted
on.
[83] See for instance Eric
Filippino, “Implementing Landmine Awareness Programs: Constraints and
Strategies,” op. cit., pp. 19,
23.
[84] UNICEF contribution to
Landmine Monitor—Appendices, undated but received 13 July 2001.
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