Key
developments since May 2000: In May 2001 the Chilean Senate passed
ratification legislation. As of July 2001, the President had not signed the
legislation into law. The Army has approximately 25,000 antipersonnel mines
stockpiled. The Navy destroyed 2,000 M16 mines on 6 November 2000. There are
no reports of significant mine clearance operations. Landmine Monitor fieldwork
has produced new information on mined areas.
Chile signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December
1997. On 3 May 2001, during the forty-first extraordinary session, the Chilean
Senate passed legislation, Bulletin 2209-10, approving ratification of the Mine
Ban Treaty.[190] As of July
2001, President Ricardo Lagos had not yet signed the legislation into law, after
which the instrument of ratification can be deposited with the United Nations.
Concerns over implementation costs related to mine clearance are believed to
be one reason for the long delay in ratification. During the May 2001 session
the Senate also agreed to request a report from its National Defense Commission
on future implementation of the treaty, including technical and financial
aspects.[191]
In December
2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela,
noted the government’s positive steps such as limited stockpile
destruction and small mine clearance operations, but added, “Despite these
clear demonstrations of will, it is vital and urgent that we conclude the
ratification process, not only because three years have passed since we signed,
or more than a year and a half since it entered into effect, but because of our
country’s commitment to the principles and values sustained in the
treaty.”[192] Alvear said
it was unnecessary to assess the total cost of mine clearance prior to
ratification, but rather the country should begin the process in accordance with
its own resources and priorities.
Chile attended the Second Meeting of
States Parties in September 2000, as an observer. Chile did not participate in
intersessional Standing Committee meetings in December 2000, but a
representative from its Permanent Mission in Geneva attended the May 2001
meetings.
Chile attended the Fourth Defense Ministerial Conference of the
Americas in Manaus, Brazil from 16 to 21 October 2000. The “Declaration
of Manaus” issued at the Conference included under point 11, a call for
“greater participation in effective implementation of the Ottawa
Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer
of antipersonnel landmines and on their
destruction.”[193]
Chile participated in a Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction in the
Americas in Buenos Aires in November 2000. The Chilean representative, Navy
Captain Cristian Rudloff Álvarez, announced destruction of a Navy
stockpile of 2,000 M16 mines on 6 November
2000.[194] It is not known
whether Chile will meet the “Managua Challenge” issued at the
meeting in Buenos Aires, which includes challenges to complete ratification and
stockpile destruction by the time of the Third Meeting of States Parties in
Managua in September 2001.[195]
Also in November 2000, Chile voted in favor of UN General Assembly
Resolution 55/33V, supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.
Chile is not a State
Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but in December 2000 it
attended the Second Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol
II (Landmines) as an observer.
Production, Transfer and Use
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile
has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines since
1985.[196] Chile has produced
at least six different types of antipersonnel mines in the
past.[197] Both the
Army’s Fabricaciones Militares (FAMAE) and Industrias Cardoen, a private
company, manufactured the
mines.[198] In 1975 Chile
imported 300,000 M14 antipersonnel mines from the United
States.[199]
On 26 April
1999, Chile declared an official moratorium on the production, export and use of
new antipersonnel mines.[200]
The Undersecretary of War at the Ministry of Defense, Gabriel Gaspar, who chairs
the National Commission that oversees and authorizes arms exports, told Landmine
Monitor that Chile has two types of export prohibitions relevant to mines: a
complete prohibition on the export of inhumane weapons such as landmines,
cluster bombs and chemical weapons, and a prohibition on arms exports to certain
countries.[201]
Stockpiling and Destruction
In December 2000, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
official told Landmine Monitor that the Chilean Army has 25,000 antipersonnel
mines stockpiled and the estimated cost to destroy these mines is
$750,000.[202] This is similar
to figures provided in February 2000 to ICBL by Chile’s Ambassador to the
United States of 22,000 antipersonnel mines stockpiled with an estimated cost of
destruction of $850,000.[203]
The stockpile numbers are surprisingly low given that Chile produced and
imported numerous antipersonnel mines, while the destruction costs are extremely
high. The War Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defense, Gabriel Gaspar, told
Landmine Monitor that information on the quantity, location and types of
antipersonnel stockpiled is not available to the public because it is related to
national security.[204]
No
destruction plan has been announced and the government body responsible for
coordinating stockpile destruction it is not known. General Ricardo
Gutiérrez, who replaced Admiral Couyoumdjian as Chief of Staff of
National Defense (the coordinating body for the Army, Navy and Air Force) in
December 2000, declined to provide Landmine Monitor with an update on the
stockpile destruction
plan.[205]
On 6 November
2000, the Navy destroyed 2,000 M16 antipersonnel mines in Puerto Aldea in Region
IV, at a cost of $50,000.[206]
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that the
destruction was intended to demonstrate Chile’s full commitment to the
eradication of this weapon.[207]
It is not known if the Chilean Navy has more antipersonnel mines stockpiled.
One source informed Landmine Monitor that the Navy’s mine stockpile had
been completely
eliminated.[208]
Landmine Problem
The reported number of landmines laid in Chile
varies considerably from one million to 250,000 depending on the
source.[209] The Chilean Army
reportedly has 293 minefields, located in Regions I and II in the north of the
country, and in Region XII in the south, potentially affecting 17
municipalities.[210] Of the 17
mine-affected municipalities, three are major urban centers (Arica, Calama and
Antofagasta). According to one media report, the majority of mines laid along
Chile’s borders are M14 antipersonnel mines and M15 antivehicle mines,
both manufactured by the United
States.[211]
The Andean
mountain range straddles the mine-affected border regions between Chile and
Bolivia, between Chile and Argentina and approximately half of the border
between Chile and Perú. Mines were planted at altitudes of 3,000 to
4,000 meters above sea level and even higher in some cases. During the summer
months (December to March) an intense precipitation in the Andean mountain
region in the north, known as the Invierno Boliviano (Bolivian winter), produces
either rainfall or snow that moves the mines from their original locations to
lower altitudes.
In May 2001 the Bolivian Ministry of Defense provided
detailed information to Landmine Monitor on the border minefields, which are all
in Chilean territory.[212] (See
Bolivia country report for locations and descriptions of the minefields in
Chile). According to Bolivia, there are fifteen known minefields along the
border with Chile in Regions I and II, thirteen of which cover an area of
3,158,100 square meters while the two other are suspected minefields. In seven
of the fifteen minefields, Bolivian reports there are 196,767 antipersonnel and
antivehicle mines.[213]
In
February 2001 the Landmine Monitor researcher for Chile visited mine-affected
areas in Regions I and II of northern Chile.
Region I
Mamiña: 100 kilometers east of
Iquique and 60 kilometers west of the Bolivian border. The area is known for its
thermal baths and attracts hundreds of tourists annually. Most of the local
residents are indigenous peasants who graze cattle. In 1996, a
10-year-old Mamiña resident lost part of his right hand when he
picked up a “shiny object in the middle of a public road” outside
Mamiña.[214] The mine
had apparently been carried from a minefield by a small river running alongside
the road. The survivor’s father’s cousin had died a few years
earlier after stepping on a landmine in the same area.
Putre:
140 kilometers east of Arica, 80 kilometers from the Peruvian border and 50
kilometers from the Bolivian border. Putre is a small town at a high altitude
in the Chilean altiplano (Andean plateau) and has a mostly indigenous
population. The police in Putre acknowledge landmines are a problem for the
community. The last incident occurred in 1999, when a military conscript was
fixing fencing around a minefield and stepped on a landmine, losing his
foot.[215]
Lago
Chungará: 50 kilometers east of Putre. There are marked and
fenced-off minefields along the Bolivian border in Chungará Lake, within
the Lauca National Park. The Army has partially demined the area recently and
while it was not possible to determine how many mines were removed, evidence
remained that the mines were detonated in the ground, leaving depressions. The
fencing of at least one of the Chungará Lake minefields was in poor
condition, making it easy for animals or humans to enter and the Landmine
Monitor researcher saw the carcass of a donkey in the minefield, beyond the
fence.[216]
Region II
San Pedro de Atacama: 80
kilometers east of Calama, the third largest city in Region II, and one of
Chile’s biggest tourist destinations. A number of minefields are unmarked
and unexploded ordnance (UXO) also poses a threat. There is one minefield
eleven kilometers east of San Pedro de Atacama, marked with a “danger
explosives, do not travel” sign. The San Pedro police said the dry
riverbed is full of mines that have been displaced by the rains and also told
Landmine Monitor that a truck belonging to a company installing a gas pipeline
hit a UXO in this area, but no one was
injured.[217]
The general
manager of a high-end hotel in San Pedro de Atacama told Landmine Monitor that
when the hotel project was being designed he met with military personnel who
told him all landmines are located in border areas where they are all contained
in marked minefields.[218] When
Landmine Monitor visited the area, however, local police pointed out several
areas that were mined or had UXO, some very close to the San Pedro tourist
circuit.[219] Dr. Enrique
Larenas, whose son was injured by UXO, told Landmine Monitor that tourists
visiting San Pedro de Atacama, “walk around, ride bikes [and] sometimes
they go off the main roads and into open fields, where there is a danger coming
across abandoned explosives, usually buried, that could explode if stepped
on.”[220]
In January
2001 tourists in the vicinity of San Pedro de Atacama came across an
antipersonnel mine on the way to El Tatio and notified local
authorities.[221] The police
and mine clearance personnel from the “Calama” regiment were
mobilized and while they did not locate any mines, they requested local people
and tourists to report any sightings of “these bombs, which are buried in
the Andean areas of the region.”
Landmine Monitor visited an unmarked
military training field a few kilometers outside Calama, which was littered with
rocket launchers, missile casings and other pieces of used artillery that could
still contain explosive
powder.[222] A road leading
through the training field begins at the Loa river, a popular picnic and
swimming site for Calama families on weekends.
Valle de la Luna
(Valley of the Moon), the most popular tourist attraction in the San Pedro de
Atacama area with an average of 100 visitors each day. There are no markings to
indicate the presence of
explosives.[223] A Chilean
tourist was injured by a UXO right outside the Valle de la Luna in 1994.
Also in 1994 José Miguel Larenas, the son of Dr. Larenas, drove his
truck over a UXO that exploded three to four meters from the road at the
entrance to the Valle de la Luna and 50 meters from a “Nature
Sanctuary” sign. A private explosives company investigated the area where
the incident occurred and found a number of UXO. Details of the investigation
have formed part of a court case currently in process (Dr. Larenas is suing the
state for damages) and therefore cannot be made public at the present
time.[224]
In 1999, Gustavo
Soto was working for an Australian-owned copper mine, Escondida, in Region II
when he picked up an unidentified object that exploded and lost both hands, his
right eye and suffered hearing loss and severe
burns.[225] The incident
occurred near Socompa, an outpost close to the Argentine border and less than 50
kilometers north of Llullaillaco National Park, on a road used by trucks and
personnel from the copper mine who live at the base
camps.[226]
Region XII
Landmine Monitor did not visit Region XII but it is
believed that the Navy planted an unspecified number of landmines in a number of
islands in southern Chile, near Cape Horn and Tierra del
Fuego.[227] A Navy spokesman
said that mine clearance in southern Chile would facilitate development of the
tourist industry, suggesting that minefields are located in national parkland or
other areas with potential for tourism
development.[228]
The
population in mine-affected rural municipalities in Regions I and II in the
north of the country are for the most part indigenous peoples who subsist from
farming, animal ranching, folk art sales, and trading. The inhabitants of
mine-affected municipalities in the south conduct similar activities. In both
the northern and southern mine-affected areas, some of the mine-affected lands
could be used for farming, animal grazing or
tourism.[229]
People from
Bolivia and Perú trafficking in drugs and contraband goods often enter
Chile illegally through the mine-affected borders, and landmine incidents may
not always be reported. The War Undersecretary told Landmine Monitor, “we
have detected that in some northern zones, in the minefields, drug traffickers
have cleared small paths for
themselves.”[230]
Various government officials and private groups that promote tourism in the
country have commented on the mine problem and unsafe travel conditions in
tourist and potential tourist areas. The acting mayor of Calama, José
Albarricín, told Landmine Monitor:
We have beautiful areas, part of
the heritage of Atacama indigenous cultures that could be used for tourism.
However, tourism development in these areas is severely limited since we
ourselves are afraid to visit because of the minefields. ... The presence of
minefields means that tourism companies are not going to want to bring people to
these areas. The farmers are even afraid of going [there], and good grazing land
is lost, Andean communities cannot collect firewood from border areas. There may
even be mining projects that cannot be carried out because of the mines. So it
is clear that minefields negatively affect the region’s
economy.[231]
The mayor
also said that wildlife typical of the region around Calama has been found dead
from landmine blasts, including wild donkeys, vicuñas, llamas and
vizcachas.[232]
Chile’s National Forestry Corporation (CONAF) has confirmed that
there are minefields in six state-protected wilderness areas, including Lauca
National Park, Las Vicunas Nature Reserve, National Monument Salar de Surire,
Llullaillaco National Park, Los Flamencos Nature Reserve, and Cabo de Hornos.
CONAF told Landmine Monitor that the mines are in remote areas not accessible to
the public, and are marked in a discreet way. No visitor or park ranger has
been hurt by a landmine.[233]
In 1999, over 60,000 tourists visited these parks.
According to a retired
Army officer who participated in mine laying in Region II, the Chilean Army
maintains a “registry of every single mine it has
laid.”[234] A journalist
specializing in military affairs told Landmine Monitor that the Army Engineering
Corps had told him they have records of where mines were laid, but only a rough
idea of where the mines are because “the maps are notoriously
imprecise.”[235] In March
2001 Senator Sergio Bitar (Region I) provided Landmine Monitor with several
maps, including one dated 1976, which had a note stating that the minefield was
450 meters wide and contained 807 M14 AP mines and 1,035 M15 AV
mines.[236] Dr. Larenas told
Landmine Monitor, “the military’s maps are so old that some of them
have even been lost” and “since the mines were laid 22 to 24 years
ago, it is very unlikely that they are still in the same places indicated in the
military’s
maps.”[237]
Admiral
Patricio Arancibia stated on national television that minefields belonging to
the Navy are marked and guarded by service personnel to prevent civilian entry
and that there is no chance of mines being washed away by
floods.[238]According
to a retired Army officer, the Chilean Army has made a concerted effort to
improve markings and fencing around minefields, including cementing metal posts
so that the fencing would not blow
away.[239] The officer added
that the real risk is that “99 percent of the mines laid in this region
have shifted due to rains and erosion, especially the lighter plastic mines.
Some of them could have been carried as far as ten kilometers from the original
site where they were
laid.”[240] The
municipality of San Pedro decided not to allow the retired Army officer to talk
with tourism companies about the mine risk because it could generate too much
alarm. The officer said,
If the real situation regarding mines and abandoned
UXO were made public, it would produce so much alarm that nobody would go to San
Pedro. The municipality has done almost nothing to protect the town’s
inhabitants and its visitors. The townspeople are generally able to recognize a
mine, but those that can’t are at risk of hurting themselves.
For
now, the tourism companies know about the situation and are instructed to keep
to the main roads.[241]
The
countries with borders on the mine-affected areas, Argentina, Bolivia and
Perú, have all called on Chile to address its mine problem.
Mine Action Funding and Coordination
In December 2000 a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
official told Landmine Monitor that the estimated cost to clear mines laid by
the Army is $135 million and $50 million for mines laid by the Navy. The
official said the combined cost of stockpile destruction and mine clearance was
estimated at between $250 and $300
million.[242] In November 1999
the Army unveiled plans for an eleven-year mine clearance program along the
borders at an estimated cost of $250
million.[243]
The Chilean
government has not budgeted any funds in 2001 for mine clearance and according
to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official if the national demining agency and
national mine clearance plan were ready in 2001, they could only be considered
for the 2003 budget, since the Chilean budget is determined one year in
advance.[244]
In November
2000, a group of senators from the governing center-left party,
Concertación, called on the government to guarantee the funds necessary
to initiate mine clearance. During hearings on the 2001 budget, Senator Sergio
Bitar, who represents mine-affected Region I in northern Chile, tried
unsuccessfully to persuade the government to allocate a symbolic sum of money to
initiate demining.[245]
On
27 January 2001, members of the Commissions of International Relations of the
House of Deputies of Bolivia and Chile issued a joint declaration on mine
clearance and other bilateral issues at a meeting in Cochambamba,
Bolivia.[246] The declaration
reportedly stated that “it is resolved that the respective governments be
informed of our willingness to find and count on the necessary resources in
order to clear, as soon as possible, the landmines laid on the
border.”[247] The
delegates decided to hold regular meetings to discuss the demining issue and a
follow-up meeting was planned in Valparaíso.
A Navy source told
Landmine Monitor that in March 2001 the Chilean Navy planned to announce a
comprehensive mine clearance plan, that would take four to five years to
complete.[248] In April 2001,
a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that a national demining agency was
being planned and information was sought on the experiences of other countries
and international organizations in this
respect.[249]
Mine Clearance
In April 2001 a small area of land near the
Perú border was demined by Chilean Army
engineers.[250] This came in
the wake of tensions between the two countries, after Chilean Navy Marines
established an observation tower close to the border at Aconcordia, on the coast
north of Arica. Perú accused Chile of placing the tower on Peruvian
territory.[251] The Chilean
Navy withdrew the Marines from the tower after a few days. The Chilean Minister
of Defense, Mario Fernández, later stated at a press conference that the
observation tower had been set up to monitor an area where there had been
displacement of landmines planted in the 1970s due to the Invierno
Altiplánico (highland
winter).[252]
Other than
this activity, Landmine Monitor did not obtain official information or any
reports on any Chilean mine clearance operations in 2000 or 2001.
Previously, a mine clearance operation took place in December 1999 in Region
I where it was reported that deminers from the “Azapa” 6th Engineers
Regiment had cleared an area of 13,500 square meters in Portezuelo de Tambo
Quemado near the Bolivian border, destroying 250 M-14 antipersonnel mines and 27
M-15 antivehicle mines found 15 to 150 meters from the international highway
linking Arica with La Paz.[253]
At the time, the Chilean Army estimated it would take approximately three months
to demine the area but no further clearance was reported or observed in
2000.[254]
In May 2001 the
Chilean Army reportedly purchased two vehicles specially designed for mine
removal from a Dutch company, Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij
B.V. (RDM), made from refurbished Leopard 1 tanks used by the
Dutch Royal Army.[255] The
Chilean Army reportedly states that this was the first in a series of purchases
that will be made in order to fulfill the Mine Ban Treaty obligations.
Chile
assists mine clearance programs in other countries. On 4 December 2000 Chile
and Ecuador signed an agreement for the Chilean Army to assist with its mine
clearance program along the border with
Perú.[256] In July 2001,
the Engineering Command of the Army said, “Three members of the
Engineering Arm of the Chilean Army will travel to Ecuador for a period of four
months to assist in the Humanitarian Demining Project on the border between
Ecuador and
Perú.”[257]
Mine Awareness
There are no official government or NGO mine
awareness programs in Chile. The War Undersecretary of the Defense Ministry told
Landmine Monitor there was no need for a public awareness campaign because the
minefields are properly marked with warning signs. He said, “The thing
is, if someone is looking for high risk, he is going to find it. We can’t
prevent
that.”[258]
Legislators
from mine-affected areas have tried to raise awareness about the landmine
problem on several occasions but there is no sustained, concerted campaign to
raise awareness. On 8 November 2001, a Deputy in the National Legislature,
Guido Girardi, called for a publicity campaign to warn tourists and others in
the mine-affected areas.[259]
One unregistered organization, Andes Sur Action Team, seeks to bring attention
to the landmine problem in Chile and to the need for victim assistance; it
reports it has obtained support from
UNICEF.[260] CODEPU, a human
rights NGO, has assigned a lawyer to represent landmine survivor Gustavo Soto in
his suit against the government.
Landmine Casualties
The most recent known victim to Chilean minefields
occurred on 7 April 2001. A 23-year-old Peruvian youth was trying to enter
Chile illegally to look for work with two friends when he stepped on a
landmine.[261] The incident
reportedly occurred in the Escritos ravine, six kilometres east of border marker
No.5, and four kilometres from the observation tower briefly set up by Chilean
Navy Marines close to the border earlier in the month. Chilean police took the
victim to the Juan Noé Hospital in Arica where his right leg was
amputated. His two companions who were knocked unconscious during the incident
were turned over to police to be sent back to Perú.
No other mine
casualties were reported in 2000 or 2001. Landmine Monitor Report 2000
reported one mine death in September 1999, one mine injury in November 1999 and
another mine injury in May
2000.[262] Between 1976 and
1999 twenty-six civilians were reportedly injured and seven killed by landmines,
and in the same period fifty Chilean military personnel were reported injured
and five killed.[263]
Survivor Assistance
Military personnel injured by mines and UXO receive
care in military hospitals. There are no specific services available from the
national health service, private health institutions or NGOs for civilian
landmine victims in Chile.[264]
The Fondo Nacional de Discapacitados [National Fund for the Disabled] provides
social assistance for the disabled.
In February 2001, Landmine Monitor
interviewed three UXO survivors in Calama who each said they have been using the
same prostheses for the past 17 years. They did not know of any institutions
that could help them.[265] The
municipality had previously offered to pay half of the cost of new prostheses,
but the survivors said there was no way they could afford the other half given
the that the total cost for one prosthesis was approximately $4,000. One
survivor told Landmine Monitor, “I’m going through bad moments right
now. My prosthesis is broken. My upper leg got thinner and the prosthesis is
now too big for me. I had to fill it in with PVC. I can hardly even walk
anymore because if I take a step it comes off and I fall, so I have to move
around in a
wheelchair.”[266] These
three UXO survivors said they have requested the help of local politicians but
to no avail. They survive on monthly unemployment pensions of $64 each.
[190] “Senado
ratificó acuerdo para destruir minas antipersonales,” EFE
(Santiago), 3 May 2001; “Chile ratifies treaty to ban landmines,”
Reuters (Santiago), 4 May
2001.
[191] “Session
41 extraordinaria, en Jueves 3 de mayo de 2001...Convencion Sobre Prohibicion de
Empleo y Produccion de Minas Antipersonales,” Senate Information Office,
Valparaiso, 4 May 2001. See also, www.senado.cl/sesiones/pags/diar/.
[192] Foreign Minister
Soledad Alvear, “A tres años de la convención de
Ottawa,” El Mercurio (Santiago), 4 December
2000.
[193] Declaration of
Manaus, IV Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas, Manaus, Brazil, 16-21
October 2000. See www.defesa.gov.br.
[194] Notes taken by
Landmine Monitor researcher at the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction in
the Americas, Buenos Aires, 6 November
2000.
[195] See OAS,
“Informe del Secretario General sobre la implementación de las
Resoluciones 1745 (apoyo a la acción contra las minas en Ecuador y
Perú) y 1751 (apoyo a la acción contra las minas en
Centroamérica),” CP/doc.3422/01 rev.1, 7 May
2001.
[196] Response by the
Chilean Foreign Ministry to Landmine Monitor 1999 provided by the Chilean
Ambassador to Uruguay, Augusto Bermúdez Arancibia, 2 February
1999.
[197] See Landmine
Monitor Report 1999, p. 290 for details and
types.
[198]Jane’s
Mines and Mine Clearance, on-line update, 19 November
1999.
[199] US Army Armament,
Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), letter to Human Rights Watch, 25
August 1993, and attached statistical
tables.
[200] Letter from
María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, Minister of Foreign Affairs to
Jean-Benoît Burrion, Director General, Handicap International (Belgium),
dated 31 August 2000; Gobierno de Chile, Declaración Oficial,
“Moratoria Unilateral en la Producción, Exportación,
Importación, e Instalación de Nuevas Minas Terrestres
Antipersonal,” Santiago, 26 April 1999.
[201] Interview with Gabriel
Gaspar, War Undersecretary, Ministry of Defense, Santiago, 15 January
2001.
[202] Interview with
Verónica Chain, Director, Special Policy Section, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Santiago, 1 December
2000.
[203] ICBL (Jody
Williams and Liz Bernstein) meeting with Ambassador Mario Artaza, Embassy of
Chile to the US, Washington, DC, 7 February 2000. See also follow-up letter
from Williams to Artaza, dated 8 February
2000.
[204] Interview with
Gabriel Gaspar, Ministry of Defense, 15 January
2001.
[205] A spokesperson
for Gutiérrez told Landmine Monitor that the General was not available to
make any public comments on landmines.
[206] Interview with Captain
Cristián Rudloff Alvarez, Chilean Navy, Buenos Aires, 7 November 2000;
Interview with Verónica Chain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 December
2000.
[207] Interview with
Gabriel Gaspar, Ministry of Defense, 15 January
2001.
[208] The Navy official
wished to remain anonymous.
[209] For example, in
September 1997 a Ministry of Defense official said Chile had planted nearly one
million mines on its borders with Argentina, Bolivia, and Perú. Interview
published by La Tercera, Santiago, 8 September 1997, and reproduced in
Clarín (Buenos Aires), 8 December 1997. Estimates in 1998 ranged
between 500,000 and one million landmines. Agence France Presse (Arica),
18 July 1998; Agence France Presse (Antofagasta), 21 June 1998. In
November 1999, a military official said there were 300,000 mines in border
regions. “Chile retirará a la brevedad minas antipersonales de
frontera con Argentina, Bolivia y Perú,” Associated Press
(La Paz), 18 November 1999. In December 1999 a policy analyst at the Ministry
of Defense stated there were at least 500,000 landmines along the border with
Argentina. José Higuera, “Desminado fronterizo: La atrevida
promesa de Izurieta,” El Metropolitano (Santiago), 20 December
1999. In November 2000 a Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told
Landmine Monitor that there were 500,000 mines along the border between Chile
and Bolivia. Interview with Barbara Cañedo, Director of Multilateral
Affairs, Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 6 November 2000.
In December 2000 a Foreign Affairs Ministry official said the Chilean Army had a
total of 250,000 mines planted in border areas with the three neighboring
countries but it is not clear whether the figure of 250,000 mines includes both
Army and Navy mines or only those belonging to the Army. Interview with
Veronica Chain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 December
2000.
[210]
“Financiamiento detiene desminado,” La Estrella de Arica
(Arica), 10 April 2001; Telephone interview with Elir Rojas, Andes Sur Action
Team, 3 May 2001.
[211]
“Senado ratificó acuerdo para destruir minas antipersonales,”
EFE (Santiago), 3 May
2001.
[212] Bolivian Ministry
of Defense Response to Landmine Monitor, faxed by Ambassador Jorge Soruco
Villanueva, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 March
2001.
[213] This includes
16,716 antipersonnel mines, 153,396 blast mines (“explosives”),
15,267 bounding mines (“saltadoras”) and 11,388 antivehicle
mines.Bolivian Ministry of Defense Response to Landmine Monitor, faxed
by Ambassador Jorge Soruco Villanueva, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22
March 2001.
[214] Interview
with Elias Moscoso Challapa, landmine survivor now aged 15 years, Mamiña,
6 February 2001.
[215]
Interview with Francisco Castro, Acting Captain of the Second Precinct of Putre,
Putre, 8 February 2001.
[216]
Landmine Monitor field visit to Lago Chungará accompanied by the National
Police, 8 February
2001.
[217] Interview with
Capitán Fredy Muñoz Olivares, Captain of the sub-precinct of San
Pedro de Atacama, San Pedro de Atacama, 10 February
2001.
[218] Telephone
interview with Felipe Cruz, General Manager, Hotel Explora in San Pedro de
Atacama, 27 February
2001.
[219] Field visit to by
Landmine Monitor researcher Dana Holahan, 4-11 February
2001.
[220] Interview with
Dr. Enrique Larenas, Calama, 9 February
2001.
[221] “Alarma por
supuesta bomba en El Tatio,” La Estrella de Loa (Loa), 12 January
2001.
[222] Field visit to
unmarked military training field with Dr. Enrique Larenas, Calama, 10 February
2001.
[223] Field visit to
Valle de la Luna accompanied by the National Police, 10 February
2001.
[224] Interview with
José Miguel Larenas, Santiago, 16 January
2001.
[225] On the way to one
of the copper mine base camps, high in the Andean mountains, Soto stopped by the
roadside and picked up a green plastic object “the size of the face of a
large watch” which he thought could be a lid for one of the water bottles
commonly used in the region, where water is scarce. He placed the object on the
dashboard of the pickup truck in which he was the front seat passenger. As the
truck started to move, it slid and he put his hands down on it to prevent it
from falling, when it exploded. Interview with Gustavo Soto, Santiago, 1 March
2001.
[226] Interview with
Gustavo Soto, Santiago, 1 March
2001.
[227] Interview with
Navy official, November
2000.
[228] Interview with
Captain Cristián Álvarez, Chilean Navy, 6 November
2000.
[229] Observations made
during field visit to northern Chile and previous trips to southern
Chile.
[230] Interview with
Gabriel Gaspar, Defense Ministry, 15 January
2001.
[231] Interview with
José Albarracín, acting mayor of Calama, Calama, 9 February
2001.
[232]
Ibid.
[233] Fax to Landmine
Monitor researcher from Carlos Weber, Executive Director of CONAF, 27 July 2001.
See also, “Urgencia Humanitaria,” El Diario Austral de
Osorno, Osorno, 14 November
2000.
[234] Telephone
interview with retired Army officer, 18 May 2001. [235] Email to Landmine
Monitor from journalist specializing in military affairs, 14 December 2000. [236] Landmine Monitor
has a copy of one of the several maps given to Senator
Bitar.
[237] Interview with
Dr. Enrique Larenas, Calama, 9 February
2001.
[238] “24
Horas,” Televisión Nacional (state television broadcast), 6
November 2000.
[239]
Telephone interview with retired Army officer, 18 May 2001. [240] Ibid. [241] Ibid. [242] Interview with
Verónica Chain, Foreign Affairs Ministry, 1 December
2000.
[243] “11
Años tomará el retiro de minas,” El Mercurio
(Santiago), 26 November 1999; “Financiamiento detiene desminado,”
La Estrella de Arica (Arica), 10 April
2001.
[244] The fiscal year
in Chile is the same as the calendar year (January to December). Email to
Landmine Monitor from Ramón Hormazábal, Director, Department of
Disarmament and International Security, Special Policy Section, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 17 May
2001.
[245] Interview with
Sergio Bitar, Senator for Region I, Santiago, 22 March 2001. See also
“Urgen a Entregar Recursos para Desminado,” El Mercurio
(Santiago), 21 November
2000.
[246] “Chile y
Bolivia levantarán de su frontera minas antipersonales,” El
Tribuno (Salta) 28 January
2001.
[247]
Ibid.
[248] Interview with
Navy official, November
2000.
[249] Interview with
Ramón Hormazábal,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 April
2001; Emails to Landmine Monitor from a consultant to the Department of
Disarmament and International Security, Special Policy Section, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, April
2001.
[250] Telephone
interview with Elir Rojas, Andes Sur Action Team, 24 July
2001.
[251] When the
observation tower was established, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru,
Javier Pérez de Cuellar, expressed “his preoccupation and
disagreement to the Chilean government,” and there were demonstrations by
Peruvian reservists and civilians at the site. “Cancillería
comunica a Chile su extrañeza y preocupación,” El
Comercio (Lima), 5 April 2001; “Armada retiró
vigilancia,” La Estrella de Arica (Arica, Chile), 6 April 2001;
Editorial, “Frontera con Chile,” La Industria de Trujillo
(Trujillo, Perú), 11 April 2001;
[252]
“Cancillería comunica a Chile su extrañeza y
preocupación,” El Comercio (Lima), 5 April 2001;
“Armada retiró vigilancia,” La Estrella de Arica
(Arica, Chile), 6 April 2001; “Chilenos invaden territorio peruano,”
La República (Lima), 3 April 2001; “Chile usurpa más
de 24 mil metros cuadrados de territorio peruano. Gobierno chileno, en tanto,
ordena retiro de tropa militar,” El Expreso (Lima), 6 April
2001.
[253]
“Concluyó Primera Operación de Desminado,” El
Mercurio (Santiago) 4 December 1999; “277 Landmines Destroyed,”
MISNA (Tambo Quemado), Chile, 9 December 1999; Letter from María
Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Jean-Benoît
Burrion, Director General, Handicap International (Belgium), dated 31 August
2000.
[254] On the basis of
army reconnaissance patrols, Bolivia reported that up until March 2001 no
further demining activities were carried out on the Chilean side of the border.
Bolivian Ambassador Jorge Soruco Villanueva, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,
in response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, received 22 March
2001.
[255] “Nuevo plan
de acción para eliminar minas,” La Estrella de Arica
(Arica), 21 May 2001.
[256]
Interview with Verónica Chain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 December
2000. During a Landmine Monitor visit to CENDESMI, Ecuador’s national
demining agency in April 2001, the director of CENDESMI said a Chilean military
delegation was visiting CENDESMI to learn from the Ecuadorian mine clearance
experience and discuss bilateral cooperation. Landmine Monitor briefly met with
the Chilean military officials. See also “Chile ayuda a retirar minas en
frontera Perú-Ecuador” La Hora (Santiago), 13 December 2000;
“Chile will help Ecuador remove landmines on border with Peru,”
EFE (Quito), 4 December
2000.
[257] Public Relations
Office of the Army Engineering Command, “Commission of the Chilean Army is
sent to Ecuador to participate as consultants in the humanitarian demining
project,” Santiago, 26 July
2001.
[258] Interview with
Gabriel Gaspar, Ministry of Defense, 15 January
2001.
[259] “24
Horas,” Televisión Nacional (state television broadcast), 8
November 2000.
[260]
Telephone interview with Elir Rojas, Andes Sur Action Team, 3 May
2001.
[261] “Cuando
intentaba entrar ilegalmente a Chile. Peruano resultó herido por mina
antipersonal,” La Tercera (Santiago), Chile, 9 April 2001;
“Pierde pie derecho por ingresar en forma ilegal a Chile,” El
Comercio (Lima), 10 April 2001; Editorial, “Frontera con Chile,”
La Industria de Trujillo (Trujillo), 11 April 2001.
[262] See Landmine
Monitor Report 2000, p.
312.
[263]
“Ejército confirma intención de retirar minas
antipersonales,” La Hora (Santiago), 25 November
1999.
[264] See Landmine
Monitor Report 2000, p.
312.
[265] Interviews with
Luis Vergara, Francisco Vergara and Silverio Morales, Calama, 9 February
2001.
[266] Interview with
Silverio Morales, Calama, 9 February 2001.
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