A
total of 140 countries have signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31
July 2001, thereby legally committing themselves to no use of antipersonnel
mines. A total of 117 of those countries have ratified or acceded, thereby
fully committing to all the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty. After the treaty
entered into force on 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign
the treaty with intent to ratify at a later date. Since the publication of
Landmine Monitor Report 2000, three states have acceded: Nauru (7 August
2000), Kiribati (7 September 2000), and Congo-Brazzaville (4 May 2001).
Considering the relatively short time that this issue has been before the
international community, the number of signatories and accessions – nearly
three-quarters of the world’s nations -- is exceptional. This is a clear
indication of the widespread international rejection of any use or possession of
antipersonnel mines.
Every country in the Western Hemisphere has signed
except the US and Cuba, every member of the European Union except Finland, every
member of NATO except the US and Turkey, 42 of the 48 countries in Africa, and
key Asia-Pacific nations such as Australia, Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Several of the most heavily mine-affected states are states parties: Cambodia,
Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Several others are
signatories: Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Major past producers and exporters
are now States Parties, including: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Still, 53
countries have not yet joined the treaty. This includes three of the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the United
States. It includes most of the Middle East, most of the former Soviet
republics, and many Asian nations. Major producers such the US, Russia, China,
India and Pakistan are not part of the treaty.
Virtually all of the
non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel
mines at some point in time, and many have already at least partially embraced
the Mine Ban Treaty. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/33v calling
for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted in November 2000 by a
vote of 143 in favor, none opposed, and 22 abstentions. Nineteen
non-signatories voted for the resolution, including Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus,
Bhutan, Comoros, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal,
Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Turkey and the United Arab
Emirates.
Some developments during the reporting period are encouraging. The
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey announced that they will join the treaty
and will deposit their instruments of ratification and accession, respectively,
at the same time. Cyprus has announced its intention to ratify soon. FR
Yugoslavia has announced its intention to accede to the treaty. Nigeria has
decided to accede and initiated the legal process. In several countries where
conflict has ended recently, governments have expressed interest in joining the
Mine Ban Treaty, including DR Congo, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.
Many States
Parties are putting a high priority on promoting universalization of the Mine
Ban Treaty. A Universalization Contact Group has been formed, coordinated by
Canada, with participation by a number of States Parties, the ICBL and ICRC. In
addition to many bilateral efforts to promote adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty,
there have been important regional conferences aimed at universalization.
Nevertheless, there has been little or no change in the ban policies of some
states in the past year, including the US, Russia and China. Universalization
clearly remains the biggest challenge facing ban supporters. The fact that only
five countries have acceded to the treaty since its entry-into-force on 1 March
1999 is testament to that.
After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban
Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law.
This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral
treaty ever. For a State that ratifies or accedes now, the treaty enters into
force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that
State deposited its instrument of ratification. That State is then required to
make its implementation report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days,
destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground
within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic
implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.
A total of
117 countries have ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty as of 1 August
2001, including seventeen since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report
2000. Three nations acceded (Kiribati, Nauru, and Congo-Brazzaville) and
fourteen ratified in this reporting period: Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Colombia,
Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Maldives, Malta, Moldova, Romania, Sierra Leone,
Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zambia.
There are 23 governments that have signed
but not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. Several have reportedly already
completed, or nearly completed, the domestic process necessary for ratification,
but have not formally submitted an instrument of ratification to the United
Nations: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Cook Islands, DR Congo and São
Tomé e Príncipe.
There is concern that the pace of
ratifications/accessions has slowed. There were three ratifications in December
1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference, 55 in 1998, 32 in 1999, and
19 in 2000 and eight from January-July 2001.
Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program
The first two years of the Mine Ban Treaty
intersessional work program successfully fulfilled their intended purpose in
helping to maintain a focus on the landmines crisis, in becoming a meeting place
for all key mine action players, and in stimulating momentum to fully implement
the Mine Ban Treaty. The four intersessional Standing Committees on Victim
Assistance, Mine Clearance, Stockpile Destruction and General Status and
Operation of the Convention helped to provide a global picture of priorities, as
well as to consolidate and concentrate global mine action efforts. As a result,
the role of the Mine Ban Treaty as a comprehensive framework for mine action
continued to be highlighted.
The intersessional process is a collaborative
process conducted in the Ottawa Process tradition of inclusivity, partnership
(between governments, ICBL, ICRC, and International Organizations), dialogue,
openness and practical cooperation. Action points identified from the first year
of the intersessional work program were included in the Second Meeting of States
Parties President’s Action Program and served as the basis for planning
for the second year of intersessional work. Implementation of these Action
Points was ongoing throughout the year. Compliance with all key Articles of the
Convention became an overall focus of the second intersessional year.
The
intersessional Standing Committee meetings will become increasingly important in
the years leading up to the first Review Conference in 2004, as the Mine Ban
Treaty continues to rapidly move toward establishment of the international norm.
The ICBL remains deeply committed to full and active participation in this
critical intersessional process.
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)
The ICBL continued to monitor developments at the
CCW and its Amended Protocol II with a minimal presence during the Second Annual
Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in December 2000,
and the December 2000 and April 2001 PrepComs for the Second CCW Review
Conference, to be held in December 2001. Most NGOs who attended, though ICBL
members, were there to further their individual NGO’s work on non-ICBL
matters, such as cluster munitions. ICBL statements were made at both
PrepComs.
Proposals presented and discussed at these meetings included:
extension of scope, compliance issues, antivehicle mines, wound ballistics and
Explosive Remnants of War. From the ICBL perspective the most important
development during these sessions was the discussion surrounding the ICRC
proposal regarding Explosive Remnants of War and progress made toward the goal
of having the Review Conference approve a mandate for continuing discussions on
remnants of war. Most delegations spoke in favor of ongoing consideration and
discussion of this important humanitarian issue. The Netherlands plays a
leading role in this issue and the ICRC as well as many NGOs, who are ICBL
members, continue to work on the issue.
Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties
Landmine Monitor has
received disturbing reports that indicate a strong possibility of use of
antipersonnel mines by Ugandan forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
in June 2000. Uganda became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in August
1999. Landmine Monitor believes that these serious and credible allegations
merit the urgent attention of States Parties, who should consult with the
Ugandan government and other relevant actors in order to seek clarification,
establish the facts, and resolve these questions regarding compliance with the
Mine Ban Treaty. The Ugandan government has denied that it used antipersonnel
mines in the DRC.
Mine Ban Treaty Signatories
One Mine Ban Treaty signatory has acknowledged
continued use of antipersonnel mines: Angola (against UNITA rebels).
While
Landmine Monitor does not have conclusive evidence, there are strong indications
that two other signatories used antipersonnel mines: Ethiopia (until the end of
its border conflict with Eritrea in June 2000), and Sudan (ongoing use against
SPLA and other rebel forces). Both governments deny any use of antipersonnel
mines.
There have also been serious allegations of use of antipersonnel
mines by Rwandan forces in the DRC in June 2000. Rwanda was a Mine Ban Treaty
signatory at the time; it became a State Party on 1 December 2000. Rwanda
denies any use of antipersonnel mines.
In Burundi, which is a treaty
signatory, antipersonnel mines have continued to be used, and there have been
allegations of use by both government and rebel forces, but Landmine Monitor has
not been able to establish responsibility for the mine use. The government of
Burundi denies any mine use.
Mine Ban Treaty Non-Signatories
In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May
2000, the following countries which have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty, have
acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines: Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Russia, Sri
Lanka, and Uzbekistan.
Other non-signatories who are credibly reported to
have used antipersonnel mines in this time period include: Democratic Republic
of Congo, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, and Somalia. The DRC and Nepal have
denied use.
Armed Non-State Actors
Opposition groups are reported to have used
antipersonnel mines in at least 19 countries.
Africa: Angola; Burundi; DR
Congo; Namibia; Senegal; Somalia; Sudan; Uganda
Europe/Central Asia: Georgia
(in Abkhazia); FYR Macedonia; Russia (in
Chechnya); FR Yugoslavia (in and
near Kosovo)
Developments Since Landmine Monitor Report 2000
As of mid-2001, it would not appear that
antipersonnel mines are being used on a massive scale in any conflict. The most
regular use is likely occurring in Russia (Chechnya), Sri Lanka, and Burma.
Reports of Uzbekistan continuing to mine its borders were still being received
in June 2001.
The kind of widespread use of antipersonnel mines that was
witnessed in FR Yugoslavia/Kosovo in 1999 and in Russia/Chechnya at the height
of that conflict in 1999 and early 2000 was not evident in this reporting period
in any location. It would appear, however, that use of antipersonnel mines
increased in a number of countries, notably in Colombia by guerrillas and in
Namibia by Angolan rebels (UNITA) and Angolan government troops.
Most
instances of use of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period were in ongoing
situations of conflict, where the governments and rebel groups were using mines
in the previous reporting period as well. However, there were a number of cases
of new instances of antipersonnel mine use, or serious allegations of new use.
These include:
Russia: In addition to continued use of antipersonnel mines in the conflict
with Chechen rebels (who also use mines), Russian forces have laid antipersonnel
mines on the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border, and have laid
antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan on the Tajik-Afghan border.
Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan has laid antipersonnel mines on its borders with
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Both governments have accused Uzbekistan of
emplacing mines across the border in their territory.
Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgyz forces reportedly mined the border with Tajikistan in mid
to late 2000, then subsequently cleared the mines.
Nepal: There are now serious indicators that government police forces are
using antipersonnel mines against the Maoist rebels who are increasingly using
homemade mines.
FYR Macedonia: Since ethnic Albanian insurgents began fighting the
government in March 2001, at least six antivehicle mine incidents have been
reported and there have been several reported seizures of antipersonnel mines
being smuggled into FYR Macedonia from Kosovo.
FR Yugoslavia: In southern Serbia, bordering Kosovo, irregular ethnic
Albanian forces have used antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.
On the other side from these new outbreaks of use of antipersonnel mines, it
would appear that, compared to Landmine Monitor Report 2000, the
government of FR Yugoslavia did not use antipersonnel mines in this reporting
period and the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia stopped use early in the
period. In each instance, the stoppage in use of mines was the result of the
cessation of hostilities, rather than a policy decision.
In other
developments in this reporting period:
Eritrea for the first time
admitted to use of antipersonnel mines during its border conflict with Ethiopia
from May 1998 to June 2000.
Israel acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in
South Lebanon prior to its withdrawal from the area in May 2000, and provided
minefield maps to the United Nations. It appears that Israel has continued to
use antipersonnel mines in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, allegedly
without proper fencing and marking as required by CCW Amended Protocol II, which
entered into force for Israel on 30 April 2001. When asked about the
allegation, Israel replied that it “fulfills its obligations to the
fullest extent, and strongly rejects allegations to the contrary.” There
have been allegations of mine use by Palestinians as well.
In February 2001
the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the first time known to
Landmine Monitor denied current or past use of antipersonnel mines.
In August
2000, the government of Burundi, for the first time known to Landmine Monitor,
accused rebel forces of using antipersonnel mines. This came in response to
Landmine Monitor’s report of serious allegations of use by the Burundi
army. The government has subsequently frequently accused rebels of planting
mines.
In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000, there
was confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines, or credible allegations of new
use, in the following countries:
Africa
Angola: government and rebels (UNITA)
Burundi:
unknown (allegations of rebels and government)
Democratic Republic of Congo:
unknown (allegations of DRC government, RDC rebels, other rebels, Ugandan
government, Rwandan government)
Eritrea: government
Ethiopia:
government
Namibia: Angolan government and UNITA
Senegal: rebels
(MFDC)
Somalia: various factions
Sudan: government and rebels
(SPLA/M)
Uganda: rebels (LRA) ,
Americas
Colombia: rebels
(FARC-EP, UC-ELN) and paramilitaries (AUC),
Asia-Pacific
Afghanistan: opposition forces (Northern
Alliance)
Burma (Myanmar): government and 11 rebel groups
India/Pakistan
(Kashmir): militants
Nepal: government and rebels (Maoists)
Philippines:
rebels (Abu Sayaff, MILF, NPA)
Sri Lanka: government and rebels
(LTTE),
Europe/Central Asia
Georgia: non-state actors (use in
Abkhazia)
Kyrgyzstan: government
FYR Macedonia: rebels
Russia:
government and rebels (Chechnya)
Tajikistan: Russian government
Uzbekistan: government
FR Yugoslavia: non-state actors (in and near
Kosovo),
Middle East/North Africa
Israel: government (in
Occupied Palestinian Territories)
Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines
In its first two annual
reports, Landmine Monitor identified sixteen producers of antipersonnel
landmines. This year, Landmine Monitor has decided to remove two of those
nations, Turkey and FR Yugoslavia, from the list.
Turkey has, for the first
time, provided Landmine Monitor with a written statement indicating that it has
not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has said that it does not
intend to produce them. Turkey’s Foreign Minister announced in April 2001
that Turkey was starting the process of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.
FR
Yugoslavia has also provided a written statement saying that it has not produced
antipersonnel mines since 1992. While Landmine Monitor has received some
contrary information in the past, this statement, combined with the decision of
the new government to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, justifies removal from the
list of producers.
Antipersonnel Mine Producers
In the Americas: Cuba, United States
In
Europe: Russia
In Middle East: Egypt, Iran, Iraq
In Asia: Burma,
China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore,
Vietnam
Forty-one nations have ceased production of antipersonnel
mines.
Of the 14 remaining producers, it should be noted that:
Egyptian officials have stated several times since 1997 that Egypt no longer
produces antipersonnel mines. However, this position has not been issued in
writing as a formal policy statement, despite numerous requests from Landmine
Monitor and the ICBL. Thus, Landmine Monitor continues to count Egypt as a mine
producer.
The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has
no known plans for production. However, it has refused to adopt an official
moratorium or ban on production, and thus is still listed as a mine
producer.
South Korea has reported to Landmine Monitor that in the last two years, it
has only produced Claymore-type antipersonnel mines. When used in
command-detonated mode, these are permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty. One
military official told Landmine Monitor that the ROK has produced no
antipersonnel mines since 1997 (presumably except for the
Claymores).
Among the other developments in the global situation
with respect to antipersonnel mine production since May 2000:
Landmine Monitor has received new allegations regarding production of
antipersonnel mines in Uganda at the government-owned National Enterprise
Corporation (NEC) factory at Nakasongora. Four sources, including three Ugandan
military personnel, independently told Landmine Monitor that production of
antipersonnel mines continues. However, Landmine Monitor is not in a position
to confirm or deny these allegations. An independent inspection of the facility
has not been made.
Australia informed Landmine Monitor that it produced antipersonnel mines in
the past, but stopped in the early 1980s. Landmine Monitor was previously
unaware of this information.
India has for the first time designed a remotely-delivered mine system (with
a self-destruction/self-deactivation mechanism) for trial evaluation and
prototype production. It has also designed for production a detectable version
of its hand-emplaced, non-metallic M14 mine. Pursuant to its obligations under
CCW Amended Protocol II, the government of India has stated that production of
non-detectable mines has ceased on 1 January 1997.
It appears Pakistan is engaged in new production of both hand-emplaced
detectable mines and remotely delivered mines that meet CCW Amended Protocol II
standards. Pakistan has stated that since 1 January 1997 it has produced only
detectable antipersonnel landmines. At a Landmine Monitor meeting, the Pakistani
Ambassador said that use and production of fragmentation mines had been
abandoned. This statement has not been confirmed.
Russia stated in December 2000 that it is decommissioning facilities for
production of antipersonnel blast mines. Officials have said Russia is
increasingly focusing efforts on research and development of landmine
alternatives, rather than new antipersonnel mine production.
Singapore has confirmed that it continues to produce landmines to be used in
national defense
The South Korean Ministry of Defense reported that 7,000 KM18A1 Claymore
mines were produced in 2000.
In the US, decisions are pending on the continued development and production
of two key alternatives to antipersonnel mines, RADAM and NSD-A, both of which
may be inconsistent with the Mine Ban Treaty.
The 41 nations
that have stopped production of antipersonnel mines include a majority of the
big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Eight of the twelve biggest
producers and exporters over the past thirty years are now States Parties to the
Mine Ban Treaty and have stopped all production and export: Belgium, Bosnia and
Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, Czech Republic (former
Czechoslovakia), France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines
Landmine Monitor
research did not find evidence of antipersonnel mine exports or imports by Mine
Ban Treaty State Parties or signatories. Indeed, Landmine Monitor did not
identify a single significant shipment of antipersonnel mines from one nation to
another. It was noted in Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2000-2001
that there has been a “virtual absence of mines--legitimate or
otherwise--at arms shows and military equipment exhibitions this year. The
stigmatization process has clearly had a major impact: even the non-signatories
to the Mine Ban Treaty seem to feel the need to appear politically
correct.”[4]
There remains
a concern about the possible transit or trans-shipment of antipersonnel mines
through treaty nations. There have been a few reports of seizures of illicit
shipments of light weapons that have included some antipersonnel mines. It
continues to be the case that antipersonnel mine trade has been reduced to a
relatively small amount of illicit trafficking.
Thirty-four countries are
known to have exported antipersonnel landmines in the past. Today, all of
those nations with the exception of Iraq have at the least made a formal
statement that they are no longer exporting. In September 2000, an Iraqi
diplomat said to Landmine Monitor, “How can we export landmines? We only
export oil for food.”
Twenty-two countries have signed the Mine Ban
Treaty and thus stopped exporting, although many had unilateral restrictions in
place prior to signing. Among non-signatories, one has an export ban in place
(USA), four have a moratorium in place (Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore),
and six have made declaratory statements that they no longer export (China,
Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Yugoslavia, Vietnam). Russia’s moratorium and
China’s declaratory policy only apply to export of non-detectable and
non-self-destruct mines, in keeping with CCW restrictions. However, neither
nation is known to have made a significant export since 1995.
Article 3 of
the Mine Ban Treaty allows transfers of antipersonnel mines for research and
development of demining technologies and for training as well as for the purpose
of destruction. Several states parties have commendably reported these
activities in their Article 7 reports:
Canada’s Department of National Defense received a transfer of four
mines (two PROM 1, one MRUD, and one PMR 2A) from the United Nations Mine Action
Coordination Center in Kosovo between 15 March 2000 and 15 February 2001.
On 29 September 1999, Nicaragua authorized the transfer of 286 mines to
MARMINCA JID-OEA to be used in the training of mine detecting dogs.
In 1999, the Danish Defence Command authorized transfer of mines to both
Sweden and the Netherlands for development and training purposes. On 12 October
1999 Sweden received 92 M/58 mines and 189 M/56 mines while on 8 December 1999
the Netherlands acquired 864 M/66 mines.
Denmark reported that 2,834 M/58 mines were transferred in 2000 from an Army
Depot Area to EBV GmbH in Germany in order to be destroyed.
Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines
Landmine Monitor estimates that there are 230-245
million antipersonnel mines stockpiled by about 100 countries. Mine Ban Treaty
States Parties account for an estimated 8-9 million stockpiled antipersonnel
mines. According to the latest data made available to Landmine Monitor, the
biggest stocks among States Parties are: Italy (3 million), Albania (1.6
million), and Japan (762,729). However, these numbers are outdated, as
destruction programs are underway in all these countries.
Signatories to
the Mine Ban Treaty (countries which have signed but not ratified) also hold an
estimated 8-9 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Ukraine has revised
downward its stockpile estimate to 6.35 million. Other Mine Ban Treaty
signatories with large stockpiles are likely to be Angola, Ethiopia, Poland and
Greece. None of these states will reveal information about their mine stocks.
Treaty non-signatories have an estimated 215-225 million antipersonnel mines
in stock. Landmine Monitor estimates that the largest stockpiles belong to:
China (110 million), Russia (60-70 million), United States (11.2 million),
Pakistan (6 million) India (4-5 million), and Belarus (4.5 million). Other
non-signatories believed to have large stockpiles are Egypt, Eritrea, Finland,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, and
Yugoslavia.
In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have
stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in such places as Angola, Burma, Chechnya,
Colombia, DR Congo, Kashmir, FYR Macedonia, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, and FR Yugoslavia (including Kosovo).
Stockpile Developments Since May 2000
Africa
Botswana, Gabon,
Mauritius, Togo, and Zambia have stated that they have only small stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines for training, but have not provided the exact number of
mines in stock.
Burkina Faso, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, and
Senegal have confirmed that they do not possess antipersonnel mines.
Burundi revealed that its stockpile numbers less than 15,000 antipersonnel
mines, all of Belgian manufacture.
Cameroon declared a stockpile of 500 antipersonnel mines for training
purposes.
Congo-Brazzaville indicates that its stockpile may number as much as
700,000-900,000 antipersonnel mines.
Mauritania has destroyed its stockpile and decided to retain 5,918
antipersonnel mines for training purposes; this was previously unknown to
Landmine Monitor.
Mozambique’s initial Article 7 report revealed the size of its
stockpile for the first time: 37,818.
Sierra Leone acknowledged a stockpile of approximately 900 antipersonnel
mines.
Tanzania is the only State Party yet to reveal whether or not it maintains
any stockpile of antipersonnel mines.
Americas
Argentina’s initial Article 7 report revealed
the size of its stockpile for the first time: 89,170.
Brazil’s initial Article 7 report revealed the size of its stockpile
for the first time: 34,562.
For the first time, Colombia provided a precise number for its antipersonnel
mine stockpile: 18,294.
El Salvador has acknowledged that it still has a stockpile of antipersonnel
mines, numbering 5,657.
Guyana confirmed possessing a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but did not
reveal its size.
It is not known whether Suriname maintains an antipersonnel mine
stockpile.
Uruguay confirmed its stockpile amounts to 1,918 antipersonnel mines.
Venezuelan military sources indicate that there is a “small”
number of antipersonnel mines in stock for training purposes.
Asia-Pacific
Mongolian officials have indicated that Mongolia
possesses a very substantial stockpile, though no numbers have been
revealed.
South Korea has confirmed that it has an estimated 2 million antipersonnel
mines in stockpile, one of the biggest inventories
globally.
Europe and Central Asia
Belarus for the first time revealed the size of its stockpile of 4.5 million
antipersonnel mines.
Georgia is reportedly conducting an inventory of its antipersonnel mine
stockpile.
According to one newspaper report, Kazakhstan possesses 800,000 to one
million antipersonnel mines; this is the only known public estimate of
Kazakhstan’s antipersonnel mine stockpile.
Romania for the first time revealed that its stockpile totals 1,076,629
antipersonnel mines.
Ukraine revised its stockpile disclosure to 6.35 million antipersonnel
mines, down from earlier estimates of 10.1 million.
Middle
East North Africa
Tunisia declared a stockpile of 17,575 antipersonnel mines.
Qatar has confirmed that it has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.
Oman revealed for the first time that it has a “limited”
stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.
Stockpile Destruction (Article 4)
Landmine Monitor research shows that approximately
27 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in recent years by more than
50 nations, including Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, signatories, and
non-signatories. Some 5 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in this
reporting period.
Forty-eight States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have
destroyed about 21 million antipersonnel mines. A total of twenty-nine States
Parties have completed destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles. Eight
have completed destruction in this reporting period, including the Czech
Republic in June 2001, Malaysia in January 2001, Bulgaria in December 2000,
Honduras, Spain and Zimbabwe in November 2000, Slovak Republic in September
2000, and Mauritania at an unknown date.
Of the twenty-nine, fifteen
completed destruction since entry-into-force of the Mine Ban Treaty in March
1999. In addition to the above: Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Denmark, France, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. Another fourteen States
Parties reported destruction of their stockpiles prior to March 1999: Austria,
Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Mali, Namibia, New
Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland.
Another nineteen
States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Albania,
Argentina, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Moldova, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia,
Uganda, and Yemen.
The seventeen States Parties that have not begun the
destruction process include: Bangladesh, Brazil, Chad, Djibouti, Kenya,
Macedonia FYR, Mozambique, Niger, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Venezuela and Zambia. A number of these have only been
States Parties a short time including Bangladesh, Kenya, Romania, Tanzania, and
Zambia.
Stockpile Destruction Developments Since May
2000
Africa
Mauritania reported that it destroyed its stockpile
of approximately 5,000 antipersonnel mines over the course of the past three
years.
Zimbabwe completed the destruction of its stockpile in November
2000.
Americas
At a regional meeting in Buenos Aires in November
2000, states announced the “Managua Challenge” which includes the
objective of completion of stockpile destruction in the region before the Third
Meeting of States Parties in Managua in September 2001.
Argentina began destroying its stockpile on 8 November 2000 by destroying
200 Spanish manufactured P-4-B antipersonnel mines.
Chile destroyed 2,000 US-manufactured M16 antipersonnel mines on 6 November
2000.
Honduras destroyed its stockpile of 7,441 antipersonnel mines on 2 November
2000.
Nicaragua destroyed 40,000 antipersonnel mines since May 2000, and 70,000
total.
Peru destroyed 117,506 stockpiled antipersonnel mines from March 2000
through July 2001.
Uruguay has destroyed 242 antipersonnel mines since May
2000.
Asia-Pacific
Australia destroyed an additional 6,460
antipersonnel mines; these were “inadvertently omitted” from a
previous inventory.
Japan had destroyed 223,508 antipersonnel mines as of the end of February
2001.
Malaysia destroyed its entire stockpile in January 2001.
Thailand destroyed an additional 69,346 antipersonnel mines since January
2001.
Europe and Central Asia
The problems associated with the destruction of
PFM-1 and PFM-1S antipersonnel mines has garnered attention and was the subject
of an international meeting in Budapest co-hosted by Hungary and Canada. The
following countries are thought to stockpile this type of antipersonnel mine:
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine. Bulgaria destroyed
12,000 of these mines in 1999.
A NATO-sponsored stockpile destruction program is in-place in Albania to
destroy the stockpile of 1.6 million antipersonnel mines there. A similar NATO
program is being created to assist Moldova destroy its stockpile of 12,000
antipersonnel mines.
Ukraine and Canada signed a framework agreement for destruction of PMN
mines, and discussions are underway with NATO on a PMN destruction project.
Bulgaria completed destruction of its stockpile in December 2000.
The Czech Republic completed the destruction of its stockpile in June 2001.
Italy had destroyed 4,086,057 antipersonnel mines as of March 2001, and had
3,034,324 mines left to destroy.
The Slovak Republic completed destruction of its stockpile in September
2000.
Slovenia destroyed nearly 20,000 antipersonnel mines as of May 2001; plans
call for destruction of the remaining mines by the end of 2001.
Spain completed destruction of its stockpile in November 2000.
Sweden, as of April 2001, has destroyed 2,335,069 antipersonnel mines since
entry-into-force of the Mine Ban Treaty, and there were 24,200 antipersonnel
mines still in stockpile.
Middle East North Africa
Yemen destroyed an additional 4,286 antipersonnel mines in February
2001.
Jordan destroyed an additional 16,000 antipersonnel mines.
Mines Retained for Training and Development (Article 3)
It appears that the majority of States Parties
possessing a stockpile of antipersonnel mines are opting to exercise the Article
3 exception. Many intend to keep between 1,000-5,000 mines. Several intend to
keep significantly more: Brazil 16,550; Ecuador 16,000; Japan 13,582; Sweden
11,120; and Italy 8,000. Argentina declared in May 2001 that it will increase
the number of mines retained from 3,049 to 13,025.
After the ICBL raised this
issue repeatedly in the Standing Committee meetings, a number of countries have
decided to decrease the number of mines kept: Australia from 10,000 to 7,845;
Bulgaria from 10,446 to 4,000; Croatia from 17,500 to 7,000, Denmark from 4,991
to just over 2,106, Peru from 9,526 to 5,578; Slovakia from 7,000 to 1,500;
Spain from 10,000 to 4,000; Thailand from 15,600 to 5,000. Slovenia confirms
that it will reduce the number of antipersonnel mines retained from 7,000 to
1,500 after 2003.
The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for
training. The ICBL believes that it is important not only to have complete
transparency on this through more detailed Article 7 reporting, but also to
continue to evaluate the necessity for the exception.
Special Issues of Concern
Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices (Article 2)
During the Oslo treaty
negotiations in 1997, the ICBL identified as “the major weakness in the
treaty” the sentence in the Article 2 Paragraph 1 definition of
antipersonnel mine that exempts antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling
devices: “Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or
contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with
anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of
being so equipped.” The ICBL expressed its belief that many antivehicle
mines (AVMs) with antihandling devices (AHDs) could function as antipersonnel
mines and pose similar dangers to civilians.
To address this concern, which
was shared by many government delegations, negotiators changed the draft
definition of antihandling device (which had been identical to the one in CCW
Protocol II) by adding the words “or otherwise intentionally
disturb”: “‘Anti-handling device’ means a device
intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or
placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with
or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.” It was emphasized by
Norway, which proposed the language, and others, that the word
“intentionally” was needed to establish that if an AVM with an AHD
explodes from an unintentional act of a person, it is to be considered an
antipersonnel mine, and banned under the treaty. This language was eventually
accepted by all delegations without
dissent.[5]
The ICBL has
expressed concern that there has not been adequate recognition by States Parties
that AVMs with AHDs that function like antipersonnel mines are in fact
prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, nor discussion of the practical implications
of this. The ICBL has repeatedly called on States Parties to be more explicit
about what types of AVMs and AHDs, and what deployment methods, are permissible
and prohibited. The ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, and the German
Initiative to Ban Landmines have all produced lists and publications regarding
AVMs of concern.[6] Landmine Monitor
researchers have identified such mines in their individual country studies
contained in this report.
During the reporting period, officials of a number
of States Parties made policy statements on the issue of AVMs with AHDs in
various domestic and international venues or in communications with Landmine
Monitor researchers. Highlights of these statements include (see individual
country reports for details):
The Bolivian Defense Minister stated that Bolivia is not using and does not
reserve the right to use other munitions which might function like antipersonnel
mines and pose danger to civilians, such as antitank mines with antihandling
devices.
In the Belgian Parliament, legislation banning AHD, or interpreting existing
law to ban AHD, has been proposed and studied.
An official from Canada, in a statement made during to Standing Committee
meeting in May 2001 noted, “Canada does not accept the argument that all
antihandling devices could be activated by unintentional disturbance. Canada is
currently undertaking work to better explain what we consider to be antihandling
devices that would conceivably be banned by the Convention and those that we
would consider not banned by the
Convention.”[7]
The current German government position is that AVM with AHD do not fall
within the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty, but Parliamentarians and some
Government officials are considering options to ban or regulate use of AVMs.
The French Ambassador for Mine Action has asserted that the antivehicle
mines currently stockpiled by the Ministry of Defense are not covered by the
Mine Ban Treaty, but do comply with the CCW Amended Protocol II.
Italy, in its recent CCW National Annual Report, noted that its stringent
national legislation banning antipersonnel landmines (Law 374/97), “adopts
a wide definition of [antipersonnel mines] which does not foresee an exception
for anti-vehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices.”
The Netherlands at a Standing Committee meeting in May 2001 supported the
call for the issue of AVM with AHD to be dealt with by “best
practices” because, in its view, this has the advantage of being voluntary
but allows States to deal with humanitarian concerns while recognizing military
needs.
An official at the Slovakian Ministry of Defense stated in a January 2001
interview, “Slovakia is not obliged to provide information on antivehicle
landmines and antihandling devices, since no nation has done so, moreover there
is no obligation emanating from the Ottawa Treaty that requires it or any other
State to do so. However, Slovakia has interest and unreservedly supports the
destruction of antivehicle landmines and antihandling devices on a world-wide
basis.”
The Spanish Foreign Ministry noted that Spain’s Law 33/98 refers to
mines designed to explode in the presence, proximity or contact with a person,
thus AVM with AHD “will not be treated as antipersonnel landmines.”
According to Defense officials from the United Kingdom, very sensitive
antidisturbance devices are not found among UK stocks. According to
Parliamentary statements, “All UK weapons systems have been checked for
compliance with the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty. There are no weapons or
munitions in the UK inventory which fall under the Ottawa definition of an
antipersonnel mine.”
Acting upon recommendations made in
Standing Committee meetings in 2000, the ICRC hosted a technical experts meeting
on “antivehicle mines with sensitive fuses or with sensitive antihandling
devices” on 13-14 March 2001 in Geneva. Governments that sent
representatives to this seminar included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Nicaragua, Norway, South Africa, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The GICHD and ICBL also
participated.
Discussion at the seminar centered on identifying the specific
technical measures that States Parties can adopt to minimize the risk to
civilians posed by AVMs with sensitive fuze mechanisms and antihandling devices
that might be activated by an unintentional act. Emerging from the seminar was
a set of recommendations for best practices regarding the design and use of
sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices. Key among them were establishing a
minimum pressure threshold of 150 kilograms for AVMs and discontinuing use of
AVMs with tripwires and tilt rod fuzes, because they function as antipersonnel
mines. Participants in the ICRC seminar had trouble developing recommendations
about best practices for sensitive antihandling devices. The experts called
upon states to do further research on this matter and to examine the
sensitivities of their AHDs with the goal of establishing a minimum level needed
to fulfill their function.
Joint Operations (Article 1)
In the previous editions of the Landmine Monitor
Report, the ICBL raised concerns about the possible participation of States
Parties in joint military operations with non-States Parties that use
antipersonnel landmines. There is serious concern about the consistency of such
operations with the treaty’s Article 1 obligation for a State Party
“never under any circumstance...[t]o assist, encourage or induce, in any
way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention.” Such joint operations at the least would go against the
spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all possession and use of antipersonnel
mines.
In particular, the question has been raised as to what
“assist” means in the treaty’s Article 1. A number of
governments have interpreted this to mean “active” or
“direct” assistance in actual laying of mines, and not other types
of assistance in joint operations, such as provision of fuel or security. This
narrow interpretation of assistance is of concern to the ICBL; in keeping with
the spirit of a treaty aimed at total eradication of the weapon, interpretation
of assistance should be as broad as possible.
During the meetings of the SC
on General Status of the Convention, the ICBL has emphasized the need for States
Parties to reach a common understanding of the term “assist,”
especially as it applies to joint military operations, foreign stockpiling of AP
mines, and foreign transit of mines across the territory of a State Party. Full
and effective implementation of the treaty will be enhanced if States Parties
are clear and consistent with regard to what acts are permitted and what acts
are prohibited.
It appears that various States Parties may have significantly
different understandings about what acts are permitted. Human Rights Watch
prepared and distributed at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2001 a list
of questions about joint military operations in order to help determine whether
States Parties consider such actions to be
prohibited.[8] The ICBL urges States
Parties to clarify their views on the legality of joint operations with
non-States Parties using mines, as well as foreign stockpiling and transit of
antipersonnel mines.
Though often discussed in terms of potential US use of
antipersonnel mines in a NATO operations, this is by no means a problem limited
to the NATO alliance. Based on research for the Landmine Monitor Report
2001, there are significant questions regarding the position of Tajikistan,
a State Party, toward the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces stationed
in Tajikistan along the border with Afghanistan. In addition, it appears that a
number of States Parties in Africa have engaged in military operations with (or
in support of) armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines. This would
include Namibia (with Angola against UNITA), as well as Uganda, Rwanda and
Zimbabwe with various forces in the DRC.
All of these States Parties should
make clear the nature of their support for other armed forces that may be using
antipersonnel mines, and make clear their views with regard to the legality
under the Mine Ban Treaty of their military operations with these armed forces.
As parties to the treaty, they should state categorically that they will not
participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.
As reported in the Landmine Monitor Report 2000, several NATO members
have made strong statements rejecting use of antipersonnel mines in NATO
operations including France and the Netherlands. A number of countries,
including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, have adopted
legislative provisions or made formal statements with regard to possible
participation of their armed forces in joint military operations with a treaty
non-signatory that may use antipersonnel mines. In each of these cases,
government officials have stated that the intent is to provide legal protections
to their military personnel who participate in joint operations with a
non-signatory who may utilize antipersonnel mines.
Several governments have
provided new or updated information on Joint Operations at Standing Committee
meetings or during the research process for the Landmine Monitor Report
2001:
The Belgian Foreign Ministry stated in June 2000 and again in March 2001,
“Any Belgian unit engaged in joint operations outside national territory
cannot use antipersonnel mines, in any circumstances, whatever framework and
subordination mode this engagement is
undergoing.”[9]
Canada in May 2001 provided an explicit statement on the issue: “For
Canada, this subject is relevant in addressing matters related to
interoperability as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With
this in mind, in 1998-even before the Convention entered in to force-the Chief
of the Defence Staff communicated the following to all Canadian Forces
personnel:
Participation in Combined Operations: Canada may
participate in combined operations with a state that is not Party to the
Convention. Canadian contingents may not, however, use anti-personnel mines and
the Canadian Forces may not request, even indirectly, the use of anti-personnel
mines by others.
Rules of Engagement: When participating in combined
operations with foreign forces, Canada will not agree to Rules of Engagement
which authorize the use by the combined force of anti-personnel mines. This
would not, however, prevent States that are not parties to the Convention from
using anti-personnel mines for their own national purposes.
Operational
Plans: When engaged in combined operations with foreign forces, Canada will
not agree to operational plans which authorize the use by the combined force of
anti-personnel mines. While Canadians may participate in operations planning as
members of a multinational staff, they may not participate in planning for the
use of anti-personnel mines. This would not prevent a state that is not a
Signatory to the Convention from planning for the use of anti-personnel mines by
its own forces.
Command and Control: The use of anti-personnel mines
by the combined force will not be permitted in cases where Canada is in command
of a combined Force. Likewise, if Canadian Forces personnel are being commanded
by other nationalities, they will not be allowed to participate in the use of,
or planning for the use of anti-personnel mines. Were Canadian Forces personnel
to engage in such activities they would be liable to criminal prosecution under
Canadian law.”[10]
The Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic stated “mere participation
in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military
activity” where non-signatories use antipersonnel mines should not render
Czech personnel liable to
prosecution.[11]
The Ministry of Defense of Denmark has stated, “in the participation
in joint military operations, Denmark does not involve itself in activities that
are related to the laying of antipersonnel
mines.”[12]
The Minister of Defense of France already declared in 1998 that France
“would unreservedly enforce the Ottawa Treaty. France will prohibit the
planned or actual use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation
whatsoever by its military personnel. Furthermore, France will refuse to agree
to rules of engagement in any military operation calling for the use of
antipersonnel mines.”[13] In
October 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to directives forbidding
French military personnel to use antipersonnel mines, to participate in planning
operations employing use of antipersonnel mines, or to give their agreement to
any document mentioning possible
use.[14]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary states, “Hungarian soldiers
are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines abroad during NATO army exercises,
and foreign soldiers are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines in Hungary
during NATO army
exercises.”[15]
Representatives of Italy have stated that Italian forces cannot be involved
in activities not compatible with the Mine Ban Treaty, and transit is allowed
only for destruction.[16]
Presumably this equally applies to the issue.
Representatives of the Netherlands reiterated in May 2001 that Dutch forces,
“will not help in the laying, transporting or in any other way, nor ask
for a foreign commander to do so” in joint military operations, and
“if asked to do so by a foreign commander, will not do so.” The
representative added that this was set out in a parliamentary
answer.[17]
The Ministry of Defense of Norway states that Norwegian forces can
participate in joint operations with States which are not party to the Mine Ban
Treaty, and in such cases may take advantage of cover from already mined areas,
but cannot strengthen or renew the mining of these
areas.[18]
According to officials from Portugal, “it may participate in joint
operations with armed forces which use antipersonnel mines, but it won’t
gain any benefit from such use. A guarantee that Portugal will not benefit, in
such case, would be assured at the operational level. The participation in any
military operation comes under national
sovereignty.”[19] The
Ministry of Defense added, “So it belongs to Portugal to decide on this
participation, the way it would be processed and to which extent, independent of
whether it is an operation with countries that use mines or
not.”[20] The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs declared, “Portugal being a State Party to the Ottawa
Convention, the Portuguese contingent will not use antipersonnel mines in joint
operations.”[21]
Sweden is awaiting the outcome of the discussions of Joint Operations in the
Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.
Sweden is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but
does currently participate in joint peacekeeping operations with States that are
not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, such as the US.
In May 2000 the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom stated in a
Parliamentary Written Answer, “UK armed forces were involved in 15 joint
operations involving the use of anti-personnel landmines over the last three
years, primarily involving operations in the Balkans. However, in no instances
were UK armed forces responsible for their
use.”[22] This was
subsequently clarified as referring to mines “not laid at that time by our
operation partners or the UK Armed Forces but [mines that] were a remnant of
war, or previous actions, in the area of operations. As such the 15 operations
did not involve the laying of anti-personnel landmines, but their existence in
the areas in which operations took place means that their presence was a factor
in those
operations.”[23]
The
ICBL continues to believe that the legality of State Party participation in
joint operations with an armed force that uses antipersonnel mines is an open
question, and that participation in such operations is contrary to the spirit of
the treaty. The ICBL has called on States Parties to insist that any
non-signatories do not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations, and to
refuse to take part in joint operations that involve use of antipersonnel mines.
Stockpiling and Transit of Foreign Antipersonnel Mines (Articles 1, 2, and
4)
The ICBL believes that it would violate the spirit
of the treaty for States Parties to permit any government or entity to stockpile
antipersonnel mines on their territory, and would violate the letter of the
treaty if those stocks are under the jurisdiction or control of the State
Party.
The United States stores antipersonnel mines on the territory of 12
states. The following states host US stockpiles: Norway (123,000), Japan
(115,000), Germany (112,000), Saudi Arabia (50,000), Qatar (11,000), United
Kingdom at Diego Garcia (10,000), Kuwait (8,900), Oman (6,200), Bahrain (3,200),
Greece (1,100), Turkey (1,100), and South Korea. The US stockpiles about 50,000
self-destructing mines in South Korea, and maintains approximately 1.2 million
non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines to be used in any future resumption of
war in Korea, but it is unclear if the non-self-destructing mines are stockpiled
in Korea or elsewhere.
The United States has antipersonnel landmines stored
in at least five nations that are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty:
Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and United Kingdom at Diego Garcia, as well as
treaty signatory Greece. US antipersonnel mine stockpiles have been removed
from Italy and Spain. Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom do not consider
the US mine stockpiles to be under their jurisdiction or control, and thus not
subject to the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty or their national
implementation measures. Norway, through a bilateral agreement with the US, has
stipulated the mines must be removed by 1 March 2003, which is the deadline for
Norway to comply with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 4 obligation for destruction
of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction and control. Qatar has yet to
comment on the issue.
Developments in this reporting period highlight that
this issue extends beyond US antipersonnel mines. Russian forces stationed in
State Party Tajikistan are likely to stockpile antipersonnel mines there, given
the recent use by Russian forces on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is not known
whether Russian peacekeeping forces possess antipersonnel mines in the
Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic, a breakaway region of State Party Moldova.
On a related issue, the United States has also discussed with a number of
treaty States Parties the permissibility of the US transiting mines through
their territory. A debate has emerged over whether the treaty’s
prohibition on “transfer” of antipersonnel mines also applies to
“transit,” with some States Parties maintaining that it does not.
This would mean that US (or other nations) aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying
antipersonnel mines could pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in,
restock in) a State Party on their way to a conflict in which those mines would
be used. The ICBL believes that if a State Party willfully permits transit of
antipersonnel mines which are destined for use in combat, that government is
certainly violating the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, is likely violating the
Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly
violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer. The ICRC has also expressed
its view that the treaty prohibits transiting of mines.
Research published
in previous editions of Landmine Monitor showed that States Parties including
France, Denmark, Slovakia, South Africa, and Spain have indicated transit is
prohibited. Canada, Norway, Germany, and Japan indicate that this is permitted.
Statements made by governments during this reporting period have increased
the number of States Parties prohibiting the transit of antipersonnel mines with
Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Guinea, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, and
Switzerland added to the list. Namibia has said that the Angolan army is
“prohibited from transiting weapons like mines through
Namibia.”[28]
Claymore-Type Mines
A “Claymore mine” is a generic term for
a round or rectangular directional fragmentation munition that can function
either in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode. They are mostly mounted
above ground level and are designed to have antipersonnel effects. However,
some of the larger variants of this type can be used to damage light vehicles.
When operated in the command-detonated mode, they do not meet the definition of
an antipersonnel mine in the Mine Ban Treaty. However, use of Claymore-type
mines with a tripwire as an initiating device is prohibited. States Parties
have not adopted a common practice regarding reporting of stockpiles of
Claymore-type mines and what measures they have taken to ensure that the mines
are not configured to function in a victim-activated mode.
Claymore-type
mines have been found in or cleared in demining operations in at least 33
mine-affected countries and regions: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya, Chile, Colombian, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Iraq,
Kosovo, Lebanon, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Northern Iraq (Iraqi
Kurdistan), Rwanda, Thailand, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.[24]
A total of 14
States Parties are known to have decided to retain operational stocks of
Claymore-type mines. These countries include: Australia, Austria, Canada,
Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Honduras and Thailand have
reversed their initial position of destroying their Claymore mines and have
apparently chosen to retain them.
Representatives of several of these States
Parties have made statements to Landmine Monitor confirming that measures have
been taken to insure that their Claymore mines cannot be used in the
victim-activated mode or that they have destroyed the tripwire assemblies and
mechanical fuzes. These include Austria, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. Norway made a detailed presentation at the December
2000 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction of the steps it
has taken ensure that its Claymore mines are permanently modified to operate
only in a command-activated mode. No country has reported on modification
measures in their annual transparency measures reports required under Article 7
of the Mine Ban Treaty.
A total of nine States Parties have signaled their
intention to destroy their stocks of Claymore-type mines, aside for those
retained under Article 3 for training or research purposes, or to not retain any
Claymore-type mines: Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Croatia, Ecuador, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Peru. The Philippines destroyed all of
its Claymore mines, but is now considering re-obtaining them.
No indication
has been received from the following States Parties that are known to have at
one time produced, imported, or stockpiled Claymore-type mines on their
interpretation of this issue: El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Malaysia,
Moldova, Mozambique, Romania, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
Transparency Reporting (Article 7)
As of 1 August 2001, the UN had received initial
transparency measures reports from 64 States Parties. A total of 37 States
Parties are late submitting initial reports. One signatory, Cameroon, submitted
its report even though it has yet to officially ratify the convention. The
overall rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports
is 63%.
At the December 2000 and May 2001 meetings of the Standing Committee
on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the ICBL outlined a
number of overall concerns regarding Article 7 reporting:
Late
Reporting -- 37 countries are late in submitting their initial transparency
measures report. These governments have thus far failed to fulfill a treaty
obligation; Article 7 reporting is not optional; 180 days after entry-into-force
is a legal deadline, not a target date. Timely reporting is also an important
indicator of a government’s commitment to the eradication of antipersonnel
mines. It is important that governments meet the obligations of the treaty, so
as to build confidence in their intention and ability to meet other vital
obligations. Article 7 reporting is also crucial because it can provide a
wealth of information that will be useful to mine action practitioners.
The
ICBL appreciates that the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation has
highlighted this problem and has sought ways to remedy it. States Parties and
non-governmental organizations should make every effort to ascertain why a
government is late, should provide strong encouragement to report as soon as
possible, and most importantly, should provide any possible assistance in
completing the report (consistent with Article 6 of the convention). Those in
need of assistance and those willing to provide it should make known precisely
what type of assistance (technical, translation, etc.) is needed and available,
respectively.
Two important initiatives are underway on this matter.
Belgium has taken the lead in coordinating an Article 7 Contact Group to
encourage and facilitate reporting, and the NGO VERTIC has, in cooperation with
the ICBL and ICRC, developed an Article 7 Reporting Handbook, which will be
presented at the Third Meeting of States Parties. The ICBL urges governments to
support these initiatives in all ways possible.
Need for Reporting on
Victim Assistance, Use of Form J -- The ICBL Working Group on Victim
Assistance has noted that victim assistance reporting is conspicuously missing
in treaty obligations. In order to give victim assistance proper attention,
States Parties should report on their activities in this regard. For annual
transparency measures reports due by 30 April 2001, 11 States Parties used form
J: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru,
Sweden, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.
Lack of Reporting on Foreign Stocks --
A State Party is required to report on mines “owned or possessed by it, or
under its jurisdiction or control.” States Parties should report on the
US stockpiles in order to be consistent with at least the spirit if not the
letter of the convention. Yet, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom did not
even mention the existence of US antipersonnel mine stocks in their Article 7
reports. Norway acknowledged that “[t]here are pre-stocked US mines on
Norwegian territory,” but “[d]ue to previously concluded agreements,
information on pre-stocked military materiel is not available for
reporting.” Qatar is late submitting its initial Article 7
report.
Lack of Reporting on Prohibited Antivehicle Mines with
Antihandling Devices -- According to the definitions in the treaty,
antivehicle mines (AVMs) with sensitive fusing mechanisms (such as tilt rods or
tripwires) and AVMs equipped with antihandling devices (AHDs) which explode from
an unintentional act of a person – that is to say, AVMs that function like
antipersonnel mines -- are banned by the treaty. Thus, prohibited AVMs with
overly sensitive fuses or overly sensitive AHDs should be included in Article 7
reporting, including types and numbers possessed, modified and destroyed. Yet,
none of the governments that have submitted Article 7 reports have given any
details on prohibited antivehicle mines captured by the treaty, even though
several governments have destroyed or modified such mines.
Lack of
Reporting on Claymore-type Mines -- Claymore mines are legal under the Mine
Ban Treaty as long as they are command detonated, and not victim-actuated (used
with a tripwire). States Parties that retain Claymores must use them in
command-detonated mode only. Transparency is necessary on Claymore mines, too.
States Parties should take the technical steps and modifications necessary to
ensure command detonation only, and should report on those measures. Yet, very
few of the governments that have submitted Article 7 reports have given any
details on stockpiles of Claymore mines and no State Party has reported on the
efforts or modifications undertaken to make these mines compliant under the
treaty.
Need for Expanded Article 3 Reporting -- Article 3 reporting
on mines retained for mine clearance training and development should not only
include types and quantities and institutions authorized to retain (as currently
delineated in the Article 7), but should be expanded to include the specific
anticipated purpose and then actual use of any retained mines.
National Implementation Measures (Article 9)
Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty (“National
Implementation Measures”) states “Each State Party shall take all
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition
of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by
the treaty. However, only 28 of the 117 countries that have ratified or acceded
to the treaty have passed domestic laws implementing the treaty.
A total
of 10 States Parties have passed domestic implementing legislation since
entry-into-force, including six in this reporting period (since May 2000):
Bulgaria, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. They
join Cambodia, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Monaco, which passed
implementing legislation after entry-into-force on 1 March 1999.
The
following 18 States Parties report that they enacted implementation legislation
prior to 1 March 1999 or that legislation became effective on that day:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Some countries have deemed existing
domestic law as sufficient to implement the treaty. These laws cover civilian
possession of armaments and explosives. Included among these are Andorra,
Denmark, Ireland, Jordan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Namibia, Netherlands, and
Peru.
Another seven States Parties indicate that the legislation used for
ratification is sufficient because international treaties become self-executing
in those countries: Mexico, Portugal, Rwanda, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Yemen.
A total of 24 States Parties report that steps to enact
legislation are underway. This group of States Parties includes: Albania,
Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica,
Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, Kiribati, Holy See, Iceland, Malawi, Mauritania,
Moldova, Samoa, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and
Zambia.
In a total of 50 States Parties, nearly 43% of all States Parties,
Landmine Monitor is unaware of any steps underway to enact domestic legislation
implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.
Some governments have indicated that they
do not believe an implementation law is required, because they have never
possessed antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected, thus, no special action
is necessary to fulfill the terms of the treaty.
The ICBL is concerned,
however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that would impose
penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and would
provide for full implementation of all aspects of the convention.
The ICRC,
in cooperation with the ICBL and the government of Belgium, has produced an
“Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement
the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines.” This document
will be of great use to States Parties in helping them to fulfill their
obligations under Article 9.
[3]
Throughout this report, the term ratification is used as a short-hand for
“consent to be bound.” The treaty allows governments to give consent
to be bound in a variety of ways, including ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession -- all of which give binding legal status beyond signature. Also
for the purposes of this report, those countries who have given their consent to
be bound, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included
in the “States Parties” sections of the Regional
Chapters.
[4]Jane’s Mines
and Mine Clearance 2000-2001, Fifth Edition, pp.
[22]-[23].
[5] For a detailed
description of the diplomatic history on this issue, see Human Rights Watch Fact
Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January
2000.
[6] See ICRC,
“Information Paper: Anti-Vehicle Mines Equipped with Anti-Handling
Devices,” April 1999; Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle
Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January 2000; and GIBL website at:
http://www.landmine.de
[7]
Canadian delegation, “Intervention on Article 2,” Standing Committee
on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001. The
intervention was made orally, but the written text was provided to Landmine
Monitor.
[8] See
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/mines/2001/memo0511.htm
[9]
Interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 15 June 2000; Belgian
Response to the Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, March 2001, p.
5.
[10] Canadian delegation,
“Intervention on Article 1,” Standing Committee on General Status
and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001. The intervention was made
orally, but the written text was provided to Landmine
Monitor.
[11] Letter from Pavol
Sepelák, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 15 February 2001; see also
Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p.
625.
[12] Letter from Ministry of
Defence, 15 January 2001 stating “Ved deltagelse i fælles
militære operationer involverer Danmark sig ikke i aktiviteter, der
relaterer sig til udlægning af personelminer.” Also letter from
K.-A. Eliasen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 January
2001.
[13] Extract from speech by
Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Debate, Official Journal of the French
Republic, unabridged report of Parliamentary sessions of Thursday, 25 June 1998,
pp. 5402-5403.
[14] Letter to
ICBL from Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 October
1999.
[15] Letter from
Zoltán Pecze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 12 March 2001, and
personal Communication from László Deák, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 29 March
2001.
[16] Oral remarks to the
Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11
May 2001.
[17] Oral remarks to
the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention,
Geneva, 11 May 2001.
[18] Letter
from Ministry of Defense, 9 April 2001. Landmine Monitor translation from
Norwegian: “The Norwegian forces can, when taking over positions from
foreign forces in the frontline, take advantage of the cover that already put
out antipersonnel mines give, but do not have the opportunity to strengthen or
renew this cover if it is a question about time-limited/restricted
period.”
[19] Letter from
the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001; letter from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[20]
Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January
2001.
[21] Letter from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January
2001.
[22] Hansard, 17 May 2000,
col 161W.
[23] Letter dated 18
October 2000 from John Spellar MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, to
Dr. Jenny Tonge MP.
[28]
“Army not breaking landmine treaty,” IRIN, 9 January 2001,
citing MOD spokesman Frans
Nghitila.
[24]Landmine
Monitor Report 2001, Landmine Monitor Report 2000, and Landmine
Monitor Report 1999. Original sources cited in respective country entries.
All entries were also cross-checked with sources such as Jane’s Mine
and Mine Clearance, 2000-2001,pp. 658-665, Minefacts, Version 1.2 - a
CD-ROM distributed jointly by the US Department of State and the US Department
of Defense, and all United Nations Mine Action Service, Mine Action
Assessment Mission Reports conducted between 1998-2000.
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