Key
developments since May 2000: In September 2000, South Korea began a
transport linkage project across the DMZ that will require clearing thousands of
landmines, but the project has been suspended. South Korea states it cleared
1,100 antipersonnel mines below the DMZ and 4,800 antipersonnel mines in the
rear areas in 2000. There were six civilian and thirteen military mine
casualties reported in 2000. South Korea produced about 7,000 KM18A1 Claymore
mines in 2000. South Korea ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 9 May
2001.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has not acceded to the
1997 Mine Ban Treaty. South Korea abstained on the November 2000 vote on the UN
General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in
previous years. South Korea did not participate as an official observer at the
Second Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in September
2000, though a few South Korean diplomats attended the opening ceremony. ROK
has regularly attended the meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committees,
including in December 2000 and May 2001.
A South Korean representative
attending the Second Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in December 2000, stated: “We
earnestly hope that further improvement in the political and security situation
on the Korean Peninsula would enable us to take a more forward-looking stance on
the APL issues.”[1] Asked
if South Korea would join the Mine Ban Treaty if North Korea agreed to do so,
the ROK replied, "We will consider this issue
positively."[2]
South Korea
deposited its instrument of ratification of the CCW Amended Protocol II on 9 May
2001.[3] South Korea submitted
one reservation and a number of declarations with its ratification document, but
notably did not exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for key
obligations. The reservation stated that the ROK “reserves the right to
use a small number of mines prohibited under this Protocol exclusively for
training and testing purposes.” The National Assembly approved the
related implementation bill for Amended Protocol II on 26 April 2001.
Production
South Korea has apparently produced three types of
antipersonnel landmines, two which are similar to the US M18A1 Claymore mine and
one similar to the US M16A2 bounding mine. The Korean designations for the
Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines are KM18A1 and K440. They are
usually used in a command-detonated mode, but can also be used with
tripwires.[4] According to the
ROK government, about 7,000 KM18A1 Claymore mines were produced in 2000 by the
Korea Explosives Company,
Ltd.[5] South Korea has also
apparently produced the M16A2, a bounding fragmentation mine, in the
past.[6] However, a South
Korean official has said that no antipersonnel mines have been produced since
1997 (presumably except for the Claymore
types).[7]
Transfer
In 1996, the government extended a one-year
moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines for an indefinite
period.[8] In 2001 South Korea
decided to abandon possible sales of K440 Claymore-type mines to New Zealand,
Malaysia, and Singapore, because of a dispute with the US as to whether the K440
mine is a copy of the M18A1 (and if so, the sale would require written consent
of the US State Department and be subject to payment of an eight percent
royalty).[9]
Earlier ROK
mine imports from the US are detailed in previous Landmine Monitor
reports.
Stockpiling
The South Korean government now confirms that its
antipersonnel landmine stockpile is “about twice as many as those that are
buried.”[10] Since the
government has estimated the number of buried mines at one
million,[11] this would mean
that South Korea holds some two million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
The ROK states that it has already made its old (non-self-destructing) mines
detectable, as required under the CCW Amended Protocol
II.[12] This job entailed
attaching a washer to the bottom of M-14
mines.[13] In addition, South
Korea holds a number of self-destructing landmines, including US ADAM
artillery-delivered mines[14]
and, according to one source, some US GEMMS
mines.[15]
Furthermore, the
United States is apparently stockpiling in South Korea some 40,000 air-delivered
Gator mines, 10,000 Volcano mines, and some infantry-delivered Modular Pack Mine
System (MOPMS) mines. The US has made it known that it is maintaining
approximately 1.2 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines,
to be used in any future resumption of war in
Korea,[16] but it is unclear if
the non-self-destructing mines are stockpiled in Korea or elsewhere.
Use and Landmine Problem
During the Korean War, between 1952 and 1953, the
US Army and the ROK Army heavily mined the area along the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) to maintain the battle line. Since the ceasefire in July 1953, both
armies have planted additional mines in the DMZ and within the Civilian Control
Zone (CCZ), which is immediately below the
DMZ.[17] Nearly all the
antipersonnel mines planted in these areas are US M16 bounding fragmentation
mines or US M14 plastic blast
mines.[18]
The 155-mile
Demilitarized Zone may be one of the most heavily mined areas in the world.
South Korean soldiers have been injured while patrolling inside or along the DMZ
area. Another dangerous area is the Civilian Control Zone which was established
in 1954 to bar any entry of civilians in the immediate area below the DMZ.
Although this area is better mapped with warning signs, there are still
unidentified minefields. Since 1959, the military has allowed some civilians to
enter certain areas in the CCZ to farm the land and establish new villages.
There are now 213 villages in the CCZ. Civilians living in the CCZ, as well as
soldiers training in the area, have become landmine
victims.[19]
There is growing
concern is South Korea about the danger of landmines in the so-called
“rear areas.” Both South Korea and the United States have used
antipersonnel mines extensively in the rear areas (south of the DMZ and CCZ) to
protect military installations. The Ministry of National Defense disclosed that
from 1970 to 1988, it planted antipersonnel mines at 39 sites below the Han
River where important military facilities are
located.[20] A senior ROK
military official has told Landmine Monitor that there are 30 minefields in the
rear area; he also noted that some are around former US Army bases and the
Korean Army only recently received maps and other documents about numbers and
locations of the
mines.[21]
In a joint
initiative, the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines and Japan Campaign to Ban
Landmines in 2001 have surveyed 36 districts and identified 41 minefields.
Fifteen of those minefields were deployed around former US Army
bases.[22]
As noted in
Landmine Monitor Report 2000, South Koreans have experienced problems in
recent years due to flooding or landslides from heavy rains that wash landmines
out of minefields or storage sites into areas frequented by
civilians.[23]
Landmine
problems also arise when the ROK and US military relocate their military bases
without completely removing protective antipersonnel mines. For instance, the
US military reportedly left behind some 20,000 antipersonnel landmines at a
missile base at Joong-Ri San (mountain), in Pusan, and some 1,700 antipersonnel
mines at a missile base in Hadong County, South Kyongsang Province.
The total
number of mines planted in South Korea, including the DMZ, Civilian Control
Zone, and rear areas is estimated to be more than one million, including 68,000
in the rear areas.[24]
New
facts regarding the manner and methods by which the United States plans to use
antipersonnel mines in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula have
emerged because of research and interviews conducted by Vietnam Veterans of
America Foundation (VVAF).[25]
The US has acknowledged retaining more than 1 million non-self-destructing
antipersonnel mines for use in a future Korean conflict. It was revealed in
briefings provided to VVAF by officers of US Forces Korea, upon threat of
attack, the United States plans to transfer approximately 500,000 US stockpiled
non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines to South Korea forces. South Korean
forces would use the mines to create a set of barriers and obstacles to help
slow a North Korean invasion. The remainder of the US stockpile is for use by
US forces arriving to reinforce and counterattack, days, if not weeks after the
invasion. VVAF also notes that US military officers stated that self-destruct
mines and mixed systems are of limited value in Korea because of the mountainous
and wooded terrain.
A 19 May 2001 letter to President Bush from six retired
US generals and two admirals said, “Several of us are former commanders of
elements of I-Corps (USA/ROK group), and believe that APM [antipersonnel mines]
are not in any way critical or decisive in maintaining the peninsula’s
security.... It is our understanding that the standing response plan to a North
Korean attack does not call for these weapons to be used to counter an initial
attack.”[26]
According to the Ministry of National Defense,
between April 1999 and June 2000, the Korean Army cleared about 6,200
antipersonnel landmines, prioritizing areas susceptible to flooding, areas where
military bases have been moved, and urban access
areas.[27]
In February
2001, the ROK government told Landmine Monitor that since the June 2000 summit
meeting, it had cleared about 1,100 mines in “front areas” and about
4,800 mines in “rear
areas.”[28] The 1,100
front area landmines were apparently destroyed between September 2000 and
November 2000, from areas below the DMZ, consisting of M14 and M16 antipersonnel
mines as well as M7A2 and M15 antitank
mines.[29] The press reported
the rear area clearance included work on seven sites and completion at six
sites, including Ka-chang (Taegu), Mt. Ho-myong (Uijongbu), Mt. Woo-myun
(Seoul), and Kwang-ju (Kyonggi
Province).[30]
On 13
February 2001, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the Korean Army plans to
clear all the mines in the rear area by 2006. A press account said the ROK
military plans to remove some 10,000 antipersonnel mines from five sites south
of the Han River in 2001, including some 1,700 antipersonnel mines from the
former US Nike missile site at Mt. Kumho, in South Kyongsang
Province.[31] The deputy
director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Landmine Monitor in April 2001 that
the Korean Army expects to clear five or six minefields in 2001, including Mt.
Keuma and Mt. Joori.[32]
Following the agreement reached with North Korea in July 2000, on 18
September 2000 the South Korean government launched an inter-Korean transport
linkage project that will re-connect a railroad from Munsan to Jangdan at the
military demarcation line (MDL) and build a new four-lane highway from Tongil
village to the MDL. The South Korean military accepted the task of clearing
mines in the path of the transport project with a goal of completing the
clearance by spring of 2001. Some 3,000 soldiers and 110,000 civilians were
expected to work on the project, starting from the Munsan
area.[33] South Korean military
leaders estimated the number of landmines in this area of 560,000 square meters
at 3,000-10,000.
The actual mine clearance and construction work inside the
DMZ was planned to commence in March 2001, after signing an agreement with North
Korea on joint regulations to govern the conduct of troops working in the
DMZ.[34] However, North Korea
has delayed signature of the agreement, apparently in reaction to South
Korea’s 2001 Defense White Paper. The agreement was still not signed as
of July 2001.
In January 2001 the Sengdo Construction Co., which specializes
in demolition, set up Specialist Demining Engineering (SDE), the first private
demining company in South Korea. SDE has signed a technical assistance
agreement with the UK’s Specialist Gurkha
Services.[35]
In February
2001, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines began an initiative to survey the
rear areas. The aim is to identify the minefields and to investigate civilian
mine victims in the areas. It is carrying out the project in cooperation with
the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, which is contributing financial and
technical support.[36] The KCBL
plans to conduct the survey in three stages until November 2001. During the
first stage, the survey team will visit the 21 locations where mines are thought
to be planted in the rear areas. The second stage will focus on former US Air
Force bases where many antipersonnel landmines are presumed to have been laid.
The third stage will target the so-called Civilian Control Zone.
In 2000,
the ROK government contributed $300,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for
Assistance in Mine Clearance and $30,000 to the Slovenia International Trust
Fund.[37]
Landmine Casualties
According to the Ministry of National Defense, 155
people have died of mine accidents since 1990, including 75
civilians.[38] The number of
injured victims is likely to be much higher than the number of deaths. The
Ministry of National Defense reported that in 2000 one soldier died and 12 were
injured in landmine incidents in the DMZ area and Korean Army
bases.[39] In 2000, there were
six civilian casualties in Korea, including two children; none of the accidents
occurred in acknowledged
minefields.[40]
In mid-May
2001, while conducting a patrol along the DMZ, a US Army soldier received
injuries to his right foot after stepping on an M14 antipersonnel
mine.[41]
Recognizing the
shortage of reliable data, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines estimates that,
dating back to the end of the war, there have been more than 1,000 civilian mine
victims, and 2,000-3,000 military mine victims in South
Korea.[42]
Survivor Assistance
The government states that it pays compensation to
the civilian victims of landmines through the State Compensation Act. The
civilian victim must first file a claim with the District Compensation Board,
located near the accident site, under the jurisdiction of the National Defense
Ministry. If the claim is denied, the victim may appeal to the Special
Compensation Board of the National Defense Ministry or bring a civil action in
court. The National Medical Insurance System covers the medical bills. The
Veterans Hospital provides medical services to soldiers wounded while on duty.
Depending upon the degree of their injury, the government provides various
preferential treatments for wounded soldiers such as tax cuts, employment
advantages for their children, and assistance in home purchases.
[43]
The KCBL claims that
the national compensation law has several limitations, such as a three-year
statute of limitation, a low ceiling on the maximum amount of compensation, and
burden of proof on claimants, which discourage mine victims’ legitimate
requests. Mine victims have to sue the government for compensation for a long
period as the Defense Minister generally refuses to admit any responsibility.
The KCBL provides legal assistance to mine victims.
Some civic groups are
providing direct assistance to landmine victims. The Church Women United of
Korea gave 100,000 won ($90) per month to nineteen victims from April to October
2000. The KCBL has a project to supply US$100 per month for 10 months to 22
victims.
In a letter sent to
the US Ambassador to Korea, dated 5 September 2000, the KCBL urged the United
States to take measures to provide appropriate compensation to Korean mine
victims who have been injured within the areas under the past or current control
of the US military.
[1] Statement of Minister Yun
Byung-Se, head of the ROK delegation to the Second Annual Conference of the
States Parties to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Geneva, 11 December
2000.
[2] Response of the ROK
Mission to the United Nations in New York to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 21
March 2000.
[3] Leading up to
the formal deposit, the Ministry of National Defense had submitted ratification
documents on 24 July 2000; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended
ratification to the National Assembly on 28 September 2000; and the National
Assembly ratified Amended Protocol II on 8 December 2000. Telephone interview
with Mr. Lee Kie-cheon, Counselor of the ROK Mission to the UN, 1 February
2001.
[4] See,
Jane’s Mines & Mine Clearance 1999-2000, and Eddie Banks,
Brassey’s Essential Guide to Antipersonnel Landmines (London:
Brassey’s, 1997), pp.
200-201.
[5] Response of the
ROK Mission to the United Nations in New York to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire,
2 February 2001. This company is also known as Hanwha, the Korean acronym for
the English name.
[6]Jane’s Mines & Mine Clearance, 1999-2000, pp. 478-480. Hanwha
is listed as the
manufacturer.
[7] Telephone
interview with Lt Col Il-soo Park, Ministry of National Defense, Seoul, 9 July
2001.
[8] See Landmine
Monitor Report 2000, p.
499.
[9] Jason Sherman,
“Comparison May Settle Clash Over Land Mine,” Defense News,
22 January 2001; Jason Sherman, “S. Korean Firm Defuses Land Mine Issue
With Pentagon,” Defense News, 4-10 June 2001, p.
13.
[10] Response of ROK
Mission, 2 February
2001.
[11]
Ibid.
[12] Response of the
ROK Mission, 21 March
2000.
[13] Caleb Rossiter,
Winning in Korea Without Landmines (Washington, DC: VVAF Monograph
Series, 2000), p. 34.
[14]
The US sold 31,572 ADAM mines to South Korea from
1886-88.
[15] Caleb Rossiter,
Winning in Korea Without Landmines (Washington, DC: VVAF Monograph
Series, 2000), p. 36. GEMMS is a mine system with M74 antipersonnel mines and
M75 antitank mines that are scattered from trailers using the
“flipper” scattering device.
[16] See Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, p. 333.
[17]Saegae Ilbo (South Korean daily newspaper), 25 August 2000. This report
said mines were laid in 1962, 1967, 1978, and 1988. The Civilian Control Zone
is also sometimes called the Military Control
Zone.
[18] Caleb Rossiter,
Winning in Korea Without Landmines (Washington, DC: VVAF Monograph
Series, 2000), p. 34. Other US mines planted in South Korea may include M2, the
M3, M16A1, M16A2, and M26 mines. See Jane’s Mines and mine Clearance,
p. 653.
[19] Jai-Kook
Cho, “Facts Concerning AP Landmine Victims,” on KCBL website at
http://landmine.peacenet.or.kr/ (in Korean); Si-Woo Lee, “Facts Concerning
AP Landmines Outside of DMZ and the US Lies,” 29 December 2000, on KCBL
website.
[20]Hankook
Ilbo (South Korean daily newspaper), 15 November
2000.
[21] Interview with
Col. Kang-soo Lee, deputy director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Korean Army
Headquarters, 19 April
2001.
[22] Information
provided by Dr. Jai-kook Cho, KCBL, 11 July 2001. Green Korea United, a South
Korean civic organization, has identified twenty-one minefields in the rear
areas, including in major cities like Seoul and Pusan, as well as national and
provincial parks all over South Korea. The breakdown of the twenty-one sites
are as follows: four minefields each in Kyonggi Province and South Kyongsang
Province; three minefields in South Chungchong Province; two minefields each in
Pusan and South Cholla Province; and one minefield each in Seoul, Taegu, Ulsan,
Kangwon Province, North Kyongsang Province and North Cholla province. See
www.greenkorea.org
[23] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p.
501.
[24] Response of ROK
Mission, 2 February 2001, stated an estimated 1 million in the DMZ and an
estimated 68,000 in “other areas.” A 1999 ROK Defense Ministry
report cited 1.05 million antipersonnel and antitank mines in the DMZ and CCZ,
plus 75,000 antipersonnel mines in rear areas. Landmine Monitor Report
2000, p. 500.
[25]
Briefing provided to Landmine Monitor by Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation,
“Landmines and the Situation on the Korea Peninsula,” March 2001.
This briefing summarized the findings of visits to military officers of U.S.
Forces Korea and South Korean government and military officials by Lieutenant
General (Retired) Robert Gard and Dr. Edwin Deagle, 11-14 December
2000.
[26] Letter to
President George W. Bush, dated 19 May 2001, signed by Rear Adm-ret Eugene
Carroll, Lt Gen-ret Henry Emerson, Lt Gen-ret James Hollingsworth, Lt Gen-ret
Harold Moore, Lt Gen-ret Dave Palmer, Vice Adm-ret Jack Shanahan, Lt Gen-ret
DeWitt Smith, Lt Gen-ret Walter
Ulmer.
[27] Response of
Ministry of National Defense to Lawmaker Hyung-ho Kim in a session of the
National Defense Committee, 10 October 2000.
[28] Response of ROK
Mission, 2 February
2001.
[29] Response of
Ministry of National Defense to KCBL’s Questionnaire, 21 November 2000;
Christopher Torchia, “Hard Task To Clear S.Korea Mines,”
Associated Press (Seoul), 19 October
2000.
[30]Hankook
Ilbo, 15 November
2000.
[31] “ROK Army To
Clear Anti-Personnel Landmines in Rear Areas in 2001,” The Korea
Herald, 22 December 2000. On 27 February 2001, the ROK Army met with NGOs
(including KCBL) in Mt. Keumo to discuss mine clearance operations and the Army
said it is planning to clear the minefields around army
bases.
[32] Interview with
Col. Kang-soo Lee, deputy director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Korean Army
Headquarters, 19 April
2001.
[33]Hankook
Ilbo, 19 September 2000; See also Landmine Monitor Report 2001 on
DPRK for further information on inter-Korea transportation linkage
project.
[34] “Two
Koreas to Start Work on DMZ Rail Link in March,” Reuters, 21
December 2000; “Koreas Reach Agreement on DMZ Joint Regulations,”
The Korea Times, 1 February
2001.
[35] “Korean,
British firms agree to cooperate on landmine clearance,” Korea
Herald, 3 February
2001.
[36] “Korean,
Japanese civic groups to draw map of minefields,” The Korea Herald,
8 February 2001.
[37]
Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 2 February
2001.
[38] “Land Mines
Kill 155 People in S. Korea Since 1990,” Xinhua News Agency
(Seoul), 6 November
2000.
[39] Response of
Ministry of National Defense to Lawmaker Hyung-ho Kim, 31 October 2000. Response
of the ROK Mission, 2 February
2001.
[40] KCBL, “Diary
of Landmine Incidents,” on its website:
http://landmine.peacenet.or.kr/.
[41]
The Landmine Monitor coordinator, Mary Wareham, interviewed the soldier at
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 6 July
2001.
[42] See Landmine
Monitor Report 1999, p.
480.
[43] Response of the ROK
Mission, 2 February 2001.