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Country Reports
India, Landmine Monitor Report 2003


Key developments since May 2002: India laid large numbers of mines along its border with Pakistan between December 2001 and July 2002. The Indian Army started major mine clearance operations in October 2002. Numerous new civilian landmine casualties continue to be reported.

Mine Ban Policy

India has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The government position on antipersonnel mines remains unchanged. At the Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Ambassador Rakesh Sood stated, “India remains dedicated to the pursuit of the ultimate objective of a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines in a manner that addresses the legitimate defence requirements of States. We believe that the process of complete elimination of anti-personnel mines will be facilitated if we approach the issue with due cognizance of the legitimate operational role of anti-personnel mines as part of the defense policies of the States that use them.”[1]

India’s November 2002 annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II states, “The world’s mine contamination problem has reached a crisis point. Towards this end, India remains committed to the ultimate objective of a global ban on anti-personnel landmines (APL). The implementation process, however, should be phased and address the legitimate security requirements of the State.”[2]

India was one of the 23 states to abstain from voting on the pro-ban treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74 on 22 November 2002. India did not participate as an observer in the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2002 and did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in February and May 2003.

Ambassador Sood has served as chairperson of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established at the CCW Review Conference in December 2001 to consider the issues of explosive remnants of war and antivehicle mines. As a part of this work, India submitted a document on “Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by Non State Actors.”[3]

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

India in the past produced two types of antipersonnel mines: M16A1 bounding fragmentation mines and low-metal-content M14 blast mines. India has declared that no low-metal-content mines have been produced since January 1997.[4] India has in the past indicated it will modify the M14 mines to be compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II, and in December 2002 reported that it “has completed the design, development and necessary trials of detectable anti-personnel mines affixed with 8 grams of iron and are presently ensuring the implementation of the programme.”[5] In December 2001, India indicated that a detectable version of the M14 “has been designed and approved for production.”[6] In November 2002 India reported, “The design and development of detectable anti-personnel mines has since been completed. All necessary technical issues have been resolved and requisite financial support has also been obtained to effect the said modifications.”[7]

In October 2000, India reported that it would produce other new mines in conformity with Amended Protocol II. It said that a new remotely delivered mine with self-destruct/self-deactivation mechanisms “has been designed. Prototype production and trial evaluation will follow.”[8] India has not previously produced remotely delivered mines of any type.

India has not provided official information regarding the size of its antipersonnel mine stockpile. Previous Landmine Monitor Reports have estimated a stockpile of four to five million antipersonnel mines, mostly low-metal-content M14. However, that estimate may no longer be accurate given the huge number of antipersonnel mines employed by Indian forces in December 2001 and 2002.

India maintains that it has never exported or imported antipersonnel mines and has had a comprehensive export moratorium in place since 3 May 1996. India’s most recent Article 13 Report states, “India has a formal moratorium, of unlimited duration, prohibiting export of landmines and favours an outright ban on the transfer of mines even to States Parties to the Protocol. The above reduces the difficulties associated with the task of regulating the production and use of landmines.”[9]

However, it would appear that exports did occur prior to 1996. Antipersonnel mines of Indian origin have been declared by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in their Article 7 transparency reports. These include: Bangladesh (3,480 M14 low-metal-content blast mines), Mauritius (93 M14 low-metal-content blast mines, Lot Number 45-8B0CZ-85), and Tanzania (48 M16 bounding fragmentation mines and 1,729 unidentified blast mines, Lot Number BP33-9/72IMI).[10]

Non-state actors in India produce Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that function as antipersonnel landmines.[11]


Following the attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001, the Indian Army began deploying antipersonnel and antivehicle mines along the 1,800-mile northern and western border with Pakistan.[12] Interviews in the border villages of Ganganagar, Rajastan, Abohar, and Punjab, indicate that the mine-laying operation ceased after July 2002.[13]

The exact number of landmines planted is not known. In a meeting with Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams, ICBL Government Relations Officer Sylvie Brigot, and two Indian landmine survivors, Ambassador Sood, according to Ms. Williams and Ms. Brigot, indicated “millions” of mines were laid by Indian forces.[14] Asked to verify this, an Indian official present in the meeting said that Ambassador Sood remarked, “Given the length of the international boundary, a large number of mines were indeed laid by the Indian forces.”[15] Ambassador Sood also remarked that the “mine-laying by Indian forces was undertaken in full compliance with the obligations under the Amended Protocol II of the CCW.”[16]

Minefields extend as far as six to eight kilometers from the border.[17] Mines were planted in cultivated and uncultivated land and around villages in defensive positions.

The ICBL has raised concerns about whether this massive mine-laying operation was carried out in compliance with India’s obligations under CCW Amended Protocol II. The large number of civilian casualties resulting from the newly planted mines calls into question whether India has met the requirement to provide effective exclusion of civilians from areas containing non-remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. In addition, India has neither confirmed nor denied whether it used low-metal-content M14 mines from its stockpiles. Amended Protocol II prohibits use of this mine without the addition of extra metal content. As noted above, India appears to be in the early stages of both modifying existing stocks of M14s by adding metal, and producing a new, detectable version of the M14.

Landmine Monitor provided a draft of this report to Indian officials, seeking comment. India stated in reply: “Minefields were laid, recorded and marked in consonance with well-established Standard Operating Procedures and in conformity with Amended Protocol II. In addition, all village headmen were personally informed about the location of the minefields in order to insure that local inhabitants were adequately sensitized. Mine awareness programmes were also conducted at the sub-district/village level. All efforts were made to ensure that the markings remained visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects.”[18]

The mine-laying operation was characterized by numerous deaths and injuries to Indian forces. A total of 145 Army personnel were killed or injured in the first three months alone. This high accident rate during mine-laying has been attributed to “adverse climatic and terrain conditions like night laying, dense fog” and “mines and fuzes held in inventory for a long period.”[19]

On 16 October 2002, India announced a troop pullback, which was reciprocated by Pakistan, and major mine clearance activities began. According to a media report, demining operations were not extended to the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, where India is now apparently maintaining permanent minefields.[20]

In its November 2002 Article 13 Report India states, “During the period of the Report, mines were laid along our Western and Northern borders due to our national security imperatives. Mine recovery has since commenced in right earnest. Instructions have been issued to all field formations to achieve an end-state of 100% recovery.... It is also pertinent to mention that restraint characterizing the use of landmines by Indian Forces in international conflicts has been widely acknowledged.”[21]

India used mines in its three wars with Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. It also used mines in its war with China in 1962.

Mine Use by Non State Actors

Non-State Actors (NSAs) continued to use antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Jammu and Kashmir, Central India, and North East India. In Jammu and Kashmir at least five militant groups have used landmines and IEDs: Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Hakat-ul-Jihadi Islami.[22] In 2002, a total of 111 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were seized from militants, and another 55 were recovered in the first four months of 2003.[23]

In the Central Indian states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh, three militant groups were responsible for landmine attacks: CPI (ML) – Party Unity; the People’s War Group (PWG); and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC).[24] In Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, Naxalite groups have used mines and IEDs. Following an incident in Gadchiroli, investigations revealed that the Naxalites had laid Claymore-type mines with electrical detonation several months before.[25] In Assam in North East India, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have used landmines.[26]

The government’s CCW discussion paper “Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by Non State Actors” states:

The use of MOTAPM, explosives and other munitions by NSAs conforms to no norms and therefore can cause considerable harm to the life and property of innocent civilians in unpredictable ways over a prolonged period of time.... NSAs are also responsible for indiscriminate use of MOTAPM and Improvised Explosive Devices on roads that are extensively used for civilian traffic, targeting vehicles carrying security personnel as well as civilians.... [T]he indiscriminate and irresponsible use of MOTAPM by the NSAs lead to the following long-term hazards: unrecorded areas that are mined and left unmarked, casualties to civilians and livestock, disruption of normal economic activities, disruption of humanitarian assistance to affected areas, practical difficulties in de-mining in the absence of any authentic record.[27]

The Landmine Problem

Following the mine-laying operations that began in December 2001, there are minefields all along the 1,800-mile border with Pakistan, which cross the Indian states of Gujarat, Rajastan, Punjab, and Indian-administrated Kashmir. Landmines can be found on cultivable and grazing land, around infrastructure, and around some villages. In many locations, farmers cannot tend their crops or graze their animals. Some border villagers have been forced to vacate their homes, and some border farmers have had to work as laborers in fields far away from where they live.[28] Landlords have had their farmland expropriated and been turned into landless laborers.[29]

According to government figures, the Army operations along the border affected 1,900,000 farmers in 1,818 villages, cultivating on 60,915 acres in the three border districts of Ferozpur, Gugudaspur, and Amritsar.[30] The government has estimated that 200 villages were affected in the Jammu, Kathua, Rajouri, and Poonch districts; the Army expropriated 70,100 acres of land of which 25,000 acres were mined. The state legislator from the border region of Jammu is reported to have said, “We are in a minefield, country yards and mountains, everything here is mined.”[31] Various media reports indicate that mined land included about 20,000 acres in the Punjab border area,[32] 9,500 acres in the Amritsar border area,[33] and 29,000 hectares (about 71,000 acres) in the Ferozpur district.[34] One report, citing senior Army officials, said a total of 173,000 acres had been mined.[35]

According to a media report, the state revenue department has estimated the winter crop loss from 2001 to 2002 at Rs.83 million ($1.77 million).[36] Some farmers have noted that mined fields will have declined in fertility due to the growth of weeds and lack of irrigation over the last two years. Moreover, the number of field rats has multiplied due to the shelter of the mined areas and the rats have caused much damage to crops in nearby fields.

The media report that the government has agreed to pay farmers compensation for their land at the rate of Rs. 11,000 ($234) per acre in three installments, but not all the installments have been paid.[37] Some maintain that this sum compensates only for the loss of one crop, while farmers have already lost three crops since their fields were mined. A case has been brought before the High Court of Punjab for full compensation to farmers for three crops.[38] Farmers in Rajasthan have also complained that there is no compensation for damage to fodder and cattle. The impact on the poor, landless people who previously worked as day laborers is even harsher, as they have not received any kind of compensation.

The Ministry of External Affairs wrote to Landmine Monitor: “During the mine-laying operations, land was temporarily expropriated to prevent untoward casualties to civilians. This will be returned once 100% recovery is achieved. Compensation is being paid for the period of expropriation and for any adverse impact on both the winter and the summer crops. There is no standard figure for acreage-wise compensation.... Instead compensation rates are based on various factors.... A Board of officials, including representatives from the respective State Governments, has been specially instituted to look into these matters.”[39]

The Indian government has stated, “The country has well established Standard Operating Procedures, whereby, whenever minefields are to be laid, they are to be explicitly marked and fenced with barbed wire and Long Angle Iron Pickets. The procedures have been specifically laid down to obviate any casualties to innocent civilians who might inadvertently stray into such dangerous areas. Humans aside, these precautions are also incorporated to prevent casualties to cattle and other domesticated animals.”[40]

Some of these markings have disappeared in time. Moreover, mines have shifted due to natural phenomena such as the sand storms in the deserts of Rajasthan, heavy rains in the flat land of Punjab and Jammu and snow in the mountainous Kashmir valley. In addition, field rats have carried scores of small antipersonnel mines over large distances and sometimes taken them into their burrows.[41] One former military officer estimated that as a result of these factors, 15 to 20 percent of mines are not recovered during mine clearance operations, thus posing ongoing dangers to civilians.[42]

The eleven-year-old girl on the cover of this Landmine Monitor Report 2003, Kiran Dip, was the victim of inadequate marking of a newly-laid minefield on the border with Pakistan. On 4 June 2002, she was grazing goats near her village in Sri Karanpur sub-district, Sri Ganganagar district, Rajasthan province. One of the goats walked under some barbed wire erected by the Indian Army in two rows some 3 to 5 feet from the ground. She went to retrieve the goat and stepped on an antipersonnel mine. Her right foot was subsequently amputated. Kiran Dip did not realize that she had entered a minefield. There were no warning signs. Villagers say that the Army planted the mines in January 2002, but did not erect any signs or other kind of marking. After her incident, the Army put up warning signs.[43]

Mine Clearance

Following the announcement of the withdrawal of Indian troops in October 2002, the Indian Army started major mine clearance operations.[44] At the end of December 2002, Minister of Defense George Fernandes announced that the Army had completed the clearance of about 16 to 18 percent of the mine-affected area and that at least six more months were needed to complete the operation.[45] In November 2002, Chief of Army Staff General S. Padmanabhan said mine clearance would cost up to Rs.700 million ($14.9 million).[46] As detailed below, Indian military personnel suffered at least 175 casualties during mine laying and clearance operations.

Military personnel engaged in clearance along the Punjab border reported that mine clearance was painstakingly slow and dangerous. Mines had shifted from their original locations for a variety of reasons. After nearly a year of being exposed to the elements, some of the mines had become unstable and prone to exploding. The scarcity of trained manpower and mine detection equipment further complicated the problem.[47] The media reported that the Army stopped mine clearance twice in January and February 2003, because soldiers doing the work lacked proper equipment and safety gear.[48] A Ministry of External Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that operations were halted only once during February 2003, in order to provide rest and relief to the deminers.[49]

According to a March 2003 media report in the Amritsar border area, 2,500 acres of land out of a total mine-affected area of 9,500 acres had been cleared. About 1,600 acres had been handed back to the original owners.[50] A May 2003 media report stated that in the Ferozpur district about 65 percent of the 29,000 hectares of mined land had been cleared, but not yet handed back to landlords and farmers. A senior Army official admitted that there is some concern about mines that are missing or have drifted from their original positions.[51]

In a 28 July 2002 letter to Landmine Monitor, an Indian official stated, “Recovery of mines emplaced as part of the military operations continues to be underway, with 85% of the mines having been retrieved so far. The objective is 100% retrieval.”[52]

Mine Risk Education

There are no formal mine risk education programs in India. The government has reported that the Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament & Environmental Protection (IIPDEP) and the All India Women’s Conference have contributed to public knowledge about the problem of landmines and helped create awareness regarding international and state legislation. India has also reported that the Armed Forces, “during operations, as part of civic action programs,” educate civilians on the issue of landmines and make them aware of measures to be taken to prevent mine casualties. [53]

The IIPDEP organized three public education and awareness seminars and four mine risk education workshops.[54] In addition, Youth Against War events were held in southern India, Rajasthan and Punjab. The delegates attending the seminars were expected to arrange public education, awareness and advocacy programs in the local language in their respective cities, towns or villages. The IIPDEP conducted mine risk education workshops in Abohar, Barmer, Ferozpur, and Ganganagr. Activities included meetings with children, women and men in the mine-affected villages and the distribution of posters showing landmines and UXO, and warning messages in the local language. The workshops reached about 1,000 people directly. Some 500 volunteers were involved. The government of Canada and donations from the Indian people funded the IIPDEP seminars and workshops.[55]

The government states that mine risk education is provided at the field level by field force commanders.[56]

Landmine Casualties

In 2002, the exact number of landmine casualties is not known, as there is no comprehensive data collection mechanism on mine incidents in India. However, based on an analysis of media reports, information is available on at least 523 new casualties caused by landmines, IED, or UXO in 2002, of which 310 people were killed and 213 injured. Media reports tended to focus on military casualties. Of the 523 reported casualties, 335 involved military personnel or militants. Of the 173 civilian casualties, at least fifteen were children.[57] Due to the remoteness and lack of transport and communication facilities in some of the mine-affected border areas it is believed that many civilian casualties are not reported.

Minister of Defense George Fernandes reported to Parliament in March 2002 that during the previous three months 50 Army personnel and seven civilians had been killed in mine blasts, and that 95 Army personnel and 23 civilians had been injured.[58] At the end of December 2002, Fernandes said that about 80 Indian military personnel had died during “mine removal.”[59]

In one district of Rajasthan, Sriganganagar, landmines have reportedly killed 29 people and injured 84 others, including 18 children, in a 15 to 16 month period since December 2001. Only seven of the casualties were military personnel.[60]

IIPDEP visited three border villages in the Ganganagar district, Rajasthan, and in four villages close to the border town of Abohar, Punjab. In the seven border villages, 71 landmine casualties were identified, of which 16 were killed and 55 injured. Adults reportedly stepped on landmines while working in fields, cutting grass or grazing their animals. Children suffered landmine injuries while grazing animals or playing. New landmine incidents have continued to occur in these seven villages in 2003. On 31 March 2003, six children were injured after one child stepped on a landmine in a field.[61]

In 2002, reported casualties were not confined to the Jammu and Kashmir areas. Incidents were also reported in Assam, Jharkland, Bijapur, Bihar, Manipur and Andhra Pradesh.

In 2001, 332 new mine casualties were reported in the media, of which 133 people were killed and 199 injured. Of the 332 reported casualties, 225 involved military personnel or militants. Of the 107 civilian casualties, 32 were children.[62]

Military and civilian casualties continue to be reported in 2003. Between 1 January and 13 June 2003, 190 casualties from landmines, UXO or IEDs were reported, of which 52 people were killed and 138 injured, including eleven children. Civilians accounted for 122 of the reported casualties.[63]

On 13 May 2002, an Indian peacekeeper was injured in a landmine incident in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[64]

Survivor Assistance

India has a system of free medical care for all citizens; however, in rural areas the quality and availability of services can be problematic.[65] First aid is not available in remote border villages. State hospitals provide treatment free of charge to mine casualties including amputation surgery if required. Mine survivors living in remote border villages have no access to physiotherapy or prosthetics services.[66]

The government of India has indicated its support for the rehabilitation of mine survivors, including assistance with economic reintegration and financial grants. The Army’s Artificial Limb Center (ALC) reportedly provides prostheses for mine survivors. India declared, “In essence, the country as a whole remains committed to provide rehabilitation to the unfortunate victims of landmine accidents.”[67]

A composite rehabilitation center in Srinagar supported by the government provides ALIMCO type artificial limbs free of charge to mine survivors.[68]

The NGO Bhagwan Mahaveer Viklang Sahayata Samiti (BMVSS) provides an artificial limb known as the Jaipur Foot as well as walking aids, especially targeting people with limited resources. The artificial limbs, which cost about Rs.900 ($18) to produce, are free and at the center patients are given a place to sleep, meals, and transport home. The BMVSS was established in Jaipur in 1975 and now has ten branches in Jaipur, New Delhi, Mumbai, Jodhpur, Ajmer, Bikaner, Kota, Pali, and Udaipur. The BMVSS receives financial support from the government and from private donors.[69] In January 2002, an Indian orthopedic team arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan, with one thousand artificial limbs, which were available free-of-charge for Afghan amputees. The prosthetic legs, fitted with the so-called Jaipur foot, were provided by BMVSS. The Indian government funded the program.[70]

The NGO Ortho Prosthetics Care and Rehabilitation (OPCAR) provides orthopedic devices and mobility aids for persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors. OPCAR has two orthopedic workshops, one in Delhi and another in Nalagarh. It also runs mobile camps in several places where landmines are a problem to identify needs.[71]

Several other NGOs operate within Jammu and Kashmir assisting the population, including persons with disabilities, with medical care, rehabilitation, education and training.[72]

Two landmine survivors participated in the Raising the Voice training program held during the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2003.

Disability Policy and Practice

India has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities. The practical effects of the legislation have been minimal due in part to a clause that makes the implementation of programs dependent on the “economic capacity” of the government.[73]

In July 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs told Landmine Monitor, “All efforts are made by the Government to provide free, expeditious and quality medical and other assistance to landmine victims.... Depending upon the nature of the injury and the extent of disability, compensation is provided to the victims. In addition, facilities such as assistance in securing employment and provision of artificial limbs are also extended by the Government.”[74]

The IIPDEP survey in seven border villages revealed that the families of landmine casualties who had died received initial compensation of Rs.10,000 (about $200). The government paid Rs.5,000 (about $100) to those who had lost a limb. Farm owners who lost livestock, such as cows, buffaloes, sheep, goats and camels, did not receive any compensation. There is no disability awareness in the community. There are no opportunities for vocational training, or special education facilities for children who have lost limbs in mine incidents. Socio-economic reintegration is a major problem for landmine survivors and for family members who were dependent on a person who was killed.[75]

[1] Statement by Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Head of the Indian Delegation at the Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 11 December 2002.
[2] Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Preamble, 6 December 2002.
[3] Discussion Paper: India, “Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by Non State Actors,” Geneva, 10-14 March 2003. The paper contains a number of suggestions regarding measures to eliminate access by non-state actors to such weapons.
[4] Article 13 Report, Form C, 6 December 2002.
[5] Statement by Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties, 11 December 2002.
[6] Article 13 Report, 10 December 2001, p. 6.
[7] Article 13 Report, Form C, 6 December 2002.
[8] Article 13 Report, 18 October 2000, p. 7.
[9] Article 13 Report, Form D, 6 December 2002.
[10] None of the countries have provided an acquisition date for the Indian antipersonnel mines. Bangladesh also lists the US as a source for its M14. It is unclear how many came from what source. Bangladesh Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2003; Mauritius Article 7 Report, Form B, 20 May 2002; Tanzania Article 7 Report, Form D, 5 February 2003.
[11] “PWG tentacles spreading in state,” The Times of India, 10 January 2002; “PW ultras surrender, ammunition dump recovered,” The Times of India, 12 January 2002.
[12] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 660–662.
[13] Interviews with delegates from border villages who attended the Regional Seminars in Gangangar, Rajasthan, 23 February 2003, and in Abohar, Punjab, 23 March 2003.
[14] Meeting with Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Geneva, 14 May 2003. Williams and Brigot reported this in an ICBL meeting the following day, and Brigot has confirmed it from her notes, including that a follow-up question was asked regarding the “millions” remark. One news article stated, “Although no one has the exact figure, the mines along the border number 2 million.” “Landmine removal to cost Rs 700 crore,” New Delhi Business Standard, 29 November 2002.
[15] Letter No.GEN/PMI/254/41/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor Global Coordinator, from T.P. Seetharam, Minister (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 18 July 2003.
[16] Ibid.
[17] The Landmine Monitor researcher saw the minefields in Ganganagar, Rajasthan, 27 December 2002, and in Abohar, Punjab, 23 March 2003. Indian military personnel confirmed that this corresponds to Indian military tactics.
[18] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor Global Coordinator, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Additional Secretary, Disarmament & International Security Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.
[19] Indian Ministry of Defence press release, New Delhi, 7 March 2002. The release notes that this information was given by Defence Minister George Fernandes in a written reply to two Parliamentarians.
[20] “Landmines play havoc along the LoC,” The Hindu, India, 27 April 2003. Another article said the Army “top brass is understood to be in favor of keeping some of the minefields in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat alive.” “Mine mire on return route,” The Telegraph, New Delhi, 18 October 2002.
[21] Article 13 Report, Form B, 6 December 2002.
[22] Suba Chandran, “The Use of Landmines by Non-State Actors in India and Nepal,” Research for Landmine Monitor Report, New Delhi, May 2002.
[23] See http://www.armyinkashmir.org/weapons.html (accessed 30 April 2003). The 2002 figure is the lowest in more than a decade, and compares to 264 in 2001 and 386 in 2000. See also, “Huge arms haul in Valley,” Hitvada, regional newspaper, 3 January 2003.
[24] Numerous media reports from June 2002 to May 2003, including: "10 injured in Jharkhand land mine blast," Press Trust of India, Daltonganj, 29 July 2002; "Chattisgarh: Two cops killed in landmine blast," Press Trust of India, Jagdalpur, 13 October 2002; "Seven Indian policemen killed in landmine blast," Agence France Press, Ranchi, 20 November 2002; Sanjay K. Jha, "Left Wing Terror: The MCC in Bihar and Jharkhand," South Asia Intelligence Review, 21 April 2003.
[25] “Cops do not rule out Naxals (terrorists) laying landmine network in Gadchiroli,” Hindustan Times, 26 September 2002.
[26] “Tribal militants kill 10 in India’s troubled northeast,” Agence France Press (Guwahati), 5 August 2002; “Assam policemen killed in landmine blast,” Times of India, 21 August 2002.
[27] Discussion Paper: India, “Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by Non State Actors,” Geneva, 10-14 March 2003.
[28] Chander Parkash, “Treading on Trouble,” Tribune of India, 11 May 2003.
[29] The Landmine Monitor researcher spoke to a farmer from a Karanpur border village who had 25 hectares of land and used to hire 15 or 20 laborers for his fields, but had to leave his village and become a laborer somewhere else.
[30] Rahul Kumar, Amar De, and Massod Hussain, “Villagers here sow seeds and harvest mines,” Hindustan Times, 27 December 2002. The article states that according to the state’s chief secretary Y.S.Ratra, New Delhi had authorized only Rs66 million ($1.4 million). Exchange rate at 25 May 2003: Rs1=US$0.0213, used throughout.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “Demining of fields in border areas soon: Army,” Times of India, 2 November 2002.
[33] “Army intensifies de-mining work,” Times of India, 6 March 2003.
[34] Chandra Parkash “Treading on Trouble,” Tribune of India, 11 May 2003.
[35] Binoo Joshi, “Indian Troops Begin Removing Mines from Kashmir Border Towns,” Associated Press (Jammu), 4 July 2002.
[36] Rahul Kumar, Amar De, and Massod Hussain, “Villagers here sow seeds and harvest mines,” Hindustan Times, 27 December 2002.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Firozpur Jagran (regional daily newspaper), 7 March 2003.
[39] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.
[40] Article 13 Report, Form B, 6 December 2002.
[41] “India mine clearing to take months,” BBC News, 10 January 2003.
[42] Interview with former military officer, Ganganagar, Rajasthan, 23 February 2003.
[43] Interviews with the family of Kiran Dip and other villagers, 15 O village, Sri Karanpur sub-district, Sri Ganganagar district, Rajasthan province, 27 May 2003.
[44] Media reports indicate that initial clearance began in some areas in June and July 2002.
[45] “Demining Pakistan frontier to take at least six months: India,” Agence France Press (New Delhi), 27 December 2002.
[46] “Landmine removal to cost Rs700 crore,” New Delhi Business Standard, 29 November 2002.
[47] “India mine clearing to take months,” BBC News, 10 January 2003.
[48] “India restarts demining on border with Pakistan,” Associated Press (New Delhi), 18 February 2003.
[49] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor Global Coordinator, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Additional Secretary, Disarmament & International Security Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.
[50] “Army intensifies de-mining work,” Times of India, 6 March 2003.
[51] Chandra Parkash “Treading on Trouble,” Tribune of India, 11 May 2003.
[52] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.
[53] Article 13 Report, Form A, 6 December 2002.
[54] These were held in Hyderabad, South India, 1 September 2002; Ganganagar, Rajasthan, 26 December 2002; Kota, Rajasthan, 29 December 2002; Proddatur, South India, 10 February 2003; Barmer, Rajasthan, 23 February 2003; Abohar, Punjab, 23 March 2003 and Ferozpur, Punjab, 30 March 2003.
[55] Information provided by Balkrishna Kurvey, IIPDEP, Rome, 8 April 2003.
[56] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.
[57] Landmine Monitor collated data from 78 media reports between 1 January and 31 December 2002. Details of individual reports are available. The reported total represents a minimum number as many media reports do not give an exact figure of the number killed or injured but report “several” casualties. In these cases no number was included in the analysis.
[58] Indian Ministry of Defense press release, New Delhi, 7 March 2002. The release states that this information was given by Defense Minister George Fernandes in a written reply to two Parliamentarians.
[59] “Demining Pakistan frontier to take at least six months: India,” Agence France Press, 27 December 2002.
[60] Rajesh Sinha, "Killing fields - Civilians worst hit by land mines," Hindustan Times, 13 July 2003.
[61] Interviews by IIPDEP with mine survivors and the families of those killed in seven border villages in December 2002 and March 2003.
[62] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 666.
[63] Landmine Monitor collated data from 28 media reports between 1 January and 13 June 2003. Details of individual reports are available.
[64] "UN Peacekeeper killed by Landmine in the DRC,” Xinhua News Agency, 13 May 2002.
[65] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 667.
[66] Interviews by IIPDEP with mine survivors in seven border villages in December 2002 and March 2003.
[67] Article 13 Report, Form B, 6 December 2002.
[68] Site visit and interview by Handicap International India, July 2003.
[69] Tim Sullivan, “In a dusty Indian city, amputees find hope in a handmade foot,” Associated Press, 28 January 2003; http://www.jaipurfoot.org/index.htm.
[70] Ian McWilliam, “Jaipur foot for Afghan amputees: Thousands have lost limbs during 20 years of war,” BBC, 4 January 2002.
[71] ICBL, “Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs,” September 2002, available at www.landminevap.org.
[72] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 667.
[73] Ibid., pp. 667-668.
[74] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.
[75] IIPDEP interviews with mine survivors in seven border villages in December 2002 and March 2003.