Key developments
since May 2002: India laid large numbers of mines along its border with
Pakistan between December 2001 and July 2002. The Indian Army started major
mine clearance operations in October 2002. Numerous new civilian landmine
casualties continue to be reported.
Mine Ban Policy
India has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The
government position on antipersonnel mines remains unchanged. At the Fourth
Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on
Conventional Weapons, Ambassador Rakesh Sood stated, “India remains
dedicated to the pursuit of the ultimate objective of a non-discriminatory,
universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines in a manner that addresses the
legitimate defence requirements of States. We believe that the process of
complete elimination of anti-personnel mines will be facilitated if we approach
the issue with due cognizance of the legitimate operational role of
anti-personnel mines as part of the defense policies of the States that use
them.”[1]
India’s November 2002 annual report required by Article 13 of Amended
Protocol II states, “The world’s mine contamination problem has
reached a crisis point. Towards this end, India remains committed to the
ultimate objective of a global ban on anti-personnel landmines (APL). The
implementation process, however, should be phased and address the legitimate
security requirements of the
State.”[2]
India was one of the 23 states to abstain from voting on the pro-ban treaty
UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74 on 22 November 2002. India did not
participate as an observer in the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty in September 2002 and did not attend the intersessional Standing
Committee meetings in February and May 2003.
Ambassador Sood has served as chairperson of the Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) established at the CCW Review Conference in December 2001 to
consider the issues of explosive remnants of war and antivehicle mines. As a
part of this work, India submitted a document on “Irresponsible Use of
Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by Non State
Actors.”[3]
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
India in the past produced two types of
antipersonnel mines: M16A1 bounding fragmentation mines and low-metal-content
M14 blast mines. India has declared that no low-metal-content mines have been
produced since January 1997.[4]
India has in the past indicated it will modify the M14 mines to be compliant
with CCW Amended Protocol II, and in December 2002 reported that it “has
completed the design, development and necessary trials of detectable
anti-personnel mines affixed with 8 grams of iron and are presently ensuring the
implementation of the
programme.”[5] In
December 2001, India indicated that a detectable version of the M14 “has
been designed and approved for
production.”[6] In
November 2002 India reported, “The design and development of detectable
anti-personnel mines has since been completed. All necessary technical issues
have been resolved and requisite financial support has also been obtained to
effect the said
modifications.”[7]
In October 2000, India reported that it would produce other new mines in
conformity with Amended Protocol II. It said that a new remotely delivered mine
with self-destruct/self-deactivation mechanisms “has been designed.
Prototype production and trial evaluation will
follow.”[8] India has not
previously produced remotely delivered mines of any type.
India has not provided official information regarding the size of its
antipersonnel mine stockpile. Previous Landmine Monitor Reports have
estimated a stockpile of four to five million antipersonnel mines, mostly
low-metal-content M14. However, that estimate may no longer be accurate given
the huge number of antipersonnel mines employed by Indian forces in December
2001 and 2002.
India maintains that it has never exported or imported antipersonnel mines
and has had a comprehensive export moratorium in place since 3 May 1996.
India’s most recent Article 13 Report states, “India has a formal
moratorium, of unlimited duration, prohibiting export of landmines and favours
an outright ban on the transfer of mines even to States Parties to the Protocol.
The above reduces the difficulties associated with the task of regulating the
production and use of
landmines.”[9]
However, it would appear that exports did occur prior to 1996. Antipersonnel
mines of Indian origin have been declared by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in
their Article 7 transparency reports. These include: Bangladesh (3,480 M14
low-metal-content blast mines), Mauritius (93 M14 low-metal-content blast mines,
Lot Number 45-8B0CZ-85), and Tanzania (48 M16 bounding fragmentation mines and
1,729 unidentified blast mines, Lot Number
BP33-9/72IMI).[10]
Non-state actors in India produce Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that
function as antipersonnel
landmines.[11]
Use
Following the attack on Parliament on 13 December
2001, the Indian Army began deploying antipersonnel and antivehicle mines along
the 1,800-mile northern and western border with
Pakistan.[12] Interviews in the
border villages of Ganganagar, Rajastan, Abohar, and Punjab, indicate that the
mine-laying operation ceased after July
2002.[13]
The exact number of landmines planted is not known. In a meeting with Nobel
Peace Laureate Jody Williams, ICBL Government Relations Officer Sylvie Brigot,
and two Indian landmine survivors, Ambassador Sood, according to Ms. Williams
and Ms. Brigot, indicated “millions” of mines were laid by Indian
forces.[14] Asked to verify
this, an Indian official present in the meeting said that Ambassador Sood
remarked, “Given the length of the international boundary, a large number
of mines were indeed laid by the Indian
forces.”[15] Ambassador
Sood also remarked that the “mine-laying by Indian forces was undertaken
in full compliance with the obligations under the Amended Protocol II of the
CCW.”[16]
Minefields extend as far as six to eight kilometers from the
border.[17] Mines were planted
in cultivated and uncultivated land and around villages in defensive positions.
The ICBL has raised concerns about whether this massive mine-laying operation
was carried out in compliance with India’s obligations under CCW Amended
Protocol II. The large number of civilian casualties resulting from the newly
planted mines calls into question whether India has met the requirement to
provide effective exclusion of civilians from areas containing
non-remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. In addition, India has neither
confirmed nor denied whether it used low-metal-content M14 mines from its
stockpiles. Amended Protocol II prohibits use of this mine without the addition
of extra metal content. As noted above, India appears to be in the early stages
of both modifying existing stocks of M14s by adding metal, and producing a new,
detectable version of the M14.
Landmine Monitor provided a draft of this report to Indian officials, seeking
comment. India stated in reply: “Minefields were laid, recorded and
marked in consonance with well-established Standard Operating Procedures and in
conformity with Amended Protocol II. In addition, all village headmen were
personally informed about the location of the minefields in order to insure that
local inhabitants were adequately sensitized. Mine awareness programmes were
also conducted at the sub-district/village level. All efforts were made to
ensure that the markings remained visible, legible, durable and resistant to
environmental
effects.”[18]
The mine-laying operation was characterized by numerous deaths and injuries
to Indian forces. A total of 145 Army personnel were killed or injured in the
first three months alone. This high accident rate during mine-laying has been
attributed to “adverse climatic and terrain conditions like night laying,
dense fog” and “mines and fuzes held in inventory for a long
period.”[19]
On 16 October 2002, India announced a troop pullback, which was reciprocated
by Pakistan, and major mine clearance activities began. According to a media
report, demining operations were not extended to the Line of Control in Jammu
and Kashmir, where India is now apparently maintaining permanent
minefields.[20]
In its November 2002 Article 13 Report India states, “During the period
of the Report, mines were laid along our Western and Northern borders due to our
national security imperatives. Mine recovery has since commenced in right
earnest. Instructions have been issued to all field formations to achieve an
end-state of 100% recovery.... It is also pertinent to mention that restraint
characterizing the use of landmines by Indian Forces in international conflicts
has been widely
acknowledged.”[21]
India used mines in its three wars with Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971.
It also used mines in its war with China in 1962.
Mine Use by Non State Actors
Non-State Actors (NSAs) continued to use antipersonnel mines, antivehicle
mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Jammu and Kashmir, Central
India, and North East India. In Jammu and Kashmir at least five militant groups
have used landmines and IEDs: Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar,
Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Hakat-ul-Jihadi
Islami.[22] In 2002, a total of
111 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were seized from militants, and another
55 were recovered in the first four months of
2003.[23]
In the Central Indian states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh, three
militant groups were responsible for landmine attacks: CPI (ML) – Party
Unity; the People’s War Group (PWG); and the Maoist Communist Center
(MCC).[24] In Andhra Pradesh
and Maharashtra, Naxalite groups have used mines and IEDs. Following an
incident in Gadchiroli, investigations revealed that the Naxalites had laid
Claymore-type mines with electrical detonation several months
before.[25] In Assam in North
East India, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have used
landmines.[26]
The government’s CCW discussion paper “Irresponsible Use of Mines
Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by Non State Actors” states:
The use of MOTAPM, explosives and other munitions by NSAs conforms to no
norms and therefore can cause considerable harm to the life and property of
innocent civilians in unpredictable ways over a prolonged period of time....
NSAs are also responsible for indiscriminate use of MOTAPM and Improvised
Explosive Devices on roads that are extensively used for civilian traffic,
targeting vehicles carrying security personnel as well as civilians.... [T]he
indiscriminate and irresponsible use of MOTAPM by the NSAs lead to the following
long-term hazards: unrecorded areas that are mined and left unmarked, casualties
to civilians and livestock, disruption of normal economic activities, disruption
of humanitarian assistance to affected areas, practical difficulties in
de-mining in the absence of any authentic
record.[27]
The Landmine Problem
Following the mine-laying operations that began in
December 2001, there are minefields all along the 1,800-mile border with
Pakistan, which cross the Indian states of Gujarat, Rajastan, Punjab, and
Indian-administrated Kashmir. Landmines can be found on cultivable and grazing
land, around infrastructure, and around some villages. In many locations,
farmers cannot tend their crops or graze their animals. Some border villagers
have been forced to vacate their homes, and some border farmers have had to work
as laborers in fields far away from where they
live.[28] Landlords have had
their farmland expropriated and been turned into landless
laborers.[29]
According to government figures, the Army operations along the border
affected 1,900,000 farmers in 1,818 villages, cultivating on 60,915 acres in the
three border districts of Ferozpur, Gugudaspur, and
Amritsar.[30] The government
has estimated that 200 villages were affected in the Jammu, Kathua, Rajouri, and
Poonch districts; the Army expropriated 70,100 acres of land of which 25,000
acres were mined. The state legislator from the border region of Jammu is
reported to have said, “We are in a minefield, country yards and
mountains, everything here is
mined.”[31] Various media
reports indicate that mined land included about 20,000 acres in the Punjab
border area,[32] 9,500 acres in
the Amritsar border area,[33]
and 29,000 hectares (about 71,000 acres) in the Ferozpur
district.[34] One report,
citing senior Army officials, said a total of 173,000 acres had been
mined.[35]
According to a media report, the state revenue department has estimated the
winter crop loss from 2001 to 2002 at Rs.83 million ($1.77
million).[36] Some farmers have
noted that mined fields will have declined in fertility due to the growth of
weeds and lack of irrigation over the last two years. Moreover, the number of
field rats has multiplied due to the shelter of the mined areas and the rats
have caused much damage to crops in nearby fields.
The media report that the government has agreed to pay farmers compensation
for their land at the rate of Rs. 11,000 ($234) per acre in three installments,
but not all the installments have been
paid.[37] Some maintain that
this sum compensates only for the loss of one crop, while farmers have already
lost three crops since their fields were mined. A case has been brought before
the High Court of Punjab for full compensation to farmers for three
crops.[38] Farmers in Rajasthan
have also complained that there is no compensation for damage to fodder and
cattle. The impact on the poor, landless people who previously worked as day
laborers is even harsher, as they have not received any kind of
compensation.
The Ministry of External Affairs wrote to Landmine Monitor: “During the
mine-laying operations, land was temporarily expropriated to prevent untoward
casualties to civilians. This will be returned once 100% recovery is achieved.
Compensation is being paid for the period of expropriation and for any adverse
impact on both the winter and the summer crops. There is no standard figure for
acreage-wise compensation.... Instead compensation rates are based on various
factors.... A Board of officials, including representatives from the respective
State Governments, has been specially instituted to look into these
matters.”[39]
The Indian government has stated, “The country has well established
Standard Operating Procedures, whereby, whenever minefields are to be laid, they
are to be explicitly marked and fenced with barbed wire and Long Angle Iron
Pickets. The procedures have been specifically laid down to obviate any
casualties to innocent civilians who might inadvertently stray into such
dangerous areas. Humans aside, these precautions are also incorporated to
prevent casualties to cattle and other domesticated
animals.”[40]
Some of these markings have disappeared in time. Moreover, mines have
shifted due to natural phenomena such as the sand storms in the deserts of
Rajasthan, heavy rains in the flat land of Punjab and Jammu and snow in the
mountainous Kashmir valley. In addition, field rats have carried scores of
small antipersonnel mines over large distances and sometimes taken them into
their burrows.[41] One former
military officer estimated that as a result of these factors, 15 to 20 percent
of mines are not recovered during mine clearance operations, thus posing ongoing
dangers to civilians.[42]
The eleven-year-old girl on the cover of this Landmine Monitor Report
2003, Kiran Dip, was the victim of inadequate marking of a newly-laid
minefield on the border with Pakistan. On 4 June 2002, she was grazing goats
near her village in Sri Karanpur sub-district, Sri Ganganagar district,
Rajasthan province. One of the goats walked under some barbed wire erected by
the Indian Army in two rows some 3 to 5 feet from the ground. She went to
retrieve the goat and stepped on an antipersonnel mine. Her right foot was
subsequently amputated. Kiran Dip did not realize that she had entered a
minefield. There were no warning signs. Villagers say that the Army planted
the mines in January 2002, but did not erect any signs or other kind of marking.
After her incident, the Army put up warning
signs.[43]
Mine Clearance
Following the announcement of the withdrawal of
Indian troops in October 2002, the Indian Army started major mine clearance
operations.[44] At the end of
December 2002, Minister of Defense George Fernandes announced that the Army had
completed the clearance of about 16 to 18 percent of the mine-affected area and
that at least six more months were needed to complete the
operation.[45] In November
2002, Chief of Army Staff General S. Padmanabhan said mine clearance would cost
up to Rs.700 million ($14.9
million).[46] As detailed
below, Indian military personnel suffered at least 175 casualties during mine
laying and clearance operations.
Military personnel engaged in clearance along the Punjab border reported that
mine clearance was painstakingly slow and dangerous. Mines had shifted from
their original locations for a variety of reasons. After nearly a year of being
exposed to the elements, some of the mines had become unstable and prone to
exploding. The scarcity of trained manpower and mine detection equipment
further complicated the
problem.[47] The media reported
that the Army stopped mine clearance twice in January and February 2003, because
soldiers doing the work lacked proper equipment and safety
gear.[48] A Ministry of
External Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that operations were halted only
once during February 2003, in order to provide rest and relief to the
deminers.[49]
According to a March 2003 media report in the Amritsar border area, 2,500
acres of land out of a total mine-affected area of 9,500 acres had been cleared.
About 1,600 acres had been handed back to the original
owners.[50] A May 2003 media
report stated that in the Ferozpur district about 65 percent of the 29,000
hectares of mined land had been cleared, but not yet handed back to landlords
and farmers. A senior Army official admitted that there is some concern about
mines that are missing or have drifted from their original
positions.[51]
In a 28 July 2002 letter to Landmine Monitor, an Indian official stated,
“Recovery of mines emplaced as part of the military operations continues
to be underway, with 85% of the mines having been retrieved so far. The
objective is 100%
retrieval.”[52]
Mine Risk Education
There are no formal mine risk education programs
in India. The government has reported that the Indian Institute for Peace,
Disarmament & Environmental Protection (IIPDEP) and the All India
Women’s Conference have contributed to public knowledge about the problem
of landmines and helped create awareness regarding international and state
legislation. India has also reported that the Armed Forces, “during
operations, as part of civic action programs,” educate civilians on the
issue of landmines and make them aware of measures to be taken to prevent mine
casualties.[53]
The IIPDEP organized three public education and awareness seminars and four
mine risk education
workshops.[54] In addition,
Youth Against War events were held in southern India, Rajasthan and Punjab. The
delegates attending the seminars were expected to arrange public education,
awareness and advocacy programs in the local language in their respective
cities, towns or villages. The IIPDEP conducted mine risk education workshops
in Abohar, Barmer, Ferozpur, and Ganganagr. Activities included meetings with
children, women and men in the mine-affected villages and the distribution of
posters showing landmines and UXO, and warning messages in the local language.
The workshops reached about 1,000 people directly. Some 500 volunteers were
involved. The government of Canada and donations from the Indian people funded
the IIPDEP seminars and
workshops.[55]
The government states that mine risk education is provided at the field level
by field force
commanders.[56]
Landmine Casualties
In 2002, the exact number of landmine casualties
is not known, as there is no comprehensive data collection mechanism on mine
incidents in India. However, based on an analysis of media reports, information
is available on at least 523 new casualties caused by landmines, IED, or UXO in
2002, of which 310 people were killed and 213 injured. Media reports tended to
focus on military casualties. Of the 523 reported casualties, 335 involved
military personnel or militants. Of the 173 civilian casualties, at least
fifteen were children.[57] Due
to the remoteness and lack of transport and communication facilities in some of
the mine-affected border areas it is believed that many civilian casualties are
not reported.
Minister of Defense George Fernandes reported to Parliament in March 2002
that during the previous three months 50 Army personnel and seven civilians had
been killed in mine blasts, and that 95 Army personnel and 23 civilians had been
injured.[58] At the end of
December 2002, Fernandes said that about 80 Indian military personnel had died
during “mine
removal.”[59]
In one district of Rajasthan, Sriganganagar, landmines have reportedly killed
29 people and injured 84 others, including 18 children, in a 15 to 16 month
period since December 2001. Only seven of the casualties were military
personnel.[60]
IIPDEP visited three border villages in the Ganganagar district, Rajasthan,
and in four villages close to the border town of Abohar, Punjab. In the seven
border villages, 71 landmine casualties were identified, of which 16 were killed
and 55 injured. Adults reportedly stepped on landmines while working in fields,
cutting grass or grazing their animals. Children suffered landmine injuries
while grazing animals or playing. New landmine incidents have continued to
occur in these seven villages in 2003. On 31 March 2003, six children were
injured after one child stepped on a landmine in a
field.[61]
In 2002, reported casualties were not confined to the Jammu and Kashmir
areas. Incidents were also reported in Assam, Jharkland, Bijapur, Bihar,
Manipur and Andhra Pradesh.
In 2001, 332 new mine casualties were reported in the media, of which 133
people were killed and 199 injured. Of the 332 reported casualties, 225
involved military personnel or militants. Of the 107 civilian casualties, 32
were children.[62]
Military and civilian casualties continue to be reported in 2003. Between 1
January and 13 June 2003, 190 casualties from landmines, UXO or IEDs were
reported, of which 52 people were killed and 138 injured, including eleven
children. Civilians accounted for 122 of the reported
casualties.[63]
On 13 May 2002, an Indian peacekeeper was injured in a landmine incident in
the Democratic Republic of
Congo.[64]
Survivor Assistance
India has a system of free medical care for all
citizens; however, in rural areas the quality and availability of services can
be problematic.[65] First aid
is not available in remote border villages. State hospitals provide treatment
free of charge to mine casualties including amputation surgery if required.
Mine survivors living in remote border villages have no access to physiotherapy
or prosthetics services.[66]
The government of India has indicated its support for the rehabilitation of
mine survivors, including assistance with economic reintegration and financial
grants. The Army’s Artificial Limb Center (ALC) reportedly provides
prostheses for mine survivors. India declared, “In essence, the country
as a whole remains committed to provide rehabilitation to the unfortunate
victims of landmine
accidents.”[67]
A composite rehabilitation center in Srinagar supported by the government
provides ALIMCO type artificial limbs free of charge to mine
survivors.[68]
The NGO Bhagwan Mahaveer Viklang Sahayata Samiti (BMVSS) provides an
artificial limb known as the Jaipur Foot as well as walking aids, especially
targeting people with limited resources. The artificial limbs, which cost about
Rs.900 ($18) to produce, are free and at the center patients are given a place
to sleep, meals, and transport home. The BMVSS was established in Jaipur in
1975 and now has ten branches in Jaipur, New Delhi, Mumbai, Jodhpur, Ajmer,
Bikaner, Kota, Pali, and Udaipur. The BMVSS receives financial support from the
government and from private
donors.[69] In January 2002, an
Indian orthopedic team arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan, with one thousand
artificial limbs, which were available free-of-charge for Afghan amputees. The
prosthetic legs, fitted with the so-called Jaipur foot, were provided by BMVSS.
The Indian government funded the
program.[70]
The NGO Ortho Prosthetics Care and Rehabilitation (OPCAR) provides orthopedic
devices and mobility aids for persons with disabilities, including landmine
survivors. OPCAR has two orthopedic workshops, one in Delhi and another in
Nalagarh. It also runs mobile camps in several places where landmines are a
problem to identify
needs.[71]
Several other NGOs operate within Jammu and Kashmir assisting the population,
including persons with disabilities, with medical care, rehabilitation,
education and training.[72]
Two landmine survivors participated in the Raising the Voice training program
held during the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2003.
Disability Policy and Practice
India has legislation to protect the rights of
persons with disabilities. The practical effects of the legislation have been
minimal due in part to a clause that makes the implementation of programs
dependent on the “economic capacity” of the
government.[73]
In July 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs told Landmine Monitor,
“All efforts are made by the Government to provide free, expeditious and
quality medical and other assistance to landmine victims.... Depending upon the
nature of the injury and the extent of disability, compensation is provided to
the victims. In addition, facilities such as assistance in securing employment
and provision of artificial limbs are also extended by the
Government.”[74]
The IIPDEP survey in seven border villages revealed that the families of
landmine casualties who had died received initial compensation of Rs.10,000
(about $200). The government paid Rs.5,000 (about $100) to those who had lost a
limb. Farm owners who lost livestock, such as cows, buffaloes, sheep, goats and
camels, did not receive any compensation. There is no disability awareness in
the community. There are no opportunities for vocational training, or special
education facilities for children who have lost limbs in mine incidents.
Socio-economic reintegration is a major problem for landmine survivors and for
family members who were dependent on a person who was
killed.[75]
[1] Statement by Ambassador Rakesh Sood,
Head of the Indian Delegation at the Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties
to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 11
December 2002. [2] Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Preamble, 6 December
2002. [3] Discussion Paper: India,
“Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by
Non State Actors,” Geneva, 10-14 March 2003. The paper contains a number
of suggestions regarding measures to eliminate access by non-state actors to
such weapons. [4] Article 13 Report,
Form C, 6 December 2002. [5] Statement
by Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties, 11
December 2002. [6] Article 13 Report, 10
December 2001, p. 6. [7] Article 13
Report, Form C, 6 December 2002. [8]
Article 13 Report, 18 October 2000, p.
7. [9] Article 13 Report, Form D, 6
December 2002. [10] None of the
countries have provided an acquisition date for the Indian antipersonnel mines.
Bangladesh also lists the US as a source for its M14. It is unclear how many
came from what source. Bangladesh Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2003;
Mauritius Article 7 Report, Form B, 20 May 2002; Tanzania Article 7 Report, Form
D, 5 February 2003. [11] “PWG
tentacles spreading in state,” The Times of India, 10 January 2002;
“PW ultras surrender, ammunition dump recovered,” The Times of
India, 12 January 2002. [12] For more
details see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
660–662. [13] Interviews with
delegates from border villages who attended the Regional Seminars in Gangangar,
Rajasthan, 23 February 2003, and in Abohar, Punjab, 23 March
2003. [14] Meeting with Ambassador
Rakesh Sood, Geneva, 14 May 2003. Williams and Brigot reported this in an ICBL
meeting the following day, and Brigot has confirmed it from her notes, including
that a follow-up question was asked regarding the “millions” remark.
One news article stated, “Although no one has the exact figure, the mines
along the border number 2 million.” “Landmine removal to cost Rs
700 crore,” New Delhi Business Standard, 29 November
2002. [15] Letter No.GEN/PMI/254/41/2003
to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor Global Coordinator, from T.P. Seetharam,
Minister (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva, 18 July 2003. [16]
Ibid. [17] The Landmine Monitor
researcher saw the minefields in Ganganagar, Rajasthan, 27 December 2002, and in
Abohar, Punjab, 23 March 2003. Indian military personnel confirmed that this
corresponds to Indian military
tactics. [18] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to
Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor Global Coordinator, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma,
Additional Secretary, Disarmament & International Security Affairs, Ministry
of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July
2003. [19] Indian Ministry of Defence
press release, New Delhi, 7 March 2002. The release notes that this information
was given by Defence Minister George Fernandes in a written reply to two
Parliamentarians. [20] “Landmines
play havoc along the LoC,” The Hindu, India, 27 April 2003. Another
article said the Army “top brass is understood to be in favor of keeping
some of the minefields in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat alive.”
“Mine mire on return route,” The Telegraph, New Delhi, 18 October
2002. [21] Article 13 Report, Form B, 6
December 2002. [22] Suba Chandran,
“The Use of Landmines by Non-State Actors in India and Nepal,”
Research for Landmine Monitor Report, New Delhi, May 2002.
[23] See
http://www.armyinkashmir.org/weapons.html
(accessed 30 April 2003). The 2002 figure is the lowest in more than a decade,
and compares to 264 in 2001 and 386 in 2000. See also, “Huge arms haul in
Valley,” Hitvada, regional newspaper, 3 January
2003. [24] Numerous media reports from
June 2002 to May 2003, including: "10 injured in Jharkhand land mine blast,"
Press Trust of India, Daltonganj, 29 July 2002; "Chattisgarh: Two cops killed in
landmine blast," Press Trust of India, Jagdalpur, 13 October 2002; "Seven Indian
policemen killed in landmine blast," Agence France Press, Ranchi, 20 November
2002; Sanjay K. Jha, "Left Wing Terror: The MCC in Bihar and Jharkhand," South
Asia Intelligence Review, 21 April
2003. [25] “Cops do not rule out
Naxals (terrorists) laying landmine network in Gadchiroli,” Hindustan
Times, 26 September 2002. [26]
“Tribal militants kill 10 in India’s troubled northeast,”
Agence France Press (Guwahati), 5 August 2002; “Assam policemen killed in
landmine blast,” Times of India, 21 August
2002. [27] Discussion Paper: India,
“Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) by
Non State Actors,” Geneva, 10-14 March
2003. [28] Chander Parkash,
“Treading on Trouble,” Tribune of India, 11 May
2003. [29] The Landmine Monitor
researcher spoke to a farmer from a Karanpur border village who had 25 hectares
of land and used to hire 15 or 20 laborers for his fields, but had to leave his
village and become a laborer somewhere
else. [30] Rahul Kumar, Amar De, and
Massod Hussain, “Villagers here sow seeds and harvest mines,”
Hindustan Times, 27 December 2002. The article states that according to the
state’s chief secretary Y.S.Ratra, New Delhi had authorized only Rs66
million ($1.4 million). Exchange rate at 25 May 2003: Rs1=US$0.0213, used
throughout. [31]
Ibid. [32] “Demining of fields in
border areas soon: Army,” Times of India, 2 November
2002. [33] “Army intensifies
de-mining work,” Times of India, 6 March
2003. [34] Chandra Parkash
“Treading on Trouble,” Tribune of India, 11 May
2003. [35] Binoo Joshi, “Indian
Troops Begin Removing Mines from Kashmir Border Towns,” Associated Press
(Jammu), 4 July 2002. [36] Rahul Kumar,
Amar De, and Massod Hussain, “Villagers here sow seeds and harvest
mines,” Hindustan Times, 27 December
2002. [37]
Ibid. [38] Firozpur Jagran (regional
daily newspaper), 7 March 2003. [39]
Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant
Sharma, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July
2003. [40] Article 13 Report, Form B, 6
December 2002. [41] “India mine
clearing to take months,” BBC News, 10 January
2003. [42] Interview with former
military officer, Ganganagar, Rajasthan, 23 February
2003. [43] Interviews with the family of
Kiran Dip and other villagers, 15 O village, Sri Karanpur sub-district, Sri
Ganganagar district, Rajasthan province, 27 May
2003. [44] Media reports indicate that
initial clearance began in some areas in June and July
2002. [45] “Demining Pakistan
frontier to take at least six months: India,” Agence France Press (New
Delhi), 27 December 2002. [46]
“Landmine removal to cost Rs700 crore,” New Delhi Business Standard,
29 November 2002. [47] “India mine
clearing to take months,” BBC News, 10 January
2003. [48] “India restarts
demining on border with Pakistan,” Associated Press (New Delhi), 18
February 2003. [49] Letter No.
106/5/2003 to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor Global Coordinator, from Dr. Sheel
Kant Sharma, Additional Secretary, Disarmament & International Security
Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July
2003. [50] “Army intensifies
de-mining work,” Times of India, 6 March
2003. [51] Chandra Parkash
“Treading on Trouble,” Tribune of India, 11 May
2003. [52] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary
Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Ministry of External
Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003. [53]
Article 13 Report, Form A, 6 December
2002. [54] These were held in Hyderabad,
South India, 1 September 2002; Ganganagar, Rajasthan, 26 December 2002; Kota,
Rajasthan, 29 December 2002; Proddatur, South India, 10 February 2003; Barmer,
Rajasthan, 23 February 2003; Abohar, Punjab, 23 March 2003 and Ferozpur, Punjab,
30 March 2003. [55] Information provided
by Balkrishna Kurvey, IIPDEP, Rome, 8 April
2003. [56] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to Mary
Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Ministry of External
Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003. [57]
Landmine Monitor collated data from 78 media reports between 1 January and 31
December 2002. Details of individual reports are available. The reported total
represents a minimum number as many media reports do not give an exact figure of
the number killed or injured but report “several” casualties. In
these cases no number was included in the
analysis. [58] Indian Ministry of
Defense press release, New Delhi, 7 March 2002. The release states that this
information was given by Defense Minister George Fernandes in a written reply to
two Parliamentarians. [59]
“Demining Pakistan frontier to take at least six months: India,”
Agence France Press, 27 December
2002. [60] Rajesh Sinha, "Killing fields
- Civilians worst hit by land mines," Hindustan Times, 13 July
2003. [61] Interviews by IIPDEP with
mine survivors and the families of those killed in seven border villages in
December 2002 and March 2003. [62] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
666. [63] Landmine Monitor collated data
from 28 media reports between 1 January and 13 June 2003. Details of individual
reports are available. [64] "UN
Peacekeeper killed by Landmine in the DRC,” Xinhua News Agency, 13 May
2002. [65] Landmine Monitor Report 2002,
p. 667. [66] Interviews by IIPDEP with
mine survivors in seven border villages in December 2002 and March
2003. [67] Article 13 Report, Form B, 6
December 2002. [68] Site visit and
interview by Handicap International India, July
2003. [69] Tim Sullivan, “In a
dusty Indian city, amputees find hope in a handmade foot,” Associated
Press, 28 January 2003;
http://www.jaipurfoot.org/index.htm. [70]
Ian McWilliam, “Jaipur foot for Afghan amputees: Thousands have lost limbs
during 20 years of war,” BBC, 4 January
2002. [71] ICBL, “Portfolio of
Landmine Victim Assistance Programs,” September 2002, available at
www.landminevap.org. [72]
See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
667. [73] Ibid., pp.
667-668. [74] Letter No. 106/5/2003 to
Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, from Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Ministry of External
Affairs, New Delhi, 28 July 2003. [75]
IIPDEP interviews with mine survivors in seven border villages in December 2002
and March 2003.
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