The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3
December 1997. After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998,
the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding
international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any
major multilateral treaty ever. Since 1 March 1999, states must accede and
cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later. For a state that
ratifies or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of
the sixth month after the date on which that state deposited its instrument of
ratification. That state is then required to make its initial transparency
report to the UN Secretary General within 180 days (and annually thereafter),
destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground
within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic
implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.
Universalization
A total of 134 countries are States Parties to the
Mine Ban Treaty, as of 31 July
2003.[3] Another 13 countries have
signed, but not ratified the
treaty.[4] Thus, 147 countries have
legally committed to the core obligations of the treaty, including no use of
antipersonnel mines.[5]
Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2002, nine additional
countries have become States Parties. Four countries acceded: Afghanistan (11
September 2002), Comoros (19 September 2002), Central African Republic (8
November 2002), and Timor-Leste (7 May 2003). Five countries ratified: Cameroon
(19 September 2002), The Gambia (23 September 2002), Cyprus (17 January 2003),
São Tomé e Príncipe (31 March 2003), and Lithuania (12 May
2003).
Two of these new States Parties are mine-affected (Afghanistan and Cyprus).
Since the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature in December 1997, over
three-quarters of the world’s nations have joined the treaty. This
indicates widespread international rejection of any use or possession of
antipersonnel mines, and widespread commitment to mine clearance and assistance
to mine survivors.
Most of the major mine-affected countries are now States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty. These include: Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Thailand in Asia; Angola,
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Mozambique in Africa; Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia in Europe; Colombia and Nicaragua in the
Americas. These countries—among the biggest users of antipersonnel mines
in the past—have now foresworn the weapon.
Every country in sub-Saharan Africa is a State Party or signatory, except
Somalia, which does not have a functioning government; every country in the
Americas region, except the US and Cuba; every member of the European Union,
except Finland; every member of NATO, except the US and Turkey (which is about
to accede). Major Asia-Pacific nations have joined, such as Australia,
Indonesia, and Japan.
In 2002 and 2003, there were many encouraging movements toward accession or
ratification in countries not yet party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Belarus, with
one of the largest antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the world, completed all the
domestic measures necessary for its accession on 30 July 2003. The parliament
of Serbia and Montenegro passed legislation to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty on
20 June 2003. The foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey affirmed that their
countries would proceed to submit simultaneously their respective instruments of
adherence, having completed all the domestic procedures to join the treaty. In
April 2003, Guyana's National Assembly approved ratification of the Mine Ban
Treaty. In Burundi, a draft law for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was
adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 2003 and by the Senate in June
2003. In Sudan, in May 2003, Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail announced
that the Council of Ministers had officially and unanimously endorsed the Mine
Ban Treaty and had transmitted it to Parliament for ratification.
Estonia’s Prime Minister has stated that the government is seriously
considering joining the Mine Ban Treaty and has started the process of internal
deliberations for joining. In April 2003, theLatvian Ambassador to the
UN in Geneva said the country would probably join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004.
In October 2002, the Sri Lankan government announced its willingness to accede
to the Mine Ban Treaty contingent upon reaching an agreement with the rebel LTTE
on the non-use of landmines. An official from Papua New Guinea indicated in May
2003 that accession would be completed before the Fifth Meeting of States
Parties in September 2003. In the Cook Islands, ratification legislation is
being considered by the Parliament.
Sustained and systematic universalization efforts among States Parties, the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), and United Nations (UN) agencies continue. The
Universalization Contact Group, coordinated by Canada, met several times in 2002
and 2003 to strategize and identify universalization targets. There were
numerous important regional conferences and other meetings and missions aimed at
universalization, including in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma, Ethiopia, Indonesia,
Laos, Nepal, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. (See ICBL chapter
in this Landmine Monitor Report 2003). For most countries that have
joined to the treaty since 2000, there seems to be a tangible relationship
between the occurrence of either a States Parties or intersessional meeting and
the ratification/accession of the treaty for those countries. Since February
2000, 24 of the 44 states ratified the treaty within two weeks before or after
such a meeting.
Virtually all of the 47 non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a
comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines at some point in time, and many have
already at least partially embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 57/74 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty
was adopted on 22 November 2002 by a vote of 143 in favor, none opposed, and 23
abstentions. The same eighteen states not party to the treaty voted for the
resolution as did for the resolution last year: Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus,
Bhutan, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Papua New
Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and
Yugoslavia.[6] The 23 abstentions
were four more than on a similar resolution last year. State Party
Tajikistan described its abstention as a “mistake.”
Despite the large and growing number of States Parties, there is concern that
the pace of new ratifications and accessions has slowed. There were three
ratifications in December 1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference,
then 55 ratifications/accessions in 1998, 32 in 1999, 19 in 2000, 13 in 2001,
eight in 2002, and four from January to July 2003.
Forty-seven countries (24 percent of the world’s total) have not yet
joined the treaty. This includes three of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States. Most of the Middle
East, most of the former Soviet republics, and many Asian states are outside the
treaty. Major antipersonnel mine producers and stockpilers, such as China,
India, Pakistan, Russia, and the US are not part of the treaty. Moreover, there
has been little or no positive change in the ban policies of some states in the
past year, including the US, Russia, and China. Universalization still remains
the biggest challenge facing ban supporters.
Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program
During 2002-2003, the intersessional work program,
established in 1999 to carry the work of the Mine Ban Treaty forward between the
annual Meetings of States Parties, continued to help maintain international
attention on the global antipersonnel mine problem, consolidate global mine
action efforts, provide a global picture of priorities, and contribute to the
full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The ICBL remained a full and active
participant in the intersessional process, showing that the strong partnership
with governments continues.
The four Standing Committees—Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies;
Stockpile Destruction; and General Status and Operation of the
Convention—each met twice in 2002 and twice in 2003 at the Geneva
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in Geneva. An Action
Program issued by the President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties
(Belgium) served as the basis for planning for the fourth year of intersessional
work.The Standing Committees focused more than ever before on the
needs, gaps and resources available for the implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty, especially its mine action components, in the period leading up to the
first Review Conference in November 2004.
The Coordinating Committee (CC) of the States Parties met monthly in 2002 and
2003, with the President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties as its chair.
The CC consists of the co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the intersessional
Standing Committees, the chairs of the ad hoc contact groups for
Universalization (Canada), Articles 7 & 9 (Belgium), Resource Mobilization
(Norway), and the Sponsorship Group (UK), and the presidents of past and
forthcoming Meetings of States Parties. The meetings discussed practical
coordination matters relating to the intersessional work program and
preparations for the annual Meetings of States Parties. The ICBL and ICRC
continued to participate in these meetings on a regular basis.
Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) became
operational in January 2002, it has more than proven its worth by ensuring
better preparations for the intersessional meetings, providing valuable support
to all interested States, serving as an information source, and contributing to
strategic thinking on how to achieve the overall goals of the treaty. The ICBL
works very closely with the ISU. The ISU together with the Sponsorship Group of
interested States Parties helps to enable full participation in the
intersessional program of mine-affected countries with limited resources.
Participation in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in February
and May 2003 reached record levels, with more than 500 persons in attendance,
representing 126 countries (96 States Parties and 30 non-States Parties), dozens
of members of the ICBL, Landmine Monitor researchers, the ICRC, international
and regional organizations, UN agencies, and academic institutions.
Convention on Conventional Weapons
A total of 90 countries are States Parties to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), as of 31 July 2003. In December 2001,
States Parties to the CCW agreed to expand the scope of the CCW to apply to
internal as well as international armed conflicts; by July 2003, 14 had ratified
this amendment to Article 1 of the
Convention.[7] The States Parties
also agreed to form a Group of Governmental Experts to explore the problems
posed by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines other than antipersonnel
mines (MOTAPM).
In December 2002, the States Parties agreed to a mandate to negotiate an
instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for ERW and to continue
work on MOTAPM. The ICBL and other NGOs have challenged States Parties to
conclude a strong, effective, legally binding instrument in 2003 on the wider
problem of explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions. The ICBL and
other NGOs have also urged the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to
end the civilians casualties caused by antivehicle mines, and has encouraged all
States to examine their national stocks to take steps to eliminate antivehicle
mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices that cause the mine to
function like an antipersonnel mine, as these are already prohibited by the Mine
Ban Treaty.
The Group of Governmental Experts met for one week in March 2003 and two
weeks in June 2003. They will meet again in November. Ambassador Chris Sanders
of the Netherlands, the coordinator of the group’s work on ERW, put
forward a draft framework paper in March, and a draft instrument in June. It is
unclear if the negotiations will conclude in November; while most States Parties
support a new protocol on ERW, the United States and a few others have raised
objections to a legally-binding instrument.
A total of 69 countries are States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW,
as of 31 July 2003. Amended Protocol II regulates landmines, booby-traps and
other devices; it took effect on 3 December 1998. Just ten of the 69 States
Parties to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China,
Estonia, Finland, India, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Pakistan, South Korea, and the
US. Several of these have indicated they are likely to join the Mine Ban
Treaty, including Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Thus, very few of the States
Parties to Amended Protocol II continue to assert the right to use antipersonnel
mines.
Two States Parties to Amended Protocol II are known to have used
antipersonnel mines since December 1998: India and Pakistan. US forces in
Afghanistan have incorporated Soviet-era minefields into their perimeter
defense, deriving military advantage from these minefields. India, Pakistan,
and the US are obligated to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II requirements to
mark and monitor minefields to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. But
none of these countries provided detailed information on measures taken in their
annual national reports for Amended Protocol II submitted in December 2002.
China and Pakistan deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability
of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex of Amended
Protocol II, until 3 December 2007. Neither country has provided detailed
information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability
requirement.
Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Belarus,
China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the
US, while India is developing such systems. Bulgaria, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the UK have destroyed their stockpiles of
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines in order to comply with Article 4 of the
Mine Ban Treaty.
Amended Protocol II States Parties China, Pakistan, and Ukraine have deferred
compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex. They
have up to nine years to come into full compliance with the technical
specifications. The deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and
Pakistan, and 15 May 2008 for Ukraine. Ukraine, a signatory of the Mine Ban
Treaty, is taking steps to destroy its stockpile of 5.9 million PFM-type
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. India and Pakistan have reported that
new compliant remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines are being developed and
tested.
Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines
The drop in global use of antipersonnel mines that
began to take hold in the mid-1990s continued in this reporting period. In
recent years, antipersonnel mines have been used by fewer countries and in
lesser numbers than seen from the 1960s through the early 1990s, when the global
landmine crisis was created. There have been notable aberrations from the
general pattern of decreased use, but the overall trend has been positive, even
with respect to non-States Parties, as the international norm against the
antipersonnel mine has spread.
In this reporting period, since May 2002, Landmine Monitor has confirmed that
six governments used antipersonnel mines: India, Iraq, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal,
Pakistan, and Russia. This compares to use by at least nine governments listed
in Landmine Monitor Report 2002 and 13 governments in Landmine Monitor
Report 2001.[8] There are
credible allegations of mine use by three other governments, but Landmine
Monitor has not been able to definitively confirm the allegations: Burundi,
Georgia, and Sudan. All three governments strongly deny using antipersonnel
mines.
As of July 2003, it appears that only Myanmar and Russia are laying
antipersonnel mines on a regular basis. India, Pakistan, and Nepal have all
stopped their mine-laying operations, and the government of Iraq has ceased to
exist. Since the cessation of mine-laying operations by India and Pakistan in
mid-2002, there has not been a single government engaged in massive, sustained
use of antipersonnel mines.
During the reporting period, it is likely that the greatest number of mines
were used by the government forces of Myanmar, Nepal, and Russia (in Chechnya).
The most extensive use of antipersonnel mines by rebels was also likely in those
three countries, as well as in Colombia.
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties
In this reporting period, Landmine Monitor has found no concrete evidence of
use of antipersonnel mines by any State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Mine Ban Treaty Signatories
Landmine Monitor cannot definitively conclude that any signatory government
used antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. However, Landmine Monitor
has received ever-more compelling reports of use of antipersonnel mines inside
Burundi by government forces, as well as rebels. The government strongly denies
these allegations, stating that only rebels use mines. In Sudan, government and
rebel forces exchanged accusations of mine use, while both deny
responsibility.
States Parties Ecuador and Venezuela in their Article 7 transparency reports
indicated that they used antipersonnel mines after signing the Mine Ban Treaty
in December 1997, but prior to entry into force. Angola, now a State Party, has
also acknowledged use while still a signatory. The ICBL believes that use of
antipersonnel mines by a signatory is a violation of international humanitarian
law, in that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that treaty
signatories must refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
the instrument they have signed.
Mine Ban Treaty Non-Signatories
The governments of India, Pakistan, Nepal and Russia have all acknowledged
using antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. It is clear that government
forces in Myanmar continued to lay mines. Saddam Hussein’s forces used
antipersonnel mines in the lead-up to and during the 2003 conflict in Iraq.
There have been credible reports of use by Georgia, but the government denies
it.
Armed Non-State Actors
Opposition groups are reported to have used antipersonnel mines in at least
eleven countries. Non-state actors have used mines in Burma (Myanmar),
Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia (in Abkhazia), India,
Nepal, Philippines, Russia (in Chechnya), Somalia, and Sudan. This compares to
reports of use by non-state actors in at least fourteen countries in the
previous reporting period.
In addition, there have been a small number of reported incidents of use of
antipersonnel mines, improvised explosive devices or booby-traps by non-state
actors in countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Indonesia, and Serbia and
Montenegro (including Kosovo).
Key Developments Since Landmine Monitor Report 2002
Cessation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines
Use of antipersonnel mines by both government and rebel forces in three of
the most mine-affected countries stopped during the previous Landmine Monitor
reporting period. Use stopped in Afghanistan (aside from a few sporadic
incidents) with the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, in Sri Lanka with the
cease-fires in December 2001, and in Angola with the peace agreement in April
2002.
After increased use by both government and rebel forces in Nepal in 2002,
there has been little or no use by either side since the January 2003
cease-fire. At some point in 2002, apparently in mid-year, India and Pakistan
stopped their major mine-laying operations begun in December 2001.
Initiation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines
Iraq is the only government to be added to the list of antipersonnel mine
users in this reporting period. In March and April 2003, it laid significant
numbers of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in numerous locations throughout
the country. Coalition forces did not use antipersonnel mines.
Two more rebel groups (New Mon State Party and Hongsawatoi Restoration Party)
were identified as mine users in Burma, bringing the total to 15 groups in that
country. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines resumed
its use of antipersonnel mines, despite having signed the Geneva Call Deed of
Commitment prohibiting all use.
Ongoing and Increased Use of Antipersonnel Mines
There was substantially increased use of mines and improvised explosive
devices by both government and Maoist rebel forces in Nepal in 2002. The
government for the first time openly acknowledged use, admitting to laying some
10,000 mines in all 75 districts of the country. As noted above, the January
2003 cease-fire has brought a virtual halt to mine use in Nepal.
There was also expanded use by guerrilla forces in Colombia, particularly
FARC-EP and UC-ELN, as well as AUC paramilitary forces; the government reported
638 incidents of mine use in 2002.
Mine use was reportedly on the rise in Burundi, with both rebel and
government forces blamed. The UN reported, “2002 saw an escalation of the
conflict, and increases in mine use in provinces such as Gitega and
Mwaro.” Some incidents in Burundi point to continued use of mines by both
sides even after the December 2002 cease-fire agreement prohibiting mine
use.
In Burma, government forces and 15 different rebel groups used antipersonnel
mines; during this reporting period, it appears that mines were laid most
extensively in Karen State.
There was also ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by both Russian federal
forces and rebels in Chechnya; the rebels are said to use mines on an almost
daily basis.
The government of Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of
antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996. However, there have been
credible reports of use in both 2001 and 2002 in areas near Abkhazia. Abkhazian
authorities have stated that that in mid-2002, troops from both Abkhazia and
Georgia mined areas around the Marukh mountain pass. The government of Georgia
denies any use of antipersonnel mines.
Mine-laying by India and Pakistan that began in December 2001 likely
continued into this reporting period, but was apparently halted sometime in
mid-2002. India may have laid millions of mines on the border.
Also in India, non-state actors continued to use antipersonnel mines and
improvised explosive devices in Jammu and Kashmir, Central India, and North East
India. A number of rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo allegedly
used mines, including RCD-Goma, UPC, RCD-ML, and MLC. There were reports of
continued mine use by various factions in Somalia. In the Philippines, in
addition to new use by the MILF, the New People’s Army and the Abu Sayyaf
Group continued to use mines.
Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines
At least 36 nations have
ceased production of antipersonnel mines. Thirty are States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty.[9] The other six are
Finland, Greece, Israel, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. Taiwan has
also stopped production.
Landmine Monitor identifies fifteen countries that continue to produce
antipersonnel landmines. This year, Landmine Monitor is adding Nepal to the
list, reflecting the open admission by government officials that production has
taken place. This marks the first time that the number of antipersonnel mine
producers has increased since Landmine Monitor reporting started in 1999.
ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE PRODUCERS
Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Nepal, North
Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States, Vietnam
Nine of the fifteen mine producers are in Asia (Burma, China, India, Nepal,
North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam), three in the Middle
East (Egypt, Iran, and Iraq), two in the Americas (Cuba and United States), and
one in Europe (Russia).
India and Pakistan are actively engaged in new production of antipersonnel
mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW. But, for most of
the rest of these countries, it is not known if production lines were active in
2002 and 2003.
In several cases, there appears to have been no production for a number of
years. The US has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997. South Korea
produced only Claymore mines in 1998-2000 and no mines since then. Egypt has
unofficially stated that it ceased production in 1988. Russia has stated that
it has not produced or supplied to its troops antipersonnel mines of the PFM-1,
PMN, PMN-2, and PMN-4 types for the past eight years.
In September 2002, Iran said it has not produced antipersonnel mines since
the end of its war with Iraq in 1988. However, last year Landmine Monitor
reported that hundreds of Iran-manufactured antipersonnel mines with production
stamps of 1999 and 2000 were encountered by demining organizations in
Afghanistan.
Since the coalition occupation of Iraq, any industrial production of
antipersonnel mines that may have been taking place has, presumably, ceased.
Landmine Monitor will keep Iraq on the list of producers until a new government
officially renounces antipersonnel mine production.
Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines
In recent years,
Landmine Monitor findings indicate that the trade in antipersonnel mines has
dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged trade.
The scope and nature of the global landmine trade, which now appears to be
defunct, is reflected in the Mine Ban Treaty transparency reports. Between
March 1999 and July 2003, 39 States Parties declared stockpiles of antipersonnel
mines imported from at least 23 countries in their Article 7 transparency
measures reports.[10] These numbers
are likely to increase over the coming year as more countries submit initial
transparency reports. States Parties have included significant supplementary
information about the countries of origin and dates of acquisition of their
antipersonnel mine stockpile.
The de facto global antipersonnel mine transfer ban established during
the 1992-1997 period has been reconfirmed and extended in 2002. Several
countries outside the Mine Ban Treaty have extended their moratoria on exports
and transfers of antipersonnel mines during this reporting period. Belarus
extended its moratorium through the end of 2007. China reaffirmed its limited
moratorium in December 2002. Israel extended its export moratorium until July
2005. Poland adopted a new law prohibiting all transfers. Russia continues
observing its limited export moratorium while in the process of extending it.
Singapore affirms that its indefinite moratorium is still in effect. South
Korea announced the indefinite extension of its moratorium in December 2002.
Turkey made its export moratorium permanent. The US extended its export
moratorium through October 2008.
Questions remain about exports from Iran. Landmine Monitor Report 2002
reported that newIranian antipersonnel mines had been found in
Afghanistan and also intercepted en-route to Palestine. An export moratorium
was instituted by Iran in 1997, but it is not known if it is still formally in
effect.
Following are some examples of possible continuing illicit trade. According
to a media account, in May 2003, a Panamanian court sentenced four Panamanians
and three Colombians to 20 and 60 months imprisonment for attempting to import
into Colombia weapons acquired in Nicaragua, which included thirteen Russian
antipersonnel mines. A former official from the Central African Republic said
that landmines were brought into the CAR from Chad during the coup attempt in
October 2002; there is no independent confirmation of this allegation. In July
2003, the head of the Transitional National Government in Somalia accused
Ethiopia of supplying arms, including landmines, to Somali factions; Ethiopia
dismissed the claim. A media report in November 2002 claimed that Turkish
customs officials had detained a truck containing a large load of weapons,
including antipersonnel mines, at the border with Georgia, allegedly coming from
Kazakhstan.
Transfers for Purposes Permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty permits the transfer of antipersonnel mines
for the purpose of their destruction or for training and research needs. During
2002, two companies in Germany received quantities of antipersonnel mines for
destruction from foreign sources. Spreewerk Lubben destroyed 42,175 mines
received from Taiwan. The company EBV destroyed 5,984 BLU-92 Gator
antipersonnel mines transferred from the Netherlands. In 2001, Canada reported
the transfer of 180 mines from the US and 110 from Yugoslavia, and Ecuador
transferred 1,644 mines to the US, all for demining research purposes.
Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines
Landmine Monitor estimates that there are
approximately 200-215 million antipersonnel mines currently stockpiled by 78
countries. This new estimate reflects the concrete progress of implementing the
Mine Ban Treaty and the rejection of the weapon, even among states not party to
the ban on antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor Report 2002 cited an
estimate of 230 million antipersonnel mines stockpiled globally. The rapid
destruction of antipersonnel mine stockpiles accounts for the reduction, most
notably Russia’s new claim that it destroyed nearly 17 million
antipersonnel mines since 1996.
Landmine Monitor estimates 22 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile
between one million and two million antipersonnel mines, as of 31 July 2003.
The sizable range in the estimate reflects that several new States Parties
likely to have substantial stocks have not yet officially reported their
numbers, including Afghanistan, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Eritrea.
Landmine Monitor estimates that the 13 signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty
stockpile approximately 8.5 to 9 million antipersonnel mines. Ukraine has
reported that it possesses a stockpile of 6.35 million. Poland and Greece
recently declared stockpiles in excess of one million antipersonnel mines each.
Indonesia in May 2002 revealed it has a stockpile of 16,000 antipersonnel mines.
These voluntary declarations, as well as one by non-signatory Serbia and
Montenegro, were indicators of their commitment to the objectives of the Mine
Ban Treaty. Ethiopia and Sudan also likely hold stockpiles, though Sudan claims
to have mines only for training. Brunei, Burundi, and Guyana also acknowledge
possessing antipersonnel mines. Signatories Cook Islands, Haiti, Marshall
Islands, and Vanuatu are unlikely to stockpile antipersonnel mines.
Landmine Monitor estimates that the greatest numbers of antipersonnel mines,
between 190 million and to 205 million, are stockpiled by states not party to
the Mine Ban Treaty. The largest stockpiles likely belong to China (estimated
110 million) and Russia (estimated 50 million). Other states with large
stockpiles include the US (10.4 million), Pakistan (estimated 6 million) India
(estimated 4-5 million), Belarus (4.5 million), South Korea (2 million), and
Serbia and Montenegro (1.3 million). Other states not party to the treaty
believed to have large stockpiles are Burma, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
North Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Vietnam.
Russia has publicly claimed for the first time that it destroyed more than
16.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 1996 and 2002. This
startling information is inconsistent with past statements and documents.
Taking this new information into account, Landmine Monitor has reduced its
estimate of Russia’s stockpile to 50 million antipersonnel mines.
In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines, including groups in Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, DR Congo,
Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda.
Stockpile Developments Since May 2002
States Parties
Algeria declared a stockpile of 165,080 antipersonnel mines.
Bangladesh declared a stockpile of 204,227 antipersonnel mines.
Chile declared a stockpile of 213,076 antipersonnel mines.
Republic of Congo declared a stockpile of 5,090 antipersonnel mines.
Cyprus voluntarily revealed that it has a stockpile of 48,615 antipersonnel
mines.
Guinea-Bissau declared a stockpile of 4,997 antipersonnel mines.
Lithuania voluntarily revealed that it stockpiles 8,091 antipersonnel
mines.
Mauritius declared a stockpile of 93 antipersonnel mines.
Tajikistan declared a stockpile of 3,339 antipersonnel mines under its
control and 18,200 mines under the control of Russian forces.
Tanzania declared a stockpile of 23,987 antipersonnel mines.
Togo declared a stockpile of 436 antipersonnel mines.
Venezuela declared a revised stockpile of 46,136 antipersonnel mines, up
from 22,136.
Non-States Parties
Greece voluntarily declared a stockpile of 1,078,557 antipersonnel
mines.
Latvia voluntarily declared a stockpile of 2,980 antipersonnel mines.
Poland voluntarily declared that it possesses 1,055,971 antipersonnel
mines.
Serbia and Montenegro voluntarily declared that it stockpiles 1,320,621
antipersonnel mines.
The figure for the US stockpile of antipersonnel mines has been updated and
reduced to 10.4 million, based on information provided to the US Congress in
2002.
Stockpile Destruction
Since 1992, a total of 69 countries have destroyed
approximately 52 million antipersonnel mines. Sixty-three States Parties to the
Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed 30 million antipersonnel mines. Since May
2002,18 States Parties completed the destruction of their stockpiles,
eliminating a combined total of almost 10.8 million antipersonnel mines over the
course of their destruction programs. About 3 million mines were destroyed in
the past year by States Parties, and more than one million by non-States Parties
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Somaliland).
An important milestone in the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was
reached on 1 March 2003: the four-year deadline for destruction of stockpiled
antipersonnel mines for all countries that were party to the treaty when it
first entered into force on 1 March 1999. Fulfillment of this obligation by
States Parties was not only an important test of the health and viability of the
treaty, but a sign of the impact of the international norm against the
antipersonnel mine. Positive movement by States Parties toward destruction of
stockpiled mines has also motivated non-States Parties to destroy antipersonnel
mines.
It would appear that all States Parties with a 1 March 2003 deadline met
their obligation, with the minor exception of Djibouti, which was two days late,
and the major issue related to Turkmenistan, which reported completion of
destruction, but also declared retention of 69,200 antipersonnel mines. The
ICBL expressed its view that retention of such a number of mines in fact means
that Turkmenistan did not fully destroy its stocks, and that it is not keeping
“the minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the treaty,
and is therefore in violation of a core treaty obligation.
A total of 99 States Parties have either completed destruction of
antipersonnel mines stockpiles, or declared never having a stockpile. Fifty-one
States Parties have completed destruction of their
stockpiles.[11] Eighteen States
Parties completed destruction since the publication of the Landmine Monitor
Report 2002: Brazil, Chad, Croatia, Djibouti, El Salvador, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Portugal,
Slovenia, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Uganda.
Forty-eight States Parties have officially declared not stockpiling
antipersonnel mines.[12] In the
reporting period, Barbados, Comoros, Dominica, The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi,
Maldives, Niger, Seychelles, and Trinidad and Tobago officially confirmed that
they do not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.
Twelve States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles. Six
initiated the destruction process since the previous Landmine Monitor
Report: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan, Tanzania, and
Venezuela. Six others continued destruction programs: Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Romania, Tunisia, and Uruguay.
Four States Parties (Algeria, Bangladesh, Republic of Congo, and Kenya) have
not begun the destruction process, but each has developed a plan to destroy
their stockpiles in advance of the treaty-mandated deadline.
Fifteen States Parties have not officially declared the presence or absence
of antipersonnel mine stockpiles because of their failure to submit transparency
measures reports on time.[13] The
deadline for stockpile destruction has passed for three of these countries
(Equatorial Guinea, Guinea and
Namibia).[14]
Four States Parties will announce their plans when they submit their initial
transparency measures reports: Central African Republic, Cyprus, Timor-Leste,
and São Tomé e
Príncipe.[15]
Stockpile Destruction Developments since May 2002
Completed Destruction
Brazil completed destruction of its stockpiled mines, destroying 27,397
antipersonnel mines between December 2001 and January 2003.
Chad completed destruction of its 4,490 stockpiled antipersonnel landmines
in January 2003.
Croatia completed destruction of its 199,003 stockpiled antipersonnel mines
in October 2002.
Djibouti destroyed its stockpile of 1,118 antipersonnel mines on 2 March
2003.
El Salvador completed destruction of its 6,539 stockpiled antipersonnel
mines on 20 February 2003.
Gabon reported that its stockpile of 1,082 antipersonnel mines was destroyed
when the treaty entered into force for Gabon.
Italy completed the destruction of over 7.1 million stockpiled antipersonnel
mines in November 2002.
Japan completed destruction of its 1,000,089 stockpiled antipersonnel mines
on 8 February 2003.
Jordan completed the destruction of its stockpile of 92,342 antipersonnel
mines on 23 April 2003.
FYR Macedonia completed destruction of its stockpile of 38,921 antipersonnel
mine stockpile on 20 February 2003.
Moldova completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile on 26
November 2002.
Mozambique completed destruction of its stockpile of 37,318 antipersonnel
mines on 28 February 2003.
In the Netherlands, stockpile destruction was completed in December 2002,
with the destruction of 5,984 Gator antipersonnel mines.
Nicaragua completed destruction of its 133,435 stockpiled antipersonnel
mines on 28 August 2002.
Portugal completed destruction of its 231,781 stockpiled antipersonnel mines
in February 2003.
Slovenia completed destruction of its stockpile of 168,898 antipersonnel
mines on 25 March 2003.
Thailand completed destruction of its 337,725 stockpiled antipersonnel mines
on 24 April 2003.
Turkmenistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction by 1 March
2003, destroying almost 700,000 mines in an eighteen-month period.
Uganda completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in July
2003.
Other Destruction Developments
States Parties
In Afghanistan, ceremonial destructions of antipersonnel landmines were
conducted on 12 May 2003 to emphasize the government’s commitment to
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Argentina and the OAS signed an agreement in June 2003 for cooperation and
technical assistance in the destruction of the country’s 90,000 stockpiled
antipersonnel mines.
Chile destroyed 185,446 antipersonnel mines from August 2002 to May
2003.
Colombia began its stockpile destruction program in June 2003.
In the DR Congo, the NGO Handicap International Belgium reported destroying
1,660 antipersonnel mines from rebel stockpiles in 2002 and 2003.
Guinea-Bissau destroyed 1,000 mines in September 2002.
Romania destroyed 486,000 antipersonnel mines from April 2002 to April 2003.
Tajikistan began destroying its stockpiled mines in August 2002.
Tanzania destroyed its first 9,837 antipersonnel mines in March 2003.
Tunisia has destroyed another 13,684 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and
plans to complete destruction in September 2003.
Uruguay destroyed another 400 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in June and
October 2002.
Venezuela began stockpile destruction in May 2003.
Non-States Parties
As a signal of its support for the Mine Ban Treaty, non-signatory Belarus
destroyed 22,963 PMN-2 antipersonnel mines in 2002.
Russia reported for the first time that it destroyed more than 16.8 million
stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 1996 and 2002, including 638,427 in
2002.
In Somaliland, 2,382 stockpiled antipersonnel landmines were destroyed in
November 2002.
Ukraine, a Mine Ban Treaty signatory, completed the destruction of nearly
405,000 PMN-type mines between July 2002 and May 2003.
Mines Retained for Training and Research
Of the 134 States Parties, 62 retain over 280,000
antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes under Article 3 of the
Mine Ban Treaty. This is an increase of 11 countries and at least 112,000 mines
since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2002.
Of these 62 states, five intend to keep more than 10,000 mines. These five
countries account for nearly half of all the mines retained by States Parties.
Turkmenistan alone accounts for 25 percent, with 69,200 mines retained. Others
with very high levels are Brazil (16,545), Sweden (16,015), Algeria (15,030),
and Bangladesh (15,000).
Six more States Parties intend to keep more than 5,000 antipersonnel mines.
Thirty-four intend to keep between 1,000 and 5,000 mines. Another 17 are
retaining less than 1,000 mines. Colombia, Mozambique, and Rwanda have reversed
earlier decisions and now have chosen to retain mines.
A total of 55 States Parties have chosen not to retain any antipersonnel
mines. Joining this category in this reporting period are Afghanistan, Chad,
Guinea-Bissau, and Qatar. Of those not retaining, 13 states once stockpiled
mines, but have destroyed them or are in the process of destroying them. The
number of States Parties that have not yet declared whether they intend to
retain any antipersonnel mines has decreased from 22 to 17.
The most distressing development in this area is Turkmenistan’s
announcement that it plans to retain 69,200 mines for training. At the
intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2003, several States Parties
expressed concern over Turkmenistan’s retention of such a large quantity
of mines. The ICBL believes that 69,200 mines is an unacceptable, and likely
illegal, number. It is obviously not the “minimum number absolutely
necessary,” as required by the treaty.
Another disturbing development is that some states are retaining their entire
stockpile of antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes. Lithuania
has stated its intention to retain its entire stockpile of 8,091 antipersonnel
mines, the seventh largest amount of all States Parties, despite the fact that
it conducts only small scale demining training in cooperation with other Baltic
countries. Latvia appears poised to follow Lithuania’s lead, keeping all
2,980 mines, based on its voluntary Article 7 submission of 1 May 2003. Togo
(436), Ireland (116 mines), Mauritius (93 mines), and Botswana (unknown number)
are also among this group. Antipersonnel mines do not affect any of these
countries. Zambia originally proposed retaining its entire stockpile of 6,691
antipersonnel mines under Article 3, but it has reconsidered its position and
announced that this total will be reduced.
One encouraging trend is the significant number of States Parties that have
reduced the number of mines retained from the high levels originally proposed.
Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, and Thailand have taken this step in previous years. During
this reporting period: Chile reduced the number of mines retained from 28,647 to
6,245; Italy reduced from a ceiling of 8,000 mines retained to 811; Mauritania
reduced from 5,728 to 843; the United Kingdom reduced from 4,949 to 1,783; and
Uganda reportedly reduced from 2,400 to 1,764.
Against the trend of reducing the numbers of mines retained, a handful of
countries have actually increased their holdings. FYR Macedonia is now
retaining 4,000 antipersonnel mines, a vastly greater amount than the 50
originally declared. Venezuela, in modifying the number of mines in its
stockpile, also increased the number of mines retained from 2,214 to 4,614.
Previously undeclared antipersonnel mines held by a private defense manufacturer
in Sweden have necessitated an increase in mines retained from 13,948 to 16,015.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is now holding 2,525 antipersonnel mines, 120 more than
previously reported.
The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training and calls
on States Parties to continue to evaluate the necessity of this exception.
Several States Parties also echoed this view in interventions made at the
intersessional Standing Committee meetings, including Afghanistan, Austria, New
Zealand, and Norway.
The ICBL believes that it is important to have complete transparency on mines
retained for training and strongly supports the recommendation of the Standing
Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention that States Parties
should in their Article 7 reports “include information on the intended
purpose and actual use” of retained mines.
An increasing number of States Parties are declaring the number of
antipersonnel mines actually consumed each year, and for what precise training
and research purposes. Fifteen States Parties reported consumption of 3,806
antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes in
2002.[16] Most States Parties did
not report any activities or consumption of their retained mines in 2002, and
some of these countries have apparently not used or consumed any mines retained
for training or research since 1999.
Transparency Reporting
As of 31 July 2003, the UN has received initial
Article 7 transparency measures reports from 113 States Parties. The overall
compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures
reports is a highly commendable 88 percent, up from 75 percent reported last
year and 63 percent reported in 2001. A total of 21 State Parties have
submitted initial reports since May 2002: Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Chile,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Gabon, The
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Maldives, Niger, Seychelles, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
Efforts over the past year to promote full transparency have halved the
number of late initial reports. Landmine Monitor Report 2002 noted that
30 States Parties were late in submitting their initial reports. As of 31 July
2003, a total of 15 States Parties are still late in submitting their initial
transparency measures report: Angola, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Saint
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and
Suriname.
For Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Namibia, and the Solomon Islands, the deadline
for submission of their initial report was in 1999, which represents what can
only be considered gross negligence in fulfilling the treaty’s
transparency obligation.
As of 31 July 2003, the rate of compliance for annual reports due on 30 April
2003 for calendar year 2002 is 62 percent. A total of 76 reports were submitted
to the UN by the 123 States Parties obligated to submit annual updates. Of the
47 States Parties not submitting an annual update in 2003, half of them also did
not submit reports in 2002 for calendar year
2001.[17]
In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban
Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Lithuania in 2002
when it was a signatory, and Latvia and Poland in 2003. At the May 2003
Standing Committee meeting, Ambassador Jean Lint of Belgium (President of the
Fourth Meeting of States Parties) suggested that all non-States Parties that
voted in favor the UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74, which calls for
universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, should be encouraged
to submit voluntary transparency reports.
During this reporting period, the responsibility for maintaining the online
database for Article 7 reports was shifted from UN offices in New York to
Geneva.[18] This transition did not
go as smoothly as anticipated, due to technical and capacity problems, as well
as the fact that many States Parties do not submit their reports in electronic
format. Solving these problems should be a high priority during the next
intersessional period to ensure that reports are posted in a timely and
comprehensive manner, especially near the 30 April annual deadline.
Belgium continues to coordinate a contact group aimed at promoting
transparency reporting. In November 2002, Belgium hosted a seminar in Brussels
for African countries on transparency reporting under Article 7. The NGO
VERTIC, in cooperation with the ICBL and the ICRC, developed the “Guide to
Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention.”
National Implementation Measures
Only 36 of the 134 States Parties have passed new
domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9
of the Mine Ban Treaty.[19] None
have done so in this reporting period.
A total of 19 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are
underway.[20] Those initiating the
process in the past year include Bangladesh, Benin, Republic of Congo, Jamaica,
and Togo.
Thirty-one States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law
is required to implement the treaty, a significant increase from the 18 reported
in the Landmine Monitor Report 2002. Croatia, the Netherlands, Thailand
and Tunisia reported that legislation was in the process of being adopted in
previous years, but now deem existing law sufficient. Other countries that have
adopted this position, whose views were previously unknown to Landmine Monitor,
include the Holy See, Maldives, Paraguay, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal,
Tajikistan, and Tanzania.
In many cases, governments believe no steps are necessary because they have
never stockpiled antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected. The ICBL is
concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that
includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and
provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.
Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress to enact appropriate domestic
measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, as required in Article 9, in 48
States Parties.
Special Issues of Concern
Joint Military Operations and “Assist”
Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates
State Parties to “never under any circumstances...assist, encourage or
induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention.” To ensure uniform implementation of the treaty,
States Parties must reach a common understanding of how this obligation applies
to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist.” The ICBL
believes that it is critical for States Parties to sort out the different
understandings about what acts are permitted and which are prohibited.
Events since entry into force concretely demonstrated the necessity of
reaching a common understanding. Since 1 March 1999, States Parties have
participated in joint combat operations with the forces of non-States Parties or
armed non-state actors wherein antipersonnel mines were reportedly used by the
non-State Party or non-state actor; States Parties have placed their forces
under the operational command of a non-State Party; States Parties have
participated in joint training and peacekeeping operations with non-State
Parties; and, non-States Parties have transferred antipersonnel mines stockpiled
in a State Party and transited them across the territory of other States Parties
for possible use in combat.
While the majority of States Parties have yet to make their views known, at
least 30 states have expressed some views and interpretations. A majority of
the 30 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning
and implementation of activities related to antipersonnel mine use in joint
operations or training.[21]
Some States Parties made new policy statements regarding joint military
operations with states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or have offered their
national interpretation of the term “assist.” Only brief summaries
of these new developments are included here; see individual country reports for
details.
Australia has placed limitations on its forces so as not to violate treaty
commitments during joint operations.
Bosnia and Herzegovina states that its forces would not participate in joint
military operations with any forces planning, exercising, or using antipersonnel
mines.
Bulgaria stated in February 2003 that while it participates in joint
exercises with some neighboring countries not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, no
prohibited activities involving antipersonnel mines are planned or executed
during the exercises.
Croatia reports that its military would not assist in the use of
antipersonnel mines within Croatia or in other countries, including those not
party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Japan noted that under Article 9 of its Constitution, its armed forces
cannot be deployed outside of its territory and cannot participate in any joint
military operations.
Luxembourg states that its forces are not authorized to participate,
actively or passively, in operations involving the use of antipersonnel
mines.
New Zealand clarified its view on “assist” by stating it cannot
“actively assist” with prohibited acts, noting that providing cover
for the laying of mines would be active assistance, as would participating in
planning or training for use of antipersonnel mines. It also said that
“incidental benefit” from mine-laying by others would not constitute
active assistance.
Portugal confirmed that it would not assist, encourage, or induce, in any
way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.
Switzerland associated itself with the statements of other countries that
Article 1 clearly bans joint military operations that may involve use of
antipersonnel mines. Switzerland appealed to all States Parties to respect
“the words and spirit” of Article 1.
Tajikistan states that its Armed Forces would refuse orders by Russia to lay
mines and said that Tajik forces are under separate command and control
structures.
The United Kingdom in May 2003 extensively elaborated on the activities it
finds unacceptable, including: planning with others for the use of antipersonnel
mines; training others for the use antipersonnel mines; agreeing rules of
engagement permitting the use of antipersonnel mines; agreeing operational plans
permitting the use of antipersonnel mines in combined operations; requests to
non-States Parties to use antipersonnel mines; and providing security or
transport for antipersonnel mines. Furthermore, it is not acceptable for UK
forces to accept orders that amount to assistance in the use of antipersonnel
mines. UK forces are also instructed not to seek to derive direct military
benefits from the deployment of antipersonnel mines in combined operations,
recognizing that it is not always possible to say in advance that military
benefit will not arise where this results from an act that is not deliberate or
pre-planned.
Foreign Stockpiling and Transit of Antipersonnel Mines
Only 21 of the 134 States Parties have explicitly stated that they prohibit
transfers through (transit) or stockpiling of foreign antipersonnel mines on
their national territory.[22]
However, several developments during this reporting period are encouraging as
more States Parties declare their policy and establish more examples of state
practice. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here; see
individual country reports for details.
Bosnia and Herzegovina announced in April 2003 that it will not allow the
storage or transit of antipersonnel mines belonging to another country in or
through its territory.
Cameroon stated in September 2002 that it will not facilitate the transit of
antipersonnel mines through its territory.
Malaysia prohibits the transit of antipersonnel mines that might be carried
in vessels through Malaysian territory.
Norway reports that US antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Norway were removed
in November 2002. US stockpiles were removed from Italy and Spain in previous
years.
Qatar stated in May 2003 that it would not support any citizen of Qatar to
carry, transport, or store any antipersonnel mines with the US. It also stated
that any US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines on their territory are not under
Qatari jurisdiction or control.
Tajikistan is the first State Party to report details on antipersonnel mines
stockpiled by a non-State Party on its territory. It reported in February 2003
approximately 18,200 antipersonnel mines of various types are held by Russian
Ministry of Defense units deployed in Tajikistan. These stockpiles are not
under the jurisdiction or control of Tajikistan. Intergovernmental talks were
underway to clarify and complete data collection regarding these Russian
mines.
The United Kingdom confirmed its position that transit of foreign
antipersonnel mines through UK territory is contrary to the obligations of the
Mine Ban Treaty and in May 2003 equated transit to “assistance”
under Article 1. The UK stated that US antipersonnel mines were not transited,
stockpiled or maintained on the Diego Garcia bases in British Indian Ocean
Territory, during operations in Afghanistan in 2002. It takes the view that the
stockpiling or transit of US antipersonnel mines on UK territory, including
Diego Garcia, would constitute a breach of the UK's obligations under Mine Ban
Treaty. It added that any landmines on US naval ships or military aircraft at
Diego Garcia are not under the jurisdiction or control of the
UK.
As reported in the past, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway believe that the
Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the transit of antipersonnel mines, at least
in certain circumstances.
Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the United States stored
antipersonnel mines on the territory of at least 14 countries, including seven
States Parties.[23] US
antipersonnel mines have been removed from States Parties Italy, Norway, and
Spain, at the request of those countries. Germany, Japan, Qatar, and the UK
state that US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines on their territory are not under
their jurisdiction or control.
It is not possible to confirm current locations or numbers of US
antipersonnel mines in foreign countries following the significant movements of
equipment and ammunition during the military build-up in the Persian Gulf region
preceding the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. For example, on 5 September 2002,
US Secretary of the Army Thomas White disclosed that in July 2002 one set of
equipment and ammunition that was identified as containing artillery-delivered
antipersonnel mines, was moved from Qatar to Kuwait.
Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices and Sensitive Fuzes
Applying the definitions in Article 2 to all mines that function as
antipersonnel mines, including some designated as antivehicle mines, remains a
highly contentious issue. The way that States Parties come to a common
understanding on this issue may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban
Treaty is implemented and universalized. Perhaps the most discouraging
development in the reporting period was the unwillingness of some States Parties
to support an initiative by the ICRC to host experts’ work in 2004 on
“best practices” regarding antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes
within the context of the Mine Ban Treaty, with the aim of agreement on language
on a common understanding at the 2004 Review Conference. Germany, Denmark,
France, Japan, and the United Kingdom opposed the ICRC initiative, stating that
CCW was the only appropriate venue to discuss antivehicle mines. The ICBL
believes that Germany’s “open matrix” approach in the CCW
Group of Governmental Experts group is a welcome and complementary development
that should help resolve the issue in the context of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Some progress has been made on clarifying what specific types of sensitive
fuzes on antivehicle mines pose unacceptable dangers to civilians. Germany and
the United Kingdom have made statements in 2003 supporting the view that
antivehicle mines equipped with sensitive fuzes like tilt rods, tripwires, and
breakwires are inappropriate and cannot be designed in a way to prevent
detonation by a person. Hungary has destroyed the last of its tilt rod fuzes.
Croatia and Slovenia have stated their willingness to discuss the
appropriateness of tilt rod fuzes within the context of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Canada, France, Mali, and the United Kingdom have removed tilt rod fuzes from
their inventories. Sweden has prohibited its forces from using tripwire fuzes
with antivehicle mines if they are removed from storage for use. The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom have retired from service one type of
antivehicle mine with a breakwire fuze. France is exploring alternative fuzing
mechanisms for its antivehicle mines.
However, state practice in this area is not yet universal. The Czech
Republic continues to market an antivehicle mine with a tripwire fuze, stating
it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a
violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Many States Parties, the ICRC, and the ICBL believe that an antivehicle mine,
regardless of design intent or label, with a fuze or antihandling device (AHD)
capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person meets the
definition of an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited by the treaty. Among the
States Parties that have publicly expressed this understanding of what was
agreed upon during the treaty negotiations in Oslo in 1997 are Australia,
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Slovakia, South Africa, and Switzerland.
Some States Parties disagree and do not believe that the Mine Ban Treaty
applies to antivehicle mines at all, and that the CCW is the only appropriate
forum to consider any restrictions or prohibitions on antivehicle mines.
Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are the only States
Parties that have publicly expressed this view.
Unfortunately only a small number of States Parties, 22 of the current 134,
have expressed views or shared national practice on the applicability of the
Mine Ban Treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or
AHD.[24] Some States Parties made
new policy statements or announced concrete steps taken nationally during the
reporting period. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included
here, see individual country reports for details.
Bulgaria stated in February 2003 that production of the TM-46, the only
antivehicle mine in its stockpile capable of being fitted with an AHD, had been
discontinued and existing stocks were decommissioned and in the process of being
destroyed.
Croatia stated in May 2003 that it does not stockpile antivehicle mines with
AHD that can be accidentally activated. It also declared that the pressure
fuzes for its mines function at levels above 120 kilograms, typically 150 to 300
kilograms. Croatia also acknowledged that it possesses tilt rod fuzes that
function at the level of 1.3 to 1.7 kilograms and is willing to discuss these
within the context of Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty.
The Czech Republic has decided to withdraw from stockpiles
“old-fashioned antivehicle mines” and replace them with
“newer, less dangerous devices.”
The German Parliament passed a resolution in June 2002 urging the government
to work nationally and internationally toward a ban of all antivehicle mines
equipped with sensitive fuzes. At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, the
German delegation drew a distinction between antivehicle mines with AHD, and
antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, stating the former are permitted, while
the latter is prohibited. Germany asked States Parties to reach a common
understanding on this.
Hungary destroyed its remaining 100,000 tilt rod fuze equipped UKA-63
antivehicle mines.
The Netherlands disposed of 10,000 DM-31 (the Swedish produced FFV-028) as
surplus and declared that it will not use the remaining stockpile of this type
of antivehicle mine unless it is assured that the mines cannot function in
response to mine detection equipment.
Portugal appears interested in applying the Mine Ban Treaty’s
prohibitions to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes that function like
antipersonnel mines.
Slovakia expects the results of its study regarding which of its antivehicle
mines are prohibited or permissible by the Mine Ban Treaty later in 2003.
Slovenia acknowledges possessing 59,500 antivehicle mines, but none with
AHD. Within this stockpile are 8,228 TMRP-6 that are equipped with both
pressure and tilt rod fuzes. Slovenia has indicated it is willing to discuss
the TMRP-6.
Claymore Mines
The Mine Ban Treaty permits Claymore-type mines (directional fragmentation
munitions) used in command-detonated mode. However, the treaty prohibits
Claymore-type mines used in a victim-activated mode because the weapon then
meets the definition of an antipersonnel mine.
Twenty-one States Parties retain stocks of Claymore-type antipersonnel
mines.[25] South Africa and
Zimbabwe reported that they stockpile Claymore-type mines, but without the types
of fuzes necessary for victim-activation. Croatia, Hungary, New Zealand, and
Slovenia also declared that measures have been taken to ensure that their
Claymore-type mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode. These
declarations bring the number of States Parties who have taken measures to 17,
an increase of six countries in this reporting period. Landmine Monitor
Report 2002 incorrectly included Slovakia and Germany on a list of countries
retaining Claymore-type mines.
The number of States Parties confirming that they do not possess
Claymore-type antipersonnel mines has increased to 24 with the inclusion of
Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal, and
Kenya.[26] Additionally,
Bangladesh, Mozambique, and Tajikistan have signaled their intent by scheduling
their stocks of Claymore-types mines for destruction, aside from those retained
under Article 3 for training and research purposes. Another 41 States have
declared that they do not possess antipersonnel mine stockpiles and are presumed
not to possess Claymore-type mines.
The ICBL urges the remaining 48 States Parties to declare whether they
possess Claymore-type mines.[27]
States Parties that possess Claymore mines should declare the measures that have
been taken to ensure that they cannot be used in the victim-activated mode.
[3] For the purposes of this report, Landmine
Monitor identifies as a State Party any country that has given its consent to be
bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some of these countries have not completed the
six-month waiting period for formal entry-into-force mandated by the treaty.
Also, in this report the term ratification is used as shorthand for
“consent to be bound.” The treaty allows governments to give
consent to be bound in a variety of ways, including ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession – all of which give binding legal status beyond
signature. [4] Thirteen states have signed but
not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31 July 2003: Brunei, Burundi, Cook
Islands, Ethiopia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Poland,
Sudan, Ukraine, and Vanuatu. [5] Under Article
18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, when a State has signed a
treaty, it “is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose” of that treaty. [6]
Non-States Parties Afghanistan and Comoros also voted for the resolution in
2001, but have subsequently acceded. [7] The
14 are: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, France, Holy See,
Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, South Korea, Sweden, and the
UK. [8] The change from the 2002 report to the
2003 report reflects the addition of Iraq and the removal of Angola,
Afghanistan, Georgia, and Sri Lanka. [9]
States Parties that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.
Others have been cited as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua,
Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. [10]
Antipersonnel mines from the following countries have been declared in the
stockpiles of States Parties as of 31 July 2003: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil,
Chile, China, former Czechoslovakia, France, Germany (including the former East
Germany), Iran, Israel, Italy, Libya, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, former
Soviet Union, Spain, South Africa, Syria, UK, US, former Yugoslavia, and
Zimbabwe. This total does not include stockpiles resulting from domestic
production or inherited stockpiles declared by successor states, which exclude
consideration of States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan. [11] The 51 States include:
Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El
Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova,
Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
[12] The 48 States include: Andorra,
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji,
The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati,
Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta,
Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Niger, Niue, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St.
Kitts & Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Swaziland, Togo,
Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia. [13] The
15 States include: Angola, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and Suriname. Of those 15,
those believed to stockpile antipersonnel mines are Angola, Eritrea, Liberia,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and possibly
Guinea. [14] Equatorial Guinea has stated
that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines. Namibia claims to only retain
mines for training and research purposes. Guinea’s stockpile status is
not currently known. [15] Of these, only
Cyprus is believed to stockpile antipersonnel
mines. [16] The 15 States include: Japan
(1,610), Sweden (1,002), Netherlands (314), Belgium (293), Australia (213),
Croatia (200), South Africa (55), Denmark (33), Germany (19), France (17),
Slovakia (14), Canada (12), Luxembourg (10), Ireland (9), and Brazil
(5). [17] Those not submitting include:
Andorra,* Antigua and Barbuda,* Bahamas, Belize,* Benin, Bolivia,* Botswana,*
Cape Verde,* Chad, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,*
Equatorial Guinea,* Eritrea,* Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,*
Guatemala, Guinea,* Honduras, Kenya, Kiribati,* Liberia,* Madagascar,* Maldives,
Mali,* Namibia,* Nauru,* Nigeria, Niue, Paraguay, Portugal, Saint Kitts and
Nevis,* Saint Lucia,* Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,* Samoa, San Marino,
Sierra Leone,* Solomon Islands,* Spain, Swaziland,* Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkmenistan,* and Uruguay. (* indicates States Parties that also failed to
submit an annual update in 2002 covering events in
2001). [18]
http://disarmament.un.org/mineban.nsf [19]
The one addition to the list since Landmine Monitor Report 2002 is Honduras,
which Landmine Monitor recently learned enacted implementation legislation in
June 2000. The 36 States Parties are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago,
United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. [20] The 19
States include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Benin, Republic of
Congo, Croatia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger,
Philippines, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, and
Zambia. [21] Twenty-one States Parties have
explicitly rejected participation in joint operations with antipersonnel mine
use: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Qatar, Senegal, Sweden, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and
Zimbabwe. [22] Twenty-one States Parties
explicitly prohibiting the storage or transit of foreign antipersonnel mines on
or across their territory as of 31 July 2003: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Guinea, Hungary,
Italy, Malaysia, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Slovakia, South Africa,
Spain, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. [23] Apart from the seven States
Parties, the countries have included: Bahrain, Greece, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey. [24]
Previous editions of the Landmine Monitor Report contain statements or
developments on the issue of antivehicle mines with AHD or sensitive fuzes from
States Parties Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Portugal and Slovenia join
this list in this edition of the Landmine Monitor
Report. [25] The 21 States Parties include:
Australia,* Austria,* Canada,* Colombia, Croatia,* Denmark,* Ecuador, Honduras,
Hungary,* Malaysia,* Moldova, Netherlands,* New Zealand,* Norway,* Slovenia,*
South Africa,* Sweden,* Switzerland,* Thailand,* United Kingdom,* and Zimbabwe.*
(* indicates States Parties that declared that measures have been taken to
ensure that their Claymore-type mines cannot be used in the victim-activated
mode). [26] The 24 States Parties include:
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czech
Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Yemen. [27]
The 48 States Parties that have not declared include: Afghanistan, Albania,
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Central
African Republic, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Djibouti, DR
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Japan, Liberia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, São
Tomé e Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Spain, Suriname,
Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Zambia.