+   *    +     +     
About Us 
The Issues 
Our Research Products 
Order Publications 
Press Room 
Resources for Monitor Researchers 
Table of Contents
Country Reports
Iraq, Landmine Monitor Report 2003


Key developments since May 2002: In 2003, Iraq underwent far-reaching political, military, and humanitarian changes. The conflict beginning in March 2003 increased the threats to civilians from landmines and unexploded ordnance, particularly abandoned Iraqi munitions and US and UK cluster munition duds. Iraqi forces laid landmines in several regions. The Humanitarian Operations Center has information on 317 minefields, 1,102 Coalition cluster munition strike sites, and 707 other UXO locations.

In mid-March 2003, the established mine action programs in northern Iraq (with the exception of the Mines Advisory Group) were for the most part suspended when conflict became imminent, but have since resumed and been extended into new areas. Mine action programs were initiated for the first time in southern Iraq after the main fighting ceased. The new United Nations Mine Action Coordination Team is overseeing UN mine action programs in Iraq. Several emergency survey and assessment projects were either planned or underway by June 2003 in various parts of Iraq. The United Nations appealed in March 2003 for $20.4 million for mine action in Iraq, as part of a six-month emergency response plan. Numerous countries have provided or promised funds for mine action, and notably the European Commission announced in June 2003 a contribution of €10 million.

In Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq in 2002, there were 457 recorded casualties due to mines or UXO; figures in Baghdad-controlled Iraq were unknown. The casualty rate in northern Iraq increased dramatically—by 90 percent according to the UN—during and after the 2003 hostilities.

Mine Ban Policy

Iraq has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The former government of Iraq did not make any statements on landmines or send representatives to any international meetings related to landmines in 2002 or 2003. As a result of failure to pay dues, Iraq was ineligible to vote on the UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74 promoting the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2002.

Since April 2003, there has not been an organized Iraqi governing body to construct policy on the landmine issue. The occupying powers, the United States (which is not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty) and United Kingdom (which is a State Party), had not stated a Coalition Provisional Authority position on landmines as of June 2003.

Northern Iraq’s major political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have both stated their support for the principles of the Mine Ban Treaty.[1] In August 2002, both parties signed the Swiss NGO Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment not to use, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines.[2]

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Iraq has produced antipersonnel landmines, though it is not known how recently. Since the Coalition Provisional Authority’s occupation of Iraq, any industrial production of mines that may have been taking place has, presumably, ceased. Before the collapse of the former government, Iraq was the only known mine exporter that had neither instituted an export ban or moratorium, nor made a policy declaration of no current export. However, no confirmed evidence has been found of Iraqi exports of landmines in recent years. There is likely to be a very significant stockpile of antipersonnel mines in Iraq.[3]

Before the war started on 20 March 2003, a covert US Army Special Forces unit reportedly found a cache of landmines in a bunker at an Iraqi military base in the western desert near Qaim. Some US analysts believed the mines were designed to disperse liquid contents such as chemical or biological agents. However, the mines were reportedly badly deteriorated and the composition of their contents was not determined definitively.[4]

Iraqi Use

In March 2003, reports emerged of Iraqi forces laying mines around the northern city of Kirkuk.[5] These were confirmed after the Iraqi forces withdrew; antivehicle and antipersonnel landmines had been laid in dense minefields along and between main roads near Kirkuk, and around abandoned Iraqi military posts.[6] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) demining teams operating in Kirkuk found Valmara 69 antipersonnel bounding fragmentation mines, PMN antipersonnel blast mines, and VS 1.6 antivehicle mines laid extensively across nearly all routes and around strategic points.[7] Mines were also encountered on the roads between Erbil and the cities of Kirkuk, Guwer, Mosul, and Makhmer.[8]

Antipersonnel landmines were found packed in bunkers near residential areas of Kirkuk,[9] and MAG’s Emergency Survey teams reported that Iraqi forces had left stockpiles of mines and other munitions in civilian buildings inside and around Kirkuk that had been used as military positions.[10] In early April 2003, it was discovered that Iraqi forces had stored landmines inside a mosque in Kadir Karam in northern Iraq and laid mines around the mosque before abandoning it.[11] MAG removed 1,077 antivehicle and antipersonnel mines from the mosque.[12] Iraqi forces reportedly mined water tanks in the town of Chamchomal after cutting off its water supply, as part of widespread Iraqi mine-laying around villages in the Mosul-Kirkuk area.[13]

British Royal Marines advancing towards Basra encountered freshly sown antipersonnel minefields, and newly laid antivehicle mines also slowed their progress.[14] Iraqi citizens in Umm Qasr had to avoid landmines planted by retreating Iraqi forces in March 2003.[15] Iraqi forces were reported in late March 2003 to have deployed landmines along access routes to their positions around Al-Nasiriyah.[16] British troops near the southern Rumaila oilfields found mines and booby-traps left by Iraqi forces.[17]

US troops entering Najaf in the last days of March encountered mines on roads and bridges into the city.[18] Landmines newly planted prior to the coalition attack were reported on the road between Basra and Baghdad.[19] According to a US State Department demining expert, most mines found were a twenty-year-old design, largely imported from Italy.[20] US explosive clearance teams cleared at least 500 Italian-made antivehicle mines from the road surface on a 1.3 kilometer span of the highway linking Baghdad and the Baghdad airport, in early April.[21]

Coalition Use

Prior to the conflict, the US Pentagon refused to rule out landmine use in Iraq, saying on one occasion that American forces might use mines to prevent access to suspected chemical weapons sites.[22] By February 2003, the US reportedly had stockpiled 90,000 antipersonnel mines in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.[23] Yet, there have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the United States or other coalition forces during the conflict. US forces used command-detonated Claymore directional fragmentation mines, which are permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty.[24]

US and British use of cluster munitions in Iraq in 2003 littered the country with tens of thousands of dangerous explosive “dud” bomblets. British forces said they used some 66 BL-755 cluster bombs and 2,100 surface-launched cluster munitions; the US dropped nearly 1,500 cluster bombs and likely used far more surface-launched cluster munitions.[25] Each cluster bomb or munition contains hundreds of submunitions. Coalition use of cluster munitions has been confirmed in many populated areas throughout Iraq, including Baghdad, Basra, Hillah, Kirkuk, Mosul, Nasiriyah, and other cities and towns.

Landmine Problem and Survey

Iraq’s landmine and unexploded ordnance problem is a consequence of the Iraq-Iran War, two decades of internal conflict, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 conflict. According to MAG, estimates of the total number of mines throughout Iraq vary between eight and twelve million, not including the vast quantity of other explosive remnants of war.[26] Much more is known about the landmine problem in northern Iraq, where humanitarian mine clearance programs have operated for the past decade, than in the rest of the country.[27] The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) reports that it completed a Landmine Impact Survey in northern Iraq in 2002.[28]

The landmine situation has been exacerbated by the fresh laying of landmines by Iraqi forces in 2003. This is particularly the case in the regions bordering Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, and to a lesser extent in the southern and central regions. The UXO threat, on the other hand, has become much more acute throughout the country, including major cities, and particularly where US and British forces used cluster munitions. Explosives and ammunition abandoned by Iraqi forces are commonplace. MAG, in the north, and the US Commander of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group who is responsible for dealing with the mine, UXO, and explosive ordnance problem in the south, as well as UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), have stated that abandoned explosive ordnance constitutes the primary humanitarian threat to many communities as of mid-June 2003.[29]

In April 2003, the Humanitarian Operations Center, tasked with coordinating the humanitarian response following the conflict, released a map showing general locations of sites in Iraq known to be contaminated by mines, submunitions, or other explosives. This map, which is regularly updated, is based on data provided by the Coalition. As of May 2003, it contained references to 317 minefields, 1,102 Coalition cluster munition strike sites, and 707 other UXO locations.[30] Several survey and assessment projects were either planned or underway by June 2003 in various parts of Iraq, striving to make up for a lack of contamination data on south and central Iraq prior to March 2003.

An initial assessment conducted in early June 2003 by UNICEF and the Iraqi Civil Defense Organization (CDO) in Baghdad found over 50 UXO-contaminated sites in the 24 CDO districts of the city.[31] To help plan its mine risk education activities, UNICEF and CDO held a workshop to develop more detailed methods for recognizing and recording UXO/mine-contaminated areas, and improved survey methods for gathering victim data.[32]

Iraqi refugees crossing over the Iran border were thought to be at particular risk from mines, as the border region was heavily mined during the Iraq-Iran War. This area has been largely off-limits to UN demining agencies in the past, although MAG conducted demining there. UN Office for Project Services survey teams started carrying out impact survey activities in the 5-kilometer zone bordering Iran in northern Iraq in June 2003.[33]

The MAG and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) were conducting an emergency survey of mines and UXO in northern Iraq as of mid-June 2003, funded by UNMAS.[34] An assessment in the south is to be done by MineTech International.[35] MAG carried out emergency contamination surveys in dozens of communities in the northern areas around Mosul and Kirkuk in the weeks before mid-June 2003.

Mine Action Coordination and Planning

According to the US State Department, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has assumed responsibility for mine action in Iraq under its mandate as set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1483, and has established the Iraq National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Iraq Mine Action Center (IMAC) in Baghdad. A Regional Mine Action Center will also be developed to coordinate and execute mine action in the north as the UN Oil for Food Program mandate phases out after 21 November. A Regional MAC will be developed in the Basra (southern) region in 2004.[36]

There has been extensive cooperation between the CPA, US and UK coalition agencies, UN agencies, NGOs and other humanitarian agencies to confront the complex mine-UXO problem in Iraq. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq established mine action as a separate sector for humanitarian coordination as of mid-March 2003.[37] The UN Mine Action Service, supported by the UNICEF and UNOPS, leads UN mine action planning. The UN mine action programs in Iraq are overseen by the Mine Action Coordinating Team (MACT), which is divided into Area Mine Action Coordinating Teams (AMACT) responsible for different parts of the country. The Basra-based AMACT for south Iraq was operational by late May 2003;[38] it was established with logistical assistance from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency.

The first meeting on mine action coordination in Iraq for the UN was held in Amman, Jordan, on 12 March 2003.[39] On 9 May 2003, a meeting was held in Larnaca, Cyprus, to discuss coordination of demining agencies’ activities in Iraq, attended by representatives from Danish Demining Group, Handicap International (HI), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Intersos, MineTech, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, VVAF, World Food Program, UNOPS and the MACT. The AMACT in Basra was to help determine the most suitable areas to work for the organizations, most of which planned to enter Iraq within two to six weeks of the meeting.[40]

An Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) project to manage relevant data was undertaken by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in cooperation with UNMAS, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, and mine action personnel in the field.[41] Coalition forces agreed to continue to collect data in such a way as to be compatible with the IMSMA format.[42]

By late May 2003, MAG was meeting with members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Organization in the northern regions of previously Baghdad-controlled Iraq to explore how to utilize their knowledge and clearance capacity. In the first week of June, MAG met with the head of the Iraqi Civil Defence Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit based in Mosul, which was part of the Iraqi fire department prior to the 2003 war. The Civil Defense EOD team members have extensive experience in disposal of bombs and other explosives. MAG assessed the Iraqi team to have a good base for expanded training and capacity-building, and judged its local connections, knowledge, and experience—going back to the Iran-Iraq War—highly valuable. Consultations were ongoing as of June 2003.[43]

In the north, MAG met regularly to coordinate activities with the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), while in the south, by late May 2003, MAG was working closely with the Basra UN AMACT, the CMOC, and other mine action organizations.[44] As of early June, the UN Mine Action Coordination Team, MAG, and VVAF were meeting to coordinate the mine impact emergency survey that began within the month.[45]

In northern Iraq, the UNOPS Mine Action Program began functioning as the Area Mine Action Coordination Team, in addition to its ongoing planning and operational responsibilities. UNOPS reports that between 23 April and 15 May, MAP re-established its full international presence in northern Iraq.[46]

Mine Action Funding

Between 1998 and early 2003, approximately $125.5 million was invested in the Mine Action Program for northern Iraq by the UN Office of the Iraq Program.[47] These funds came entirely from the UN Oil for Food Program. Additional funds were provided directly to the two NGO demining organizations working in northern Iraq, MAG and NPA.

In 2002, the UN program received $27.3 million. In 2003, funding is expected to total approximately $35 million.[48] MAG received $3 million in 2002 for its activities in northern Iraq.[49] The UN Oil For Food Program is expected to end on 21 November 2003, as stipulated by UN Security Council Resolution 1483. UNMAS, UNOPS and other affected UN mine action agencies were working, as of June 2003, to develop plans to meld their northern Iraq activities with those of the Mine Action Teams in the other regions of Iraq.[50]

In March 2003, the US State Department’s Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs discussed a $23.5 million three-year plan of mine action in Iraq, dependent upon approval of funding.[51] Implementation will begin during September-December 2003 with the creation of a 110-man Iraqi demining group with mine detection dog (MDD) capabilities to carry out mine/UXO clearance in the central region.[52]

The UK Department for International Development reported contributing £4 million ($6 million) to the UNMAS, £320,000 ($480,000) to UNICEF’s mine risk education efforts, and £81,000 ($121,000) to MAG as of 16 May 2003.[53] The Netherlands pledged €675,000 ($641,000[54]) for mine clearance to be carried out by MAG in northern Iraq.[55] Canada contributed nearly $3.6 million, earmarked for Iraq, to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action.[56]

At a Mine Action Support Group (MASG) meeting in June 2003, representatives discussed mine action funding in Iraq.[57] Germany reported that it allocated about $100,000 to HI for mine risk education programs in the Baghdad area. Canada said it provided Can$5 million (US$3.6 million) “due to the emerging situation.” The UK pledged to give £7 million ($10.5 million) to UNICEF, mostly for mine risk education programs. Italy has earmarked €500,000 ($475,000) for Iraq mine action. Portugal has contributed about €100,000 ($95,000) to UNICEF mine action programs. Finland plans to give €200,000 ($190,000) to UNMAS programs. About $70 million of Japan’s $100 million funding of humanitarian assistance will go to UNICEF, ICRC, and WFP, which perform various mine action activities.

On 5 June 2003, the European Commission announced a grant of €10 million ($9.5 million) to go toward mine-related humanitarian aid, including mine risk education, mine location data gathering, and some mine and UXO clearance.[58] The funds will be distributed through the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office.

In March 2003, the United Nations issued its Iraq Flash Appeal for six-month emergency funding of $2.2 billion to cover a wide variety of humanitarian assistance. As of May 2003, it had met 33.6 percent of its overall requested funding, or $746 million.[59] The appeal included $20.4 million for mine action to be undertaken by UNMAS, UNDP UNICEF, and the World Food Program.[60]

Specific contributions to UNMAS as of July totaled $11.5 million, including $5.9 million from the UK, Canada’s $3.6 million to the UN Trust Fund, about $1.2 million from Australia, about $215,000 from Finland, and about $538,000 from Italy.[61]

Mine Clearance

Northern Iraq

Before the coalition occupation of Iraq, the only coordinated mine action programs were in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. From the start of 1997 to 2003, the northern Iraq Mine Action Program of UNOPS cleared over 12 square kilometers of land in the three northern governorates, encompassing 124 minefields. In that period, over 1,300 national deminers and supervisors were trained and deployed in northern Iraq.[62] Local Kurdish demining NGOs were established in northern Iraq by mid-2002, and were carrying out demining activities with UNOPS support.[63] These NGOs included Aras Demining Organization in Erbil governorate, Tiroj Demining Organization in Dahuk governorate, and Pirmam Demining Organization and Bawajy Demining Organization in Sulaymaniyah governorate.

In 2002, MAG conducted manual and mechanical mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, survey, marking, mine risk education, and management and support roles in northern Iraq. In 2002, MAG cleared 411,097 square meters and reduced a total of 191,487 square meters. During these operations MAG destroyed 2,149 mines and 662 UXO. In the same period, MAG marked 10 minefields and surveyed 22 minefields covering 640,161 square meters. [64]

In 2002, NPA deployed three manual demining teams, comprised of 24 deminers each, in its mine action program in northern Iraq. The teams worked in the Mawat subdistrict of Sharbazher district, Sulaymaniyah province. NPA conducted mine clearance of high priority areas and urgent EOD tasks. In 2002, NPA teams cleared a total of 44,446 square meters of land and destroyed 259 antipersonnel mines, 23 antivehicle mines and 195 UXO in the operations.[65] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded the program.

In the lead-up to the March 2003 war, the UN Mine Action Program withdrew all international personnel from Iraq and suspended clearance activities, but continued marking, risk education and victim assistance.[66] MAG, with its more than 700 Kurdish staff, remained active during the hostilities, as did Kurdish military mine removal teams to a lesser extent.[67] During the first few months of 2003, MAG marked minefields along routes likely to be used by refugees in northern Iraq.[68]

Post-March 2003 Iraq

It is unclear to what extent Iraqi forces engaged in mine clearance activities in Baghdad-controlled Iraq before March 2003. According to MAG, prior to the 2003 war the Iraqi Army was responsible for clearing landmines; Civil Defense Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams removed aircraft bombs, cluster submunitions, and projectiles; while a division of the secret police handled booby-traps, car bombs, and such devices.[69]

Prior to hostilities in Iraq, MAG positioned staff in Kuwait and Jordan, enabling them to move quickly into southern Iraq to begin assessment activities as soon as the security situation allowed.[70] During the first six months of 2003, MAG cleared a total of 194,930 square meters of land and reduced 154,183 square meters, destroying 3,635 mines and 287 items of UXO. During the same period MAG marked a total of 1,949,931 square meters. Throughout the conflict MAG continued its mine risk education activities, emergency demining and EOD activities while they expanded their operations into former Government of Iraq areas as Kurdish and Coalition forces pushed south. MAG reported removing 430,170 items of UXO and 14,055 mines and various types of booby-traps from around Kirkuk and Mosul, from mid-April to 20 June 2003. From April to the end of June 2003, working in the Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah regions of northern Iraq, MAG cleared, or declared safe after visual contamination search, roughly 3.9 square kilometers of land.[71]

In mid-June 2003, MAG reported that it was still the only mine action agency operating in the previously Baghdad-controlled northern governorates, aside from coalition explosive disposal teams.[72] MAG had established a base of operations for southern Iraq in Basra by that time.[73] Forty-four people are expected to begin demining training at a school newly established by MAG at a former military base in Kirkuk.[74]

UNOPS reported that local NGOs had carried out UXO and mine clearance, destruction, and land marking work in the three northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. From 18 March to 3 June 2003, these Mine Clearance Teams (MCT) marked 68 minefields, encompassing 44 villages within over 4.5 million square meters of land. In the same period over 7,500 items of UXO were recovered, including 88 antipersonnel mines.[75] As of mid-2003, over 90 minefields were being cleared by UNOPS teams.[76] UNOPS expects local demining NGOs to take over all Mine Action Program capabilities by the third quarter of 2003.[77]

In 2003, prior to the conflict, NPA continued to work in the same areas of northern Iraq as in 2002.[78] In addition, NPA conducted a leadership training course for deminers, in which eleven women participated. In post-conflict 2003, NPA plans to double the capacity of its mine action program. A recruitment process and training of new deminers had started as of June 2003. Activities following the conflict included a rapid emergency survey to assess living conditions and provide information on basic humanitarian needs to aid agencies in and around Mawat. NPA conducted mine risk education for 1,280 internally displaced families in villages neighbouring Mawat. NPA set up a medical clinic inside its operation base in Mawat and provided medical treatment to 324 cases through the base and through its mobile teams. NPA deployed five multi-skilled teams to Halabjah to conduct emergency mine action survey, marking of hazardous areas, urgent mine clearance tasks, and EOD. The teams destroyed 110 items of UXO and 17 mines in Halabjah.

NPA has established an office in Baghdad that serves as the headquarters for the NPA southern division. In July 2003, it had four international staffs in addition to local staff. NPA’s objective is to build up local capacities within the Iraqi Civil Protection and to set up 4 EOD teams to deal with UXO and abandoned munitions. NPA's southern division is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NOK 13 million) and ECHO (€1 million). HI is responsible for the MRE component of the project.[79]

A team of some ninety explosive ordnance disposal experts from MineTech International, based in Zimbabwe, were due to begin assessment, detection, and clearance work in southern Iraq in the second half of May 2003. The company was contracted by UNOPS as part of the UN’s Mine Action Rapid Response Plan for Iraq, and arrived in Basra with the personnel, dogs, and tools to enable them to carry out a three to six month demining program.[80]

The Danish NGO, DanChurchAid (DCA), started to conduct emergency mine clearance in the south in early June 2003, operating out of Basra with Action by Churches Together (ACT). The program was initially funded by the two organizations and the Danish government (DANIDA). On 1 July the program was extended with a six-month €1.6 million grant from the European Union (ECHO).[81]

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Deminage, FSD) has supported the World Food Program’s humanitarian efforts in Iraq since mid-April 2003. Fifteen FSD experts train WFP personnel in mine and UXO awareness, survey key WFP operation sites, and destroy mines and UXO on those priority sites. It was expected that by late June 2003, 85 national bomb disposal experts trained by the FSD would be actively supporting the activities of the WFP. A delivery to the FSD of five armored cars, two armored trucks and trailers, and armored excavators was expected to arrive at Basra in early June, to facilitate mine clearance operations.[82]

Deminers from the US State Department’s Mozambique-based Quick Reaction Demining Force worked in Al-Hillah, where they had cleared over 27,600 square meters of land of 922 mines and 92 UXO by the end of July, and near Baghdad, where they had surface-cleared in excess of 1.1 million square meters and destroyed over 1,200 UXO by the same date. In the process, the QRDF also cleared several kilometers of downed power lines.[83]

During and after the main military campaign, US and British forces deployed mine and explosive ordnance disposal teams, which cleared some primarily civilian areas and areas directly endangering coalition troops. The clearance activities focused mainly on strike sites and Iraqi ammunition stockpiles.[84]

Within the Iraqi Civil Defense Organization, certain members specialize in explosive ordnance disposal, while also performing other duties, such as firefighting. Since the 2003 conflict began, these EOD activities have focused primarily on removal of cluster submunitions and other UXO. The US military has been reluctant to share explosives necessary for mine/UXO destruction with CDO members, as their training has been deemed generally inadequate.[85]

Mine Risk Education

A variety of agencies have conducted Mine Risk Education (MRE) activities. UNICEF is implementing a rapid response assessment, to enable more effective targeting of MRE activities.[86] Four MRE television spots were under development in early June.[87]

HI was conducting emergency MRE activities in Baghdad as of May 2003.[88] By mid-May HI and UNICEF were producing materials for a planned distribution to teachers of 65,000 “school in a box” kits, containing 80 MRE leaflets each.[89] By June, HI had been appointed by UNICEF to conduct mine and UXO risk awareness activities for the populations of Baghdad, Karbala, Hillah, Al Kut, Najaf, and Samawa. The HI team distributed and displayed 100,000 leaflets and 25,000 posters, and encouraged local newspapers to develop the risk education program.[90]

Local NGOs supported by UNOPS conducted MRE programs for nearly 100,000 people in the northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah from 18 March to 30 May 2003.[91] In late May 2003, 29 MRE teams of the UNOPS-supported NGO Kurdistan Organization for Mine Awareness were operating in the three northern governorates.[92]

MAG reported in mid-April 2003 having distributed over the previous months more than 200,000 MRE leaflets to people crossing into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. In the latter half of May 2003, MAG carried out MRE activities at nearly 40 schools for some 6,000 students and teachers in and around Kirkuk, as well as providing MRE for local health department officials and other authorities. In June, MAG continued to focus its MRE activities around Kirkuk on schoolchildren and teachers.[93] Well over 1,000 villagers near Mosul and between Mosul and Dahuk received MRE in the latter half of May.[94] MAG, in cooperation with the UN Area Mine Action Coordination Team, deployed three MRE teams for three months in the south as of late May 2003.[95]

As of June 2003, MAG continued to develop networks in Iraq to disseminate MRE messages, by meeting with teachers and school heads, religious figures, members of the Red Crescent, local leaders, and Civil Defense Organization figures.[96] In early June MAG met with 21 municipality leaders to inform them of mine risks and enable them to distribute MRE materials and accurately pass on mine/UXO-contaminated site locations that they may discover.[97] On 14 June, a multi-day training course began in Basra for prospective Iraqi MRE officers.[98] Around Mosul, MAG was using Arabic-language banners to convey MRE messages and explanations of MAG’s roles; also, a series of 15-minute programs on Mosul television were planned.[99]

The US State Department’s Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs had a program running by mid-March 2003 to produce “mine boards” in cooperation with the Department of Defense as part of a short-term MRE plan.[100]

The ICRC was conducting training as of June 2003 to volunteers of the Iraq Red Crescent Society (IRCS) on how to conduct MRE activities for adults and children. Posters and leaflets were being distributed to all southern Iraq IRCS branches, and MRE radio spots were to be aired on local radio stations around the country.[101]

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2002, 457 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded in northern Iraq. Casualty statistics are maintained by UNOPS and MAG. UNOPS recorded 279 mine/UXO casualties in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, of which 17 people were killed and 262 injured, including 111 children. Of these casualties, 117 were caused by landmines. UNOPS estimates that its casualty data represents 90 percent of new casualties in the three northern governorates of Iraq (including Dohuk).[102] In the same period, MAG recorded 32 new mine/UXO casualties in Kirkuk and Dohuk, of which three people were killed and 29 injured, including 10 children. MAG also recorded 96 new mine/UXO casualties in Sulaymaniyah, of which 22 people were killed and 74 injured, including 20 children.[103]

In 2002, a deminer was killed and another five injured in mine clearance accidents in northern Iraq.[104]

Mines and UXO continue to inflict casualties in other regions of the country, but information is limited. A German medical team attached to UNIKOM conducted several evacuations of Iraqi civilians seriously injured by mines and UXO, including ten people in the period 25 September 2001 to 20 March 2002,[105] seven people in the period 21 March to 15 September 2002,[106] and three people in the period 16 September 2002 to 21 March 2003.[107]

In 2001, UNOPS reported that UXO and mine explosions caused an average of 30 casualties per month,[108] while MAG recorded 201 people killed or injured in mine/UXO incidents in northern Iraq,[109] and at least 21 people were killed or injured in mine/UXO incidents in other regions of the country.[110]

The mine/UXO casualty rate in northern Iraq has risen considerably in 2003. UNOPS reported that the number of mine and UXO casualties during March and April 2003 increased by 90 percent compared with the same period in 2002.[111] In the five months to the end of May, 493 new mine/UXO casualties were reported; 42 people were killed and 451 injured. The majority of casualties were children (53 percent), and Kirkuk recorded the highest number of casualties; 22 people were killed and 338 injured.[112]

There is no comprehensive or reliable information available on mine/UXO casualties in the south of Iraq in 2003. However, according to a member of the British Royal Engineers, around five people each week are being killed or injured in Basra alone by UXO since the end of April.[113] Since June, the UN MACT has established a mine/UXO casualty monitoring system through 82 public health centers in the Basra governorate.[114]

In April, an Iranian BBC cameraman was killed when he stepped on a landmine in Kifri; a BBC producer lost his foot in the same incident.[115]

Between mid-March and the end of May 2003, at least five US soldiers were killed and 21 injured in mine, cluster bomb and UXO incidents in Iraq; and two British soldiers were killed in separate UXO and landmine incidents in March and May, one of which occurred during an EOD operation.[116]

During the 1991 Gulf War, landmines, UXO and cluster munitions killed 34 US servicemen and injured 143 others, or 13 percent of all casualties; at least 81 casualties were caused by landmines.[117]

Between 1991 and 2000, 10,997 mine/UXO casualties were reported in six governorates of northern Iraq; 3,697 people were killed and 7,300 injured.[118]

Survivor Assistance

The health system in Iraq was once among the best in the Middle East region; however, conflict and more than a decade of economic sanctions have seriously impacted on the quality of care available. Medical facilities are reportedly inadequate to treat the injured and sick. Some health facilities lack running water and constant electricity supplies, equipment has not been properly maintained, and there is a lack of well-trained and experienced health care workers.[119]

Since 1999, the ICRC has completed rehabilitation work on ten hospitals and 23 primary health care centers as part of its integrated medical-emergency program. Two hospitals and eight health care centers were renovated in 2002; work was still in progress at three other centers.[120]

In 2002, the ICRC provided support to six government-run prosthetic/orthotic centers located in Baghdad (4), Basra and Najef, as well as to the Iraqi Red Crescent/Norwegian Red Cross-supported centers in Mosul and Erbil. Facilities at the center in Erbil were upgraded during the year. Training courses for prosthetic/orthotic technicians were also organized for Iraqi staff.[121] In 2002, these centers manufactured 2,405 prostheses, of which 1,160 were for mine survivors; 1,635 orthoses, of which three were for mine survivors; and distributed 1,276 pairs of crutches and 24 wheelchairs.[122] During 2002, ICRC staff visited northern Iraq and identified a need for the renovation of four prosthetics centers in the region, and also renovation of the center in Basra.[123]

In 2002, the UNDP implemented a “Community Based Rehabilitation for the Disabled” project in Iraq to create employment opportunities for people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups. As of June 2002, more than 400 micro-credit programs had been started. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare established a National Fund for Micro-finance to supported persons with disabilities.[124] It is not known if any mine survivors benefited from this program.

In northern Iraq, the UNOPS Victim Assistance Program is integrated into the MAP and provides a network of services to mine/UXO survivors, including support for four prosthetic/orthotic centers (Dohuk, Diana, Halabja, and Sulaymaniyah), seven orthopedic outreach centers, three rehabilitation centers, two emergency surgical hospitals, and 20 first-aid posts; all of these have received funding under the Oil for Food program. The aim of the program is to provide comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation for mine/UXO survivors and other persons with disabilities. UNOPS considers the prosthetic and surgical centers are sufficient to meet the needs of survivors. The construction of a rehabilitation and vocational training center in Diana was completed, and the construction of another center in Dohuk is in its final stages.[125] Since the program started in 1997, over 300,000 services ranging from medical treatment, prostheses, and rehabilitation, have been provided to mine/UXO survivors.[126] Over 60 percent of employees working in the rehabilitation centers have a disability. In 2002, a total of 1,305 prostheses were provided,[127] of which about 795 were for landmine amputees. The UNOPS Victim Assistance Program assists 5,000 to 6,000 people each year at an annual cost of around US$4 million and approximately 927 national staff are employed in all funded programs. From 1 January to 31 May 2003, the UNOPS network assisted over 1,500 new patients, produced over 560 prostheses and orthoses, provided over 13,400 physiotherapy treatments, and recorded 27,800 out-patient visits.[128]

Under the UNOPS program, mine survivors receive vocational training in various skills including shoemaking, carpentry, and tailoring, for six months after the fitting of prostheses to improve their opportunities for gaining employment.[129]

The Italian NGO Emergency runs the Surgical Hospital for Civilian War Victims in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and provides services at the 20 first-aid posts throughout northern Iraq. In 2002, 2,231 patients received surgical treatment, including 117 landmine casualties. The facility at Sulaymaniyah also provided rehabilitation services, including the fitting of 512 prostheses and distribution of 118 crutches. Emergency is co-implementing rehabilitation and vocational training services with the Dohuk and Diana prosthetic limb centers.[130]

Handicap International Belgium (HIB) runs two orthopedic centers in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, and two satellite units in Penjwen and Kalar. In 2002, the centers produced and distributed 653 walking aids and 568 prostheses. In addition, 1,955 physiotherapy sessions were held at the centers. Social workers are available to provide psychosocial support to aid in the reintegration of persons with disability into their community. HIB also assisted in the training of seven prosthetic technicians and four assistants. Brochures were distributed and magazines published, cultural and artistic events were held, and exhibitions were organized. A total of 22 television and radio programs were broadcast in order to raise awareness about people with disabilities.[131]

The Norwegian Red Cross supports two prosthetic centers in the cities of Erbil and Mosul and in 2002, 1,479 patients received physical rehabilitation, including 546 landmine survivors. The centers distributed 930 lower limb prostheses, 506 crutches and 24 wheelchairs, and repaired 268 prostheses. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Red Cross financially support the centers.[132]

The Norwegian NGO, Trauma Care Foundation (TMC), runs a program training local health care workers in emergency first aid. A study in 2001 carried out by TMC in northern Iraq found that 70 percent of mine survivors suffered chronic pain long after the mine incident. The TMC encouraged mine survivors and their families to establish self-help groups that were then able to access income-generating programs. It was found that for many of the survivors in the study their pain problems were alleviated once they were earning an income to support their families. The training manual, Save Lives, Save Limbs will be distributed in the Kurdish language in 2003.[133] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds the program.

The Ministry of Public Health in Sulaymaniyah, the Dutch NGO ACORN, the Rozh Society for Disabled People, the Helena Center, and the Handicapped Union (local NGOs) are also engaged in the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities in northern Iraq.

In June 2003, it was reported that the role of victim assistance in the UN MACT would be reviewed. Issues to be considered included mine casualty reporting; planning of national victim assistance services, and the UN policy on mine action and victim assistance.[134]

[1] Letter to UN Secretary-General from Masoud Barzani, President of the KDP, 3 October 1999; letter to UN Secretary-General from Jalal Talabani, PUK General Secretary, 26 January 2000.
[2] Geneva Call, “NSA Newsletter,” June 2003, p. 4. The deputy head of the PUK, Adnan Mufti, signed the deed after some amendments. “Kurdish PUK-led government signs mine-banning treaty,” Al-Sulaymaniyah Kurdistani Nuwe, 11 August 2002.
[3] In addition to its own production, Iraq has obtained mines from Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, and the United States. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 931.
[4] Barton Gellman, “Covert Unit Hunted for Iraqi Arms,” Washington Post, 13 June 2003.
[5] “U.S. and Britain Struggle to Find Iraq Consensus,” Reuters, 11 March 2003; “Iraqi forces litter northern front with landmines,” Agence France Presse, 19 March 2003.
[6] Mines Advisory Group (MAG), “MAG in Iraq—First in, last out,” ReliefWeb, 19 April 2003.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Muhy-al-Din Qadr, “Over 1,000 mines removed from just three liberated areas,” Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party newspaper Brayati, 26 April 2003. Text republished by BBC, “Over 1,000 mines removed in April—Kurdish paper,” 28 April 2003.
[9] Michael Howard, “Fighting is over but the deaths go on,” Guardian (UK newspaper), 28 April 2003.
[10] MAG, “First in, last out,” ReliefWeb, 19 April 2003.
[11] Human Rights Watch press release, “Iraqi Mines Found in Mosque,” 2 April 2003.
[12] Michael Holden, “Iraqis face ‘horrendous’ mine legacy,” Reuters, 3 April 2003.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Tim Butcher, “Marines plan the siege of Basra,” Daily Telegraph (UK newspaper), 31 March 2003.
[15] Lawrence M. O’Rourke, “Conflict with Iraq: Fedayeen could pose lingering threat, aid worker says,” Naples Daily News, 5 April 2003.
[16] IRAQWAR.RU, Venik’s Aviation translated report based on Russian military intelligence report, 25 March 2003.
[17] Lindsay Taylor, “Basra and Baghdad,” Channel 4 News (UK), 25 March 2003.
[18] Reported by the New York Times, mentioned in “Iraq Stored Land mines in Mosque,” Reuters, 3 April 2003.
[19] “US Landmine Experts Begin Removal Work in Iraq,” Voice of America, 24 May 2003.
[20] Ibid.
[21] “US forces clear mines from road linking airport to Baghdad,” Agence France Presse, 11 April 2003.
[22] US Department of Defense, “Background Briefing On Targeting,” 5 March 2003.
[23] Alexander G. Higgins, “Campaigners fear use of land mines in Iraq,” Associated Press, 6 February 2003.
[24] US Central Command, “CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing,” 31 March 2003.
[25] See Human Rights Watch press release, “Iraq: Clusters Info Needed from US, UK,” 29 April 2003.
[26] MAG, “Iraq factsheet—an overview,” ReliefWeb, 20 January 2003.
[27] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 841-842.
[28] Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Charles Downs, Division Chief, Mine Action Unit, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), 24 July 2003.
[29] UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “UNMAS Update on Iraq,” 14 May 2003; Mine Action Support Group (MASG) Newsletter, June 2003, Annex 5, p. 17.
[30] Data provided to Human Rights Watch by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, at the Humanitarian Operations Center, Kuwait City, May 2003.
[31] MASG, “Newsletter: June 2003,” Annex 5, p. 25.
[32] Ibid.
[33] UNOPS, “Iraq: UNOPS-MAP Situation Report 6 June 2003,” ReliefWeb, 6 June 2003.
[34] MAG, “Iraq Update – Week Ending 13 June 2003.”
[35] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 22 May 2003.
[36] Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tom Seal, Deputy Director PM/HDP, US Department of State, 1 August 2003. 28 Iraqi government employees comprising the indigenous staff of the NMAA completed the Cranfield University Senior Mine Action Managers Course at the end of July 2003. Another 18 government workers who are IMAC staff have completed their initial IMSMA training and have begun to populate the national mine/UXO threat database.
[37] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 14 March 2003.
[38] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 22 May 2003.
[39] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 14 March 2003.
[40] Ibid.
[41] GICHD, “Update on Activities Between January and March 2003.”
[42] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 22 May 2003.
[43] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 6 June 2003.
[44] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 30 May 2003.
[45] MASG, “Newsletter: June 2003,” Annex 5, p. 18.
[46] Email from Charles Downs, UNOPS, 24 July 2003.
[47] Email from Charles Downs, UNOPS, 24 July 2003; UN Office of the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program, “Landmine Mapping and Clearance,” no date given.
[48] Email from Charles Downs, UNOPS, 24 July 2003.
[49] Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 22 July 2003.
[50] MASG, “Newsletter: June 2003.”
[51] US Department of State, “Humanitarian Mine Action Subgroup Minutes of March 13, 2003,” 8 April 2003.
[52] Email from Tom Seal, US Department of State, 1 August 2003.
[53] Department for International Development (UK), “DFID Iraq Update No. 31,” ReliefWeb, 16 May 2003.
[54] All monetary conversions based on Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 6 January 2003, unless otherwise noted.
[55] Government of the Netherlands, “The Netherlands gives €1.7 million extra for humanitarian aid in Iraq,” ReliefWeb, 6 June 2003.
[56] MASG, “Newsletter: June 2003.”
[57] Ibid, Annex 1, pp. 4-5.
[58] European Commission External Relations, “Iraq: Commission grants EUR 10 million to combat landmines,” 5 June 2003.
[59] UN, “Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals: Mid-Year Review Status Report 2003,” May 2003, pp. 4, 7. This report indicates the US, UK, and EC provided nearly 60 percent of pledged and received resources to the Consolidated Appeals Process for UN and various NGO humanitarian programs by mid-year 2003. Most funding contributions were not directed toward specific programs of action, but rather toward specific humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian assistance for Iraq outside of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal system accounted for some $308 million as of mid-June 2003. See, UN, “Table IV: Additional Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq Crisis 2003 outside of the framework of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal,” 12 June 2003.
[60] UNMAS, “Consolidated Mine Action Requirements from Iraq Flash Appeal,” 15 May 2003.
[61] Email from Charles Downs, UNOPS, 24 July 2003; UN, “United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Iraq Crisis 2003: Donor breakdown of contributions by project, sector,” 12 June 2003.
[62] UNOPS Appendices Contribution to Landmine Monitor Report 2003.
[63] UN Office of the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program, “Landmine Mapping and Clearance,” (undated).
[64] Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 22 July 2003; MAG Iraq, Activities Summary, faxed to Landmine Monitor (NPA) on 20 June 2003. For MAG, reduction of minefields means that a portion of the area thought to be mined is re-surveyed, and exploratory breaches are employed to help verify if areas are mined. If the land is safe, it will be “reduced” without formal clearance taking place. The entire process is clearly documented and fully agreed with the local community and authorities.
[65] This information on NPA is compiled from “NPA Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2003;” email from Sherko H. Rashid, Program Manager, Iraq Mine Action Program, NPA, 29 June 2003.
[66] Email from Charles Downs, UNOPS, 24 July 2003; UNOPS Appendices Contribution to Landmine Monitor Report 2003.
[67] MAG, “Iraq-factsheet—an overview,” ReliefWeb, 20 January 2003.
[68] MAG, “First in, last out,” ReliefWeb, 19 April 2003.
[69] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 6 June 2003.
[70] “Summary of MAG Achievements in Iraq March-May 2003,” emailed to Landmine Monitor (NPA) from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 20 June 2003.
[71] Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 22 July 2003.
[72] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 13 June 2003.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] UNOPS, “Iraq: UNOPS-MAP Situation Report 6 June 2003,” ReliefWeb, 6 June 2003.
[76] UNOPS, Landmine Monitor Report 2003 appendices contribution.
[77] Ibid.
[78] This information on NPA is compiled from “NPA Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2003;” email from Sherko H. Rashid, Iraq Mine Action Program, NPA, 29 June 2003.
[79] Email from Erik Tollefsen, Technical Advisor MA, NPA Oslo, 28 June 2003.
[80] MineTech International, “UN Deploys Rapid Response Mine Action Force to Iraq,” 20 May 2003.
[81] Email to LandmineMonitor (HRW) from Lennart Skov-Hansen, DCA, 21 July 2003.
[82] FSD, “The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) organizes an important delivery of heavy-duty armored demining machinery and vehicles to the airport of Basra on the 4.6.2003,” ReliefWeb, 30 May 2003.
[83] Email from Tom Seal, US Department of State, 1 August 2003.
[84] Email from Charles Downs, UNOPS, 24 July 2003.
[85] Landmine Monitor (HRW) interview with Bonnie Docherty, Human Rights Watch researcher, 11 July 2003. Docherty conducted a mission to Iraq in May 2003.
[86] Email from Charles Downs, UNOPS, 24 July 2003.
[87] Ibid; MASG, “Newsletter: June 2003,” Annex 5, p. 25-26.
[88] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 22 May 2003.
[89] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 14 May 2003.
[90] HI, “Handicap International takes the first steps to help the victims of war and peace,” ReliefWeb, 22 May 2003.
[91] UNOPS, “Iraq: UNOPS-MAP Situation Report 6 June 2003,” ReliefWeb, 6 June 2003.
[92] Ibid.
[93] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 13 June 2003.
[94] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 23 May 2003 and 30 May 2003.
[95] UNMAS, “Update on Iraq,” 22 May 2003.
[96] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 13 June 2003.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] MAG, “Iraq Update,” 13 June 2003.
[100] US Department of State, “Humanitarian Mine Action Subgroup Minutes of March 13, 2003,” 8 April 2003.
[101] ICRC, “Iraq bulletin—6 June 2003,” 6 June 2003.
[102] Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, Mine Victim Assistance Manager, UNOPS Mine Action Program, Erbil, 24 June 2003. Data is based on casualties admitted to the two Emergency Surgical Hospitals. Children are classified as 18-years-old and under.
[103] Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 22 July 2003; MAG-Iraq, “Mines & UXO’s Victims Statistics: January 1991–May 2003,” fax from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 20 June 2003. MAG does not collect data from the Emergency Surgical Hospital in Sulaymaniyah. MAG recorded 45 casualties in Erbil but these statistics have not been included in the total of new casualties in 2002.
[104] Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNOPS Mine Action Program, 24 June 2003.
[105] Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (for the period 25 September 2001 to 20 March 2002), S/2002/323, 28 March 2002, p. 3.
[106] Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (for the period 21 March to 15 September 2002), S/2002/1039, 18 September 2002, p. 2.
[107] Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (for the period 16 September 2002 to 21 March 2003), S/2003/393, 31 March 2003, p. 3.
[108] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 846.
[109] MAG-Iraq, “Mines & UXO’s Victims Statistics: January 1991–May 2003,” 20 June 2003.
[110] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 672-673.
[111] “UN Update on Iraq,” email from Richard Kollodge, UNMAS, 15 May 2003.
[112] MAG-Iraq, “Mines & UXO’s Victims Statistics: January 1991 – May 2003,” 20 June 2003.
[113] Andrew Marshall, “UK troops lecture Iraqi pupils on unexploded bombs,” Reuters, 17 May 2003.
[114] UN Update on Iraq, email from Richard Kollodge, UNMAS, 12 June 2003.
[115] “BBC cameraman killed by landmine in Iraq,” Reuters, 2 April 2003.
[116] Landmine Monitor analysis of ten media reports for the period: 19 March-7 June 2003.
[117] “Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” GAO-02-1003, United States General Accounting Office, September 2002, pp. 14-16.
[118] MAG-Iraq, “Mines & UXO’s Victims Statistics: January 1991–May 2003,”20 June 2003.
[119] “Briefing Note on the Potential Impact of Conflict on Health in Iraq: March 2003,” World Health Organization, 20 March 2003, pp. 8-11, available at www.who.int/disasters/repo/9141.pdf (accessed 21 June 2003); see also ICRC, “Annual Report 2002,” Geneva, June 2003, p. 298.
[120] ICRC, “Annual Report 2002,” p. 298.
[121] Ibid, p. 299.
[122] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program, “Annual Report 2002.”
[123] ICRC, “Annual Report 2002,” p. 299.
[124] “The UNDP in Iraq: A Fact Sheet,” available at www.undp.org/dpa/journalists/UNDP_in_Iraq.pdf (accessed 21 June 2003).
[125] Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNOPS Mine Action Program, 24 June 2003.
[126] UNOPS, “Mine Action Programme, Northern Iraq: Fact Sheet,” 8 April 2003.
[127] Further information on two of the centers providing this total number of prostheses is included below in the reports on activities of the NGOs Emergency (Suleymaniya) and Handicap International Belgium (Halabja).
[128] Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNOPS Mine Action Program, 24 June 2003.
[129] “Widespread landmines pose danger to returnees,” UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 12 June 2003, available at www.reliefweb.int (accessed 21 June 2003).
[130] Donatella Farese, Desk Officer for Iraq, Emergency, response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 11 March 2003.
[131] Handicap International Belgium, “Activity Report 2002,” p. 21.
[132] Email and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Ole Trapness, Coordinator External Resources, Norwegian Red Cross, 2 June 2003. The statistics for these two centers are included in the total ICRC statistics for Iraq.
[133] Dr. Torben Wisborg, Trauma Care Foundation, presentation to the Standing Committee on Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 13 May 2003; Trauma Care Foundation, Tromsoe Mine Victim Resource Center, “Annual Report 2002,” pp. 7-8.
[134] “UN Update on Iraq,” email from Richard Kollodge, UNMAS, 20 June 2003.