Table of Contents

Country Reports

LM Report 2003

Mine Ban Policy Use Production, Transfer and Stockpiling Landmine Problem Mine Clearance and Mine Risk Education Landmine Casualties Survivor Assistance

Nepal

Key developments since May 2002: For the first time, government and military officials have openly and officially acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines by security forces. An Army official also acknowledged production of antipersonnel mines. There was increased use of antipersonnel mines and Improvised Explosive Devices by both security forces and rebels in 2002, including use in all 75 districts. However, there has been little or no mine use by either side since the 29 January 2003 cease-fire. During a joint mission of the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines and the ICBL, both government and Maoist leaders expressed support for including a ban on landmines in the cease-fire code of conduct.

Mine Ban Policy

Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In a statement to the United Nations in October 2002, Nepal’s Permanent Representative said, “Opposed to anti-personnel landmines, Nepal has actively participated in the evolution of the convention to control them, and our moral commitment to it remains strong. When the time is ripe, we will be happy to join the rank of those that have the privilege of becoming a party to that very important global treaty.”^[1]

In an interview with Landmine Monitor, the Chief of the United Nations Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “We have yet to reach the conclusion of the study [of the Mine Ban Treaty]. The study is positively moving forward. There were two meetings on the issue at the ministry this year. We are unhurried to sign the treaty as the government is blamed for hasty signature and its consequences on implementation. The government has no objection to the treaty principally. The government is also well aware of increasing aid following the signing of the treaty. We believe that the Nepal government will soon reach the conclusion of the study. The time cannot be specified.”^[2]

In September 2002, the Royal Nepalese Ambassador to Switzerland Shambhu Ram Simkhada, told Landmine Monitor, “The reason behind not signing the Mine Ban Treaty by Nepal could be that it is not a matter of priority for the government. The warring Maoists are using mines unceasingly and the Royal Nepalese Army also requires it.”^[3] In a May 2003 meeting with Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams and Nepalese mine survivors, Ambassador Gyan Chandra Acharya expressed his sympathy for the mine victims but said, “Nepal is still not fully convinced that a total ban of landmines could enhance the national security.”^[4]

Under the 2002 Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment) Act, landmines are included under the definition of bombs, and the use and possession of such items by civilians is considered a terrorist act.^[5]

Nepal voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74 in November 2002, as it had in previous years. Nepal participated as an observer in the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002, but not in the intersessional meetings in February and May 2003.

In 2002 the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) organized a range of mine ban campaign activities including a one-day national seminar on “Emergency and Landmines,” a “Landmine Clearance” workshop, a “Victim Assistance” workshop, a poem competition, a signature collection and other public education meetings. Ministers, parliamentarians, security forces and representatives from different organizations participated in the initiatives, which also received extensive media coverage. NCBL published a Landmine Monitor country report in Nepalese and English and distributed it widely.

The government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal agreed to a cease-fire on 29 January 2003. The cease-fire Code of Conduct, issued in March 2003, does not include a specific prohibition of mine use. NCBL has urged the inclusion of an additional clause calling for a permanent halt to the use of landmines.

The NCBL and the Non-State Actors Working Group of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) conducted a joint mission in June 2003. They met with government leaders, including the peace negotiator, and with Maoist leaders, requesting that a ban on landmines be included in the Code of Conduct. Brigadier General Kul Bahadur Khadka welcomed such a step, and Maoist leader Khrisna Bahadur Mahara also indicated they would be amenable. The NCBL/ICBL said it also secured support from two major political parties, the National Human Rights Commission, and 25 human rights and peace groups to push for Nepal’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.^[6]

Use

Both the Maoist rebels and government security forces used antipersonnel mines in significantly increased numbers in 2002. However, there has been little or no new use of mines by either side since the January 2003 cease-fire. A small number of incidents have occurred causing new casualties, but it is not clear if these are the result of new mine use or an existing problem.

Use by Government

For the first time, government and military officials have openly and officially acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines by security forces (the Royal Nepalese Army, the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force). The past two Landmine Monitor Reports noted serious indicators that government forces were using antipersonnel mines, but no public admission had been made.

It now appears that there was a great expansion of use of antipersonnel mines by security forces in 2002. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Home Affairs told Landmine Monitor that security forces used mines in all 75 districts of the country.^[7] Army officials, parliamentarians, political leaders from affected areas, and local populations have all confirmed widespread use by security forces. A Royal Nepalese Army official told the joint NCBL/ICBL mission that the Army had used approximately 10,000 antipersonnel mines, mostly to defend some 50 army posts around the country from Maoist attacks.^[8]

Security forces planted mines around police stations, army barracks and government offices in order to protect against attacks by the Maoist rebels. A former Home Minister has been quoted saying that in addition to these defensive uses, security forces have used mines to trap the Maoists: “The security force has closely been following the Maoists, all the entry points are blocked, and ambushes are laid.”^[9]

In a meeting organized by the NCBL in Rukum district, one of the Maoist strongholds, local people said that security forces also planted mines in fields owned by civilians that were close to government buildings. In some cases owners received compensation, but others claimed not to have received any.^[10]

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs spokesperson, landmines were laid following safety procedures and were adequately marked. He said, “In order to minimize the risk of common people falling victim to mines laid by the security forces, the concerned personnel are trained in laying mines. The area is fenced with barbed wire. People are informed of it. Common people fall victim only rarely, due to technical error.”^[11] An Army Captain also declared, “We fence the area where we plant mines with barbed wire with a view to preventing not only people, but also animals. Very rarely the common people have fallen victim. The Human Rights Cell of the Royal Nepalese Army upon suspicion of common people falling victim to mines makes an onsite study.”^[12]

Local representatives of 30 districts all reported mine use around army and police posts in their districts.^[13] They also confirmed that the minefields were fenced with barbed wire, but landmine warning signs were posted only in two places: in Darakh of Sukhad Village Development Committee (VDC) of Kailali district^[14] and in Manthali of Ramechhap district. In Ramechhap the population was also informed by the Army in every party meeting and through loudspeakers. In spite of the public information efforts two goats died in a landmine blast.^[15]

In some cases even the police are not fully informed of mine-contaminated locations. In one incident a civilian and two security personnel were seriously injured when they walked into an ambush laid by the security forces around the District police station and an Armed Police Force camp.^[16]

In some districts, mines are planted during the night and are cleared in the morning.^[17] An Army official said to Landmine Monitor, “We clear all the mines when we shift from that place.”^[18] However, incidents due to mines being left behind have been reported. In an area declared cleared, a cow died in a mine explosion in Darakh of Sukhad Village Development Committee of Kailali. The incident terrorized the entire village.^[19]

Officially the security forces do not reveal the type of devices laid. An Army officer said that they are homemade mines (IEDs).^[20] It is believed the security forces use victim-activated mines (pressure and tripwire), command-detonated mines (remote control), and explosive devices with timers.^[21]

Use by Rebels

The use of landmines and other explosives by the Maoists escalated in November 2001, after their assault on the Army barracks in Dang district. The Maoists used mines and other weapons during their attacks in Syangja, Salleri of Solukhumbu, Sanphebagar and Mangalsen of Achham, Bhiman of Sindhuli, Sandikharka of Arghakhanchi, and Jumla and Lahan of Siraha districts.^[22]

In 2002 there were reports of landmine incidents attributed to rebel mining in 72 districts.^[23] The use of mines damaged industry, trade and agriculture, and disrupted transport lines between villages. A delegation of the Social Justice Committee of the National Assembly could not reach Rajapur village in Bardia district due to massive mine-laying in the area.^[24]

The Maoists laid a large number of mines around villages in some districts to prevent security forces from entering into their areas. In other cases, the mines were used to ambush security forces. An Army Colonel said, “The Maoists have made use of ambush and mines more than the security forces. And it has caused a considerable damage to the security forces.”^[25] A spokesperson from the Ministry of Home Affairs also said, “The Maoists heavily use ambush mines. They lay traps in paths and the use of electric and other explosives has caused a great damage to people and property. The Maoists have massively used mines in destroying physical infrastructures as well.”^[26]

Like security forces, it is believed the Maoists use victim-activated mines (pressure and tripwire), command-detonated mines (remote control), and explosive devices with timers.^[27] In June 2002, the Royal Nepalese Army displayed weapons confiscated from the Maoists, including mines. Thousands of people viewed the weapons, including NCBL representatives.^[28]

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Last year, Landmine Monitor cited an unconfirmed report that indicated that the government had two small factories that produced antipersonnel mines, as well as grenades and ammunition. In December 2002, an Army spokesperson denied this: “Explosives are produced in the factory at Swyambhu, but they are not landmines. The material used in landmines is also used in the explosives that we produce. It is produced in Swyambhu only.”^[29]

However, during the NCBL/ICBL mission in June 2003, an Army official stated that Nepal possessed both locally produced and imported antipersonnel mines. Brigadier General Kul Bahadur Khadka gave assurances that the Army will not acquire any new stocks of victim-activated antipersonnel mines.^[30]

It is believed that the Army has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, and that it in turn provides mines to the police forces.^[31] While the original suppliers of the mines are not known, one official told Landmine Monitor that according to an Army Major, they are factory-produced (not improvised) mines, and are designed to explode with the pressure of 5 to 9 kilograms.^[32]

The Maoist rebels produce significant quantities of victim-activated homemade mines (also known as Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs). According to the spokesperson of the Royal Nepalese Army, most of the explosives used by the Maoists are looted from the government, in particular from the Department of Roads. He also alleges that the rebels might have obtained explosives from sources outside the country.^[33] There have been allegations that the Maoists have received training and weaponry from two Indian-based rebel groups, the Maoist Communist Center and the People’s War Group.^[34] However, there are no specific allegations on landmines.

Landmine Problem

In 2002, landmine and IED incidents were reported in 72 out of 75 districts – all except Manang, Mustang and Parsa.^[35] Increased use of mines by government and rebel forces has had a corresponding socio-economic impact. The danger of mines has hindered movement within the country, but has also contributed to the increase in the number of internally displaced people and refugees. It has also disrupted farming and other economic activity. This is particularly true for the mid-western regions of the country.^[36] There have been no surveys or assessments of the mine situation in Nepal.

Mine Clearance and Mine Risk Education

The Royal Nepalese Army endeavors to defuse or destroy mines whenever it encounters them. Records of mines defused or destroyed are not available. An Army officer said, “The mine disposal team of the Army disposes any mines wherever they are planted. The quantity of the disposed mines cannot be specified. It is difficult to say the exact number because they are defused on sight.”^[37] According to media reports from January to December 2002, the security forces defused mines in thirty-six districts.

The Army official claimed, “The disposal team has enough knowledge for defusing mines. They are well trained. Sometimes the people involved in disposal also meet with an accident, but not because of lack of training. However, there is a challenge of making the disposal team more efficient and skilled.”^[38] He also added, “As new types of mines are being used, we need more training and more sophisticated equipment.”^[39] Clearance operations are difficult in a mountainous country like Nepal. An Army Captain reported a disposal team might walk up to eight days to reach the mine-affected area.^[40]

There are no formal mine risk education programs in Nepal, either governmental or non-governmental. The NCBL has helped to raise awareness of the dangers of mines in a variety of ways, including publishing a pictorial book entitled “Beware of Dangerous Things.” NCBL has also broadcast awareness messages on the radio and has conducted regular educational meetings.

Landmine Casualties

There are no official records on landmine casualties in Nepal due to the disruption of communication lines and the fact that records on landmine and war casualties are a “sensitive issue.”^[41] According to one police officer, “The Maoists have targeted not only security forces, but the general public has also been massively injured.”^[42]

According to information collected by the NCBL, in 2002 there were 720 casualties caused by landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosive devices, including 202 people killed and 518 injured. A total of 313 of the casualties were civilians, including 49 women and 46 children.^[43] The Bheri Zonal Hospital reports that about 13 percent of the casualties of the conflict treated at the hospital in 2002 were mine casualties.^[44] A review of the NCBL database on casualties leads Landmine Monitor to estimate that there were 177 civilian casualties to landmines and IEDs in 2002.

In 2001, the NCBL recorded 214 people killed and 210 injured in 148 landmine and IED incidents.^[45] Casualties continued at a greatly reduced rate in 2003. The media have reported 13 casualties, including four killed and nine injured, from 29 January through May 2003.^[46]

Survivor Assistance

Nepal has taken special measures to aid casualties of the conflict, but no special provisions are designed for mine survivors.^[47] The government provides financial assistance to security personnel and to civilians injured or killed in Maoist attacks. Eight hospitals provide assistance to mine/IED casualties including Bheri Zonal Hospital, Bir Hospital, Tribhuvan Teaching Hospital, Dipendra Police Hospital, Birendra Police Hospital, Pokhara Zonal Hospital, B.P. Memorial Hospital, and Patan Hospital.^[48] However, financial constraints create difficulties in providing treatment to the injured.

Hospitals and health posts in the affected areas are poorly equipped, and often lack medicines and adequately trained staff.^[49] In Bheri Zonal Hospital a Mass Casualty Management Team has been established. However, due to a financial crisis, the zonal and district units did not receive funding and as a result, the existing facilities have been cut and survivors are sometimes forced to return home without completing their treatment.^[50] The Bir Hospital has experienced similar financial problems and reports that some patients have not been able to receive adequate treatment.^[51] Tribhuvan Teaching Hospital reports that while there are delays in receiving funds from the government the casualties of the conflict are properly cared for.^[52]

In 2002, the ICRC provided first-aid posts and surgical facilities with medicines and other supplies to treat the wounded. It assisted the Nepal Red Cross to set up first aid services in the districts of Aindhuli, Salyhan and Phyuthan. The ICRC also conducted a war-surgery seminar for around 100 specialists and trainees from health care facilities in Kathmandu and Nepalganj.^[53]

There are no known programs offering physiotherapy, prosthetics, or psychological support to mine survivors in the affected areas. Prosthetic facilities are available in Kathmandu but many mine survivors cannot afford the cost of transport, accommodation and food during the seven days required for fitting.

In October 2002, the NCBL raised funds for six child mine survivors to support the costs of schooling, medical treatment, prosthetics and crutches.

The government has acknowledged the problems caused by the lack of funding to assist casualties of the conflict.^[54] It appears that no funds have been allocated for mine survivor assistance from the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund, the three-year program of the Army, or the financial assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and China.

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[1] Statement by H.E. Murari Raj Sharma, Permanent Representative of Nepal to the UN, at the General Debate of the First Committee of the 57th Session of the General Assembly, New York, 4 October 2002. It is unclear if this is a reference to the Mine Ban Treaty or to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
[2] Interview with Pushkar Man Singh Rajbhandary, Chief of UN Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu, 27 December 2002.
[3] Meeting with Sambhu Ram Simkhada, Nepalese Ambassador to Switzerland, Geneva, 17 September 2002.
[4] Meeting with Gyan Chandra Acharya, Nepalese Ambassador to Switzerland, Geneva, 15 May 2003.
[5] “Nepal Ain Sangraha,” [Collection of Acts], Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment) Act, 2058 (2002).
[6] ICBL Non-State Actors Working Group Press Statement, Nepal Mission, Latipur, Nepal, 15 June 2003.
[7] Interview with Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, Spokesman, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singhdarbar, Kathmandu, 31 December 2002.
[8] ICBL Non-State Actors Working Group Press Statement, Nepal Mission, Latipur, Nepal, 15 June 2003.
[9] Rajdhani Daily, 11 September 2002, citing former Home Minister Khum Bahadur Khadka.
[10] Statements made at meeting organized by NCBL, Rukum district, 23 September 2002; interview with Amar Bahadur Thapa, local political leader, Dailekh, 5 November 2002.
[11] Interview with Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 December 2002.
[12] Capt. Anup Adhikari, Royal Nepalese Army, Statement at the Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August 2002.
[13] NCBL interviews in November and December 2002 with local leaders and local organizations.
[14] Interview with Jeevan Kumar Rai, local political leader, Kailali, 24 September 2002.
[15] Interview with Dev Shankkar Paudel, former Member of Parliament, Ramechhap, 22 May 2002.
[16] Kantipur (daily newspaper), 13 September 2002. A highly placed security official said the incident occurred because security personnel who knew about the mine ambush had died and the new personnel were unaware.
[17] Interview with Amar Bahadur Thapa, local political leader, 5 November 2002.
[18] Capt. Anup Adhikari, Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August 2002.
[19] Interview with Jeevan Kumar Rai, local political leader, 24 September 2002.
[20] Capt. Anup Adhikari, Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August 2002.
[21] Ibid.
[22] NCBL, “The Growing Threat of Landmines in Nepal, Part V” (Collection of Newspaper Articles from January to December 2002).
[23] Ibid.
[24] Interview with Bijul Biswokarma, Social Justice Committee, Upper House, Kathmandu, 13 January 2003.
[25] Interview with Col. Deepak Gurung, Spokesperson, Royal Nepalese Army, Army Headquarters, Bhadrakali, Kathmandu, 26 December 2002.
[26] Interview with Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 December 2002.
[27] Capt. Anup Adhikari, Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August 2002.
[28] NCBL, “The Growing Threat of Landmines in Nepal, Part V.”
[29] Interview with Col. Deepak Gurung, Royal Nepalese Army, 26 December 2002. For an earlier denial, see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 720.
[30] ICBL NSA WG Press Statement, Nepal Mission, 15 June 2003. Asked if the production took place at Swyambhu or Sundarijal, he answered no, indicating there was a factory in the area near Army headquarters. Email from NCBL to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 16 July 2003.
[31] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 720; Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 563.
[32] Interview with Khem Man Khadka, Chairperson, District Development Committee, Kathmandu, 11 March 2002.
[33] Interview with Col. Deepak Gurung, Royal Nepalese Army, 26 December 2002.
[34] Kantipur (daily newspaper), 3 May 2002.
[35] NCBL, “The Growing Threat of Landmines in Nepal, Part V.”
[36] Raja Ram Gautam, “War Area after the Emergency,” Nepal Monthly, 15 September to 1 October 2002; interviews with mine victim Govinda Bahadur K.C., and other local residents.
[37] Interview with Maj. B.N. Kumar Sharma, Coordinator, Human Rights Cell, Royal Nepalese Army, Army Headquarters, Kathmandu, 26 December 2002.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Captain Anup Adhikari, Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August 2002.
[41] Interview with Biswo Shahi, Police Superintendent, Terrorist Control Division, Police Headquarters, Kathmandu, 2 January 2003; interview with Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 December 2002; interview with Dr. Manohar Shrestha, Director, Bir Hospital, Kathmandu, 23 December 2002.
[42] Interview with Biswo Shahi, Police Superintendent, 2 January 2003.
[43] NCBL collects data from interviews with Members of Parliament, government officials, Army and Police personnel, local political leaders, human rights activists, journalists, media, and other organizations.
[44] Interview with Dr. Durga Prashad Pradhan, Director, Bheri Zonal Hospital, Nepaljung, 18 March 2003.
[45] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 721.
[46] Email from NCBL to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 16 July 2003.
[47] Interview with Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 December 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 721.
[48] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 721-722; email from NCBL to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 16 July 2003.
[49] The NCBL visited various hospitals and health posts in the affected areas during 2002.
[50] Kantipur, 15 July 2002.
[51] Interview with Dr. Manohar Shrestha, Bir Hospital, 23 December 2002.
[52] Interview with Dr. Mahendra Nepal, Director, Tribhuvan Teaching Hospital, Kathmandu, 27 December 2002.
[53] ICRC, “Annual Report 2002,” Geneva, June 2003, p. 163.
[54] Interview with Madhu Raman Acharya, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu, 27 December 2002.