Key developments since May 2002: Perú
has served as the co-chair of the Standing Committee on General Status and
Operation of the Convention since September 2002. On 13 December 2002,
Perú officially created the Peruvian Center for Mine Action,
“Contraminas,” responsible for mine action planning and
policy-making. A national mine action plan is being drafted. In 2002, the Army
completed mine clearance of the Zarumilla Canal, its source at La Palma, and the
area leading to the international bridge at Aguas Verdes. Between June 2002 and
May 2003, the National Police and SIMA cleared 17,651 mines from around 688
high-tension electrical towers. Mine risk education was provided for the first
time in 2002 to many of the people living near the towers.
Mine Ban Policy
Perú signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3
December 1997, ratified on 17 June 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1
March 1999.
Perú does not yet have any specific legislation in place to implement
the Mine Ban Treaty. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
reported in 2002 that it is supporting the preparation of national
implementation legislation by the National Commission for the Study and
Application of International Humanitarian Law (Spanish acronym,
CONADIH).[1] A number of
provisions in Perú’s Criminal Code apply to possession and trade of
weapons, such as antipersonnel landmines, and include criminal
sanctions.[2]
Perú attended the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002
and the Standing Committee meetings in February and May 2003. Perú has
served as the co-chair of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention, together with Austria, since September 2002. It has
continued to play a leadership role in the intersessional work program in
general, including in the Universalization, Article 7 and Resource Mobilization
Contact Groups. It has also actively participated in the President’s
Consultations on preparations for the 2004 Review Conference.
At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Perú’s Ambassador said,
“Perú reiterates its complete rejection of any use of antipersonnel
mines, in particular their massive use in recent conflicts; and likewise we
strongly reject their use by both regular forces and by non-state
actors.”[3]
Perú submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report in April 2003;
it covers the period from March 2002 to March 2003 and includes voluntary form
J.[4]
Perú voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74,
promoting universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Perú is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) and attended the Fourth Annual Conference of States
Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2002. It did not submit its national
annual report under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II.
In May 2003, Perú announced that, with the support of Canada and the
Organization of American States (OAS), it will host a regional conference on
mine action in Lima in August
2003.[5]
Production, Transfer and Use
Perú is a former producer of antipersonnel
mines. The National Police (PNP, Policía Nacional del Perú)
produced the “DEXA” mine until production facilities were closed in
1994, while the Navy (Marina de Guerra del Perú) produced the MG-MAP-304
“CICITEC” mine until production facilities were closed in
1997.[6] Landmine Monitor has
been told that Perú never exported antipersonnel
mines.[7] In the past,
Perú imported mines from Belgium, Spain, the United States, the former
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.
Landmine Monitor did not receive any allegations of use of antipersonnel
mines in 2002. On 25 June 2003, a media article reported that Shining Path
(Sendero Luminoso) ambushed a military patrol in Pampa Aurora, Ayahuanco
department, Huanta province and a few hours later in the same area a government
soldier was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine allegedly laid by the
rebels.[8]
Perú maintains that it did not use mines before, during, or after the
1995 Cenepa conflict, and that it does not possess maps or registries of mines
in these areas.[9]
Stockpiling and Destruction
Perú completed destruction of its stockpile
of 322,892 antipersonnel mines in 2001. It destroyed 321,730 mines between May
and 13 September 2001, and another 926 antipersonnel mines in December 2001,
following a decision to reduce the number of mines retained for training
purposes.[10]
In May 2002, Perú reported that it was retaining 4,024 antipersonnel
mines for training; the same number of mines is reported in the April 2003
Article 7 report.[11]
Landmine Problem
Perú’s northern border with Ecuador is
affected by landmines laid during the 1995 border conflict between the two
countries. Two coastal departments
(Lima[12] and Ica) and four
departments in the Andean highlands (Cajamarca, Huancavelica, Junín, and
Puno) are affected by landmines laid around public infrastructure and electrical
installations by the National Police during Perú’s internal
conflict of the 1980s and early 1990s. Perú’s southern border with
Chile is also contaminated with landmines laid by Chile during the 1970s.
In May 2002, Perú provided additional information on departments in
northern border areas that are suspected to be mine-affected, due to mine
incidents in those areas.[13]
These include six suspected areas in
Tumbes,[14] three in
Piura,[15] four in
Amazonas[16] and six in
Loreto.[17] In April 2003,
Perú provided information on other areas along the northern border that
are suspected to be mine-affected, including Sector La Coja, Pueblo Nuevo,
Lechugal, and Tiwinza in the department of
Tumbes.[18] The OAS Mine Action
Program (AICMA) in Perú informed the government of two areas in Tumbes
with minefields laid by Ecuadorian forces. Marked minefields are in La Palma
and La Coja, and dangerous areas are between La Coja and Lechugal, and in
Quebrada Seca. The OAS, Ecuador and Peru plan to meet in Tumbes to discuss the
mined areas.[19]
Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the mine problem has been
affected by climatic changes such as El Niño, and that heavy rainfall
along the border with Ecuador creates the danger of mine displacement, for
example in the Zarumilla Canal zone and surrounding
areas.[20]
According to the 2002 Article 7 report, 54,343 CICITEC and DEXA mines were
laid around 1,655 high-tension electricity towers in Huancavelica, Ica,
Junín, and Lima between 1989 and June
1993.[21] The 2003 Article 7
report provides a reduced number of mines — 41,799 — due to mine
clearance progress.[22]
Based on the number of mine incidents, an independent study published by the
Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) in 2000, and media
reports, the mined areas around the high-tension electricity towers pose the
greatest threat to the civilian population in
Perú.[23] The ICRC
reports that approximately 350 communities live in close proximity to mined
towers in the departments of Huancavelica, Ica, and Junín; in some parts
of Huayucachi and Junín the mined towers are located right in the middle
of the community.[24] According
to the ICRC, the towers are fenced and marked, but some fencing and warning
signs have deteriorated due to weather and damage by the local population. In
some places the mines have been displaced and are visible on the
ground.[25]
In May 2002 and April 2003, Perú reported that the perimeter of public
infrastructure, mainly prisons, in the departments of Lima, Puno, and Cajamarca,
and in Callao, had been mined during the 1990s with CICITEC
mines.[26]
Mine Action Funding
In April 2002, the government and the OAS signed a
Memorandum of Understanding that extended an agreement signed in May 2001 and
which includes provision of assistance to clear 350 high-tension electricity
towers belonging to the state company ETECEN (Empresa de Transmisión
Eléctrica Centro Norte
S.A.).[27] On 22 May 2002,
ETECEN and the National Police (PNP) signed a $371,000 agreement for mine
clearance around those same 350 high-tension
towers.[28] According to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demining operations of an additional 1,350
high-tension towers began on an unspecified date, following an agreement between
ETECEN, the PNP, and the Industrial Services of the Navy (SIMA, Servicios
Industriales de la Marina).[29]
This was to require an investment of $1,991,500 that would be provided by
ETECEN.[30]
An OAS contribution of $100,000 will be used to insure demining personnel,
equipment, food, and
lodging.[31] According to the
National Police, the insurance covered 56 police
deminers.[32]
At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2003, the OAS presented a
projection of financial requirements for the period 2003-2007. For Perú,
the total was $4.4 million: $600,000 for 2003; $800,000 for 2004; $1 million for
2005; $1 million for 2006; and $1 million for 2007, when OAS funding is due to
end for Perú.[33]
In its fiscal year 2002, the United States contributed more than $925,000 to
Perú to fund humanitarian demining
activities.[34]
Peruvian representatives made various calls during 2002 and 2003 for
financial assistance in mine
clearance.[35] In February
2003, Perú noted that through financial loans by public companies,
Perú had allocated $371,000 to mine clearance in 2002 and almost $2
million for mine clearance in
2003.[36]
In May 2003, Ambassador Maritza Puertas de Rodríguez announced that
the European Union had communicated to the Peruvian government its willingness
to contribute to mine clearance along the border with Ecuador, and to contribute
to institutional strengthening of
Contraminas.[37]
Mine Action Coordination and Planning
On 13 December 2002, Perú officially created
the Peruvian Center for Mine Action, “Contraminas” (Centro Peruano
de Acción contra las Minas
Antipersonales).[38]
Contraminas is the office responsible for planning and policy-making for mine
action, including humanitarian
demining.[39] It is housed in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is comprised of an Executive Committee and a
Technical Secretariat. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Education,
Interior, Health and the National Commission to Integrate the Handicapped must
designate representatives to the Executive Committee, but as of May 2003 only
one member had been designated, from the Ministry of
Education.[40] In May 2003, the
Coordinator of the Technical Secretariat said Contraminas remained understaffed,
with three permanent staff, and lacked logistical resources to achieve its
objectives.[41] The US and the
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) have donated
equipment, computers and software, including the Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) system, to
Contraminas.[42]
Efforts during 2002 to set up the IMSMA database were delayed by problems
obtaining statistical data and maps, including from the National Statistics
Institute.[43] Contraminas has
obtained a registry of health care centers–updated to 1993–from the
Ministry of Health, and maps of the location of high-tension electricity towers
from the Ministry of Energy and Mines.
In January and February 2003, informal meetings were held between
Contraminas, representatives of the Police, ICRC, various government ministries
and the National Commission for the Study and Application of International
Humanitarian Law, to develop a national mine action plan, which as of June 2003,
was still being drafted.[44]
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the February 2003
Standing Committee meetings Peruvian representatives and the OAS met to discuss
future OAS support for mine action in
Perú.[45] This would
include provision of GPS equipment to the PNP so that the exact coordinates of
mined high-tension towers could be identified, financial support for personnel,
and support for the creation of an IMSMA database to be used in mine risk
education campaigns.
According to the OAS, in 2002 the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)
provided four groups of supervisors from Central America to give training and
assistance to sappers from the Army and the PNP. In addition, a team of
military experts from the US was reported to have trained 26 national
supervisors and assisted with the establishment of a center for demining
operations in Tumbes.[46]In April 2003, the IADB established a permanent team of international
monitors to support mine clearance in Perú and
Ecuador.[47]
Mine Clearance
In 2002, the OAS estimated that it will take eight
to nine years to complete mine clearance operations in Perú, because of
technical issues and extremely difficult conditions in most of the mine-affected
areas in the country. The aim is to declare Perú “mine safe”
in 2010.[48]
Perú’s treaty-mandated deadline for clearance of all mined areas is
1 March 2009.
Border with Ecuador
As part of the peace agreement of 26 October 1998, Perú and Ecuador
agreed to demine the border under the supervision of the Ecuador/Perú
Multinational Observation Mission,
MOMEP.[49] Mine clearance along
the border with Ecuador is carried out by a battalion of 140 Peruvian Army
Engineers, divided into ten fourteen-person
teams.[50]
Between January 1999 and June 2002, three significant mine clearance
operations were completed along the border with
Ecuador.[51] In 2002, mine
clearance of the Zarumilla Canal, its source at La Palma, and the area leading
to the international bridge at Aguas Verdes was
completed.[52]
According to the OAS, the Army has developed a draft demining plan for the
border areas with Ecuador.[53]
As records of mined areas were incomplete and inaccurate, there was a need to
implement a detailed study on the impact of uncleared mines in five provinces,
in order to set priorities. In March 2003, the Army carried out impact
assessment studies in the border areas of the departments of Tumbes, and Piura
in Sullana province.[54]
Mine clearance in Tumbes and Piura should be completed by September
2003.[55] The mine clearance
operations will then concentrate on the less affected areas in Amazonas,
Cajamarca, and Loreto.[56]
High-tension Electrical Towers
Mine clearance of high-tension electrical towers is the responsibility of the
electricity companies. It is carried out by a specialized unit of the National
Police called JEFAMDEAP (Jefatura de Activación de Minas y Dispositivos
de Autoprotección), and by deminers hired by the Industrial Services of
the Navy (SIMA).[57]
In February 2001, the National Police completed clearance of 178 mined
high-tension towers owned by the private company EDEGEL. By December 2001,
eight high-tension towers owned by the state electricity company ETECEN had been
cleared, with 212 mines cleared and
destroyed.[58]
Between 13 June and 19 September 2002, the National Police cleared and
destroyed 8,165 mines from around 350 high-tension towers owned by
ETECEN.[59] The clearance
operation began in San Juan de Miraflores (Lima) and continued towards Huancayo
(Junín) and Huancavelica in the center of the country.
On 19 December 2002, the National Police and SIMA signed a cooperation
agreement to demine 338 high-tension
towers.[60] During the initial
phase of this clearance operation, from 19 December 2002 to 5 February 2003,
4,319 mines were cleared and destroyed from around 174 high-tension towers on
the transmission lines 201/202 Mantaro–Pomacocha and 218/219
Mantaro–Pachachaca.[61]
During the final phase, from 24 March to 24 May 2003, 5,167 mines were cleared
and destroyed from the remaining 164
towers.[62]
Therefore, according to available information, as of May 2003, a total of 696
high-tension towers of the ETECEN Company were cleared, with a total of 17,863
mines cleared and destroyed.
According to National Police, clearance of 250 minefields around high-tension
towers was due to begin on 15 June 2003, following a new agreement with
SIMA.[63] At the Standing
Committee meeting in May 2003, the Peruvian representative stated that mine
clearance of the country’s high-tension electrical towers would be
completed by early 2004.[64]
In 2002, a number of mine action trainings were held for deminers from the
National Police and Army, with the support of the
OAS.[65] In 2003, a first aid
training was being carried out at the same time as mine clearance operations in
the departments of Huancavelica and
Junín.[66]
In early 2003, four deminers were injured in mine
explosions.[67] Following the
demining casualties, an OAS AICMA mission to Perú in March 2003 inspected
equipment used during Police and SIMA mine clearance
activities.[68] The mission
report had not been released by OAS AICMA as of June 2003. Concerns have been
raised about inadequate provision of equipment, training, and information for
deminers. Landmine Monitor was told by a former police deminer who had
participated in one SIMA clearance operation in Pisco, Ica that deminers wore
old bullet-proof vests, used knives to demine, and did not have maps due to lack
of cooperation from the
police.[69]
Mine Risk Education
According to the ICRC, most of the 350 communities
that live close to mined high-tension towers in Huancavelica, Ica and
Junín have not received mine risk education
(MRE).[70] In 2002, the ICRC
carried out its first MRE activities for these communities. The activities
included an explanatory talk, a puppet show, and a discussion in Quechua, for
communities where this indigenous language is spoken
widely.[71] Eighteen
presentations were provided in 17 communities between June and September 2002,
in which approximately 7,040 persons
participated.[72] Residents
frequently asked why ten years had passed and “they had just been informed
of what was in their
communities.”[73]
The Unit of Peasant Communities of the Central Andes (UCSICEP, Unidad de
Comunidades Campesinas de la Sierra Central del Perú) was instrumental in
bringing the MRE teams to communities not accessible by car and in translating
MRE messages into Quechua.[74]
The National Police reports that under the “Protección
Campesino” (Protection for Peasants) plan it provided MRE sessions in
January and February 2002 for communities in Huancavelica and Junín
living near ETECEN high-tension electrical towers, including the distribution of
brochures, bulletins and illustrated
calendars.[75]
Perú reports that army personnel are in charge of MRE campaigns in
communities close to the Ecuadorian border, providing talks in schools and
communities in the mined
areas.[76]
In 2003, Contraminas developed a training program in MRE with support of the
ICRC, OAS AICMA, the National Police, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Contraminas was tasked with coordinating and securing
funding for the program for teachers and community leaders in Junín and
Huancavelica, involving the ICRC, the OAS AICMA, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the Ministry of Education. In 2003, the ICRC contributed $23,400
to the MRE campaign, while the OAS AICMA program provided $20,000 and the
Ministry of Education provided
$4,500.[77] In the first stage,
two workshops were held in April
2003.[78] A national teachers
strike partly suspended the program in May 2003. The second stage involves the
provision of MRE activities to communities; due to funding limitations, less
than half the mine-affected communities will be targeted. The final stage of
the program is monitoring and evaluation. The program is due to end in November
2003.[79]
Landmine Casualties
In 2002, 19 people were injured in mine and UXO
incidents in Perú. The casualties included five deminers, two electrical
tower maintenance officers, three other males, and nine children. Landmines
caused eleven of the
casualties.[80] In 2001, four
civilians were injured in three landmine incidents (two incidents in Chilean
territory and one in
Perú).[81]
As of May 2003, five people had been injured in mine explosions in
Perú in 2003, including four deminers, and a 10-year-old
child.[82] In a separate
incident on 21 March 2003, a 37-year-old Peruvian male lost his leg in a mine
explosion after entering a marked minefield in Chilean territory, at Quebrada de
Escritos. He received medical treatment at the Juan Noé Hospital in
Arica, Chile.[83]
Statistics on mine casualties are believed to be incomplete and inaccurate
because the locations of incidents are remote. According to the OAS, Peruvian
authorities have recorded 179 landmine casualties since 1995, including 62
soldiers, 67 police, and 50
civilians.[84] Information
gathered during MRE activities by the ICRC also indicates that there is
underreporting of casualties. The ICRC reports that most of the casualties it
has recorded are
civilians.[85]
Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice
The Army and the National Police provide medical
assistance, physical rehabilitation and prostheses for their personnel injured
by landmines. Assistance to civilians is limited, particularly in rural areas
close to the border with Ecuador and in the Andean
highlands.[86] In most cases,
police deminers injured in 2002 and 2003 received medical treatment at the
Police Hospital in Lima.[87]
The ICRC continues to support civilian mine/UXO casualties in Perú.
Assistance to survivors is given through an agreement with the National
Institute of Rehabilitation in Callao, where survivors receive emergency aid,
rehabilitation, prostheses, psychological support and skills
training.[88] In 2002, the ICRC
covered the costs of medical care for 21 mine/UXO survivors, and provided
prostheses for another three mine
survivors.[89] The ICRC
allocated approximately $6,000 for survivor assistance in 2002, and to May 2003,
$1,200. The survivor assistance budget of the ICRC will be suspended at the end
of 2003.[90]
The state Integrated Health Insurance (SIS, Seguro Integral de Salud) has
provided support for some mine/UXO youth casualties. According to ICRC, the
treatment of a child severely injured in May 2003 was partially supported
through SIS.[91]
In 2002, ETECEN covered the medical costs of seven mine/UXO casualties
including one male civilian survivor, four children, and two officers who were
injured during electrical tower maintenance
operations.[92]
In early 2003, an Association of Victims and Survivors of Landmines was
created by a group of former policemen who worked in either laying mines or in
clearance and were injured during their
work.[93]
Perú has legislation and measures to protect the rights of persons
with disabilities, including mine survivors; however, a lack of resources limits
the effectiveness of these
measures.[94]
[1] ICRC, “Programa de
Sensibilización de los Peligros de las Minas Antipersonal,” Lima,
2002, p. 9. [2] A project to reform the
Criminal Code began in 2002 and is scheduled to be completed in October 2003;
Congress will then consider and adopt the
code. [3] Statement by Ambassador Harry
Beleván McBride, Undersecretary of Multilateral and Special Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Fourth Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 17
September 2002. [4] No date in April was
specified for submission of the report. See also Article 7 Report, 16 May 2002
(for the period March 2001-March 2002); Article 7 Report, 4 May 2001 (for the
period March 2000-March 2001); Article 7 Report, 2 May 2000 (covering the period
up to March 2000). [5] Statement by
Ambassador Maritza Puertas de Rodríguez, Director, Political Multilateral
Affairs and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Standing Committee on
General Status and Operation, Geneva, 16 May
2003. [6] Article 7 Report, Forms E and
H, April 2003; ICRC, “Programa de Sensibilización de los Peligros
de las Minas Antipersonal,” Lima, 2002, p.
7. [7] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002,
p. 400. [8] Hugo Ned Alarcón,
“Shining Path guerrillas kill one soldier in Peruvian jungle
ambush,” Associated Press (Ayacucho), 25 June 2003. Other media articles
reported that a soldier had his left leg amputated as a result of weapons fire
during the ambush. See “Senderistas roban medicinas,” El Comercio
(Lima), 27 June 2003; “Matan a soldado en emboscada senderista,” La
República (Lima) 26 June
2003. [9] Article 7 Report, Form C,
Table 2, April 2003. [10] See Landmine
Monitor Report 2002, pp.401-402; Article 7 Report, Form G, 16 May
2002. [11] This included 500 PMD-6
(USSR-manufactured), 775 CICITEC (Perú), 600 M18-A1 Claymore (USA), 100
M35 C/ESP M5 (Belgium), 525 M-409 (Belgium), 500 PMA-3 (former Yugoslavia), 500
PMD-6M (USSR), and 500 POMZ-2M (USSR), all retained by the Army; and 24 CICITEC
mines retained by the National Police. Article 7 Report, Form B and Form D,
Table 1, April 2003. [12] See section on
mine clearance for completion of operations in the department of
Lima. [13] Article 7 Report, Form C,
Table 2, 16 May 2002. [14] Puente
Internacional-Hito Grau, Bocatoma La Palma-Papayal, Papayal-Los Limos, Los
Limos-Quebrada Seca, and Quebrada
Seca-Matapalo. [15] Los Hornos
(Sullana), Playa Norte-Hito Pampa Larga, and La
Tina. [16] Chinchipe, Achuime-Comainas,
Cenepa, and Santiago. [17] Morona,
Pastaza, Tigre, Curaray, Napo, and
Aguarico. [18] The department in which
these areas are located was not specified in the Article 7 report, but a
document provided to Landmine Monitor by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
indicates that the areas are in the department of Tumbes. See Article 7 Report,
Form C, Table 2, April 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aide Memoire,
“Tratamiento dispensado por el Perú al tema de las minas
antipersonal,” Lima, March
2003. [19] Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Aide Memoire, March 2003. [20] Ibid.;
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
402. [21] Article 7 Report, Form C
(Table 1.2), 16 May 2002. [22] Article 7
Report, Form C (Table 1.2) and Form G, April
2003. [23] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, p. 403. [24] ICRC, “Programa
de Sensibilización,” pp. 6,
26. [25] Ibid, pp. 6,
8. [26] Facilities in Puno (2,906
mines), Cajamarca (2,889 mines) and Lima (3,189 mines) were mined at the request
of the National Penitentiary Institute. There were also 927 mines laid in
Callao. Article 7 Report, Form C (Table 1.1), April
2003. [27] On 17 May 2001, the OAS and
the government of Perú signed an Agreement for Support of Integrated Mine
Action that foresaw funding totaling $5,168,820. The funds were destined for
mine clearance, training of deminers, equipment, training and awareness
campaigns for civilian populations, victim assistance and support for obtaining
international cooperation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aide Memoire, March
2003. [28] Interview with Minister
Manuel Talavera and First Secretary Hugo Contreras, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Lima, 10 May 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aide Memoire, provided to
Landmine Monitor (Perú) on 10 May 2002; letter from Colonel Alfredo
Miranda, 17 May 2002. [29] SIMA is a
private company belonging to the Peruvian Navy and that produced mines in the
1990s. The company usually bids for public construction
contracts. [30] Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Aide Memoire, March 2003. [31]
Ibid. [32] The contribution was also
used for antifragmentation boots, boots covers, 15 electronic metal detectors,
helmets with antifragmentation visors, policarbonate glasses, 30
antifragmentation jackets, and 15 antifragmentation uniforms. Document
036-2003-DIRSEGPU PNP/JEFAMDEAP.APO, 28 March 2003, provided to Landmine Monitor
(Perú) by the PNP. [33] See OAS,
“Mine Action Program: Making the Western Hemisphere landmine-safe,”
Resource Mobilization: Projection of Financial Resources/Requirements 2003-2007,
p.6. Presented at the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the
Convention, Geneva, 12 May 2003. [34] US
Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” September 2002.
This included $225,000 from the State Department and an estimated $700,000 from
the Defense Department. US military personnel have trained Peruvian Army
personnel in demining techniques, and have also provided assistance in the areas
of mine awareness and mine action management
procedures. [35] See, for example,
statement by Ambassador Harry Beleván McBride, Fourth Meeting of State
Parties, 17 September 2002. [36]
Statement by Perú, Standing Committee on General Status and Operations,
Geneva, 3 February 2003. [37] Statement
by Ambassador Maritza Puertas de Rodríguez, Standing Committee on General
Status, 12 May 2003. [38] Supreme Decree
N°113-2002-RE. “Normas Legales,” El Peruano (Official
Government Gazette), 13 December 2002, pp.
235027-235028. [39] Interview with
Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Coordinator, Technical Secretariat of Contraminas,
Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2003; Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2003. [40] By Ministerial
Resolution 088-2003-ED (21-01-03). Article 7 Report, Form A, April
2003. [41] Interview with Wilyam
Lúcar Aliaga, Coordinator, Technical Secretariat, Contraminas, Lima, 30
May 2003. Resources are lacking, from insufficient memory in the computers, to
telephone lines unable to call mobile
phones. [42] Statement by Perú,
Standing Committee on General Status and Operations, Geneva, 3 February
2003. [43] Interview with Hugo
Contreras, First Secretary, Multilateral and Special Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Coordinator,
Technical Secretariat of Contraminas, Lima, 10 March
2003. [44] Interview with Wilyam
Lúcar Aliaga, Technical Secretariat of Contraminas, 16 May
2003. [45] Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Aide Memoire, “Tratamiento dispensado por el Perú al tema de las
minas antipersonal,” Lima, March
2003. [46] OAS, Update on Regional Mine
Action Efforts, May 2003. [47]
Ibid. [48] OAS, “Landmines Removal
in Peru,” Project document located on the UN Mine Action
“E-mine” website, updated 30 November 2002 (accessed 25 May
2003). [49] Telephone interview with
Minister Manuel Talavera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June
2002. [50] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, p. 404; see also, OAS, “Landmines Removal in Peru,” Project
document located on the UN Mine Action “E-mine” website, updated 30
November 2002 (25 May 2003). [51] The
first operation, between January and March 1999, allowed for the placement of
border markers between the two countries; the second, between October 1999 and
March 2000, cleared a trail joining the Tiwinza Memorial, located on the
Peruvian side of the border, with Ecuador; the third, completed 14 June 2002,
cleared the Zarumilla canal zone. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
405. [52] Ministry of Defense press
release, “Annual Report,” 30 December 2002, p.
2. [53] OAS, “Landmines Removal in
Peru,” E-mine website. [54] OAS
Update on Regional Mine Action Efforts, May
2003. [55] Statement by Ambassador
Maritza Puertas de Rodríguez, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, MRE
and Mine Action Technologies, 14 May
2003. [56] OAS, “Landmines Removal
in Peru,” E-mine”
website. [57] JEFAMDEAP was formerly
known as DIVSAM-DEXA (División de Seguridad de Activación de Minas
– Dispositivos Explosivos de
Autoprotección). [58] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 405. According to the May 2002 Article 7
Report, 236 mines were cleared from those ETECEN
towers. [59] Document 036-2003-DIRSEGPU
PNP/JEFAMDEAP.APO, 28 March 2003, provided to Landmine Monitor (Perú) by
the PNP. The number of mines reported cleared from June 2002 to February 2003
totals 12,848. This figure differs from the 12,544 mines reported cleared to
March 2003 in the Article 7 Report. Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 1.2, Form G,
April 2003. [60] According to
Ministerial Resolution No. 2232-2002-IN-PNP of 18 December 2002. See Document
036-2003-DIRSEGPU PNP/JEFAMDEAP.APO, 28 March
2003. [61] Document 036-2003-DIRSEGPU
PNP/JEFAMDEAP.APO, 28 March 2003. [62]
Interview with Jaime Toso, OAS AICMA Perú, Lima, 29 May 2003. According
to the OAS, the second phase of clearance operations ended on 21 May
2003. [63] Telephone interview with
Commander Acuña, JEFAMDEAP-PNP, 5 June
2003. [64] Statement by Ambassador
Maritza Puertas de Rodríguez, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 14
May 2003. [65] PNP Document, 28 March
2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 405. According to DIVSAM-DEXA
personnel, 40 personnel received instruction in mine clearance and another 30 in
planning humanitarian demining operations between April and May
2002. [66] PNP Document, 28 March
2003. [67] Statistics compiled by
Landmine Monitor from Perú’s Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2003,
and media reports including Buenos Días Perú, Channel 5
television, 30 May 2003; “Explosión de mina deja sin manos a
niño” Perú.21 (newspaper), 30 May 2003, p.
19. [68] The inspections took place at
the Navy Base in Lima on 6-7 March 2002. Interview with Wilyam Lucar, Lima, 10
March 2003. Lt. Edgardo Velásquez (Honduras) of the Interamerican Board
of Defense verified and supervised the equipment, uniforms and procedures of
JEFAMDEAP. PNP Document, 28 March
2003. [69] Interview with former police
deminer, Lima, January 2003. [70] ICRC,
“Programa de Sensibilización,” p.
10. [71] Ibid., p.
5. [72] Four in Lima, four in
Junín and ten in Huancavelica. Ibid., p. 5 and p.
16. [73] Ibid., pp. 10,
28. [74] Ibid., p. 2. The UCSICEP
personnel were provided with food, and in some cases received compensation for
the loss of a day’s work on their
land. [75] PNP Document, 28 March
2003. [76] Article 7 Report, Form I,
April 2003. [77] Interview with Jaime
Toso, National Coordinator, OAS AICMA Perú, Lima, 29 May 2003; interview
with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Coordinator, Technical Secretariat of
Contraminas, Lima, 30 May 2003. [78]
Statement by Ambassador Maritza Puertas de Rodríguez, Standing Committee
on Mine Clearance, 14 May 2003. [79]
Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Technical Secretariat of Contraminas,
16 May 2003; statement by Ambassador Maritza Puertas de Rodríguez,
Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 14 May
2003. [80] Statistics compiled by
Landmine Monitor from Perú’s Article 7 Report, Form J (Table 2), 16
May 2002; Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2003; information provided by Fanny
Díaz, Medical Assistance Program, ICRC, 30 May
2003. [81] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, p. 406. [82] Statistics compiled
by Landmine Monitor from Perú’s Article 7 Report, Form J, April
2003, and media reports including Buenos Días Perú, Channel 5
television, 30 May 2003; “Explosión de mina deja sin manos a
niño” Perú.21 (newspaper), 30 May 2003, p.
19. [83] “Peruano herido por
mina,” La Estrella de Iquique (Iquique), 22 March 2003;
“Ejército logra rescate en zona minada,” El Mercurio
(Santiago, Chile), 22 March 2003. [84]
“OAS/Mine Victim Assistance Program in Perú,” ICBL Portfolio
of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, September 2002, p. 103, available at
www.landminevap.org. [85]
ICRC, “Programa de Sensibilización,” pp.
7-8. [86] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, p. 407. [87] Interview with
Colonel José Paz, Chief, JEFAMDEAP, Lima, 28 March
2003. [88] ICRC, “Programa de
Sensibilización,” p. 24; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
407-408. [89] ICRC, “Annual Report
2002,” Geneva, June 2003, p.
214. [90] Interview with Fanny
Díaz, Medical Assistance Program, ICRC, Lima, 30 May
2003. [91]
Ibid. [92] Article 7 Report, Form J
(Table 2), 16 May 2002; Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2003; information
provided to Landmine Monitor by Fanny Díaz, ICRC, 30 May
2003. [93] Email to ICBL from Carlos
Estrada, President, Association of Victims and Survivors of Landmines, 20 May
2003. [94] Article 7 Report, Form J,
April 2003; Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 385.
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