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Table of Contents
Country Reports
Russian Federation, Landmine Monitor Report 2003

Russian Federation

Key developments since May 2002: Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in 2002 and 2003. Russia denied new allegations of mine use by Russian peacekeeping forces in Georgia in October 2002. In 2003, Russia for the first time publicly claimed that it destroyed more than 16.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines from 1996 through 2002. In November 2002, a senior military official stated that for the past eight years Russia has not produced or supplied to its troops antipersonnel mines of the PFM-1, PMN, PMN-2, and PMN-4 types. Russia’s eight-year export moratorium expired on 1 December 2002, but officials indicate that steps to formally extend it are underway. In November 2002, the ICRC hosted a regional conference on “Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War” in Moscow.

Mine Ban Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. At an international seminar in Moscow in November 2002, a government official said, “The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation shares the concern of the international community related to the solution of the mine problem.... Russia is aware of its role and responsibility in the movement of the international community towards the future free of mines.... We understand and support the humanitarian significance of it [the ban treaty].” He listed a number of measures Russia has taken in recent years and noted that “we think they are quite concrete steps directed at realization of the Ottawa Convention.”[1]

However, he confirmed that military requirements continue to shape Russia’s attitude toward the mine ban: “As of today, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation considers anti-personnel mines as a necessary element in its purely defensive arsenals.... At this stage we are not prepared to implement the radical requirements related to a complete ban on and destruction of anti-personnel mines, and immediately accede to the Ottawa Convention.”[2]

He said Russia’s preconditions for joining the Mine Ban Treaty include the design and production of sufficient quantities of alternatives to antipersonnel mines and its ability to clear mine-affected areas and destroy antipersonnel mine stockpiles within the time frames set by the Mine Ban Treaty. Among the factors preventing Russia from joining the treaty are the “significant length of our borders, continuous tensions in different strategic directions, a number of treaty obligations in the field of defense that we share with our partners from the CIS countries, the ongoing anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya, and resistance to international terrorism including actions against drug trafficking.”[3]

Russia attended the Fourth Meeting of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in September 2002 and participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in February and May 2003. As it has done every year since 1996, Russia abstained from voting on the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74 on 22 November 2002, which called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II, but not the 1996 Amended Protocol II on landmines, booby-traps and other devices. Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification in early May 2000, but in March 2001 the ratification package was returned for further interdepartmental consultations on legal, political, military, technical, and economic matters and no progress toward ratification has been noted since then.

On 4-5 November 2002 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) hosted a regional conference on “Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War” in Moscow with the participation of official representatives from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[4] A large delegation from Russia participated in the meeting, including high-ranking officials from the Ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs. Delegations presented their national positions and circumstances regarding the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.

Production and Transfer

The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of antipersonnel mines. Since 1992, Russia has produced at least ten types of antipersonnel mines.

In November 2002, a senior military official for the first time revealed that for the past eight years Russia has not produced or supplied to its troops antipersonnel mines of the PFM-1, PMN, PMN-2, and PMN-4 types.[5] Previously, in May 1998, Russia declared that it had stopped producing blast antipersonnel mines, and, in December 2000, Russia said that it was decommissioning production facilities for blast mines.

There is no new information on the status of a prototype alternative to antipersonnel mines called the M-225 Engineer Munition with Cluster Warhead, which was first displayed at the International Exhibition of Defense and Protection Means in Nizhny Taghil on 3-6 July 2001 by the Scientific Research Machine Building Institute (NIMI).[6]

On 1 December 1994, Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This moratorium was extended for five years on 1 December 1997.[7] Although the export moratorium expired on 1 December 2002 and has not been officially extended, a Russian military official told Landmine Monitor that “Russia continues abiding by the moratorium requirements. New moratorium elaboration is underway.”[8] In a presentation to a NATO-Russia meeting in April 2003, Russia confirmed that it continues to abide by the moratorium, and stated, “The necessary documents package for the prolongation of the moratorium has been prepared and will be submitted to the RF President.”[9]

Stockpiles and Stockpile Destruction

Official information on the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Russia is not publicly available. Landmine Monitor has previously reported an estimate of 60-70 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, the world’s second largest stockpile.[10] With new reports of massive stockpile destruction, that estimate may no longer be valid.

Russian officials have acknowledged that there are antipersonnel mine stockpiles at the disposal of Russian military units in certain other CIS states. Tajikistan, a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, officially declared in February 2003 that Russian forces stockpile 18,200 antipersonnel mines of different types on its territory and that bilateral negotiations are ongoing about the disposition of these stockpiles.[11]

In 2003, Russia for the first time publicly claimed that it destroyed more than 16.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines from 1996 through 2002. This startling information is inconsistent with past statements and documents. For example, in November 2002, a senior military official publicly said that “in the period from 1991 to 2002 several million of anti-personnel mines were recycled.”[12] In December 2001, a Russian ambassador reported to CCW delegates, “To date, all in all more than 1 million anti-personnel mines were destroyed and over 1 million antitank mines and about 1 million antipersonnel engineering munitions.”[13] Very detailed information provided by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces and published in previous Landmine Monitor reports showed that 1,054,094 stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed from 1996 through 2000.[14]

The new information on stockpile destruction differs from previous information primarily with respect to PFM-1 and PFM-1S mines. Whereas before, destruction of less than 150,000 such mines had been reported, Russia now states that more than 13.8 million PFMs were destroyed from 1999 through 2002.[15] It appears that in previous reporting, Russia counted destruction of KSF-1 and KSF-1S cluster mines as one mine each, when in fact each KSF-1 contains 72 PFM-1 antipersonnel mines and each KSF-1S contains 64 PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.

From 1996-2002, Russia now reports destruction of more than 1.6 million PMN, PMN-2, and PMN-4 mines, 822,000 POMZ-2M mines, and 227,439 OZM-72 mines. The overall cost of destruction has been estimated as an equivalent of about $30 million.[16]

In 2002, Russia destroyed 638,427 antipersonnel mines, including 512,000 PFM-1S.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpile Destruction in Russia 1996-2002[17]

Type of Munitions
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Total Destroyed
PMN
 
9,908
61,400
 
40,771
609,000
3,675
724,754
PMN-2
 
 
65,100
 
 
800,000
 
865,100
PMN-4
 
 
50,000
 
 
 
 
50,000
OZM-72
 
 
25,700
 
 
94,100
107,639
227,439
MON-100
22,200
8,000
22,500
 
7,799
111,600
11,766
183,865
MON-200
11,100
5,369
12,000
 
9,036
76,600
298
114,403
POMZ-2M
 
 
197,000
350,000
 
275,000
 
822,000
PFM-1 in KSF-1[18]
 
 
 
1,615,680
3,117,600
2,592,000
 
7,325,280
PFM-1S in KSF-1S[19]
 
 
 
2,788,288
2,554,496
640,000
512,000
6,494,784
Other types
 
 
 
 
 
 
3,049
3,049
Total
33,300
23,277
433,700
4,753,968
5,729,702
5,198,300
638,427
16,810,674

At a meeting between European Union representatives and officials of MoD, MoFA and Center for Mine Action and Munitions Disposal on 27 March 2003, Russian officials lauded a Russian cementation method—developed by the state-owned Bazalt enterprise[20]—that they maintain irreversibly deprives PFM-1/1S mines of the landmine function, secures safe transportation and storage, and allows further use of “converted” cluster mines as industrial charges with no way of using them as mines; they maintain it provides a comprehensive solution to the disposal of all elements of PFM-1/1S in KSF and BKF cluster mines.[21] On 31 March 2002, the jury at the Fifth International Salon of Industrial Technologies, “Archimed 2002,” awarded the developers of this cementation process the gold medal in Ammunition Demilitarization methods.[22]

During 2002 and through early 2003, consultations have been held between Russian Foreign and Defense Ministry representatives and the NATO Partnership for Peace fund aimed at developing an agreement to demilitarize PFM-type antipersonnel mines using the Russian cementation disposal method. At the same time, preliminary talks were held on the same issue with technical experts from the European Commission.[23]

Use

Russia has acknowledged using antipersonnel mines during conflicts in the past six years in Chechnya and Tajikistan, but has denied allegations of mine use in Georgia.[24] New allegations of mine use by Russian peacekeeping forces in Georgia surfaced in October 2002.

In Chechnya, Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in 2002 and 2003. In addition to using mines to secure checkpoints, unit positions and strategic points, Russian forces use antipersonnel mines while engaged in direct combat operations. Russian forces also deployed antipersonnel mines in 1999 and 2000 from airplanes, helicopters, and rockets, resulting in large tracts of mined land that is unmarked and unfenced.[25] Russian officials continue to assert that antipersonnel mines are only used in accordance with the requirements of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. They claim all minefields are fenced and marked to prevent civilian casualties, and that once active military operations are over, minefields are cleared.[26] Neither past nor current reports coming out of Chechnya validate these claims. (See separate Landmine Monitor report on Chechnya).

Georgian media sources reported on 16 October 2002 that there was a landmine incident involving a 14-year-old boy near Kuabchara settlement, in the upper part of Kodori gorge, in the area under the control of the Georgian government.[27] According to “Rustavi-2,” a Georgian TV company, the mine had been planted by the Russian peacekeepers during their patrolling of the gorge. The press secretary of the CIS Peacekeeping Force, Aleksander Tretyakov, rejected these allegations, saying, “CIS peacekeeping forces have been conducting the monitoring of the gorge together with the UN Military Observing mission. Our task is to control the fulfillment of the 1994 Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of conflicting sides, but not to plant mines.”[28]

In February 2003, Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, reported on minefields in Tajikistan that had been laid by Russian forces.[29] Six minefields in the Rushan region of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast had been laid by Russian forces in 1995.[30] Seven other minefields in the Vanch region and eight minefields in the Darvoz region were emplaced by Russian forces in 1995. Additionally, nine minefields in “regions subordined (sic) to the central government” were emplaced in 2000 by Russian forces using PMN, PMN-2, POMZ-2, and OZM-72 antipersonnel mines. These latter minefields are located on parts of the Tajik-Afghan border that are under the control of the Russian border guard forces. The last time Russian authorities informed Tajik authorities of mine use by Russian forces in Tajikistan was October 2001.[31]

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

The problem of mines and unexploded ordnance left over from World War II remains acute in Russia. For example, bomb disposal experts reportedly were called out 159 times around St. Petersburg alone in 2002, and removed a total of nearly 15,000 World War II-era bombs and mines.[32] In Moscow and its vicinity more than 500 pieces of UXO were cleared in 2002.[33] On 18 November 2002, a German-made antipersonnel mine produced in 1939 was discovered on the edge of the road next to the residence of the Russian Federation President in Zavidovo, Tver region.[34] After violent floodwaters swept through a region on the Black Sea coast in August 2002, explosive removal experts cleared some 50 World War II-era mines and explosives found on the shore.[35]

During the period from 1946 to 2002 in the USSR/Russian Federation, more than 153 million items of UXO and mines were cleared and destroyed.[36] The overall cost for these activities has been estimated at tens of billions of US dollars.[37] A Russian Federation delegation in December 2002 stated, “Over 100,000 mines [and UXO] left after World War II are being deactivated every year in the territory of Russia.”[38] In April 2003 it was estimated that a total clearance of mines and UXO in affected areas of Russia would take 15-20 years providing “all means and resources are utilized.”[39]

There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations underway in Chechnya, but Russian engineering troops conduct military mine clearance operations on a daily basis to support the safe movement of Russian troops[40] In 2000 and 2001, the engineer units of the United Grouping of Forces in the Northern Caucasus surveyed and cleared about 317,900 landmines and UXO.[41]

The Russian Federation stated in December 2002 that Russian deminers participating in humanitarian demining programs had “rendered harmless more than 100,000 explosive objects,” including 70,000 in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, 25,000 in Abkhazia and Georgia, and 15,000 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[42]

From February through March 2002, a Russian non-governmental demining company named “Fort” participated in humanitarian demining operations in Croatia under a contract with Heinrich Hirdes GmbH. It checked and cleared over 156,000 square meters of land around the Drava-Dunai dam in Drav national park, as well as the Orlovnak, Plovar, Barbara, Yakovac, Kopachevo Channels, and the Vuka River.[43]

A Counter Mine Danger Service was reportedly established under the auspices of the Russian Federation Engineer Forces, to integrate military and civilian mine action-related elements, and to provide to the armed forces and the civilian population effective protection from dangers posed by mines and unexploded ordnance.[44] Russian officials attributed the 43 percent reduction in the number of recorded mine/UXO incidents in January-June 2003 as compared with the same period in 2002 to the successful work of the new Counter Mine Danger Service.[45]

Mine Risk Education

Currently there are no federal-level mine risk education (MRE) activities in the areas of ongoing conflict in Chechnya and neighboring territories. International aid organizations such as UNICEF and the ICRC are responsible for the bulk of mine risk education activities in affected areas in Russia. In 2002, the focus of the ICRC’s MRE activities shifted from working with internally displaced people living in Ingushetia, to supporting local structures in Chechnya. In the first half of 2003, the ICRC conducted MRE programs, including “beware of mine” poster design contests and poster displays in schools and public locations in two regions of Dagestan.[46] The ICRC also joined with the Republican puppet theater to produce an MRE puppet show, which opened in February 2003 in Makhachkala.[47] IPPNW/CBL-Russia also made a number of contributions to mine awareness efforts during the reporting period.

In 2002 and 2003, UNICEF supported MRE activities for children at internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Ingushetia. UNICEF’s implementing partners--Let’s Save the Generation, Voice of the Mountains, and others--distributed and displayed materials including posters and notebooks.[48] In May 2003, Voice of the Mountains intensified MRE activities in the camps in preparation for the expected movement of children back to Chechnya in the summer.[49] IDP children attended regular MRE dramatic performances sponsored by UNICEF at the Russian Academic Theater in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, in 2002 and 2003.[50]

Landmine Casualties

There have been substantial numbers of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999. In September 2002, five boys were killed after tampering with a World War II landmine at the site of the Stalingrad battle near Volgograd.[51] There is limited official data on mine casualties in these regions.

According to various media and military sources, there were over 1,300 mine incidents involving Russian federal forces in Chechnya from 1999 to March 2003, resulting in 2,500 military casualties. In 2002, there were at least 360 mine incidents among Russian forces. Landmine Monitor reported that in 2001, based on various sources, 279 Russian armed forces, including police and internal forces, were killed in reported landmine incidents and 684 injured. In 2000, approximately 300 Russian servicemen were killed in reported landmine incidents and over 1,000 injured.[52]

The Ministry of Health of Chechnya reported that 5,695 landmine/UXO casualties were registered by health facilities in 2002, including 938 children of which 125 were killed. In 2001, officials report that there were 2,140 landmine casualties.[53] Landmine Monitor recorded about 300 mine/UXO casualties in Chechnya from international media sources in 2002. In 2001, Landmine Monitor collated data on at least 1,153 mine casualties.[54] (See Chechnya report for more information on civilian mine casualties.)

On 8 June 2002, one Russian peacekeeper was killed and another injured by a landmine in the Kodori gorge of Georgia’s separatist Abkhazia region. The peacekeepers were patrolling the gorge near the village of Zemmo-Lata when the mine exploded.[55]

In April 2003, a Russian UN Military Observer was killed when his vehicle detonated an antivehicle mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[56]

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in the treatment of blast injuries. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. There are about seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operate in the Russian Federation.[57]

The International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, have been assisting mine survivors with surgical and rehabilitation assistance, vocational training and socio-economic reintegration since 1998.[58] Under the program an Ice Hockey-On-Prostheses Team, the “St. Petersburg Elks,” was formed. In April 2003, the team participated in the first-ever World Standing Amputee Ice Hockey Championships in Helsinki.[59] Members of the team, which includes seven mine survivors, participated in the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socioeconomic Reintegration in Geneva in February 2003, following a demonstration ice hockey match in Geneva the previous weekend.

Many international agencies and local and international NGOs are working to strengthen the health infrastructure in Ingushetia and other regions of the Northern Caucasus with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise and training for local staff at hospitals and health posts. Others have supported mobile clinics, psycho-social support services, transportation to medical facilities, and other humanitarian aid activities, often aimed at internally displaced persons from Chechnya. Organizations that engage in survivor assistance-related activities include Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, CARE International, Center for Peacemaking and Community Development, Danish Refugee Council/Danish Peoples Aid, Hammer Forum, Handicap International, ICRC, International Humanitarian Initiative, International Medical Corps, Islamic Relief, Medecins du Monde, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Memorial, People in Need Foundation, Saudi Red Crescent Society, Save the Generation, Serlo, UNHCR, UNICEF, VESTA, WHO, and World Vision.[60] (For more information see Chechnya report).

Disability Policy and Practice

Since 1995, mine survivors in Russia have been under the protection of the Federal Law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped.”[61]

The All-Russian Public National Military Foundation has been focusing its efforts on the support of military personnel injured in Chechnya. In February 2002, two major directions for the Foundation's efforts were identified: the purchase of flats for the families of the servicemen killed in Chechnya; and ensuring medical aid to servicemen wounded in Chechnya, especially to those who need prosthetic aid. According to the Chairman of the Council, state agencies including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will provide the Foundation with verified lists of persons needing medical or other aid, and the Foundation will arrange and finance the necessary aid.[62]

In May 2001 the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts, and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005” was approved by a resolution of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries.[63]

About 2.5 million people in 17 countries have benefited from the Inter-State Program’s support since 2001 through early 2003. In 2002, consultations on medical and social care, including outpatient treatment, medicines, medical care, rehabilitation, and prosthetics was provided to 2,780 veterans and members of their families. Other forms of assistance was provided to 16,152 war veterans and participants of local conflicts, 25 veteran organizations, associations, and medical institutions in Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Uzbekistan. Assistance was also provided to the Inter-regional Organization of the Vietnam War Veterans, RF Ministry of Emergency Situations and Catastrophes, Ryazan Paratroop Division, and Moscow House of Invalids.[64]


[1] Major General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of Defense, “Making the Ottawa Convention a Reality: Military Implications,” presentation to the ICRC Seminar on Landmines and ERW, Moscow, 4 November 2002.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] ICRC, “Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War: Proceedings of the Regional Conference,” Moscow, 4-5 November 2002.
[5] Presentation by Major General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of Defense, 4 November 2002.
[6] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 733.
[7] Presidential Decrees No. 2094, 1 December 1994 and No. 1271, 1 December 1997.
[8] Telephone interview with of a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 7 April 2003.
[9] Presentation by the Russian Federation delegation to a NATO-Russia Group of Experts Meeting, Brussels, 29 April 2003.
[10] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809.
[11] Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 February 2003.
[12] Presentation by Major General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of Defense, 4 November 2002.
[13] Statement by HE Ambassador Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Geneva, to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[14] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 734.
[15] Presentation by the Russian delegation to NATO meeting, 29 April 2003.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] There are 72 PFM-1 antipersonnel mines in each KSF-1 cluster.
[19] There are 64 PFM-1S antipersonnel mines in each KSF-1S cluster.
[20] “Russia patents new technology for scrapping antipersonnel mines,” Interfax, 29 May 2003.
[21] Vladimir Korenkov, General Director of FGUP GNPP “Bazalt,” at the meeting between EU representatives and officials of MoD, MoFA and Center for Mine Action and Munitions Disposal, 27 March 2003.
[22] Vadim Udmantsev, “Russia: New Technologies for Land Mine, Ammunition Disposal Examined,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review), Moscow, 21 June 2002.
[23] Interviews with Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, January-March 2003.
[24] Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation. Sent by Fax to Landmine Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications LLC, Washington DC.
[25] “Unexploded Federal Ammunition Makes Up Most of Landmines Used by Chechen Guerillas,” Interfax (Moscow) 20 May 2003.
[26] Interviews with officials from the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs during January-March 2002.
[27] Black Sea Press Information Agency, 15 October 2002; “Rustavi-2” TV company, 15 October 2002; APSNYPRESS Information Agency (Abkhazia), #210, 16 October 2002.
[28] APSNYPRESS Information Agency (Abkhazia), #210, 16 October 2002.
[29] Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form C, 3 February 2003.
[30] The number of mines used is not known, but include the following types: PMN-2, PFM-1, OZM-72, MON-50, and MON-100, as well as the ML-7 (a booby-trap).
[31] Interview with Johnmahmad Rajabov, Deputy Head of the Board of the Constitutional Guarantees of Citizens Rights, Executive Board of the President, Geneva, 5 February 2003.
[32] “15,000 WWII shells and mines found in 2002 in St Petersburg,” Agence France Presse, 30 December 2002.
[33] Vadim Udmantsev, “Moscow Is Filled with Mines and Airbombs,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (national daily), 7 March 2003.
[34] Aleksei Lyakhov, “The President Had Been Sitting on Mine,” Vremya Novostei (news agency), 18 November 2002.
[35] “At least 58 dead in Black Sea floods,” Agence France Presse, 11 August 2002.
[36] Presentation by Russian Federation Ministry of Defense to a Russia-UK meeting on anti-terrorism measures within the international military cooperation program, London, April 2003.
[37] Ibid. Military sources have cited an estimate of $46 billion to Landmine Monitor.
[38] Statement of the Delegation of the Russian Federation on Military Security and Arms Control to the Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE, 23 December 2002.
[39] Presentation by Russian Ministry of Defense to anti-terrorism meeting, April 2003.
[40] Landmine Monitor researchers prepared a 30-page list of these efforts in Chechnya during 2001, using Russian media reports and other sources.
[41] Presentation by Major General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of Defense, 4 November 2002.
[42] Statement by Russian Delegation to the OSCE, 23 December 2002.
[43] Interview with Andrei Kostiukov, Director, Fort, Moscow, 23 March 2003.
[44] Official response to Landmine Monitor (IPPNW-Russia) inquiry from Ministry of Defense, signed by General of Army Nikolai Kormiltsev, Chief Commander, Ground Forces of the Russian Federation and Deputy Minister of Defense, Ref. # 565/2507, 27 June 2003.
[45] Ibid.
[46] ICRC, “Chechnya: still in dire need of help,” 18 June 2003, at www.icrc.org.
[47] Ibid.
[48] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, 10 February 2003, and 13 January 2003.
[49] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, “OCHA Humanitarian action in Chechnya and Neighbouring Republics (Russian Federetion [sic]) 16 - 31 May 2003,” ReliefWeb, 31 May 2003.
[50] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, 10 February 2003, and October 2002.
[51] “Second World War mine kills five boys in Russia,” Reuters, 14 September 2002. For details on post-WW II casualties, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 814.
[52] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 738.
[53] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 61: 10-24 February 2003; US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002, Russia, Section 1.g.: Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts,” 31 March 2003, available at www.state.gov.
[54] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 805.
[55] “Russian peacekeeper killed in breakaway Georgian province,” Associated Press, 9 June 2002.
[56] “UN Envoy Condemns Violence in Wake of Historic Meeting in Capital,” UN News Service, 30 April 2003.
[57] For more information see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p 845; Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 907-908.
[58] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 908; see also ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victims Assistance Programs, available at www.landminevap.org.
[59] Christopher Hamilton, “Amputation No Handicap for These Hockey Players,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 April 2003.
[60] World Health Organization, “Health Sector Field Directory: Republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya, Russian Federation,” Nazran, March 2003, available at www.who.int/disasters/repo/9010.doc.
[61] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 908.
[62] RIA NOVOSTI, 21 February 2002.
[63] For details see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 740.
[64] Letter to Landmine Monitor (IPPNW-Russia) from Professor Galina Z. Demchenkova, Doctor of Medical Science, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for War Veterans Affairs under the CIS Council of Heads of Governments, 25 June 2003.