Key developments since May 2002: In an
unprecedented operation, South Korea cleared about 1,000 antipersonnel mines
from inside the DMZ as part of the inter-Korean transportation projects. It
also cleared 6,019 landmines in rear areas in 2002. The government confirmed it
has a stockpile of two million antipersonnel mines.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has not acceded to the
1997 Mine Ban Treaty. In December 2002, the ROK’s UN Ambassador in Geneva
noted that while the unprecedented demining operations in the Demilitarized Zone
“should not be interpreted in any way as altering our position on the
landmine issue, we earnestly hope that further improvement in the political and
security situation on the Korean peninsula would enable us to take a more
forward-looking stance on this
issue.”[1]
In November 2002, South Korea abstained from voting on the pro-mine ban UN
General Assembly resolution, as it had in previous years. South Korea did not
attend the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002, and it did not
participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in February and
May 2003.
South Korea is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its
Amended Protocol II on landmines. In October 2002, South Korea submitted its
annual Article 13 report required under Amended Protocol II. It participated in
Fourth Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2002. It
also attended all meetings of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts working on
Explosive Remnants of War and antivehicle mines in 2002 and 2003.
South Korea attended a subcommittee meeting of the annual Defense Forum held
in Tokyo from 28 to 30 January 2003. Session II of the meeting focused on
efforts made toward banning antipersonnel mines in Asia-Pacific region. The
participants agreed on the importance of a humanitarian response to the landmine
problem in the region and emphasized that regional security should be built
through trust-building and dialogue with a view to achieving a comprehensive ban
on antipersonnel
landmines.[2]
The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL), together with the Japan Campaign
to Ban Landmines, conducted the “No Mine World Cup” campaign aimed
at raising public awareness on the landmine issue during the Soccer World Cup
held in Korea and Japan in June 2002.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
The ROK government reported to Landmine Monitor
that it did not produce any antipersonnel mines in 2002, including Claymore
mines and remote-delivery self-destructing
mines.[3] It also reported that
it did not import any antipersonnel mines in
2002.[4] In December 2002,
South Korea stated that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite
extension of its moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines since
1997.”[5] The Research
Center of National Defense has begun research on alternatives to antipersonnel
mines and is utilizing studies conducted in other
countries.[6]
The Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that it has a stockpile of
about 2 million antipersonnel
mines.[7] This confirmed the
previous Landmine Monitor estimate. The stockpile includes 960,000 M14 mines
that were modified before July 1999 to meet the detectability requirements of
CCW Amended Protocol II.[8]
South Korea also holds an unknown number of self-destructing mines, including
US-supplied ADAM artillery-delivered, scatterable
mines.[9]
The US stockpiles more than 1 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing
antipersonnel mines, to be used in any future resumption of war in
Korea.[10] Last year’s
Landmine Monitor Report 2002 cited official US Army documentation
indicating that the US stored nearly half of the 1,138,600 non-self-destructing
mines designated for use in Korea in the continental United States, not in the
ROK.[11] However, the ROK
government in February 2003 told Landmine Monitor that the entire US stockpile
of non-self-destructing mines is in South
Korea.[12] The US also
stockpiles remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South
Korea.
Use and Landmine Problem
The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the three-to-six
mile wide Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately below the southern boundary
of the DMZ, remains one of the most heavily mined areas in the
world.[13] The Ministry of
National Defense has stated that 1,368 million square meters of land are mined
in the DMZ and CCZ.[14] The
number of mines is officially estimated at 1.1 to 1.2
million.[15] In addition, the
ROK government states that there are about 44,000 mines in 31 military sites in
“rear areas” south of the DMZ and
CCZ.[16]
There are also significant “unconfirmed minefields,” particularly
around Yonchon.[17] Yonchon
County authorities have reported that unconfirmed minefields cover an area of
1,411,606 square meters in 25
villages.[18] According to
KCBL, most unconfirmed minefields are marked with a small number of faded signs
and decayed barbed wire. However, the ROK government in its October 2002
Article 13 report, declared, “units located near the borderline have
amended a significant amount of mine field and mine area signs to enhance their
visibility and recognition by the civilian
population.”[19]
Each year, torrential rains sweep antipersonnel mines out of minefields. In
2001, it was publicly disclosed that more than 1,000 landmines have been lost
since 1998, after being washed out of the minefields or military bases by heavy
rains.[20] In September 2002,
84 antipersonnel mines were displaced in Gangneung, Gangwon province because of
typhoon Lusa; the Army recovered 52 of the
mines.[21] During the recovery
operations, an Army officer lost his left eye and both hands in a landmine
explosion.[22]
KCBL, with the support of Community Chest of Korea, conducted research on
past use of landmines by the US Army. From April to August 2002, the KCBL
research team visited about 60 US Army sites or facilities, gathered documents,
and interviewed residents and landmine survivors living close by. On 15 January
2003, KCBL released its report that concluded that the US Army was responsible
for most of the landmines deployed during the Korean War from 1951-1953, and
during the Cuban Crisis in
1962.[23] The US Forces Korea
(USFK) responded by saying that the report contained incorrect information, that
the United States was not responsible for landmines in Korea, and that the US
had shared all necessary information regarding minefields with the ROK Army for
many years.[24]
On 19 September 2002, the ROK Army began its
first-ever demining operations in the DMZ, as part of the two inter-Korean
transportation projects to link railways and
roads.[25] The two Koreas
simultaneously commenced mine clearance in accordance with an agreement
initially reached in July 2000, as well as a subsequent military security
agreement on 17 September 2002 governing the demining
operations.[26] The operations
were completed in December 2002. The ROK Army cleared about 1,000 landmines in
225,800 square meters of land in the western section and 25,800 square meters in
the eastern section.[27] Of the
two corridors cleared in the southern part of the DMZ, one in the west is 1.8
kilometers long and 250 meters wide and the other one in the east is1.2
kilometers long and 120 meters
wide.[28]
The ROK Army used a six-step demining process in steep and rocky terrain and
a four-step process in other terrain. The ROK used its German Mine Breaker and
Rhino machines, and its British MK-4 machine, to clear mines in the western
section (Gyeungui).[29]
In addition to the DMZ demining, in 2002 the ROK military cleared 6,019
landmines from the periphery of seven military camps and air force bases in rear
areas.[30] The ROK military
intends to clear landmines from thirteen sites in the rear in 2003, and to
complete clearance operations there by 2006.
The government reports that, in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II, ROK
Armed Forces have updated 12,443 signs for minefields, and constructed
wire-entanglements with a total length of about 116 kilometers around
bases.[31]
The ROK states that it provides mine risk education to the civilians living
in the CCZ via television, radio, and
pamphlets.[32] According to a
survey in the rear areas made by KCBL, the residents of 36 mine-affected
districts have not received any mine risk education from the military or the
local government.[33]
KCBL produced a video documentary “Landmine,” directed by
Chung-hoon Chang, which was broadcast by Korea Broadcasting System on 15 March
2003.[34]
In 2002, the ROK government contributed US$100,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust
Fund, allocating $40,000 to Laos, $30,000 to Cambodia and $30,000 to Sri
Lanka.[35]
Landmine Casualties
In 2002, eight new landmine incidents were
reported resulting in 15 casualties, of which two people were killed and 13
injured.[36]
In April 2002, at Kegok-ri in Kyunggi-do, six people including a 5-year-old
boy were injured by a mine in a rice field, and in a separate incident in the
DMZ, three Korean soldiers were injured by a landmine while trying to recover
the body of a man who had been killed in an earlier mine explosion. In another
April incident, a man was injured after hitting a K440 mine while driving his
truck in Yongtae-ri, Pajoo city. Two months later another truck driver lost his
sight after hitting an antitank mine. In June 2002, a 29-year-old soldier was
killed by a landmine in Inje county, and a 33-year-old woman required an
amputation after stepping on an M14 mine in Namge-ri, Yonchon city. In October
2002, a South Korean soldier was injured in a mine incident at
Chulwon.[37]
In 2001, four new landmine casualties were
reported.[38]
Casualties continue in 2003 with two new landmine casualties reported. In
April, a 64-year-old woman was killed by a mine at Mt. Chun-dok, in Kyunggi-do
province, after entering a minefield to pick herbs. In a similar incident in
May a 72-year-old woman stepped on an M14 mine while picking herbs in a
minefield.[39]
Survivor Assistance
South Korean civilian casualties of landmines can
file for government compensation through the State Compensation Act. Medical
bills are covered by the National Medical Insurance system. Soldiers injured
while on duty, receive a veteran’s pension and free medical services from
the Veterans Hospital.[40]
Depending on the degree of their injuries, the government also provides
preferential treatment for military mine survivors such as tax cuts and
employment advantages for their
children.[41]
While the government states that it pays compensation to civilian casualties
of landmines through the State Compensation Act, it seems very few survivors are
actually receiving any government benefits. The KCBL claims that the national
compensation law has several
limitations.[42]
In 2002, two landmine survivors won lawsuits for compensation against the
State. On 3 November 2002 the Seoul district court ordered the State to pay
compensation of about $100,000 to a civilian mine survivor and his
family.[43] On 13 November 2002
another landmine survivor was awarded $8,000
compensation.[44] These cases
represent the first time that the Court has recognized the State’s
responsibility for a mine incident.
The Seoul-based NGO, Global Civic Sharing, supports mine survivors and other
persons with disabilities in Vietnam. In 2002, 337 people were provided with
prostheses, including 62 mine
survivors.[45]
[1] Statement of Ambassador Chung Eui-Yong,
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, at the
Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 11 December
2002. [2] Papers distributed by the
Japanese Defense Agency at the seminar on stockpile destruction, Tokyo, 14
February 2003. [3] Response to Landmine
Monitor (KCBL) from Col. Gi-ok Kim, Director, International Arms Control
Division, Arms Control Office, Ministry of National Defense, 13 May 2003;
response to Landmine Monitor (JK) from ROK Mission to the UN, New York, 26
February 2003. For details on past production of Claymore-type and other mines,
see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
680-681. [4] Response from ROK Mission
to the UN, 26 February 2003. Earlier ROK mine imports from the US are detailed
in previous Landmine Monitor reports. In case of a renewed war in Korea, the US
plans to transfer most of its M14 and M16 mines that are stockpiled in South
Korea to the ROK Army. See, Human Rights Watch press release, “Landmines:
Almost Half of Korea Mines in U.S.,” 3 December
2001. [5] Statement of Ambassador Chung
Eui-Yong, Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 11
December 2002. As discussed in Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 681, the
moratorium apparently does not include Claymore-type mines. However, Col. Kim
reported that South Korea did not export any Claymore-type mines in 2002.
Response from Col. Gi-ok Kim, Ministry of National Defense, 13 May
2003. [6] Response from Col. Gi-ok Kim,
Ministry of National Defense, 13 May
2003. [7]
Ibid. [8] Response from Lt. Col Su-yong
Song, Ministry of National Defense, to Landmine Monitor (KCBL), 14 May 2002.
[9] For more details, see Landmine
Monitor Report 2001, p. 544. [10] See
Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p.
333. [11] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, pp. 681-682. [12] Response of the
ROK Mission to the UN, 26 February
2003. [13] Ibid. Sometimes the depth of
the CCZ is cited as 3 to 12 miles. See Jeon Ick-Jin, “Rail Trip Offers
View of North,” Joongang Ilbo (South Korean daily newspaper), 24 January
2002. [14] Response of Ministry of
National Defense to Lawmaker Sung-ho Kim, National Congress, Seoul, 10 October
2000. [15] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, p. 682, for various US and ROK estimates and details on types of mines.
Some sources have estimated 2 million mines in the DMZ and another 1 million in
the CCZ. [16] Response of ROK Mission to
the UN, 26 February 2003. Last year, the government cited 49,149 mines in 39
minefields at 38 US and ROK military sites. Some of the minefields have since
been cleared. Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
682. [17] The ROK Army defines
unconfirmed minefields as areas that are suspected to be mined, but for which
there are not maps and other type of information. Such areas have signs saying
“Unconfirmed Minefield
Danger.” [18] Yonhap News, 6 May
2003. [19] Article 13 Report, Form D,
October 2002. [20] “1,000 Land
Mines Unaccounted For,” Korea Times, 17 September
2001. [21] Jai-kook Cho, “Campaign
to Ban Landmines as practical task of Brighten One Corner,” in Brighten
One Corner 2002, Anyang University Press, 2002, pp. 272-273; “Lost
Landmines,” Yonhap News, 3 September 2002; “About 80 Landmines Lost
in Kangnung,” Joongang Ilbo, 4 September 2002. In its 2002 Article 13
report (Form B), the ROK indicated that the Armed Forces detected and cleared 45
landmines swept away by rains. [22]
“Medal to Landmine Victim Officer,” Yonhap News, 24 December
2002. [23] KCBL, “Report on
Antipersonnel Mine Use by US Forces Korea and the Situation of Civilian Victims
in Korea,” 15 January 2003, p. 23,
www.kcbl.or.kr. [24]
US Forces Korea issued a statement (in Korean) on 20 January 2003 responding to
the KCBL report. [25] The projects will
link up two major railways, the Gyeungui line on the west coast and the Donghae
line on the east coast. [26] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 541; Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
679. [27] Response of ROK Mission to the
UN, 26 February 2003. Article 13 Report, Form B, October 2002, cites estimates
of clearing 1,500 in the west and 400 in the east. Article 13, Form G, also
states that 850,000 square meters were cleared in the process of constructing
the Gyeungui railway and highway. [28]
Response from Col. Gi-ok Kim, Ministry of National Defense, 13 May
2003. [29] Article 13 Report, Forms E
and G, October 2002. Details on the demining processes are
provided. [30] Article 13 Report, Form
B, October 2002. Col. Kim said 9,000 M14 mines were cleared from seven
minefields. Response from Col. Gi-ok Kim, Ministry of National Defense, 13 May
2003. [31] Article 13 Report, Form D,
October 2002. [32] Response from ROK
Mission to the UN, 26 February
2003. [33] KCBL, “Report on
minefields of rear area in Korea,” 26 July 2001, p.
16. [34] Omynews, 14 March
2003. [35] Response from ROK Mission to
the UN, 26 February 2003. [36] The KCBL
collects information on landmine incidents from various sources; see also
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
683. [37] Response from ROK Mission to
the UN, 26 February 2003. [38] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
683. [39] The KCBL collects information
on landmine incidents from various
sources. [40] Response from ROK Mission
to the UN, 26 February 2003. [41] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p.
549. [42] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, p. 684. [43] Yonhap News, 6
November 2002. [44] Yonhap News, 18
November 2002. [45] Information provided
to KCBL by Global Civic Sharing.
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