Key developments since May 2002: The UK
provided £10.7 million (US$16 million) to mine action in financial year
2002-2003, a decrease from £12 million in 2001-2002. In May 2003, the UK
announced £4 million ($6 million) for mine clearance and coordination of
mine action in Iraq. The UK decided to reduce the number of mines retained
under Article 3, destroying 3,116 mines by June 2003. The UK has further
elaborated its views on the issue of joint operations with non-States Parties
that may use antipersonnel mines, and clarified its position that transit of
antipersonnel mines is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. The UK has stated
that tripwires, break wires and tilt rods are not acceptable methods of
detonating antivehicle mines. Two British nationals were killed and three
others injured in landmine/UXO explosions in 2002 and early 2003.
Mine Ban Policy
The United Kingdom signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3
December 1997 and ratified it on 31 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March
1999. National legislation (the Landmines Act 1998) includes penal
sanctions.[1]
The UK participated in the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September
2002. The UK took over responsibility for chairing the Sponsorship Program,
which assists mine-affected and less developed countries to attend Mine Ban
Treaty meetings, and contributed £25,000
(US$37,500)[2] to the
Committee’s funds.[3] The
UK also participated actively in the Standing Committee meetings in February and
May 2003, including the Universalization and Resource Mobilization Contact
Groups, as well as the President’s Consultations in January and May 2003
on the 2004 Review Conference.
In November 2002, the UK voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution
57/74, which calls for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty.
In February 2003, the Ministry of Defence carried out a treaty compliance
exercise, Operation Partlett. This was the fourth such exercise to be
undertaken at different military premises in the UK.
In March 2003, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) informed Parliament
that, three years after the FCO’s last global effort, British officials in
countries which are not members of the Mine Ban Treaty will ask their host
government what plans there are for ratification or accession. The UK sees the
Universalization Contact Group, established by States Parties, as “a
valuable part of the Ottawa follow-up process.” Other activities in
support of universalization included funding an exploratory visit on 13-15
November 2002 by a UK ordnance expert to the Russian Federation in connection
with the destruction of stockpiled PFM antipersonnel
landmines.[4]
On 30 April 2003, the UK submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report
for calendar year 2002. This is the UK’s fifth Article 7
report.[5]
The UK is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its
Amended Protocol II and submitted the annual report required by Article 13 of
the Protocol in October 2002.[6]
The UK attended the Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to the Protocol
in December 2002.
Joint military operations and “assist”
The UK delegation stated during a Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meeting
in February 2003 that Parliament had been informed that UK forces may not
participate actively in the use of antipersonnel mines or in any physical
activity related to the use of antipersonnel mines, may not seek benefit from
their use by others, and may not request their use in support of UK forces. It
added that any interpretation would have to take into account the military
realities of the battlefield at the
time.[7]
At a May 2003 Standing Committee meeting, the UK delegation provided
additional details: The United Kingdom has a broad interpretation of assistance
under the terms of Article 1 of the Convention. Unacceptable activities include:
planning with others for the use of anti-personnel mines (APM); training others
for the use APM; agreeing Rules of Engagement permitting the use of APM;
agreeing operational plans permitting the use of APM in combined operations;
requests to non-States Parties to use APM; and providing security or transport
for APM. Furthermore, it is not acceptable for UK forces to accept orders that
amount to assistance in the use of APM. UK forces should not seek to derive
direct military benefits from the deployment of APM in combined operations. It
is not, however, always possible to say in advance that military benefit will
not arise where this results from an act that is not deliberate or
pre-planned.[8]
The Ministry of Defence also reported to Parliament on 24 February 2003 that,
“United Kingdom Forces will not provide any assistance for the use of
antipersonnel
landmines.”[9] However,
it earlier stated that “the mere participation in the planning or
execution of operations, exercises or other military activity by the UK’s
Armed Forces, or individual UK nationals, conducted in combination with armed
forces of States not party to the Ottawa Convention, which engage in activity
prohibited by that Convention, is not, by itself, assistance, encouragement or
inducement.”[10] Landmine
Action and other campaigning organizations continue to argue against this
definition of assistance, and believe that Section 5 of the Landmines Act 1998
could serve as a loophole in the prohibition against use.
In January 2003, DynCorp Aerospace Ltd was reported as “being
offered” a contract worth £600 million (US$900 million) to maintain
weapons stockpiles in Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, including antipersonnel mines.
The magazine report stated that the company employs British ex-servicemen to
work on the contract.[11] On 11
April 2003, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was
asked to make a statement on the maintenance of landmine stores in the Gulf
region by DynCorp Aerospace Ltd. Such maintenance would seemingly violate the
Mine Ban Treaty prohibition on assistance. The FCO responded that it was
“not aware that any investigation has been launched into the activities of
DynCorp Aerospace Ltd. or that any of its employees have been prosecuted for
breaches of the 1998 Landmines Act. The Department has not come into the
possession of any relevant evidence, though naturally, if it were to do so, it
would pass this to the police for
investigation.”[12]
Foreign stockpiles and transit of antipersonnel mines
Landmine Monitor has previously reported that US antipersonnel mines have
been stored on ships offshore the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego
Garcia. The UK government has stated that “US stocks do not fall under
our national jurisdiction or control,” and therefore the UK has no
obligation to have them removed or
destroyed.[13]
At a Standing Committee meeting in February 2003, the UK delegation confirmed
its position that transit of foreign antipersonnel mines through UK territory is
contrary to the obligations of the Mine Ban
Treaty.[14] At a Standing
Committee meeting in May 2003, the UK said that, “permitting transit
across UK territory would amount to assistance under the terms of Article
1.” It added, “If APM [antipersonnel mines] are on foreign naval
ships in the territorial waters of a UK Dependent Territory, these naval ships
remain the sovereign territory of the state in question. In the UK’s
legal interpretation such APM are not on UK territory provided they remain on
the ships.” [15]
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office maintained that during operations in
Afghanistan in 2002, US antipersonnel mines were not transited, stockpiled, or
maintained on the Diego Garcia bases in British Indian Ocean Territory, to which
the UK Landmines Act
applies.[16]
In January 2003, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund and Landmine
Action raised concerns about transit of foreign mine stockpiles on the British
Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia in the build-up to the conflict in
Iraq.[17] On 25 February 2003,
the Minister of State for the Armed Forces wrote that “it is clear that
the stockpiling of US antipersonnel mines on UK territory, including Diego
Garcia, or the transit of antipersonnel mines across UK territory would
constitute a breach of our obligations under the Ottawa Convention.... The
United States...has assured us that it will respect our international treaty
obligations. Any landmines that may be on US naval ships or military aircraft
are not under the jurisdiction or control of the UK. However, if antipersonnel
mines were off-loaded on to land, e.g. to be transferred from ship to aircraft,
this would not be consistent with our Ottawa Convention
obligations.”[18]
Antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices
At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002, the UK delegation
stated that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices do not fall within the
Mine Ban Treaty, and that “the CCW process is the right place in which to
consider how best to reduce the humanitarian risks presented by some antivehicle
mines.”[19] This view was
repeated at a Standing Committee meeting in May 2003, where the UK delegation
stated, “On the definition of anti-personnel mines in the Convention, the
UK does not accept that certain so-called sensitive fuses for anti-vehicle or
anti-tank mines are banned by the Convention.... We have worked closely on our
legal interpretation of the definition, as we did at the Oslo [negotiating]
conference, and are confident in our
interpretation.”[20] Also
in May, the UK also opposed a proposal of the International Committee of the Red
Cross to do expert work on antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes within the
Mine Ban Treaty context.[21]
At a Standing Committee meeting in February 2003, the UK stated that, in the
CCW context, it is reviewing fuzing mechanisms for antivehicle
mines.[22] In the CCW Group of
Governmental Experts dealing with the issue, the UK stated on 14 March 2003 that
tripwires, break wires and tilt rods are not acceptable methods of detonating
mines other than antipersonnel mines, and has recommended a descriptive approach
to establishing best practices regarding sensitive
fuzes.[23]
Regarding the Mk. 7 and L3A1 antivehicle mines for which there was previously
said to be a continuing requirement, the Ministry of Defence stated in March
2003, “We no longer hold operational stocks of either of these AVMs.
We are making efforts to destroy [them] as they are no longer in
use.”[24]
Transfer and Stockpiling
Antipersonnel mine production facilities in the UK
were converted or decommissioned by 1999. Destruction of the UK’s
stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines was completed in October
1999.
Regarding the offer by the UK company, PW Defence Ltd, to supply landmines to
a BBC journalist, reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2002, the Crown
Prosecution Service stated in November 2002 that there were no grounds for legal
action.[25] Referring to this
incident, a parliamentary Early Day Motion was started in May 2002, which had
received 94 signatures by MPs by the end of 2002.
During the Ministry of Defence’s treaty compliance exercise, Operation
Partlett, in February 2003, it was noted by a Landmine Action observer that
there were still some JP233 dispensers and at least one HB876 bomblet present on
military premises.[26] The HB
876 submunition for the JP233 weapon system was previously described by the
government as the “last of the RAF’s operational stocks of
APMs” whose destruction “was completed on 19 October
1999.”[27] The UK’s
Article 7 report for 2002 repeats previous statements that the HB876 destruction
program has been completed.[28]
The MoD subsequently said that the mines are “among old munitions awaiting
or in the process of destruction, and could in no way be considered as
operational stocks. The MoD accepts that the JP233 system falls within the
definition of anti-personnel mines in the Ottawa
Convention.”[29]
Mines Retained Under Article 3
In 1998, the UK intended to “retain about
4,000 anti-personnel landmines,” but by the end of 2001, the number
retained had increased to
4,949.[30] The April 2003
Article 7 report indicated that the total had reduced to 4,899 at the end of
2002, with the consumption of 28 C3 Elsie mines and 22 foreign mines. How these
mines were consumed was not
reported.[31]
At a Standing Committee meeting in May 2003, the UK delegation stated that at
the time of entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty it was difficult to estimate
how many mines would be needed for the training and development purposes
permitted by the treaty’s Article 3. The UK then announced,
“Despite the fact that the UK is active in the areas of research specified
in Article 3, we have found that our initial estimate of requirement is more
than we need. We are therefore planning to reduce our holding significantly in
the near future.”[32]
On 9 June 2003, the Ministry of Defence told Landmine Monitor that the UK
had destroyed all 2,088 Ranger mines and all 1,028 C3 (Elsie) mines previously
retained under Article 3.[33]
This left 1,783 retained mines “of foreign manufacture for the development
of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction
techniques.”[34]
Asked to describe the purposes for which mines are retained, the Ministry of
Defence stated on 19 March 2003 that they are used for “training explosive
and mine detection dogs; training military and civilian mine clearance
personnel; making relevant training films, videos, and posters; testing and
trials of mine clearance devices; and testing and trials of protective clothing
and equipment.”[35]
Mine Action Funding and Assistance
The UK reports that it “selects carefully
targeted projects working mainly through UN agencies, with limited support now
going via specialist NGOs and national demining agencies.... The focus
continues to be on projects which alleviate poverty and support national
capacity-building so that affected countries can take an increasingly effective
role in their national demining
programs.”[36] This
strategy was also described at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2003,
where the UK delegation added that it encourages “practical innovation to
enhance safety and efficiency in operations,” and wants “to see
strengthening of international systems for co-ordination and
collaboration.” The UK’s policy is no longer to fund NGOs or
countries bilaterally, but instead to agree to global programs with UN agencies,
which are then responsible for allocations based on criteria such as,
“good country policies and performance on mine clearance...preventing
disability or obtaining urgent humanitarian access for displaced populations,
and funding gaps.”[37]
In May 2003, the UK delegation also expressed concern that not enough was
being done to assist in the care and rehabilitation of mine survivors. The UK
had earmarked “a significant amount of financial resources to address this
issue.”[38] Victim
assistance funding “focuses on assisting disabled people, including
antipersonnel mine victims, through bilateral programs aimed at poverty
eradication, health care and community-based
rehabilitation.”[39]
In the future, the Department for International Development (DFID) plans to
provide £10 million (US$15 million) for mine action annually – an
amount lower than the past four years. Additionally, “mine victims
benefit from DFID’s mainstream health and population and social
development programs, as well as specific programs assisting the
disabled.”[40]
DFID estimated its contribution to humanitarian mine clearance, mine risk
education, and mine-related research and development in the financial year April
2002 – April 2003 as £10.7 million (US$16.05
million).[41] This represents a
decrease from £12 million in 2001-2002, and £16 million in 2000-2001.
In the past three years funds for research and development have increased each
year from £1 million, to £1.3 million, to £1.4 million, while
funding for other mine action has decreased from £15 million, to £10.7
million, to £9.3
million.[42]
In 2002-2003, an estimated £9 million ($13.5 million) was allocated to
humanitarian mine clearance and integrated mine risk education programs,
£300,000 ($450,000) to UNICEF for mine risk education, and £1.4
million ($2.1 million) to research and
development.[43]
Funds of some £3.5 million were earmarked for specific countries in
2002-2003, including Afghanistan – $1.8 million ($2.7 million); Nicaragua
– £378,000 ($567,000); Cambodia – £500,000 ($750,000);
Northern Iraq – £500,000 ($750,000); and Georgia –
£325,000 ($487,500). The activities funded are said to be generally
integrated and include elements other than humanitarian mine clearance, such as
mine risk education.[44] The
funding for Cambodia was later said to have been moved to
2003-2004.[45]
On 23 May 2003, Parliament was informed that £115 million (US$172.5
million) allocated “to support work by humanitarian agencies in the
current crisis” in Iraq included £4 million (US$6 million) to the UN
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) for mine clearance and coordination of mine action
in Iraq, and £80,883 ($121,325) to the Mines Advisory Group for “mine
action preparedness, mine marking and deployment of coordinators” in
central and southern Iraq.[46]
For 2002-2003, the majority of funds were allocated to implementing
organizations, as shown in the table below. However, this data from a
parliamentary report results in a total of £11.07 million funding in
2002-2003, not £10.7 as cited above. The difference between the two
figures is attributed to varying
estimates.[47] The
discrepancies are not known. The UNMAS Mine Action Investments database does
not have a UK annual donor report for 2002, and this data was not included in
the April 2003 Article 7 report.
Mine action expenditure by implementing organization in
2002-2003[48]
Organization
Amount in GB£
Equivalent amount in US$
UNMAS
5,300,000
7,950,000
UNDP
2,500,000
3,750,000
GICHD
1,000,000
1,500,000
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (bilateral)
660,000
990,000
OAS (Nicaragua demining)
378,000
567,000
The HALO Trust (bilateral)
325,000
487,500
UNICEF (Mines Awareness)
300,000
450,000
QINETIQ (Tech Advice and Testing)
219,000
328,500
Landmine Monitor
137,000
205,500
ERA (Research and Development)
117,000
175,500
BARIC Consultants (Technical Advice)
100,000
150,000
SERCO (Research and Development)
30,000
45,000
DISARMCO (Research and Development)
10,000
15,000
Total
11,076,000
16,614,000
In July 2002, the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Development (CHAD)
department of DFID carried out an assessment mission to Angola to determine the
extent of the humanitarian crisis, including that caused by
landmines.[49]
The UK and Denmark jointly engaged an independent consultant to evaluate the
UN mine action program for
Afghanistan.[50]
Non-financial assistance in 2002 included UK military advisers attached to UN
mine action centers assisting in the development of mine action programs. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina they also supervised mine clearance and provided mine
awareness to local
populations.[51]
The Ministry of Defence Mine Information Training Centre (MITC) provides mine
awareness to military personnel prior to deployment overseas, and to other
government departments, NGOs, academia, industry and civilians. Since December
1997, the Centre has provided mine awareness training to more than 51,000 people
including over 1,500 returning Kosovo refugees. The government states that it
“is impossible to cost accurately” this
work.[52]
DFID estimated that £1.4 million ($2.1 million) was spent on research
and development in 2002-2003 in connection with humanitarian mine
action.[53] No details of
individual projects have been reported. Several UK companies continue research
into mine detection and destruction or
clearance.[54]
NGO Mine Action and Funding
British NGOs engaged in humanitarian mine clearance include the HALO Trust
(in Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Kosovo, Karabakh, Mozambique, Somaliland and Sri Lanka), Landmine Action
(Sudan), the Mines Advisory Group (Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia,
Burma, Cambodia, Lao, Lebanon, Mauritania, Namibia, Northern Iraq, Somaliland,
Sri Lanka and Viet Nam) and the Mines Awareness Trust.
British NGOs which support survivor assistance programs in mine-affected
countries, include Action on Disability and Development, Afghanaid, Africa
Educational Trust, CAFOD, Cambodia Trust, Handicap International UK, Heather
Mills Health Trust, Hope for Children, Jaipur Limb Campaign UK, Jesuit Refugee
Service, Mercy Corps Scotland, Motivation, POWER, Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan
Appeal, Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund, and Soroptomist
International.
Details on the activities of these NGOs can be found in the various country
reports of this edition of Landmine Monitor Report.
In 2002, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund announced another round
of grants for victim assistance and mine risk education
programs.[55] Total
“Landmines and Disabilities” funding of £1,170,716 over three
years (US$1,756,074 at 2002 exchange rate) will support programs run by British
NGOs in Colombia (Children of the Andes), Abkhazia (HALO Trust), Angola (Mines
Advisory Group and Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund), and Pakistan
(Response International). In addition, “Helping Communities Post
Conflict” funding of £455,290 over three years ($682,935) will
support mine survivor assistance run by British NGOs in Laos (POWER) and Sri
Lanka (Motivation). Mercy Corps Scotland also receives £99,000 ($148,500)
for its rehabilitation program on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Hope for
Children supports a mobile prosthetic unit in Sri Lanka supported by the Fund.
Other NGO Activities
In November 2002, Landmine Action and its
coalition members held an awareness week highlighting humanitarian concerns
related to landmines and explosive remnants of war. A parliamentary meeting was
co-organized with the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines to raise awareness
within the Pakistani community in the UK of the landmine situation in Pakistan.
Landmine Action is working in partnership with the Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban
Landmines and Geneva Call on a cross-conflict initiative to ban antipersonnel
mines in Sri Lanka during 2003. Landmine Action also launched a schools’
pack on the landmine issue.
Handicap International (UK) arranged a week-long program on landmines and
mine action on The Community Channel, a cable TV channel dedicated to the work
of charities and NGOs.
Landmine Problem
The Mine Ban Treaty commits States Parties to have
completed “destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after
entry into force” of the treaty. The ten-year deadline for the UK runs
out on 1 March 2009.
The UK reports as in previous years, that it is “working towards a
UK-led study, to be funded by the Argentine Government, into the feasibility of
mine clearance options” in the
Falklands/Malvinas.[56] In line
with the International Mine Action Standards, the UK has appointed a National
Mine Action Authority to allow for future
work.[57]
World War II mines are occasionally found in the UK, usually on the
coastline. In October 2002, one such mine was discovered on a beach in Norfolk,
reportedly one of 350,000 laid during the
war.[58]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
The Ministry of Defence states that there were no
new mine casualties among British armed forces personnel between January 2002
and February 2003.[59] On 31
March 2003, a British soldier was killed in southern Iraq during an explosive
ordnance disposal operation.[60]
In April 2003, a British soldier was killed by a landmine near Basra in
Iraq.[61]
In July 2002, a British national was injured clearing landmines in southern
Lebanon while working for the British company BACTEC
International.[62] Another
British national was injured by an antipersonnel mine in Sri Lanka during
November 2002.[63] In April
2003, a BBC producer was injured and his Iranian cameraman was killed in a
landmine explosion in northern
Iraq.[64]
[1] For details of national legislation,
see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.
813-814. [2] GB£1 = US$1.50, used
throughout this report. Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 6 January 2003. [3]
Hansard, 3 March 2003, col. 850W; interview with John Wattam, Permanent Mission
to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 7 February
2003. [4] Email from Nick McDuff, United
Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 5 June
2003. [5] Article 7 Report, 30 April
2003 (for calendar year 2002); Article 7 Report, 21 March 2002 (for calendar
year 2001); Article 7 Report, 25 April 2001 (for the period 1 April 2000-31
December 2000); Article 7 Report, 17 April 2000 (for the period 1 August 1999-1
April 2000); Article 7 Report, 26 August 1999 (for the period 1 March-1 August
1999). [6] Amended Protocol II Article
13 Report, October 2002 (day not
given). [7] Intervention by the UK,
Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention,
Geneva, 7 February 2003 (Landmine Monitor/LA notes); email from Peter Balmer,
Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence, 13 February
2003. [8] Intervention by the UK on
Article 1, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the
Convention, Geneva, 16 May 2003, available at
www.gichd.ch. [9]
Hansard, 24 February 2003, col.
303W. [10] Hansard, 9 January 2003, col.
294W. [11] “The Desert
Pong,” Private Eye (weekly magazine), No. 1072, 24 January-6 February
2003. Although not stated in the report, the weapons stores presumably belong
to the US. [12] Hansard, 11 April 2003,
col. 437W. [13] See, Landmine Monitor
Report 2001, p. 818. [14] UK
Intervention, Standing Committee on the General Status, 7 February 2003; email
from Peter Balmer, Ministry of Defence, 13 February
2003. [15] UK Intervention, Standing
Committee on the General Status, 16 May
2003. [16] Hansard, 26 February 2002,
col. 1155W, and 15 March 2002, col.
1298W. [17] The Diana, Princess of Wales
Memorial Fund and Landmine Action press release, 14 January
2003. [18] Letter from the Rt. Hon. Adam
Ingram MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, 25 February
2003. [19] Statement by the UK on
Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva,
16-20 September 2002 (Landmine Monitor
notes). [20] Intervention by the UK on
Article 2, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the
Convention, Geneva, 16 May 2003, available at
www.gichd.ch. [21] See ICBL
Interventions on Article 2, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention, Geneva, 16 May
2003. [22] UK Intervention, Standing
Committee on the General Status, 7 February 2003.
[23] Email from Reza Afshar,
Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence, 3 April
2003. [24] Email from Reza Afshar,
Ministry of Defence, in late March
2003. [25] “Chemring says
authorities to take no further action over landmine allegations,” AFX
(news agency), 2 November 2002; see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 507-508
for this and other similar
incidents. [26] Report by Landmine
Action representative, Operation Partlett, 5 February 2003.
[27] Hansard, 25 October 1999, col.
695; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p.
749. [28] Article 7 Report, Form F, 30
March 2003. [29] Email to Landmine
Action from Peter Balmer, Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry
of Defence, 28 July 2003. [30] Letter
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to UK Working Group on Landmines, 27
April 1998; Article 7 Report, Form D, 21 March 2002.
[31] Article 7 Report, , Form D.1, 30
April 2003. [32] UK Intervention,
Standing Committee on the General Status, 16 May
2003. [33] Telephone interview with Reza
Afshar, Ministry of Defence, 9 June
2003. [34] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30
April 2003. [35] Hansard, 19 March 2003,
col.782W. [36] Response to the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) questionnaire,
October 2002 (day not stated); see also Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
510-511. [37] “Statement by John
Wattam,” Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration,” Geneva, 13 May
2003. [38]
Ibid. [39] Response to OSCE
questionnaire, October 2002; see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
510-511. [40] “Statement by John
Wattam,” Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, 13 May
2003. [41] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col.
956W. [42] Ibid. For comparison with
previous years, see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
511. [43] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col.
956W. [44] Ibid.; emails from Andrew
Willson, Department for International Development, 2 and 5 June
2003. [45] Email from Andrew Willson,
Department for International Development, 2 June
2003. [46] Hansard, 21 May 2003, col.
815W. [47] Email from Andrew Willson,
Department for International Development, 2 June
2003. [48] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col.
956W. Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 2
June 2003, stated that the contribution to QinetiQ was £219,000 (recorded
as £200,000 by Hansard), for UK representation on the International Test
and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP). The total of funding
in 2002-2003 has been adjusted accordingly.
[49] Hansard, 28 October 2002, col.
552W. [50] Informal Minutes, Reinforced
Mine Action Support Group meeting, New York, 14 November 2002, in Newsletter,
Mine Action Support Group, December
2002. [51] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col.
956W. [52] Ibid.; Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Form F, October
2002. [53] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col.
956W. [54] Hansard, 10 March 2003, col.
61W. [55] The Diana, Princess of Wales
Memorial Fund, at
www.theworkcontinues.org. [56] Article 7
Report, Form F, 30 April 2003. [57]
Hansard, 5 March 2003, col. 1068W. [58]
Jerome Monahan Lindsey Fraser, “Underground killers left behind by
wars,” Guardian, 29 October
2002. [59] Telephone interview with Reza
Afshar, Ministry of Defence, 11 February
2003. [60] Andrew Ellson,
“Casualties of War,” Guardian, 3 April
2003. [61] Michael Smith,
“Landmine kills British soldier,” Daily Telegraph, 2 May
2003. [62] “British sapper loses
leg in south Lebanon landmine explosion,” Associated Press, 20 July
2002. [63] Landmine Monitor
researcher’s conversation with deminers (who wished to remain anonymous),
Sri Lanka, November 2002. [64]
“BBC cameraman dies in Iraq,” BBC, 3 April 2003.
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