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Country Reports
United Kingdom, Landmine Monitor Report 2003

United Kingdom

Key developments since May 2002: The UK provided £10.7 million (US$16 million) to mine action in financial year 2002-2003, a decrease from £12 million in 2001-2002. In May 2003, the UK announced £4 million ($6 million) for mine clearance and coordination of mine action in Iraq. The UK decided to reduce the number of mines retained under Article 3, destroying 3,116 mines by June 2003. The UK has further elaborated its views on the issue of joint operations with non-States Parties that may use antipersonnel mines, and clarified its position that transit of antipersonnel mines is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. The UK has stated that tripwires, break wires and tilt rods are not acceptable methods of detonating antivehicle mines. Two British nationals were killed and three others injured in landmine/UXO explosions in 2002 and early 2003.

Mine Ban Policy

The United Kingdom signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 31 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National legislation (the Landmines Act 1998) includes penal sanctions.[1]

The UK participated in the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002. The UK took over responsibility for chairing the Sponsorship Program, which assists mine-affected and less developed countries to attend Mine Ban Treaty meetings, and contributed £25,000 (US$37,500)[2] to the Committee’s funds.[3] The UK also participated actively in the Standing Committee meetings in February and May 2003, including the Universalization and Resource Mobilization Contact Groups, as well as the President’s Consultations in January and May 2003 on the 2004 Review Conference.

In November 2002, the UK voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74, which calls for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

In February 2003, the Ministry of Defence carried out a treaty compliance exercise, Operation Partlett. This was the fourth such exercise to be undertaken at different military premises in the UK.

In March 2003, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) informed Parliament that, three years after the FCO’s last global effort, British officials in countries which are not members of the Mine Ban Treaty will ask their host government what plans there are for ratification or accession. The UK sees the Universalization Contact Group, established by States Parties, as “a valuable part of the Ottawa follow-up process.” Other activities in support of universalization included funding an exploratory visit on 13-15 November 2002 by a UK ordnance expert to the Russian Federation in connection with the destruction of stockpiled PFM antipersonnel landmines.[4]

On 30 April 2003, the UK submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2002. This is the UK’s fifth Article 7 report.[5]

The UK is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II and submitted the annual report required by Article 13 of the Protocol in October 2002.[6] The UK attended the Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to the Protocol in December 2002.

Joint military operations and “assist”

The UK delegation stated during a Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meeting in February 2003 that Parliament had been informed that UK forces may not participate actively in the use of antipersonnel mines or in any physical activity related to the use of antipersonnel mines, may not seek benefit from their use by others, and may not request their use in support of UK forces. It added that any interpretation would have to take into account the military realities of the battlefield at the time.[7]

At a May 2003 Standing Committee meeting, the UK delegation provided additional details: The United Kingdom has a broad interpretation of assistance under the terms of Article 1 of the Convention. Unacceptable activities include: planning with others for the use of anti-personnel mines (APM); training others for the use APM; agreeing Rules of Engagement permitting the use of APM; agreeing operational plans permitting the use of APM in combined operations; requests to non-States Parties to use APM; and providing security or transport for APM. Furthermore, it is not acceptable for UK forces to accept orders that amount to assistance in the use of APM. UK forces should not seek to derive direct military benefits from the deployment of APM in combined operations. It is not, however, always possible to say in advance that military benefit will not arise where this results from an act that is not deliberate or pre-planned.[8]

The Ministry of Defence also reported to Parliament on 24 February 2003 that, “United Kingdom Forces will not provide any assistance for the use of antipersonnel landmines.”[9] However, it earlier stated that “the mere participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity by the UK’s Armed Forces, or individual UK nationals, conducted in combination with armed forces of States not party to the Ottawa Convention, which engage in activity prohibited by that Convention, is not, by itself, assistance, encouragement or inducement.”[10] Landmine Action and other campaigning organizations continue to argue against this definition of assistance, and believe that Section 5 of the Landmines Act 1998 could serve as a loophole in the prohibition against use.

In January 2003, DynCorp Aerospace Ltd was reported as “being offered” a contract worth £600 million (US$900 million) to maintain weapons stockpiles in Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, including antipersonnel mines. The magazine report stated that the company employs British ex-servicemen to work on the contract.[11] On 11 April 2003, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was asked to make a statement on the maintenance of landmine stores in the Gulf region by DynCorp Aerospace Ltd. Such maintenance would seemingly violate the Mine Ban Treaty prohibition on assistance. The FCO responded that it was “not aware that any investigation has been launched into the activities of DynCorp Aerospace Ltd. or that any of its employees have been prosecuted for breaches of the 1998 Landmines Act. The Department has not come into the possession of any relevant evidence, though naturally, if it were to do so, it would pass this to the police for investigation.”[12]

Foreign stockpiles and transit of antipersonnel mines

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that US antipersonnel mines have been stored on ships offshore the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia. The UK government has stated that “US stocks do not fall under our national jurisdiction or control,” and therefore the UK has no obligation to have them removed or destroyed.[13]

At a Standing Committee meeting in February 2003, the UK delegation confirmed its position that transit of foreign antipersonnel mines through UK territory is contrary to the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.[14] At a Standing Committee meeting in May 2003, the UK said that, “permitting transit across UK territory would amount to assistance under the terms of Article 1.” It added, “If APM [antipersonnel mines] are on foreign naval ships in the territorial waters of a UK Dependent Territory, these naval ships remain the sovereign territory of the state in question. In the UK’s legal interpretation such APM are not on UK territory provided they remain on the ships.” [15]

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office maintained that during operations in Afghanistan in 2002, US antipersonnel mines were not transited, stockpiled, or maintained on the Diego Garcia bases in British Indian Ocean Territory, to which the UK Landmines Act applies.[16]

In January 2003, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund and Landmine Action raised concerns about transit of foreign mine stockpiles on the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia in the build-up to the conflict in Iraq.[17] On 25 February 2003, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces wrote that “it is clear that the stockpiling of US antipersonnel mines on UK territory, including Diego Garcia, or the transit of antipersonnel mines across UK territory would constitute a breach of our obligations under the Ottawa Convention.... The United States...has assured us that it will respect our international treaty obligations. Any landmines that may be on US naval ships or military aircraft are not under the jurisdiction or control of the UK. However, if antipersonnel mines were off-loaded on to land, e.g. to be transferred from ship to aircraft, this would not be consistent with our Ottawa Convention obligations.”[18]

Antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices

At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002, the UK delegation stated that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices do not fall within the Mine Ban Treaty, and that “the CCW process is the right place in which to consider how best to reduce the humanitarian risks presented by some antivehicle mines.”[19] This view was repeated at a Standing Committee meeting in May 2003, where the UK delegation stated, “On the definition of anti-personnel mines in the Convention, the UK does not accept that certain so-called sensitive fuses for anti-vehicle or anti-tank mines are banned by the Convention.... We have worked closely on our legal interpretation of the definition, as we did at the Oslo [negotiating] conference, and are confident in our interpretation.”[20] Also in May, the UK also opposed a proposal of the International Committee of the Red Cross to do expert work on antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes within the Mine Ban Treaty context.[21]

At a Standing Committee meeting in February 2003, the UK stated that, in the CCW context, it is reviewing fuzing mechanisms for antivehicle mines.[22] In the CCW Group of Governmental Experts dealing with the issue, the UK stated on 14 March 2003 that tripwires, break wires and tilt rods are not acceptable methods of detonating mines other than antipersonnel mines, and has recommended a descriptive approach to establishing best practices regarding sensitive fuzes.[23]

Regarding the Mk. 7 and L3A1 antivehicle mines for which there was previously said to be a continuing requirement, the Ministry of Defence stated in March 2003, “We no longer hold operational stocks of either of these AVMs.  We are making efforts to destroy [them] as they are no longer in use.”[24]

Transfer and Stockpiling

Antipersonnel mine production facilities in the UK were converted or decommissioned by 1999. Destruction of the UK’s stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines was completed in October 1999.

Regarding the offer by the UK company, PW Defence Ltd, to supply landmines to a BBC journalist, reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2002, the Crown Prosecution Service stated in November 2002 that there were no grounds for legal action.[25] Referring to this incident, a parliamentary Early Day Motion was started in May 2002, which had received 94 signatures by MPs by the end of 2002.

During the Ministry of Defence’s treaty compliance exercise, Operation Partlett, in February 2003, it was noted by a Landmine Action observer that there were still some JP233 dispensers and at least one HB876 bomblet present on military premises.[26] The HB 876 submunition for the JP233 weapon system was previously described by the government as the “last of the RAF’s operational stocks of APMs” whose destruction “was completed on 19 October 1999.”[27] The UK’s Article 7 report for 2002 repeats previous statements that the HB876 destruction program has been completed.[28] The MoD subsequently said that the mines are “among old munitions awaiting or in the process of destruction, and could in no way be considered as operational stocks. The MoD accepts that the JP233 system falls within the definition of anti-personnel mines in the Ottawa Convention.”[29]

Mines Retained Under Article 3

In 1998, the UK intended to “retain about 4,000 anti-personnel landmines,” but by the end of 2001, the number retained had increased to 4,949.[30] The April 2003 Article 7 report indicated that the total had reduced to 4,899 at the end of 2002, with the consumption of 28 C3 Elsie mines and 22 foreign mines. How these mines were consumed was not reported.[31]

At a Standing Committee meeting in May 2003, the UK delegation stated that at the time of entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty it was difficult to estimate how many mines would be needed for the training and development purposes permitted by the treaty’s Article 3. The UK then announced, “Despite the fact that the UK is active in the areas of research specified in Article 3, we have found that our initial estimate of requirement is more than we need. We are therefore planning to reduce our holding significantly in the near future.”[32]

On 9 June 2003, the Ministry of Defence told Landmine Monitor that the UK had destroyed all 2,088 Ranger mines and all 1,028 C3 (Elsie) mines previously retained under Article 3.[33] This left 1,783 retained mines “of foreign manufacture for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.”[34]

Asked to describe the purposes for which mines are retained, the Ministry of Defence stated on 19 March 2003 that they are used for “training explosive and mine detection dogs; training military and civilian mine clearance personnel; making relevant training films, videos, and posters; testing and trials of mine clearance devices; and testing and trials of protective clothing and equipment.”[35]

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

The UK reports that it “selects carefully targeted projects working mainly through UN agencies, with limited support now going via specialist NGOs and national demining agencies.... The focus continues to be on projects which alleviate poverty and support national capacity-building so that affected countries can take an increasingly effective role in their national demining programs.”[36] This strategy was also described at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2003, where the UK delegation added that it encourages “practical innovation to enhance safety and efficiency in operations,” and wants “to see strengthening of international systems for co-ordination and collaboration.” The UK’s policy is no longer to fund NGOs or countries bilaterally, but instead to agree to global programs with UN agencies, which are then responsible for allocations based on criteria such as, “good country policies and performance on mine clearance...preventing disability or obtaining urgent humanitarian access for displaced populations, and funding gaps.”[37]

In May 2003, the UK delegation also expressed concern that not enough was being done to assist in the care and rehabilitation of mine survivors. The UK had earmarked “a significant amount of financial resources to address this issue.”[38] Victim assistance funding “focuses on assisting disabled people, including antipersonnel mine victims, through bilateral programs aimed at poverty eradication, health care and community-based rehabilitation.”[39]

In the future, the Department for International Development (DFID) plans to provide £10 million (US$15 million) for mine action annually – an amount lower than the past four years. Additionally, “mine victims benefit from DFID’s mainstream health and population and social development programs, as well as specific programs assisting the disabled.”[40]

DFID estimated its contribution to humanitarian mine clearance, mine risk education, and mine-related research and development in the financial year April 2002 – April 2003 as £10.7 million (US$16.05 million).[41] This represents a decrease from £12 million in 2001-2002, and £16 million in 2000-2001. In the past three years funds for research and development have increased each year from £1 million, to £1.3 million, to £1.4 million, while funding for other mine action has decreased from £15 million, to £10.7 million, to £9.3 million.[42]

In 2002-2003, an estimated £9 million ($13.5 million) was allocated to humanitarian mine clearance and integrated mine risk education programs, £300,000 ($450,000) to UNICEF for mine risk education, and £1.4 million ($2.1 million) to research and development.[43]

Funds of some £3.5 million were earmarked for specific countries in 2002-2003, including Afghanistan – $1.8 million ($2.7 million); Nicaragua – £378,000 ($567,000); Cambodia – £500,000 ($750,000); Northern Iraq – £500,000 ($750,000); and Georgia – £325,000 ($487,500). The activities funded are said to be generally integrated and include elements other than humanitarian mine clearance, such as mine risk education.[44] The funding for Cambodia was later said to have been moved to 2003-2004.[45]

On 23 May 2003, Parliament was informed that £115 million (US$172.5 million) allocated “to support work by humanitarian agencies in the current crisis” in Iraq included £4 million (US$6 million) to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) for mine clearance and coordination of mine action in Iraq, and £80,883 ($121,325) to the Mines Advisory Group for “mine action preparedness, mine marking and deployment of coordinators” in central and southern Iraq.[46]

For 2002-2003, the majority of funds were allocated to implementing organizations, as shown in the table below. However, this data from a parliamentary report results in a total of £11.07 million funding in 2002-2003, not £10.7 as cited above. The difference between the two figures is attributed to varying estimates.[47] The discrepancies are not known. The UNMAS Mine Action Investments database does not have a UK annual donor report for 2002, and this data was not included in the April 2003 Article 7 report.

Mine action expenditure by implementing organization in 2002-2003[48]

Amount in GB£
Equivalent amount in US$
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (bilateral)
OAS (Nicaragua demining)
The HALO Trust (bilateral)
UNICEF (Mines Awareness)
QINETIQ (Tech Advice and Testing)
Landmine Monitor
ERA (Research and Development)
BARIC Consultants (Technical Advice)
SERCO (Research and Development)
DISARMCO (Research and Development)

In July 2002, the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Development (CHAD) department of DFID carried out an assessment mission to Angola to determine the extent of the humanitarian crisis, including that caused by landmines.[49]

The UK and Denmark jointly engaged an independent consultant to evaluate the UN mine action program for Afghanistan.[50]

Non-financial assistance in 2002 included UK military advisers attached to UN mine action centers assisting in the development of mine action programs. In Bosnia and Herzegovina they also supervised mine clearance and provided mine awareness to local populations.[51]

The Ministry of Defence Mine Information Training Centre (MITC) provides mine awareness to military personnel prior to deployment overseas, and to other government departments, NGOs, academia, industry and civilians. Since December 1997, the Centre has provided mine awareness training to more than 51,000 people including over 1,500 returning Kosovo refugees. The government states that it “is impossible to cost accurately” this work.[52]

DFID estimated that £1.4 million ($2.1 million) was spent on research and development in 2002-2003 in connection with humanitarian mine action.[53] No details of individual projects have been reported. Several UK companies continue research into mine detection and destruction or clearance.[54]

NGO Mine Action and Funding

British NGOs engaged in humanitarian mine clearance include the HALO Trust (in Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kosovo, Karabakh, Mozambique, Somaliland and Sri Lanka), Landmine Action (Sudan), the Mines Advisory Group (Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Burma, Cambodia, Lao, Lebanon, Mauritania, Namibia, Northern Iraq, Somaliland, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam) and the Mines Awareness Trust.

British NGOs which support survivor assistance programs in mine-affected countries, include Action on Disability and Development, Afghanaid, Africa Educational Trust, CAFOD, Cambodia Trust, Handicap International UK, Heather Mills Health Trust, Hope for Children, Jaipur Limb Campaign UK, Jesuit Refugee Service, Mercy Corps Scotland, Motivation, POWER, Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan Appeal, Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund, and Soroptomist International.

Details on the activities of these NGOs can be found in the various country reports of this edition of Landmine Monitor Report.

In 2002, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund announced another round of grants for victim assistance and mine risk education programs.[55] Total “Landmines and Disabilities” funding of £1,170,716 over three years (US$1,756,074 at 2002 exchange rate) will support programs run by British NGOs in Colombia (Children of the Andes), Abkhazia (HALO Trust), Angola (Mines Advisory Group and Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund), and Pakistan (Response International). In addition, “Helping Communities Post Conflict” funding of £455,290 over three years ($682,935) will support mine survivor assistance run by British NGOs in Laos (POWER) and Sri Lanka (Motivation). Mercy Corps Scotland also receives £99,000 ($148,500) for its rehabilitation program on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Hope for Children supports a mobile prosthetic unit in Sri Lanka supported by the Fund.

Other NGO Activities

In November 2002, Landmine Action and its coalition members held an awareness week highlighting humanitarian concerns related to landmines and explosive remnants of war. A parliamentary meeting was co-organized with the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines to raise awareness within the Pakistani community in the UK of the landmine situation in Pakistan. Landmine Action is working in partnership with the Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines and Geneva Call on a cross-conflict initiative to ban antipersonnel mines in Sri Lanka during 2003. Landmine Action also launched a schools’ pack on the landmine issue.

Handicap International (UK) arranged a week-long program on landmines and mine action on The Community Channel, a cable TV channel dedicated to the work of charities and NGOs.

Landmine Problem

The Mine Ban Treaty commits States Parties to have completed “destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after entry into force” of the treaty. The ten-year deadline for the UK runs out on 1 March 2009.

The UK reports as in previous years, that it is “working towards a UK-led study, to be funded by the Argentine Government, into the feasibility of mine clearance options” in the Falklands/Malvinas.[56] In line with the International Mine Action Standards, the UK has appointed a National Mine Action Authority to allow for future work.[57]

World War II mines are occasionally found in the UK, usually on the coastline. In October 2002, one such mine was discovered on a beach in Norfolk, reportedly one of 350,000 laid during the war.[58]

Landmine/UXO Casualties

The Ministry of Defence states that there were no new mine casualties among British armed forces personnel between January 2002 and February 2003.[59] On 31 March 2003, a British soldier was killed in southern Iraq during an explosive ordnance disposal operation.[60] In April 2003, a British soldier was killed by a landmine near Basra in Iraq.[61]

In July 2002, a British national was injured clearing landmines in southern Lebanon while working for the British company BACTEC International.[62] Another British national was injured by an antipersonnel mine in Sri Lanka during November 2002.[63] In April 2003, a BBC producer was injured and his Iranian cameraman was killed in a landmine explosion in northern Iraq.[64]

[1] For details of national legislation, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 813-814.
[2] GB£1 = US$1.50, used throughout this report. Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 6 January 2003.
[3] Hansard, 3 March 2003, col. 850W; interview with John Wattam, Permanent Mission to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 7 February 2003.
[4] Email from Nick McDuff, United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 5 June 2003.
[5] Article 7 Report, 30 April 2003 (for calendar year 2002); Article 7 Report, 21 March 2002 (for calendar year 2001); Article 7 Report, 25 April 2001 (for the period 1 April 2000-31 December 2000); Article 7 Report, 17 April 2000 (for the period 1 August 1999-1 April 2000); Article 7 Report, 26 August 1999 (for the period 1 March-1 August 1999).
[6] Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, October 2002 (day not given).
[7] Intervention by the UK, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 7 February 2003 (Landmine Monitor/LA notes); email from Peter Balmer, Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence, 13 February 2003.
[8] Intervention by the UK on Article 1, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 16 May 2003, available at www.gichd.ch.
[9] Hansard, 24 February 2003, col. 303W.
[10] Hansard, 9 January 2003, col. 294W.
[11] “The Desert Pong,” Private Eye (weekly magazine), No. 1072, 24 January-6 February 2003. Although not stated in the report, the weapons stores presumably belong to the US.
[12] Hansard, 11 April 2003, col. 437W.
[13] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 818.
[14] UK Intervention, Standing Committee on the General Status, 7 February 2003; email from Peter Balmer, Ministry of Defence, 13 February 2003.
[15] UK Intervention, Standing Committee on the General Status, 16 May 2003.
[16] Hansard, 26 February 2002, col. 1155W, and 15 March 2002, col. 1298W.
[17] The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund and Landmine Action press release, 14 January 2003.
[18] Letter from the Rt. Hon. Adam Ingram MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, 25 February 2003.
[19] Statement by the UK on Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16-20 September 2002 (Landmine Monitor notes).
[20] Intervention by the UK on Article 2, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 16 May 2003, available at www.gichd.ch.
[21] See ICBL Interventions on Article 2, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 16 May 2003.
[22] UK Intervention, Standing Committee on the General Status, 7 February 2003.
[23] Email from Reza Afshar, Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence, 3 April 2003.
[24] Email from Reza Afshar, Ministry of Defence, in late March 2003.
[25] “Chemring says authorities to take no further action over landmine allegations,” AFX (news agency), 2 November 2002; see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 507-508 for this and other similar incidents.
[26] Report by Landmine Action representative, Operation Partlett, 5 February 2003.
[27] Hansard, 25 October 1999, col. 695; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 749.
[28] Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 March 2003.
[29] Email to Landmine Action from Peter Balmer, Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence, 28 July 2003.
[30] Letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to UK Working Group on Landmines, 27 April 1998; Article 7 Report, Form D, 21 March 2002.
[31] Article 7 Report, , Form D.1, 30 April 2003.
[32] UK Intervention, Standing Committee on the General Status, 16 May 2003.
[33] Telephone interview with Reza Afshar, Ministry of Defence, 9 June 2003.
[34] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2003.
[35] Hansard, 19 March 2003, col.782W.
[36] Response to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) questionnaire, October 2002 (day not stated); see also Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 510-511.
[37] “Statement by John Wattam,” Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration,” Geneva, 13 May 2003.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Response to OSCE questionnaire, October 2002; see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 510-511.
[40] “Statement by John Wattam,” Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, 13 May 2003.
[41] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col. 956W.
[42] Ibid. For comparison with previous years, see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 511.
[43] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col. 956W.
[44] Ibid.; emails from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 2 and 5 June 2003.
[45] Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 2 June 2003.
[46] Hansard, 21 May 2003, col. 815W.
[47] Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 2 June 2003.
[48] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col. 956W. Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 2 June 2003, stated that the contribution to QinetiQ was £219,000 (recorded as £200,000 by Hansard), for UK representation on the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP). The total of funding in 2002-2003 has been adjusted accordingly.
[49] Hansard, 28 October 2002, col. 552W.
[50] Informal Minutes, Reinforced Mine Action Support Group meeting, New York, 14 November 2002, in Newsletter, Mine Action Support Group, December 2002.
[51] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col. 956W.
[52] Ibid.; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form F, October 2002.
[53] Hansard, 4 March 2003, col. 956W.
[54] Hansard, 10 March 2003, col. 61W.
[55] The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, at www.theworkcontinues.org.
[56] Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2003.
[57] Hansard, 5 March 2003, col. 1068W.
[58] Jerome Monahan Lindsey Fraser, “Underground killers left behind by wars,” Guardian, 29 October 2002.
[59] Telephone interview with Reza Afshar, Ministry of Defence, 11 February 2003.
[60] Andrew Ellson, “Casualties of War,” Guardian, 3 April 2003.
[61] Michael Smith, “Landmine kills British soldier,” Daily Telegraph, 2 May 2003.
[62] “British sapper loses leg in south Lebanon landmine explosion,” Associated Press, 20 July 2002.
[63] Landmine Monitor researcher’s conversation with deminers (who wished to remain anonymous), Sri Lanka, November 2002.
[64] “BBC cameraman dies in Iraq,” BBC, 3 April 2003.