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Country Reports
Argentina, Landmine Monitor Report 2004


Key developments since May 2003: Argentina completed destruction of its stockpile of more than 90,000 antipersonnel mines on 4 December 2003, ahead of its 1 March 2004 treaty-mandated deadline. It is retaining 1,772 mines for training, instead of the 1,000 previously declared.

Key developments since 1999: Argentina ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 21 July 1999 and it entered into force on 1 March 2000. Argentina has not enacted domestic implementation legislation. Argentina completed destruction of its stockpile of more than 90,000 antipersonnel mines on 4 December 2003. Argentina reported in July 2002 that it would retain 13,025 mines; the number was decreased to 1,000 in 2002 with the decision to make 12,025 of them inert “exercise mines.” In 2004 the number was adjusted again to 1,772 mines retained. Argentina co-hosted a regional seminar on stockpile destruction in November 2000. In 2000, a Working Group composed of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces was created to oversee Mine Ban Treaty implementation, and an Office for Humanitarian Demining was established.

Mine Ban Policy

Argentina signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 14 September 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2000. An interpretive statement on the Malvinas/Falklands was submitted to Congress and accepted without amendment at the same time as the ratification instrument.[1]

There is no domestic legislation in place to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Argentina first reported to Landmine Monitor in December 2000 that it was studying ways to incorporate penalties on the use, stockpiling, production or transferring of antipersonnel mines into Argentine law, and has repeated this every year since then.[2] In May 2004, Argentina said the Defense Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, together with advisors from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, was studying legislation creating sanctions for all weapons violations.[3] Law No. 4745/01 prohibits the use of antipersonnel mines by the Armed Forces.[4]

A Working Group on Antipersonnel Mines and Humanitarian Demining was established on 25 February 2000 by Resolution MD 169/00. It is responsible for implementing treaty requirements, including Article 7 reporting. (See more below). On 13 April 2004, Argentina submitted its annual Article 7 report, for calendar year 2003. This was the country’s fifth Article 7 report.[5]

Argentina actively participated in the Ottawa Process leading to the Mine Ban Treaty, and has voted in favor of every pro-ban United Nations General Assembly resolution since 1996, including UNGA Resolution 58/53 on 8 December 2003. Since entry into force, Argentina has attended every annual Meeting of States Parties, including the Fifth Meeting in September 2003, and every intersessional Standing Committee meeting, including those held in February and June 2004. In its statement at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Argentina announced four national goals it aims to achieve by the time of the 2004 Review Conference in Nairobi: complete destruction of the stockpile; share stockpile destruction experience internationally; continue training mine clearance personnel; and comply with Article 9 on national implementation legislation.[6]

Regionally, Argentina co-hosted a seminar on stockpile destruction in Buenos Aires in November 2000, together with Canada and the Organization of American States (OAS). Prior to the seminar, the NGO Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ) hosted a regional meeting of Landmine Monitor researchers and ICBL campaigners. Argentina has also participated in regional landmine meetings held in Ecuador (August 2004), Colombia (November 2003), and Perú (August 2003).

Argentina has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3. Thus, it has not made known its views on the issues of joint military operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.

However, in August 2004, Argentina and Chile announced they would jointly examine the minimum number of mines needed by each country, with the aim of identifying that minimum number based on actual plans for use in training and development, and not on any stated maximum number to be retained.[7] They circulated a non-paper (dated 26 July 2004) on this at a First Review Conference preparatory meeting in Geneva on 24 September 2004.

Argentina is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and it attended the Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2003. Argentina has submitted annual reports as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II every year except 2001.

Production, Transfer and Use

Argentina is a former producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines. Production took place at the General Directorate of Military Industries (Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares) of the Ministry of Defense. Argentina has stated it produced only one type of antipersonnel mine, the FMK-1 plastic blast mine, at the “Fray Luis Beltrán” factory between 1976 and 1990, manufacturing 18,970 FMK-1 mines during this period.[8] Equipment formerly used for production is now being used to make reinforced fuzes, detonators for grenades, estopines (initiators), and other items.[9] According to the US Department of Defense, Argentina had manufactured two other types of antipersonnel mines: the MAPG pressure or tripwire-initiated mine and the MAPPG bounding mine.[10] The government never officially declared production of these mines which date from the 1940s/1950s, but an official said the mines could have been imported and re-catalogued to make their identification easier.[11]

Based on Article 7 reports and mines found in the Malvinas/Falklands, Argentina imported antipersonnel mines from Libya (MAP and TRA), Israel (Number 4), Italy (SB-33), and Spain (P4B). Argentina exported nearly 3,000 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines to Honduras. An export moratorium was instituted in March 1995, which has since been superceded by the Mine Ban Treaty. There is little information available on Argentine exports of antipersonnel mines prior to the 1995 moratorium. Argentina sold weapons to Croatia, including 5,750 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines several months before the moratorium was instituted.[12] This sale caused a scandal, because the transfer was made during a UN arms embargo against Croatia.

Argentina last used landmines during the Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982, and it has stated that the islands are the only mine-affected part of Argentina. (See also United Kingdom entry in this Landmine Monitor Report.) According to Argentina’s May 2001 Article 7 report, 20,000 EXPAL P-4-B, and FMK-1 antipersonnel mines were laid during the 1982 conflict.[13] In July 2002, it added SB-33 antipersonnel mines to the list of mines it used in the islands.[14]

During the confrontation with Chile in 1978, the Chilean army laid mines along the border; it is unknown whether the Argentine army laid mines as well.[15]

Stockpiling and Destruction

Argentina completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile on 4 December 2003, in advance of its 1 March 2004 treaty-mandated deadline. Argentina has given ever-changing, inconsistent, and incomplete information about the size and composition of its stockpile, the mines destroyed, and the mines retained for training and development purposes. Argentina has variously reported the total number of antipersonnel mines destroyed as 90,166; 90,764; 90,919; and 93,124.

In February and April 2004, Argentina reported that by December 2003 it had destroyed 81,646 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, rendered another 5,400 P-4-B mines inert, and transformed 3,120 FMK-1 mines into fuzes for FMK-5 antivehicle mines, making a total of 90,166 antipersonnel mines destroyed.[16] According to another table in the April 2004 report, however, 90,919 mines had been destroyed by December 2003, including 525 SB-33 mines rendered inert, 118 SB-33 and 110 FMK-1 mines destroyed in training, and an additional 1,582 mines destroyed but left unreported in 2003.[17]

Argentina started its stockpile destruction after an agreement on cooperation and technical assistance was concluded between the government and the OAS on 9 June 2003, with technical assistance provided by Canada.[18] In August 2003, the OAS reported that Canada had provided $220,000 to the OAS to facilitate stockpile destruction in Argentina and Chile.[19]

The destruction was carried out in eight locations throughout the country: Serrezuela in Córdoba province, Zapala in Neuquén province, Sarmiento in Chubut province, Puerto Santa Cruz in Santa Cruz province, Monte Caseros in Corrientes province, and Azul, Puerto Belgrano and Campo de Mayo in Buenos Aires province.[20]

The last stockpiles were destroyed on 4 December 2003 in an event at Campo de Mayo, Buenos Aires attended by the Minister of Defense and other government officials, the heads of the Brazilian and Chilean armies, diplomatic and OAS representatives, and Landmine Monitor.[21] The Minister of Defense, Jose Pampuro, stated, “We can feel proud that we break the chain of death with this destruction.”[22] Media and local authorities, including environmental protection officials, witnessed earlier destruction events, as well.

Before the 2003 destruction, Argentina had executed three other stockpile destruction events: the Air Force destroyed its entire antipersonnel mine stockpile of 1,160 FMK-1 mines on November 1998; the Army destroyed 1,000 FMK-1 mines and their fuzes at the Fray Luis Beltrán factory between November 1999 and March 2000; and, 200 P-4-B antipersonnel mines were destroyed at the conclusion of a regional seminar on stockpile destruction in November 2000.[23]

On 15 May 2003, Argentina told States Parties that a total of 90,764 stockpiled antipersonnel mines would be destroyed by 4 December 2003.[24] This was 655 more mines than the total reported in the 12 May 2003 Article 7 report.[25] An Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that the difference in figures is due to the fact that during the final inventory of arsenals, carried out by the supervision and control team, antipersonnel mines were found in crates that corresponded to other types of munitions.[26]

The mines reported stockpiled in May 2003 are 6,404 mines fewer than the number reported in the July 2002 Article 7 report, due to the reporting of an additional 400 FMK-1 mines that were previously overlooked, and the rendering inert of 6,844 mines. Despite these clarifications, the figures reported still remain inconsistent.[27]

In July 2002, Argentina also reported that the Army would keep 1,160 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines as fuzes (initiators) for antivehicle mines which have a “cápsula adaptadora,” a cap that cannot be removed, and a resistance of 300 kilograms. Argentina reported that these FMK-1 mines would be destroyed when the antivehicle mines were destroyed[28] and considered these FMK-1 mines “destroyed for the purposes of the Convention.”[29] The removal of these 1,160 mines was not reflected in the May 2003 Article 7 report.

The number reported in July 2002 is 7,343 more mines than the 89,170 mines reported stockpiled in Article 7 reports submitted May 2001 and August 2000, in part because 4,287 Libyan mines were reported for the first time in July 2002.[30] The remaining difference of 3,056 mines was apparently due to “different criteria that were used to carry out inventory of the different deposits that had AP mines. Mines not reported as new types correspond to mines already reported in previous reports.”[31]

Mines Retained For Training

In April 2004, Argentina reported a total of 1,772 mines retained as of December 2003: 772 mines (742 SB-33 and 30 FMK-1) retained by Navy Engineers at the Naval Depot in Puerto Belgrano and 1,000 antipersonnel mines (500 P-4-B, 250 FMK-1, and 250 unspecified Libyan mines) retained by the Army’s Munitions Company No. 121 for use in the development of a mine detection robot under a project by the Technical Directorate of the Army. According to the report, the 1,000 mines retained by the Army had not previously been reported.[32] The April 2002 and May 2003 Article 7 reports indicated 1,000 mines (860 SB-33 and 140 FMK-1) would be held by the Navy, and none by the Army.

Argentina also for the time reported that some of its retained mines had actually been consumed (destroyed) during training or development activities: 118 SB-33 and 110 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines.[33]

Originally, in August 2000, Argentina indicated that the Navy would retain 3,049 antipersonnel mines for training, but the number of mines to be retained by the Army was under consideration.[34] In May 2001, Argentina reported that another 10,000 mines of unspecified type would be retained by the Army, and adjusted the number of mines retained by the Navy to 3,025, making a total of 13,025 antipersonnel mines retained for training.[35] In April 2002, Argentina informed Landmine Monitor that 12,025 (92 percent) of these mines were considered “exercise mines,” as Argentina planned to empty them of their explosive content and render them inert.[36] This information was reflected in the July 2002 Article 7 report. The remaining 1,000 mines would be retained by the Navy and used for training until 1 April 2010.[37]

Landmine and UXO Problem

Argentina and the United Kingdom recognize that there is a problem with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. (See also United Kingdom entry in this Landmine Monitor Report.) Argentina included an interpretative statement (“Declaración Interpretativa”) on its claims of sovereignty over the islands in its April 2004 Article 7 report, as it had in previous years. There are 101 minefields covering 20 square kilometers and containing 16,000 mines, according to the Falkland Islands government.[38] The mined areas are mainly beaches and peat areas, and are marked and fenced.

After more than three years of negotiations, in October 2001 Argentina and the UK announced that a feasibility study would be conducted to assess mine clearance options for the islands.[39] According to the Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining in Argentina’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, funding for the first phase of the study has been included in the national budget since 2002, but the country’s economic problems have meant the funds could not be spent.[40] In February 2004, the UK Ministry of Defence confirmed that the government was fully committed to destroying all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under UK jurisdiction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty and it would “continue working towards a UK-led study, to be funded by the Argentine Government, into the feasibility of mine clearance in the Falklands.”[41]

Argentina has maintained that its sizeable border with Chile is mine-affected on the Chilean side only. According to media reports, Argentine provinces on the affected border include Catamarca,[42] Jujuy, and Salta.[43] In March 2003, the Office for Humanitarian Demining told Landmine Monitor that there were no official studies on the existence of UXO in Argentina.[44] Argentina and Chile have held previous meetings and produced statements on mine clearance of Chilean minefields along their common border. In May 2004, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that the landmine problem in the Beagle Channel was discussed in periodical meetings of representatives of the two governments.[45]

Mine Action and Assistance

A Working Group on Antipersonnel Mines and Humanitarian Demining was established on 25 February 2000 by Resolution MD 169/00 and includes representatives from the Ministries of Defense, Army and Navy, and the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces (CITEFA). The Working Group is responsible for implementing treaty requirements, including Article 7 reporting. On 27 November 2000, an Office of Humanitarian Demining was created in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces to assist in the execution of the Working Group’s tasks.[46] The Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining attended the intersessional meeting in June 2004 and the regional mine action seminar in Quito, Ecuador in August 2004.

The Center for Training in Humanitarian Demining (Centro de Entrenamiento en Desminado Humanitario, CEDH) provides training to national and international armed forces personnel.[47] The Argentine Center of Joint Training for Peace Operations (Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz, CAECOPAZ) provides courses on demining and humanitarian assistance for peacekeeping operations. On 23-27 June 2003, CAECOPAZ held its fifth demining refresher course for 14 Army officers, seven Navy officers and one Air Force officer, and on 3-7 November 2003, its sixth refresher course for 15 Army, eight Navy and three Air Force officers.[48] A seventh course was planned for June 2004, and an eighth for October or November 2004.[49] CEDH and CAECOPAZ also provided training to Armed Forces personnel in 2001 and 2002. Naval Marine Engineers receive training in humanitarian demining at the Naval Base in Puerto Belgrano.[50]

In its Fiscal Year 2002, the United States provided $700,000 to fund a one-time US military train-the-trainer session for Argentine humanitarian mine action instructors, with the aim of increasing Argentina’s ability to provide humanitarian demining training to other nations.[51] From late August until 11 September 2001, military personnel from the US and eight other countries of the region participated in “Cabañas 2001” military exercises in Salta, Argentina. According to media reports, the exercises included recovery of a soldier who had strayed into a minefield and procedures to identify and mark mined areas.[52]

Argentina has not provided any financial assistance to international mine action since 1998.[53] In the past, Argentina has participated in mine action programs in Kuwait and Angola.[54] Argentina participated in OAS mine action activities in Central America from 1993 to 1999, including mine clearance in Nicaragua.[55] Argentine personnel also participated in the 1995-1999 peacekeeping operation MOMEP (Misión de Observadores Militares Ecuador-Perú), which included the verification of mine clearance along the border.[56]

Landmine Casualties

No landmine casualties have been recorded in Argentina since Landmine Monitor started reporting in 1999. In August 1999, the media reported on two UXO survivors injured by grenades near San Antonio de los Cobres and the 1995 disappearance of a US volcanologist on Llullailaco volcano was attributed to a landmine incident.[57]

Argentine civilians and military have fallen victims to mines overseas. An Argentine soldier who lost both legs in a landmine explosion in Croatia in December 1993 while serving with the United Nations finally received compensation from Argentina in December 2003, using funds the UN had provided originally in January 1998.[58] Comprehensive national disability laws exist.[59]

[1] “Argentina manifests that its territory in the Malvinas Islands is mine-affected, a fact which was communicated to the UN General Assembly in resolutions 48/7, 49/215, 50/82, and 51/149.... Argentina is impeded access to AP mines in the Malvinas in order to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty because of the illegal occupation by the United Kingdom.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 30 March 2000; Intervention by Argentina, Fifth Meeting of Status Parties, Bangkok, 16 September 2003. Argentina also has included an interpretative statement on the Malvinas/Falklands in its Article 7 reports.
[2] Interview with Santiago Villalba, Secretary, Direction of International Safety, Nuclear and Space Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 19 December 2000, and successive Article 7 reports, Form A.
[3] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated May 2004.
[4] Article 7 Report, Form A, 23 July 2002.
[5] Article 7 reports submitted: 16 May 2003 (for calendar year 2002); 23 July 2002 (for calendar year 2001); 28 May 2001 (for the period 22 August 2000 – 11 May 2001); and 31 August 2000 (for the period 14 March – 21 August 2000).
[6] Intervention by Argentina, Fifth Meeting of Status Parties, 16 September 2003.
[7] Landmine Monitor (MAC) notes taken on interventions by Argentina and Chile, Regional Mine Action Seminar, Quito, 13 August 2004.
[8] Article 7 Report, Form E, 12 May 2003. The April 2004 Article 7 report does not include Form E.
[9] Article 7 Report, Form E, 12 May 2003.
[10] US Department of Defense, “Mine Facts” CD-ROM.
[11] Email from Mariela Adriana Fogante, DIGAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 October 2004.
[12] Clarin (Buenos Aires), 27-28 March 1995; Lawrence Whelan, “Latin arms shipped to Croatia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 August 1996, p. 14. The government said that the final destinations of the weapons were supposed to be Panamá and Venezuela, and it had been deceived by an intermediary company which had coordinated the operation. But federal justice authorities ordered the arrest of former executives of the company, which is publicly-owned, and the former Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers were charged.
[13] Article 7 Report, Form C, 23 July 2002. The previous year, Argentina reported that it had laid 20,000 P4B and FMK-1 antipersonnel mines during the conflict. Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 August 2000.
[14] Article 7 Report, Form C, 23 July 2002.
[15] Interview with Osvaldo Gazzola, Advisor, Office of Congressmen Alfredo Bravo and Jorge Rivas, 14 February 2000.
[16] Article 7 Report, Form G, appended Table, 13 April 2004, p. 8; Presentation by Argentina, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 12 February 2004.
[17] See Table 1 in Article 7 Report, Form G, 13 April 2004. The 1,582 mines included an additional 436 P-4-B mines; an additional 1,156 FMK-1 mines; and 10 fewer Libyan mines (type unspecified). Article 7 Report, Form B, and Form G, Table 1, 13 April 2004.
[18] OAS, “Argentina y la OEA firman acuerdo para la destrucción de minas antipersonal almacenadas,” Press Release AG-06, 9 June 2003.
[19] OEA AICMA, Portafolio 2003-2004, August 2003, p. 3.
[20] Presentation by Argentina, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 12 February 2004.
[21] “Acta de Destrucción,” 4 December 2004; Guido Braslavsky, “Argentina eliminó sus últimas minas antipersonales,” Clarín (Buenos Aires), 5 December 2003; “Argentina eliminates all antipersonnel mines,” MercoPress (Mercosur), 6 December 2003; ICRC, “Argentina: Last mines destroyed,” ICRC News No. 32/162, 19 December 2003.
[22] See “Destruyeron minas antipersonales,” La Nación (Buenos Aires), 5 December 2003.
[23] Article 7 Report, Form G, 23 July 2002.
[24] Presentation by Argentina, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 15 May 2003.
[25] The May 2003 total of 90,190 mines consisted of: 71,115 P-4-B (Spain); 6,995 SB-33 (Italy); 7,712 FMK-1 (Argentina); 1,699 MAP (Libya); and 2,588 TRA (Libya). Form G provided additional but contradictory information about removal and destruction of mines from stockpiles in 2002, stating that 3,904 FMK-1 mines were rendered inert at the General Directorate of Military Industries (these are listed as P-4-B in Form B) and another 2,940 P-4-B were rendered inert by destruction of their explosive content at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base (these are listed as SB-33 in Form B). Article 7 Report, Forms B and G, 12 May 2003.
[26] Email from Mariela Adriana Fogante, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 October 2004.
[27] If 6,844 mines are subtracted from the total of 96,513 and then 400 newly discovered FMK-1s are added, then that results in a new stockpile total of 90,069 mines. To make these figures match, 40 additional mines must have been added to the stockpile inventory or 40 fewer mines must have been rendered inert. The July 2002 total of 96,513 antipersonnel mines consisted of: 75,019 P-4-B (Spain); 9,935 SB-33 (Italy); 7,272 FMK-1 (Argentina); 1,699 MAP (Libya); and 2,588 TRA (Libya) mines. Article 7 Report, Form B, 23 July 2002.
[28] Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002; Response from Capt. Carlos Nielsen, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 April 2002.
[29] Article 7 Report, Form G, 12 May 2003.
[30] The August 2000 and May 2001 total of 89,170 mines consisted of: 72,924 P-4-B (Spain); 10,885 SB-33 (Italy); and 5,361 FMK-1 (Argentina). Article 7 Reports, Form B, 30 August 2000 and 28 May 2001. No mention was made of the other types of antipersonnel mines produced by Argentina in the past, or of any imported from Israel.
[31] Email from Mariela Adriana Fogante, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 October 2004.
[32] Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2004. While Argentina had indicated before that it was retaining a quantity of FMK-1 mines, this was the first indication that P-4-B and Libyan types would be kept.
[33] Article 7 Report, Form G, 13 April 2004.
[34] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 August 2000.
[35] Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 May 2001.
[36] Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 April 2002; Response by Capt. Carlos Nielsen, Office of Humanitarian Demining, 2 April 2002. In May 2003, Argentina reported that the Army had begun a process of transforming 10,000 P-4-B antipersonnel mines into training devices, a process scheduled to conclude in 2003. Article 7 Report, Form F, 12 May 2003.
[37] Article 7 Report, Form D, 23 July 2002.
[38] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, October 2003; Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2004; email from Sam A-Bailey, CSMM, Falkland Islands Government Office, London, 25 June 2003. When depositing its first Article 7 report in August 1999, the UK included minefield maps.
[39] Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2003.
[40] Email from Capt. Carlos Nielsen Enemark, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Landmine Monitor (MAC), 29 September 2004.
[41] Fax from Alasdair Pennycook, Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, UK Ministry of Defence, 9 February 2004.
[42] Juan Castro Olivera, “Chile keeps 14 minefields along frontier areas,” La Nación, 2 July 1999.
[43] Antonio Oieni, “Chile tiene 8 campos minados en su frontera con Salta,” El Tribuno (Salta), 16 August 1999. See www.eltribuno.com.ar/especiales/minas/minas.htm, accessed 12 October 2004. See also “Frontera explosiva: las secuelas de una guerra que no fue,” Telenoche Investiga (programa 04, ciclo 2001), Channel 13 (Buenos Aires), 31 October 2001. Landmine Monitor has a copy of the documentary.
[44] Response to Landmine Monitor by Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 March 2003.
[45] Response by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2004.
[46] Interview with Capt. Carlos Nielsen, Office for Humanitarian Demining, Buenos Aires, 7 November 2000; Telephone interview with Capt. Carlos Nielsen, 22 February 2001.
[47] Article 13 Report, Form F, 15 November 1999; Statement by Argentina, UN General Assembly, 18 November 1999.
[48] Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2004.
[49] Carlos Nielsen, “Mine Action Training in Argentina” in “The Role of the Military in Mine Action,” James Madison University, Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.1, June 2004.
[50] Article 7, Form A, 12 May 2003; Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 April 2002.
[51] US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” September 2002.
[52] Graciela Eslanoa, “Civiles recorrieron las sendas del operative military Cabañas 2001,” El Tribuno, 30 August 2001; “El Ejército por dentro,” El Tribuno, 12 September 2001.
[53] Argentina contributed US$254,764 to mine action in 1998. Resource Mobilization Contact Group, “A review of resources to achieve the Convention’s aims,” presented by Norway to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 25 June 2004, Table 1A, p. 5.
[54] “Risky Argentine Mission in Angola,” La Nación, 19 April 1999; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 15 November 1999.
[55] Alberto Armendáriz, “Argentina collaborates with the removal of landmines in Nicaragua,” La Nación, 18 April 1999; Statement by Argentina, UN General Assembly, 18 November 1999; email from Juan Luis Hurtado, military member of the mission in Central America, March 2000; interview with Alejandra Martín, Advisor to the Secretary of Military Affairs Guillermo Tello, Ministry of Defense, Buenos Aires, March 2000.
[56] See Capt. Rafael Recasens, “Misión de Observadores Militares Ecuador-Perú, Experencia de la Participación de Chile,” Revista Marina (Chile), May 2000.
[57] Antonio Oieni, “Los costos de una guerra que no fue,” El Tribuno, 17 August 1999.
[58] Ministry of Defense, “El gobierno efectivizará indemnización después de 10 años a sargento herido como casco azul,” Press Release N° 80/2003, 29 December 2003.
[59] Law 22.431 published 20 March 1981, modified by Laws 23.876, 24.308, 24.314, and 24.901.