Key developments since May 2003: Argentina completed destruction of
its stockpile of more than 90,000 antipersonnel mines on 4 December 2003, ahead
of its 1 March 2004 treaty-mandated deadline. It is retaining 1,772 mines for
training, instead of the 1,000 previously declared.
Key developments since 1999: Argentina ratified the Mine Ban Treaty
on 21 July 1999 and it entered into force on 1 March 2000. Argentina has not
enacted domestic implementation legislation. Argentina completed destruction of
its stockpile of more than 90,000 antipersonnel mines on 4 December 2003.
Argentina reported in July 2002 that it would retain 13,025 mines; the number
was decreased to 1,000 in 2002 with the decision to make 12,025 of them inert
“exercise mines.” In 2004 the number was adjusted again to 1,772
mines retained. Argentina co-hosted a regional seminar on stockpile destruction
in November 2000. In 2000, a Working Group composed of representatives of the
Ministry of Defense and the armed forces was created to oversee Mine Ban Treaty
implementation, and an Office for Humanitarian Demining was established.
Mine Ban Policy
Argentina signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 14
September 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2000. An
interpretive statement on the Malvinas/Falklands was submitted to Congress and
accepted without amendment at the same time as the ratification
instrument.[1]
There is no domestic legislation in place to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.
Argentina first reported to Landmine Monitor in December 2000 that it was
studying ways to incorporate penalties on the use, stockpiling, production or
transferring of antipersonnel mines into Argentine law, and has repeated this
every year since then.[2] In May
2004, Argentina said the Defense Committee of the Senate and House of
Representatives, together with advisors from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Defense, was studying legislation creating sanctions for all weapons
violations.[3] Law No. 4745/01
prohibits the use of antipersonnel mines by the Armed
Forces.[4]
A Working Group on Antipersonnel Mines and Humanitarian Demining was
established on 25 February 2000 by Resolution MD 169/00. It is responsible for
implementing treaty requirements, including Article 7 reporting. (See more
below). On 13 April 2004, Argentina submitted its annual Article 7 report, for
calendar year 2003. This was the country’s fifth Article 7
report.[5]
Argentina actively participated in the Ottawa Process leading to the Mine Ban
Treaty, and has voted in favor of every pro-ban United Nations General Assembly
resolution since 1996, including UNGA Resolution 58/53 on 8 December 2003.
Since entry into force, Argentina has attended every annual Meeting of States
Parties, including the Fifth Meeting in September 2003, and every intersessional
Standing Committee meeting, including those held in February and June 2004. In
its statement at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Argentina announced four
national goals it aims to achieve by the time of the 2004 Review Conference in
Nairobi: complete destruction of the stockpile; share stockpile destruction
experience internationally; continue training mine clearance personnel; and
comply with Article 9 on national implementation
legislation.[6]
Regionally, Argentina co-hosted a seminar on stockpile destruction in Buenos
Aires in November 2000, together with Canada and the Organization of American
States (OAS). Prior to the seminar, the NGO Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ)
hosted a regional meeting of Landmine Monitor researchers and ICBL campaigners.
Argentina has also participated in regional landmine meetings held in Ecuador
(August 2004), Colombia (November 2003), and Perú (August 2003).
Argentina has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties
have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1,
2, and 3. Thus, it has not made known its views on the issues of joint military
operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of
antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling
devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.
However, in August 2004, Argentina and Chile announced they would jointly
examine the minimum number of mines needed by each country, with the aim of
identifying that minimum number based on actual plans for use in training and
development, and not on any stated maximum number to be
retained.[7] They circulated a
non-paper (dated 26 July 2004) on this at a First Review Conference preparatory
meeting in Geneva on 24 September 2004.
Argentina is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW), and it attended the Fifth Annual Conference of
States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2003. Argentina has submitted
annual reports as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II every year
except 2001.
Production, Transfer and Use
Argentina is a former producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines.
Production took place at the General Directorate of Military Industries
(Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares) of the Ministry of
Defense. Argentina has stated it produced only one type of antipersonnel mine,
the FMK-1 plastic blast mine, at the “Fray Luis Beltrán”
factory between 1976 and 1990, manufacturing 18,970 FMK-1 mines during this
period.[8] Equipment formerly
used for production is now being used to make reinforced fuzes, detonators for
grenades, estopines (initiators), and other
items.[9] According to the US
Department of Defense, Argentina had manufactured two other types of
antipersonnel mines: the MAPG pressure or tripwire-initiated mine and the MAPPG
bounding mine.[10] The government
never officially declared production of these mines which date from the
1940s/1950s, but an official said the mines could have been imported and
re-catalogued to make their identification
easier.[11]
Based on Article 7 reports and mines found in the Malvinas/Falklands,
Argentina imported antipersonnel mines from Libya (MAP and TRA), Israel (Number
4), Italy (SB-33), and Spain (P4B). Argentina exported nearly 3,000 FMK-1
antipersonnel mines to Honduras. An export moratorium was instituted in March
1995, which has since been superceded by the Mine Ban Treaty. There is little
information available on Argentine exports of antipersonnel mines prior to the
1995 moratorium. Argentina sold weapons to Croatia, including 5,750
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines several months before the moratorium was
instituted.[12] This sale caused
a scandal, because the transfer was made during a UN arms embargo against
Croatia.
Argentina last used landmines during the Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982, and
it has stated that the islands are the only mine-affected part of Argentina.
(See also United Kingdom entry in this Landmine Monitor Report.)
According to Argentina’s May 2001 Article 7 report, 20,000 EXPAL P-4-B,
and FMK-1 antipersonnel mines were laid during the 1982
conflict.[13] In July 2002, it
added SB-33 antipersonnel mines to the list of mines it used in the
islands.[14]
During the confrontation with Chile in 1978, the Chilean army laid mines
along the border; it is unknown whether the Argentine army laid mines as
well.[15]
Stockpiling and Destruction
Argentina completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile on 4
December 2003, in advance of its 1 March 2004 treaty-mandated deadline.
Argentina has given ever-changing, inconsistent, and incomplete information
about the size and composition of its stockpile, the mines destroyed, and the
mines retained for training and development purposes. Argentina has variously
reported the total number of antipersonnel mines destroyed as 90,166; 90,764;
90,919; and 93,124.
In February and April 2004, Argentina reported that by December 2003 it had
destroyed 81,646 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, rendered another 5,400 P-4-B
mines inert, and transformed 3,120 FMK-1 mines into fuzes for FMK-5 antivehicle
mines, making a total of 90,166 antipersonnel mines
destroyed.[16] According to
another table in the April 2004 report, however, 90,919 mines had been destroyed
by December 2003, including 525 SB-33 mines rendered inert, 118 SB-33 and 110
FMK-1 mines destroyed in training, and an additional 1,582 mines destroyed but
left unreported in 2003.[17]
Argentina started its stockpile destruction after an agreement on cooperation
and technical assistance was concluded between the government and the OAS on 9
June 2003, with technical assistance provided by
Canada.[18] In August 2003, the
OAS reported that Canada had provided $220,000 to the OAS to facilitate
stockpile destruction in Argentina and
Chile.[19]
The destruction was carried out in eight locations throughout the country:
Serrezuela in Córdoba province, Zapala in Neuquén province,
Sarmiento in Chubut province, Puerto Santa Cruz in Santa Cruz province, Monte
Caseros in Corrientes province, and Azul, Puerto Belgrano and Campo de Mayo in
Buenos Aires province.[20]
The last stockpiles were destroyed on 4 December 2003 in an event at Campo de
Mayo, Buenos Aires attended by the Minister of Defense and other government
officials, the heads of the Brazilian and Chilean armies, diplomatic and OAS
representatives, and Landmine
Monitor.[21] The Minister of
Defense, Jose Pampuro, stated, “We can feel proud that we break the chain
of death with this
destruction.”[22] Media and
local authorities, including environmental protection officials, witnessed
earlier destruction events, as well.
Before the 2003 destruction, Argentina had executed three other stockpile
destruction events: the Air Force destroyed its entire antipersonnel mine
stockpile of 1,160 FMK-1 mines on November 1998; the Army destroyed 1,000 FMK-1
mines and their fuzes at the Fray Luis Beltrán factory between November
1999 and March 2000; and, 200 P-4-B antipersonnel mines were destroyed at the
conclusion of a regional seminar on stockpile destruction in November
2000.[23]
On 15 May 2003, Argentina told States Parties that a total of 90,764
stockpiled antipersonnel mines would be destroyed by 4 December
2003.[24] This was 655 more mines
than the total reported in the 12 May 2003 Article 7
report.[25] An Argentine Ministry
of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that the difference in figures
is due to the fact that during the final inventory of arsenals, carried out by
the supervision and control team, antipersonnel mines were found in crates that
corresponded to other types of
munitions.[26]
The mines reported stockpiled in May 2003 are 6,404 mines fewer than the
number reported in the July 2002 Article 7 report, due to the reporting of an
additional 400 FMK-1 mines that were previously overlooked, and the rendering
inert of 6,844 mines. Despite these clarifications, the figures reported still
remain inconsistent.[27]
In July 2002, Argentina also reported that the Army would keep 1,160 FMK-1
antipersonnel mines as fuzes (initiators) for antivehicle mines which have a
“cápsula adaptadora,” a cap that cannot be removed, and a
resistance of 300 kilograms. Argentina reported that these FMK-1 mines would be
destroyed when the antivehicle mines were
destroyed[28] and considered these
FMK-1 mines “destroyed for the purposes of the
Convention.”[29] The
removal of these 1,160 mines was not reflected in the May 2003 Article 7
report.
The number reported in July 2002 is 7,343 more mines than the 89,170 mines
reported stockpiled in Article 7 reports submitted May 2001 and August 2000, in
part because 4,287 Libyan mines were reported for the first time in July
2002.[30] The remaining
difference of 3,056 mines was apparently due to “different criteria that
were used to carry out inventory of the different deposits that had AP mines.
Mines not reported as new types correspond to mines already reported in previous
reports.”[31]
Mines Retained For Training
In April 2004, Argentina reported a total of 1,772 mines retained as of
December 2003: 772 mines (742 SB-33 and 30 FMK-1) retained by Navy Engineers at
the Naval Depot in Puerto Belgrano and 1,000 antipersonnel mines (500 P-4-B, 250
FMK-1, and 250 unspecified Libyan mines) retained by the Army’s Munitions
Company No. 121 for use in the development of a mine detection robot under a
project by the Technical Directorate of the Army. According to the report, the
1,000 mines retained by the Army had not previously been
reported.[32] The April 2002 and
May 2003 Article 7 reports indicated 1,000 mines (860 SB-33 and 140 FMK-1) would
be held by the Navy, and none by the Army.
Argentina also for the time reported that some of its retained mines had
actually been consumed (destroyed) during training or development activities:
118 SB-33 and 110 FMK-1 antipersonnel
mines.[33]
Originally, in August 2000, Argentina indicated that the Navy would retain
3,049 antipersonnel mines for training, but the number of mines to be retained
by the Army was under
consideration.[34] In May 2001,
Argentina reported that another 10,000 mines of unspecified type would be
retained by the Army, and adjusted the number of mines retained by the Navy to
3,025, making a total of 13,025 antipersonnel mines retained for
training.[35] In April 2002,
Argentina informed Landmine Monitor that 12,025 (92 percent) of these mines were
considered “exercise mines,” as Argentina planned to empty them of
their explosive content and render them
inert.[36] This information was
reflected in the July 2002 Article 7 report. The remaining 1,000 mines would be
retained by the Navy and used for training until 1 April
2010.[37]
Landmine and UXO Problem
Argentina and the United Kingdom recognize that there is a problem with mines
and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. (See also
United Kingdom entry in this Landmine Monitor Report.) Argentina
included an interpretative statement (“Declaración
Interpretativa”) on its claims of sovereignty over the islands in its
April 2004 Article 7 report, as it had in previous years. There are 101
minefields covering 20 square kilometers and containing 16,000 mines, according
to the Falkland Islands
government.[38] The mined areas
are mainly beaches and peat areas, and are marked and fenced.
After more than three years of negotiations, in October 2001 Argentina and
the UK announced that a feasibility study would be conducted to assess mine
clearance options for the
islands.[39] According to the
Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining in Argentina’s Joint
Chiefs of Staff, funding for the first phase of the study has been included in
the national budget since 2002, but the country’s economic problems have
meant the funds could not be
spent.[40] In February 2004, the
UK Ministry of Defence confirmed that the government was fully committed to
destroying all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under UK jurisdiction in
accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty and it would “continue working towards
a UK-led study, to be funded by the Argentine Government, into the feasibility
of mine clearance in the
Falklands.”[41]
Argentina has maintained that its sizeable border with Chile is mine-affected
on the Chilean side only. According to media reports, Argentine provinces on
the affected border include
Catamarca,[42] Jujuy, and
Salta.[43] In March 2003, the
Office for Humanitarian Demining told Landmine Monitor that there were no
official studies on the existence of UXO in
Argentina.[44] Argentina and
Chile have held previous meetings and produced statements on mine clearance of
Chilean minefields along their common border. In May 2004, the Argentine
Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that the landmine problem in
the Beagle Channel was discussed in periodical meetings of representatives of
the two governments.[45]
Mine Action and Assistance
A Working Group on Antipersonnel Mines and Humanitarian Demining was
established on 25 February 2000 by Resolution MD 169/00 and includes
representatives from the Ministries of Defense, Army and Navy, and the Institute
of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces (CITEFA). The Working
Group is responsible for implementing treaty requirements, including Article 7
reporting. On 27 November 2000, an Office of Humanitarian Demining was created
in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces to assist in the
execution of the Working Group’s
tasks.[46] The Director of the
Office of Humanitarian Demining attended the intersessional meeting in June 2004
and the regional mine action seminar in Quito, Ecuador in August 2004.
The Center for Training in Humanitarian Demining (Centro de Entrenamiento en
Desminado Humanitario, CEDH) provides training to national and international
armed forces personnel.[47] The
Argentine Center of Joint Training for Peace Operations (Centro Argentino de
Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz, CAECOPAZ) provides courses on
demining and humanitarian assistance for peacekeeping operations. On 23-27 June
2003, CAECOPAZ held its fifth demining refresher course for 14 Army officers,
seven Navy officers and one Air Force officer, and on 3-7 November 2003, its
sixth refresher course for 15 Army, eight Navy and three Air Force
officers.[48] A seventh course
was planned for June 2004, and an eighth for October or November
2004.[49] CEDH and CAECOPAZ also
provided training to Armed Forces personnel in 2001 and 2002. Naval Marine
Engineers receive training in humanitarian demining at the Naval Base in Puerto
Belgrano.[50]
In its Fiscal Year 2002, the United States provided $700,000 to fund a
one-time US military train-the-trainer session for Argentine humanitarian mine
action instructors, with the aim of increasing Argentina’s ability to
provide humanitarian demining training to other
nations.[51] From late August
until 11 September 2001, military personnel from the US and eight other
countries of the region participated in “Cabañas 2001”
military exercises in Salta, Argentina. According to media reports, the
exercises included recovery of a soldier who had strayed into a minefield and
procedures to identify and mark mined
areas.[52]
Argentina has not provided any financial assistance to international mine
action since 1998.[53] In the
past, Argentina has participated in mine action programs in Kuwait and
Angola.[54] Argentina
participated in OAS mine action activities in Central America from 1993 to 1999,
including mine clearance in
Nicaragua.[55]Argentine
personnel also participated in the 1995-1999 peacekeeping operation MOMEP
(Misión de Observadores Militares Ecuador-Perú), which included
the verification of mine clearance along the
border.[56]
Landmine Casualties
No landmine casualties have been recorded in Argentina since Landmine Monitor
started reporting in 1999. In August 1999, the media reported on two UXO
survivors injured by grenades near San Antonio de los Cobres and the 1995
disappearance of a US volcanologist on Llullailaco volcano was attributed to a
landmine incident.[57]
Argentine civilians and military have fallen victims to mines overseas. An
Argentine soldier who lost both legs in a landmine explosion in Croatia in
December 1993 while serving with the United Nations finally received
compensation from Argentina in December 2003, using funds the UN had provided
originally in January 1998.[58]
Comprehensive national disability laws
exist.[59]
[1] “Argentina manifests that its
territory in the Malvinas Islands is mine-affected, a fact which was
communicated to the UN General Assembly in resolutions 48/7, 49/215, 50/82, and
51/149.... Argentina is impeded access to AP mines in the Malvinas in order to
comply with the Mine Ban Treaty because of the illegal occupation by the United
Kingdom.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs response to Landmine Monitor
questionnaire, 30 March 2000; Intervention by Argentina, Fifth Meeting of Status
Parties, Bangkok, 16 September 2003. Argentina also has included an
interpretative statement on the Malvinas/Falklands in its Article 7
reports. [2] Interview with Santiago
Villalba, Secretary, Direction of International Safety, Nuclear and Space
Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 19 December 2000,
and successive Article 7 reports, Form
A. [3] Response to Landmine Monitor
questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated May
2004. [4] Article 7 Report, Form A, 23
July 2002. [5] Article 7 reports
submitted: 16 May 2003 (for calendar year 2002); 23 July 2002 (for calendar year
2001); 28 May 2001 (for the period 22 August 2000 – 11 May 2001); and 31
August 2000 (for the period 14 March – 21 August
2000). [6] Intervention by Argentina,
Fifth Meeting of Status Parties, 16 September
2003. [7] Landmine Monitor (MAC) notes
taken on interventions by Argentina and Chile, Regional Mine Action Seminar,
Quito, 13 August 2004. [8] Article 7
Report, Form E, 12 May 2003. The April 2004 Article 7 report does not include
Form E. [9] Article 7 Report, Form E, 12
May 2003. [10] US Department of Defense,
“Mine Facts” CD-ROM. [11]
Email from Mariela Adriana Fogante, DIGAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1
October 2004. [12] Clarin (Buenos
Aires), 27-28 March 1995; Lawrence Whelan, “Latin arms shipped to
Croatia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 August 1996, p. 14. The
government said that the final destinations of the weapons were supposed to be
Panamá and Venezuela, and it had been deceived by an intermediary company
which had coordinated the operation. But federal justice authorities ordered the
arrest of former executives of the company, which is publicly-owned, and the
former Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers were
charged. [13] Article 7 Report, Form C,
23 July 2002. The previous year, Argentina reported that it had laid 20,000 P4B
and FMK-1 antipersonnel mines during the conflict. Article 7 Report, Form C, 30
August 2000. [14] Article 7 Report, Form
C, 23 July 2002. [15] Interview with
Osvaldo Gazzola, Advisor, Office of Congressmen Alfredo Bravo and Jorge Rivas,
14 February 2000. [16] Article 7 Report,
Form G, appended Table, 13 April 2004, p. 8; Presentation by Argentina, Standing
Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 12 February
2004. [17] See Table 1 in Article 7
Report, Form G, 13 April 2004. The 1,582 mines included an additional 436 P-4-B
mines; an additional 1,156 FMK-1 mines; and 10 fewer Libyan mines (type
unspecified). Article 7 Report, Form B, and Form G, Table 1, 13 April
2004. [18] OAS, “Argentina y la
OEA firman acuerdo para la destrucción de minas antipersonal
almacenadas,” Press Release AG-06, 9 June
2003. [19] OEA AICMA, Portafolio
2003-2004, August 2003, p. 3. [20]
Presentation by Argentina, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 12
February 2004. [21] “Acta de
Destrucción,” 4 December 2004; Guido Braslavsky, “Argentina
eliminó sus últimas minas antipersonales,” Clarín
(Buenos Aires), 5 December 2003; “Argentina eliminates all antipersonnel
mines,” MercoPress (Mercosur), 6 December 2003; ICRC, “Argentina:
Last mines destroyed,” ICRC News No. 32/162, 19 December
2003. [22] See “Destruyeron minas
antipersonales,” La Nación (Buenos Aires), 5 December
2003. [23] Article 7 Report, Form G, 23
July 2002. [24] Presentation by
Argentina, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 15 May
2003. [25] The May 2003 total of 90,190
mines consisted of: 71,115 P-4-B (Spain); 6,995 SB-33 (Italy); 7,712 FMK-1
(Argentina); 1,699 MAP (Libya); and 2,588 TRA (Libya). Form G provided
additional but contradictory information about removal and destruction of mines
from stockpiles in 2002, stating that 3,904 FMK-1 mines were rendered inert at
the General Directorate of Military Industries (these are listed as P-4-B in
Form B) and another 2,940 P-4-B were rendered inert by destruction of their
explosive content at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base (these are listed as SB-33
in Form B). Article 7 Report, Forms B and G, 12 May
2003. [26] Email from Mariela Adriana
Fogante, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 October
2004. [27] If 6,844 mines are subtracted
from the total of 96,513 and then 400 newly discovered FMK-1s are added, then
that results in a new stockpile total of 90,069 mines. To make these figures
match, 40 additional mines must have been added to the stockpile inventory or 40
fewer mines must have been rendered inert. The July 2002 total of 96,513
antipersonnel mines consisted of: 75,019 P-4-B (Spain); 9,935 SB-33 (Italy);
7,272 FMK-1 (Argentina); 1,699 MAP (Libya); and 2,588 TRA (Libya) mines.
Article 7 Report, Form B, 23 July
2002. [28] Response from Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002; Response from
Capt. Carlos Nielsen, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 April
2002. [29] Article 7 Report, Form G, 12
May 2003. [30] The August 2000 and May
2001 total of 89,170 mines consisted of: 72,924 P-4-B (Spain); 10,885 SB-33
(Italy); and 5,361 FMK-1 (Argentina). Article 7 Reports, Form B, 30 August 2000
and 28 May 2001. No mention was made of the other types of antipersonnel mines
produced by Argentina in the past, or of any imported from
Israel. [31] Email from Mariela Adriana
Fogante, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 October
2004. [32] Article 7 Report, Form D, 13
April 2004. While Argentina had indicated before that it was retaining a
quantity of FMK-1 mines, this was the first indication that P-4-B and Libyan
types would be kept. [33] Article 7
Report, Form G, 13 April 2004. [34]
Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 August
2000. [35] Article 7 Report, Form D, 28
May 2001. [36] Response by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 4 April 2002; Response by Capt. Carlos Nielsen, Office of
Humanitarian Demining, 2 April 2002. In May 2003, Argentina reported that the
Army had begun a process of transforming 10,000 P-4-B antipersonnel mines into
training devices, a process scheduled to conclude in 2003. Article 7 Report,
Form F, 12 May 2003. [37] Article 7
Report, Form D, 23 July 2002. [38] CCW
Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, October 2003; Article 7 Report,
Form F, 30 April 2004; email from Sam A-Bailey, CSMM, Falkland Islands
Government Office, London, 25 June 2003. When depositing its first Article 7
report in August 1999, the UK included minefield
maps. [39] Article 7 Report, Form F, 30
April 2003. [40] Email from Capt.
Carlos Nielsen Enemark, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Landmine Monitor (MAC), 29 September
2004. [41] Fax from Alasdair Pennycook,
Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, UK Ministry of Defence, 9
February 2004. [42] Juan Castro Olivera,
“Chile keeps 14 minefields along frontier areas,” La Nación,
2 July 1999. [43] Antonio Oieni,
“Chile tiene 8 campos minados en su frontera con Salta,” El Tribuno
(Salta), 16 August 1999. See www.eltribuno.com.ar/especiales/minas/minas.htm,
accessed 12 October 2004. See also “Frontera explosiva: las secuelas de
una guerra que no fue,” Telenoche Investiga (programa 04, ciclo 2001),
Channel 13 (Buenos Aires), 31 October 2001. Landmine Monitor has a copy of the
documentary. [44] Response to Landmine
Monitor by Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
21 March 2003. [45] Response by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May
2004. [46] Interview with Capt. Carlos
Nielsen, Office for Humanitarian Demining, Buenos Aires, 7 November 2000;
Telephone interview with Capt. Carlos Nielsen, 22 February
2001. [47] Article 13 Report, Form F, 15
November 1999; Statement by Argentina, UN General Assembly, 18 November
1999. [48] Article 7 Report, Form A, 13
April 2004. [49] Carlos Nielsen,
“Mine Action Training in Argentina” in “The Role of the
Military in Mine Action,” James Madison University, Journal of Mine
Action, Issue 8.1, June 2004. [50]
Article 7, Form A, 12 May 2003; Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 April
2002. [51] US Department of State,
“To Walk the Earth in Safety,” September
2002. [52] Graciela Eslanoa,
“Civiles recorrieron las sendas del operative military Cabañas
2001,” El Tribuno, 30 August 2001; “El Ejército por
dentro,” El Tribuno, 12 September
2001. [53] Argentina contributed
US$254,764 to mine action in 1998. Resource Mobilization Contact Group,
“A review of resources to achieve the Convention’s aims,”
presented by Norway to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of
the Convention, Geneva, 25 June 2004, Table 1A, p.
5. [54] “Risky Argentine Mission
in Angola,” La Nación, 19 April 1999; CCW Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Form E, 15 November
1999. [55] Alberto Armendáriz,
“Argentina collaborates with the removal of landmines in Nicaragua,”
La Nación, 18 April 1999; Statement by Argentina, UN General Assembly, 18
November 1999; email from Juan Luis Hurtado, military member of the mission in
Central America, March 2000; interview with Alejandra Martín, Advisor to
the Secretary of Military Affairs Guillermo Tello, Ministry of Defense, Buenos
Aires, March 2000. [56] See Capt. Rafael
Recasens, “Misión de Observadores Militares Ecuador-Perú,
Experencia de la Participación de Chile,” Revista Marina (Chile),
May 2000. [57] Antonio Oieni, “Los
costos de una guerra que no fue,” El Tribuno, 17 August
1999. [58] Ministry of Defense,
“El gobierno efectivizará indemnización después de 10
años a sargento herido como casco azul,” Press Release N°
80/2003, 29 December 2003. [59] Law
22.431 published 20 March 1981, modified by Laws 23.876, 24.308, 24.314, and
24.901.