Key developments since May 2003: In 2003, there were numerous
incidents involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by
cocaleros (coca leaf-growing farmers). At least seven people were killed
and more than 83 injured in reported IED incidents in the Chapare region in
2003.
Key developments since 1999: Bolivia became a State Party to the Mine
Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. Bolivia submitted its initial Article 7
transparency report in November 1999, but has not issued any of the required
annual updated reports. Bolivia has not enacted any legal implementation
measures, as required by Article 9. In March 2001, Bolivia provided detailed
information to Landmine Monitor on Chilean minefields near its border. In 2003,
there were numerous incidents involving the use of Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs).
Mine Ban Policy
Bolivia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 9 June
1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. Bolivia was an active
participant in the Ottawa Process, including the Oslo treaty negotiations, and
it was the first country in South America to ratify the treaty. It has
subsequently worked to promote the Mine Ban Treaty, both regionally through
MERCOSUR, the Rio Group, the Organization of American States (OAS), and
globally, including by voting in favor of every annual pro-mine ban United
Nations General Assembly resolution since 1996.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army, Bolivia has not
yet enacted any national implementation
legislation.[1] In February 2004,
the Defense Committee of the House of Representatives was considering draft
legislation on weapons, including antipersonnel
mines.[2]
On 8 November 1999, Bolivia submitted its initial Article 7 transparency
report, for the period 1 January 1999 to 8 November 1999. It has not issued any
of the required annual updated reports, due by 30 April of each year. In
previous years and most recently in April 2004, the Ministry of Defense told
Landmine Monitor it is preparing an annual Article 7 report, but none had been
submitted by September
2004.[3]
Bolivia has participated in every annual meeting of States Parties, with the
exception of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok, Thailand, which it
did not attend due to budgetary
restrictions.[4] According to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bolivia was represented by its neighboring
countries through the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina), which attended as a
subregional grouping. Bolivia attended some early meetings of the
treaty’s intersessional Standing Committees, but it has not participated
since 2001. The government has sent representatives to participate in regional
meetings on landmines held in México (January 1999), Argentina (November
2000), Perú (August 2003), and Ecuador (August 2004).
Bolivia has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have
had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2,
and 3. Thus, it has not made known its views on the issues of joint military
operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of
antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling
devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.
Bolivia is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and
its Amended Protocol II on landmines and it participated in the November 2003
Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties.
Production, Trade, Stockpiling, Use
Bolivia has reported on several occasions, including in its Article 7 report,
that it has never produced, exported, or used antipersonnel mines and it has no
stockpiles, including any mines retained for
training.[5]
In March 2001, the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that
“Bolivia is not using and does not reserve the right to use Claymore
mines. It is not using and does not reserve the right to use other munitions
which might function like AP mines and pose danger to civilians, such as
anti-tank mines with anti-handling devices, improvised explosive devices, or
certain munitions and cluster
bombs.”[6]
Use of Improvised Explosive Devices
In recent years the Chapare region in north-central Bolivia has experienced
social and political unrest, and often violent confrontations between
cocaleros (coca leaf-growing farmers) and their organizations on the one
hand, and state security forces implementing a coca crops eradication program
called “Plan Dignidad” (Dignity
Plan).[7] In 2003, several
incidents were recorded of cocaleros using Improvised Explosive Devices
(IED) called cazabobos (fool-catcher booby-traps) against security forces
in the Chapare region, that killed or injured members of the Armed Forces and
Police. This is the first time Landmine Monitor reports on their use in
Bolivia. IEDs and explosive booby-traps that are victim-activated are
prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
In March 2004, the Police Commander (Policía Ecológica) told
media that 90 IED casualties were recorded in 2003, of which 83 were injured
(including soldiers, policemen and civilians) and seven killed (five soldiers
and two policemen).[8] The media
has reported a wide range of casualty figures for 2003 in the Chapare region. A
February 2004 article stated that seven Bolivian anti-drug soldiers were killed
and at least 91 injured in the Chapare region in 2003, “most of them by
explosive booby traps planted shoulder high in the dense
undergrowth.”[9]
Unless noted, the following list of cazabobos incidents was provided
to Landmine Monitor by the Army in August
2004:[10]
On 5 October 2002, a sailor was killed by a cazabobo that had been
hidden in a tree in San Andrés sector, Chapare;
On 19 October 2002, a soldier was injured by an explosive booby-trap in
Sindicato Tres Cruces;
On 19 November 2002, four sailors were injured by an unknown explosive
booby-trap in Sindicato Tres Cruces;
In February 2003, four soldiers were injured after leaving their base in
Chimoré when a cazabobo
exploded.[11] They were
transported to the Santa María Clinic in Santa Cruz de la Sierra for
treatment.
On 15 June 2003, two soldiers were killed and seven soldiers and police
injured by a cazabobo in Sindicato Barrientos y Tacuaral;
On 19 June 2003 two police officers were injured by a cazabobo;
On 4 September 2003, a police office was injured by a cazabobo in
Samuzabeti;
On 27 September 2003, five policemen were injured, two seriously, by a
cazabobo laid 300 meters from the Rojo II camp of the Fuerza de Tarea
Conjunta (Joint Task Force) in the Isinuta zone, Chapare, 270 kilometers from
the city of Cochabamba.[12]
On 13 October 2003, an 18-year-old soldier lost his eyes and an arm when he
moved a rock blocking a road, triggering a cazabobo, near Ivirgazama,
Chapare, 280 kilometers from Santa Cruz de la
Sierra.[13]
On 14 October 2003, an Army officer and soldier were injured by an explosive
booby-trap in Mariposas sector;
On 23 October 2003, a soldier was killed and seven others injured when a
cazabobo exploded two kilometers from Amarillo III camp of the Fuerza de
Tarea Conjunta in the Tocopaya sector, near the Isiboro Sécure Park of
Cochabamba.[14] The Commander of
the Cochabamba Police told media that the cazabobo was “more
sophisticated” than previous ones, as it was activated electronically
which required “specialized training.” According to the report, the
device was triggered by remote control from a distance of 200
meters.[15]
On 28 October 2003, a sailor was killed and ten soldiers and sailors were
injured by an explosive booby-trap in Comuna Tacopaya;
On 11 November 2003, a cazabobo exploded near Isinuta, at the
entrance of the Isiboro Sécure Park, but a nearby group of soldiers was
not injured.[16] Police
subsequently found and deactivated a second device.
On 13 November 2003, a policeman was killed when he stepped on an IED and
two others were injured in Primavera sector in the Isiboro Sécure
Park.[17] According to the report,
the government, “did not discard the possibility that the artifact was an
antipersonnel mine.[18]
On 29 November 2003, a 20-year-old soldier was killed and six others
injured, after their Army truck detonated a “homemade mine” in
Ismael Montes region, Isinuta.[19]
A government official from Chimoré was quoted as saying “while
before cazabobos were activated through small batteries and there was
lesser potential to harm, now detonators are activated by electrical charges
from car batteries and the authors can visualize and select their objective from
a distance of 200 meters.”
There are a few reports of IED use prior to 2003. In October 2001, a
nine-year-old girl was injured after detonating a booby-trap tripwire on the
main road to Villa 4 de
Septiembre.[20]
The Army describes cazabobos as “explosive booby traps”
made from industrial and homemade explosives, using fuzes triggered by
“pressure, traction, release of tension, and electricity” that are
placed where people pass, leading to serious injury or death. They are made by
specialists and may contain black gunpowder or ammonium nitrate as the
multiplier explosive charge.[21]
The Commander of the Unidad de Policía Ecológica (Ecological
Police Unit) was reported by media as stating that authorities have known about
the manufacture of homemade explosives since 1998 and the devices have evolved
since then: “At first they used sulphuric acid, then they began using
electrical systems with flashlight bulbs and now they are using cement and
intermittent light
bulbs.”[22] In August
2004, the Army informed Landmine Monitor that it did not have information on the
scope of the problem with cazabobos in the Chapare region, or on
clearance of the
devices.[23]
Landmine Problem
Bolivia is not mine-affected, but the border with Chile was mined by Chile in
the 1970s, particularly in 1978 during a territorial dispute. There is no
information available on the extent of the cazabobo problem in the
Chapare region.
In March 2001, Bolivia’s Ministry of Defense provided Landmine Monitor
with detailed information on fifteen Chilean minefields laid near the
country’s south-western border covering an area of 3,158,100 square
meters:[24]
Border marker XIII: Along the Caquena river (foothills of Jiska Cobiri), in
Choyota ravine, 400 metres from the border, to the south-west of Cosapa Grande.
Border marker XV: In Portesuelo de Achuta, on the road to Achuta, in the
foothills of Carbiri hill, in the ravine Jaka Khollo, 100 metres from the
border, to the west of Estancia Achuta.
Border marker XVI: Opposite Paso de Casiri.
Border marker XVII: On the pass to Ajata, close to Quisi Quisini hill.
Border marker XVIII: “Tambo Quemado.” On Paso de Chungara.
Border marker XIX: Opposite Juchaloma hill and the Paso de Uncaliri and
Guallatiri.
Border marker XXIII:Lacataya Loma hill, close to Salar de Surire.
Border marker XXIV: “Abra Capitán.” Between Luzcaya and
Capitán hills, approximately 50 meters west of the marker.
Border marker XXXII: posite Pisiga, approximately 4,000 meters from the
border.
Border marker XXXIV: Opposite Salitral marker.
Border marker XXXVIII: “Apacheta Tilujaya.” Opposite Apacheta
Oje, approximately 4,000 meters from the border.
Border marker XLI: “Camino de Gancosa.” In Quebraba Gancosa,
approximately 500 meters from the border.
Border marker XLII: near Santalle hill.
In Lincancaur Sector, in the only pass between lake Verde and San Pedro de
Atacama. The size of the minefield is not specified and it may not be genuine.
Border marker LXXXII: “Portesuelo del Cajón,” near
Guayaques hill.
The mined areas are located near lakes and mountain passes, especially in
Khasiri, Chungara, Tambo Quemado, and Pisiga, in areas that are not near
populated centers.[25] In April
2004, the Ministry of Defense informed Landmine Monitor that most landmines were
planted between Achuta and border marker
15.[26] Seven of the fifteen
minefields were reported to contain a total of 196,767 antipersonnel and
antivehicle mines.[27] In May
2002, Bolivia’s Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that the country
has no detailed maps of mined areas in the border region, as these areas are
located in Chilean
territory.[28]
Mine Clearance
Bolivia has offered to assist Chile to demine the border on several
occasions, but no clearance of the border had taken place by September
2004.[29] Chile did, however,
began mine clearance near its border with Perú in August 2004.
In the Chapare region, the police are responsible for deactivating IED;
according to a media report, approximately 100 police officers have been trained
to neutralize these
explosives.[30] The Police
Commander told media that routes used by coca eradication personnel are swept
daily for explosives and devices are either deactivated or destroyed in
situ.[31] According to the
Police Commander, 22 explosives were deactivated or neutralized in 2001. In the
first four months of 2003, four booby-traps were deactivated and two were
neutralized.[32]
In 2002, Bolivia provided three military mine action supervisors to the
MARMINCA mine clearance program by the OAS in
Nicaragua.[33] It previously
provided two supervisors in 2000.
For the first time, the Army's First Division carried out a mine awareness
campaign during 2003 in regions bordering
Chile.[34]
Landmine and IED Casualties
In March 2003, a Bolivian national and a Chilean national smuggling drugs
across into Chile were reportedly injured by an antipersonnel
mine.[35] The government,
however, denies that any mine casualties took place along the border in 2003 and
Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify the
report.[36] Since 1999,
Landmine Monitor identified only one other landmine incident in Bolivia. On 26
May 2000, a peasant from Jankomarca, Villarroel province, in La Paz department,
lost part of his left foot while crossing the
border.[37]
The total number of landmine casualties in Bolivia is not known. Between
1995 and 1997, landmines reportedly killed three Bolivian
peasants.[38]
It would appear that Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) pose a greater threat
than landmines in Bolivia. At least seven people were killed and more than 83
injured in reported IED incidents in the Chapare
region.[39]
Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice
Basic health services exist in the border area with Chile, while more
specialized health services including surgery are found in the capitals of
departments such as La Paz, Oruro, and
Potosí.[40]
Bolivia has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities,
including Law 1678 of 15 December 1995. Article 17 established the National
Committee of Disabled Persons (CONALPEDIS), as a decentralized body of the
Ministry of Human Development, responsible for coordinating issues relating to
persons with disabilities.[41]
According to the Ministry of Defense, treatment of injured military personnel
and full rehabilitation is the responsibility of the NAS (Antinarcotics
assistance), and is available at the Fioanni Clinic in Santa Cruz. In the case
of disability, Articles 114 and 118 of the Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas
Armadas LOFA (Fundamental Law of the Armed Forces) cover provisions for
treatment, rehabilitation and
compensation.[42]
[1] Response to Landmine Monitor by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed by Edgar Pinto Tapia, Director General of
Multilateral Affairs, 7 April 2004, p. 1; Response from Gen. César
López Saavedra, General Commander of the Army, sent by Edgar Pinto Tapia,
General Director of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 August
2004. [2] Telephone interview with Julio
Mollinedo Claros, Disarmament and International Security Desk, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 4 February 2004. [3] An
Article 7 report for calendar year 2001 was reportedly submitted to the United
Nations in May 2002, but not posted on the website of the UN Department of
Disarmament Affairs. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 112. Landmine
Monitor was also informed that a report was being prepared in March 2003, but
this report is also not posted. See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 114; and
response to Landmine Monitor from Amb. Gonzalo Montenegro, Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, faxed on 24 March 2003. See also
response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2004, p.
1. [4] Response by Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 7 April 2004, p. 2. [5] Ibid;
Response to Landmine Monitor from Amb. Jorge Soruco Villanueva, Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, faxed on 22 March 2001; Article 7 Report,
8 November 1999. [6] Response by
Ministry of Defense, 22 March 2001. [7]
Human rights violations by state security forces have also been widely reported.
See Kathryn Ledebur, “Popular Protest Brings Down the Government,”
Washington Office on Latin America, November 2003; “Four Dead and
Blockades Continue,” Andean Information Network, 15 January
2003. [8] Guísela López R.
Chapare, “Hay 100 desactivadores de cazabobos,” El Deber (Santa Cruz
de la Sierra), 15 March 2004. [9] Kevin
G. Hall, “Coca growers are using bombs and booby traps,” Knight
Ridder, 10 February 2004. [10] Response
by Army, 30 August 2004. [11]
“Militares heridos en el Chapare,” El Nuevo Día (La Paz), 15
February 2003. [12] “Un cazabobos
deja heridos a cinco policías en el Chapare,” La Prensa (La Paz),
28 September 2003. [13] “Soldado
mutilado en Chapare queda inhábil y precisa ayuda,” El Deber, 26
October 2003. [14] “Sofisticado
cazabobo mata a soldado y deja 7 heridos,” El Diario (La Paz), 24 October
2003. [15]
Ibid. [16] “Explota otro
“cazabobo” en Chapare. La Policía Ecológica
inmediatamente después logró deactivar un explosivo,” Los
Tiempos (Cochabamba), 12 November
2003. [17] “Un cazabobos mata a un
policía y hiere a otros dos,” La Razón (La Paz), 14 November
2003. [18] Ibid. According to the report
this was the latest in a series of incidents involving cazabobos. On 14 June
2003, two soldiers were killed and seven were seriously injured in San
José Tacuaral zone; on 18 June 2003, two policemen were injured in Santa
Fé zone; on 29 September 2003 five policemen were injured in Valle Alto
Sindicato, Isinuta; and on 14 October 2003 an Army captain and a soldier were
seriously injured. [19] “Atentado
en Bolivia. Un soldado muerto y otros seis heridos,” AP (La Paz), 30
November 2003; “Un soldado muere y seis son heridos en el Chapare,”
La Razón, 30 November 2003; “Mesa admite que hay terrorismo en
Chapare y promete erradicarlo,” Los Tiempos (Cochabamba), 1 December
2003. [20] “Bolivia Negotiations
Stall as Coca Growers Reject Government Proposal,” Bulletin from the
Andean Information Network, 12 October
2001. [21] Ministry of National
Defense response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, signed by Division General
César López Saavedra, General Commander of the Army, p. 1-3, faxed
on 8 April 2004; Response by Army, 30 August
2004. [22] Jesús Aponte Vargas,
“Cazabobos: peligro constante en Chapare,” El Deber, 2 November
2003. [23] Response by Army, 30 August
2004. [24] The affected area may be
larger as Bolivian authorities were not able to determine the size of two mined
areas. For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 277. Response by
Ministry of Defense, 22 March
2001. [25]
Ibid. [26] Response by Ministry of
National Defense, 8 April 2004. [27]
Response by Ministry of Defense, 22 March 2001. This included 16,716 AP mines,
153,396 blast mines, 15,267 bounding mines, and 11,388 antivehicle
mines. [28] Response by Ministry of
Defense, 10 May 2002. [29] In July
1998, Bolivia’s President Hugo Bánzer asked Chile to demine the
border as soon as possible and offered Bolivia’s assistance in this
effort. See “Bolivia offers Chile assistance to accelerate the demining
along the border,” Agence France-Presse (La Paz), 4 July
1998. [30] “Hay 100
desactivadores de cazabobos,” El Deber, 15 March
2004. [31] Jesús Aponte Vargas,
“Cazabobos: peligro constante en Chapare,” El Deber, 2 November
2003. [32] “Hay 100
desactivadores de cazabobos,” El Deber, 15 March
2004. [33] “Contributing
Countries (International Supervisors) to the OAS Program of Demining in Central
America,” Table provided to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18
June 2002. [34] Response by Army, 30
August 2004. [35] “Hot news from
Chile: Mine clearance along Bolivian border,” MercoPress (Montevideo), 24
November 2003. [36] Response by
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2004, p.
3. [37] “Bolivian national
injured by an antipersonnel mines on border with Chile,” Agence France
Press (La Paz), 27 May 2000. [38] El
Diario, 21 September 1997. [39] See
“Use of Improvised Explosive Devices” section in this report for
details of reported incidents. [40]
Response to Landmine Monitor from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March
2001. [41] Congress of Bolivia,
“Ley de la Persona con Discapacidad del 15 de diciembre de 1995,”
Law No. 1678, .solobolivia.com
. [42] Response by Ministry of
Defense, 7 April 2004, p. 2-3.