Key developments since May 2003: In April 2004, Brazilian
antipersonnel mines with the same lot numbers as some of Brazil’s mines
retained for training were recovered by police from a drug lord outside Rio de
Janeiro. Brazil has retained 16,545 mines for training, the highest number of
any State Party, but in April 2004, Brazil reported no training activities were
carried out in 2002 and 2003 due to budgetary constraints. In 2003 and 2004
Brazil participated in international humanitarian mine action efforts in Central
America, Ecuador and Perú.
Key developments since March 1999: Brazil ratified the Mine Ban
Treaty on 30 April 1999, and it entered into force on 1 October 1999. On 31
October 2001, Brazil enacted national implementation legislation, Law 10.300.
Brazil completed destruction of its stockpiled mines in January 2003, ahead of
the October 2003 deadline. It is retaining 16,545 antipersonnel mines for
training, the highest number of any State Party. Brazil has made important
interpretive statements on antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and
antihandling devices, joint military operations with non-States Parties, and
foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines. Brazil has participated
in international humanitarian mine action efforts on a bilateral and
multilateral basis; 60 percent of military officers serving with the MARMINCA
demining program in Central America between 1994 and 2003 were Brazilian.
Mine Ban Policy
Brazil signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 30 April
1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 October 1999. National
implementation legislation, Law 10.300, took effect on 1 November
2001.[1] Brazil submitted its
fifth Article 7 transparency report, covering the year 2003, on 30 April
2004.[2]
After some initial reluctance, Brazil became an active participant in the
Ottawa Process and its involvement has since continued. The country has
attended every annual meeting of States Parties, including the Fifth Meeting of
States Parties in September 2003, and has participated in all the treaty’s
intersessional meetings, including in 2004. Brazil has voted in favor of every
annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including UNGA
Resolution 58/53 of 8 December 2003. Regionally, it has supported the Mine Ban
Treaty by taking part in regional meetings on landmines held in Argentina
(November 2000), Perú (August 2003), and Ecuador (August 2004), as well
as by hosting the Fourth Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in
October 2000 in Manaus, which in its final declaration included a call for
greater participation in, and effective implementation of, the
treaty.[3]
While Brazil has yet to co-chair an intersessional Standing Committee, it has
called for these leadership positions to “continue to be fulfilled on the
basis of a balanced representation between donor and affected countries”
and it has warned against any institutionalization of the intersessional work
program.[4]
As part of extensive discussions among States Parties regarding matters of
interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 of the Mine Ban
Treaty, Brazil has made some important and forceful statements, including at the
Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002 and during intersessional
Standing Committee meetings held in 2002 and 2003.
On Article 1(c), which states that a State Party may “never under any
circumstances... assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a State Party,” Brazil said the article:
...clearly bans joint operations with non-States Parties that may involve the
use of antipersonnel mines. Even if the States Parties involved in such
operations do not participate directly and actively in the laying of
anti-personnel mines, the operations should be considered illegal if the use of
landmines by a non-State Party is of direct military benefit to those States
Parties. In the absence of such a broad interpretation of the term
“assist,” Article 1 would contain a serious and unfortunate
loophole. All States Parties should commit strictly to observe the provisions
of Article 1, which would include giving the term "assist" as broad an
interpretation as
possible.[5]
With respect to the stockpiling and transit of foreign-owned mines, Brazil
stated that:
[I]ndefinite retention by a State Party of foreign-owned anti-personnel mines
on territory under its national control and jurisdiction is incompatible with
the spirit and letter of the Convention. Under a literal interpretation of
Article 4, States Parties would not be obligated to destroy foreign-owned mines
held on their national territory, given that Article 4 states that States
Parties are obliged only to destroy mines they ‘own or possess,’ or
that are under their ‘jurisdiction and control.’ Article 1,
however, does set forth a broad obligation to never “stockpile, retain or
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines.” Brazil
is of the view that the latter obligation applies to foreign-owned landmines.
Brazil has no foreign anti-personnel mines on its territory and will never,
under any circumstances, allow any transiting of anti-personnel mines on its
national territory for purposes that are banned by the Convention. We call upon
other States Parties to undertake a similar
pledge.[6]
Brazil has stated that it has no antivehicle mines, “with sensitive
anti-handling devices that may be unintentionally detonated by
individuals” and it has repudiated their use on “humanitarian
grounds.”[7] In September
2002, Brazil stated that it has favored a total ban on antivehicle mines
equipped with antihandling devices since the time of the negotiations of the
Mine Ban Treaty.[8] According
to Brazil, the wording of Article 2, Paragraph 3, makes clear that antivehicle
mines equipped with antihandling devices, “which may be detonated by the
unintentional act of a person constitute, for all practical purposes,
anti-personnel mines, and are therefore banned by the Convention. Brazil calls
upon all States Parties to reaffirm that
understanding.”[9]
Brazil is a State Party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and it has participated in the annual conferences
of States Parties to Amended Protocol II since 1999, including the Fifth Annual
Conference of States Parties held in November 2003. Brazil submitted its annual
Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report on 26 November 2003. It has attended
annual conferences and submitted reports in previous years.
The Brazilian Campaign Against Landmines (CBCM, Campanha Brasileira Contra
Minas Terrestres) is one of the ICBL’s most active country coalitions and
in September 2003, it joined the leadership body of the ICBL, the Coordination
Committee. The Brazilian campaign’s goals include a reduction in the
number of antipersonnel mines retained for training and greater mine action
assistance provided by the government to countries affected by Brazilian mines.
In January 2004, CBCM published the Brazilian chapter of Landmine Monitor
Report 2003 and its national coordinator made a presentation on national
implementation measures to a landmines seminar held in
Colombia.[10] The Brazilian
campaign undertook several activities at the annual World Social Forum in Porto
Alegre between 2001 and 2003, hosting workshops on landmines, organizing a photo
exhibition, and collecting petitions. In December 2001, CBCM assisted the NGO
Associação do Jovem Aprendiz to host the annual regional meeting
of Landmine Monitor researchers in Brasilia, where the participants engaged in
advocacy activities, including a roundtable on landmines held by the Human
Rights Commission of the National Congress.
Production, Transfer and Use
Brazil is a former producer, exporter and importer of antipersonnel mines.
It reports that production and export ceased in
1989.[11] At least two
antipersonnel mine s were produced by
Brazil:[12] the NM T-AB-1,
manufactured by IBQ Indústrias Químicas (formerly Britanite
Indústria Química Ltda), and the NM AE T1 antipersonnel mine,
manufactured by Química Tupan
AS.[13]
In the past, Brazil imported antipersonnel mines from Belgium (the NM M-409)
and Austria (DFC19).[14]
According to previous Landmine Monitor reports and information from Article 7
reports submitted by other countries, Brazilian antipersonnel mines have been
planted in the ground or stockpiled in Ecuador, Mozambique, Nicaragua and
Perú.[15]
Landmine Monitor has not found any evidence of antipersonnel mine use in
Brazil, including areas near the border with Colombia. In September 2002, media
reported that Colombian police had recovered 16 Brazilian-manufactured T-AB-1
antivehicle mines apparently stockpiled by the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia) in a forested area near the municipality of Pasto,
in the Colombian department of Nariño, near the border with
Ecuador.[16]
Stockpiling and Destruction
In its initial Article 7 Report submitted March 2000, Brazil reported a
stockpile of 35,012 antipersonnel mines: 30,875 NM M409 and 4,137 NM
T-AB-1.[17] This was the first
time Brazil had made details about its stockpile public.
In March 2003, Brazil reported that it had completed destruction of its
stockpiled antipersonnel mines in January
2003,[18] well ahead of its
treaty-mandated deadline of 1 October 2003. It stated that a total of 27,852
antipersonnel mines were destroyed: 27,397 M409 mines between December 2001 and
January 2003, 5 T-AB-1 destroyed during training in 2001, and 450 M409 mines
destroyed during training in the year
2000.[19] All of the
Army’s stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed by 5 July 2002, and a
total of 1,013 mines held by the Navy were destroyed in January
2003.[20] Destruction
apparently took place at ten different
locations.[21]
Between September and December 2001, Brazil destroyed 9,385 M409 mines that
were not declared in earlier Article 7 reports “because they already were
operationally
disabled.”[22]
In an anomaly, Brazil indicated that at the end of 2001 its stocks included
4,132 T-AB-1 mines, and subsequently stated it is retaining 3,063 of those
mines.[23] It has not, however,
reported on the destruction of the other 1,069 T-AB-1 mines.
No civil society representatives or media were invited to witness
Brazil’s stockpile destruction. In May 2002, the Landmine Monitor
researcher for Brazil and the Brazilian Campaign asked to participate as
observers in the stockpile destruction events, but did not receive a response
until July 2002, when the stockpile destruction had been completed, except for a
small number of mines held by the
Navy.[24] The Ministry of
Defense provided Landmine Monitor with a detailed report on the destruction
effort, dated 6 June
2003.[25]
Mines Retained for Training
Brazil originally retained 17,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes,
and at the end of 2003 still had a total of 16,545 mines. Since
Turkmenistan’s announcement in 2004 that it would destroy all of its
69,500 mines retained for training, Brazil has assumed an unenviable position as
the State Party with the most antipersonnel mines retained for training
purposes.[26] Brazil has
reported that mines retained will be destroyed in training activities during the
10-year period after entry into force of the treaty, by October
2009.[27] By this timeline, it
has retained enough mines to consume 1,700 per year in training activities, but
from March 2000 to December 2003 it had destroyed only 455 mines, less than 3
percent of the total. In April 2004, Brazil reported no training activities
were carried in 2002 and 2003 due to budgetary
constraints.[28] In April 2004,
Brazilian antipersonnel mines of the same lot numbers as the mines retained for
training were recovered by police from the home of a drug lord outside Rio de
Janiero (see below).
In March 2004, Brazil stated that the country requires a large number of
mines because it is “an active contributor to international humanitarian
mine clearance missions” and therefore the mines are needed “to
safeguard the training capacity of the Brazilian Armed
Forces.”[29] In July
2002, a Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor, “Brazil has
more than 200 operational [Army] units with possibilities of being designated to
peacekeeping operations. For this reason, it is necessary to keep a reduced
number of mines for training soldiers and graduates. As you can see, the
quantity of mines retained is almost
symbolic.”[30]
Brazil reported that at the end of 2003, it had a total of 16,545
antipersonnel mines retained for training: 13,482 M409 mines and 3,063 T-AB-1
mines. The Ammunition Central Deport holds 13,550 mines: 13,482 M409 mines
(3,789 of lot number 1-34, 5,497 of lot number 1-35, and 4,196 of lot number
1-36) and 68 T-AB-1 mines (59 of lot number 1 and 9 of lot number 21). The Navy
Ammunition Centre holds 2,995 T-AB-1 mines (265 of lot number 01-82, 1,390 of
lot number 01-85, 1,100 of lot number 01-89 and 240 of lot number
01-98).[31]
From an original total of 17,000 mines retained for training, Brazil has
reported destruction of 455 mines between March 2000 and December 2001: five
T-AB-1 mines in 2001, and 450 M409 mines between March and December
2000.[32]
The 16,545 mines reported as retained for training in Brazil’s January
2003 and March 2004 Article 7 reports differs from the number reported retained
in December 2001: there are an additional 33 M409 mines and 33 fewer T-AB-1
mines.[33] The lot numbers of
the mines reported retained for training in January 2003 and March 2004 differs
widely from the lot numbers reported in December 2001. The lot number 1-34 for
M409 mines and lot number 21 for T-AB-1 mines were reported for the first time
in March 2003.[34]
Originally, in September 2000, Brazil stated that it would retain 17,000
antipersonnel mines for training
purposes.[35] The Ammunition
Central Deport would hold 14,000 mines: 13,899 M409 mines (7,866 of lot number
1-35 and 6,033 of lot number 1-36) and 101 T-AB-1 mines of lot number 1. The
Navy Ammunition Centre would hold 3,250 T-AB-1 mines (1,278 of lot number 01-82,
1,390 of lot number 01-85, 82 of lot number 01-89, and 250 of lot number IBQ
01-98).
The Landmines in Rio de Janerio Incident
On 20 April 2004, in a case that was widely reported by the national and
international media, Rio de Janeiro State Police seized weapons in a house in
the slum of Coréia, Senador Camará, west of Rio de Janeiro that
allegedly belonged to a drug-trafficking gang led by Robson André da
Silva, also known as “Robinho Pinga.” The weapons included eight
M409 antipersonnel mines, with lot numbers
1-35.[36] The CBCM said this
lot number was the same as the number reported by Brazil for its mines retained
for training and held by the Army Logistics
Department.[37] On 23 April
2004, the Minister of Defense told media that a check of stocks of mines
retained found no mines
missing.[38] In this regard,
the Law 10300 is being used in the incrimination of Pinga and some others
supposedly involved in this
incident.[39]
In May 2004 Civilian and Military Police found another illegal arsenal, this
time in the slum of Rocinha also near Rio de Janeiro. Among the materials found
were three fuzes for
landmines.[40]
Mine Action
Brazil has stated that there are no mined areas and no areas suspected of
containing landmines in territory under its
jurisdiction.[41]
In 2003 and the first half of 2004 Brazil continued to participate in
international humanitarian mine action efforts on a bilateral and multilateral
basis, with ten military technical experts deployed to the MARMINCA demining
program in Central America under the auspices of the OAS. A Brazilian officer
headed the OAS MARMINCA team from January 2003 to January 2004.
According to the Ministry of Defense, sixty percent or 101 of 170 military
officers serving with OAS MARMINCA between 1994 and 2003 were
Brazilian.[42] Four Brazilian
officers have led the MARMINCA team. Between May 2003 and May 2004, four
Brazilian supervisors were engaged in the OAS MARMINAS (Misión de
Asistencia a Remoción de Minas en América del Sur) operations in
Ecuador and Perú.[43] In
May 2004, they were replaced by two Army and two Navy officers.
In December 2000, Brazil reported a contribution of $3,000 to the Voluntary
Trust Fund of Assistance in Mine
Action.[44] In January 2002,
Brazil made a contribution of $305,392 to the OAS, which according to the OAS
press release, would be used for a variety of activities including the demining
program in Central
America.[45]
The Engineering Section of the Army School of Specialized Instruction (Escola
de Instrução Especializada) has offered a four-week training
course on landmine detection and mine clearance to Brazilian Army and Navy
personnel since 1996.[46]
The Brazilian Army assisted with mine clearance in Angola from September 1995
to July 1997. In December 2002, the media reported that Brazil had reached an
agreement with Mozambique that called for Brazil to send an expert to Mozambique
in January 2003 for a one-year period, at a cost of $120,000 to assist in mine
clearance in the south of the
country.[47] As of June 2004
however, the expert had not been
sent.[48]
Landmine Casualties
There have been some Brazilian landmine casualties in the past, but no
precise number is available. In 1997, a Brazilian Navy Captain lost his leg,
while an Army Captain was injured in 1999, both on MARMINCA demining
duties.[49]
[1] The law “prohibits and
establishes as criminal offences all activities on national territory involving
antipersonnel landmines, including use, development, production, transfer,
stockpiling and any commercial activities,” with the exception of those
carried out by the Armed Forces according to Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.
It includes four to six years imprisonment or a fine with the possibility that
the penal sanction will increase by one-third if a public servant is responsible
(civilian or military), and will increase by one-half in the case of repeat
offenders. See Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2002. See also National
Office Journal, no. 210, Section 1, 1 November
2001. [2] The other four reports were
submitted on 17 March 2003 (for the period December 2001 – January 2003),
30 April 2002 (for calendar year 2001), 30 April 2001 (for the period March 2000
– December 2000), 29 March 2000 (for the period October 1999 – March
2000). [3] “Declaration of
Manaus,” Point 11, IV Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas,
Manaus, Brazil, 16-21 October
2000. [4] Statement by Amb. Marco A.D.
Brandão, Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Bangkok, 16 September
2003. [5] Statement by Fernando
Apparicio da Silva, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva,
Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18 September 2002. Brazil made
similar interventions at Standing Committee meetings in January 2002 and
February 2003. [6]
Ibid. [7] Brazilian intervention,
Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September
2001. [8] Statement by Fernando
Apparicio da Silva, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, 18 September
2002. [9]
Ibid. [10] See also
Associação do Jovem Aprendiz, “Minas Terrestres,
Relatório Brasileiro 2002,”
2002. [11] Article 7 Report, Form E,
30 April 2004. In 1999, Brazil told the First Meeting of States Parties that it
had not exported antipersonnel mines since
1984. [12] Article 7 Report, Form H,
Table 2, 30 April 2004. [13]
Production by Química Tupan AS reportedly began in 1978. See Military
Technology, October 1985, p. 112. [14]
In March 2003, Brazil reported that it possessed the DFC19 directional
fragmentation antipersonnel mine, produced by Dynamit Nobel Graz (DNG) of
Austria. Article 7 Report, Form H, 17 March 2003.
[15] See Landmine Monitor Report
2001, p. 110 (Mozambique) and p. 328 (Ecuador) and Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
p. 266 (Nicaragua). The US Department of Defense reports that Brazilian mines
were used in Ecuador and Perú. See ORDATA Database at
maic.jmu.edu/ordata. [16]
“Policía desmantela depósito de minas antitanques de las
FARC,” Agence France-Presse (Bogotá), 2 October
2002. [17] Article 7 Report, Form B, 4
September 2000. [18] Article 7 Report,
Form F, 17 March 2003. [19] Article 7
Report, Form G, 17 March 2003. [20]
Statement by Amb. Celina M. Assumpção do Valle Pereira, Fourth
Meeting of States Parties, 17 September 2002; letter from Col. Maurizil Othon
Neves Gonzaga, Advisor, Division of International Organizations, Ministry of
Defense, 30 July 2002; letter to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, from
Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer, Minister Counselor, Permanent Mission of
Brazil to the UN in Geneva, No. 344, 1 July
2003. [21] Eight destruction sites are
listed in the 2002 report: 22º Depósito de Suprimento, Osasco,
São Paulo State; 13ª Companhia Depósito de Armamento e
Munição, Santa Maria, State of Rio Grande do Sul; 4º
Depósito de Suprimento, Juiz de Fora, State of Minas Gerais;
2ª/5º Batalhão de Suprimento, Curitiba, in Paraná State;
2ª/ 6º Depósito de Suprimento, Salvador, Bahia State; 7ª
Região Militar, Campo de Instrução de Betione, Miranda,
Mato Grosso do Sul State; 2ª/10º Depósito de Suprimento,
Fortaleza, Ceará State; and 2ª/ 11º Depósito de
Suprimento, Brasília, Distrito Federal. See Article 7 Report, Form F, 30
April 2002. Two more destruction locations were listed by the 2003 report:
Depósito Central de Munição, Paracambi, Rio de Janeiro
State; and 7ª Região Militar, Recife, Pernambuco State. See Article
7 Report, Form F, 17 March 2003. [22]
Article 7 Report, Form G, 30 April
2002. [23] Article 7 Report, Form B,
30 April 2002; Article 7 Report, Form G, 17 March
2003. [24] Letter from Col. R1
Maurizil Othon Neves Gonzaga, Ministry of Defense, 30 July
2002. [25] Jose Wellington Castro
Ferreira Gomes, Chief of Technical Division, Logistics Department, Ministry of
Defense, “Relatorio do Programa de Destruiçião de Minas
Terrestres AP Contempladas pela Convenção de Ottawa,” 6 June
2003. [26] See Turkmenistan country
report in Landmine Monitor Report
2004. [27] Article 7 Report, Form D,
30 April 2001. [28] Article 7 Report,
Form B, 30 April 2004. [29] Statement
by Jandyr Ferreira dos Santos Jr, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the CNEMA
seminar, Paris, 12-13 March 2004. See also: Letter from Frederico S. Duque
Estrada Meyer, 1 July 2003. [30] Email
from Col. Maurizil Othon Neves Gonzaga, Ministry of Defense, 30 July
2002. [31] Article 7 Report Form D, 4
September 2000. [32] Ibid; Article 7
Report, Form D, 30 April 2001; and Article 7 Report, Form G, 30 April
2002. [33] Brazil reported that
“the quantities concerning lots 1-34 and 1-35 have been wrong and they
were modified.” This does not explain the difference in total numbers of
M409 and of T-AB-1 mines. See Article 7 Report, Form B, 17 March
2003. [34] The total number of
antipersonnel mines retained included 3,789 M409 mines of lot number 1-34; 5,497
M409 of lot 1-35; 4,196 M409 of lot 1-36; 265 T-AB-1 mines of lot number 01-82;
1,390 T-AB-1 of lot 01-85; 1,100 T-AB-1 mines of 01-89; 240 A-TB-1 mines of lot
01-98; 59 A-TB-1 of lot 1; and 9 T-AB-1 of lot 21. Article 7 Report, Form B, 17
March 2003. [35] Article 7 Report Form
D, 4 September 2000. [36]
“Tráfico tinha minas terrestres em favela,” Tribuna da
Impresa (Rio de Janeiro), 21 April 2004; “Apreensão de oito minas
terrestres no Rio deixam organização internacional em
alerta,” Desarme, 20 April
2004. [37] Angélica Freitas,
“Unidades têm número de lote do Exército brasileiro,
segundo ONG,” O Estado de São Paulo, 22 April 2004; F. Cimieri and
R. Cariello, “Minas são iguais as compradas pelo
Exército,” Folha de São Paulo, 22 April 2004; “A
guerra do Rio – Director de núcleo da UFF acha que paiol já
tinha sido esvaziado e que há outros cem em favelas,” O Globo (Rio
de Janeiro), 22 April 2004. [38]
Roberta Pennafort, “Viegas: lote de mina teve vários
compradores,” O Estado de São Paulo, 23 April
2004. [39] Telephone interview with
Carlos Oliveira, Delegate of the Civilian Police, DRAE, Rio de Janeiro, 9 August
2004. [40] “Polícia
apreende armas de guerra em 2 favelas,” O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), 12 May
2004. [41] Article 7 Report, Forms C,
F and I, 30 April 2004. [42] Email
from Col. Maurizil Othon Gonzaga, Ministry of Defense, 30 June
2004. [43]
Ibid. [44] CCW Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Form E, 13 December
2000. [45] OEA Comunicado de Prensa
C-001, “Brasil entrega contribución a fondos voluntarios de la
OEA,” 2 January 2002. [46] Cap.
Eng. André Luiz Vieira Cassiano, “Especialização em
Deminagem no Exército Brasileiro,” Revista Realengo (magazine of
the Escola), No. 11, April-June
2001. [47] “Moçambique:
Brasil vai participar no programa de desminagem,” Lusa (Brasília),
11 December 2002. [48] Email from Col.
Maurizil Othon Gonzaga, Ministry of Defense, 30 June
2004. [49] Interview with Leonardo
Cleaver de Athayde, DDS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brasília, 9 May
2000.
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