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Country Reports
Chechnya, Landmine Monitor Report 2004


Key developments since May 2003: Russian federal forces and Chechen rebels continued to use antipersonnel landmines. The Chechen rebels who seized the school in Beslan, North Ossetia with disastrous consequences emplaced both antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices throughout the school. Mine risk education activities expanded greatly in 2003, as about 263,000 people took part in mine risk education sessions in Chechnya and Internally Displaced Persons camps in the region. In 2003, UNICEF recorded 218 new civilian mine and UXO casualties.

Key developments since 1999: Renewed conflict in 1999 was accompanied by extensive use of antipersonnel mines by Russian and Chechen forces. In December 1999, mine clearance operations by HALO Trust were suspended. Because of the ongoing security situation, there has been no humanitarian mine clearance since that time. Mine risk education activities also ground to a halt, but resumed in 2000. Since then, UNICEF and the ICRC have expanded their mine risk education and survivor assistance programs in Chechnya and neighboring Ingushetia, where the majority of Chechen Internally Displaced Persons reside. From 1999 to 2003, about 543,000 people took part in mine risk education sessions in Chechnya and IDP camps in the region, including 263,000 in 2003 alone. In 2001, UNICEF started data collection on civilian mine and UXO casualties in Chechnya. UNICEF has recorded 2,340 new civilian landmine and UXO casualties occurring between 1999 and the end of 2003.


In September 1991, Chechnya declared independence from Russia, and adopted the name Chechen Republic “Ichkeria.” On 11 December 1994, Russia sent troops into Chechnya where mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. The Khasav-Yurt agreements were signed in August 1996, in which a cease-fire was called and a decision on the Chechen Republic Ichkeria’s status was delayed until 1 January 2001. Russian withdrawal from the region was agreed to in November 1996. Relations remained tense, however, and after a series of bombings blamed on Chechen rebels killed over 300 people across the Russian Federation in September 1999 and an incursion into neighboring Dagestan, Russian forces were sent into Chechnya. Russian troops first secured the northern section of the country, occupied the Chechen capital of Grozny, and began pursuit of rebels in the mountainous areas of southern Chechnya. Chechen forces evacuated Grozny in February 2000 and the conflict has since entered a guerrilla war phase. Since 1999 there have been massive violations of human rights and laws of war, including widespread use of mines, by both sides.

The Chechen conflict displaced hundreds of thousands of people both internally and across regional borders, mostly into neighboring Ingushetia.[1] After hostilities re-commenced, some 280,000 people were forced to flee, and another 150,000 were displaced inside Chechnya.[2] IDPs still face difficult conditions and are especially vulnerable to mines. There has been increased pressure from Russian authorities for IDPs living in camps in Ingushetia to return home. Camps have been declared closed, and the residents forced to either return to Chechnya or find other accommodations.[3]

Mine Ban Policy

Chechnya is not an internationally recognized sovereign state, and therefore cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. In 1998 then Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ilias Akhmadov expressed support for the Mine Ban Treaty and said that the Chechen Republic Ichkeria would be ready to sign immediately.[4] With the resumption of the war in 1999, the Chechen position on a mine ban has reversed.

One Chechen parliamentarian noted that “any questions pertaining to the antipersonnel mine ban, which may be put by a sovereign state in peacetime to the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, are unacceptable at the present time.”[5] Another government official said, “The question of banning the use of antipersonnel mines, which we put to some field commanders...caused unconcealed indignation. We considered it senseless to make further inquiries pertaining to this theme. The main conclusion made by our representatives is that mines will not be discarded from general military strategy by either the Russian Army or the Chechen detachments.”[6]


Use of Mines by Russian Forces

Russian forces used mines in both Chechen wars. They employed mines in great numbers as the war resumed in 1999 and 2000 and was being fought at a high level, but less so in recent years as the conflict evolved into more classic guerrilla warfare. Federal troops have laid mines around and leading up to bases, checkpoints, commanders’ offices, governmental buildings, factories and power plants; on roads, on mountain paths, in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu, in the estuary of the River Sunzha, along various borders, and in areas deemed “suspicious.”

In addition to using hand-emplaced mines, Russian forces have also deployed antipersonnel mines from airplanes, helicopters, and rockets, resulting in large tracts of mined land that is unmarked and unfenced.[7] Most of this scatterable mining took place in 1999 and 2000.[8] In 2000, a Russian Air Force general admitted, “The efficiency of middle altitude and long range aviation is low....”[9] In 2000, only half of the cluster munitions containing PFM mines dropped in Chechnya actually detonated.[10] . In October 2000, it was acknowledged that “the mines had elements that would cause them to self-destruct in ten days, however, some of them did not work, either due to factory flaws or as a result of mechanical damage from shrapnel or bullets.”[11]

In January 2001, a Russian military official reportedly said that Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in Chechnya.[12] In February 2001, a Chechen commander contended that Russian troops had used 1.8 million mines in Chechnya,[13] while in July 2002, a Chechen official estimated the Russians had used three million mines during the second Chechen war.[14]

The Russian government has stated that it only uses mines in cases of “dire necessity,” and claims that its mine usage is in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II: minefields are mapped, marked, and the mines used are all of the self-destructing or self-deactivating variety. It has stated throughout the past five years that Russia does not engage in indiscriminate mine usage. In August 2001, the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States stated to Landmine Monitor, “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base areas used by [rebel] units and to close movements routes and convoy paths across the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in [Amended Protocol II].... Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local inhabitants, and to protect and guard positions and places where border divisions are stationed.”[15] In December 1999, Colonel -General Nikolai Serdtsev said that mines were cleared when military camps were moved, that all minefields were mapped and that “security zones” were marked.[16]

These contentions have been contradicted frequently since 1999 both by evidence and statements by Russian officials. In January 2002, a Russian commander in Grozny stated that he did not have maps or information on area minefields, and that mine clearance only occurs at special request.[17] In January 2002, Landmine Monitor interviewed villagers in a district near the border with Georgia who said they could not determine the perimeter of suspected mine areas and village elders said they have requested Russian minefield maps, but received none. Due to the practice of rotating different army units from different parts of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) every three to six months, the danger of losing minefield information is increased. In July 2000, a Russian deminer said, “It is dangerous to walk in the woods, which have been mined by both our forces and the rebels. Since no minefields have been mapped, not even sappers take the risk.”[18]

Use of Mines by Chechen Rebels

Chechen rebels have used mines extensively, although in recent years, they have more commonly used Improvised Explosive Devices than mass-produced landmines. On 9 May 2004, Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov and 24 others were killed when a timer-triggered IED placed in the construction block beneath the VIP stands during a Victory Day parade exploded. Two more IED were found later in the same area.[19] On 13 July 2004, another landmine went off under the motorcade of Chechnya’s acting president, Sergei Abramov, killing one of his bodyguards.[20] The situation is especially serious in the capital of Grozny, where in April 2003 it was reported that five people were killed by a mine in the same spot from which sappers had removed a mine earlier that same day.[21] Reports of mine casualties and discoveries peaked in April 2003, coinciding with increased “disappearances” and human rights violations by Russian troops.[22]

At the start of the renewed conflict in 1999, Chechen opposition forces used primarily Soviet-produced weapons left over from the breakup of the Soviet Union, mainly antivehicle mines, but also some antipersonnel mines (PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-100, MON-200). Over the course of the past five years, however, improvised explosive devices have become the main form of explosive device used by insurgent groups, due both to a depletion of Soviet stocks and to an abundance of readily available materiel used for constructing IEDs.

On 18 May 2003, a Russian official stated that, “90% of landmines, which guerillas place under us, are made of the shells that we have fired ourselves, the rest are home-made explosive devices.”[23] Often these devices are filled with scraps of metal to increase their lethality.[24] Many weapons caches discovered since January 2003 have generally included what were explicitly described as “home-made” explosive devices, explosives as mentioned above, and detonators.[25] An analysis of 2003 media reports shows that at least half of all rebel explosive devices are IEDs.[26] Russian military sources have told Landmine Monitor that Chechen IEDs are increasingly detonated by remote control; some estimated over half of all rebel IEDs were remotely detonated.

Rebel mines are laid mostly on roads, to disrupt or attack convoys and patrols. The majority of military mine casualties in 2003 were caused by landmines exploding under trucks or armored personnel carriers.[27] Chechen forces used mines extensively during the 1994-96 war. Rebel troops set explosive booby-traps in houses and mined the corpses of Russian soldiers during the battle for Grozny.[28] With renewed attacks by Russian forces in 1999, rebel groups continued to use mines in order to retard the advance of Russian troops, to complicate the rebuilding of the communication infrastructure, along railroads, electric supply lines, and other economic targets. Landmines have also been planted on local paths[29] and near villages,[30] as well as in larger cities. Mines are laid frequently in Grozny, which have exploded in crowded areas or destroyed passenger buses.[31]

President of the Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” Aslan Maskhadov said in an interview in March 2000 that the decision to use mines is one made by junior commanders, and that their use would only increase as the partisan war progressed. Indeed, Olara Otunnu, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, noted in 2002 that explosive devices were being used to target Russian officials and others of political significance, as well as Chechen civilians perceived to be cooperating with the pro-Russian government.[32]

Insurgents have reportedly paid civilians, among them children, to plant the mines,[33] and sometimes used threats and blackmail to compel civilian help.[34] Exploitation of children to plant landmines continued in 2003.[35] One child stated that he was paid $30-100 for laying a mine, and this figure was tripled or quadrupled for “a direct hit.”[36] Mines have been hidden in clocks, cigarette lighters, mobile phones, children’s toys[37] and piles of trash.[38]

As Landmine Monitor Report 2004 went to print, on 3 September at least 338 people died when Chechen rebels seized a school in Beslan, North Ossetia.[39] The hostage-takers laid both antipersonnel mines and IEDs throughout the school, including in a gymnasium crowded with over 1,000 children and their parents. According to various sources, the mines used included PMN blast mines and POMZ, OZM-72, MON-50, and MON-100 fragmentation mines.[40] At least 127 improvised explosive devices were reportedly laid in the school.[41] After the siege, Russian EOD teams located and destroyed approximately 70 antipersonnel mines and 50 kilograms of IED.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

There have been no reports of mass production of landmines in Chechnya since 1999. In 2001, the Chechen representative to the United States stated, “The Chechen Republic has no factories for making mines.”[42] Since then, no more information has been forthcoming. However, there is widespread construction and use of IEDs by Chechen rebels.[43] In the period January 2003 until the present, analysis of media reports seems to indicate that the majority of rebel explosive devices are IEDs.[44] Raids of Chechen weapons caches continue to turn up manufactured mines; however, the bulk of materials found are frequently components appropriate for the construction of IEDs, such as plastic explosive, detonators, and artillery shells.[45]

There has been no official declaration from Chechen rebels on export or import of mines. In 1999, a Chechen military officer stated that all rebel mines were either obtained from the Russian military or were left over from the first war in Chechnya.[46] In 2001, Chechen fighters confirmed that mines were obtained from the Russian military.[47] In 2000 a Russian news program reported that Chechens used “serial landmines of Western manufacturing.”[48] A military news agency, AVN, made similar allegations in the same year.[49] Col. Vladimir Bobkov of the Russian Ministry of Defense stated on 16 December 1999 that rebels use Italian-made mines.[50] There were no independent confirmations of the reports. To date there have been no other similar reports.

Mine Problem

Continuing hostilities between Russian federal forces and Chechen separatists have precluded precise statistical assessments of Chechnya’s mine problem since 1999. However, it is clear that the region is heavily mined. Given that no humanitarian mine clearance has taken place since the HALO Trust was evicted in December 1999, conditions can only be growing worse. In June 2002, Olara Otunnu, the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, called Chechnya “one of the most landmine-polluted zones in the world,” and estimated that there were 500,000 landmines placed in the region.[51] In 1999, HALO estimated that 20,000 hectares (200 square kilometers) of Chechen land was unusable because of landmines[52]

The most heavily mined areas are those in which rebels continue to put up resistance, namely the southern regions and Grozny.[53] Urban areas (including civil and administration buildings in Grozny), villages, roads, fields, woods, mountain paths, bridges, rivers and estuaries, as well as the borders of Chechnya are mined.[54] A May 2003 media report stated that the engineering service of the North Caucasus military district emplaced 123 minefields in Grozny in 1999 and 2000 (119 antipersonnel minefields, two antivehicle, and two mixed).[55]

On 24 April 2000, Russia declared that it had completely cleared Grozny of mines and UXO, removing over 177,000 explosive devices.[56] These reports were later contradicted by other sources.[57] In October 2003, the Russian military again declared that Grozny was clear of minefields, stating that there were “virtually none left,” although the threat of unexploded ordnance remained.[58]

Civilians living in villages and towns are seriously affected by mines. Areas around populated areas are mined—one doctor who treated many mine casualties said in 2000 that no single town or district is without mines.[59] Responding to a Landmine Monitor interview in 2001, inhabitants of 15 regions of Chechnya, together composing most of the south, considered the landmine problem urgent and felt that there was a threat to them. Of those interviewed, 92 percent knew of agricultural or forested areas that were mined, 56 percent knew of mined buildings, and 38 percent knew of mined roads, bridges or railroads. Eighty percent said that these minefields were unmarked.[60] Interviews in January 2002 in the southeastern district of Vedensky showed that all 26 villages there were believed to be mined.[61] Landmines in these areas render “huge” areas of agricultural land unusable,[62] kill farm animals, and prevent inhabitants from walking in the forests.[63] Up to 40 percent of Vedensky’s inhabitants could not collect firewood in 2002 and had to move into gas-heated residences in the winter. Villagers report that minefields are not marked, and requests to the Russian government by village elders for maps go unanswered.[64]

Mine Clearance

All mine clearance activities being conducted in Chechnya today are carried out by Russian forces. These operations are designed primarily to keep transport lines open and ensure the safe operation of military facilities. Russian engineer troops search roads daily for newly laid mines.[65] In 2003, Russian military sources stated that they had cleared over 350,000 landmines and pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) since 1999.[66] Russian engineering outfits were reported in 2000 to be poorly equipped, resulting in many casualties.[67] Officials in the Ministry of Defense said, “Engineer training is considered to be secondary, it takes only 2-3% of all study time. As the result, the number of casualties is high.”[68] Russian military sources have told Landmine Monitor that the effectiveness of Russia’s engineer forces has been increasing, largely as a result of the Program of Counter-mine Protection of the Armed Forces. They report that during 2003 the number of mine incidents decreased by 25 percent.

There has been no independent humanitarian mine clearance since HALO Trust ceased operations in December 1999 due to the new outbreak of violence. The Russian government subsequently accused the organization of espionage, among other things, and arrested some of their staff. HALO denied these accusations.[69] HALO Trust had trained manual and mechanical assistance teams and conducted demining operations in 1998 and 1999.

Mine Risk Education

The number of organizations involved in providing mine risk education (MRE) in Chechnya has rapidly increased since 1999. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF remain the primary agencies involved in the coordination and implementation of MRE in Chechnya, working in cooperation with local NGOs. The ICRC has partnered with Minga, a local NGO, and Chechen government ministries, while UNICEF’s programs are implemented by two main partners, Voice of the Mountains (VoM) and Let’s Save the Generation (LSG). UNICEF coordinates organizations involved in mine action, holding monthly meetings for international and local agencies.[70]

In 2003, about 263,000 people took part in mine risk education sessions in Chechnya and IDP camps in the region. This continued the major expansion of MRE activities that occurred in 2001 and 2002. From 1999 to 2002, about 280,000 people took part in MRE sessions.[71] Mine risk education in this heavily affected region has focused on the particularly vulnerable groups of children and IDPs.

Voice of the Mountains, the first local NGO to address the landmine/UXO problem in Chechnya, held mine risk education seminars in Chechen schools and the program is now as of the beginning of 2004 included in the official Chechen curriculum.[72] The addition of MRE to the official school curriculum has resulted in sensitization of over 138,000 schoolchildren since January 2003.[73] The seminars, provided to children aged six to seventeen, consist of interactive presentations such as rehearsals of proper behavior, supported afterward by materials such as fairy tales and stories of mine survivors.[74] UNICEF and the Chechen Ministry of Education, ICRC, UN, and NGO partners collaborated to develop content for the course.[75] Distribution of MRE booklets, leaflets, notebooks, and pens follows each course.[76] Training for VoM teachers has been improved and the scope of the program has been expanded since February 2003, when ECHO/UNICEF observers noted the need for further development of the program.[77] From mid-2003 until completion in May 2004, a crew of 15 monitors observed schools throughout Chechnya, ensuring that MRE training was, in fact, taking place as well as the proper delivery of MRE materials to school libraries.[78] In March 2004, a kindergarten MRE program was launched.[79] VoM also provided MRE to IDP camps and settlements in Ingushetia, reaching thousands.[80] A total of 30,000 children in IDP camps in Ingushetia and Chechnya received MRE in 2003.[81]

Let’s Save the Generation, with the support of UNICEF, continued its MRE drama presentations. In August 2003, the program moved from North Ossetia, where it had provided MRE to 11,000 children, to Grozny, where it began a partnership with the Chechen State Drama Theater (CSDT).[82] The prominence of participating actors in the CSDT raised the profile of the presentations, adding to their attendance, which was consistently in the hundreds throughout late 2003 and early 2004.[83] Drama presentations are frequently made in Temporary Accommodation Centers (TACs) for IDPs.[84] In February 2004, three “drama circles” were created, each consisting of a manager, an artist, two actors and 8-10 children.[85]

Danish Demining Group (DDG) continued its mine risk education activities, providing direct presentations mainly to Chechen adults.[86] In 2003, 78,486 persons attended DDG’s MRE sessions.[87] Since its launch in 2000, this program provided MRE to 214,429 persons.[88] DDG has received DKK2,200,000 (US$334,346) from Denmark as the first installment of a commitment of DKK4,800,000 (US$729,483) for capacity building.[89]

In 2003, UNICEF received a total of approximately $4.4 million for its MRE activities in Chechnya and neighboring republics.[90] From January to November 2003, the European Union (via ECHO) contributed $184,382 to UNICEF’s Mine Action Program, and UNICEF collected unearmarked funds from the United States($1.46 million), the United Kingdom ($766,127), German National Committee ($537,002), Denmark ($461,550), the Netherlands ($421,000) and Sweden ($582,005).[91] From January until May 2004, UNICEF’s Northern Caucasus program received contributions from the Dutch National Committee ($282,963), Germany ($161,691), while the Netherlands ($445,000) and Sweden ($714,286) provided unearmarked funds.[92]

The ICRC provides mine risk education primarily through media campaigns and special events. In 2003, the ICRC trained 90 children to relay MRE messages to other children, a total of 5,353 children saw the MRE puppet show “The Thousandth Jug,” and 556 schools in Chechnya and another 58 schools in Dagestan received various MRE materials.93

[93] In April 2003, the ICRC collaborated with the Republican Youth Center and the Chechen Ministry of Culture to hold an exhibition featuring MRE posters made by children throughout Chechnya.[94] At the request of the ICRC, a five-part series entitled “Beware Mines” was produced in 2003 and subsequently broadcast on state and regional television. Mine-related stories were published in “Rainbow,” a popular children’s magazine.[95] Cheerdig, the ICRC’s mine awareness character, continued to appear in his cartoon; puppet shows and comics were also used.[96] On 17 February 2004, the “Landmine Café” opened in Grozny, supported by the ICRC and Minga. The café, established by nine mine survivors, distributes MRE materials, holds mine awareness events, and convenes monthly group support sessions for mine survivors.[97] In April 2004, the ICRC produced four television spots featuring the testimony of mine survivors, and the Chechen Ministry of Emergency Situations put up 34 billboards made by the ICRC.

Both the ICRC and UNICEF expanded their programs in 2002. UNICEF provided MRE to 194,000 children and trained 460 teachers from 458 schools to provide MRE.[98] In 2002, UNICEF began to sponsor drama performances at the Russian Academic Theater in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia. Implementing partner Let’s Save the Generation distributed MRE materials and provided transportation to Vladikavkaz for youth MRE presentations. The Danish Demining Group provided MRE to 64,576 IDPs in Ingushetia and 55,124 people in Chechnya.[99]

In 2001, mine risk education efforts improved markedly and new programs were initiated. The ICRC started an MRE program featuring folk hero Cheerdig for the first time, in Ingushetia, providing presentations to some 1,600 children in IDP camps.[100] In November 2001, ICRC began its first efforts in Chechnya proper with similar puppet shows.[101] The UNHCR worked in coordination with UNICEF to reach 15,000 children in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Training of MRE teachers began, producing a group of 400 instructors in 2001. The UN, NGOs and other government partners met in Ingushetia for MRE training in 2000.

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 reported that in Chechnya, “there are no training brochures, films or leaflets produced locally. All materials on mine awareness come from abroad. Literature and films are mostly in English and require translation.”[102] The year 2000 saw only marginal improvements, due to renewed violence in the area. The ICRC and Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN) were able to provide some MRE before the fighting forced cessation of activities; UNHCR, the Danish Refugee Council and other Chechen NGOs had plans for mine awareness activity in 2000, but were only beginning to carry them out due to restrictions on movement and information on mined territories.[103]

Landmine Casualties

The total number of landmine casualties in Chechnya is not known. The on-going armed conflict and the volatile security situation has made collection of comprehensive data extremely difficult. There is, however, limited information available that gives an indication of the extent of the problem. In June 2002, Olara Otunnu, the UN special representative for children and armed conflict stated that “We estimate between 7,000 and 10,000 people have been maimed by landmines [in the course of two Chechen conflicts], and easily more than half of those are children.”[104]

In 2003, UNICEF recorded 218 new civilian mine/UXO casualties, including 41 killed and 177 injured; 41 were children (six killed and 35 injured). Between 1999 and the end of 2002, UNICEF recorded 2,122 new civilian landmine/UXO casualties: 383 casualties in 2002; 576 in 2001; 763 in 2000; and 400 in 1999. As of September 2004, the UNICEF mine casualty database contained information on 2,939 landmine and UXO casualties in Chechnya since 1994, including at least 1,817 people injured.[105] UNICEF reports that around 49 percent of mine/UXO casualties require a lower limb amputation, 26 percent an upper limb amputation, and 14 percent suffer a loss of eye sight as a result of their injuries, and the 15 to 29-year-old age group is the most affected.

The majority of casualties have been recorded in Grozny. Since 2001, UNICEF has trained staff of three local NGOs, Voice of the Mountains, Minga, and Let’s Save the Generation, on data collection and data management using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Nine trained representatives of the three NGOs work on gathering data and VoM staff manage the database in Ingushetia. Mine casualty data is provided by the WHO, the ICRC, DDG, health facilities, and several other local NGOs, working in IDP camps and in the territory of Chechnya.[106] The database is continually being updated as both new and less recent mine incidents are identified.

The number of new mine/UXO casualties appears to be reducing over time. In 2002, NGOs working in hospitals in Chechnya estimated that there were between 30 and 50 civilians injured each month in landmine incidents.[107] Since mid-2003, the number of estimated new casualties dropped from 15 a month to about three or four a month by February 2004.[108] ICRC-supported hospitals in Chechnya (ten hospitals), Ingushetia (one) and Dagestan (one) reported treating 334 mine casualties in 2003 and 445 in 2002.[109]

Landmine Monitor recorded at least 246 new casualties (126 killed and 120 injured) caused by landmines, UXO and improvised explosive devices (IED) from international media sources in 2003, including 170 military personnel, militants, sappers and police, and four women and five children.[110] International media sources reported 298 mine/UXO/IED casualties (119 killed and 179 injured), including 187 military personnel, militants, sappers and police, in Chechnya in 2002.[111] In 2001, Landmine Monitor collated data on 1,153 mine/UXO/IED casualties (367 killed and 786 injured); 137 were civilians (62 killed and 75 injured) including 23 children.[112]

According to various media and military sources, there were over 1,300 mine incidents involving Russian federal forces, including police and internal forces in Chechnya from 1999 to March 2003, resulting in 2,500 military casualties, including more than 600 killed and 1,700 injured. Not all military casualties were the result of rebel mine use; accidents and improper handling or storage of mines also caused many casualties.[113]

Casualties continued in 2004 with UNICEF recording 81 new civilian mine/UXO casualties to September,[114] and at least 194 new casualties caused by landmines, UXO and IED were reported in the international media to the end of June 2004; 145 casualties were military personnel, militants, sappers or police.[115]

Landmine Monitor Report 2003 reported that information quoted in at least two other sources from the Ministry of Health of Chechnya indicated that 5,695 new mine and UXO casualties were registered by health facilities in 2002; a significant increase from the 2,140 landmine and UXO casualties recorded in 2001.[116] On further investigation it would appear that these statistics included not only landmine and UXO casualties but also other war-related injuries. The precise number of landmine and UXO casualties included in these statistics is not known. In 2001, medical institutions in Chechnya registered 1,020 casualties with gunshot and landmine injuries, as compared to 814 such casualties registered in 2000.[117]

Survivor Assistance

Surgical and general health facilities in Chechnya remain devastated because of war damage and a lack of resources and maintenance. More than half of the available hospitals function without running water, proper heating, or sewerage systems. A lack of skilled staff, equipment, basic supplies, emergency transport, and the security situation also hampers the delivery of adequate assistance. Chechnya reportedly had 139 state health facilities, including 58 hospitals, 34 polyclinics and 47 ambulatories; 18 hospitals are either totally destroyed or are difficult to access due to ongoing military activities.[118] In 2001, when describing Grozny’s Hospital Number Nine, a journalist reported that the hospital “has a sign and a gate; otherwise it could be mistaken for more ruins. The five-story main building, once the hospital’s pride, is windowless and pockmarked by bullets.”[119]

Before the conflict, Chechnya had 18 social rehabilitation centers and 13 social services facilities; all have since been partially or totally destroyed.[120] Many international agencies and local and international NGOs are working to strengthen the health infrastructure in Chechnya, and neighboring republics with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise and training for local staff at hospitals and health posts. Others support mobile clinics, psychosocial support services, transportation to medical facilities, and other humanitarian aid activities. Significant problems faced by mine survivors include their inability to access skilled medical assistance and a lack of psychological support and social care.[121]

In June 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) released an updated “Health Sector Field Directory” detailing health services available to all Chechens, including the internally displaced in neighboring republics. Organizations active in mine survivor assistance-related activities include Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, CARE Canada, Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development, Danish Refugee Council/Danish Peoples Aid, Hammer Forum, Handicap International, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Initiative, International Medical Corps, Islamic Relief, Médecins du Monde, Médecins sans Frontières, Memorial, People in Need Foundation, Save the Generation, Serlo, UNICEF, WHO, and World Vision.[122] It is not possible to provide details on all the mine survivors assisted by the various organizations as the cause of disability is often not recorded to avoid possible security risks for the beneficiaries.

Since 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross has supported up to 27 hospitals in Chechnya and the surrounding republics. In 2003, the ICRC regularly provided surgical support, medicines, and medical supplies to improve the quality of care in ten referral hospitals in Chechnya and two other hospitals in Ingushetia and Dagestan. Since 2001, ICRC-supported hospitals reported treating 1,019 mine/UXO casualties, including 334 in 2003, 445 in 2002, and 240 in 2001. The ICRC also facilitated specialized training for eight Chechen doctors in Moscow and Nalchik in 2003. One Chechen surgeon participated in a war-surgery seminar in Moscow in October 2002.[123] On 13 March 2002, the ICRC signed an agreement with the Chechen Ministry of Health and the Chechen branch of the Russian Red Cross to assist the health facilities in Chechnya. Assistance included the repair of facilities, the supply of medicines, and two Russian Red Cross mobile clinics.[124]

In October 2001, the ICRC signed an agreement with the federal Ministry of Labor and Social Development to improve physical rehabilitation in Chechnya by providing further training for qualified Chechen staff to work at the prosthetic/orthopedic center in Grozny. The Ministry of Labor and Social Development reconstructed the orthopedic center and installed electricity and heating, while the ICRC supplied equipment. Prosthetic production commenced at the end of January 2003 before the official opening of the Ministry of Labor and Social Development-run center on 24 April 2003. In 2003, the center produced 148 prostheses (97 for mine survivors) and distributed 1,434 crutches and 69 wheelchairs; 1,200 crutches and 29 wheelchairs were distributed in 2002. The ICRC is also supporting the Marachkala orthopedic center in Dagestan with training and supplies to rehabilitate amputees referred from Grozny. In addition to on-the-job training for technicians, in 2002 the ICRC started a two-year training program for eight prosthetic technicians from Chechnya at the Sochi Orthopedic Center (in southern Russia).[125] In November 2001, the WHO also held a training course for 14 prosthetic technicians and doctors from Chechnya.[126]

In August 2000, UNICEF commenced its Mine Action Program in the North Caucasus with survivor assistance being one of the main components. The program which focuses on mine-injured children and women from Chechnya includes physical rehabilitation, the fitting of prostheses, psychosocial counseling, and vocational training. UNICEF works with the WHO, and other NGO partners, to facilitate services for the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of mine survivors and others affected by the conflict. The physical rehabilitation component of the program started at the Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center in Ingushetia in December 2001. Children and women from Chechnya and the IDP camps are transported to the Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center and the Vladikavkaz Prosthetic Center on a weekly basis. The program involves a two-month cycle of visits for fitting of orthopedic devices, physiotherapy treatment, and psychosocial support to assist survivors in coming to terms with their disability. In 2003, about 280 prosthetic and orthopedic devices were provided by UNICEF and 26 by the WHO. UNICEF also supports the Republican Clinical Hospital in Grozny to provide physical rehabilitation for child mine/UXO survivors.[127]

Handicap International (HI), with financial support from the WFP, ECHO, Switzerland, and German associations, continues to strengthen health, rehabilitation, and social services for persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors. In 2003, HI supplied ten hospitals and rehabilitation facilities with equipment, consumables and training. HI facilitated the fitting of prostheses through referral of 90 people in need to appropriate facilities in the region. Assistive aids such as walking sticks, crutches, and wheelchairs were also distributed to people with disability in their homes in Chechnya and refugee camps in Ingushetia by mobile teams and through local associations (VOI, STG). HI supported the Grozny Medical College, published rehabilitation training and awareness material, and conducted four seminars for a total of 50 health professionals and disability workers on physical rehabilitation; 62 attended seminars in 2002. In cooperation with the Society of Invalids in Chechnya, HI developed an income generation project; a sewing workshop in Urus-Martan, employing 16 women with disabilities. HI is also raising awareness on the rights of people with disabilities. In 2001, HI carried out a needs assessment on the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities in Chechnya, interviewing 2,200 people.[128]

CARE Canada, with the support of UNICEF and local NGO New Generation, continues to run a psychosocial rehabilitation program for groups of 30 war-affected children at the Psychosocial Rehabilitation Center in Vladikavkaz. The children, including mine survivors, visit the center twice a week and receive counseling and participate in activities including dance and music therapy, embroidery, yoga therapy and physical exercise. A field-based psychologist works in the IDP camp Satsita to assist mine/UXO-affected children and their parents. From May 2002 to February 2003, the program assisted 215 war and mine-affected children.[129]

The NGO Minga, in cooperation with UNICEF, distributes wheelchairs, crutches, and walking sticks in six districts of Chechnya.[130] The Russian Center of Disaster Medicine (RCDM) “Zaschita” also provides health services for civilians in the northern Caucasus.[131]

In June 2002, UNICEF and VoM set up a soccer team of child mine survivors in Grozny. The team plays games and participates in joint training with the Vladikavkaz professional amputee football club. Other teams have also been set up, including in Achkhoy-Martanovskiy district, in 2004.[132]

On 29 July 2003, the first meeting of the Mine Survivors Club was organized by the ICRC in Gudermes.[133] On 27 February 2004, the Landmine Café in Grozny, established by landmine survivors and supported by the ICRC and Minga, opened. The Café distributes mine awareness materials and holds weekly support sessions for mine survivors.[134]

In June 2002, VoM, with support from UNICEF, commenced 3-month vocational training courses in English and computers at the Grozny Technical College for groups of 30 mine/UXO-affected adolescents. UNICEF also supports a vocational training program in carpentry and joinery run by the People in Need Foundation (PINF) in Ingushetia established in 2003. In 2003, at least 60 mine/UXO survivors completed their training courses in English, computing, and carpentry and joinery; 43 graduated in 2002.[135] In 2004, a vocational training program in sewing for 20 girls with a disability in Grozny was started in cooperation between the Chechen branch of the All-Russian Society of the Disabled and UNICEF.[136]

A Chechen participated in the Raising the Voices training program in Geneva in February 2004.

The mine survivor featured on the cover of this Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Umar Eskiev, stepped on an antipersonnel mine on 9 July 2002 as he returned home from selling milk at the market in Grozny. Alone at the time of the incident, the 13-year-old Umar crawled to a main road and a passing vehicle took him to a hospital where his left leg was amputated. He has received treatment and prostheses from local NGOs and from the Grozny Orthopedic Center, which is supported by the ICRC. At the age of fifteen, Umar had to leave school to support his family.

Disability Policy and Practice

The Federal Fund of Obligatory Medical Insurance and a Russian Federation Ministry of Health decree, dated 16 May 2001, is intended to ensure that medical care for the Chechen population is available in other republics.[137] Small pensions are available for persons with disabilities through the Ministry of Labor and Social Development. However, according to the head of Chechnya’s Society of Invalids, the pensions are inadequate to cover the basic costs of living. The Ministry acknowledged that the budget for assisting the disabled “was not nearly enough” but that it was not possible to allocate more resources.[138]

[1] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus: Humanitarian Appeal for Children and Women,” 14 January 2000.
[2] UNICEF, “Emergency Programmes: Northern Caucasus Donor Update,” 28 September 2000.
[3] UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update,” 25 May 2004.
[4] Interview with Ilias Akhmadov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 December 1998.
[5] Interview with Mr. A. Idigov, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Paris, December 1999.
[6] Interviews with Kh. Israpilov, Commander-in Chief, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Grozny, 2-3 January 2000.
[7] “Unexploded Federal Ammunition Makes Up Most of Landmines Used by Chechen Guerillas,” Interfax (Moscow), 20 May 2003.
[8] Interview with Maj. Yevgeny Pasynok, Chief of Engineering Service, Grozny Military Commandant's office, published in “Unexploded federal ammunition makes up most of landmines used by Chechen guerillas,” Izvestia Interfax-AVN (Moscow), 20 May 2003.
[9] Gen. A. M. Kornukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, p.7.
[10] Maj. V. Denisov, student of the Military Engineering Academy, roundtable report on engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik, No. 6, June 2000, pp.40-41.
[11] “Russian Combat Engineers Fight ‘Mine War’ in Chechnya,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian weekly military journal), 13-19 October 2000.
[12] “Russia Admits: Land Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucuses, 10 January 2001. This was re-stated in the letter from a government representative of the Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” Lyoma Usamov, dated 19 June 2001, which stated, “The Russian command, several months after the beginning of war, “boasted” about its “achievements,” declaring that they planted half a million mines against “the Chechen terrorists.”
[13] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of Southwest Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001. This number was also stated in the 19 June 2001 letter from Chechen Representative Usmanov.
[14] Umar Khanbiev, Minister for Health of the Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” citation translated from Russian by Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2002, www.chechenpress.com .
[15] Response from Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications, LLC, Washington, DC.
[16] Interview with Col. Gen. Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999.
[17] Interview with Col. V. Dushukhini, Commandant of Leninskaya, Grozny, 27 January 2002.
[18] “Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” RTR (Russian TV), 5 July 2000.
[19] Yuri Bagrov, “Rebels Turn Up Heat,” Herald-Sun, 11 May 2004. Devices with timers or command-detonation are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, though certain uses of such devices could violate international humanitarian law. The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits victim-activated explosive devices.
[20] “Chechen leader’s convoy hits landmine” CBC News Online, 13 July 2004.
[21] Timur Aliev, “Chechnya: Blasts Signal New Campaign,” CRS No. 179 (Znamenskoye), 15 May 2003.
[22] Human Rights Watch, “Briefing to the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights,” January 2004.
[23] “Unexploded federal ammunition,” Interfax, 20 May 2003.
[24] See Yuri Safronov, “Federal foces destroy 15 bases, 14 caches in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 5 April 2004; “Russian Military Says ‘Practically’ No Minefields Left in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 14 October 2003.
[25] See “Federals destroy eight caches with arms and ammunition in Chechnya” ITAR-TASS, 27 May 2004; Yuri Safronov, “Federal forces destroy 15 bases,” ITAR-TASS, 5 April 2004; “Federal troops kill 11 militants in Chechnya since March 1,” ITAR-TASS, 9 March 2004; “Cache with 17 kg of TNT found in Chechnya,” Russian Information Center, 17 September 2003; “Federal sappers defuse 13 landmines in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 17 July 2003.
[26] About half of the media reports reviewed by Human Rights Watch in 2003 specifically identified insurgent explosive devices as IED; vague language implied that others were as well but was inconclusive; and many reports simply did not specify whether a device was an IED or manufactured mine.
[27] Yuri Safronov, “Federal forces destroy 15 bases,” ITAR-TASS, 5 April 2004.
[28] The UK Working Group on Landmines, “Landmines in the Former Soviet Union,” June 1997, p. 8.
[29] “Feds kill two gunmen in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 11 August 2004.
[30] “Landmines kill three Chechen civilians,” Interfax, 28 May 2003.
[31] “Groznyy bombing death toll could have been much higher,” NTV (Russian TV), 30 May 2003.
[32] Press Briefing by Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, 1 July 2002.
[33] Sharon LaFraniere, “Chechnya’s Children Fall Prey to Mines,” Washington Post, 20 October 2002.
[34] “New Terrorist Acts in Chechnya,” TVT (TV channel), 12 September 2000.
[35] Yuri Safronov, “Three children died attempting to plant landmine in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 22 September 2003; “In Chechnya militants commit act of sabotage against civilians” RIA (Novosty), 20 November 2003.
[36] Timur Aliev, “Chechnya: Blasts Signal New Campaign,” CRS No. 179, 15 May 2003.
[37] “‘Practically’ No Minefields Left in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 14 October 2003.
[38] Sergei Venyavsky, “Land mine shreds bus in Chechnya, 6 Die” Associated Press, 3 April 2003.
[39] In a letter published on the Internet, Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev subsequently claimed responsibility for the siege. “Excerpts: Basayev claims Beslan,” BBC News, 17 September 2004.
[40] Many antipersonnel mines could be clearly seen in television footage of the events.
[41] "127 Home-made Explosives Laid in Beslan School," Novosti Rossii, 9 September 2004.
[42] Letter from Lyoma Usmanov, US Representative of the Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” 19 June 2001.
[43] The representative of the Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” to the US and others have stated that the absence of factories disqualifies the construction of IEDs in Chechnya from being an “industry.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p.865.
[44] Based on review of news reports on Chechnya since January 2003, primarily from Interfax and ITAR-TASS news agencies.
[45] See, for example, “Federal troops kill 11 militants,” ITAR-TASS, 9 March 2004; “Cache with 17 kg of TNT found in Chechnya,” Russian Information Center, 17 September 2003; “Federal sappers defuse 13 landmines in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 17 July 2003.
[46] Interview with Col. M. Arsaliev, engineering at “Krasny Molot” plant, Grozny, December 1999.
[47] Interview with I. T. Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001; interview with a group of Chechen fighters, 15 January 2001.
[48] “Segodnya” (news program), NTV, 11 pm, 6 March 2000.
[49] “The rebels are ready to unleash a mine war” SMI.RU, 2 July 2000.
[50] ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999.
[51] “UN envoy says Chechen kids run landmine gauntlet,” Reuters (Chechnya), Moscow, 24 June 2002; see also, “Press Briefing by Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict,” 1 July 2002.
[52] Interview with I. T. Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001.
[53] UK Working Group Against Landmines, Landmines in the former Soviet Union, pp.8.
[54] Statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor from Vassily V. Boriak, Embassy of Russia to the US, 16 August 2001; interview with I. T. Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001; interview with a Russian Armed Forces colonel, RTR, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.
[55] “Unexploded federal ammunition,” Interfax, 20 May 2003.
[56] Olga Allenova, “’Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, pp.1.
[57] “Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” “Vesti” newscast, RTR, 5 July 2000.
[58] “‘Practically’ No Minefields Left in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 14 October 2003.
[59] Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000.
[60] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 940.
[61] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 803.
[62] Interview with I. T. Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001.
[63] “Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” “Vesti” newscast, RTR, 5 July 2000.
[64] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 803.
[65] Yuri Bagrov, “Armored personnel carrier explodes on landmine, killing two soldiers,” Associated Press, 8 April 2003; ABH Agency, 19 April 2001.
[66] Information provided to IPPNW-Russia by Russian military sources.
[67] “Russian Combat Engineers Fight ‘Mine War’ in Chechnya,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 13-19 October 2000.
[68] N. I. Serdtsev, Commander, Russian Engineer troops, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, pp.20-24.
[69] Alexander Sobolev, “FSB [Federal Security Services] accuses the international organization ‘HALO-TRUST’ of rendering assistance to the rebels,’ Vremia novostey, No. 100, 10 August 2000.
[70] UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update,” 13 November 2003.
[71] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 943; Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 804; Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 739; Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, Programme Assistant, UNICEF North Caucasus, 7 September 2004; Email from Elina Dibirova, Program Coordinator, Danish Demining Group Chechnya, 9 September 2004.
[72] UNICEF, “Humanitarian Assistance in the Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 84,” 31 March 2004.
[73] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Donor Update,” 13 November 2003 and 12 February 2004.
[74] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 85,” 30 April 2004.
[75] Email from Enrico Leonardi, Program Coordinator, UNICEF, Vladikavkaz, 11 July 2002.
[76] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 81,” 19 December 2003; UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 87,” 2 July 2004.
[77] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 61,” 25 February 2003.
[78] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 86,” 31 May 2004.
[79] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 84” 31 March 2004.
[80] Ibid.
[81] UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action Central & Eastern Europe, CIS and Baltic States Region in 2004,” accessed 20 August 2004,
[82] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 74,” 1 September 2003.
[83] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 75,” 16 September 2003.
[84] See for example, UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 80,” 30 November 2003; UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 81,” 19 December 2003.
[85] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 87,” 2 July 2004.
[86] Michaëla Bock Pedersen, “DDG Initiates MRE in Ingushetia and Chechnya,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 7.2, August 2003.
[87] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 7 September 2004.
[88] Email from Elina Dibirova, Danish Demining Group, 9 September 2004.
[89] Email to Landmine Monitor from Wenche Brenden, 9 September 2004.
[90] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 7 September 2004.
[91] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Donor Update 13 Nov 2003,” 13 November 2003; Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Tullio Santini, Emergency Programme Coordinator, UNICEF Moscow, 7 September 2004.
[92] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus donor update,” 25 May 2004; email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 7 October 2004.
[93] ICRC, “Annual Report 2003,” p.234.
[94] ICRC, “Russian Federation: Children’s poster exhibition on mines opens in Grozny,” 7 April 2003.
[95] ICRC, “Chechnya still in dire need of humanitarian aid and rebuilding,” 19 June 2003.
[96] ICRC, “Russian Federation: Children’s poster exhibition on mines opens in Grozny,” 7 April 2003.
[97] ICRC, “Russian Federation/Chechnya: Landmine Café opens in Grozny,” 17 February 2004.
[98] UNICEF, “Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2004: Chechnya and Neighboring Republics.”
[99] Email from Malene Hombolt, Danish Demining Group, 19 May 2003.
[100] In 2001, the majority of Chechen IDPs were in Ingushetia—150,000 out of some 180,000 IDPs were in that region (with another 160,000 displaced persons in Chechnya). ICRC, “Northern Caucasus and southern Russia: facts & figures on recent ICRC action (Apr - May 2002)” 8 July 2002.
[101] ICRC, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia (Sep 2001)” 2 November 2001.
[102] Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 846.
[103] Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 873. MERLIN is no longer involved in Chechen mine action.
[104] “U.N. envoy says Chechen kids run landmine gauntlet,” Reuters (Moscow), 24 June 2002.
[105] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 27 September 2004; Email from Tullio Santini, UNICEF, 18 July 2003. UNICEF’s landmine/UXO casualty database does not include victims of terror attacks.
[106] UNICEF, “Situation Report,” No. 86 (1-31 May 2004); No. 84 (1-31 March 2004); No. 63 (11-24 March 2003); No. 60 (27 January–9 February 2003).
[107] Information from various unofficial sources sent to Landmine Monitor (HI) in 2002.
[108] UNICEF, “Situation Report,” No. 83, 1-29 February 2004.
[109] ICRC Special Report, “Mine Action 2003,” Geneva, August 2004, p. 42.
[110] Data collated by Landmine Monitor from 54 media reports between 9 January and 2 December 2003. Media reports often listed several people killed or injured without giving a specific number. It was often not possible to differentiate between incidents caused by landmines and improvised explosive devices.
[111] Data collated by Landmine Monitor from 60 media reports between 8 January and 31December 2002.
[112] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 805.
[113] Ibid, p. 740.
[114] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 27 September 2004.
[115] Data collated by Landmine Monitor from 46 media reports between 29 January and 28 June 2004.
[116] UNICEF, ”Situation Report,” No. 61, 10-24 February 2003; US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002, Russia, Section 1.g.: Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts,” 31 March 2003.
[117] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter on Emergency Preparedness and Response, April/May 2002, p. 7.
[118] WHO, “State Health Facilities Assessment: Hospitals 2002/2003 – Republic of Chechnya,” pp. 2 and 17-18. WHO, Newsletter, April/May 2002, p. 7. Information in this section focuses on civilian mine casualties as Russian military mine casualties receive medical care in military hospitals and subsequent rehabilitation. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 806.
[119] Sharon LaFraniere, “Grozny Experiences Peace in Name Only,” Washington Post, 25 June 2001.
[120] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, June-July 2002, p. 8.
[121] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, July/August 2003, p. 4.
[122] For more information on these organizations, see WHO, “Health Sector Field Directory: Republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia, Russian Federation,” Nazran, June 2004.
[123] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programs, “Annual Report 2003,” Geneva, 9 March 2004, p. 15; ICRC Special Reports, “Mine Action 2003,” Geneva, August 2004, pp. 42-43; “Mine Action 2002,” July 2003, p. 45; “Mine Action 2001,” July 2002, p. 35; “Mine Action 2000,” July 2001, p. 32; “Mine Action 1999,” August 2000, p. 39.
[124] ICRC News, “Medical aid stepped up in Chechen Republic,” 21 March 2002.
[125] ICRC, “Mine Action 2003,” August 2004, p. 42; “Mine Action 2002,” July 2003, p. 45; “Mine Action 2001,” July 2002, p. 35.
[126] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, December 2001, p. 6.
[127] UNOCHA, “Mine Action,” 1 March 2004, available at www.ocha.ru For details on activities in prior years see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 742; Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 807-808.
[128] Email from Dominique Granjon, Desk Officer for Europe, HI, 30 September 2004; Email from Catherine Naughton, Program Manager, HI North Caucasus, 29 July 2002.
[129] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, Oct-Nov 2002, p. 8; UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 59, 14-26 January 2003; UNOCHA, “Humanitarian action in the North Caucasus,” Information Bulletin, 1-15 Mar 2003.
[130] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, Jan-Feb 2003, p. 10.
[131] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 946-947.
[132] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 88, 1-31 July 2004; UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 53, 21 October-3 November 2002.
[133] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, July/August 2003, p. 4.
[134] ICRC, “Russian Federation/Chechnya: Landmine Café in Grozny,” 17 February 2004.
[135] UNOCHA, “Mine Action,” 1 March 2004, available at www.ocha.ru; WHO, “Health Action,” Newsletter, Oct-Nov 2002, p. 8; UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 81 (1-18 December 2003), No. 42 (18 May–2 June 2002), No. 51 (25 September–5 October 2002), No. 56 (1-17 December 2002).
[136] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 87, 1 June–2 July 2004.
[137] WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, April/May 2002, p. 7.
[138] Timur Aliev, “Little Help for Chechnya’s Disabled,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 4 July 2003.