Key developments since May 2003: Russian federal forces and Chechen
rebels continued to use antipersonnel landmines. The Chechen rebels who seized
the school in Beslan, North Ossetia with disastrous consequences emplaced both
antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices throughout the school.
Mine risk education activities expanded greatly in 2003, as about 263,000 people
took part in mine risk education sessions in Chechnya and Internally Displaced
Persons camps in the region. In 2003, UNICEF recorded 218 new civilian mine and
UXO casualties.
Key developments since 1999: Renewed conflict in 1999 was accompanied
by extensive use of antipersonnel mines by Russian and Chechen forces. In
December 1999, mine clearance operations by HALO Trust were suspended. Because
of the ongoing security situation, there has been no humanitarian mine clearance
since that time. Mine risk education activities also ground to a halt, but
resumed in 2000. Since then, UNICEF and the ICRC have expanded their mine risk
education and survivor assistance programs in Chechnya and neighboring
Ingushetia, where the majority of Chechen Internally Displaced Persons reside.
From 1999 to 2003, about 543,000 people took part in mine risk education
sessions in Chechnya and IDP camps in the region, including 263,000 in 2003
alone. In 2001, UNICEF started data collection on civilian mine and UXO
casualties in Chechnya. UNICEF has recorded 2,340 new civilian landmine and UXO
casualties occurring between 1999 and the end of 2003.
Background
In September 1991, Chechnya declared independence from Russia, and adopted
the name Chechen Republic “Ichkeria.” On 11 December 1994, Russia
sent troops into Chechnya where mines were used extensively in the fighting by
both sides. The Khasav-Yurt agreements were signed in August 1996, in which a
cease-fire was called and a decision on the Chechen Republic Ichkeria’s
status was delayed until 1 January 2001. Russian withdrawal from the region was
agreed to in November 1996. Relations remained tense, however, and after a
series of bombings blamed on Chechen rebels killed over 300 people across the
Russian Federation in September 1999 and an incursion into neighboring Dagestan,
Russian forces were sent into Chechnya. Russian troops first secured the
northern section of the country, occupied the Chechen capital of Grozny, and
began pursuit of rebels in the mountainous areas of southern Chechnya. Chechen
forces evacuated Grozny in February 2000 and the conflict has since entered a
guerrilla war phase. Since 1999 there have been massive violations of human
rights and laws of war, including widespread use of mines, by both sides.
The Chechen conflict displaced hundreds of thousands of people both
internally and across regional borders, mostly into neighboring
Ingushetia.[1] After
hostilities re-commenced, some 280,000 people were forced to flee, and another
150,000 were displaced inside
Chechnya.[2] IDPs still face
difficult conditions and are especially vulnerable to mines. There has been
increased pressure from Russian authorities for IDPs living in camps in
Ingushetia to return home. Camps have been declared closed, and the residents
forced to either return to Chechnya or find other
accommodations.[3]
Mine Ban Policy
Chechnya is not an internationally recognized sovereign state, and therefore
cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. In 1998 then Chechen Minister of Foreign
Affairs Mr. Ilias Akhmadov expressed support for the Mine Ban Treaty and said
that the Chechen Republic Ichkeria would be ready to sign
immediately.[4] With the
resumption of the war in 1999, the Chechen position on a mine ban has
reversed.
One Chechen parliamentarian noted that “any questions pertaining to the
antipersonnel mine ban, which may be put by a sovereign state in peacetime to
the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, are unacceptable at the present
time.”[5] Another
government official said, “The question of banning the use of
antipersonnel mines, which we put to some field commanders...caused unconcealed
indignation. We considered it senseless to make further inquiries pertaining to
this theme. The main conclusion made by our representatives is that mines will
not be discarded from general military strategy by either the Russian Army or
the Chechen
detachments.”[6]
Use
Use of Mines by Russian Forces
Russian forces used mines in both Chechen wars. They employed mines in great
numbers as the war resumed in 1999 and 2000 and was being fought at a high
level, but less so in recent years as the conflict evolved into more classic
guerrilla warfare. Federal troops have laid mines around and leading up to
bases, checkpoints, commanders’ offices, governmental buildings, factories
and power plants; on roads, on mountain paths, in fields running from Grozny to
Alkhan-Kalu, in the estuary of the River Sunzha, along various borders, and in
areas deemed “suspicious.”
In addition to using hand-emplaced mines, Russian forces have also deployed
antipersonnel mines from airplanes, helicopters, and rockets, resulting in large
tracts of mined land that is unmarked and
unfenced.[7] Most of this
scatterable mining took place in 1999 and
2000.[8] In 2000, a Russian Air
Force general admitted, “The efficiency of middle altitude and long range
aviation is low....”[9]
In 2000, only half of the cluster munitions containing PFM mines dropped in
Chechnya actually detonated.[10]
. In October 2000, it was acknowledged that “the mines had elements that
would cause them to self-destruct in ten days, however, some of them did not
work, either due to factory flaws or as a result of mechanical damage from
shrapnel or bullets.”[11]
In January 2001, a Russian military official reportedly said that Russian
forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in
Chechnya.[12] In February 2001,
a Chechen commander contended that Russian troops had used 1.8 million mines in
Chechnya,[13] while in July
2002, a Chechen official estimated the Russians had used three million mines
during the second Chechen
war.[14]
The Russian government has stated that it only uses mines in cases of
“dire necessity,” and claims that its mine usage is in compliance
with CCW Amended Protocol II: minefields are mapped, marked, and the mines used
are all of the self-destructing or self-deactivating variety. It has stated
throughout the past five years that Russia does not engage in indiscriminate
mine usage. In August 2001, the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United
States stated to Landmine Monitor, “Mine barriers have been laid to
blockade specific base areas used by [rebel] units and to close movements routes
and convoy paths across the state border, using fragmentation-action
antipersonnel mines with self-destruction mechanisms and control options that
comply with requirements in [Amended Protocol II].... Mines are emplaced
primarily on sectors of the border where difficult physical and geographical
conditions do not permit other forces or methods to be employed effectively,
where there are virtually no local inhabitants, and to protect and guard
positions and places where border divisions are
stationed.”[15] In
December 1999, Colonel -General Nikolai Serdtsev said that mines were cleared
when military camps were moved, that all minefields were mapped and that
“security zones” were
marked.[16]
These contentions have been contradicted frequently since 1999 both by
evidence and statements by Russian officials. In January 2002, a Russian
commander in Grozny stated that he did not have maps or information on area
minefields, and that mine clearance only occurs at special
request.[17] In January 2002,
Landmine Monitor interviewed villagers in a district near the border with
Georgia who said they could not determine the perimeter of suspected mine areas
and village elders said they have requested Russian minefield maps, but received
none. Due to the practice of rotating different army units from different parts
of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) every three to six
months, the danger of losing minefield information is increased. In July 2000,
a Russian deminer said, “It is dangerous to walk in the woods, which have
been mined by both our forces and the rebels. Since no minefields have been
mapped, not even sappers take the
risk.”[18]
Use of Mines by Chechen Rebels
Chechen rebels have used mines extensively, although in recent years, they
have more commonly used Improvised Explosive Devices than mass-produced
landmines. On 9 May 2004, Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov and 24 others were
killed when a timer-triggered IED placed in the construction block beneath the
VIP stands during a Victory Day parade exploded. Two more IED were found later
in the same area.[19] On 13
July 2004, another landmine went off under the motorcade of Chechnya’s
acting president, Sergei Abramov, killing one of his
bodyguards.[20] The situation
is especially serious in the capital of Grozny, where in April 2003 it was
reported that five people were killed by a mine in the same spot from which
sappers had removed a mine earlier that same
day.[21] Reports of mine
casualties and discoveries peaked in April 2003, coinciding with increased
“disappearances” and human rights violations by Russian
troops.[22]
At the start of the renewed conflict in 1999, Chechen opposition forces used
primarily Soviet-produced weapons left over from the breakup of the Soviet
Union, mainly antivehicle mines, but also some antipersonnel mines (PMN, PMN-2,
OZM-72, MON-50, MON-100, MON-200). Over the course of the past five years,
however, improvised explosive devices have become the main form of explosive
device used by insurgent groups, due both to a depletion of Soviet stocks and to
an abundance of readily available materiel used for constructing IEDs.
On 18 May 2003, a Russian official stated that, “90% of landmines,
which guerillas place under us, are made of the shells that we have fired
ourselves, the rest are home-made explosive
devices.”[23] Often these
devices are filled with scraps of metal to increase their
lethality.[24] Many weapons
caches discovered since January 2003 have generally included what were
explicitly described as “home-made” explosive devices, explosives as
mentioned above, and
detonators.[25] An analysis of
2003 media reports shows that at least half of all rebel explosive devices are
IEDs.[26] Russian military
sources have told Landmine Monitor that Chechen IEDs are increasingly detonated
by remote control; some estimated over half of all rebel IEDs were remotely
detonated.
Rebel mines are laid mostly on roads, to disrupt or attack convoys and
patrols. The majority of military mine casualties in 2003 were caused by
landmines exploding under trucks or armored personnel
carriers.[27] Chechen forces
used mines extensively during the 1994-96 war. Rebel troops set explosive
booby-traps in houses and mined the corpses of Russian soldiers during the
battle for Grozny.[28] With
renewed attacks by Russian forces in 1999, rebel groups continued to use mines
in order to retard the advance of Russian troops, to complicate the rebuilding
of the communication infrastructure, along railroads, electric supply lines, and
other economic targets. Landmines have also been planted on local
paths[29] and near
villages,[30] as well as in
larger cities. Mines are laid frequently in Grozny, which have exploded in
crowded areas or destroyed passenger
buses.[31]
President of the Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” Aslan Maskhadov
said in an interview in March 2000 that the decision to use mines is one made by
junior commanders, and that their use would only increase as the partisan war
progressed. Indeed, Olara Otunnu, UN Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict, noted in 2002 that explosive devices were being used to target
Russian officials and others of political significance, as well as Chechen
civilians perceived to be cooperating with the pro-Russian
government.[32]
Insurgents have reportedly paid civilians, among them children, to plant the
mines,[33] and sometimes used
threats and blackmail to compel civilian
help.[34] Exploitation of
children to plant landmines continued in
2003.[35] One child stated that
he was paid $30-100 for laying a mine, and this figure was tripled or quadrupled
for “a direct
hit.”[36] Mines have been
hidden in clocks, cigarette lighters, mobile phones, children’s
toys[37] and piles of
trash.[38]
As Landmine Monitor Report 2004 went to print, on 3 September at least 338
people died when Chechen rebels seized a school in Beslan, North
Ossetia.[39] The hostage-takers
laid both antipersonnel mines and IEDs throughout the school, including in a
gymnasium crowded with over 1,000 children and their parents. According to
various sources, the mines used included PMN blast mines and POMZ, OZM-72,
MON-50, and MON-100 fragmentation
mines.[40] At least 127
improvised explosive devices were reportedly laid in the
school.[41] After the siege,
Russian EOD teams located and destroyed approximately 70 antipersonnel mines and
50 kilograms of IED.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
There have been no reports of mass production of landmines in Chechnya since
1999. In 2001, the Chechen representative to the United States stated,
“The Chechen Republic has no factories for making
mines.”[42] Since then,
no more information has been forthcoming. However, there is widespread
construction and use of IEDs by Chechen
rebels.[43] In the period
January 2003 until the present, analysis of media reports seems to indicate that
the majority of rebel explosive devices are
IEDs.[44] Raids of Chechen
weapons caches continue to turn up manufactured mines; however, the bulk of
materials found are frequently components appropriate for the construction of
IEDs, such as plastic explosive, detonators, and artillery
shells.[45]
There has been no official declaration from Chechen rebels on export or
import of mines. In 1999, a Chechen military officer stated that all rebel
mines were either obtained from the Russian military or were left over from the
first war in Chechnya.[46] In
2001, Chechen fighters confirmed that mines were obtained from the Russian
military.[47] In 2000 a Russian
news program reported that Chechens used “serial landmines of Western
manufacturing.”[48] A
military news agency, AVN, made similar allegations in the same
year.[49] Col. Vladimir Bobkov
of the Russian Ministry of Defense stated on 16 December 1999 that rebels use
Italian-made mines.[50] There
were no independent confirmations of the reports. To date there have been no
other similar reports.
Mine Problem
Continuing hostilities between Russian federal forces and Chechen separatists
have precluded precise statistical assessments of Chechnya’s mine problem
since 1999. However, it is clear that the region is heavily mined. Given that
no humanitarian mine clearance has taken place since the HALO Trust was evicted
in December 1999, conditions can only be growing worse. In June 2002, Olara
Otunnu, the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed
Conflict, called Chechnya “one of the most landmine-polluted zones in the
world,” and estimated that there were 500,000 landmines placed in the
region.[51] In 1999, HALO
estimated that 20,000 hectares (200 square kilometers) of Chechen land was
unusable because of
landmines[52]
The most heavily mined areas are those in which rebels continue to put up
resistance, namely the southern regions and
Grozny.[53] Urban areas
(including civil and administration buildings in Grozny), villages, roads,
fields, woods, mountain paths, bridges, rivers and estuaries, as well as the
borders of Chechnya are
mined.[54] A May 2003 media
report stated that the engineering service of the North Caucasus military
district emplaced 123 minefields in Grozny in 1999 and 2000 (119 antipersonnel
minefields, two antivehicle, and two
mixed).[55]
On 24 April 2000, Russia declared that it had completely cleared Grozny of
mines and UXO, removing over 177,000 explosive
devices.[56] These reports were
later contradicted by other
sources.[57] In October 2003,
the Russian military again declared that Grozny was clear of minefields, stating
that there were “virtually none left,” although the threat of
unexploded ordnance
remained.[58]
Civilians living in villages and towns are seriously affected by mines.
Areas around populated areas are mined—one doctor who treated many mine
casualties said in 2000 that no single town or district is without
mines.[59] Responding to a
Landmine Monitor interview in 2001, inhabitants of 15 regions of Chechnya,
together composing most of the south, considered the landmine problem urgent and
felt that there was a threat to them. Of those interviewed, 92 percent knew of
agricultural or forested areas that were mined, 56 percent knew of mined
buildings, and 38 percent knew of mined roads, bridges or railroads. Eighty
percent said that these minefields were
unmarked.[60] Interviews in
January 2002 in the southeastern district of Vedensky showed that all 26
villages there were believed to be
mined.[61] Landmines in these
areas render “huge” areas of agricultural land
unusable,[62] kill farm animals,
and prevent inhabitants from walking in the
forests.[63] Up to 40 percent
of Vedensky’s inhabitants could not collect firewood in 2002 and had to
move into gas-heated residences in the winter. Villagers report that minefields
are not marked, and requests to the Russian government by village elders for
maps go unanswered.[64]
Mine Clearance
All mine clearance activities being conducted in Chechnya today are carried
out by Russian forces. These operations are designed primarily to keep
transport lines open and ensure the safe operation of military facilities.
Russian engineer troops search roads daily for newly laid
mines.[65] In 2003, Russian
military sources stated that they had cleared over 350,000 landmines and pieces
of unexploded ordnance (UXO) since
1999.[66] Russian engineering
outfits were reported in 2000 to be poorly equipped, resulting in many
casualties.[67] Officials in
the Ministry of Defense said, “Engineer training is considered to be
secondary, it takes only 2-3% of all study time. As the result, the number of
casualties is high.”[68]
Russian military sources have told Landmine Monitor that the effectiveness of
Russia’s engineer forces has been increasing, largely as a result of the
Program of Counter-mine Protection of the Armed Forces. They report that during
2003 the number of mine incidents decreased by 25 percent.
There has been no independent humanitarian mine clearance since HALO Trust
ceased operations in December 1999 due to the new outbreak of violence. The
Russian government subsequently accused the organization of espionage, among
other things, and arrested some of their staff. HALO denied these
accusations.[69] HALO Trust had
trained manual and mechanical assistance teams and conducted demining operations
in 1998 and 1999.
Mine Risk Education
The number of organizations involved in providing mine risk education (MRE)
in Chechnya has rapidly increased since 1999. The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF remain the primary agencies involved in the
coordination and implementation of MRE in Chechnya, working in cooperation with
local NGOs. The ICRC has partnered with Minga, a local NGO, and Chechen
government ministries, while UNICEF’s programs are implemented by two main
partners, Voice of the Mountains (VoM) and Let’s Save the Generation
(LSG). UNICEF coordinates organizations involved in mine action, holding
monthly meetings for international and local
agencies.[70]
In 2003, about 263,000 people took part in mine risk education sessions in
Chechnya and IDP camps in the region. This continued the major expansion of MRE
activities that occurred in 2001 and 2002. From 1999 to 2002, about 280,000
people took part in MRE
sessions.[71] Mine risk
education in this heavily affected region has focused on the particularly
vulnerable groups of children and IDPs.
Voice of the Mountains, the first local NGO to address the landmine/UXO
problem in Chechnya, held mine risk education seminars in Chechen schools and
the program is now as of the beginning of 2004 included in the official Chechen
curriculum.[72] The addition of
MRE to the official school curriculum has resulted in sensitization of over
138,000 schoolchildren since January
2003.[73] The seminars,
provided to children aged six to seventeen, consist of interactive presentations
such as rehearsals of proper behavior, supported afterward by materials such as
fairy tales and stories of mine
survivors.[74] UNICEF and the
Chechen Ministry of Education, ICRC, UN, and NGO partners collaborated to
develop content for the
course.[75] Distribution of MRE
booklets, leaflets, notebooks, and pens follows each
course.[76] Training for VoM
teachers has been improved and the scope of the program has been expanded since
February 2003, when ECHO/UNICEF observers noted the need for further development
of the program.[77] From
mid-2003 until completion in May 2004, a crew of 15 monitors observed schools
throughout Chechnya, ensuring that MRE training was, in fact, taking place as
well as the proper delivery of MRE materials to school
libraries.[78] In March 2004, a
kindergarten MRE program was
launched.[79] VoM also provided
MRE to IDP camps and settlements in Ingushetia, reaching
thousands.[80] A total of
30,000 children in IDP camps in Ingushetia and Chechnya received MRE in
2003.[81]
Let’s Save the Generation, with the support of UNICEF, continued its
MRE drama presentations. In August 2003, the program moved from North Ossetia,
where it had provided MRE to 11,000 children, to Grozny, where it began a
partnership with the Chechen State Drama Theater
(CSDT).[82] The prominence of
participating actors in the CSDT raised the profile of the presentations, adding
to their attendance, which was consistently in the hundreds throughout late 2003
and early 2004.[83] Drama
presentations are frequently made in Temporary Accommodation Centers (TACs) for
IDPs.[84] In February 2004,
three “drama circles” were created, each consisting of a manager, an
artist, two actors and 8-10
children.[85]
Danish Demining Group (DDG) continued its mine risk education activities,
providing direct presentations mainly to Chechen
adults.[86] In 2003, 78,486
persons attended DDG’s MRE
sessions.[87] Since its launch
in 2000, this program provided MRE to 214,429
persons.[88] DDG has received
DKK2,200,000 (US$334,346) from Denmark as the first installment of a commitment
of DKK4,800,000 (US$729,483) for capacity
building.[89]
In 2003, UNICEF received a total of approximately $4.4 million for its MRE
activities in Chechnya and neighboring
republics.[90] From January to
November 2003, the European Union (via ECHO) contributed $184,382 to
UNICEF’s Mine Action Program, and UNICEF collected unearmarked funds from
the United States($1.46 million), the United Kingdom ($766,127), German National
Committee ($537,002), Denmark ($461,550), the Netherlands ($421,000) and Sweden
($582,005).[91] From January
until May 2004, UNICEF’s Northern Caucasus program received contributions
from the Dutch National Committee ($282,963), Germany ($161,691), while the
Netherlands ($445,000) and Sweden ($714,286) provided unearmarked
funds.[92]
The ICRC provides mine risk education primarily through media campaigns and
special events. In 2003, the ICRC trained 90 children to relay MRE messages to
other children, a total of 5,353 children saw the MRE puppet show “The
Thousandth Jug,” and 556 schools in Chechnya and another 58 schools in
Dagestan received various MRE materials.93
[93] In April 2003, the ICRC
collaborated with the Republican Youth Center and the Chechen Ministry of
Culture to hold an exhibition featuring MRE posters made by children throughout
Chechnya.[94] At the request of
the ICRC, a five-part series entitled “Beware Mines” was produced in
2003 and subsequently broadcast on state and regional television. Mine-related
stories were published in “Rainbow,” a popular children’s
magazine.[95] Cheerdig, the
ICRC’s mine awareness character, continued to appear in his cartoon;
puppet shows and comics were also
used.[96] On 17 February 2004,
the “Landmine Café” opened in Grozny, supported by the ICRC
and Minga. The café, established by nine mine survivors, distributes MRE
materials, holds mine awareness events, and convenes monthly group support
sessions for mine survivors.[97]
In April 2004, the ICRC produced four television spots featuring the testimony
of mine survivors, and the Chechen Ministry of Emergency Situations put up 34
billboards made by the ICRC.
Both the ICRC and UNICEF expanded their programs in 2002. UNICEF provided
MRE to 194,000 children and trained 460 teachers from 458 schools to provide
MRE.[98] In 2002, UNICEF began
to sponsor drama performances at the Russian Academic Theater in Vladikavkaz,
North Ossetia. Implementing partner Let’s Save the Generation distributed
MRE materials and provided transportation to Vladikavkaz for youth MRE
presentations. The Danish Demining Group provided MRE to 64,576 IDPs in
Ingushetia and 55,124 people in
Chechnya.[99]
In 2001, mine risk education efforts improved markedly and new programs were
initiated. The ICRC started an MRE program featuring folk hero Cheerdig for the
first time, in Ingushetia, providing presentations to some 1,600 children in IDP
camps.[100] In November 2001,
ICRC began its first efforts in Chechnya proper with similar puppet
shows.[101] The UNHCR worked in
coordination with UNICEF to reach 15,000 children in Ingushetia and Chechnya.
Training of MRE teachers began, producing a group of 400 instructors in 2001.
The UN, NGOs and other government partners met in Ingushetia for MRE training in
2000.
Landmine Monitor Report 1999 reported that in Chechnya, “there are no
training brochures, films or leaflets produced locally. All materials on mine
awareness come from abroad. Literature and films are mostly in English and
require translation.”[102]
The year 2000 saw only marginal improvements, due to renewed violence in the
area. The ICRC and Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN) were able to
provide some MRE before the fighting forced cessation of activities; UNHCR, the
Danish Refugee Council and other Chechen NGOs had plans for mine awareness
activity in 2000, but were only beginning to carry them out due to restrictions
on movement and information on mined
territories.[103]
Landmine Casualties
The total number of landmine casualties in Chechnya is not known. The
on-going armed conflict and the volatile security situation has made collection
of comprehensive data extremely difficult. There is, however, limited
information available that gives an indication of the extent of the problem. In
June 2002, Olara Otunnu, the UN special representative for children and armed
conflict stated that “We estimate between 7,000 and 10,000 people have
been maimed by landmines [in the course of two Chechen conflicts], and easily
more than half of those are
children.”[104]
In 2003, UNICEF recorded 218 new civilian mine/UXO casualties, including 41
killed and 177 injured; 41 were children (six killed and 35 injured). Between
1999 and the end of 2002, UNICEF recorded 2,122 new civilian landmine/UXO
casualties: 383 casualties in 2002; 576 in 2001; 763 in 2000; and 400 in 1999.
As of September 2004, the UNICEF mine casualty database contained information on
2,939 landmine and UXO casualties in Chechnya since 1994, including at least
1,817 people injured.[105]
UNICEF reports that around 49 percent of mine/UXO casualties require a lower
limb amputation, 26 percent an upper limb amputation, and 14 percent suffer a
loss of eye sight as a result of their injuries, and the 15 to 29-year-old age
group is the most affected.
The majority of casualties have been recorded in Grozny. Since 2001, UNICEF
has trained staff of three local NGOs, Voice of the Mountains, Minga, and
Let’s Save the Generation, on data collection and data management using
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Nine trained
representatives of the three NGOs work on gathering data and VoM staff manage
the database in Ingushetia. Mine casualty data is provided by the WHO, the
ICRC, DDG, health facilities, and several other local NGOs, working in IDP camps
and in the territory of
Chechnya.[106] The database is
continually being updated as both new and less recent mine incidents are
identified.
The number of new mine/UXO casualties appears to be reducing over time. In
2002, NGOs working in hospitals in Chechnya estimated that there were between 30
and 50 civilians injured each month in landmine
incidents.[107] Since
mid-2003, the number of estimated new casualties dropped from 15 a month to
about three or four a month by February
2004.[108] ICRC-supported
hospitals in Chechnya (ten hospitals), Ingushetia (one) and Dagestan (one)
reported treating 334 mine casualties in 2003 and 445 in
2002.[109]
Landmine Monitor recorded at least 246 new casualties (126 killed and 120
injured) caused by landmines, UXO and improvised explosive devices (IED) from
international media sources in 2003, including 170 military personnel,
militants, sappers and police, and four women and five
children.[110] International
media sources reported 298 mine/UXO/IED casualties (119 killed and 179 injured),
including 187 military personnel, militants, sappers and police, in Chechnya in
2002.[111] In 2001, Landmine
Monitor collated data on 1,153 mine/UXO/IED casualties (367 killed and 786
injured); 137 were civilians (62 killed and 75 injured) including 23
children.[112]
According to various media and military sources, there were over 1,300 mine
incidents involving Russian federal forces, including police and internal forces
in Chechnya from 1999 to March 2003, resulting in 2,500 military casualties,
including more than 600 killed and 1,700 injured. Not all military casualties
were the result of rebel mine use; accidents and improper handling or storage of
mines also caused many
casualties.[113]
Casualties continued in 2004 with UNICEF recording 81 new civilian mine/UXO
casualties to September,[114]
and at least 194 new casualties caused by landmines, UXO and IED were reported
in the international media to the end of June 2004; 145 casualties were military
personnel, militants, sappers or
police.[115]
Landmine Monitor Report 2003 reported that information quoted in at least two
other sources from the Ministry of Health of Chechnya indicated that 5,695 new
mine and UXO casualties were registered by health facilities in 2002; a
significant increase from the 2,140 landmine and UXO casualties recorded in
2001.[116] On further
investigation it would appear that these statistics included not only landmine
and UXO casualties but also other war-related injuries. The precise number of
landmine and UXO casualties included in these statistics is not known. In 2001,
medical institutions in Chechnya registered 1,020 casualties with gunshot and
landmine injuries, as compared to 814 such casualties registered in
2000.[117]
Survivor Assistance
Surgical and general health facilities in Chechnya remain devastated because
of war damage and a lack of resources and maintenance. More than half of the
available hospitals function without running water, proper heating, or sewerage
systems. A lack of skilled staff, equipment, basic supplies, emergency
transport, and the security situation also hampers the delivery of adequate
assistance. Chechnya reportedly had 139 state health facilities, including 58
hospitals, 34 polyclinics and 47 ambulatories; 18 hospitals are either totally
destroyed or are difficult to access due to ongoing military
activities.[118] In 2001, when
describing Grozny’s Hospital Number Nine, a journalist reported that the
hospital “has a sign and a gate; otherwise it could be mistaken for more
ruins. The five-story main building, once the hospital’s pride, is
windowless and pockmarked by
bullets.”[119]
Before the conflict, Chechnya had 18 social rehabilitation centers and 13
social services facilities; all have since been partially or totally
destroyed.[120] Many
international agencies and local and international NGOs are working to
strengthen the health infrastructure in Chechnya, and neighboring republics with
medicines, hospital supplies, expertise and training for local staff at
hospitals and health posts. Others support mobile clinics, psychosocial support
services, transportation to medical facilities, and other humanitarian aid
activities. Significant problems faced by mine survivors include their
inability to access skilled medical assistance and a lack of psychological
support and social care.[121]
In June 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) released an updated
“Health Sector Field Directory” detailing health services available
to all Chechens, including the internally displaced in neighboring republics.
Organizations active in mine survivor assistance-related activities include
Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, CARE Canada, Centre for Peacemaking
and Community Development, Danish Refugee Council/Danish Peoples Aid, Hammer
Forum, Handicap International, International Committee of the Red Cross,
International Humanitarian Initiative, International Medical Corps, Islamic
Relief, Médecins du Monde, Médecins sans Frontières,
Memorial, People in Need Foundation, Save the Generation, Serlo, UNICEF, WHO,
and World Vision.[122] It is
not possible to provide details on all the mine survivors assisted by the
various organizations as the cause of disability is often not recorded to avoid
possible security risks for the beneficiaries.
Since 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross has supported up to
27 hospitals in Chechnya and the surrounding republics. In 2003, the ICRC
regularly provided surgical support, medicines, and medical supplies to improve
the quality of care in ten referral hospitals in Chechnya and two other
hospitals in Ingushetia and Dagestan. Since 2001, ICRC-supported hospitals
reported treating 1,019 mine/UXO casualties, including 334 in 2003, 445 in 2002,
and 240 in 2001. The ICRC also facilitated specialized training for eight
Chechen doctors in Moscow and Nalchik in 2003. One Chechen surgeon participated
in a war-surgery seminar in Moscow in October
2002.[123] On 13 March 2002,
the ICRC signed an agreement with the Chechen Ministry of Health and the Chechen
branch of the Russian Red Cross to assist the health facilities in Chechnya.
Assistance included the repair of facilities, the supply of medicines, and two
Russian Red Cross mobile
clinics.[124]
In October 2001, the ICRC signed an agreement with the federal Ministry of
Labor and Social Development to improve physical rehabilitation in Chechnya by
providing further training for qualified Chechen staff to work at the
prosthetic/orthopedic center in Grozny. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Development reconstructed the orthopedic center and installed electricity and
heating, while the ICRC supplied equipment. Prosthetic production commenced at
the end of January 2003 before the official opening of the Ministry of Labor and
Social Development-run center on 24 April 2003. In 2003, the center produced
148 prostheses (97 for mine survivors) and distributed 1,434 crutches and 69
wheelchairs; 1,200 crutches and 29 wheelchairs were distributed in 2002. The
ICRC is also supporting the Marachkala orthopedic center in Dagestan with
training and supplies to rehabilitate amputees referred from Grozny. In
addition to on-the-job training for technicians, in 2002 the ICRC started a
two-year training program for eight prosthetic technicians from Chechnya at the
Sochi Orthopedic Center (in southern
Russia).[125] In November 2001,
the WHO also held a training course for 14 prosthetic technicians and doctors
from Chechnya.[126]
In August 2000, UNICEF commenced its Mine Action Program in the North
Caucasus with survivor assistance being one of the main components. The program
which focuses on mine-injured children and women from Chechnya includes physical
rehabilitation, the fitting of prostheses, psychosocial counseling, and
vocational training. UNICEF works with the WHO, and other NGO partners, to
facilitate services for the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of mine
survivors and others affected by the conflict. The physical rehabilitation
component of the program started at the Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center in
Ingushetia in December 2001. Children and women from Chechnya and the IDP camps
are transported to the Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center and the Vladikavkaz
Prosthetic Center on a weekly basis. The program involves a two-month cycle of
visits for fitting of orthopedic devices, physiotherapy treatment, and
psychosocial support to assist survivors in coming to terms with their
disability. In 2003, about 280 prosthetic and orthopedic devices were provided
by UNICEF and 26 by the WHO. UNICEF also supports the Republican Clinical
Hospital in Grozny to provide physical rehabilitation for child mine/UXO
survivors.[127]
Handicap International (HI), with financial support from the WFP, ECHO,
Switzerland, and German associations, continues to strengthen health,
rehabilitation, and social services for persons with disabilities, including
landmine survivors. In 2003, HI supplied ten hospitals and rehabilitation
facilities with equipment, consumables and training. HI facilitated the fitting
of prostheses through referral of 90 people in need to appropriate facilities in
the region. Assistive aids such as walking sticks, crutches, and wheelchairs
were also distributed to people with disability in their homes in Chechnya and
refugee camps in Ingushetia by mobile teams and through local associations (VOI,
STG). HI supported the Grozny Medical College, published rehabilitation
training and awareness material, and conducted four seminars for a total of 50
health professionals and disability workers on physical rehabilitation; 62
attended seminars in 2002. In cooperation with the Society of Invalids in
Chechnya, HI developed an income generation project; a sewing workshop in
Urus-Martan, employing 16 women with disabilities. HI is also raising awareness
on the rights of people with disabilities. In 2001, HI carried out a needs
assessment on the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities in Chechnya,
interviewing 2,200 people.[128]
CARE Canada, with the support of UNICEF and local NGO New Generation,
continues to run a psychosocial rehabilitation program for groups of 30
war-affected children at the Psychosocial Rehabilitation Center in Vladikavkaz.
The children, including mine survivors, visit the center twice a week and
receive counseling and participate in activities including dance and music
therapy, embroidery, yoga therapy and physical exercise. A field-based
psychologist works in the IDP camp Satsita to assist mine/UXO-affected children
and their parents. From May 2002 to February 2003, the program assisted 215 war
and mine-affected
children.[129]
The NGO Minga, in cooperation with UNICEF, distributes wheelchairs,
crutches, and walking sticks in six districts of
Chechnya.[130] The Russian
Center of Disaster Medicine (RCDM) “Zaschita” also provides health
services for civilians in the northern
Caucasus.[131]
In June 2002, UNICEF and VoM set up a soccer team of child mine survivors in
Grozny. The team plays games and participates in joint training with the
Vladikavkaz professional amputee football club. Other teams have also been set
up, including in Achkhoy-Martanovskiy district, in
2004.[132]
On 29 July 2003, the first meeting of the Mine Survivors Club was organized
by the ICRC in Gudermes.[133]
On 27 February 2004, the Landmine Café in Grozny, established by landmine
survivors and supported by the ICRC and Minga, opened. The Café
distributes mine awareness materials and holds weekly support sessions for mine
survivors.[134]
In June 2002, VoM, with support from UNICEF, commenced 3-month vocational
training courses in English and computers at the Grozny Technical College for
groups of 30 mine/UXO-affected adolescents. UNICEF also supports a vocational
training program in carpentry and joinery run by the People in Need Foundation
(PINF) in Ingushetia established in 2003. In 2003, at least 60 mine/UXO
survivors completed their training courses in English, computing, and carpentry
and joinery; 43 graduated in
2002.[135] In 2004, a
vocational training program in sewing for 20 girls with a disability in Grozny
was started in cooperation between the Chechen branch of the All-Russian Society
of the Disabled and
UNICEF.[136]
A Chechen participated in the Raising the Voices training program in Geneva
in February 2004.
The mine survivor featured on the cover of this Landmine Monitor Report 2004,
Umar Eskiev, stepped on an antipersonnel mine on 9 July 2002 as he returned home
from selling milk at the market in Grozny. Alone at the time of the incident,
the 13-year-old Umar crawled to a main road and a passing vehicle took him to a
hospital where his left leg was amputated. He has received treatment and
prostheses from local NGOs and from the Grozny Orthopedic Center, which is
supported by the ICRC. At the age of fifteen, Umar had to leave school to
support his family.
Disability Policy and Practice
The Federal Fund of Obligatory Medical Insurance and a Russian Federation
Ministry of Health decree, dated 16 May 2001, is intended to ensure that medical
care for the Chechen population is available in other
republics.[137] Small pensions
are available for persons with disabilities through the Ministry of Labor and
Social Development. However, according to the head of Chechnya’s Society
of Invalids, the pensions are inadequate to cover the basic costs of living.
The Ministry acknowledged that the budget for assisting the disabled “was
not nearly enough” but that it was not possible to allocate more
resources.[138]
[1] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus:
Humanitarian Appeal for Children and Women,” 14 January
2000. [2] UNICEF, “Emergency
Programmes: Northern Caucasus Donor Update,” 28 September
2000. [3] UNICEF, “Humanitarian
Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update,” 25 May
2004. [4] Interview with Ilias
Akhmadov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 December
1998. [5] Interview with Mr. A.
Idigov, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Chechen
Republic-Ichkeria, Paris, December
1999. [6] Interviews with Kh.
Israpilov, Commander-in Chief, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria,
Grozny, 2-3 January 2000. [7]
“Unexploded Federal Ammunition Makes Up Most of Landmines Used by Chechen
Guerillas,” Interfax (Moscow), 20 May
2003. [8] Interview with Maj. Yevgeny
Pasynok, Chief of Engineering Service, Grozny Military Commandant's office,
published in “Unexploded federal ammunition makes up most of landmines
used by Chechen guerillas,” Izvestia Interfax-AVN (Moscow), 20 May
2003. [9] Gen. A. M. Kornukov,
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, “Anti-terrorist operation in
Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya
mysl, No. 4, 2000, p.7. [10] Maj. V.
Denisov, student of the Military Engineering Academy, roundtable report on
engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik, No. 6,
June 2000, pp.40-41. [11]
“Russian Combat Engineers Fight ‘Mine War’ in Chechnya,”
Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian weekly military journal),
13-19 October 2000. [12] “Russia
Admits: Land Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucuses, 10 January 2001.
This was re-stated in the letter from a government representative of the Chechen
Republic “Ichkeria,” Lyoma Usamov, dated 19 June 2001, which stated,
“The Russian command, several months after the beginning of war,
“boasted” about its “achievements,” declaring that they
planted half a million mines against “the Chechen
terrorists.” [13] Interview with
I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of Southwest Front of the Chechen forces, 20
February 2001. This number was also stated in the 19 June 2001 letter from
Chechen Representative Usmanov. [14]
Umar Khanbiev, Minister for Health of the Chechen Republic
“Ichkeria,” citation translated from Russian by Landmine Monitor, 18
July 2002, www.chechenpress.com
. [15] Response from Vassily V.
Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16
August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications, LLC,
Washington, DC. [16] Interview with
Col. Gen. Nikolai Serdtsev, December
1999. [17] Interview with Col. V.
Dushukhini, Commandant of Leninskaya, Grozny, 27 January
2002. [18] “Mine Clearance
Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” RTR (Russian TV), 5 July
2000. [19] Yuri Bagrov, “Rebels
Turn Up Heat,” Herald-Sun, 11 May 2004. Devices with timers or
command-detonation are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, though certain
uses of such devices could violate international humanitarian law. The Mine Ban
Treaty prohibits victim-activated explosive
devices. [20] “Chechen
leader’s convoy hits landmine” CBC News Online, 13 July
2004. [21] Timur Aliev,
“Chechnya: Blasts Signal New Campaign,” CRS No. 179 (Znamenskoye),
15 May 2003. [22] Human Rights Watch,
“Briefing to the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights,”
January 2004. [23] “Unexploded
federal ammunition,” Interfax, 20 May
2003. [24] See Yuri Safronov,
“Federal foces destroy 15 bases, 14 caches in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS,
5 April 2004; “Russian Military Says ‘Practically’ No
Minefields Left in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 14 October
2003. [25] See “Federals destroy
eight caches with arms and ammunition in Chechnya” ITAR-TASS, 27 May 2004;
Yuri Safronov, “Federal forces destroy 15 bases,” ITAR-TASS, 5 April
2004; “Federal troops kill 11 militants in Chechnya since March 1,”
ITAR-TASS, 9 March 2004; “Cache with 17 kg of TNT found in
Chechnya,” Russian Information Center, 17 September 2003; “Federal
sappers defuse 13 landmines in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 17 July
2003. [26] About half of the media
reports reviewed by Human Rights Watch in 2003 specifically identified insurgent
explosive devices as IED; vague language implied that others were as well but
was inconclusive; and many reports simply did not specify whether a device was
an IED or manufactured mine. [27] Yuri
Safronov, “Federal forces destroy 15 bases,” ITAR-TASS, 5 April
2004. [28] The UK Working Group on
Landmines, “Landmines in the Former Soviet Union,” June 1997, p.
8. [29] “Feds kill two gunmen in
Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 11 August
2004. [30] “Landmines kill three
Chechen civilians,” Interfax, 28 May
2003. [31] “Groznyy bombing
death toll could have been much higher,” NTV (Russian TV), 30 May
2003. [32] Press Briefing by Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, 1 July
2002. [33] Sharon LaFraniere,
“Chechnya’s Children Fall Prey to Mines,” Washington Post, 20
October 2002. [34] “New
Terrorist Acts in Chechnya,” TVT (TV channel), 12 September
2000. [35] Yuri Safronov, “Three
children died attempting to plant landmine in Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 22
September 2003; “In Chechnya militants commit act of sabotage against
civilians” RIA (Novosty), 20 November
2003. [36] Timur Aliev,
“Chechnya: Blasts Signal New Campaign,” CRS No. 179, 15 May
2003. [37]
“‘Practically’ No Minefields Left in Chechnya,”
ITAR-TASS, 14 October 2003. [38]
Sergei Venyavsky, “Land mine shreds bus in Chechnya, 6 Die”
Associated Press, 3 April 2003. [39]
In a letter published on the Internet, Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev
subsequently claimed responsibility for the siege. “Excerpts: Basayev
claims Beslan,” BBC News, 17 September 2004.
[40] Many antipersonnel mines could
be clearly seen in television footage of the
events. [41] "127 Home-made Explosives
Laid in Beslan School," Novosti Rossii, 9 September
2004. [42] Letter from Lyoma Usmanov,
US Representative of the Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” 19 June
2001. [43] The representative of the
Chechen Republic “Ichkeria,” to the US and others have stated that
the absence of factories disqualifies the construction of IEDs in Chechnya from
being an “industry.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2000,
p.865. [44] Based on review of news
reports on Chechnya since January 2003, primarily from Interfax and ITAR-TASS
news agencies. [45] See, for example,
“Federal troops kill 11 militants,” ITAR-TASS, 9 March 2004;
“Cache with 17 kg of TNT found in Chechnya,” Russian Information
Center, 17 September 2003; “Federal sappers defuse 13 landmines in
Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 17 July
2003. [46] Interview with Col. M.
Arsaliev, engineering at “Krasny Molot” plant, Grozny, December
1999. [47] Interview with I. T.
Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001; interview
with a group of Chechen fighters, 15 January
2001. [48] “Segodnya”
(news program), NTV, 11 pm, 6 March
2000. [49] “The rebels are ready
to unleash a mine war” SMI.RU, 2 July
2000. [50] ICBL meeting with Col.
Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December
1999. [51] “UN envoy says
Chechen kids run landmine gauntlet,” Reuters (Chechnya), Moscow, 24 June
2002; see also, “Press Briefing by Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict,” 1 July
2002. [52] Interview with I. T.
Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February
2001. [53] UK Working Group Against
Landmines, Landmines in the former Soviet Union,
pp.8. [54] Statement by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor from
Vassily V. Boriak, Embassy of Russia to the US, 16 August 2001; interview with
I. T. Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001;
interview with a Russian Armed Forces colonel, RTR, March 2000. In the
interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by
artillery. [55] “Unexploded
federal ammunition,” Interfax, 20 May
2003. [56] Olga Allenova,
“’Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow
Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000,
pp.1. [57] “Mine Clearance
Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” “Vesti” newscast, RTR, 5
July 2000. [58]
“‘Practically’ No Minefields Left in Chechnya,”
ITAR-TASS, 14 October 2003. [59] Human
Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May
2000. [60] Landmine Monitor Report
2001, p. 940. [61] Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, p. 803. [62] Interview
with I. T. Tauzov, Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February
2001. [63] “Mine Clearance
Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” “Vesti” newscast, RTR, 5
July 2000. [64] Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, p. 803. [65] Yuri Bagrov,
“Armored personnel carrier explodes on landmine, killing two
soldiers,” Associated Press, 8 April 2003; ABH Agency, 19 April
2001. [66] Information provided to
IPPNW-Russia by Russian military
sources. [67] “Russian Combat
Engineers Fight ‘Mine War’ in Chechnya,” Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, 13-19 October
2000. [68] N. I. Serdtsev, Commander,
Russian Engineer troops, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main
lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4,
2000, pp.20-24. [69] Alexander
Sobolev, “FSB [Federal Security Services] accuses the international
organization ‘HALO-TRUST’ of rendering assistance to the
rebels,’ Vremia novostey, No. 100, 10 August
2000. [70] UNICEF, “Humanitarian
Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update,” 13 November
2003. [71] Landmine Monitor Report
2001, p. 943; Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 804; Landmine Monitor Report
2003, p. 739; Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, Programme Assistant, UNICEF North
Caucasus, 7 September 2004; Email from Elina Dibirova, Program Coordinator,
Danish Demining Group Chechnya, 9 September
2004. [72] UNICEF, “Humanitarian
Assistance in the Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 84,” 31 March
2004. [73] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Donor Update,” 13 November 2003 and 12 February
2004. [74] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 85,” 30 April
2004. [75] Email from Enrico Leonardi,
Program Coordinator, UNICEF, Vladikavkaz, 11 July
2002. [76] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 81,” 19 December 2003; UNICEF,
“Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 87,” 2 July
2004. [77] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 61,” 25 February
2003. [78] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 86,” 31 May
2004. [79] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 84” 31 March
2004. [80] Ibid.
[81] UNICEF, “Humanitarian
Action Central & Eastern Europe, CIS and Baltic States Region in
2004,” accessed 20 August
2004, [82] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 74,” 1 September
2003. [83] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 75,” 16 September
2003. [84] See for example, UNICEF,
“Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 80,” 30 November 2003;
UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus Situation Report No. 81,” 19 December
2003. [85] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Situation Report No. 87,” 2 July
2004. [86] Michaëla Bock
Pedersen, “DDG Initiates MRE in Ingushetia and Chechnya,” Journal of
Mine Action, Issue 7.2, August
2003. [87] Email from Eliza
Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 7 September
2004. [88] Email from Elina Dibirova,
Danish Demining Group, 9 September
2004. [89] Email to Landmine Monitor
from Wenche Brenden, 9 September
2004. [90] Email from Eliza
Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 7 September
2004. [91] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus Donor Update 13 Nov 2003,” 13 November 2003; Email to Landmine
Monitor (HI) from Tullio Santini, Emergency Programme Coordinator, UNICEF
Moscow, 7 September 2004. [92] UNICEF,
“Northern Caucasus donor update,” 25 May 2004; email from Eliza
Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 7 October
2004. [93] ICRC, “Annual Report
2003,” p.234. [94] ICRC,
“Russian Federation: Children’s poster exhibition on mines opens in
Grozny,” 7 April 2003. [95]
ICRC, “Chechnya still in dire need of humanitarian aid and
rebuilding,” 19 June 2003. [96]
ICRC, “Russian Federation: Children’s poster exhibition on mines
opens in Grozny,” 7 April
2003. [97] ICRC, “Russian
Federation/Chechnya: Landmine Café opens in Grozny,” 17 February
2004. [98] UNICEF, “Consolidated
Inter-Agency Appeal 2004: Chechnya and Neighboring
Republics.” [99] Email from
Malene Hombolt, Danish Demining Group, 19 May
2003. [100] In 2001, the majority of
Chechen IDPs were in Ingushetia—150,000 out of some 180,000 IDPs were in
that region (with another 160,000 displaced persons in Chechnya). ICRC,
“Northern Caucasus and southern Russia: facts & figures on recent ICRC
action (Apr - May 2002)” 8 July
2002. [101] ICRC, “Emergency
action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the
South of Russia (Sep 2001)” 2 November
2001. [102] Landmine Monitor Report
1999, p. 846. [103] Landmine Monitor
Report 2000, p. 873. MERLIN is no longer involved in Chechen mine
action. [104] “U.N. envoy says
Chechen kids run landmine gauntlet,” Reuters (Moscow), 24 June
2002. [105] Email from Eliza
Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 27 September 2004; Email from Tullio Santini, UNICEF, 18
July 2003. UNICEF’s landmine/UXO casualty database does not include
victims of terror attacks. [106]
UNICEF, “Situation Report,” No. 86 (1-31 May 2004); No. 84 (1-31
March 2004); No. 63 (11-24 March 2003); No. 60 (27 January–9 February
2003). [107] Information from various
unofficial sources sent to Landmine Monitor (HI) in
2002. [108] UNICEF, “Situation
Report,” No. 83, 1-29 February
2004. [109] ICRC Special Report,
“Mine Action 2003,” Geneva, August 2004, p.
42. [110] Data collated by Landmine
Monitor from 54 media reports between 9 January and 2 December 2003. Media
reports often listed several people killed or injured without giving a specific
number. It was often not possible to differentiate between incidents caused by
landmines and improvised explosive
devices. [111] Data collated by
Landmine Monitor from 60 media reports between 8 January and 31December
2002. [112] For more details see
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
805. [113] Ibid, p.
740. [114] Email from Eliza
Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 27 September
2004. [115] Data collated by Landmine
Monitor from 46 media reports between 29 January and 28 June 2004.
[116] UNICEF, ”Situation
Report,” No. 61, 10-24 February 2003; US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002, Russia, Section 1.g.: Use
of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal
Conflicts,” 31 March 2003. [117]
WHO, “Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter on Emergency
Preparedness and Response, April/May 2002, p.
7. [118] WHO, “State Health
Facilities Assessment: Hospitals 2002/2003 – Republic of Chechnya,”
pp. 2 and 17-18. WHO, Newsletter, April/May 2002, p. 7. Information in this
section focuses on civilian mine casualties as Russian military mine casualties
receive medical care in military hospitals and subsequent rehabilitation. See
also Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
806. [119] Sharon LaFraniere,
“Grozny Experiences Peace in Name Only,” Washington Post, 25 June
2001. [120] WHO, “Health Action
in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, June-July 2002, p.
8. [121] WHO, “Health Action in
the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, July/August 2003, p.
4. [122] For more information on these
organizations, see WHO, “Health Sector Field Directory: Republics of
Chechnya and Ingushetia, Russian Federation,” Nazran, June
2004. [123] ICRC Physical
Rehabilitation Programs, “Annual Report 2003,” Geneva, 9 March 2004,
p. 15; ICRC Special Reports, “Mine Action 2003,” Geneva, August
2004, pp. 42-43; “Mine Action 2002,” July 2003, p. 45; “Mine
Action 2001,” July 2002, p. 35; “Mine Action 2000,” July 2001,
p. 32; “Mine Action 1999,” August 2000, p.
39. [124] ICRC News, “Medical
aid stepped up in Chechen Republic,” 21 March
2002. [125] ICRC, “Mine Action
2003,” August 2004, p. 42; “Mine Action 2002,” July 2003, p.
45; “Mine Action 2001,” July 2002, p.
35. [126] WHO, “Health Action in
the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, December 2001, p.
6. [127] UNOCHA, “Mine
Action,” 1 March 2004, available at www.ocha.ru For details on activities in prior
years see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 742; Landmine Monitor Report 2002,
pp. 807-808. [128] Email from
Dominique Granjon, Desk Officer for Europe, HI, 30 September 2004; Email from
Catherine Naughton, Program Manager, HI North Caucasus, 29 July
2002. [129] WHO, “Health Action
in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, Oct-Nov 2002, p. 8; UNICEF,
“Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 59, 14-26 January 2003;
UNOCHA, “Humanitarian action in the North Caucasus,” Information
Bulletin, 1-15 Mar 2003. [130] WHO,
“Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, Jan-Feb 2003, p.
10. [131] See Landmine Monitor Report
2001, pp. 946-947. [132] UNICEF,
“Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 88, 1-31 July 2004;
UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 53, 21 October-3
November 2002. [133] WHO,
“Health Action in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, July/August 2003,
p. 4. [134] ICRC, “Russian
Federation/Chechnya: Landmine Café in Grozny,” 17 February
2004. [135] UNOCHA, “Mine
Action,” 1 March 2004, available at www.ocha.ru; WHO, “Health Action,”
Newsletter, Oct-Nov 2002, p. 8; UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,”
Situation Report, No. 81 (1-18 December 2003), No. 42 (18 May–2 June
2002), No. 51 (25 September–5 October 2002), No. 56 (1-17 December
2002). [136] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus,” Situation Report, No. 87, 1 June–2 July
2004. [137] WHO, “Health Action
in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, April/May 2002, p.
7. [138] Timur Aliev, “Little
Help for Chechnya’s Disabled,” Institute for War & Peace
Reporting, 4 July 2003.
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