Since March 1999, pursuing a ban on antipersonnel mines through cooperative
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty has produced impressive results. The
compliance rate for States Parties submitting initial transparency measures
reports is an admirable 91 percent.[3]
A total of 80 States Parties declared stockpiles totaling over 48 million
antipersonnel mines, 37.3 million of which have been destroyed. Sixty-five
States Parties have completed stockpile destruction. Another 51 States Parties
have declared that they did not possess stockpiles to be destroyed. Forty
States Parties have enacted national legislation to implement the treaty. Some
states not party to the treaty have voluntarily submitted transparency reports
and states globally observe an unofficial ban on the transfer and export of
antipersonnel mines.
Unfortunately, antipersonnel mines continued to be used albeit at lower rates
and scale than in previous decades. At least 13 non-signatories to the Mine Ban
Treaty have used antipersonnel mines in the past five
years.[4] Another four states have
admitted using antipersonnel mines after signing the treaty, and there have been
serious allegations about use by three other signatories and one State
Party.[5] Fifteen states actively
produce or retain the right to produce antipersonnel mines. Stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines globally remain considerable and in some cases appear to be
unsecured. While the global trade in antipersonnel mines has collapsed, armed
non-state actors continue to have access to manufactured antipersonnel mines.
Landmine Monitor has identified at least 70 armed non-state groups that have
used antipersonnel mines in the past five years.
As an alternative to a total ban, ten states follow regulations on the use of
antipersonnel mines contained in the 1996 amendment of Protocol II of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons
(CCW).[6] Sixty-nine states are party
to both this agreement and the Mine Ban
Treaty.[7] There are 27 states that
have not joined either the Mine Ban Treaty, Protocol II, or Amended Protocol
II.[8]
Universalization
Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at
one time expressed difficulties with joining. A total of 76 states have
ratified or acceded (57 ratified and 19 acceded) to the treaty since 1 March
1999, and 67 before that date. There are nine states that have signed but not
yet ratified the treaty: Brunei, Cook Islands, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia,
Marshall Islands, Poland, Ukraine, and Vanuatu. The numbers of states that
ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for signature are as
follows: 1997 (December only)—3; 1998—55; 1999—32 (23 after 1
March); 2000—19; 2001—13; 2002—8; 2003—11; 2004 (as of
Oct.)—2.
A total of nine states joined the treaty since the publication of the
Landmine Monitor Report 2003. Guyana ratified in August 2003; Greece
ratified and Belarus, Serbia & Montenegro, and Turkey acceded in September
2003; Burundi and Sudan ratified in October 2003; Estonia acceded in May 2004;
and Papua New Guinea acceded in June 2004. Four of these states hold over 10
million stockpiled antipersonnel mines combined (Belarus, Greece, Serbia &
Montenegro, Turkey). Two are significantly mine-affected and experiencing
internal conflict in which antipersonnel mines are still being used (Burundi and
Sudan). While these are very important additions, the fact that only two
nations joined from November 2003-September 2004, despite increased
universalization efforts on the part of governments and NGOs in the lead-up to
the Nairobi Summit, is disturbing.
There are positive indications from a number of states that they will join
the treaty in the near-term. Latvia has declared that it intends to accede to
the Mine Ban Treaty by November 2004. Likewise, in June 2004, an official from
Vanuatu told States Parties that ratification should “definitely” be
completed by the opening of the Review Conference in November 2004. The
ratification process in Brunei has progressed and as of August 2004 was
reportedly in its final stage. On 10 September 2004, Bhutan formally indicated
that it intends to accede, but must wait until its national assembly next meets
in mid-2005. On 24 September 2004, the Council of Ministers in Ethiopia
reportedly approved ratification legislation and unanimously agreed to send it
to the national parliament for consideration. It was also reported in September
2004 that Poland’s Defense Ministry supported ratification of the treaty
and that the Defense Minister did not see any obstacles to beginning the process
of ratification.
There has been less encouraging progress toward ratification for the other
signatories. In March 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Haiti stated
that ratification legislation would soon be published, but this had not occurred
by September 2004. Indonesia has repeatedly stated its commitment to the Mine
Ban Treaty, but has not prioritized ratification. The government of Ukraine is
still seeking guarantees from the international community to address the
stockpile destruction issue of almost 6 million PFM mines before ratification
can proceed. No apparent progress has been made toward ratification by the Cook
Islands and Marshall Islands.
A number of other non-signatory States have made statements indicating that
they intend to eventually accede. Morocco has stressed that it is in de
facto compliance with the treaty. In February 2004, Sri Lanka set a goal of
becoming mine-free by the end of 2006 and said that it is working toward
possible accession. Also in February, Palau said it is taking every step to
make sure it will soon join the treaty. Laos is showing increasing interest in
accession and officials made positive comments at the Fifth Meeting of States
Parties in Bangkok. Mongolia has repeatedly expressed its commitment to the
ultimate goal of a total ban of landmines and a process to assess accession to
the treaty had been initiated.
One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on
antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly (UNGA)
resolutions. In December 1995, a US-proposed resolution called for the
“eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines, attracted 110
co-sponsors, and was adopted without a vote. A year later, UNGA Resolution
51/45S unambiguously called for states to pursue a legally-binding agreement to
ban the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines as
soon as possible. A total of 155 states supported the resolution, no state
voted against it, but ten states
abstained.[9] Two of the ten have
subsequently joined the treaty: Belarus and Turkey.
Beginning in 1997, the annual UNGA resolution on antipersonnel mines was
recast to indicate support for the universalization and full implementation of
the Mine Ban Treaty.[10] Many
non-States Parties consistently voted in favor of these resolutions from
1997-2003, including Armenia, Bahrain, Bhutan, Finland, Georgia, Latvia,
Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, and the United Arab
Emirates.[11] The 20 or so states
habitually abstaining in voting on the resolution have also remained relatively
consistent, including Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar
(Burma), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan, and
Vietnam. Lebanon is the only state to ever vote against a resolution, in 1999.
Tajikistan is in the anomalous position of being the only State Party to abstain
from voting, in both 2002 and 2003. The vote on the resolution in 2003 totaled
the highest number of favorable votes, 153.
Despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines,
there were discouraging actions and inactions among some of the 42 states not
party to the treaty. Most egregious, government forces in Georgia, Myanmar
(Burma), Nepal and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. In February
2004, the United States abandoned its goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in
2006, and instead indicated it would keep self-destruct and self-deactivating
antipersonnel mines in its arsenals indefinitely. On 10 September 2004, Finland
announced that it would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until 2012, six years later
than its previously stated goal.
Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program
States Parties have created an array of structures and processes to ensure
progress is made in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. These include the
intersessional work program (established in 1999); the Coordinating Committee
(2000); the Contact Groups on Universalization (1999), Articles 7 and 9 (2000),
and Resource Mobilization (2002); the Sponsorship Program (2000); and the
Implementation Support Unit (2001).
During 2003-2004, the intersessional work program, established to carry the
work of the Mine Ban Treaty forward between the annual Meetings of States
Parties, focused on the needs, gaps, and resources available for the
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The landmark “Nairobi Summit on a
Mine-Free World” formed a central focus for Standing Committees’
decision-making and planning. The intersessional meetings are unique for their
informality, inclusiveness and sense of cooperation. The ICBL and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) remained full and active
participants in the intersessional process, showing that the strong partnership
with governments continues.
The four Standing Committees—Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies;
Stockpile Destruction; and General Status and Operation of the
Convention—each met twice in 2003 and twice in 2004 at the Geneva
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in Geneva. An Action
Program endorsed at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties served as the basis for
planning for the fifth year of intersessional work. Approximately 535
participants representing 120 countries, ICBL members, and international, UN and
regional organizations attended intersessional Standing Committee meetings held
in February and June 2004.
The Coordinating Committee (CC) of the States Parties met monthly in 2003 and
2004 to discuss practical coordination matters relating to the intersessional
work program and the Mine Ban Treaty more generally. The President of the Fifth
Meeting of States Parties chairs the CC, which includes the co-chairs and
co-rapporteurs of the intersessional Standing Committees, the chairs of the ad
hoc contact groups for Universalization (Canada), Articles 7 & 9 (Belgium),
Resource Mobilization (Norway), and the Sponsorship Group (UK), and the
presidents of past and forthcoming Meetings of States Parties. The ICBL and
ICRC continued to participate in these meetings on a regular basis.
Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) became
operational in January 2002, it has more than proven its worth by ensuring
better preparations for the intersessional meetings, providing valuable support
to all interested States, serving as an information source, and contributing to
strategic thinking on how to achieve the overall goals of the treaty. The ICBL
works very closely with the ISU. The ISU together with the Sponsorship Group of
interested States Parties helps to enable full participation in the
intersessional program of mine-affected countries with limited resources.
Convention on Conventional Weapons
A total of 97 states were party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons
(CCW) as of 1 October 2004. In December 2001, States Parties to the CCW agreed
to expand the scope of the CCW to apply to internal as well as international
armed conflicts; by 1 October 2004, 35 had ratified this amendment to Article 1
of the Convention.[12] The
amendment entered into force on 18 May 2004. The States Parties also agreed to
form a Group of Governmental Experts to explore the problems posed by explosive
remnants of war (ERW) and mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM).
In December 2003, the States Parties agreed to adopt a legally binding
instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for ERW. Three states
have ratified this Protocol V so far: Sweden, Lithuania, and Sierra Leone. Work
on MOTAPM continued in 2004 as did discussions on measures to prevent specific
weapons, including cluster munitions, from becoming ERW.
A total of 80 countries were States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the
CCW, as of 1 October 2004. Amended Protocol II regulates landmines, booby-traps
and other explosive devices; it took effect on 3 December 1998. A total of 11
states have joined since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2003:
Belarus, Burkina Faso, Chile, Honduras, Malta, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Sierra
Leone, Sri Lanka, and Turkmenistan. All are States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty except Sri Lanka and Poland (a signatory). Ten of the 80 States Parties
to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland,
India, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the United
States.
Two States Parties to Amended Protocol II are known to have used
antipersonnel mines since December 1998: India and
Pakistan.[13] US forces in
Afghanistan have incorporated Soviet-era minefields into their perimeter
defense, deriving military advantage from these minefields. India, Pakistan,
and the US are obligated to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II requirements to
mark and monitor minefields to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. But
none of these countries provided detailed information on measures taken in their
annual national reports for Amended Protocol II submitted in December 2002 or
December 2003.
China and Pakistan deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability
of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex of Amended
Protocol II, until 3 December 2007. Neither country has provided detailed
information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability
requirement.
Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Belarus,
China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the
US, while India is developing such systems. Bulgaria, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the UK have destroyed their stockpiles of
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines in order to comply with Article 4 of the
Mine Ban Treaty. Belarus, Greece, and Turkey will also have to destroy their
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008.
Amended Protocol II States Parties China, Pakistan, and Ukraine have deferred
compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex. They
have up to nine years to come into full compliance with the technical
specifications. The deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and
Pakistan, and 15 May 2008 for Ukraine. Ukraine, a signatory of the Mine Ban
Treaty, is taking steps to destroy its stockpile of nearly six million PFM-type
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. India and Pakistan have reported that
new compliant remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines are being developed and
tested.
Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines
The marked drop in the use of antipersonnel mines around the globe since the
mid-1990s is without question one of the great achievements of the Mine Ban
Treaty and the movement to ban antipersonnel mines more generally.
Antipersonnel mines have been used by fewer countries and in lesser numbers than
seen from the 1960s through the early 1990s, when the global landmine crisis was
created.
Since 1999, there have been three instances in which government forces have
made very extensive use of antipersonnel mines. India and Pakistan mined their
border during a period of tensions from December 2001 to mid-2002, laying
perhaps two million or more mines. Russian forces used perhaps hundreds of
thousands of hand-emplaced and scatterable mines in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000.
Ethiopia and Eritrea laid hundreds of thousands of antipersonnel mines during
their border war from 1998 to mid-2000.
The only governments that have used mines continuously in the 1999-2004
period are Russia and Myanmar (Burma). Landmine Monitor has confirmed use of
antipersonnel mines by 16 governments at some point since
1999.[14] There is compelling
evidence that another five have used
them.[15] In looking at the trend,
Landmine Monitor Report 1999 identified confirmed use by eight
governments, and compelling evidence of use by another seven; in 2000, the
totals were eight and four; in 2001, nine and four; in 2002, nine and five, in
2003, six and three; and in 2004, three and one.
In the current reporting period (since May 2003), there is confirmed use of
antipersonnel mines by three governments: Burma/Myanmar, Nepal and Russia.
There is compelling evidence of use by one other government: Georgia.
Additionally, there have been serious allegations of ongoing use by the armed
forces of Burundi (a signatory since 1997 and a State Party since April 2004).
There have also been some reports of use in this reporting period by Cuba and
Uzbekistan.
Antipersonnel Mine Use Since May 2003
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties:In this reporting period,
Landmine Monitor has found no definitive evidence of use of antipersonnel mines
by any State Party. However, in Burundi, a number of mine incidents, as well as
statements by Burundi officials, UN representatives, and local populations, give
rise to concerns of continued mine use by the Burundi Armed Forces, though
Landmine Monitor cannot determine with certainty when the mines were laid, or by
whom. Burundi ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 22 October 2003 and became a
State Party on 1 April 2004. Burundi strongly denies any use of mines.
Mine Ban Treaty Signatories: Other than Burundi, there have not been
any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by signatories to the Mine
Ban Treaty in this reporting period.
Mine Ban Treaty Non-Signatories: The government of Nepal acknowledges
using antipersonnel mines in this reporting period, and it is clear that the
government forces in Myanmar and Russia continued to lay mines. There have been
credible reports of use by Georgian forces. There have also been isolated
reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by Cuba and Uzbekistan.
Armed Non-State Actors (NSAs): Armed opposition groups have used
antipersonnel mines in at least 16 countries in this reporting period. In some
cases this involved use of standard, factory-manufactured mines, but often
involved homemade mines, improvised explosive devices and explosive booby-traps.
Mine use by NSAs was reported in the following States Parties: Bolivia, Burundi,
Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, and Uganda.
NSAs used antipersonnel mines in these non-States Parties: Bhutan,
Burma/Myanmar, Georgia, India, Iraq, Nepal, Russia (in Chechnya and North
Ossetia), and Somalia.
Use of antipersonnel mines by NSAs is cited in four countries for the first
time since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999: Bolivia, Bhutan, Iraq and
Peru. Renewed use of antipersonnel mines by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
has returned Turkey to the list, and fresh evidence of use by the Lord’s
Resistance Army has returned Uganda to the list.
The use of antipersonnel mines by Non-State Actors in 16 countries in this
reporting period compares to reported NSA use in 11 countries in Landmine
Monitor Report 2003, 14 countries in Landmine Monitor Report 2002,
and 18 countries in Landmine Monitor Reports 2001, 2000, and
1999.
Sporadic and small-scale use, including by criminals, was reported in
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Serbia and Montenegro.
Initiation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines
In Sudan, Landmine Monitor has received reports in 2004 of use of
antipersonnel mines by government-supported militias in Upper Nile. In the DR
Congo, the Army accused insurgent troops of new mine use when their forces took
the town of Bukavu in May/June 2004.
In Bolivia, there were numerous incidents involving the use of Improvised
Explosive Devices by cocaleros (coca leaf-growing farmers). In Peru, in June and
July 2003, the media reported that the Shining Path had used landmines in
various villages in the department of Ayacucho, Huanta province. According to
some media sources, Cuba has planted mines in the wake of the US invasion of
Iraq and increased tensions with the US.
In Nepal, there were no confirmed instances of new mine use by security
forces or Maoist rebels during the cease-fire from January to August 2003, but
in the wake of renewed fighting since then, both sides are again laying mines or
improvised explosive devices in significant numbers. In Bhutan, Indian rebels
are reported to have used antipersonnel mines during a Bhutanese military
offensive to oust them in December 2003.
In Georgia, a group of insurgents in Ajaria province reportedly laid
landmines in 2004. In February 2004, Kyrgyzstan accused Uzbekistan of
replanting mines in areas that Kyrgyzstan had recently cleared. In Turkey, the
government reported that in 2004, attacks by the PKK increased, including use of
mines; this is the first time in several years the PKK has been accused of
laying mines.
Since August 2003, Iraqi insurgents have greatly increased their use of
improvised explosive devices.
Ongoing and Increased Use of Antipersonnel Mines
In Burundi, FNL rebel forces have continued to use antipersonnel mines, and
there have been continued allegations and indicators of use of antipersonnel
mines by government forces as well. In Uganda, the government has stated that
the Lord’s Resistance Army has continued to lay antipersonnel mines in the
north in 2003 and 2004. Various factions in Somalia continued to lay landmines,
impeding the initiation of any mine action activities.
It appears that rebel and paramilitary forces in Colombia are among the most
prolific users of antipersonnel mines in the world. In 2003 and 2004, the use
of mines, especially by FARC, continued at a significant level.
Myanmar’s military and at least 15 rebel groups have continued to use
antipersonnel mines; there are some indications of increased mine warfare. In
India there continue to be numerous reports of armed NSAs using improvised
explosive devices, and sometimes landmines, including insurgent groups in Jammu
and Kashmir and Naxalite militants in Central and Eastern Indian states. In the
Philippines, the rebel New People’s Army and Abu Sayyaf Group used
improvised landmines; the armed forces also accused the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, which denied laying mines. In Pakistan, antivehicle mines and improvised
explosive devices have been used in tribal conflicts and against government law
enforcement agencies, most notably in Baluchistan. In Afghanistan there have
been some reports indicating new use of antipersonnel mines by Taliban or other
opposition forces.
Russian forces and Chechen fighters continued to use antipersonnel mines. The
rebels who seized the school in Beslan, North Ossetia in 2004 with disastrous
consequences emplaced both antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices
throughout the school. Despite a formal moratorium on use of antipersonnel
mines, it appears that Georgian forces have used antipersonnel several years in
a row, in various locations. In September 2004, the OSCE expressed concern
about new mine-laying by both Georgian and South Ossetian forces.
Use of Antipersonnel Mines Since May 2003*
Africa
Americas
Asia/Pacific
Europe/
Central Asia
Middle East/
North Africa
Burundi:
rebels
DR Congo:
NSAs
Somalia:
various factions
Uganda:
LRA rebels
Bolivia:
NSAs
Colombia: FARC and other rebels, AUCparamilitaries
Peru:
Shining Path rebels
Bhutan:
Indian rebels
Burma/Myanmar: government and 15 rebel groups
India: rebels
Nepal: government and Maoist rebels
Philippines:
rebels
Georgia: government and NSAs
Russia: government and rebels (in Chechnya and North Ossetia)
Turkey:
PKK rebels
Iraq:
NSAs
* In addition, there have been serious allegations of use by government
troops in Burundi and government-backed militia in Sudan. There were also
reports of new use by Cuba and Uzbekistan.
Key Developments Since 1999
Cessation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines
Since 1999, government and rebel forces in three of the most mine-affected
countries in the world have foresworn use. Use stopped in Afghanistan (aside
from sporadic instances) with the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, in Sri Lanka
with the cease-fires in December 2001, and in Angola with the peace agreement in
April 2002.
Mine Use in Africa
Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but acknowledged that
it continued to use antipersonnel landmines until the peace agreement signed
with UNITA forces in April 2002; UNITA forces also used mines until the
agreement. There have been credible, though unconfirmed, allegations of
antipersonnel landmine use by the Burundi Army throughout the period since 1999.
The government has strongly denied the charges. Rebels have admitted to using
antipersonnel mines in Burundi. Since 1999, many armed forces have been accused
of using antipersonnel mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including
those of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. All have denied it. There were serious
and credible allegations indicating a strong possibility of Ugandan use of
antipersonnel mines in the DRC, particularly in the June 2000 battle for
Kisangani; Uganda was already a State Party at the time.
In Sudan, from 1999-2002, Landmine Monitor reported serious allegations about
use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, the SPLM/A and other rebel
groups. The government has consistently denied any use. During their
1998–2000 border conflict, Eritrean forces laid an estimated 240,000
mines, and Ethiopian forces laid an estimated 150,000 to 200,000. Eritrea has
admitted to using mines, but Ethiopia has been reluctant to do so.
Mine Use in the Americas
Landmines have been used more extensively in Colombia than anywhere else in
the Americas; at many points since 1999, Colombia has been the only location in
the hemisphere where mines were being used. FARC guerrillas have been the main
users, but other guerrilla groups as well as the AUC paramilitaries are also
responsible. The government reports very significant increases in use in 2003
and 2004; the number of mine-affected municipalities increased from 125 in 1999
to 422 in 2003.
In its 2002 and 2003 Article 7 reports, Venezuela revealed that it had laid
antipersonnel mines in May 1998, five months after signing the Mine Ban Treaty,
but prior to entry-into-force. Similarly, in its Article 7 report, Ecuador
revealed that it laid antipersonnel mines from 1995 to 1998, confirming mine use
after it had signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997, but prior to
entry-into-force. The United States apparently did not use antipersonnel mines
in Iraq in 2003, and according to the government’s statements, has not
used antipersonnel mines since the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Mine Use in Asia/Pacific
In Afghanistan, the Taliban declared an end to the use of mines in 1998, but
began using them again in 2001 after the Coalition invasion. The Northern
Alliance used landmines throughout the period since 1999. During the military
operations in late 2001 and 2002, Northern Alliance, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda
fighters all used landmines and booby-traps. There has been continuous use of
antipersonnel mines in Burma (Myanmar) since 1999 by Myanmar’s military
and at least 15 rebel groups. It appears that mine warfare has increased during
much of the period.
India’s massive mine-laying operation on its border in late 2001 and
early 2002 was characterized as one of the biggest in years or decades anywhere
in the world; apparently millions of mines were emplaced. Pakistan also laid
large numbers of mines at that time. In Nepal, government forces and Maoist
rebels have used antipersonnel landmines and improvised explosive devises in the
internal conflict since 1996. The Maoists have used mines/IEDs much more
extensively than security forces. The use of mines and IEDs increased every
year from 1999 to 2002, until the cease-fire which lasted from January to August
2003. Since then, both sides are again laying mines or IEDs in significant
numbers. All 75 districts are now affected, compared to four in 1999. The
government did not officially acknowledge using mines until 2002.
In Sri Lanka, increased fighting in 2000 and 2001 with the LTTE rebels
resulted in increased use of antipersonnel mines by both sides, increased
military and civilian mine casualties, and the termination of UN mine action
programs. Fighting stopped in December 2001 and a formal cease-fire agreement
came into force in February 2002. There have been no confirmed reports of new
use of mines by either government or LTTE forces since December 2001.
Mine Use in Europe/Central Asia
During the 1999 crisis in Kosovo, Yugoslav forces laid significant numbers of
antipersonnel mines, and the NATO bombing campaign left extensive contamination
from cluster bomblets and other UXO. Over the past five years, the most
extensive antipersonnel mine use in Europe and Central Asia has consistently
been in Chechnya, by both Russian forces and Chechen fighters. Since 1999,
Russia has also deployed mines inside Tajikistan along its Afghan border, and in
its pursuit of rebels, Russia dropped mines on Georgia on at least two
occasions.
Uzbekistan has laid antipersonnel mines on its borders with Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, and both governments have accused Uzbekistan of emplacing mines
across the border in their territory. Kyrgyzstan used landmines in 1999 and
2000 to prevent infiltration across its border with Tajikistan. It appears that
Georgian Armed Forces have used antipersonnel mines each year from 2001-2004,
despite repeated government denials and Georgia’s 1996 moratorium on the
use of antipersonnel mines. Abkhazian troops have also mined contested
territory. In addition, private armed groups from Georgia have infiltrated into
Abkhazia and laid antipersonnel mines.
Mine Use in the Middle East/North Africa
Saddam Hussein's forces used antipersonnel mines in the lead-up to and during
the conflict in Iraq in early 2003. Iraqi forces planted mines extensively, and
also abandoned caches of weapons that included landmines, in many parts of the
country. There were also reports of the PKK using landmines in northern Iraq in
1999. Israel acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in South Lebanon prior to
its withdrawal from the area in 2000, and there were allegations of use in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories until 2002. There have been allegations of
Palestinian mine use as well.
Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines
More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel
mines.[16] This number has been
dramatically and permanently reduced in recent years due in large part to the
public outcry against the continued production of the weapon. Thirty-six states
have formally renounced and ceased the production of antipersonnel mines.
[17] This includes three countries
that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Finland, Israel, and
Poland.[18] Taiwan has also stopped
production. Twenty-three treaty members have reported on the status of programs
for the conversion or de-commissioning of antipersonnel mine production
facilities.[19] Since it began
reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor has removed Turkey and FR Yugoslavia (now
Serbia and Montenegro) from its list of producers.
Among those who have stopped manufacturing are a majority of the big
producers from the 1970s to mid-1990s; with the notable exceptions of the China,
Russia and the United States, the biggest producers and exporters from the past
35 years are now States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[20] Landmine Monitor
identifies 15 countries that continue to produce, or retain the right to
produce, antipersonnel landmines. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following
admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state
factories. This was the first time that the number of antipersonnel mine
producers has increased since Landmine Monitor reporting started in 1999.
Antipersonnel Landmine Producers
Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, South Korea,
Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States, Vietnam
India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel
mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW, including new
remotely delivered mine systems. Officials in Singapore and Vietnam admit that
the production of antipersonnel mines is on-going. Burma, Cuba, and North Korea
have made no public confirmation or denial of production activity since
1999.
In some cases it is unclear if production lines were active between 1999 and
2004. Egypt has unofficially stated that it ceased production in 1988. While
the US has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997, two research and
development programs are under way that could result in the resumption of
production in 2007. South Korea has stated it has not produced any mines since
2000. An official from China stated in September 2003 that no production is
occurring there. Production of certain types of antipersonnel mines by Russia
has apparently stopped.
In September 2002, Iran said it had not produced antipersonnel mines since
the end of its war with Iraq in 1988. Landmine Monitor reported in 2001,
however, that demining organizations in Afghanistan were encountering hundreds
of Iran-manufactured antipersonnel mines with production stamps of 1999 and
2000.
An Iraqi diplomat told Landmine Monitor in February 2004 that production
continued in recent years, including during the lead-up to the invasion in 2003.
Since the coalition occupation of Iraq, any industrial production of
antipersonnel mines has, presumably, ceased. Landmine Monitor will keep Iraq on
the list of producers until a new government officially renounces antipersonnel
mine production.
On the positive side, the investment community in several countries has taken
up the recommendations of NGOs to further stigmatize the production of the
antipersonnel mines. Several North American and European socially responsible
investment managers have created filters that preclude their funds from
investing in publicly traded companies associated with antipersonnel mine
production. The Norwegian Petroleum Fund removed Singapore Technologies Ltd.
from its investment portfolio in 2002, due to the company’s involvement in
production of antipersonnel mines.
Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines
A de facto global ban on the transfer or export of antipersonnel mines
has been in effect since 1996. This ban is directly attributable to the mine
ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon, the unilateral actions of
key countries, and the subsequent implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Landmine Monitor has not documented any state-to-state transfers or exports and
antipersonnel mines since then. It is believed that the trade in antipersonnel
mines has dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged
trade.
A significant number of states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted or
extended export moratoria in the past five years including China, India, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United
States. In addition, representatives of Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam have claimed
not to export antipersonnel mines, but no formal unilateral prohibition has been
put into place. While there is no evidence of transfers by them since 1999,
Burma, Nepal, and North Korea still produce antipersonnel mines and apparently
do not observe any restrictions on transfers or exports.
Questions remain about exports from Iran. Newly produced Iranian
antipersonnel mines were found in Afghanistan in 2001 and others were
intercepted en-route to Palestine. An export moratorium was instituted by Iran
in 1997, but it is not known if it is still formally in effect.
The scope of the now defunct global landmine trade is reflected in Mine Ban
Treaty transparency reports. Of the over 48 million stockpiled antipersonnel
mines declared so far by 80 States Parties, 29 million antipersonnel mines
appear to have been domestically produced, 13.6 million were inherited, and 6
million were imported from other
countries.[21] Successor states of
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia that are now States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty inherited 11.3 million and 2.3 million antipersonnel mines
respectively.[22] Three exporting
states account for the vast majority of the imported antipersonnel mines
declared by States Parties between 1999 and 2004: United States (1.7 million),
China (1.4 million), and Russia/USSR (1.06 million). Another 22 countries
contributed to the stockpiles of States
Parties.[23]
There are a number of instances of possible continuing illicit trade
involving antipersonnel mines. According to a media account, in May 2003, a
Panamanian court imprisoned four Panamanians and three Colombians for attempting
to import into Colombia weapons acquired in Nicaragua, which included thirteen
Russian antipersonnel mines. In July 2003, the head of the Transitional
National Government in Somalia accused Ethiopia of supplying arms, including
landmines, to Somali factions; Ethiopia dismissed the claim. A 2003 report to
the UN Security Council said that landmines had been shipped from Yemen and
Ethiopia to Somalia. A media report in November 2002 claimed that Turkish
customs officials had detained a truck containing a large load of weapons,
including antipersonnel mines, at the border with Georgia, allegedly coming from
Kazakhstan. There were also reports of attempts by Pakistan Ordnance Factories
to sell antipersonnel mines to British journalists posing as representatives of
private companies in both November 1999 and April 2002.
In July 2004, the United States announced its intent to pursue negotiations
on an international ban on the sale or export of non-self-destructing landmines
in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. Canada noted that the 42 CD
member states that are already part of the Mine Ban Treaty “will not be in
a position to enter negotiations on a lesser ban, aimed at arresting trade in
one category of antipersonnel mines alone but implying the acceptability of
trade in other categories of these
weapons.”[24] The CD has not
been able to agree on its agenda since 1997.
Transfers for Purposes Permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty permits the transfer of antipersonnel mines
for the purpose of their destruction or for training and research needs. In the
past five years, Denmark, Netherlands, United States, and Taiwan have
transferred antipersonnel mines to companies in Germany for destruction.
Ecuador and Romania reported transferring antipersonnel mines to the United
States, a non-State Party, for demining research and training purposes. Canada,
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and possibly Sweden reported
acquiring foreign antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes.
Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction
At the time when the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and entered into force, a
staggering 131 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million
antipersonnel mines. This stunning global total has been significantly reduced
due in large part to five years of implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and the
widespread rejection of the weapon, even among states not party to the ban on
antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor estimates that there are approximately
200 million antipersonnel mines currently stockpiled by 67 countries. In this
Landmine Monitor reporting period, some four million stockpiled antipersonnel
mines were destroyed, bringing the global total to about 62 million in recent
years.
States Parties
A total of 78 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty reported holding
stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Of these States Parties, 65 have completed
the destruction of their stockpiles. In this Landmine Monitor reporting period,
since May 2003, Argentina, Chile, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lithuania,
Mauritius, Romania, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay, and Venezuela reached this milestone. The
remaining 13 States Parties that have reported stockpiles have either started
destruction or are in the planning
process.[25]
States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 37.3 million
antipersonnel mines.[26] Italy
destroyed the most mines (7.1 million), followed by Turkmenistan (6.6 million).
Others destroying more than one million antipersonnel mines included: Albania,
France, Germany, Japan, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Landmine Monitor estimates that 18 States Parties currently stockpile at
least 11 million antipersonnel
mines.[27] This number has
fluctuated over the years as mine stockpiles are destroyed and states with
significant stockpiles join the treaty. For example, over 10 million newly
declared antipersonnel mines are now required to be destroyed since Belarus (4.6
million), Greece (1.56 million), Serbia and Montenegro (1.32 million), and
Turkey (3.04 million) all joined the treaty in September 2003.
A total of 51 States Parties reported that they did not possess stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and
training purposes.[28] Since May
2003, Cote d’Ivoire, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Solomon Islands, and
Timor-Leste have officially confirmed that they do not possess stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines.
Fourteen States Parties need to officially declare the presence or absence of
stockpiles; only three of these have informally indicated that they possess
stocks to be destroyed (Guyana, Serbia & Montenegro, and
Turkey).[29]
Signatories
Landmine Monitor estimates that five signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty
stockpile 7-8 million antipersonnel mines. The majority of these mines are held
by Ukraine (5.95 million) and Poland (996,860). Ukraine destroyed 404,000
conventional antipersonnel mines with NATO support between July 2002 and May
2003 and now only PFM-type scatterable antipersonnel mines remain in stocks.
Poland dismantled 58,291 POMZ-2(2M) mines due to the expiry of their shelf-life
during 2003. Indonesia in May 2002 revealed it has a stockpile of 16,000
antipersonnel mines. Ethiopia also likely holds stockpiles and Brunei has
acknowledged possessing antipersonnel mines (possibly Claymore-type only). It
is unlikely that the four other signatories stockpile antipersonnel mines (Cook
Islands, Haiti, Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu).
Non-States Parties
Landmine Monitor estimates that the greatest numbers of antipersonnel mines,
between 180 million and 185 million, are stockpiled by states not party to the
Mine Ban Treaty. The majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states:
China (estimated 110 million), Russia (estimated 50
million)[30] and the United States
(10.4 million). Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated
6 million), India (estimated 4-5 million), and South Korea (2 million). Other
states not party to the treaty believed to have large stockpiles are Burma,
Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Syria, and Vietnam.
Non-States Parties have destroyed significant numbers of stockpiled
antipersonnel mines in recent years. Some have chosen to take this action as a
confidence building measure prior to fully joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Others
have destroyed antipersonnel mines that were not in compliance with the
technical requirements of CCW Amended Protocol II. For others, the destruction
of stockpiles reflects routine ammunition management practice. Russia
surprisingly reported in 2003 that it had destroyed 16.8 million antipersonnel
mines from 1996 to 2002. Russian military sources told Landmine Monitor that
Russia destroyed another 1.85 million antipersonnel mines in 2003. The United
States completed destroying over 3.3 million non-self-destructing M14 and M16
antipersonnel mines in 1998. In late 1999, China reported that it had destroyed
over 1.7 million old antipersonnel mines. Between 1992 and January 2004,
Belarus, prior to becoming a State Party, destroyed an estimated 300,000
antipersonnel mines without any international assistance, including
approximately 223,000 mines in 2003 alone.
In addition to governments, many armed non-state actors also have stockpiles
of antipersonnel mines, including groups in Afghanistan, Burma, Chechnya,
Colombia, DR Congo, Iraq, Kashmir, Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda.
Fulfilling Obligations under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty
An important milestone in the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was
reached on 1 March 2003: the four-year deadline for destruction of stockpiled
antipersonnel mines for all states that were party to the treaty when it first
entered into force on 1 March 1999. States Parties are obligated to destroy
stockpiles under their jurisdiction and control four years after entry into
force of the treaty for that state.
It would appear that all States Parties with a 1 March 2003 deadline met
their obligation, with the minor exception of Djibouti, which was two days late,
and an issue of serious concern regarding Turkmenistan.
Turkmenistan notified the United Nations that it completed destruction of its
antipersonnel mine stockpiles on 28 February 2003, except for 69,200 mines
retained for training purposes. Turkmenistan’s decision to retain such a
large number of mines was roundly criticized in the international community and
engendered claims that Turkmenistan was violating both Article 3 by retaining an
excessive number of mines for training, and Article 4 for still holding an
operational stockpile after the destruction deadline. In a reversal announced
11 February 2004, Turkmenistan said it had started to destroy 60,000 of the
antipersonnel mines retained for training; it later indicated that all 69,200
mines would be destroyed by the end of 2004.
Since this 1 March 2003 milestone passed, all States Parties, except one,
have met their respective deadlines; all are now in compliance with this
important arms control aspect of the Mine Ban Treaty. Guinea did not meet its
stockpile destruction deadline of 1 April 2003. A significant amount of
uncertainty and contradictory information existed about whether Guinea possessed
a stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the date its initial transparency
measures report was due (1 September 1999) until it submitted a report on 24
June 2004. The report revealed that Guinea destroyed 3,174 antipersonnel mines
between 26 September and 11 November 2003, six months past its deadline.
The Mine Ban Treaty requires that States destroy their stockpiles “as
soon as possible,” but no later than four years after entry into force.
Most States Parties completed the destruction of their stockpiles a year or more
before their deadline:
Twelve States Parties destroyed their stockpiles prior to entry into force
of the treaty: Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Guatemala, Germany,
Luxembourg, Mali, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, and South Africa;
Twenty-two States Parties destroyed their stockpiles more than two years
ahead of their deadline: Albania, Australia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Chile, Republic of Congo, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Gabon, Honduras,
Hungary, Lithuania, Malaysia, Moldova, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain, Suriname,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe;
Six States Parties destroyed their stockpiles between one and two years
ahead of their deadline: Ecuador, Kenya, Peru, Romania, Sweden, and Uruguay;
Twenty-two States Parties destroyed their stockpiles in the year before
their deadline: Argentina, Brazil, Chad, Croatia, El Salvador, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, FYR Macedonia, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Portugal, Slovenia,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Venezuela, and
Yemen.
A number of States Parties, including Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia,
Chad, and Croatia have reported discovering and destroying previously unknown
stockpiles of antipersonnel mines after formally completing their destruction
programs. The Mine Ban Treaty does not explicitly deal with this phenomenon.
The ICBL has stressed the importance of timely destruction of these newly found
mines, no later than one year after discovery, and has urged complete
transparency about numbers and types discovered and the destruction process.
The costs of stockpile destruction have varied greatly, depending on the
types of mines in stockpile, their location, and the amount of transport and
preparation necessary to destroy the mines. Most States Parties have chosen to
dispose of their stockpiles by open detonation or open burning techniques.
Others have disassembled the mines for recovery of materials as a way to
demilitarize part or all of their stockpiles.
There are examples in the past five years of armed non-state actors getting
access to factory-manufactured stockpiled antipersonnel mines. For example,
several types of Russian antipersonnel mines were among the weapons used by
Chechen insurgents during the disastrous siege at a school in Beslan, North
Ossetia in early September 2004. Significant supplies of unsecured conventional
weapons and ammunition are now quite common in conflict zones including
Afghanistan, DR Congo, Iraq, and Somalia. Antipersonnel mines among these
stocks will continue to pose a threat for years to come if they remain unsecured
and available to non-state actors.
Mines Retained for Training and Research
Declaring a stockpile of antipersonnel mines obligates a state to destroy it
within four years, with a permissible exception under Article 3 for the minimum
number of mines absolutely necessary to develop and train in mine detection,
mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques. The ICBL has urged that all
states should declare the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel
mines retained under Article 3. During the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and during
Standing Committee discussions from 1999-2004, most States Parties have agreed
that the minimum number of mines retained should number in the hundreds or
thousands or less, but not tens of thousands. The ICBL believes that states
that retain thousands of antipersonnel mines and apparently do not use any of
these mines for permitted purposes abuse the exception permitted by Article 3.
Of the current 143 States Parties, 66 retain over 233,000 antipersonnel mines
for training and research purposes under Article 3. At least 62 have chosen not
to retain any mines. New additions to this latter group since May 2003 include
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lithuania, Mauritius, and Timor-Leste. A total of 17
States Parties once possessed stockpiles but have chosen not to retain any
mines.[31] Fifteen States Parties
have not made clear if they intend to retain any
mines.[32]
Only four States Parties accounted for nearly a third of all retained mines:
Brazil (16,545), Sweden (15,706), Algeria (15,030), and Bangladesh (15,000).
Brazil reported the destruction of 455 mines between March 2000 and December
2001. Sweden has fully reported on the intended purposes and actual uses of
retained mines, but the number of mines retained by a private company is greater
than initially reported thus increasing Sweden’s totals. Algeria and
Bangladesh have not detailed the intended purposes or requirements for retaining
so many antipersonnel mines. Turkey has indicated to Landmine Monitor its
intention to retain 16,000 antipersonnel mines, but it has not submitted its
initial transparency measures report as of 1 October 2004.
A total of eight States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines:
Namibia, (9,997), Japan (8,359), Belarus (7,530), Australia (7,465), Greece
(7,224), Croatia (6,478), Chile (6,245), and Tunisia (5,000). Namibia, Belarus,
and Greece joined this list in 2004.
A total of 34 States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000
mines.[33] Nigeria (3,364 retained
mines) and Angola (1,390 retained mines) are notable additions to this group
since May 2003. Another 20 States Parties retain less than 1,000
mines.[34] Joining this group in
this reporting period are the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Suriname.
One encouraging trend is the significant number of States Parties that have
reduced the number of mines retained from high levels originally proposed.
Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Italy,
Lithuania, Mauritania, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Zambia have taken this step
between March 1999 and September 2004. Nine of these States Parties originally
intended to retain 10,000 mines or
more.[35] On 11 August 2004,
Ecuador destroyed 1,970 of the 3,970 antipersonnel mines previously retained for
training. Venezuela intends to destroy 3,960 mines by October 2004, leaving
1,000 mines for training.
A total of 17 States Parties reported consuming 3,112 mines for training and
research in 2003. In 2002, 16 States Parties reported consuming 2,540 mines in
2002. At least 26 States apparently did not consume any retained mines in 2003:
Bangladesh, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Republic of
Congo, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, El Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, Italy,
Jordan, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Similarly, 29
States Parties did not report consuming any in 2002. Too many states retain
thousands of mines without any evidence of consuming those mines for permitted
purposes or plans stated for their intended and actual use. Retained stockpiles
of this scale without a declared plan or evidence of actual consumption of the
mines raises the specter that these States Parties possess a residual
operational stockpile of antipersonnel mines.
Chad, Lithuania, Mauritius, and Turkmenistan have reconsidered their
retention of mines and now have chosen not to retain any live mines. In
contrast, El Salvador, Hungary, and Mozambique changed their initial decision
not to keep any mines and subsequently retained mines. Against the trend of
reducing the numbers of mines retained, Bosnia & Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia,
and Sweden have actually increased their holdings significantly.
Transparency Reporting
As of 1 October 2004, the UN has received initial Article 7 transparency
measures reports from 129 States Parties. The overall compliance rate of States
Parties submitting initial transparency reports is an impressive 91 percent, up
from 88 percent reported last year, 75 percent reported in 2002, and 63 percent
reported in 2001. A total of 14 States Parties have submitted initial reports
since May 2003: Angola, Belarus, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Eritrea, Greece,
Guinea, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname, and
Timor-Leste.
Through concerted efforts to promote full transparency, the number of late
initial reports has dramatically declined. As of 1 October 2004, a total of 12
States Parties were late in submitting their initial report: Burundi, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Liberia, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia and Montenegro,
Sudan, and Turkey. This number has been significantly reduced over the past
five years: Landmine Monitor Report 2003 reported that 15 States Parties
were late in submitting their initial reports; the 2002 edition listed 30 states
being late; in 2001 the number was 37; and in 2000 the number of late reports
was 36.
Equatorial Guinea (due date 28 August 1999), St. Lucia (29 March 2000), and
Liberia (28 November 2000) can only be considered grossly non-compliant in
fulfilling the treaty’s transparency obligation. All three have passed
their deadlines for destroying any stockpiled antipersonnel mines (respectively,
1 March 2003, 1 October 2003 and 1 June 2004), but have not informed States
Parties of compliance with this core obligation.
States Parties have commendably improved the rate of annual updates submitted
for the previous calendar year. As of 1 October 2004, the rate of compliance
for annual reports due on 30 April 2004 for calendar year 2003 was 78 percent.
The rate for calendar year 2002 was 62 percent. Of the 27 States Parties not
submitting an annual update in 2004, 15 of them also did not submit reports in
2003. Eight States Parties have not submitted annual updates for any subsequent
years after submitting their initial reports in 1999 or 2000: Andorra, Antigua
& Barbuda, Bolivia, Botswana, Madagascar, St. Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland,
and Trinidad & Tobago.
In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban
Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Cameroon in 2001
and Lithuania in 2002 when they were signatories. Non-State Party Latvia and
signatory Poland submitted initial reports in 2003 and annual updates in 2004.
Other non-States Parties have announced their intention of voluntarily
submitting a transparency report in the future, including Sri Lanka and the
Ukraine.
Belgium has coordinated an informal contact group aimed at promoting
transparency reporting since 2000. In November 2002, Belgium hosted a seminar
in Brussels for African countries on transparency reporting under Article 7.
The NGO VERTIC, in cooperation with the ICBL and the ICRC, developed the
“Guide to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention.”
National Implementation Measures
Only 40 of 143 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the
Mine Ban Treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article
9.[36] This is an increase of five
States Parties since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003:
Belize, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Seychelles, South Africa, and Zambia.
A total of 27 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are
underway.[37] Those initiating the
process in the past year include DR Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, and Guinea.
However, legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years
in Benin, Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Swaziland, and
Uganda.
A total of 34 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new
law is required to implement the
treaty.[38] Belarus and Chile
joined this category in the past year. The Dominican Republic, Holy See,
Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Qatar believe that no steps are necessary
because they have never produced, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines and
are not mine-affected. The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all
states to pass legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential
future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all
aspects of the treaty.
Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 42 States Parties to enact
appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban
Treaty.[39] States Parties where
antipersonnel mines have been used remain the greatest concern: Afghanistan,
Angola, Argentina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Cyprus, Ecuador,
Eritrea, Greece, and Serbia and Montenegro.
The ICRC has produced an “Information Kit on the Development of
National Legislation to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of
Anti-Personnel Mines.” This kit is available from the ICRC in English,
French, and Spanish and is also available on the
Internet.[40]
Special Issues of Concern
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force, the ICBL has consistently
raised questions about how States Parties interpret and implement certain
aspects of Articles 1, 2, and 3. In particular, the ICBL has expressed concerns
regarding the issues of joint military operations with non-States Parties, the
prohibition on “assist,” foreign stockpiling and transit of
antipersonnel mines, mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices, and
the permissible number of mines retained for training and development purposes.
(The latter issue, related to Article 3, has been discussed above). The ICBL
has pointed out that some States Parties have diverged from the predominant
legal interpretation and predominant State practice on these matters. The ICBL
and ICRC have urged States Parties to reach common understandings on these
matters, in order to eliminate ambiguity and preserve the integrity of the
treaty.
Discussions on Articles 1, 2, and 3 have occurred at every Meeting of States
Parties and during every intersessional week. The need to promote further
clarity on how States Parties fulfill their obligations on these issues has been
repeatedly recognized, including in the Final Report and President’s
Action Program agreed upon at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok in
September 2003. The Final Report states that “the meeting called upon
States parties to continue to share information and views, particularly with
respect to Articles 1, 2, and 3, with a view to developing understandings on
various matters by the First Review Conference.”
Despite efforts by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on General Status
and Operation of the Convention at the February and June 2004 intersessional
meetings, a number of States Parties remained opposed to reaching understandings
or conclusions on Articles 1, 2 and 3 before or during the Review
Conference.
Joint Military Operations and the Meaning of “Assist”(Article
1)
Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates States Parties to
“never under any circumstances...assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention.” There has been a lack of clarity, however, regarding what
types of acts are permitted or banned within the context of the prohibition on
assistance, especially during joint military operations with non-States Parties
that may use antipersonnel mines.
States have recognized the need to address this issue and to share views on
policy and practice. Over the past five years of treaty implementation, an
understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the
meaning of “assist” has begun to emerge. A total of 35 States
Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and
implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint
operations. Kenya, Tanzania, Turkey, and Zambia provided new statements since
the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report
2003.[41] Australia, Czech
Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe, and most recently
Zambia have interpreted participation as “active” or
“direct,” but each country’s understanding of what constitutes
“active” or “direct” assistance varies. Brazil, Mexico,
and the United Kingdom would reject participation in joint operations if its
military forces derived direct military benefit from antipersonnel mine use.
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and United Kingdom would reject rules of
engagement permitting antipersonnel mine use or orders to use antipersonnel
mines. Norway obtains written precondition for placing forces under the command
of a non-State Party.
Though often discussed in terms of potential US use of antipersonnel mines in
NATO operations, this is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. It
appears that a number of States Parties in Africa have engaged in military
operations with (or in support of) armed forces or armed non-state actors that
may be using antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period, Landmine Monitor
raises serious concerns about Rwanda’s possible assistance to rebels in
the DR Congo that are using antipersonnel mines, and about Sudan’s support
for militia in the South who have also been accused of using antipersonnel
mines. In the past, Landmine Monitor has expressed concern with regard to
Namibia (assisting Angola against UNITA), as well as Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe
assisting various forces in the DR Congo. All have denied any activities that
contravene the Mine Ban Treaty.
US-led coalition military operations in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 and Iraq in
2003 made the issue of joint operations a concrete reality for many. States
Parties Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain and
the United Kingdom contributed either ground forces that engaged in combat
operations or peacekeepers for one or both conflicts. Other States Parties
participated in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan,
commanded at various periods by the United Kingdom and Turkey (then a non-State
Party), and now operating under NATO command. There is no evidence that any
Coalition troops or peacekeepers, including those of non-States Parties, have
used antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan or Iraq. Australia, Canada, Germany,
Italy, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain used this circumstance to publicly
reiterate their operational understanding of their obligations under the Mine
Ban Treaty in joint operations with non-States Parties.
Some States Parties made new policy statements or announced concrete steps
taken nationally on these issues since publication of the Landmine Monitor
Report 2003. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included
here, see individual country reports for details.
In comments to Landmine Monitor in August 2004, Australia said, “The
Australian Defence Force’s activities in military coalitions conducted
with non-Ottawa States are governed by rules of engagement which comply, without
exception, with the terms of the Convention (including the Declaration made by
Australia when depositing its instrument of ratification) as incorporated into
domestic legislation by the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Act
1998.”
The Ministry of Defense of Croatia confirmed in April 2004 that its soldiers
are not allowed to use or assist in the use of antipersonnel mines within
Croatia or in other countries, including those not party to the Mine Ban
Treaty.
At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Italy confirmed previous statements
that national legislation permits joint military activities with non-States
Parties only if the activities are compatible with Article 1 of the Mine Ban
Treaty. The armed forces “continue to receive strict instructions to
abstain from participating in actions contrary to the letter and spirit of the
Ottawa Convention.”
Kenya’s draft implementation bill does not permit the military to
participate in joint operations or drills where antipersonnel mines are being
used. The government reiterated this position in interventions on Article 1 at
the February 2004 Standing Committee meeting on General Status and Operation of
the Convention, and urged that in order to embrace the spirit of the ban treaty,
it was necessary for States Parties to review the status and contents of
memoranda of understanding allowing for joint operations.
Serbia and Montenegro submitted a formal declaration with its instrument of
accession stating that, “it is the understanding of Serbia and Montenegro
that the mere participation in the planning or conduct of operations, exercises
or any other military activities by the armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro,
or by any of its nationals, if carried out in conjunction with armed forces of
the non-States Parties (to the Convention), which engage in activities
prohibited under the Convention, does not in any way imply an assistance,
encouragement or inducement as referred to in subparagraph 1 (c) of the
Convention.”
The Spanish government, in response to a parliamentarian’s question,
said that Spanish military personnel were forbidden to use antipersonnel mines
under any circumstances, that operations in which antipersonnel mines are used
will not be planned, directed or carried out, and that no forces under Spanish
command will use antipersonnel mines other than under the exceptions allowed by
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Tanzania informed the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of
the Convention that it does not subscribe to the use of antipersonnel mines in
joint operations and would not provide assistance “to anyone in activities
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Similarly, in its
June 2004 Article 7 report, Tanzania states, “Since the United Republic of
Tanzania became a party to ‘The Landmine Ban Treaty of 1997,’ the
state has not used any type of APMs on either joint military operations or
provision of assistance to anyone in activities prohibited to a state party
under this convention.”
According to its diplomatic mission in Geneva, Turkey will not permit the
use of antipersonnel mines in Turkey by other States during joint military
operations.
Zambia’s new national legislation says that members of its armed
forces can participate in operations or other military activities with the armed
forces of a State not party to the Convention, “Provided that the
operation, exercise or military activity is not in contravention of the
Convention and that such participation does not amount to active assistance in
any activity prohibited by the Convention and this Act.”
Over the years, Landmine Monitor has raised concerns about certain national
declarations and certain clauses in the national implementation legislation of
several nations with respect to joint operations and “assist.”
Among others, it has raised these concerns regarding Australia, Canada, Czech
Republic, New Zealand, Serbia and Montenegro, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. A
highly regarded new legal commentary on the Mine Ban Treaty examines
Australia’s National Declaration and a statement by Zimbabwe on the
prohibition on “assist,” and concludes that “it is not clear
how these interpretations can be legally sustained. Reservations are
prohibited by Article 19” of the
treaty.[42] The commentary draws
particular attention to Australia’s position that the treaty would allow
“indirect support such as the provision of security for the personnel of a
State not party to the Convention engaging in such [prohibited]
activities,” including presumably the laying of antipersonnel mines by the
non-State Party.
Foreign Stockpiling and Transit of Antipersonnel Mines (Articles 1 and 2)
It appears that at least a small number of States Parties have differing
views about whether the Mine Ban Treaty’s prohibition on
“transfer” of antipersonnel mines also applies to
“transit.” The main issue is whether a non-State Party’s
aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines can pass through (and
presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party on their way to a
conflict in which those mines would be used. The ICBL believes that if a State
Party willfully permits transit of antipersonnel mines which are destined for
use in combat, that government is certainly violating the spirit of the Mine Ban
Treaty, is likely violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited
by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer.
The ICRC has also expressed its view that the treaty prohibits transiting of
antipersonnel mines.
A total of 26 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through,
foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing foreign antipersonnel mines on national
territory. Turkey and Zambia provided new statements to this effect since the
publication of the Landmine Monitor Report
2003.[43]
As reported in the past, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway believe that the
Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the transit of antipersonnel mines, at least
in certain circumstances. Germany and Japan view the issue in terms of the US
mines stored in their countries, and maintain that because they do not exercise
jurisdiction or control over the mines, they cannot prohibit transit. Canada
states that it discourages the use of Canadian territory, equipment or personnel
for the purpose of transit of antipersonnel mines.
With respect to foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, US antipersonnel
mines have been removed from Italy (announced in May 2000), Norway (November
2002), and Spain (November 1999). However, Germany, Japan, Qatar, and the United
Kingdom state that US antipersonnel mine stocks are not under their national
jurisdiction or control. Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in its
Article 7 report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by a non-State
Party on its territory. Russian forces hold 18,200 antipersonnel mines in
Tajikistan.
Some States Parties made new policy statements or announced concrete steps
taken nationally since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003.
Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here, see individual
country reports for details.
In December 2003, the Bulgarian parliament supported in principle the
stationing of US military bases in the country. Regarding the legality under
the Mine Ban Treaty of transit and stockpiling of foreign antipersonnel mines on
Bulgarian national territory, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in March
2004 that Bulgaria’s position is “based on its obligations in
accordance with Article 1 and Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Ottawa
Convention.”
At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties Sweden announced its
“preliminary interpretation that transit of antipersonnel mines (for
military use in an armed conflict) through the territory of a State Party to the
Convention would in fact be prohibited.” The final position was stated in
February 2004: “With regard to the aim and purpose of the Convention it is
suggested that transit should be regarded as prohibited by the Convention. This
shall mean that antipersonnel mines cannot be transferred over Swedish land, sea
or air territory in violation of the regulations of the Convention.”
According to its diplomatic mission in Geneva, Turkey considers the
stockpiling or transit of foreign antipersonnel mines on its territory as a
breach of the Mine Ban Treaty, and “will never permit stockpiling or
transfer of any type of antipersonnel landmine on its territory.”
Zambia’s new legislation states that “transfer” includes
“the transit of anti-personnel mines into, out of, or through Zambia by
any means....”
Prior events demonstrate that this issue is not theoretical. In 1999, US
Army engineer units deployed to Albania with antipersonnel mines and their
delivery systems (MOPMS and Volcano mixed mine systems) as part of Task Force
Hawk to support operations in Kosovo. Most of the US Army units deployed from
bases in Germany. At the time of this deployment, Albania was a signatory to
the Mine Ban Treaty and Germany was a State Party. Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Portugal have addressed this issue in light of the use of facilities in their
countries by the US.
Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the United States stored
antipersonnel mines on the territory of at least 14 countries, including seven
States Parties.[44] US
antipersonnel mines have been removed from States Parties Italy, Norway, and
Spain, at the request of those countries. Germany, Japan, the UK, and
informally Qatar, state that US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines on their
territory are not under their jurisdiction or control. It is not possible to
confirm current locations or numbers of US antipersonnel mines in foreign
countries following the significant movements of equipment and ammunition during
the military build-up in the Persian Gulf region preceding the invasion of Iraq
in March 2003.
Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Antihandling Devices (Article 2)
Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, the
ICBL has emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine
equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from
an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an
antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. Applying the definition in Article
2 to all mines that function as antipersonnel mines, including those designated
as antivehicle mines, remains a highly contentious issue. The way that States
Parties agree—or disagree—on what practices are acceptable may have
a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and
universalized.
Many States Parties support the view that any mine, despite its label or
design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person
is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited. Among the States Parties that have
publicly expressed this understanding of what was agreed upon during the treaty
negotiations in Oslo in 1997 are Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovakia, South
Africa, Switzerland, and Zambia. Unfortunately only a small number of States
Parties, 27 of the current 143, have expressed views or shared national practice
on this issue.[45] Commendably,
Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Netherlands,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland have reported on specific details regarding
this issue, including the types of mines other than antipersonnel mines
possessed and their method of initiation. However, some States steadfastly
refuse to accept that an antipersonnel mine is a mine designed to be exploded by
the presence, proximity, or contact with a person. Their key argument is that
the requirement that the mine was designed to fulfill is the determining factor,
and not the consequence of the design. Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and the
United Kingdom are the only States Parties that have publicly stated the view
that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless
of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices. Australia and
Sweden, while not directly subscribing to this position, expressed the view that
the CCW is the more appropriate forum to consider any restrictions on mines
other than antipersonnel mines.
A dangerous loophole may be created by the unwillingness of States Parties to
address this issue and the possibility exists of heretofore prohibited mines
being re-defined as to be permissible. A potentially slippery slope may be
developing wherein mines possessing inherent and irreversible victim-activated
design features are considered to be beyond the treaty’s definition of an
antipersonnel mine. If the issue remains unaddressed, other mines with features
and design consequences that serve the same function as an antipersonnel mine
could conceivably be viewed by some as “compliant” with the Mine Ban
Treaty. Thus, a mine equipped with a tripwire would not be considered an
antipersonnel mine if it is simply called something other than an antipersonnel
mine. A confusing situation is beginning to develop wherein some States Parties
have chosen to keep for future use and export mines that other States Parties
have determined are antipersonnel mines and destroyed. Notably, Italy destroyed
its stocks of the MUSPA and MIFF mines, which another State Party, Germany, does
not classify as antipersonnel mines and has not destroyed.
While state practice in this area is not yet universal, some progress has
been made on clarifying what specific types of fuzes and mines pose unacceptable
dangers to civilians. Within the context of the CCW, Germany and the United
Kingdom made statements in 2003 and 2004 supporting the view that mines equipped
with tilt rod, tripwire, and breakwire fuzes are inappropriate and cannot be
designed in a way to prevent detonation by a person.
There appears to be broad agreement that a mine that relies on a tripwire as
its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. Sweden
has prohibited its forces from using tripwire fuzes with mines if they are ever
removed from storage for use. However, the Czech Republic continues to market a
mine with a tripwire fuze, stating it does not consider the use of tripwires
with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
The low amount of lateral pressure necessary to activate a mine with a tilt
rod fuze makes it quite susceptible to victim activiation. Canada, France,
Mali, and the United Kingdom have removed tilt rod fuzes from their inventories.
Hungary has withdrawn from service and destroyed some of its mines equipped with
tilt rod fuzes; it will not export these mines and plans to destroy all of them.
Croatia and Slovenia have stated their willingness to discuss the
appropriateness of tilt rod fuzes within the context of the Mine Ban Treaty.
The Czech Republic admits possessing tilt rod fuzes but stated that the mines
that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and will be retired
within 15 years.
Breakwire fuzes should not be used as the sole fuze mechanism for a mine
because a person can easily activate a breakwire, much like a tripwire. The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom have retired from service mines with a
breakwire fuze. France is exploring alternative fuzing mechanisms for its mines
with breakwire fuzes.
Several other States Parties have reported that they have removed from
service and destroyed certain ordnance items that when used with mines can cause
them to function as antipersonnel mines. Germany and Slovakia have retired and
destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines.
Some States Parties made new policy statements or announced concrete steps
taken nationally on these matters since publication of Landmine Monitor
Report 2003. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included
here, see individual country reports for details.
Bulgaria reported that existing stocks of TM-46 antivehicle mines, the only
type in stockpiles capable of having an antihandling device, have been
decommissioned, and the destruction process is expected to be completed by the
end of 2005.
In October 2003, the German Initiative to Ban Landmines reported that the
Croatian company Agencija Alan offered the TMRP-6 for sale at the IDEF weapons
exhibition in Ankara, Turkey. The ICBL believes that the sale of TMRP-6 mines
with tilt rods would constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
During the June 2004 intersessional meetings, Colombia made a strong and
unequivocable statement that any mine that is victim-activated is an
antipersonnel mine and therefore banned. Colombia expressed concern that the
threshold of what constitutes an antipersonnel mine was being limited or
narrowed, and stressed that the treaty is a comprehensive ban.
At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2003, the Czech
delegation gave its opinion that Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty “does
not ban sensitive fuses that may have unintended effects,” but if States
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty “find it more appropriate to discuss the
problem within this forum, we will not be against this effort.”
At the Meeting of States Parties in September 2003, Kenya stated, “Any
mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine or can be modified to function like
an antipersonnel mine, should be considered an antipersonnel mine and therefore
banned within the context of the definition of a mine and in cognizance of the
letter and spirit of the convention.”
A legal advisor from Mozambique stated that Mozambique believes that the
effect of the mine should be taken into account, and that, “The emphasis
must be on the humanitarian character of the convention.” More
specifically, he indicated that while Mozambique considers mines that detonate
with more than 150 kilos of pressure to be antivehicle mines, any mine that is
capable of exploding from the contact of a person is prohibited by the
convention.
In February 2004, New Zealand’s Ambassador for Disarmament stated,
“New Zealand regards anti-vehicle mines that can be ‘exploded by the
presence, proximity or contact of a person’ to be anti-personnel mines....
It would leave open the possibility that States Parties could deploy excessively
sensitive [antivehicle mines]...which were capable of being detonated by the
presence of a person, relying on the exception under Article 2.1 as a defence by
asserting that the mines were designed to be detonated by vehicles. Such an
interpretation would leave a worrying loophole in the Convention, effectively
giving States Parties scope to interpret their obligations under this provision
in a manner that could compromise the humanitarian objectives of the
Convention.”
In September 2003, Norway reiterated its position that the treaty text
negotiated in Oslo in 1997 establishes an effect-oriented definition of
antipersonnel mines which includes any mine which functions as an antipersonnel
mine: “The definition of an anti-personnel mine in the Mine Ban Convention
simply lays down that any mine designed to explode by human contact is defined
as an antipersonnel mine. This is the ordinary meaning to be given to the text,
in accordance with the principles of international law.... It does not matter
whether the main purpose of usage for that mine is directed towards vehicles. It
does not matter whether it is called something else than anti-personnel mine. If
it falls within the definition, then it is an anti-personnel mine.”
During 2003, Slovakia carried out a study of which antivehicle mines may be
prohibited or permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty. As a result, Slovakia has
adopted a “Best Practice Policy for Antivehicle Mines” which
involves taking “appropriate measures to ban the use of antivehicle mines
which are activated by sensitive fuses and which are able to function as
antipersonnel mines.” These include “antivehicle and antitank mines
activated by trip wire running over the blocked stage of terrain or activated by
tilt rod.” The Ministry added that, “Slovakia has also taken best
practice measures banning the use of antihandling/explosive device Ro-3 together
with mines.”
Zambia’s national legislation passed in December 2003 prohibits
antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices that function as
antipersonnel mines, including those equipped with tripwires, breakwires, and
pressure-activated fuzes that operate at thresholds less than 150
kilograms.
Claymore Mines (Article 2)
Claymore-type mines (directional fragmentation munitions) are not prohibited
by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances. They are inherently dual-use, designed
to be command-initiated by electric means or victim-activated by using
mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes. In many cases, options for both
means are packaged with the mine. In order to be compliant and fully
transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them, to ensure
that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed
forces are instructed as to their legal obligations. Some States Parties have
chosen to physically modify the mine to accept only electric detonation and some
have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate
blasting cap.
This notion has recently been extended to include the OZM-72, a bounding
fragmentation mine, because according to available technical information it was
designed and issued to be dual use with both victim-activated and
command-detonated features. Both Lithuania and Moldova have reported modifying
OZM-72 mines so that they no longer consider them antipersonnel mines, and count
them as neither mines to be destroyed or mines retained for training. At the
June 2004 Standing Committee meetings, the ICBL expressed concerns that this was
not a desirable practice in that it could open the door for attempts to modify
many types of mines in ways that may not be effective in protecting
civilians.
A total of 24 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of
Claymore-type mines.[46] New among
this group since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003 are
Belarus, Lithuania, and Serbia & Montenegro. A majority of these states
(17) have reported on the measures taken to ensure that their Claymore-type
mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode, including destruction of the
tripwire assemblies and mechanical fuzes. Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and
Moldova have not made such statements.
Another 27 States Parties have declared that they do not possess
Claymore-type mines.[47] New among
this group since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003 are
Qatar, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay. For one of these, the Philippines,
there are some contradictory indicators whether the armed forces possess
Claymore-type mines.
The vast majority of States Parties, a total of 92, have not declared whether
their forces possess Claymore-type mines. While 45 of these States Parties have
declared that they do not possess antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases
it cannot be presumed that this includes Claymore-type mines. In September
2003, Bangladesh said, “The development of command-detonated mines, their
use and sale would be another source of concern, if not humanitarian, of
strategic import. This would be another case of vertical proliferation
establishing discriminatory regimes and disparity between countries.”
The ICBL urges these 93 States Parties to declare whether they possess
Claymore-type mines, and if so, include in their Article 7 transparency reports
the measures that have been taken to ensure that they cannot be used in the
victim-activated mode.
States Parties should also include Claymore-type antivehicle mines
(“off route” directional mines) in this category. When equipped
with a tripwire fuze, this mine meets the definition of antipersonnel mine in
Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty and is therefore prohibited. The Czech
Republic continues to market a Claymore-type antivehicle mine with a tripwire
fuze, stating it does not consider the use of tripwires with antivehicle mines
to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
[3] Twelve States Parties whose deadlines have
passed have not submitted an initial transparency
report. [4] Burma, Eritrea, Georgia, India,
Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and
Yugoslavia have used antipersonnel mines since 1999. The treaty has since
entered into force for Eritrea (February 2002) and Serbia and Montenegro (March
2004). [5] Angola, Ecuador, Ethiopia, and
Venezuela have admitted using antipersonnel mines after signing the Mine Ban
Treaty. There have been serious allegations regarding Burundi, Rwanda and Sudan
as signatories and Uganda as a State Party.
[6] China, Finland, India, Israel, Latvia,
Morocco, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the United States are party to
CCW Amended Protocol II but not the Mine Ban Treaty. Poland and Ukraine are
party to Amended Protocol II and signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty. Latvia and
Sri Lanka have expressed their intent of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in the near
future. Morocco states that it is in de facto compliance with the Mine Ban
Treaty. [7] Amended Protocol II also
regulates the use of booby-traps, other explosive devices and, to a limited
extent, antivehicle mines. [8] Of these, at
least 17 are thought to possess antipersonnel mines: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Brunei, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Myanmar
(Burma), Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Syria, and Vietnam. The
others are: Bahrain, Bhutan, Kuwait, Libya, Micronesia, Oman, Palau, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and United Arab Emirates. [9] The
ten countries that abstained in voting on UNGA Resolution 51/45S: Belarus,
China, Cuba, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and
Turkey. Belarus and Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in September
2003. [10] Voting results by year on the
annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation
of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38A) – 142 in favor, none
against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77N) – 147 in favor, none
against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54B) -- 139 in favor, one against,
20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33V) – 143 in favor, none against, 22
abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24M) – 138 in favor, none against, 19
abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74) -- 143 in favor, none against, 23
abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53) – 153 in favor, none against, 23
abstaining. [11] Belarus, Eritrea,
Estonia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey consistently voted for the
resolutions prior to their accession. [12]
Thirty-five States have ratified the Amendment of CCW Article 1 as of 1 October
2004: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada,
China, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Holy See, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
Panama, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Korea,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. [13] Israel and Sri Lanka used
antipersonnel mines after December 1998, but prior to when they became States
Parties to Amended Protocol II. [14] There
is confirmed use by Afghanistan, Angola, Burma/Myanmar, DR Congo, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka,
Uzbekistan, and FR Yugoslavia. [15] There
is compelling evidence of use by Burundi, Georgia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda.
All of these governments deny use. [16]
There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total
of 51 are the following. Five States Parties have been cited as past producers,
but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. Croatia
unsuccessfully attempted to replicate production of the PMA-3 antipersonnel mine
but discontinued this activity. Officials from Nicaragua note that the former
government produced crude antipersonnel mines around 1985 during the civil war
period but this activity stopped before the end of the war. In addition to
those five, there remain unanswered ambiguities about past antipersonnel mine
production in Sudan and Syria. Jordan declared possessing a small number of
mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of
production, export, or capture. There was one unconfirmed US government report
in 2000 that identified Sudan as a current producer of landmines, an allegation
not been seen before or since. [17]
Thirty-three States Parties that once produced antipersonnel mines include:
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania,
Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda,
United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. [18]
Production of antipersonnel mines in Finland ended in the early 1970s. Israel
confirmed to Landmine Monitor in 2004 that its production lines for
antipersonnel mines have been decommissioned. Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland
has voluntarily disclosed that its production activities stopped in
1988. [19] Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Peru, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, and the United Kingdom. Fourteen others have not
officially declared the ultimate disposition of production capabilities in
transparency reports despite admissions or evidence of prior production
activities, which includes the loading, assembling, and packing of antipersonnel
mines: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Norway, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe. For many of these states however, antipersonnel mine production
ceased prior to entry into force of the
treaty. [20] Former major producers and
exporters include: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia),
Bulgaria, Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia), France, Germany (including the
former East Germany), Hungary, Italy, and United
Kingdom. [21] Approximately 158,000
antipersonnel mines declared by States Parties cannot be attributed to a source
because of the use of non-standard nomenclature by the declaring
state. [22] Ex-USSR states now party to
the Mine Ban Treaty Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan
declared stockpiles; Estonia has not. All states of the ex-Yugoslavia declared
stockpiles: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Serbia and
Montenegro, and Slovenia. [23] Other big
suppliers were Brazil, Germany (including the former East Germany), Spain, and
the former Yugoslavia, followed by Belgium, Chile, former Czechoslovakia,
France, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, and Singapore. Lesser exporters included
Argentina, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, North Korea, Portugal, South Africa,
Syria, and the United Kingdom. [24]
Statement by Ambassador Paul Meyer, Canada, to the Conference on Disarmament, 29
July 2004. [25] As of 1 October 2004,
Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Cameroon, Colombia, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, and
Mauritania had begun destruction, while Algeria, Bangladesh, DR Congo, Greece,
and Zambia were in the planning
stage. [26] As of 1 October 2004, the
following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine
stockpiles: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Republic of Congo,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon,
Germany, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Moldova,
Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe. [27] In addition to the 13
States Parties already carrying out stockpile destruction, Guyana, Serbia and
Montenegro, and Turkey hold stocks, and it is likely that Burundi and Sudan do
as well. [28] The following States Parties
have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Andorra, Antigua
& Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Eritrea, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica,
Kiribati, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico,
Monaco, Nauru, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda,
St. Kitts & Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands,
Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Trinidad &
Tobago. [29] Burundi, Cape Verde, Central
African Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Guyana, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Sao Tome & Principe, Serbia &
Montenegro, Sudan, Turkey need to officially declared the presence or absence of
antipersonnel mine stockpiles. [30]
According to new information received by Landmine Monitor in 2004, which has yet
to be confirmed, Russia’s stockpile could total closer to 22-25 million
antipersonnel mines. [31] Seventeen States
Parties that once stockpiled antipersonnel mines chose not to retain any under
Article 3: Albania, Austria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Switzerland,
Turkmenistan. [32] It is not known whether
Afghanistan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., DR Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Estonia, Guyana, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, St. Vincent &
Grenadines, Sao Tome & Principe, Serbia & Montenegro, or Sudan will
choose to retain antipersonnel mines under Article
3. [33] Thirty-four States Parties retain
between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia
& Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, Djibouti,
Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Kenya, Macedonia FYR, Mali, Mozambique,
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, Yemen, and
Zambia. [34] Twenty States Parties retain
less than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Colombia, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, El
Salvador, Eritrea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Luxembourg, Mauritania,
Moldova, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela,
and Zimbabwe. [35] Argentina, Australia,
Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, Italy, Spain, Turkmenistan originally
intended to retain over 10,000 antipersonnel mines or
over. [36] Forty States Parties that have
enacted implementation legislation: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize,
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Rep.,
France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Seychelles, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, United Kingdom,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. [37] Twenty-seven
States Parties are in the process of enacting legislation: Albania, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Croatia, DR Congo,
Djibouti, El Salvador, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Uganda, and Yemen. [38] Thirty-four States
Parties have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider that new
legislation is necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Guinea Bissau, Holy See, Jordan,
Kiribati, Lesotho, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands,
Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and
Venezuela. [39] Afghanistan, Angola,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central
African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Ecuador,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guyana, Liberia, Lithuania, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, St.
Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Sao Tome e Principe, Serbia & Montenegro,
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, and
Uruguay. [40] Available at www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JR2C?OpenDocument,
accessed on 14 October 2004. [41] Previous
editions of the Landmine Monitor Report contain statements on or developments
regarding the legality of joint operations from Australia, Belgium, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. Each
individual country report in this edition contains a summary of their position
and statements. [42] Stuart Maslen,
Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties, Volume 1, The Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2004), pp.
92-95. [43] Previous editions of the
Landmine Monitor Report contain statements or developments on the issue of
foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines from States Parties
Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand,
Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. Each individual country report in this edition contains
a summary of their position and
statements. [44] Apart from the seven
States Parties, the countries have included: Bahrain, Greece, Kuwait, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. Landmine Monitor had included then non-State
Party Turkey on this list in the past, but Turkey now denies the presence of US
stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Greece is also a State Party now, but the
current status of US mines there is
unknown. [45] Previous editions of the
Landmine Monitor Report contain statements or developments on the applicability
of Article 2 to all mines from States Parties Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Each individual country
report in this edition contains a summary of their position and
statements. [46] States Parties that
possess Claymore-type mines: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Canada, Colombia,
Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Honduras, Hungary, Lithuania, Malaysia, Moldova,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovenia, South
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and
Zimbabwe. [47] States Parties that do not
possess Claymore type mines: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czech Rep., El Salvador, France, Germany,
Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Uruguay,
and Yemen.