The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. After
achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty
entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is
believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty
ever. Since 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty
with intent to ratify later. For a state that ratifies (having become a
signatory prior to 1 March) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it
on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that state deposited
its instrument of ratification. That state is then required to make its initial
transparency report to the UN Secretary General within 180 days (and annually
thereafter), destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in
the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic
implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.
Universalization
Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at
one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 147 States Parties, a
total of 80 states ratified or acceded to the treaty after its entry into force
on 1 March 1999.[1] The numbers of
states that ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for
signature are as follows: 1997 (December only)—3; 1998—55;
1999—32 (23 after 1 March); 2000—19; 2001—13; 2002—8;
2003—11; 2004—3; 2005 (as of October) —3.
Four states joined the treaty since the publication of the Landmine
Monitor Report 2004. Ethiopia ratified in December 2004, Latvia acceded in
July 2005, Bhutan acceded in August 2005, and Vanuatu ratified in September
2005. Ethiopia’s ratification leaves Somalia as the only sub-Saharan
African country not party to the treaty. Ethiopia is mine-affected and deployed
antipersonnel mines during its 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea, but has now
foresworn the weapon. With Latvia’s accession, all three Baltic states
have joined the treaty. Latvia has reported possession of a small stockpile of
antipersonnel mines. Bhutan is the second country from the South Asian
sub-continent to become a State Party, joining Bangladesh. Vanuatu provides a
positive example for the six Pacific Island states that are not yet party to the
treaty.
There are seven states that have signed, but not yet ratified the treaty:
Brunei, Cook Islands, Haiti, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Poland and Ukraine.
There are positive indications from most of these states that they will ratify
the treaty in the near-term. The Parliament of Ukraine approved a national
ratification law in May 2005; it has been signed by the President but not yet
officially deposited with the United Nations. Poland changed its policy on
joining the treaty in 2004 and announced at the First Review Conference in
December 2004 that it has begun the national ratification process. In June
2005, an interdepartmental working group in Indonesia reached a consensus in
favor of ratification and submitted to the President a recommendation to proceed
with ratification.
Also in June 2005, a Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told the
ICBL that ratification legislation passed by the national parliament would be
printed in the government gazette very soon, one of the last steps required for
Haiti to ratify; Haiti attended the June 2005 intersessional Standing Committee
meetings, its first participation in a treaty-related meeting. There were
indications that the ratification process in Brunei had reached its final stage
in August 2004, but no further progress has been reported. No apparent progress
has been made toward ratification by the Cook Islands and Marshall Islands.
There have been encouraging developments in many of the non-signatory
nations around the world as well.
In Africa: The Prime Minister of Somalia’s Transitional Federal
Government attended the First Review Conference, where he confirmed the
government’s intention to join the treaty.
In the Asia-Pacific region: The ICBL was informed that the executive
branch of the Federated States of Micronesia completed a review of the Mine Ban
Treaty and intended to send the agreement to the Congress for accession in
September 2005. In July 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Laos expressed
its intent to accede, but noted that it requires some time to prepare the
necessary steps in meeting its obligations. Mongolia has agreed on a
step-by-step approach aimed at accession in 2008. In October 2004, the
then-President of Mongolia denounced the use, production, stockpiling and
transfer of landmines during an official visit to Canada. India attended the
First Review Conference and the June 2005 intersessional meetings, its first
participation in treaty-related meetings. China expressed its desire to expand
cooperation with Mine Ban Treaty States Parties and sent a high level observer
delegation to the Review Conference.
In the Commonwealth of Independent States: Azerbaijan has expressed
greater support for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Deputy Foreign Minister has
indicated Azerbaijan will prepare a voluntary Article 7 report and will vote in
favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in 2005. In Georgia,
a Deputy Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in May 2005 that the
issue of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty has been under re-consideration, and
the Deputy Minister of Defense said that Georgia intends to destroy all of its
stockpiled antipersonnel mines. In May 2005, a Foreign Ministry official in
Kyrgyzstan noted that the issue of joining the Mine Ban Treaty will receive
in-depth study by the new government due to its changed circumstances.
In the Middle East-North Africa region: The transitional government
of Iraq is studying accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, and has made a number of
statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines. It voted in favor of the
annual UNGA pro-ban resolution in December 2004 supporting universalization of
the Mine Ban Treaty, and attended both the First Review Conference and the June
2005 intersessional meetings. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Bahrain
for the first time indicated there were no major impediments to joining the
treaty, and said internal processes to consider accession were underway. In
June 2005, a Kuwaiti official reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry of Defense had both recommended acceding to the treaty. In September
2004, senior officials in the United Arab Emirates said there were no serious
reservations against joining the treaty and indicated the UAE had initiated a
study to examine it in all aspects. At the first landmine seminar in Libya in
May 2005, the President of the Gaddafi Foundation for Charitable Associations,
who is also the son of Libya’s President, called for the country to accede
to the Mine Ban Treaty. At the First Review Conference, Egypt for the first
time officially announced a moratorium on the production of antipersonnel
mines.
One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on
antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly resolutions
calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
UNGA Resolution 59/84 was adopted on 3 December 2004 by a vote of 157 in favor,
none opposed, and 22 abstentions.[2]
This is the highest number of votes in favor of this annual resolution since
1997 when it was first introduced.[3]
Twenty-three states not party to the treaty voted in favor. This included the
four countries that subsequently became States Parties (Bhutan, Ethiopia, Latvia
and Vanuatu), five signatory countries (Brunei, Haiti, Indonesia, Poland and
Ukraine), and 14 non-signatories (Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Iraq,
Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu and the
United Arab Emirates). Notable among this latter group are Iraq, Morocco,
Somalia and Tuvalu, all of whom voted in favor of the annual resolution for the
first time.
Despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines,
there were also discouraging actions among some of the 40 states not party to
the treaty. Most egregious, government forces in Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and
Russia have continued to use antipersonnel mines on a regular basis, and it
appears Georgian forces used antipersonnel mines in 2004. In September 2004,
Finland announced that it would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until 2012, six
years later than its previously stated goal. The United States has been
developing new landmine systems that are incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty,
and is due to make a production decision on one type in December 2005.
Non-State Armed Groups
There is ever-increasing awareness of the need to involve non-state armed
groups (NSAGs) in the global efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. It is
noteworthy that during the June 2005 intersessional meetings, 16 governments,
the UN Mine Action Service and ICRC referred to non-state armed groups and their
impact on the landmine ban in their presentations. NSAGs were discussed in some
fashion in all four of the Standing Committees.
Non-state armed groups have used unilateral statements, bilateral
agreements, and signature to the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment to indicate
their willingness to observe a landmine
ban.[4] NSAGs in three States Parties
(Philippines, Senegal and Sudan) have agreed to abide by a ban on antipersonnel
mines.
Geneva Call has received signatures from 27 non-state armed groups, many of
them in Somalia, since 2001. The signatories are in Burma/Myanmar, Burundi,
India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia and Sudan. The Juba Valley Alliance, a
faction in Somalia, signed the deed in January 2005.
Four groups which had earlier indicated a willingness to abide by a landmine
ban and signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment are now part of their state's
governing authorities of their states. This includes the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army, the Conseil National pour le Défense de la
Démocratie ― Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
(CNDD-FDD) in Burundi, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan in Iraq; PUK leader Jalal Talibani now serves as President of
Iraq.
First Review Conference
The landmark First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as
the “Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World,” was one of the most
significant events in the life of the treaty since it became international law
on 1 March 1999. Held in Kenya from 29 November to 3 December 2004, this was
the biggest and highest level gathering on landmines of governments and NGOs
since the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada on 3
December 1997. The final day of the Review Conference was timed to coincide
with the seventh anniversary of the signing of the treaty.
From the ICBL perspective, the main purpose of the First Review Conference
was to re-invigorate the international community with respect to efforts to
eradicate antipersonnel mines―to increase governmental and public
awareness, to get governments to re-commit on the issue and express their
ongoing political and financial commitment, so that the job gets done.
An unprecedented number of participants, more than 1,300 people, attended
the Nairobi Summit. Over 350 NGO representatives from 82 countries were
present, including more than 50 landmine survivors and 40 youth from 24
countries. This was the largest gathering of NGOs related to landmines ever,
and demonstrated the continued strength and vitality of the ICBL, and its
long-term commitment to solving the landmine problem.
A total of 135 governments participated, including 110 States Parties. Many
States Parties responded favorably to the call for high level delegations, with
five heads of state, six deputy heads of state and 20 ministers participating.
This was by far the highest level landmine meeting since 1997, though it fell
short of the hopes and expectations of some in terms of high level
participation.
A large number (27) of non-States Parties also participated, especially from
Asia (Brunei, Bhutan, China, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Singapore, Sri Lanka
and Vanuatu) and the Middle East (Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia). Five non-States Parties from Europe and
the Commonwealth of Independent States attended (Finland, Poland, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine), as well as Cuba and Somalia. Ethiopia, which signed
the treaty in 1997, announced its ratification on the opening day.
The ICBL was pleased to hear during the High Level Segment so many strong
statements from senior officials emphasizing ongoing and long-term support for
both universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty and implementation of its
provisions, including mine clearance and victim assistance. There were
disappointingly few concrete, multi-year pledges for mine action funding (in
contrast to the signing ceremony in 1997), but many donor states indicated
continued financial commitment.
The Nairobi Summit considered and adopted four key documents: a Five-Year
Review Document, Five-Year Action Plan, the Nairobi Declaration, and a Programme
of Meetings for 2005-2009. The 80+ page Review Document is thorough in an
unprecedented way. It is noteworthy not just for the impressive amount of
information on activities, accomplishments, and difficulties of the past five
years, but also for setting out the main challenges for the years ahead. The
ICBL views the Action Plan for the period 2005-2009 as easily the best Action
Plan developed to date, providing a solid framework for ensuring ongoing
progress in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and in tackling all aspects of the
global mine problem. The Action Plan is the main concrete outcome of the
Summit.
The Nairobi Declaration is a very strong document emphasizing the renewed
commitment of States Parties to achieve “a world free of antipersonnel
mines, in which there will be zero new victims.” It declares that states
“have established a powerful international norm” against
antipersonnel mines, and that they will “condemn any use of antipersonnel
mines by any actor.” The Declaration recognizes the importance of the
“unique spirit of cooperation between states, international organizations
and civil society,” and pledges that “we shall persevere until this
unique Convention has been universally applied and its aims fully
achieved.”
Implementation and Intersessional Work Program
A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States
Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty’s provisions.
Structures created to monitor progress towards implementation, and to allow
discussion between States Parties of issues arising, include annual Meetings of
States Parties, the intersessional work program, a coordinating committee,
contact groups on universalization, on resource mobilization and on Articles 7
and 9, the sponsorship program, and an implementation support unit.
The Programme of Meetings 2005-2009 document agreed to in Nairobi calls for
continued annual Meetings of States Parties, including in mine-affected
countries when possible or appropriate, for one week-long intersessional meeting
of the Standing Committees each year (instead of two, as in previous years), and
for a Second Review Conference in 2009. The ICBL supported this schedule. It
was also decided that the Sixth Meeting of States Parties will be held in
Croatia from 28 November to 2 December 2005.
In Nairobi, States Parties also agreed that the new co-chairs and
co-rapporteurs for the Standing Committees would be as follows: General Status
and Operation: New Zealand and South Africa as co-chairs and Belgium and
Guatemala as co-rapporteurs; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action
Technologies: Algeria and Sweden as co-chairs and Jordan and Slovenia as
co-rapporteurs; Stockpile Destruction: Bangladesh and Canada as co-chairs and
Japan and Tanzania as co-rapporteurs; Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration: Nicaragua and Norway as co-chairs and Afghanistan and Switzerland
as co-rapporteurs.
The Standing Committees met in Geneva from 13-17 June 2005. Details on
Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various
thematic areas.
A total of 85 countries were States Parties to Amended Protocol II of CCW,
as of 1 October 2005. Amended Protocol II regulates landmines, booby-traps and
other explosive devices; it took effect on 3 December 1998. Liberia, FYR
Macedonia, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela joined Amended Protocol II since the
publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2004. Only 10 of the 84 States
Parties to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China,
Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka and
the United States.
China, Latvia, Pakistan, and most recently Russia deferred compliance with
the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the
Technical Annex.[6] China and
Pakistan are obligated to be compliant by 3 December 2007; neither has provided
detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability
requirement. Russia must come into compliance by 2014. Latvia’s deferral
is now presumably irrelevant due to its accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, which
prohibits the use of such mines and requires their destruction.
China, Pakistan, Ukraine, and most recently Belarus and Russia deferred
compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical
Annex.[7] Their respective nine-year
deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, 15 May
2008 for Ukraine, and 2014 for Russia. Ukraine, a signatory of the Mine Ban
Treaty, is taking steps to destroy its stockpile of nearly six million PFM-type
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. Belarus is obligated by the Mine Ban
Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM and KPOM
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008.
In December 2003, CCW States Parties agreed to adopt Protocol V, a legally
binding instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for explosive
remnants of war (ERW). As of 1 October 2005, 13 states had ratified Protocol
V.[8] In the CCW, work on mines other
than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM) and on measures to prevent specific weapons,
including cluster munitions, from becoming explosive remnants of war continued
in 2004 and 2005.
Use of Antipersonnel Mines
One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the
degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized
throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments,
has become a rare phenomenon, rather than the devastatingly common occurrence
witnessed decade after decade from the mid-20th century onward.
In this reporting period, since May 2004, three governments are confirmed to
have used antipersonnel mines: Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia. There is also
strong evidence that Georgian forces used antipersonnel mines in 2004, although
there have been no allegations regarding Georgia in 2005. These were the same
governments identified as using antipersonnel mines in the previous Landmine
Monitor reporting period.
Myanmar’s military forces continued to use antipersonnel mines
extensively. In its five-year review, Landmine Monitor Report 2004
identified Myanmar as one of only two governments, along with Russia, to have
used antipersonnel mines consistently throughout the period. There is evidence
that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, although
in August 2005, Russian military officials told Landmine Monitor that Russian
Ministry of Defense forces have not used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in 2004
or 2005. They could not comment on whether other Russian forces have used them
in that time. Previously, the Russian government has said that it only uses
mines in Chechnya in cases of “dire necessity.”
In Nepal, it appears that use of mines and improvised explosive devices by
security forces—including the Royal Nepalese Army, the Nepal Police and
the Armed Police Force—expanded in 2004 and 2005 as the civil war
intensified, particularly after King Gyanendra seized power in February 2005.
Despite a formal moratorium on use of antipersonnel mines, it appears that
Georgian forces used them in September 2004 when the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) expressed concern about new mine-laying by both
Georgian and South Ossetian forces.
There is no evidence—or even serious allegation—of use of
antipersonnel mines by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties or signatories in this
reporting period.[9] This is
notable in that many current States Parties have either admitted using, or there
are credible allegations of their using, antipersonnel mines in the recent past,
before joining the treaty, some even as
signatories.[10]
Use by Non-State Armed Groups
It is clear that use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups is now
far more widespread than use by government forces. In this reporting period,
NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least 13 countries.
NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) was reported in five States Parties (Burundi, Colombia, Philippines,
Turkey and Uganda) and in eight non-States Parties (Burma/Myanmar, Georgia,
India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia and Russia, including in Chechnya,
Dagestan and North Ossetia).
In addition, small-scale, isolated or sporadic use by NSAGs and/or
individuals was reported in Afghanistan, Egypt, Sri Lanka and Yemen. In most
cases, Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm these instances of use of
antipersonnel mines.
Compared to last year’s Landmine Monitor report, use of antipersonnel
mines by NSAGs was no longer recorded in Bhutan, Bolivia, DR Congo or
Perú. Landmine Monitor Report 2004 also noted allegations of mine
use by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sudan and
Yemen.[11] Noted this year is more
extensive use by NSAGs in
Pakistan.[12]
In Colombia, the FARC continued to be the biggest user of landmines in the
country, and among the biggest in the world. Other groups, notably the ELN and
the paramilitary AUC also used mines. In Burma/Myanmar, two armed groups not
previously reported to be mine users were identified, making a total of 12
non-state armed groups using antipersonnel landmines in the ongoing civil war.
The two newly identified groups, the Karenni People’s National Liberation
Front and the Karenni National Solidarity Organization, fought in support of the
military.
In India, a variety of non-state armed groups continued to use antipersonnel
mines, antivehicle mines and, most commonly, improvised explosive devices in the
northwest border state of Jammu and Kashmir, in the center of the country
(Communist insurgents), and in northeast India, where Burmese rebels have
planted mines inside India and various independence movements have deployed
IEDs. In Pakistan, several non-state armed groups used landmines and improvised
explosive devices regularly, most notably in Baluchistan, Waziristan Agency and
elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
In Nepal, mine/IED incidents attributed to the Maoists reportedly took place
in 73 out of 75 districts in 2004. One of the localized civilian militias known
as Village Defense Forces said it laid 1,500 mines in its area of operation. In
the Philippines, the New People’s Army continued to use command-detonated
mines and improvised explosive devices; it denied using victim-activated mines.
There were also reports of continued antipersonnel mine use by the Abu Sayyaf
Group. Following a resumption of fighting for the first time since 1996, the
Moro National Liberation Front acknowledged using antipersonnel and antivehicle
mines.
In Burundi, the government continued to accuse the FNL rebels of using
antipersonnel mines; the increased number of mine casualties, particularly in
Bujumbura Rural province where fighting has been taking place, indicates ongoing
use of antipersonnel mines. In Somalia, there has been ongoing use of
antipersonnel landmines in various parts of the country by a number of factions.
In Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army continued to use antipersonnel mines
and there were reports of Army seizures of antipersonnel mines from the
People’s Redemption Army.
In Georgia, the OSCE expressed concern in September 2004 about new
mine-laying by South Ossetian as well as Georgian forces. In Russia, there
appears to have been a considerable increase in rebel mine and IED attacks in
Dagestan, especially in the first half of 2005. Chechen rebels continued to use
IEDs and mines, including in the notorious incident in Beslan, North Ossetia in
September 2004.
In Turkey, use of landmines by the PKK led to both civilian and military
casualties; from March 2004 to March 2005, Turkey reported 148 military
casualties due to landmines laid by the PKK and related groups. In Iraq,
opposition forces have used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and, most
frequently, IEDs—both command-detonated and victim-activated. In August
2005, a US official said IED attacks were up 100 percent from the previous year.
Use of antivehicle mines by non-state armed groups was reported in at least
eight countries: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Eritrea, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan
and Turkey. Non-state armed groups continued to manufacture and use a wide
variety of improvised explosive devices, both victim-activated (which are de
facto antipersonnel mines) and command-detonated.
Use of Antipersonnel Mines since May 2004
Sub-Saharan Africa
Americas
Asia/Pacific
Europe/
Central Asia
Middle East/
North Africa
Burundi:
FNL rebels
Somalia:
Various
factions
Uganda:
LRA rebels
Colombia: FARC and other rebels, AUC paramilitaries
Burma/Myanmar: government and 12 rebel groups
India: rebels
Pakistan: rebels
Nepal: government and Maoist rebels
Philippines:
New People's Army, MNLF, ASG rebels
Georgia: government and NSAGs
Russia: government and rebels (in Chechnya, North Ossetia,
Dagestan)
Turkey:
PKK rebels
Iraq:
NSAGs
Production of Antipersonnel Mines
More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel
mines.[13] Thirty-eight states have
ceased the production of antipersonnel
mines.[14] This includes five
countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Iraq,
Israel and Poland. Taiwan has also stopped production. A total of 24 treaty
members, with the addition of Zimbabwe in this reporting period, have reported
on the status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of antipersonnel
mine production facilities.[15]
Landmine Monitor Report 2004 identified 13 countries that continued
to produce, or retain the right to produce, antipersonnel landmines. During
this reporting period, since May 2004, Landmine Monitor has received sufficient
information from public and private statements by government officials and other
sources to remove Egypt and Iraq from the producers’ list. This is the
third time Landmine Monitor has adjusted its list of countries producing
antipersonnel mines.[16]
Antipersonnel Landmine Producers
Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan,
Russia, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam
At the First Review Conference, Egypt’s Deputy Assistant Foreign
Minister stated that “the Egyptian government has imposed a moratorium on
all export and production activities related to anti-personnel mines.”
This was the first time that Egypt publicly and officially announced a
moratorium on production. Egyptian officials have unofficially said for a
number of years that Egypt stopped producing antipersonnel mines in 1988.
An Iraqi diplomat told Landmine Monitor in 2004 that all mine production
capacity had been destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign. Other sources
have confirmed that information. Given the destruction of Iraq’s
production facilities, and the government’s statements in support of
banning antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor has decided to remove Iraq from
the list of countries producing antipersonnel mines, but still awaits an
official statement regarding a prohibition on production of antipersonnel
mines.
South Korea has stated it has not produced any mines since 2000. The
Director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005
that Iran does not produce landmines, echoing an assertion from the Ministry of
Defense in 2002 that Iran has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988.
However, mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have since 2002 found many
hundreds of Iranian antipersonnel mines date stamped 1999 and 2000.
The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997. However,
it has been conducting research and development on new landmines. A decision
will be made in December 2005 whether the US will begin producing a new
antipersonnel mine called Spider. Spider contains a “battlefield
override” feature that allows for activation by the victim (target), thus
making it illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty. The Pentagon requested a total of
$1.77 billion for research on and production of new landmine systems over the
next five years.
India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel
mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW, including in
Pakistan’s case new remotely delivered mine systems. In August 2005,
India told Landmine Monitor that it is not producing remotely delivered
antipersonnel mines; it had stated in October 2000 that it had designed a
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, with self-destructing and
self-deactivating mines, for trial evaluation and prototype production.
Non-state armed groups in Burma and Colombia are known to produce
victim-activated mines or IEDs. Command-detonated, and possibly
victim-activated, IEDs were produced by NSAGs in Afghanistan, India, Iraq,
Nepal, Philippines, Somalia and Chechnya. NSAGs in other countries also likely
produced their own mines/IEDs, but specific documentation is lacking. The LTTE
in Sri Lanka produced large quantities of landmines in the past. They have not
renounced production and the current status of manufacturing capability is
unknown.
Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines
A de facto global ban on the transfer or export of antipersonnel
mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the
mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon, the unilateral actions
of key countries, and the subsequent implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Landmine Monitor has not documented any state-to-state transfers of
antipersonnel mines since then. It is believed that the trade in antipersonnel
mines has dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged
trade.
In this reporting period, a UN investigative panel reported that landmines
were being shipped to Somalia from unknown sources in Ethiopia and Yemen, in
violation of the UN embargo. Another UN panel reported that rebels in the DR
Congo obtained mines from Ugandan forces, a claim strongly denied by the Ugandan
government. A Burundi official alleged that rebels were acquiring mines from
unnamed sources in the DR Congo. Pakistan claims that mines it seized from
Baluchi rebels were smuggled by armed groups from Afghanistan.
As noted above, at the First Review Conference, Egypt stated publicly and
officially for the first time that it has a moratorium on export of
antipersonnel mines; it had previously said unofficially that it had not
exported since 1985. In July 2005, Israel extended for another three years its
moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines which was first declared in
1994. A significant number of other states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have
enacted or extended export moratoria in recent years including China, India,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United
States.
In July 2004, the United States announced its intent to pursue negotiations
on an international ban on the sale or export of non self-destructing landmines
in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). Canada noted that the 42 CD
member states that are already part of the Mine Ban Treaty “will not be in
a position to enter negotiations on a lesser ban, aimed at arresting trade in
one category of antipersonnel mines alone but implying the acceptability of
trade in other categories of these
weapons.”[17] The CD has not
been able to agree on its agenda since 1997.
Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction
In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, 131 states possessed
stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. These global
totals have been dramatically reduced since that time. Landmine Monitor now
estimates that 54 countries stockpile about 180 million antipersonnel
mines.[18] The most notable
development in this reporting period is that Russia for the first time disclosed
its stockpile total of 26.5 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor
previously estimated that Russia stockpiled 50 million antipersonnel mines.
Moreover, States Parties destroyed more than 400,000 stockpiled
antipersonnel mines in this reporting period, and non-States Parties, including
China, destroyed an unknown additional number.
States Parties
A total of 81 states party to the Mine Ban Treaty have declared possessing
stockpiles of antipersonnel mines at some point. Of these, 69 States Parties
have completed the destruction of their
stockpiles.[19] Those who have
completed most recently include Bangladesh (February 2005), Mauritania (December
2004), Uruguay (December 2004), Colombia (October 2004), Zambia (October 2004)
and Tanzania (July 2004).
States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 38.3 million
antipersonnel mines.[20] Italy
destroyed the most mines (7.1 million), followed by Turkmenistan (6.6 million).
Albania, France, Germany, Japan, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom each destroyed more than one million antipersonnel mines.
The 12 States Parties that have declared still possessing stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines include Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Burundi,
Cyprus, DR Congo, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan and
Turkey. All report that their antipersonnel mines are in the process of being
destroyed.[21] Algeria is scheduled
to complete the destruction of its remaining 8,589 stockpiled mines in November
2005. Guinea-Bissau planned to destroy its mines in October 2005. These states
possess upwards of 11 million antipersonnel mines, including Belarus (4.5
million), Turkey (2.9 million), Greece (1.5 million), and Serbia and Montenegro
(1.32 million).
Landmine Monitor believes that three other States Parties also possess
stockpiles of antipersonnel mines: Ethiopia, Guyana, and Latvia. Cameroon may
also fall into this category. These states have yet to submit Article 7 reports
that officially declare the existence of stockpiled mines. Cameroon’s
report was due August 2003, Guyana’s was due July 2004, Ethiopia’s
is due November 2005, and Latvia’s is due June 2006.
Landmine Monitor has previously estimated a stockpile of 20,000 mines for
Guyana. Latvia has declared a small stockpile inherited from the Soviet Union
in its voluntary transparency reports. Ethiopia is known to have had a
substantial stockpile of antipersonnel mines in the past, but the current status
is not known. Cameroon has provided conflicting information regarding
stockpiled mines, mines retained for training, and mines
destroyed.[22]
Pending Stockpile Destruction Deadlines
Guinea-Bissau
1 Nov 2005
Algeria
1 Apr 2006
DR Congo
1 Nov 2006
Angola
1 Jan 2007
Afghanistan
1 Mar 2007
Cameroon
1 Mar 2007
Cyprus
1 July 2007
Guyana
1 Feb 2008
Belarus
1 Mar 2008
Greece
1 Mar 2008
Serbia & Montenegro
1 Mar 2008
Turkey
1 Mar 2008
Burundi
1 Apr 2008
Sudan
1 Apr 2008
Ethiopia
1 Jun 2009
Latvia
1 Jan 2010
Four other states that Landmine Monitor does not believe have stockpiles
(Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, and São Tomé e Principe)
have nevertheless not officially declared the presence or absence of stockpiles,
due to their failure to submit an initial Article 7 report. Equatorial Guinea
has passed its deadline of 1 March 2003 for destroying any stockpiled
antipersonnel mines and has not informed States Parties of compliance with this
core obligation.
A number of States Parties, most notably Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Cambodia, have discovered and destroyed previously unknown stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines after formally completing their destruction programs.
Cambodia newly discovered and destroyed 15,446 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in
2004, a larger number than any year since the destruction program was completed
in 1999. The Mine Ban Treaty does not explicitly deal with this phenomenon.
However, Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: “When previously
unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have
passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under
Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and
destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.” The ICBL has
stressed the importance of timely destruction of these newly found mines, no
later than one year after discovery, and of complete transparency about numbers
and types discovered and the destruction process; it has suggested this
information should be transmitted immediately to the Implementation Support Unit
and Stockpile Destruction Standing Committee co-chairs.
A total of 57 States Parties have declared that they did not possess
stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for
research and training purposes.[23]
Since May 2004, Central African Republic, Estonia, Liberia, Papua New Guinea,
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, have officially confirmed that
they do not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.
Signatories
Landmine Monitor estimates that four of the seven signatories to the Mine
Ban Treaty stockpile approximately seven million antipersonnel mines. The
majority of these mines are held by Ukraine (5.95 million) and Poland (996,860).
Indonesia in May 2002 revealed that it has a stockpile of 16,000 antipersonnel
mines. Brunei has acknowledged possessing antipersonnel mines, possibly
Claymore-type only. It is unlikely that the other three signatories stockpile
antipersonnel mines (Cook Islands, Haiti and Marshall Islands).
The European Commission decided in 2004 to fund the destruction of
Ukraine’s 5.9 million PFM mines, and in June 2005, following the
completion of ratification procedures by Ukraine’s Parliament and
President, the EC announced that it had concluded the negotiation of the terms
of reference of a €6 million (some US$7.5 million) project to destroy the
mines. The Ministry of Defense of Poland said in July 2005 there were no
obstacles to destruction of Poland’s stockpile and estimated that the
destruction should not take more than two years.
Non-Signatories
Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines
are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of
these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million),
Russia (26.5 million) and the United States (10.4 million). Other states with
large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million), India (estimated 4-5
million) and South Korea (2 million). Other states not party to the treaty
believed to have large stockpiles are Burma, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
North Korea, Syria and Vietnam.
Russia for the first time disclosed the number of antipersonnel mines in its
stockpile is 26.5 million, of which 23.5 million are subject to destruction by
2015. Russia reported that it destroyed or disposed of approximately 19.5
million antipersonnel mines between 2000 and November 2004.
Non-State Armed Groups
During this reporting period, non-state armed groups were reported to
possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi,
Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Pakistan,
Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen and Chechnya.
Most often, these stockpiles were reported as part of seizures by government
forces. Landmines were seized from or turned in by NSAGs, or unidentified
sources, in 12 States Parties. Only three of these States Parties reported such
acquisitions in their Article 7 report: Burundi, Sudan and Turkey. The other
States Parties to seize mines or have them turned in were Bangladesh, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Philippines, Serbia
and Montenegro, Uganda and Yemen. These states have not reported on their
acquisition or destruction of antipersonnel mines.
Hussein Mohamed Aideed, former warlord and now Deputy Prime Minister of the
new Transitional National Government of Somalia, stated that his militia
possessed 3,500 landmines, and he estimated that mines in the possession of
other militias in the capital to total around 10,000. In June 2005, he informed
States Parties of his decision to destroy the antipersonnel mines held by his
militia.
Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)
Of the 147 States Parties, 74 retain over 248,000 antipersonnel mines for
research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the
Mine Ban Treaty. Burundi, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, and Turkey have joined
this list since publication of Landmine Monitor Report
2004.[24]
At least 64 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines, with the
recent additions of Central African Republic, Estonia, Liberia, Papua New
Guinea, St. Vincent and Grenadines, and
Turkmenistan.[25] Nine States
Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any
mines.[26]
During the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and during Standing Committee
discussions from 1999-2004, most States Parties have agreed that mines retained
should number in the hundreds or thousands or less, but not tens of
thousands.
Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines:
Brazil (16,125), Turkey (16,000), Algeria (15,030), Bangladesh (14,999) and
Sweden (14,798). Turkey is the recent addition to those retaining far more
mines than is standard state practice.
A total of ten States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines:
Australia (7,465), Greece (7,224), Japan (6,946), Croatia (6,400), Namibia
(6,151), Belarus (6,030), Chile (5,895), and Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan and
Tunisia (5,000 each). Serbia and Montenegro and Sudan are recent additions to
this list. In June 2004, signatory Indonesia indicated its intent to retain
10,000 mines for training purposes after it becomes a State Party.
The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain
between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.[27]
The notable addition to this group is Afghanistan, which had initially indicated
that it would not retain any mines, but reversed its decision and reported
retaining 1,076 antipersonnel mines for the training of mine detection dogs.
Another 18 States Parties retain less than 1,000
mines.[28]
A total of 24 States Parties reported consuming 6,761 mines for training and
research purposes in 2004.[29] In
2003, 17 States Parties reported consuming 3,112 mines. In 2002, 16 States
Parties reported consuming 2,540 mines.
At least 36 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in
2004: Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Cyprus,
Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Jordan,
Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Mali, Moldova, Mozambique, Nigeria, Perú, Portugal,
Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe. A
total of 26 States Parties did not report consuming any mines in 2003; 29 did
not consume any in 2002.
It is worth noting that the list of States Parties for 2004 includes at
least 10 that retain over 1,000 mines and have not reported consuming any mines
for research or training purposes for two or more consecutive years, including:
Algeria, Djibouti, Hungary, Jordan, Mozambique, Perú, Portugal, Thailand,
Tunisia and Yemen.
The ICBL believes that states that retain antipersonnel mines and apparently
do not use any of these mines for permitted purposes abuse the exception
permitted by Article 3.
The ICBL has long urged that all states should declare the intended purposes
and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. States Parties
agreed to this as part of the in the Nairobi Action Plan. Action #54 states
that those retaining mines should “provide information on the plans
requiring the retention of mines...and report on the actual use of retained
mines and the result of such use.” Argentina and Chile made a joint
proposal for expanded reporting forms for retained mines during the First Review
Conference and the June 2005 intersessional meetings. The ICBL has supported
the proposal.
Australia, Canada, Japan, South Africa and Sweden have in previous years
provided consistently detailed information on the intended uses and disposition
of their retained mines. Joining this list are Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,
Croatia, Namibia and the Netherlands who detailed their national practice during
the intersessional meetings in June 2005.
One encouraging trend is the significant number of States Parties that have
reduced the number of mines retained from the high levels originally proposed.
Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Italy,
Lithuania, Mauritania, Perú, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela and Zambia have
taken this step between March 1999 and October 2004. Nine of these States
Parties originally intended to retain 10,000 mines or
more.[30]
Transparency Reporting (Article 7)
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that “Each State Party shall
report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable,
and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this
Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement
aspects of the convention. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report
annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.
The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial
transparency measures reports is an impressive 96 percent. This compares
favorably with rates in previous years: 91 percent in 2004, 88 percent in 2003,
75 percent in 2002 and 63 percent in 2001.
A total of 18 State Parties have submitted initial reports since May 2004:
Belarus, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte D’Ivoire, Estonia,
Greece, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and Grenadines, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Timor Leste and
Turkey. For several of these States Parties, the deadline for submittal had
been several years ago: Namibia (August 1999), Guinea (September 1999), St.
Lucia (March 2000), Liberia (November 2000), Côte D’Ivoire (30 May
2001), and Nauru (July 2001).
Only four States Parties have a pending deadline: Ethiopia (28 November
2005), Latvia (30 June 2006), Bhutan (31 July 2006), and Vanuatu (28 August
2006). Latvia has submitted three voluntary reports, but will still need to
submit its first formal report to the United Nations within the deadline
specified.
A total of six States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports:
Equatorial Guinea (due by 28 August 1999), Cape Verde (30 April 2002), Cameroon
(27 August 2003), Gambia (27 August 2003), São Tomé e Principe (28
February 2004), and Guyana (31 July 2004).
States Parties did not improve on the rate of annual updates submitted for
the previous calendar year, which were due by 30 April 2005. As of 1 September
2005, a total of 89 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar
year 2004; 48 States Parties had not submitted
updates.[31] This equates to a
compliance rate of 65 percent. The rate of compliance for annual reports for
calendar year 2003 was 78 percent. The rate for calendar year 2002 was 62
percent.
In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban
Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Cameroon in 2001,
Gambia in 2002, and Lithuania in 2002, when they were signatories. Then
non-State Party Latvia and signatory Poland submitted voluntary reports in 2003,
2004 and 2005.
In June 2005, Sri Lanka submitted its first voluntary Article 7 report. It
is quite detailed in many areas, but does not report on stockpiled antipersonnel
mines. The other states which have submitted voluntary reports have included
stockpile information. Several other countries have stated their intention to
submit voluntary reports, including Azerbaijan, China and Mongolia.
National Implementation Measures (Article 9)
Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall
take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the
imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity
prohibited” by the treaty.
Only 44 of 147 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the
treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article
9.[32] This is an increase of four
State Parties since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2004:
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, El Salvador and Yemen. A total of 23 States
Parties report that steps to enact legislation are
underway.[33] Chad, Chile and
Malawi initiated the process in the past year. However, legislation has been
reported to be in progress for more than two years in Bangladesh, Benin,
Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Perú, Swaziland and Uganda.
A total of 36 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new
law is required to implement the
treaty.[34] Central African
Republic, Estonia and Papua New Guinea joined this category in the past year.
Guinea-Bissau is exploring the possibility of adopting new legislation even
though it has deemed existing legislation sufficient. The Dominican Republic,
Holy See, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Qatar believe that no steps are
necessary because they have never produced, stockpiled or used antipersonnel
mines and are not mine-affected. The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need
for all states to pass legislation that includes penal sanctions for any
potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation
of all aspects of the treaty.
Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 43 States Parties to enact
appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban
Treaty.[35] Albania, Cameroon and
the Republic of Congo were removed from the “in progress” category
this year having reported no concrete progress in enacting legislation in over
three previous years.
The ICRC has produced an Information Kit on the Development of National
Legislation to Implement the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel
Mines. This kit is available from the ICRC in English, French, Russian and
Spanish and is also available on the
internet.[36]
Special Issues of Concern
Compliance with Article 5
Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires the destruction of emplaced mines
as soon as possible, but not more than 10 years after entry into force of the
treaty for a particular State Party. Meeting the deadline is a matter of great
importance, but there are also other issues of concern relating to
implementation of and compliance with Article 5.
The ICBL has identified nine States Parties that it considers affected by
mines and UXO, but which do not officially declare areas containing or suspected
of containing antipersonnel mines in their Article 7 reports: Bangladesh,
Belarus, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Moldova, Namibia, Philippines and
Sierra Leone. States Parties should establish a specific process for clarifying
situations such as these when a State Party declares no mined areas but there is
some evidence to the contrary.
Djibouti initially declared mined areas, but after clearance operations
stated it was “mine safe” and indicated it had fulfilled its Article
5 obligation. It is evident, however, that mined areas still exist in Djibouti.
States Parties should establish a specific process for clarifying whether a
State Party has met its obligation under Article 5 to clear all antipersonnel
mines in mined areas, when there may be some evidence to the contrary.
Joint Military Operations, Transit, and Foreign Stockpiling (Article 1)
Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to
“never under any circumstances...assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention.” There has been a lack of clarity, however, regarding what
types of acts are permitted or prohibited within the context of the prohibition
on assistance. Many States Parties have recognized the need to address this
issue and to share views on policy and practice.
An understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and
the meaning of “assist” has begun to emerge. A total of 36 States
Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and
implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint
operations with a state not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use
antipersonnel mines.[37] Tanzania
is one State Party that has voluntarily included this information in its annual
transparency measures report.
Some States Parties have declared that only “active” or
“direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel
mines are used is prohibited; each country’s understanding of what
constitutes “active” or “direct” assistance
varies.[38] Australia has formally
declared that it is permissible to provide “indirect support such as the
provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention
engaging in such [prohibited] activities,” presumably including the laying
of antipersonnel mines. It reiterated this view in the June 2005 intersessional
meetings.
A total of 26 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through,
foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing of foreign antipersonnel mines on
national territory.[39] Germany,
Japan, Qatar and the United Kingdom have stated that US antipersonnel mine
stocks in their countries are not under their national jurisdiction or control.
Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in a transparency measures report
the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by a non-State Party on its
territory. Russian forces hold 18,200 antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan.
Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Antihandling Devices (Article 2)
Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL
has emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine
equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from
an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an
antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. However, applying the definition
in Article 2 to all mines that function as antipersonnel mines, including those
designated as antivehicle mines, remains a contentious issue. The way that
States Parties agree—or disagree—on what practices are acceptable
may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and
universalized.
Many States Parties support the view that any mine, despite its label or
design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person
is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited. Among the States Parties that have
publicly expressed this understanding of what was agreed upon during the treaty
negotiations in Oslo in 1997 are Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Perú, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland and Zambia.
At the June 2005 intersessional meetings, Argentina also appeared to endorse
this interpretation when it stressed that any mine that explodes from the
presence, proximity or contact of a person is
banned.[40] The only other State
Party to speak on the issue at that time was Australia, which emphasized that
any antivehicle mine that acts as an antipersonnel mine is prohibited; it is the
function of the munition that
matters.[41]
Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom are the only States
Parties that have publicly stated the view that the Mine Ban Treaty does not
apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive
fuzes or antihandling devices. Sweden, while not directly ascribing to this
position, has expressed the view that the CCW is the more appropriate forum to
consider any restrictions on mines other than antipersonnel mines.
A situation is developing wherein some States Parties have chosen to keep
for future use and export mines that other States Parties have determined are
antipersonnel mines and destroyed. This is already the case for mines with
tripwires, tilt rods, and overly sensitive antihandling devices.
There appears to be broad agreement that a mine that relies on a tripwire as
its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. However,
the Czech Republic has stated it does not consider the use of tripwires with an
antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty, and a Czech company
has offered for sale mines with a tripwire fuze.
The low amount of lateral pressure necessary to activate a mine with a tilt
rod fuze makes it very susceptible to be activated by a person. Canada, France,
Hungary, Mali and the United Kingdom have removed tilt rod fuzes from their
inventories. However, in 2004 and 2005 the Croatian company Agencija
Alan continued to offer TMRP-6 mines with tilt rod fuzes for sale. Croatia
has acknowledged that it stockpiles TMRP-6 mines with tilt rod fuzes that
function at the level of 1.3 to 1.7 kilograms. Slovenia has also acknowledged
possessing TMRP-6 mines that are equipped with both pressure and tilt rod fuzes.
The Czech Republic has acknowledged possessing tilt rod fuzes, but has stated
that the mines that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and
will be retired with 15 years. Sweden acknowledges possessing antivehicle mines
with tilt rods, but has not formally expressed a view on their legality under
the Mine Ban Treaty.
States Parties have been reluctant to report on the measures taken to ensure
that mines with antihandling devices are compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.
Some States Parties have simply indicated that their mines and antihandling
devices are compliant with the treaty. Unfortunately, States Parties have not
provided technical detail to support this determination. Bulgaria has
decommissioned its existing stocks of TM-46 antivehicle mines with antihandling
devices, and the destruction process is expected to be completed by the end of
2005. Slovakia has prohibited the use of the Ro-3 fuze as an antihandling
device. Belarus has committed to destroying MUV-type fuzes used as antihandling
devices and booby-traps.
Several States Parties have reported that they have removed from service and
destroyed certain ordnance items that, when used with mines, can cause them to
function as antipersonnel mines. Belgium has banned pressure and tension
release firing devices (igniters) used as booby-traps. France has destroyed a
number of unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes. Germany and Slovakia
have retired and destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines.
Claymore and OZM-72 Command-Detonated Mines
Certain types of mines are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all
instances because they are designed to be capable of being both
command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and
victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which
is prohibited by the treaty). In many cases, options for both means of
utilization are packaged with the mine.
The most common mines in this category are Claymore-type directional
fragmentation munitions.[42] In
2004 and 2005, several States Parties have extended this application to a type
of bounding fragmentation mine, the OZM-72, which also possesses these inherent
dual-use capabilities for command and target activation. Lithuania and Moldova
have reported modifying OZM-72 mines so that they no longer consider them
antipersonnel mines, and do not count them as mines to be destroyed or mines
retained for training. Most recently, Belarus decided to convert over 200,000
OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines into command-detonated munitions.
A total of 26 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of
Claymores and/or OZM-72 mines.[43]New to this list is Nicaragua which reported in 2005 that a total of 121
MON-50 and MON-200 (Claymore-type) mines previously reported as mines retained
for training have been excluded from the list as these mines are “not
included in the restrictions established by the Ottawa
Convention.”[44] However,
Nicaragua has not reported on what steps it has taken to ensure that the mines
can only be used in command-detonated mode, so that they do in fact conform to
the treaty.
Some States Parties have chosen to physically modify the mine to accept only
electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire
assembly and appropriate blasting cap. Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand and
Sweden have reported on the measures taken to modify these mines in their
Article 7 reports.
Another 27 States Parties have declared that they do not possess or have
destroyed Claymore and/or OZM-72
mines.[45] The vast majority of
States Parties, a total of 92, have not declared whether their forces possess
these types of mines. While 45 of these States Parties have declared that they
do not possess any antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases it cannot be
presumed that this includes dual-use command-detonated mines.
In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take
steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for
victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are
instructed as to their legal obligations.
[1] Of the 80, 59 were signatories
who ratified and 21 were non-signatories who acceded. [2] 22 States abstained from voting
for UNGA Resolution 59/84 in December 2004: Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Palau, Russia, South Korea, Syria, United
States, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. This marked the first time Palau voted on the
annual pro-mine ban resolution. The Marshall Islands continued to be the only
signatory to abstain, as in previous years. [3] Voting results by year on the
annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation
of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38A)―142 in favor, none
against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77N)―147 in favor, none
against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54B)—139 in favor, one
against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33V)―143 in favor, none
against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24M)―138 in favor, none
against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74)―143 in favor, none
against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53)―153 in favor, none
against, 23 abstaining. [4] Geneva Call is a Swiss-based
NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment, a signatory agrees to prohibit use,
production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake
and cooperate in mine action. [5] The full name is the Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. [6] India has also indicated that
it opted to defer compliance, although that is not recorded with the other
deferrals on the UN depositary website. [7] Remotely-delivered
antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Amended Protocol II States Parties
Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine,
and the United States. India has explored development of such systems. The
Mine Ban Treaty requires Belarus, Greece, and Turkey to destroy their
remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Mine Ban Treaty States
Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the United
Kingdom have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered
antipersonnel mines. [8] Sweden was the first to ratify
Protocol V, in June 2004, followed by Lithuania and Sierra Leone in September
2004. Ten states ratified in 2005, in this order: Croatia, Germany, Finland,
Ukraine, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Nicaragua, and most recently
on 16 September, Liberia. [9] In Burundi, there was one
notable allegation of use of antipersonnel mines by the Army which Landmine
Monitor was unable to confirm. In June 2005, the administrator of the commune of
Mpanda (Bubanza province, about 10 kilometers from Bujumbura) said he thought
the new Burundi Army (Forces de Défense Nationale, FDN) was responsible
for laying an antipersonnel mine that killed two people near a military
position. [10] See past editions of
Landmine Monitor Report for details. Angola, Ecuador, and Ethiopia have
admitted using antipersonnel mines as a signatory. Landmine Monitor has cited
credible allegations of use while a signatory by Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan and
Uganda. Other current States Parties who used antipersonnel mines since the
early 1990s, as non-signatories, include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, Eritrea, Perú, Serbia and Montenegro,
Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. [11] See also, Landmine Monitor
Fact Sheet, “Non-State Armed Groups and the Mine Ban,” prepared by
Mines Action Canada, June 2005, released at the intersessional meetings in
Geneva. [12] Use in Pakistan was recorded
as small-scale and sporadic last year. [13] There are 51 confirmed
current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties
that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia,
Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared
possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if
this represents the result of production, export, or capture. [14] Thirty-three States Parties
to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Perú, Portugal,
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. [15] Nine States Parties have not
officially declared the ultimate disposition of production capabilities in
transparency reports despite admissions or evidence of prior production
activities: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway,
Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. For many of these states the production of
antipersonnel mines ceased prior to entry into force of the treaty. [16] Since it began reporting in
1999, Landmine Monitor has removed Turkey and FR Yugoslavia (now Serbia and
Montenegro) from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2003
following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state
factories. [17] Statement by Amb. Paul
Meyer, Canada, to the Conference on Disarmament, 29 July 2004. [18] In its previous edition,
Landmine Monitor estimated that 65 countries held 200 million antipersonnel
mines. [19] As of 1 October 2005, the
following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine
stockpiles: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia,
Republic of Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El
Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Perú, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay,
Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. [20] This total is about 1
million mines higher than reported last year. More than 400,000 stockpiled mines
were destroyed in the reporting period, and the remainder of the total reflects
adjustments by Landmine Monitor for mines destroyed by current States Parties
prior to their joining the treaty, most notably Belarus. [21] In some cases, the actual
physical destruction of mines had not begun as of 1 October 2005. Landmine
Monitor considers states to be “in progress” if they have reported
they are formulating destruction plans, seeking international financial
assistance, conducting national inventories, or constructing destruction
facilities. [22] Cameroon declared 500 mines
for training and research purposes in a voluntary transparency report submitted
in March 2001. Landmine Monitor received a report by the Cameroon military,
dated 5 May 2003, which states that a total of 9,183 antipersonnel mines had
been destroyed on 17 April 2003. [23] The following States Parties
have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Andorra, Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte D’Ivoire,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein,
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Trinidad and
Tobago. [24] The 74 total includes
Botswana, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau, which have expressed their intention
to retain mines, but have not declared a number. [25] Of the 64 choosing not to
retain antipersonnel mines,18 once possessed stockpiles. [26] Bhutan, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, São Tomé e
Principe, and Vanuatu have not indicated whether they intend to retain
antipersonnel mines; most have not yet submitted an Article 7 report. Of these
nine, only DR Congo, Ethiopia and Guyana are thought to possess mines. [27] 38 States Parties retain
between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya,
FYR Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Perú,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tanzania, Thailand,
Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia. [28] Eighteen States Parties
retain less than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Colombia, Republic of Congo, El
Salvador, Eritrea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mauritania,
Moldova, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Uruguay and
Zimbabwe. [29] The following 24 States
Parties reported consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2004: Argentina (92),
Australia (70), Bangladesh (1), Belgium (267), Brazil (875), Bulgaria (12),
Canada (21), Chile (350), Colombia (100), Croatia (78), Czech Republic (20),
Denmark (69), France (11), Germany (41), Ireland (31), Japan (1,413), Luxembourg
(20), Netherlands (377), Nicaragua (810), Slovakia (54), Slovenia (5), South
Africa (33), Spain (1,103) and Sweden (908). [30] Argentina, Australia,
Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, Italy, Spain and Turkmenistan originally
intended to retain 10,000 antipersonnel mines or more. [31] The 48 States Parties not
submitting updates were: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados,
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
Guinea, Honduras, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar,
Maldives, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, Serbia and
Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Swaziland, Timor Leste, Togo,
Uganda, and Uruguay. [32] A total of 44 States Parties
have enacted implementation legislation: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, St.
Vincent and Grenadines, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. [33] A total of 23 States Parties
are in the process of enacting legislation: Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Chile, DR
Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Perú, Philippines, Rwanda, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland and Uganda. [34] A total of 36 States Parties
have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider that new legislation is
necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, Bulgaria, Central
African Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See,
Jordan, Kiribati, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova,
Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela. [35] Those without progress
toward national implementation measures include: Albania, Afghanistan, Angola,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica,
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guyana, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, São Tomé e Principe, Serbia and Montenegro,
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay. [36]
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JR2C?OpenDocument [37] 36 States Parties have
declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of
activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a
state not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines:
Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe. [38] States Parties that have
declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in
joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited: Australia,
Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Zambia and Zimbabwe. [39] A total of 26 States Parties
have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or
authorizingofforeign antipersonnel mines on national territory:
Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand,
Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom and Zambia. [40] Oral remarks to the Standing
Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 17 June
2005. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW). [41] Oral remarks to the Standing
Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 17 June
2005. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW). [42] The most common types of
Claymore-type mines are the M18A1 (produced originally by the US but also widely
copied or license-produced), MON series (produced in the former USSR and other
Warsaw Pact countries) and the MRUD (produced in the former Yugoslavia). [43] States Parties that possess
dual-use command-detonated mines: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Canada, Colombia,
Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Honduras, Hungary, Lithuania, Malaysia, Moldova,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Serbia and
Montenegro, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United
Kingdom and Zimbabwe. [44] Article 7 Report, Form D, 19
May 2005. [45] States Parties that do not
possess dual-use command-detonated mines: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France,
Germany, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Perú,
Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Turkmenistan, Uruguay and Yemen.