Key developments since May 2004: The National Mine Action Authority
estimates that there are some 8,000 square kilometers of contaminated land in
Iraq, including 1,578 square kilometers affected by mines and UXO, and 6,370
square kilometers of border minefields. This estimate is expected to increase
once the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS) is completed in 2006. As of
September 2005, the ILIS had identified 1,460 affected communities, including 83
communities with high impact, 519 with medium and 858 with low impact. In
October 2004, NMAA adopted a national mine action strategy which envisions an
Iraqi society “free from fear and impact” of landmines and UXO by
2020. According to NMAA, in 2004 more than 61 square kilometers of land were
cleared, including 56 square kilometers through battle area clearance; 13,321
antipersonnel mines, 8,806 antivehicle mines and 1,170,478 UXO were destroyed.
NMAA has stated that mine action funding of US$355 million is needed for the
period 2004 to 2008. International donations to mine action in Iraq totaled
about $58.7 million in 2004. The Iraqi government is reportedly investing $20
million in mine action.
Opposition forces have used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and most
frequently, improvised explosive devices, both command-detonated and
victim-activated. In August 2005, a US official said IED attacks were up 100
percent from the previous year. The transitional government of Iraq is studying
accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Iraq voted in favor of UN General Assembly
Resolution 59/84 on 3 December 2004, supporting universalization of the Mine Ban
Treaty. Given the destruction of Iraq’s production facilities, and the
government’s statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines,
Landmine Monitor has decided to remove Iraq from the list of countries producing
antipersonnel mines.
In 2004, there were at least 261 new, recorded mine/UXO casualties; the
actual number is likely much higher. As of August 2005, the ILIS had recorded
510 “recent” casualties; more than 20 percent were children under
15. The ILIS had also recorded 6,657 “less recent” casualties.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Iraq has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Republic of
Iraq is a transitional entity and cannot join international treaties until its
constitutional arrangements are in place and elections
held.[1] According to Iraq’s
Foreign Minister in August 2005, “The government of Iraq is about to
carefully study the joining of the
Convention.”[2] In June 2005,
an Iraqi delegation stated, “Iraqi officials announced on several
occasions that the Iraqi elected government will adhere to the conventions and
treaties concerning international humanitarian law such as the antipersonnel
mines convention. It is now under thorough study so that Iraq will be ready for
accession.”[3] A disability
group supporting the ban on antipersonnel mines met with Prime Minister Ayed
Alawi on 8 December 2004 and the Prime Minister stated that he is in favor of
joining the Mine Ban Treaty, as soon as Iraq is legally
eligible.[4]
Iraq’s Deputy Minister of Planning led the country’s delegation
to the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in
November-December 2004. In a statement to the high level segment, he expressed
Iraq’s high interest in joining the
treaty.[5] Iraq participated in a
regional seminar in Algeria in May 2005 regarding implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty. Iraq also attended the intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2005
and made a statement to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention.
Iraq voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 59/84 on 3 December
2004, supporting the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty. This was the first time Iraq was eligible to vote on the pro-mine ban
UNGA resolutions introduced annually since 1996.
Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Amended
Protocol II on landmines.
On 3 November 2004, Iraq attended the inaugural meeting in New York of the
Forum of Mine-Affected Countries (FOMAC), a group of high level representatives
from mine-affected countries. FOMAC was formed to encourage cooperation
between mine-affected
countries.[6]
Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer
Iraq was a producer of antipersonnel mines in the past, including, according
to an Iraqi diplomat, in the period leading up to the 2003
invasion.[7] This same official told
Landmine Monitor in 2004 that all mine production capacity had been destroyed in
the Coalition bombing campaign.[8]
Other sources have confirmed that information, noting the destruction of the
Aloa’oa’a and Hutten factories in Alexandria, and Aloudisie in Al
Youssfiz.[9]
Given the destruction of Iraq’s production facilities and the
government’s statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines,
Landmine Monitor has decided to remove Iraq from the list of countries producing
antipersonnel mines or retaining the right to produce them. Still, Landmine
Monitor is concerned that there has been no official statement regarding a
prohibition on production of antipersonnel
mines.[10]
Iraq is the only state known to export antipersonnel mines in the past that
by the late 1990s had not instituted an export ban or moratorium, or at least
made a policy declaration of no export. The transitional government has not
made a statement regarding export of antipersonnel mines. In practice, Landmine
Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s.
In addition to its own production, Iraq had obtained mines manufactured by
Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the
former Soviet Union and the United States. The total size of Iraq’s mine
stockpile is not known, and will likely be difficult to determine. Mines, along
with a full range of ammunition, were dispersed to storage locations across the
country and subsequently abandoned as the Iraqi Army disintegrated after the
March 2003 invasion.
Iraqi government and Coalition forces continue to find landmines in arms
caches across the country. At least 800 mines were captured by US forces in
November 2004 in weapons caches located in
Fallujah.[11] Italian forces
captured 150 antipersonnel mines and 182 antivehicle mines near their base in
Nassiriya in October 2004.[12]
Engineers from Kazakhstan and Ukraine disposed of 470 antipersonnel and
antivehicle mines in July 2005 in Wasit province, southeast of
Baghdad.[13] US forces discovered
29 antipersonnel mines among the ordnance hidden behind a false wall during a
search in Tuz Khurmatu in Diyala province in June
2005.[14]
Use
In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying
by Coalition or Iraqi government military forces. However, Iraqi
representatives have not articulated the instructions Iraqi forces receive about
the use of antipersonnel mines.[15]
Opposition forces have used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and most
frequently, improvised explosive devices (IEDs). An IED that is
victim-activated―that explodes from the contact of a person―is
considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An
IED that is command-detonated―where the user decides when to explode
it―is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices in Iraq has
often been in violation of international humanitarian law, as when civilians are
directly targeted.
Non-State Armed Groups
Armed non-state groups have used a wide variety of explosive devices to carry
out attacks. The extent to which these opposition forces have been using
factory-produced antipersonnel mines is not well-documented. Insurgent forces
have used improvised explosive devices extensively. Media reports more often
cite command-detonated bombs and IEDs, but victim-activated explosive devices
have also been used. In September 2004, according to Polish forces, four men
were killed while laying mines on a bridge near
As-Suwayrah.[16]
The commander of US logistics efforts in Iraq stated in an August 2005 press
briefing that there were approximately 30 IED attacks per week against supply
convoys; a 100 percent increase from the year
before.[17] In 2004, Landmine
Monitor recorded 238 US military personnel killed by attacks involving IEDs in
Iraq. Between January and July 2005, 233 US military personnel were killed in
IED incidents in Iraq.[18] Roadside
IEDs killed five British soldiers in Maysan during June, July and August
2005.[19]
Opposition forces have laid antivehicle mines on frequently traveled
roads.[20] For example, 14 US
Marines were killed near Al-Hadithah when their amphibious assault vehicle
detonated three antivehicle mines stacked on top of each
other.[21] In an incident on 25
April 2005, seven members of an Iraqi family were injured when their car
detonated a mine while traveling along a road in the Al-Dujayl area near
Al-Duluiyah.[22] Insurgents have
also used antivehicle mine components as detonators in IEDs.
Insurgents also apparently make use of minefields in conducting ambushes.
For example, civilian truck drivers fled into an adjacent mined area after their
convoy was attacked near Al-Khalidiyah, west of
Baghdad.[23] It is unclear whether
the mines were newly emplaced or if it was an existing minefield.
US Forces
US forces did not use antipersonnel mines during the invasion of Iraq and
have not used them during the occupation and ongoing
conflict.[24] The US is party to
Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which regulates
the types of antipersonnel mines that can be used and defines the circumstances
of their use until either their clearance or abandonment. The extent to which
US forces may utilize existing mined areas for its military benefit is not
known.[25]
In March 2005, a media report noted US plans to deploy a remote-controlled
munition activation system called Matrix to Iraq. A total of 25 Matrix systems
were reportedly to be sent to Iraq for use by units of the Army’s Stryker
Brigade by May 2005.[26] Matrix
relies on an M18A1 Claymore mine as its munition along with a man-in-the-loop
detonating mechanism and unknown types of sensors to detect
targets.[27] In late February 2005,
Human Rights Watch raised questions about the potential harm these mines could
pose to civilians.[28] (See US
country report for more details).
Other Coalition Forces
Like the US, some of the other Coalition forces are party to CCW Amended
Protocol II, notably South Korea. However, most members of the Coalition are
party to the Mine Ban Treaty that prohibits them from using antipersonnel mines
in any circumstances and prohibits them from assisting in any way the use,
production, stockpiling or transfer of antipersonnel mines. Forces of the
United Kingdom compose the bulk of Multinational Division Southeast in Southern
Iraq. A British general commands this division that also has troops from
Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal and Romania. All
of these states are party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
The extent to which any Coalition member exercises control of, derives
military benefit from, or ensures the effective exclusion of civilians from
existing mined areas in Iraq is not known. In November 2004, it was noted that
the positions of South Korean troops stationed in Erbil in northern Iraq were
ringed by 680 explosive devices, but the unit “is known to have removed
only one land mine so
far.”[29] Media reports
covering Coalition units engaged in operations along Iraq’s border with
Iran frequently highlight the visible threat presented by antipersonnel and
antivehicle mines in border minefields, but do not mention any effort to secure,
mark, fence or provide education to civilian
populations.[30]
Landmine and ERW Problem
There is a significant threat in Iraq from landmines and explosive remnants
of war (ERW) scattered throughout major cities and villages. The contamination
is the result of four decades of internal conflict, the Iraq-Iran war in the
1980s, the Gulf War of 1991 and the current conflict, which started in 2003.
Abandoned explosive ordnance presents a serious threat to the public. A
great deal of this was pilfered during post-war looting, and many caches of
explosive ordnance remain unsecured. Insurgents have utilized abandoned
explosive ordnance to make improvised explosive devices used against Iraqi
troops, Coalition forces, and civilians in Iraq. Some of the abandoned ordnance
is in an unstable condition, and there have been instances of unintended
detonations.[31]
Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) estimates that landmines
cover an area of 727 square kilometers, UXO-contaminated areas cover an
estimated 851 square kilometers, border minefields cover 6,370 square
kilometers, and other affected areas cover 53 square kilometers―a total of
some 8,001 square kilometers of contaminated
land.[32] While this information is
not precise, it provides a good indication of the magnitude of the impact caused
by mines and explosive remnants of war in Iraq. The figures will change when
final data from the ongoing Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS) become available.
The survey is scheduled to be completed in early 2006.
NMAA estimates that some 13 million people are affected by UXO and some 7.5
million are affected by
landmines.[33] Iraq’s total
population is estimated at 26
million.[34] In the north, the
population is mostly affected by landmines (81 percent of the affected
population), whereas in the south the population is mostly impacted by UXO (73
percent of the affected
population).[35]
As of August 2005, the ILIS, which was initiated in June 2004, had surveyed
about 40 percent of Iraq, primarily in the north and the south. According to
preliminary ILIS data, Iraq is displaying more contaminated communities than
many other countries where a landmine impact survey has taken place; the Iraqi
Kurdistan region alone, with 1,376 impacted communities identified thus far, is
one of the most contaminated areas in the
world.[36]
Of the 8,396 communities visited thus far in the north and the south, the
ILIS has defined 83 communities as high impact, 519 as medium impact, and 858 as
low impact. A total of 3,396 danger areas have been
documented.[37] (See Survey and
Assessment below for more details on the findings of the ILIS.)
Mine Action Program
National Mine Action Authority
Following the invasion in 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
established the National Mine Action Authority and the Iraq Mine Action Center
(IMAC) in Baghdad in July 2003. Two additional regional mine action centers
(RMACs) were created for the north (in Erbil) and the south (in Basra).
NMAA is organized within the Ministry of Planning and Development
Cooperation. NMAA is responsible for strategic planning and budget, project
coordination, donor relations, national mine action standards, and maintaining a
national mine action database. In 2004, an interministerial coordination and
cooperation committee was
established.[38] It consists of
representatives of the ministries of oil, industry, electricity, human rights,
culture, education, environment, health, interior and defense. The committee
reportedly meets once a
month.[39]
IMAC has responsibility for mine action programs in the Baghdad
area.[40] The Regional Mine Action
Center–South (RMAC-S) covers Basra, Muthanna, Thi Quar and Messan
governorates. The Regional Mine Action Center–North (RMAC-N) covers
Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk, and parts of Diyala and Tameem
governorates.[41] Responsibility
for mine action in Kurdistan was transferred to the Kurdistan Regional
Government in July 2004 and the RMAC-N was re-formed in November 2004 as the
Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center (IKMAC). The regional centers provide
interagency liaison, coordination meetings, information collection and analysis,
quality assurance, clearance plan design and implementation, monitoring, testing
and evaluation, as well as technical advice and clearance task
allocation.[42]
NMAA is assisted by the UN Mine Action Cluster (Cluster-VII), led by the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), and the US Department of State. Support to NMAA
focuses on the development of national management capacity and the establishment
of sustainable mine action programs in
Iraq.[43]
In June 2004, UNDP provided NMAA with the LIS team leader, and in January
2005 it provided five technical advisors (TAs) through the Vietnam Veterans of
America Foundation (VVAF). The five TAs were recruited to support NMAA in the
following areas: mine action operations management and capacity-building;
quality assurance, mine risk education/victim support services; public
relations; information technology and communications.
As of September 2005, only three TAs were left in the country. The
deteriorating security situation in 2005 jeopardized the capacity of the TAs to
do their work. The NMAA is based in the “red zone” in Baghdad, but
the TAs are located in the “green zone.” Regular contact between
NMAA and the international TAs is constrained, and travel between the offices is
a danger to all.[44] Consequently,
as of August 2005, UNDP was planning to review its support to the Iraq mine
action program.[45]
Since January 2004, UNICEF has assumed a leading role in mine risk education.
It has served as the deputy task manager for the UN Mine Action Cluster VII
since March 2004. The UN Mine Action Cluster VII also includes the UN Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) as the focal point for International Mine Action
Standards and emergency response (although it is not directly involved in Iraq),
and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which is tasked with ensuring
the execution of the mine/UXO clearance
project.[46]
The difficult security situation is by far the most significant challenge to
the implementation of the mine action program in Iraq. Security must be
addressed in all facets of mine action operations. Extreme precautions must be
taken when traveling to and from demining sites, as well as during the actual
operations. The problem also impacts the movement of people, dogs, equipment
and explosives. These security imperatives add significant costs to mine action
operations.[47]
The US government has been supporting a significant assistance program for
NMAA. The State Department contracted the US company RONCO to provide technical
and advisory support to the establishment of NMAA. RONCO was also tasked to
create an indigenous Iraqi demining organization, the Iraq Mine and UXO
Clearance Organization (IMCO), with headquarters in
Baghdad.[48] NMAA reports that
RONCO is providing trainers/advisors for all aspects of mine action, including
management, administration, finance, logistics, operations, training, quality
assurance, victim assistance, mine risk education, explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) and public relations.[49]
In 2004, RONCO provided senior advisors and technical advisors to NMAA in
Baghdad, RMAC-S in Basra, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center in
Erbil.[50]
At the end of 2004, funding for northern NGOs was handed over to the Kurdish
Regional Government and RONCO’s TA support in the north was reduced to
continued training of the remaining 28 mine detection dogs (MDDs). RONCO
reports that its technical support in Baghdad and Basra was also reduced in 2005
due to funding constraints in the US State
Department.[51] As of August 2005,
three RONCO advisors were supporting NMAA, one was supporting RMAC-S, one was
supporting the MDD program in the north, and three were supporting the Iraqi
Mine and UXO Clearance Organization
(IMCO).[52]
VVAF has supported NMAA with information management technical advice since
its inception. Since November 2003, the support has expanded to three technical
advisors assisting RMAC-S and RMAC-N, and later
IKMAC.[53]
NMAA told Landmine Monitor that as of September 2005, national mine action
standards had been drafted, but were undergoing
amendments.[54]
A national core curriculum and national standards and guidelines for mine
risk education (MRE) were produced during 2004, and were being reviewed in
2005.[55] NMAA has an accreditation
process in place for MRE agencies, but as of April 2005, no organization had
been accredited.[56]
Local organizations demining in Iraq in 2004 were the Iraqi Mine and UXO
Clearance Organization, Pirmam Demining Organization (PDO), Tiroj Demining
Organization (TDO), Bawaji Demining Organization (BDO), Aras Demining
Organization (ADO) and Khabat Zangana
Company.[57] These organizations
were established during the UNOPS period in northern Iraq, then sustained under
the CPA with US State Department funds. US funding ceased at the end of 2004
and, according to the ILIS Survey Team Leader, none of these organizations
conducted mine clearance from January through June 2005; he indicated that NGOs
are no longer allowed to be funded by the Kurdish Regional
Government.[58]
International organizations involved in demining activities in Iraq in 2004
were Armor Group, Danish Demining Group (DDG), HELP, Intersos, Mines Advisory
Group (MAG), MineTech International, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), RONCO
and VVAF.[59]
In addition, the Iraq Civil Defense Corp (ICDC) responds to emergency EOD
requests, including the disposal of improvised explosive
devices.[60]Some ICDC members
received limited training from Coalition Forces, and at the end of 2004 they
received additional training from the Multi-National Force-Iraq on safety and
security standards. ICDC also has some members trained to act as an emergency
response element within the Fire Department. The overall contribution to
clearance from these response elements remains small, but they are considered by
NMAA as an important element of the mine action
program.[61]
Over the next five years, most of the area cleared is likely to be done under
commercial contracts. NMAA has said that it intends to use commercial
contracts, funded nationally, in the short term to conduct survey and clearance
until local capacity can be
developed.[62]
Accreditation
Some 28 mine action organizations were accredited by NMAA in 2004. These
included organizations carrying out clearance, surveying, training, mine risk
education, and victim
assistance.[63]
Strategic Plan
In October 2004, NMAA adopted its 2004-2020 Strategic Plan for Mine Action,
“Vision 2020.” The strategy envisions an “Iraq society free
from fear and impact of landmines and unexploded ordnance.” Vision 2020
encompasses MRE, landmine/UXO clearance and survivor assistance. Its mission is
to “effectively eliminate and control the impact of landmines and UXO on
Iraqi society.” The national plan will be refined as the ILIS yields a
better understanding of the actual level of mine/UXO
contamination.[64]
Institutional structure: to increase recognition of NMAA
internationally; to improve inclusion and coordination of mine action with all
aspects of Iraqi life at government level; to establish additional RMACs in
Hilla and Mosul; to develop planning, policy-making, coordination and
implementation mechanisms between NMAA and RMACs.
Framework: to legislate mine action by the government of Iraq; to
adopt Iraqi national mine action standards; to create legislation that enables
the registration of Iraqi NGOs under Iraqi law.
Human Resources: to train all levels of the mine action community
from computer training to management courses, in addition to the ongoing
clearance, MRE and victim assistance training.
Integrated Planning: to develop a reporting mechanism to capture all
data into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and improve
cooperation for data collection with the ministries of health, education, oil,
utilities, environment and transportation.
Impact Reduction: The strategy addresses battle area clearance
(BAC)―both surface and sub-surface―as well as continued reduction of
the impact of minefields throughout the country. It calls for three additional
BAC visual teams, 281 BAC sub-surface teams, seven manual demining teams, two
dog teams and three mechanical teams. It calls for new training centers in each
of the four regions with training programs in international and national mine
action standards, as well as in clearance, explosive ordnance disposal and mine
detection dogs.
Information: Rapid collection and redistribution of information as a
base for integrated planning. Information gathering capacity through other
ministries, such as health, education, oil, transport and interior, affects the
quantity and quality of information available for planning, decision-making and
dissemination.
NMAA foresees a funding requirement for mine action from 2004 to 2008 of
approximately $355 million. This includes approximately $296 million for mine
and UXO clearance, $18 million for human resources, $15 million for MRE, $9
million for the information pillar, $7 million for victim assistance, $7 million
for institutional structure, $1.6 million for the framework pillar and $1.4
million for integrated planning.[66]
NMAA’s strategic goals for 2005 are to:
Reduce UXO and cluster submunition casualties and increase access to land
for food production by clearing 50 percent of the UXO and submunitions strike
sites, and clearing the thousands of small caches and abandoned munitions
located in communities in central and south of Iraq;
Clear the Baghdad area;
Improve the implementation capabilities of the regional mine action
centers;
Establish a system of monitoring clearance activities and conduct a process
of post-clearance inspection of cleared land;
Build guidelines for effective management of stockpile destruction in a
safe, cost-effective and efficient
manner.[67]
The strategic plan calls for a short-term focus on developing mine action
capacities in the north-central, central and southern regions of
Iraq.[68] UNDP told Landmine
Monitor in June 2005 that while the identified priorities are in the center and
the south, the focus has been on the southern governorates, since the security
situation allows better access there; the reality is that the security situation
often determines the actual areas accessible for clearance regardless of
priority.[69]
Information management
NMAA uses the Information Management System for Mine Action as the central
repository for all data on landmines and UXO, MRE, casualties and impact
surveys. IMSMA is currently deployed in a decentralized configuration in the
regional mine action centers in the north (Erbil), center (Baghdad) and south
(Basra). Each system is geographically bound to a specific area of the country
and each region has full right over the data in its area and no right over the
data assigned to other regions. Data is synchronized on a periodic basis
between regions.[70] Each region
has data entry staff, database management/programming staff and Geographic
Information Systems (GIS)/mapping staff, with an IMSMA administrator or
information officer.[71] The
Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, with funding from the US State
Department, is providing two information management advisors to RMAC-S and one
information management advisor to
Baghdad.[72]
NMAA also uses other databases. The Emergency Survey Tool Iraq (ESTI)
database was deployed by the UN to record mine/UXO data on a community survey
basis during the post-conflict Emergency Mine Action Survey (EMAS). The purpose
was to rapidly obtain a picture of the post-conflict contamination in Iraq in
order to deploy resources to do emergency demining and clearance of impacted
areas.[73] Another database is a
declassified extract of the Tactical Minefield Database (TMFDB), which is
maintained by US military engineers. It contains data about minefields, UXO
locations, submunition strikes, IEDs and caches, as reported through military
channels from the field. This is the most extensive of the data sources because
of the widespread reporting capability of the Coalition
Forces.[74]
As can be expected, there is some degree of duplication between the various
data sources, given the lack of coordination among organizations and the
non-compatibility of databases
used.[75] According to NMAA, the
Iraq Landmine Impact Survey is considering all systems―IMSMA, TMFDB and
ESTI―in planning priorities for survey and survey coverage, and the ILIS
team plans to confirm, re-survey and update all data from all systems, and
consolidate it into IMSMA.[76] In
practice, the ILIS reports that it has used information primarily from the EMAS
and from the UNOPS LIS conducted in the northern three governorates. The ILIS
reports that it strives to ensure that all suspected hazardous areas identified
through previous surveys are accounted for in the ILIS, and that any impacted
communities not identified in early surveys are also included, so that the ILIS
becomes the primary information
resource.[77]
Survey and Assessment
The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey started in June 2004 in the north and in
August 2004 in the south of Iraq. It is implemented by the Vietnam Veterans of
America Foundation with support from the US State Department and UNDP.
Previously, an Emergency Mine Action Survey was implemented by UNMAS/UNOPS
through VVAF, Mines Advisory Group and MineTech International from June 2003 to
February 2004. UNOPS also conducted a Landmine Impact Survey in the three
Kurdish governorates of northern Iraq in
2002.[78]
The Iraq LIS aims to comprehensively survey each administrative area and
document the status of each community suffering from the impact of mines and
UXO. The ILIS operates from home bases in Erbil in the north and Basra in the
south. As of August 2005, five governorates had been completed: Basra,
Al-Samawa, Thi Quar, Messan and Qadissiya. The ILIS anticipates that the survey
will be completed in the northern three governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and
Sulaymaniyah by the end of September 2005. The survey of Kirkuk governorate
began in September 2005.[79] Survey
of all governorates south of Baghdad is envisioned by early
2006.[80] The ongoing conflict and
lack of security prevent survey activities in other governorates.
The ILIS is organized into two regional survey groups, one in the north and
one in the south. Each is led by a group team leader, and consists of two data
collection team leaders, one quality assurance officer, 16 data collectors
(eight teams), two field editors, two data entry clerks and two doctors, as well
as administrative, logistics and security staff. In total, nearly 100 staff are
taking part in the ILIS. Data entry and quality assurance is in all cases
accomplished at the Forward Operating
Base.[81]
As of 31 August 2005, the ILIS had located and visited 8,396 communities.
Among those, 6,542 were verified and documented as non-contaminated, and 1,854
as contaminated. Among those contaminated, a full LIS survey has been conducted
in 1,460 communities, including 1,097 in the north and 363 in the south.
Another 182 communities have only localized and surface contamination; rather
than a full survey, their contamination has been documented through UXO Spot
Reports. A total of 212 communities were not surveyed as their only danger
areas were those shared with other communities and therefore already
registered.[82]
In the affected communities, a total of 3,396 hazard areas have been
documented, including 2,971 in the north and 425 in the
south.[83] In addition, 491 areas
of spot contamination have been
recorded.[84]
As of August 2005, the ILIS had identified 83 communities as having a high
impact from mines and UXO, 519 with medium impact and 858 with low
impact.[85] The most common impact,
in both the north and south, is the denial of land for pasture and agriculture.
Other impacts, such as blocked access to roads, water or infrastructure, are
relatively rare.
The survey has identified 510 “recent”
casualties.[86] While the most
common victim profile is a male civilian less than 30 years of age, 37 percent
of casualties were children younger than
15.[87] (See Landmine/UXO
Casualties section.)
The northern three governorates have a higher percentage of contaminated
communities than the five governorates in the south (33 percent versus 11
percent).[88] In the north, each
surveyed community on average had more danger areas (2.7) than surveyed
communities in the south (1.2). However, the southern governorates have a
higher ratio of casualties to contaminated villages. In the north, there are
about 1.5 recent casualties per 10 contaminated communities, compared to about
nine casualties per 10 contaminated communities in the
south.[89]
Apart from the ILIS, in 2004 and 2005 ArmorGroup mobile teams surveyed 180.9
kilometers of power lines around Baghdad. No mines or UXO were
found.[90]
With respect to the LIS conducted by UNOPS in the three Kurdish governorates
of northern Iraq in 2002,[91] the
ILIS Team Leader said the ILIS is re-surveying the north so as to obtain a
comprehensive national survey, including survey of areas along the border with
Turkey that were under PKK control and were inaccessible at the time of the
UNOPS survey. Other areas that were in turmoil in 2002 also needed to be
re-visited.
He further said some of the UNOPS information has been found to be incorrect
and out of date. The ILIS team found that the greatest difficulty in using the
UNOPS data was that communities that were not contaminated but visited were
never recorded, thus the survey coverage was not well enough documented for the
subsequent ILIS to be more
focused.[92]
Mine and ERW Clearance
While Iraq has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, NMAA envisions an
Iraqi society “free from fear and impact” of landmines and UXO by
2020. As explained in the NMAA mine action strategy, this vision does not
necessarily entail 100 percent clearance, but suggests that the impact is
reduced to zero and that the landmine and UXO problem is no longer a concern to
the Iraqi public.[93]
Prior to the latest conflict, the only mine action programs were in
Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq where Mines Advisory Group, Norwegian
People’s Aid and the UNOPS Mine Action Program operated (see below).
During the emergency phase following the invasion, MAG, MineTech, NPA, RONCO and
VVAF conducted mine risk education, marking, emergency clearance, survey and
information management in northern and southern
Iraq.[94]
A number of other NGOs and commercial companies began operating in Iraq
following the end of major hostilities in 2003. However, most mine action
organizations pulled out of Iraq in late 2003 and early 2004 due to the
deteriorating security situation. Some returned and resumed operations later in
2004, and a variety of international and local actors have conducted mine
clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in northern, central and
southern Iraq in 2004 and 2005.
Nevertheless, the security situation continues to render demining operations
extremely difficult. The operations that are underway are either in remote
areas or accompanied by extraordinary security measures. The notable exception
to the constraints imposed by the security situation is in the northern Kurdish
areas where mine action activities based on years of previous operations under
the UN continue under the auspices of NMAA and RMAC-N in
Erbil.[95]
According to NMAA, 61,408,823 square meters of land were cleared in 2004. Out
this total, 2,245,468 square meters were mechanically cleared, 2,934,650 square
meters were manually cleared, 56,010,759 square meters were cleared through
battle area clearance, and 217,946 square meters were cleared by mine detection
dog teams. In the process, some 13,321 antipersonnel mines, 8,806 antivehicle
mines and 1,170,478 items of explosive ordnance were
destroyed.[96]
NMAA reported that as of October 2004, mine clearance resources in Iraq
consisted of 86 demining teams, three survey teams, 15 mine detection dog teams,
40 clearance machines of various types, 11 explosive ordnance disposal teams and
four quality assurance
teams.[97]
In a very notable finding, the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey found half of all
the affected villages surveyed in the northern three governorates reported that
spontaneous (village) demining had occurred. In the south, local demining
occurred in less than 15 percent of contaminated
communities.[98]
Northern Iraq
In 2004 and 2005, Mines Advisory Group and Norwegian People’s Aid were
the only international NGOs working on demining in northern Iraq. There were
also some local NGOs carrying out demining. MAG has been working in northern
Iraq since 1992 and has remained operational throughout the recent conflict. It
is the largest demining agency in the country and expanded its operations both
above and below the Green Line after the invasion. NPA has been active in
northern Iraq since 1995 in Sulaymaniyah governorate, and has also expanded its
operations in 2005.
Between 1997 and 2003, UNOPS was responsible for the Northern Iraqi Mine
Action Program using funds provided through the UN Oil for Food Program. UNOPS
had established a number of local Kurdish demining NGOs, which were transferred
to RMAC-N when the UNOPS program was handed over to NMAA and the CPA in
2003.[99]
The Mines Advisory
Group[100] program includes
survey and demarcation, clearance, battle area clearance, Community Liaison MRE
Teams (CL/MRE), explosive ordnance disposal, capacity-building, data collection
and analysis. In 2004 and 2005, MAG focused on clearing areas to facilitate
access to key community resources such as water, schools, mosques, and land for
grazing and cultivation. Areas for reduction and clearance are prioritized
using MAG’s own IMSMA system, which is regularly synchronized with IKMAC.
In 2004 and through July 2005, MAG fielded 20 Mine Action Teams (MATs), eight
working in the Erbil sector and 12 in the Sulaymaniyah
sector.[101] MATs can be split
into Combined Operations Response Teams, handling small EOD and UXO tasks, and
advance survey work, doing reconnaissance to identify new contaminated areas.
MATs have demining, EOD and community liaison skills to allow the teams to
respond to the priorities identified by target villages. MAG believes that
“smaller and flexible teams are more appropriate to the terrain and nature
of the tasking in Iraq.”
As of mid-2005, MAG technical and operational personnel in Iraq included 400
MAT staff, 22 mechanical staff, 36 CL/MRE staff and 15 international employees.
Their activities were supported by an additional 247 national staff and six
international employees, bringing the total number of MAG employees to 705
national and 21 international staff. MAG deploys two Armtrac 100 flail/tiller
systems fitted with magnets, one armored bulldozer, one armored excavator and
three mine detection dogs.
In 2004, MAG manually searched and/or cleared 878,328 square meters of
minefields and visually reduced an additional 2,268,965 square meters of
minefields. It also manually searched and/or cleared 250,297 square meters of
battle areas and visually reduced an additional 9,607,923 square meters of
battle areas. In the process, 8,077 mines, 80,166 items of UXO and 1,452
cluster submunitions were destroyed. Twenty-six minefields were cleared and
another 75 minefields were identified and demarcated, covering an area of
6,071,854 square meters. As part of clearance activities, 92,549 square meters
of land were prepared mechanically and 27,926 square meters were searched by
dogs.
During the first quarter of 2005, 290,059 square meters of minefield were
manually searched and/or cleared, and an additional 1,406,807 square meters were
reduced through visual area reduction. Another 23,383 square meters of
battlefield areas were visually reduced. In the process, 469 mines, 6,996 items
of UXO and 1,482 cluster submunitions were destroyed. Seventeen minefields were
cleared and six minefields were identified and demarcated, covering an area of
247,932 square meters. As part of clearance activities, 53,229 square meters
were prepared mechanically. MAG estimated that in 2004 through the first
quarter of 2005, some 1,282,026 people benefited from its clearance activities.
In addition, MAG is working with the Iraqi National Guard (ING) to train a
company of 50 soldiers from the Kirkuk barracks to develop a more sustainable
clearance and EOD capacity. The ING program will run throughout 2005 and
2006.
MAG’s budget for Iraq was US$10.6 million in 2004 and $8.57 million for
2005. Donors in 2004 and 2005 included Adopt-a-Minefield, Belgium, Netherlands,
Cordaid, ECHO (European Commission), SIDA (Sweden), Trocaire (Ireland), the US
State Department, and Department for International Development (UK).
The Norwegian People’s
Aid[102] mine action program
started in 1995. NPA has carried out explosive ordnance disposal, manual
clearance, emergency survey, mine risk education and permanent marking. In
2004, some 170 staff were engaged in manual demining, supported by one flail
machine and one combined excavator/sifter. NPA operated in the Sharbazher area,
Halabja, and Diyala province in the east-center of the country. During 2004,
NPA manually cleared 210,165 square meters of land, destroying 594 mines and 546
UXO. In addition, it cleared 65,798 square meters mechanically and 115,400
square meters through BAC, destroying 313 mines and 44,188 UXO. NPA also
surveyed 168,810 square meters of land and demarcated 64,581 square meters.
In 2004, NPA mine action program expenditures amounted to NOK 7.75 million
(about $1.15 million).[103] In
addition to using its own funds, the organization was funded by the US State
Department, Norway and Swiss Labour Association.
Between January and May 2005, NPA manually cleared 106,819 square meters of
land, destroying 534 mines and 179 UXO. In addition, it cleared 3,500 square
meters through BAC and mechanically cleared 175 square meters, destroying nine
mines and 1,402 UXO. It surveyed an additional 4,300 square meters. For this
period, NPA spent a NOK 2 million (about $296,740) contribution from Norway.
In 2004, ArmorGroup surveyed 3.5 square kilometers of land near Kirkuk
and cleared 29 mines from that area. In addition, it surveyed and where
necessary cleared 1,105 square kilometers of land in various locations in Erbil
and Nassiriyah governorates. As of September 2004, ArmorGroup was conducting
battle area clearance near Tikrit, and had cleared 413,000 square
meters.[104]
The US company RONCO has an extensive mine detection dog program. As
of August 2005, 46 dog teams had been trained, accredited and assigned to
various clearance NGOs located in Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Soran. RONCO
has one Technical Advisor―a senior dog trainer―working in Erbil and
Soran. Thirty local personnel are also employed under this program including
dog handlers, dog trainers, security personnel, and a small support
staff.[105]
A number of local clearance NGOs have been conducting demining since
2003, and were supported by the US State Department, with technical advice
provided by RONCO in 2003 and
2004.[106]
Tiroj Demining Organization(TDO) was established as an NGO in
2003. TDO’s area of operation is Dohuk and parts of Mosul governorates.
In 2004, TDO had 16 mine clearance teams (each with 12 deminers, two section
leaders, one team leader and one medic); one EOD team (six operators, one team
leader and one medic); two Bozena mini-flail machine teams (one operator, one
assistant operator and one mechanic); four MDD teams (two dogs, two handlers and
one team leader); and two general survey teams (three surveyors and one team
leader).
In 2004, TDO cleared six minefields and a total of 303,129 square meters of
land manually. Another 23,395 square meters were cleared by a front-end
excavator, and 22,672 square meters were reduced by mine detection dogs. A
total of 479,493 square meters of land was prepared mechanically, and 292,000
square meters were checked by EOD teams. A total of 304 antipersonnel mines and
11,426 UXO were found and destroyed during
2004.[107]
Pirmam Demining Organization (PDO) was established as an NGO in 2001.
PDO’s operational area covers Sulaymaniyah and parts of Diyala and Kirkuk
governorates. In 2004, PDO had 23 mine clearance teams (each with 12 deminers,
two section leaders, one team leader and one medic); two EOD teams (each with
four operators, one team leader and one medic); two Bozena mini-flail machine
teams (one operator, one assistant operator and one mechanic); three MDD teams
(two dogs, two handlers and one team leader); four general survey teams (one
surveyor and one team leader).
In 2004, PDO cleared 51 minefields in which 3,961 antipersonnel mines, seven
antivehicle mines and 40,923 UXO were found and destroyed. PDO manually cleared
890,403 square meters of land, cleared an additional 125,990 square meters with
a front-end loader/excavator, reduced 31,062 square meters by MDD, and
mechanically prepared 598,771 square meters. The total area checked by the EOD
teams was about 680,935 square
meters.[108]
Bawaji Demining Organization (BDO) was established as an NGO in 2003.
BDO’s area of operations encompasses Sulaymaniyah, and parts of Erbil and
Kirkuk governorates. In 2004, BDO had 15 mine clearance teams (each with 12
deminers, two section leaders, one team leader and one medic); one EOD team
(five operators, one deputy team leader, one team leader and one medic); two
Bozena mini-flail machine teams (one operator, one assistant operator and one
mechanic); three MDD teams (two dogs, two handlers and one team leader); two
general survey teams (three surveyors and one team leader).
In 2004, BDO cleared 17 minefields in which 620 antipersonnel mines, 19
antivehicle mines and 6,855 UXO were found and destroyed. During 2004, BDO teams
manually cleared 788,719 square meters, cleared 28,999 square meters by
front-end loader/excavator, reduced 48,523 square meters by MDD, and
mechanically prepared 331,496 square meters. The EOD team checked 636,100
square meters.[109]
Aras Demining Organization (ADO) was established as an NGO in 2002.
ADO’s operational area is Erbil and parts of Mosul and Kirkuk
governorates. In 2004, ADO had 16 mine clearance teams (each with 12 deminers,
two section leaders, one deputy team leader, one team leader and one medic); two
EOD teams (six operators, one team leader and one medic); two Bozena mini-flail
machine teams (one operator, one assistant operator and one mechanic); three MDD
teams (two dogs, two handlers and one team leader); two general survey teams
(one surveyor and one team leader).
In 2004, ADO cleared 12 minefields in which 1,167 antipersonnel mines and
7,385 UXO were found and destroyed. In total, 635,920 square meters were
manually cleared, 85,963 square meters were reduced by MDD, 336,235 square
meters were prepared mechanically, and 1,506,500 square meters were checked by
EOD teams.[110]
Khabat Zangana is a demining company created in 1998. It designs and
produces demining machines, and also conducts demining through mechanical and
manual techniques. In 2004, the company reportedly cleared 192,789 square
meters of land and prepared 220,752 square meters of land mechanically. It
destroyed 383 antipersonnel mines, five antivehicle mines and one UXO. The
company was funded by RONCO until it was handed over to the regional government
in July 2005.[111]
Central and Southern Iraq
In 2004 and through mid-2005, mine clearance and EOD was carried out by
deminers from various entities, including local authorities (Civil Defense
Organization), foreign armies, a commercial company (MineTech International) and
NGOs. Three international NGOs were active in the region in 2004 and 2005:
HELP, Intersos and Danish Demining Group (DDG). The Iraqi Mine and UXO
Clearance Organization also carried out demining and training.
Due to the security situation, with repeated threats of expatriate staff
abduction, a number of international mine action organizations pulled out of
Iraq in 2003 and 2004. The following clearance organizations that operated in
the south did not resume their activities there: DanChurchAid, Handicap
International, International Mine Initiative, MAG, Mechem, NPA, Swedish Rescue
Services Agency and Swiss Foundation for Mine
Action.[112]
NMAA reported that, in 2004, the Civil Defense Organization (CDO) only
carried out a few emergency EOD
operations.[113] However, VVAF
stated that CDO has been active in many places in
Iraq.[114]
A number of foreign armies have continued to clear and destroy mines
and explosive remnants of war. Slovak military engineers mechanically cleared
an area of 574,000 square meters and manually cleared almost 14,000 square
meters in a five-month period beginning in March 2005. They also disposed of
331,000 kilograms of ammunition. Until April 2005 the Spanish Army had two
groups of deminers in Iraq, carrying out mine and ERW
clearance.[115] Slovakia has a
104-strong contingent of military engineers stationed at Hilla in central
Iraq.[116] In July 2005, media
reported that Ukrainian and Kazakh peacekeepers destroyed arms stocks abandoned
by Saddam Hussein’s former army, including 470 antivehicle and
antipersonnel mines, 354 mortars of various caliber, 63 artillery shells, and
more than 23,000 cartridges of various
caliber.[117] In June 2005, 32
peacekeepers from the Armed Forces demining unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
arrived in Iraq, marking the first presence of BiH Army deminers
abroad.[118]
Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO) was created as a
national NGO in 2003 with US Department of State support and training from
RONCO. Since early 2004, IMCO has expanded from 100 to 170 local staff. IMCO
has eight mine clearance teams (each with a team leader, six deminers, and one
medic); 11 MDD teams (one dog and handler per team); four EOD/BAC teams (each
with a team leader, eight EOD technicians, and one medic); a 17-person training
team; management and support
staff.[119]
IMCO operates in all areas of Iraq providing training to other organizations
in EOD, manual demining, MDD operations, mine action management and mine risk
education. IMCO has also provided training to local Iraqi Police and
newly-formed Iraqi military bomb disposal companies, and also provided Explosive
Hazards Awareness Training (EHAT) to Iraqi Electoral Commission
teams.[120] IMCO has worked on
high-priority clearance operations in and around Baghdad, and in Tallil and
Basra regions. As of mid-2005, IMCO was clearing minefields surrounding the
Ramallah oil fields in Basra. From February 2004 when it began clearance
operations until August 2005, IMCO had cleared more than 4.1 square kilometers
of land, and destroyed nearly 5,000 landmines and more than 81,000
UXO.[121]
HELP, the German relief organization, started its operations in Iraq
in October 2003 and was the only NGO demining in the center of Iraq in 2004.
HELP is predominantly conducting battle area clearance. Staff include 30 local
employees, split into one survey team and two BAC teams, supervised by three
international staff. Due to the security situation, HELP left Iraq in April
2004 but returned three weeks later. HELP international staff subsequently left
in September 2004 and had not returned as of September 2005. The annual budget
for 2004 was €650,000, mostly funded by Germany.
From March 2004 through February 2005, HELP conducted battle area clearance
of 1,001,824 square meters of land around Baghdad. It destroyed 92
antipersonnel mines, four antivehicle mines, 344 cluster submunitions, 14,762
shells and other items. From March 2005 through August 2005, it cleared 2,154
square meters through BAC. A total of 5,905 UXO were destroyed. In addition,
some 16,100 square meters with 22 UXO were
cleared.[122]
Intersos, the Italian NGO, started its Iraq demining activities in the
Basra area in 2003. In 2004, Intersos was to be engaged in an UNMAS project
entitled Emergency Mine Action in Iraq, initially scheduled from March to May
2004. The project aimed to create three fully trained and equipped Iraqi
EOD/BAC teams. Because of the deteriorating security situation, the project
halted in mid-April 2004. Intersos was due to resume the project at the end of
September 2005. This was to be followed by a new project to establish a
management structure and four more clearance teams for a second national NGO
funded by UNDP at the end of October
2005.[123]
Danish Demining Group, funded by UNDP, is establishing a national NGO
with 10 fully equipped and trained Iraqi EOD/BAC teams to carry out EOD and BAC
field operations and MRE, as well as management, information system and
logistic/ administrative activities. Some $1.67 million has been pledged for
this project, which is expected to last 12 months beginning in October
2005.[124] DDG conducts battle
area clearance and explosive ordnance disposal, with a primary focus on land for
cultivation. As of July 2005, DDG had cleared over 1.2 million square meters of
agricultural land. DDG also performs mine risk education with four three-member
teams. Since February 2005, DDG has submitted dangerous area reports to RMAC-S.
DDG’s national staff consists of 62 people, including paramedics and 12
office staff. In addition, there are 10 international staff for
supervision.[125]
NPA was involved in an Emergency Mine Action Program in the area of
Baghdad to assist in the clearance of the city from June 2003 until its closure
in May 2004, when it was suspended due to the security situation. More than
300,000 items of UXO were cleared from houses, storage sites, tanks, ditches and
canals during that period. NPA trained 36 staff in EOD, who were transferred to
IMCO at the closure of the
project.[126]
MineTech started its demining operations in May 2003 as part of the
UNMAS Rapid Response Plan executed through UNOPS. The project was funded until
November 2004 by UNMAS, and from December 2004 until June 2005 by the Iraqi
Trust Fund. Since August 2004, MineTech has trained, equipped and operated 15
national EOD/BAC teams. The project was terminated in June 2005 due to a lack
of donor funding, and the 15 national clearance teams had to be laid
off.[127] MineTech’s work
in 2004 and 2005 focused on agricultural land, former military staging areas and
storage bunkers, as well as some schools. In 2004, MineTech searched and/or
cleared 6,405,541 square meters of land. In 2005, it searched and/or cleared
4,783,994 square meters. From September 2003 until the beginning of August
2004, MineTech located and destroyed 1,924 antipersonnel mines, 7,719
antivehicle mines, 9,808 items of rockets and missiles, and 165,041
UXO.[128]
Mine Risk Education
An MRE needs assessment workshop for Iraq took place in Amman, Jordan, in
October 2004. At this meeting, MRE partners developed a 2005 activity plan for
mine risk education in Iraq. Another needs assessment workshop took place in
April 2005, focusing on national capacity-building, community liaison,
integration of MRE into the school national curriculum, and the need for MRE
among internally displaced persons (IDPs). All of the workshops were funded by
UNICEF and facilitated by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD).[129]
At-risk groups vary by region. In southern Iraq, farmers and Bedouin nomads
are believed to be particularly at risk due to the nature of their livelihoods,
as are scrap metal dealers. Men are the predominant at-risk group followed by
children, particularly boys. In central Iraq, in addition to those groups,
IDPs are considered to be a major at-risk group, as are the general population
of Sadr City in Baghdad and those visiting cemeteries in
Najaf.[130]
The National Mine Action Authority is the body with authority for the overall
coordination of MRE in Iraq. Organizations involved in mine risk education in
Iraq during 2004 and 2005 included the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) and
local Iraqi NGOs such as the Kurdistan Organization for Mine Awareness (KOMA)
North, KOMA South, and MEO (an acronym for the Arabic name Tigris and
Euphrates), as well as IMCO, the national clearance NGO. In addition,
international organizations such as Handicap International, Intersos, MAG,
RONCO, Save the Children and VVAF, as well as UNICEF, have carried out
MRE-related activities.
By January 2005, MAG and Intersos were the only international NGOs
implementing direct MRE programming in
Iraq.[131] Many of the
organizations conducting MRE left Iraq in 2004 due to the deteriorating security
situation.
A national media campaign of TV and radio spots, posters, and leaflets was
run by Blank Creative, a media company, on behalf of NMAA during 2004. As of
April 2005 another six TV spots had been produced, two of which were on air, two
were ready to be broadcast and two were being field-tested. These were to be
broadcast 200 times on the national Iraqi TV station, Sharquiyah, and 100 times
on the Arabic children’s TV channel. An additional four radio spots had
been produced and were awaiting broadcast on local radio
stations.[132]
During 2004, UNICEF provided an international MRE advisor based in
Amman, Jordan, to provide assistance and support to the NMAA. This advisor
departed in April 2005 and as of July UNICEF was seeking a
replacement.[133]UNICEF is
working with the Iraqi Ministry of Education and other stakeholders to integrate
MRE into the school system by training and equipping teachers to conduct MRE
sessions for students. UNICEF is also seeking to work with the Ministry of
Youth and Sports and Ministry of Health to integrate MRE into their regular
activities at the community level. UNICEF has coordinated with MAG to implement
a MRE capacity-building and teacher training project in four governorates north
of Baghdad. [134]
Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization provided MRE information
alongside its clearance work and in 2005 began integrating community liaison
activities into its core
operations.[135]
During 2004, MRE in the north was provided by KOMA North and KOMA
South, both of which operated 20 MRE teams of four people each. KOMA North
worked in the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil, and during 2004 provided direct
MRE presentations to 38,399 people in 273 villages. It provided training of
trainer sessions to 2,623 mullahs, safety wardens, secondary school teachers,
Iraqi Border Police, and NGO staff. In addition, 245 children benefited from
child-to-child training. KOMA North provided MRE in 245 secondary schools in
Erbil and Dohuk and distributed 61,000 MRE books and training materials. Tools
used include direct training, puppet shows, drama, videos and games. KOMA South
undertook similar activities during 2004 in Sulaymaniyah governorate,
distributing 58,853 copies of written MRE materials, including leaflets,
newsletters, booklets and
posters.[136]
An evaluation of KOMA activities undertaken by NMAA found that communities
that had received ongoing MRE generally demonstrated improved knowledge,
attitudes and practice towards mines and UXO, demonstrated higher levels of
reporting of mines and UXO to the RMAC and had an increased respect for mine
markings, compared to communities that had not received MRE. The evaluation
recommended that KOMA seek to improve the targeting of its MRE messages,
increase the participative nature of the MRE delivery, improve the quality and
reduce the reliance on “small media,” increase the use of mass
media, and integrate MRE more closely within mine action. Due to a lack of
funding, KOMA has not been active in
2005.[137]
In Central Iraq, a local NGO (that prefers to go unnamed) provided MRE in
Baghdad and Kerbala in 2004, with six teams of two people each. In 2005, the
NGO’s operations expanded to nine teams covering the six governorates of
Baghdad, Kerbala, Samawa, Diyala, Thi Quar and
Muthanna.[138]
Mines Advisory Group conducts community liaison (CL) and MRE in the
north of Iraq with 10 teams of two people each. Six CL/MRE teams are in the
Erbil sector (in Erbil, Ninewah, Kirkuk, and Dohuk governorates) and four are in
Sulaymaniyah sector (Sulaymaniyah, Diyala and Kirkuk
governorates).[139] The teams
collect information from villages about dangerous areas and their impact, and
give the information to RMAC and NMAA for use for clearance operations. MAG has
an MRE program training teachers in primary schools, and undertakes follow-up
activities and monitoring. It also has a program working with important
community leaders to deliver MRE messages. Where necessary, MAG also conducts
direct MRE, for example, for returnees to heavily mined areas and, in the
summer, to picnickers and those visiting family members from non-mine-affected
areas. MAG also works with teacher training institutes, religious schools and
Christian groups in Dohuk.[140]
From June to November 2004, MAG erected billboards informing of the dangers
of mines and the procedure for reporting suspected contaminated areas. In
coordination with local authorities, MAG has established reporting centers in 19
locations across the three northern governorates, and local authorities have
been trained to complete dangerous area
forms.[141]
In 2004, MAG made MRE presentations to 166,845 people in schools or mosques,
to approximately 28,700 IDPs or recent returnees, and to 29,445 shepherds and
nomads. From January through April 2005, MAG teams made 307 presentations to
3,700 people, provided 66 training courses to 356 trainees, and conducted 581
visits to educational or religious institutions, providing MRE to 3,340 people.
In addition, 32 community liaison sessions included MRE presentations to 293
people.[142] In 2005, MAG has a
training budget for national capacity-building with local NGOs, as well as a
budget for developing and disseminating a national MRE
campaign.[143]
A MAG advisor provided technical support to NMAA during 2004. In 2005, the
MAG advisor was relocated to Amman to support MAG MRE
activities.[144]
Intersos has conducted MRE in locations such as health centers for
women, mosques for men, schools for children; it attempts to incorporate mine
and unexploded ordnance safety messages in regular day-to-day activities.
Intersos has been implementing a pilot community-based MRE project to address
the threat of ERW in returnee areas in the governorate of Basra since February
2004. The project aims to develop a sustainable, community-based network of
volunteers. However, insecurity has dramatically limited the workplan. Since
June 2003, Intersos has been providing MRE in the Basra transit center, funded
by UNHCR. MRE exhibitions are displayed in the transit center with mine
markings, wooden models of mines and UXO exposed in the ground; a cartoon film
is shown to children. Children are tested on their knowledge after visiting the
center.[145]
In 2004, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided
training to 400 volunteers in 15 of the 18 governorates. These volunteers were
previously trained in 2003 to carry out field surveys and alert the population
in contaminated areas to the risk of ERW and mines. ICRC provided funding for
the production of 3,760 MRE posters and 33,000 leaflets for distribution by the
Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS). IRCS mine action staff and volunteers
had visited 2,178 at-risk communities by the end of 2004. However, operations
during 2004 were severely constrained by the security situation, and only
limited operations took place in the south of Iraq during the
year.[146]
In 2004, MRE was also provided in southern Iraq by MEO, with six teams
of two people each, and Save the Children, with one team of three
people.[147]
Handicap International provided MRE in central Iraq until April 2004,
when it suspended operations due to security concerns. In September 2004, it
closed the program. Prior to its departure, HI was predominantly focusing on
training teachers and religious leaders in MRE in the Baghdad
region.[148]
RONCO support for MRE activities were funded by the US State
Department. During 2004, RONCO provided a Technical Advisor on MRE and other
matters to NMAA, supported MRE activities of the NGOs KOMA North and KOMA South
in northern Iraq, and also channeled funding to a nationwide media
campaign.[149]
Funding and Assistance
NMAA has stated that it received some $61 million in donations in
2004.[150] Landmine Monitor has
been able to identify some $58.7 million in contributions to mine action in Iraq
in 2004 from 13 donors. This includes donations to NGOs and international
agencies operating in Iraq, and some in-kind contributions. Landmine Monitor
identified $55 million in international contributions to mine action in Iraq
from 15 donors in 2003.
International funding and assistance in 2004 included the following:
European Commission: €2 million ($2,487,600) to UNDP for mine
action;[152]
France: €53,623 ($66,696), consisting of €17,634 ($21,933) for
MRE and €35,989 ($44,763) for victim assistance to
HI;[153]
Germany: €632,742 ($787,004) to HELP for mine
clearance;[154]
Greece: €1 million ($1,243,800) for demining in south
Iraq;[155]
Italy: €2,946,171 ($3,664,447) to UNDP for mine
action;[156]
Netherlands: €1,644,242 ($3,897,660), consisting of €200,000
($248,760) for victim assistance to HI, €1,289,429 ($1,603,792) to MAG for
mine clearance, and €154,813 ($2,045,108) to Stichling
Vluchteling;[157]
Norway: NOK11,255,000 ($1,669,906), consisting of NOK9 million ($1,335,331)
to NPA for mine action and rural rehabilitation and NOK2,255,000 ($334,575) to
Trauma Care Foundation for a mine victim resource center in northern
Iraq;[158]
Republic of Korea: $3 million for mine
action;[159]
US: $35.8 million for mine action through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund.[163]
A representative of the US State Department said in February 2005 that the
Iraqi government is investing $20 million in the mine action
program.[164] It is not clear
what time period this expenditure covers. NMAA reported that the Ministry of
Oil allocated funds for 2004 and 2005 for mine/UXO clearance around oilfields
and infrastructure.[165]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
There is no comprehensive or systematic nationwide data collection mechanism
for landmine casualties in Iraq. This is largely due to the security situation
and a lack of funds.[166]In
principle, the National Mine Action Authority, through the Regional Mine Action
Centers, is the collecting and controlling body for landmine casualty data. A
data-sharing system was established in the second half of 2004 with all
stakeholders, including the Ministry of Health, and some information has been
handed over to the NMAA. However, a UN official told Landmine Monitor in August
2005 that the system is not operating at full
capacity.[167]
Only limited information is available thus far giving a partial indication of
the scope of the problem. Due to the lack of a monitoring system, the number of
reported casualties is likely significantly understated. Various actors in Iraq
have spoken of an information blackout, especially related to cluster bomb
casualties and incidents.[168]
At the First Review Conference in December 2004, Iraq stated that “tens
of people per day get hurt because of mines; on top of that people get hurt by
mines used in terrorist
acts.”[169]This would
indicate more than 7,000 casualties per year. However, Landmine Monitor has
only been able to specifically identify 261 new mine/UXO casualties in 2004,
including at least 62 people killed and 132 injured; the status of 67 casualties
is not known. Landmine Monitor believes the actual number of casualties to be
much higher, but there are inadequate sources of information available.
The Italian NGO Emergency records the mine/UXO casualties who come to their
hospitals. In 2004, Emergency recorded 140 new mine/UXO casualties, including
48 people killed and 92 injured, in 112 incidents in Erbil (30) and Sulaymaniyah
(82).[170] MAG recorded 67 new
mine/UXO casualties in Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk from 1 January to 10 August
2004.[171]
Many more casualties resulted from improvised explosive devices, most of
which appeared to be command-detonated, but some of which were victim-activated,
functioning as de facto antipersonnel mines. IEDs have been the main
cause of death and injury among US soldiers. According to one source,
fatalities due to IEDs rose by more than 41 percent in the first five months of
2005, compared with the same period in
2004.[172]
Foreign civilians have suffered landmine casualties. On 7 May, one Polish
and one Algerian national were killed, and another Pole injured in a landmine
incident on the Baghdad-Hilla road. All were part of a Polish television
crew.[173] In June, two US
civilian truck drivers were killed in two separate landmine
incidents.[174] One deminer,
working with RONCO, was injured while clearing
UXO.[175]
Foreign military personnel have suffered landmine casualties. In 2004,
landmines in Iraq killed at least two US military personnel and injured
18.[176] On 23 March, four
British soldiers were injured when a landmine exploded under their vehicle while
on patrol.[177] On 9 May, a
Polish officer was killed by a
landmine.[178] On 15 August, the
commander of a Ukrainian platoon was killed by a remote-controlled landmine
blast while collecting water.[179]
In a second incident on the same day, two Ukrainian soldiers were injured after
their vehicle hit a landmine.[180]
On 17 August, two Italian soldiers were injured when a mine exploded near their
armored vehicle.[181]
Based on the limited information available it would appear that there has
been a considerable decrease in landmine/UXO casualties compared to 2003, when a
significant spike in casualties was reported in the aftermath of major
hostilities. At least 2,189 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded in 2003,
including at least 149 people killed and 1,089 injured; the status of 953
casualties was not
reported.[182]
However, Landmine Monitor believes that the smaller number of recorded
casualties in 2004 is likely due more to increased problems with data
collection, rather than an actual decrease in deaths and injuries.
Casualties continued to be reported in 2005. Emergency’s surgical
centers had admitted 16 mine casualties and 43 UXO casualties in Erbil, and 16
mine casualties and 47 UXO casualties in Sulaymaniyah as of the end of
June.[183] Provisional MAG
casualty data indicated 35 new landmine/UXO casualties as of 28
July.[184] In April, a Turkish
truck driver was killed by a roadside
mine.[185] On 26 April, seven
family members, including one child, were injured when their car drove over a
landmine in Al-Dujayl. On 6 July, in Basra, two children aged four and six,
were killed in a cluster bomblet
explosion.[186] From January to
August 2005, three US soldiers were killed and 15 injured by mines in
Iraq.[187]
On 4 April, an Iraqi was injured in a mine explosion in the Evros minefield
on the Greece-Turkey
border.[188]
The total number of mine casualties over the years in Iraq is not known. MAG
recorded 13,672 mine/UXO casualties (4,551 killed and 9,121 injured) in the four
northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, as of the end of
2003.[189]
VVAF’s ongoing Iraq Landmine Impact Survey is expected to provide more
information than previously available. As of August 2005, the ILIS had recorded
510 “recent”[190]
casualties in the northern (165) and southern (345) governorates; at least 143
people were killed and 237 injured. An analysis of data for the five southern
governorates indicates most casualties occurred in Basra (163), followed by
Messan (66), Thi Quar (48), Qaddisiya (36) and Muthanna (32). The majority of
recent casualties were adult males, more than 20 percent were children under 15,
and the majority of reported incidents occurred during herding and
farming.[191]
The ILIS had also recorded 6,657 “less recent”
casualties.[192] In the southern
governorates, 1,700 “less recent” casualties were recorded,
including 476 people killed and 1,224 injured; the majority (360 killed and
1,145 injured) were recorded in
Basra.[193] In the northern
governorates, 4,957 “less recent” casualties were recorded,
including 2,167 people killed and 2,790 injured; Sulaymaniyah recorded 3,382
casualties, Erbil (926 casualties) and Dohuk
(649).[194]
Other data collection mechanisms are also being developed. NMAA and the
Ministry of Health have developed an Initial Incident Form for rapid reporting
of new mine/UXO casualties. This new form will complement the existing data
form on people with disabilities used by the MoH, and will be distributed to
2,200 health units.[195] The RMAC
Mine Victim Assistance Office in Sulaymaniyah records casualty data from its 14
first aid posts, police stations and surgical centers; however, as of August
2005 it was not able to provide
statistics.[196] NPA also
receives casualty data, but does not collect it systematically; the data is
mainly used to refer casualties to appropriate
services.[197]
The Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO), founded in June 2004,
set up a war victim surveillance system in mid-2004 in Baghdad, Kerbala,
Al-Muthanna, Babel, Thi Quar and Diyala, with a four-month grant and technical
support from external
experts.[198] The survey teams
gather information from health centers and hospitals, physical rehabilitation
centers and prosthetic workshops, associations of persons with disabilities, and
from interviews with survivors. As of 31 December 2004, 5,913 IMSMA data forms
(2,974 from survivors and 2,939 from organizations) were entered into a local
database; 2,917 data forms were collected in Baghdad, 1,134 in Dyala, 1,048 in
Kerbala, and 814 in Al-Muthanna; however, as of August 2005, an analysis of the
data was not available. IHSCO is collecting data, in cooperation with MAG, in
two more governorates, with an annual budget of
$1,750,000.[199] IHSCO works
independently of NMAA and plans to use EPI INFO to record data, with assistance
from the Centers for Disease
Control.[200]
The Iraqi Handicapped Society, in cooperation with the British Embassy, has
set up a database of landmine survivors and other people with disabilities;
28,000 people were reportedly registered between February and August
2004.[201]
The NGO Life for Relief and Development maintains a database on people with
disabilities; 11,877 disabled people have been recorded. From 2003 to August
2005, 47 percent of disabilities were caused by landmines, grenades and cluster
bombs, and nine percent were as a result of
UXO.[202]
Survivor Assistance
Iraq has stated that its national mine action strategy to 2009 includes
survivor assistance.[203]
However, a UN official told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iraq does not
have survivor assistance in its mine action program “for the time
being;” the current UNDP mine action strategy focuses on institutional
development and technical advice to NMAA, which coordinates survivor assistance
with implementing partners such as the Ministry of Health and other relevant
ministries.[204] Until May 2005,
NMAA had a technical advisor for survivor assistance, funded by UNDP through
VVAF.[205] Survivor assistance in
northern Iraq is mostly the responsibility of the regional Ministry of
Health, which has limited capacity and funds. The result is a lack of
countrywide information-sharing and standardized
procedures.[206]
The health system in Iraq was once among the best in the Middle East.
However, after more than a decade of economic sanctions and ongoing conflict the
health system is in a state of disrepair. The healthcare system suffers from
poor quality services, lack of management capacity, equipment and medicines,
degraded or disrupted electricity supplies, sanitation and communications,
limited accessibility, and a network that does not extend to rural and poor
areas. Twelve percent of facilities were damaged and seven percent looted
during the war, including two of the three rehabilitation hospitals, which
forced them to close.
The Ministry of Health is responsible for a network of 172 hospitals and
1,285 primary health clinics, and some specialized services for persons with
disabilities. There are also 65 private hospitals, mostly in Baghdad. However,
a third of the hospitals and half of the health centers urgently need to be
rehabilitated and there is reportedly a gap between health policy and
implementation by the Ministry of
Health.[207] However, Iraq
reports that the situation in Baghdad and the northern governorates has improved
due to reconstruction efforts by the UN and
NGOs.[208]
In Baghdad, the Shahid Adnan Karalla hospital is specialized in complex war
surgery.[209]On average, 89
percent of people are reportedly not more than 30 minutes away from a health
center. In rural areas, the coverage is much weaker, with 70 percent of people
living within 30 minutes of a health
center.[210] According to the
ILIS, in four districts of Erbil, medical facilities are available in only 19
percent of the surveyed
communities.[211] In the southern
governorates, the ILIS found that 83 percent of mine-affected communities did
not have medical facilities.[212]
In 2004, the International Committee of the Red Cross continued its work on a
limited scale due to the prevailing security situation, with a team of about 400
national staff supported by expatriates in neighboring countries, and with the
help of the Iraqi Red Crescent. ICRC priorities included providing medical,
surgical and other essential supplies to more than 20 major hospitals and four
primary healthcare centers treating war-wounded, delivering water to hospitals,
and rehabilitating and conducting emergency repairs to 30 vital health
infrastructures.[213]
In 2004, the Italian NGO Emergency ran two surgical centers for civilian war
victims in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, and supported emergency medical care at a
network of 22 first aid posts throughout northern Iraq. The two surgical
centers admitted 1,141 war-injured people, including 53 landmine casualties, 288
shell casualties and 39 other UXO casualties in 2004. The first aid posts
treated 3,544 war casualties and referred 40 mine and 132 shell casualties to
the surgical centers.
Accessibility to medical services can be a problem. Of the total patients
visiting Emergency’s Erbil surgical center, 537 took one hour or less to
reach the center, 690 took between one and four hours, and 307 took 24 hours or
more to reach the center. For the majority of patients (786) seeking treatment
at the Sulaymaniyah center, it took between one and four hours to reach the
center, 192 took one hour or less, and 258 took 24 hours or more to reach the
center.[214]
A third Emergency Surgical Center, Salaam, next to the Al-Husayn Hospital in
Karbala, is in an advanced stage of construction; however, the project has been
on hold since November 2004 because of the security situation. Emergency
received funding through the Coalition Provisional Authority from 21
November–31 December 2003, then began funding its activities from other
sources. As of May 2005, Emergency handed full control of the centers over to
the Ministry of Health in northern
Iraq.[215]
The Italian Red Cross has facilitated the treatment of 12 children injured by
mines and UXO in 2004. Children are also receiving treatment in Greece (one),
Kuwait (two) and the United Arab Emirates
(six).[216]
Other international NGOs and agencies providing medical relief and support to
casualties of the conflict include the International Medical Corps,
International Rescue Committee, CARE (until 28 October 2004), INTERSOS,
Médecins Sans Frontières, Merlin, Cap Anamur (German Emergency
Doctors), Save the Children, UNICEF, Voluntary Relief Doctors and Royal Medical
Services of Jordan.[217]
The Ministry of Health estimates that there are more than 50,000 amputees
requiring prostheses in Iraq. According to the ICRC, physical rehabilitation
services are inadequate to meet the needs of mine survivors and other persons
with disabilities, and the authorities lack the financial resources to maintain
existing facilities.[218] Several
other factors have been identified as limiting services for the rehabilitation
and reintegration of persons with disabilities including: a shortage of raw
materials, equipment and rehabilitation aids; a lack of transport to existing
facilities; the need to update and upgrade the knowledge and skills of
rehabilitation specialists; an absence of community-based rehabilitation
programs; a lack of psychosocial support programs; the need for vocational
training programs and income generation
opportunities.[219] Mental health
was reportedly not a priority under Saddam Hussein’s regime, and only a
small number of psychiatrists are available in hospitals in Baghdad. There are
also very few trained social workers, psychologists and nurses available to
provide psychological support to mine and other war
casualties.[220]
In Baghdad, there are three large governmental physical rehabilitation
centers, Akrima, Al-Fares, and Al-Mugheira, and several smaller centers,
including Al-Shumoukh, Al-Kanat and Al-Dhura. Coalition forces set up a small
prosthetics workshop in the convention center in the green zone. Most centers
also provide housing for people with
disabilities.[221]
ICRC has provided technical and material assistance to seven physical
rehabilitation centers in Baghdad, Erbil, Mosul and Najaf (closed since April
2004), and the school for prosthetics and orthotics in Baghdad, with
implementing partners including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Higher
Education and Iraqi Red Crescent Society. The centers are monitored by ICRC
expatriate staff in neighboring countries. The planned handover of the project
at the end of 2004 was postponed due to the security situation. In cooperation
with the Ministry of Health, technicians participated in refresher courses on
technical and clinical procedures for lower limb amputees. In 2004,
ICRC-supported centers assisted more than 5,700 people, produced 1,757
prostheses (772 for mine survivors), 3,997 orthoses (80 for mine survivors) and
516 crutches, and distributed 25 wheelchairs. Due to the security situation,
the centers are not running at full capacity and with the increase in mine/UXO
survivors, most centers have long waiting lists for services. Together with
representatives of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Higher Education,
ICRC participates in meetings of the Physical Rehabilitation Committee, with the
aim of improving coordination and services in the physical rehabilitation
sector.[222]
In northern Iraq, the UNOPS Mine Action Program providing comprehensive
treatment and rehabilitation for mine/UXO survivors and other persons with
disabilities was handed over to the CPA on 21 November 2003. Since then, most
organizations belonging to the network have looked for other sources of funding
or were handed over to the Ministry of
Health.[223]
Emergency supported three Centers for Rehabilitation, Prostheses and Social
Reintegration in Sulaymaniyah, Diana and Dohuk in 2004 which provide physical
and social rehabilitation programs, vocational training, and support to
establish small businesses and cooperative workshops. Employees include former
patients. In 2004, the Emergency-run Sulaymaniyah center provided 2,026
physiotherapy treatments, fitted 373 prostheses and 65 orthoses, repaired 1,681
mobility devices, distributed 132 crutches and four wheelchairs, and modified
two houses. In the first four months of 2005, 90 prostheses, 13 orthoses and
292 mobility devices were delivered. The cooperative workshops were put on hold
in 2004 and only one person graduated in carpentry in January 2004. However in
2005, there are 29 new students, including 13 mine survivors. At the end of
training, participants are assisted in setting up cooperatives or workshops.
RMAC recently allocated $200,000 to Emergency, which covers about 40 percent of
the costs of the rehabilitation center in
Sulaymaniyah.[224]
The Diana Prosthetic Limbs Organization provides physiotherapy, mobility
devices, vocational training and income generating activities. In 2004, the
center fitted 618 prostheses, and distributed 37 wheelchairs and 208 crutches.
In the past it received funding from UNOPS and USAID, but is now solely funded
by the Ministry of
Health.[225]
The Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center (PLRC) in Dohuk provides
physiotherapy, prosthetics and assistive devices, community-based rehabilitation
and vocational training. From January 2004 until 30 June 2005, the center
provided 6,388 physiotherapy sessions, 363 prostheses, 243 orthoses, 605 walking
aids and three wheelchairs. PLRC received funding from UNOPS, Emergency and the
CPA until 31 December 2004. There was a funding gap until May 2005 when the
Ministry of Health took over responsibility for the center.
[226]
Since September 2004, the Kurdistan Organization for the Rehabilitation of
the Disabled (KORD) has run two orthopedic and rehabilitation centers in
Sulaymaniyah and Halabja started by Handicap International in 1991. HI
continues to provide technical and material support to KORD, and runs three
satellite units in Penjwen, Kalar and Raniya. KORD provides physical
rehabilitation and socioeconomic reintegration support for disabled people. In
2004, the centers assisted 6,404 people, produced 329 prostheses and 538
orthoses, fitted 3,923 devices, and distributed 628 wheelchairs and 418 walking
aids. Forty percent of beneficiaries are mine/UXO
survivors.[227] Social workers
are available to provide psychosocial support. KORD raises awareness on the
rights and needs of persons with disabilities and continues to operate mobile
teams, composed of a technician, a physiotherapist and a social worker, to
ensure adequate follow-up in isolated
villages.[228]
In Baghdad, HI assisted Al-Kanat physical rehabilitation center and the
Foundation of Technical Education until February 2004. In the first two months
of 2004, 56 people received prostheses and 99 others were identified and put on
the waiting list with partner organizations. A data collection system, intended
for identification and follow-up purposes, was put in place. As of February
2004, the database contained information on 2,219 disabled people; the number of
mine survivors is not known.[229]
The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC), in cooperation with the ICRC, supports two
prosthetic centers in the cities of Erbil and Mosul in northern Iraq. Due to
the security situation and difficult working conditions, especially in Mosul,
activities have been scaled down and only Iraqis are currently working at the
centers. The Erbil staff is providing backup and supervision for the Mosul
center that suffers from lack of staff and management capacity. In 2005,
on average about 85 people per month have been assisted through the two
centers; 13 percent were women and five percent were
children. In 2004, the two centers
assisted 705 people with prostheses,
including 375 mine/UXO survivors. In addition, 44 orthoses, 290
crutches and sticks, and 10 wheelchairs were distributed. In the first
half of 2005, 154 people were fitted with prostheses, including
99 mine/UXO survivors. Funding for the centers is provided by the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (90 percent) and the NRC (10
percent). The NRC and ICRC planned to gradually hand over control of the
centers to local partners in 2005, but the conflict has postponed this option
indefinitely.[230]
In early 2005, Handicap International carried out an assessment of 26
rehabilitation centers, specialized medical centers, specialized hospitals,
orthopedic centers, and the Institutes of Technical Medicine in Baghdad, Mosul,
Kirkuk, Basra, Thi Quar and Babylon, with the aim of assessing the current
situation in the facilities, identifying needs for improvement of services and
accessibility, and finding opportunities for collaboration between local
authorities and local non-profit actors. Preliminary results indicate that 10
centers provide “a more or less satisfying level” of services, 12
provided a “medium” level of services, and four were “in need
of strong support” to improve services. The type of support needed
includes reconstruction of premises, equipment and material support, training,
and human and financial resources. The facilities assist an estimated 43,000 to
53,000 people per year; a significant number are children and about 65 percent
are lower limb amputees.[231]
Rozh Society provides referrals for medical and physical rehabilitation
services, socioeconomic reintegration, psychosocial support, awareness raising
and capacity-building through its 12 branches and sub-offices. In 2004, it
reached more than 3,000 mine/UXO survivors with its activities and social club.
Rozh is also involved in setting up the Kurdistan Paralympics committee to
supervise and create sports activities, and is working with the Iraqi parliament
on legislation for the disabled in the new
constitution.[232]
Handicap International received $26,000 from Adopt-A-Minefield’s
Emergency Fund for Iraq for landmine/UXO survivors that was used between 1 July
and 31 December 2004 to support information distribution by Rozh Society,
vocational training activities of the Handicapped Union of Kurdistan for 32
people, five home adaptations, individual support to people with a disability,
and activities of various organizations for disabled persons, including an event
on 3 December, the International Day of Disabled
Persons.[233]
In March 2004, Mercy Corps started projects that address the needs of people
with disabilities in three southern governorates, Wassit, al-Qadisiyyah and
Messan. It expanded its activities in April 2005 to two northern governorates,
Tameem and Salah Al-Din. The projects promote the reintegration of people with
disabilities, including landmine survivors, by increasing mobility, awareness
raising and helping the disabled advocate for their rights. In Messan and
Al-Qadisiyyah governorates, 1,684 people received wheelchairs, with the
cooperation of a local organization of disabled persons and the Iraqi Red
Crescent Society. In the northern governorates, 3,864 people received
wheelchairs and walking aids, in cooperation with the Iraqi Handicapped Society,
REACH and the Association of Defending Displaced and Prejudiced Iraqi Persons
(The Defenders). In al-Qadisiyyah, Messan and Wassit, ramps were constructed to
improve accessibility. Mercy Corps also established socioeconomic projects,
such as Al-Jihad internet and resource center for persons with disabilities in
Kut (Wassit governorate).[234]
In 2004, the US-based Wheelchair Foundation sent 280 wheelchairs, donated by
the Rotary Club and private individuals, to Iraq for distribution to casualties
of the war, including mine survivors. Since late 2003, 1,120 wheelchairs have
been distributed nationwide. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in
coordination with the US State Department, provided the transportation, while
the NGO Life for Relief and Development distributed the wheelchairs through
local NGOs working for people with a physical disability, including the Iraqi
Handicapped Society in Baghdad, Al-Namaa Relief Society in Kirkuk, and Al-Hayat
Society for Handicaps in Babylon. Life also distributed about 2,700 walking
aids, rehabilitated al-Hamza Disabled center in Baghdad, and established a
vocational training program, including sewing, computer courses, ceramics and
drawing.[235]
In Mahmoudia, the wheelchair factory is reportedly not working to its full
capacity due to the security situation, and needs technical support to improve
the quality of the
wheelchairs.[236]
The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), in cooperation with US
Senator Patrick Leahy, developed the Civilian Victims Assistance Program, which
aims to alleviate suffering by noncombatants as a result of the war through the
repair of homes, provision of medical care, and income generating projects.
When CIVIC’s founder, Marla Ruzicka, was killed in an explosion in Iraq in
April 2005, the fund was renamed the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund.
Between May 2003 and April 2005, the fund received $30 million through
USAID’s Iraq Community Action Program. So far 622 projects have been
established, benefiting 650,764
people.[237]
Other organizations assisting mine survivors and persons with disabilities
include the Dutch NGO ACORN, and Norwegian NGOs Trauma Care Foundation and
Tromso Mine Victim Resource
Center.[238] The Vincent
Institute in Sulaymaniyah provides vocational training for mine/UXO survivors,
but is reportedly in need of
modernization.[239]
Two mine survivors from Iraq participated in the
Survivors Summit and First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December
2004.
Disability Policy and Practice
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for issues relating
to persons with disabilities. Facilities are also provided by the ministries of
health, defense and education. The 1980 Iraqi Social Welfare Law No. 126
recognized the right of all persons with disabilities to rehabilitation
services, and other medical, educational and economic rights. Under the Law of
Administration for the Transitional Government, existing laws remain in force
and the rights of individuals to healthcare and social welfare were
reiterated.[240] Since January
2005, no new laws have been formulated.
In areas under the control of the Kurdistan regional authorities, people with
disabilities are eligible for a monthly allowance of approximately $20, under
Bill number 113, dated 10 August 2003. An official told Landmine Monitor in
August 2005 that the government is improving accessibility and all new
construction is being made accessible for disabled people; the official
indicated the next priorities are creating income generating and employment
opportunities, and leisure
activities.[241]
On 31 March and 1 April 2004, more than 185 people attended the National
Conference for the Disabled in Sulaymaniyah, organized by the Rozh Society with
support from USAID’s Local Governance Program
(LGP).[242]
[1] Interview with all members of
the Delegation of Iraq, Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World (First Review
Conference), Nairobi, 2 December 2004. For a summary of Iraq’s position on
landmines 1999-2004, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 991-994.
[2] Letter from Hoshyar Zebari,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, to Steve Goose, Human
Rights Watch, 11 August 2005.
[3] Statement by Jafar Hameed,
Diplomatic Attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on
General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 13 June 2005.
[4] Information provided by Moaffaq
Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Head of the Iraqi Handicapped Society and Landmine Monitor
researcher, who was present at the meeting.[5] Statement by Behnam Puttrus,
Ministry of Planning, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December 2004.
[6] United Nations,
“Countries stand united in the battle against landmines,” 4 November
2004, www.un.int/Angola/press_release_landmines.
[7] Landmine Monitor (HRW)
interview with Mowafak Ayoub, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 10 February 2004. Iraq previously manufactured a copy
of the Italian Valmara 69 bounding antipersonnel mine, at least one
antipersonnel mine developed with Yugoslav assistance, one former Soviet model,
and two older Italian mine designs.
[8] Landmine Monitor (HRW)
interview with Mowafak Ayoub, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 10 February
2004.
[9] Confidential Iraqi and
American sources.
[10] Members of Iraq’s
delegation to the First Review Conference said they could not address this topic
due to a lack of information. Interview with all members of the Iraq's
delegation, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December 2004.
[11] Katarina Kratovac,
“Officer: Insurgents Trying to Disrupt Vote,” Associated
Press (Fallujah), 30 November 2004.
[12] “Weapons Seized in
Major Sweep by 400 Soldiers,” ANSA News Agency (Rome), 9 October
2004.
[13] “Ukrainian
Peacekeepers Destroy Arms Cache of Hussein’s Former Army in Iraq,”
Ukrainian News (Kiev), 29 July 2005.
[14] “Improvised Explosive
Device Kills Soldier; Suicide Bomber Lone Casualty in Failed Attack,”
U.S. Federal News Service (Washington DC), 26 June 2005.
[15] Members of Iraq’s
delegation to the First Review Conference said they could not address this topic
due to a lack of information; interview with all members of the Iraq's
delegation, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December 2004.
[16] “Four Suspected
Terrorists Killed Laying Mines in Iraq: Polish Army,” Agence
France-Presse (Warsaw), 19 September 2004.
[17] US Department of Defense,Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News
Transcript, “Special DoD Press Briefing: Brig. Gen. Yves J. Fontaine,
Commander, 1ST Corps Support Command, Multinational Corps-Iraq,” 12 August
2005.
[18] Figures derived from an
examination of Official US Department of Defense casualty reports, posted at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/.
[19] US Department of Defense,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript,
“Defense Briefing by British Royal Marines,” 5 August 2005.
[20] “Sapper teams Secure
Mine Threat in Iraq,” U.S. Federal News Service (Al-Asad), 8 April
2005.
[21] Kimberly E. Johnson,
“Report of Suspects Held in Marine Deaths Disputed,” USA
Today, 14 August 2005.
[22] “Baghdad Mosque,
US-Iraqi Positions Attacked,” Iraqi Al-Sharqiyah TV (monitored by the
BBC), 26 April 2005.
[23] “Baghdad Hospital
Receives 24 Bodies,” Iraqi Al-Sharqiyah TV (monitored by the BBC), 14 June
2005.
[24] Email to Landmine Monitor
(MAC) from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, Office of Weapons
Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 4 October 2005.
[25] Protective minefields from
the Soviet era are incorporated into the perimeter defense at locations US
forces occupy in Afghanistan. The US has never reported in its annual national
reports submitted under CCW Amended Protocol II any measures to ensure the
effective exclusion of civilians from known mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[26] Michael Peck, “Stryker
Brigade in Iraq Will Protect Bases with Remote-Controlled Mines,”
National Defense Magazine (US), March 2005.
[27] Human Rights Watch (HRW)
Background Briefing, “Back in Business: US Landmine Production and
Exports,” August 2005.
[28] HRW Press Release,
“U.S.: New Landmines for Iraq Raise Fears of Civilian Risk,” 28
February 2005.
[29] “Zaytun Beefs Up
Security Following Emergency Declaration in Iraq,” Korea Times, 9
November 2004.
[30] For an example of a US unit,
see “Rebels Recycling Leftover Munitions,” Oakland Tribune,
22 March 2005. For an example of a UK unit, see Peter Greste,
“Protecting Iraq's Frontiers,” BBC News, 5 August
2004.
[31] National Mine Action
Authority, “Vision 2020 – The strategic plan of the Iraq National
Mine Action Authority,” October 2004, p. 8. [32] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 8.
[33] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 8-9.
[34] July 2005 estimate,
www.wikipedia.org, 15 September 2005.
[35] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 9.
[36] The contamination problem in
Kurdistan is likely even greater than indicated thus far. Many communities were
abandoned, and thousands of small rural communities destroyed, during the
campaign of Saddam Hussein’s forces’ against the Kurdish Peshmerga,
and the majority of them are believed to be contaminated. Also, as of 15 August
2005, some 252 communities had not been surveyed due to security concerns or
other inaccessibility at the time of survey. ILIS (VVAF), “Monthly
Activity Report (Special Update),” 15 August 2005; ILIS Totals, 31 August
2005.
[37] Email from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 1 October 2005.
[38] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 7. The relationship of the NMAA and this committee
is not clear.
[39] Email from Hayder Alwardi,
Technical Director, NMAA, 22 September 2005.
[40] Landmine Monitor was told in
October 2005 that IMAC no longer exists and NMAA takes responsibility for the
central region. Email from William Barron, Director of Information Management
and Mine Action Programs, VVAF, 4 October 2005.
[41] Email from Hayder Alwardi,
NMAA, 20 May 2005.
[42] NMAA, “Iraq Mine
Action,” www.iraqmineaction.org accessed 14
August 2005.
[43] Email from Kent Paulusson,
Mine Action Advisor, UNDP, 22 June 2005.
[44] NMAA, “Vision
2020” October 2004, p. 18.
[45] Email from Kent Paulusson,
UNDP, 29 August 2005. At that point, UNDP had four TAs based in Cyprus, in
addition to the three TAs still being provided to NMAA through VVAF. None of
UNDP’s own staff was based in Iraq, but rather in Amman, Jordan; they
conducted their work through short missions to Baghdad and Basra when
needed.
[46] UN, “Country profile:
Iraq,” www.mineaction.org.
[47] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 18-19.
[48] Email from Lance J. Malin,
Operations Advisor, NMAA, RONCO, 2 June 2005.
[49] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 6.
[50] Email from Lance J. Malin,
NMAA, RONCO, 2 June 2005. RONCO assisted NMAA with operations, training, quality
assurance, public relations, MRE, victim assistance, IMSMA, and support to NGOs;
RMAC-S, with operations, quality assurance and IMSMA; IKMAC, with operations,
quality assurance, EOD, IMSMA and mine detection dogs.
[51] Email from Lance J. Malin,
NMAA, RONCO, 2 June 2005.
[52] Email from Stacy Smith,
Communications Manager, RONCO, 20 September 2005.
[53] Email from William Barron,
VVAF, 4 October 2005.
[54] Email from Hayder Alwardi,
NMAA, 22 September 2005.
[55] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[56] Interview with Jenny Reeves,
MAG, Geneva, 12 April 2005.
[57] Email from Soran Majeed, MVA
Officer, IKMAC, 30 May 2005. The Ararat Company was also listed. According to
UNDP, this commercial company was established in 2002 in Sulaymaniyah and
produces the locally-developed remote-controlled NOMA flail system. Email from
Salomon Schreuder, UNDP Iraq Senior Mine Action Advisor, 3 October 2005. The
ILIS Survey Team leader indicates that Ararat received contracts for demining in
Sulaymaniyah in 2005. Email from John C. Brown, ILIS Survey Team Leader, 1
October 2005.
[58] Email from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 1 October 2005.
[59] NMAA has also identified
European Landmine Solutions and Specialist Support Solution (Sh3), but Landmine
Monitor has been unable to get any additional information about these
organizations’ demining work in Iraq. According to NMAA, Sh3 conducted UXO
clearance support to reconstruction of the Iraqi Electricity Network, and ELS
supported USAID with the provision of clearance for the national fiber optic and
water rehabilitation projects; in 2004 ELS cleared schools and other government
buildings for reconstruction and refurbishment works. Email from Lance J. Malin,
NMAA RONCO, 2 October 2005.
[60] Due to the lack of
operational telephone exchanges, there was no dispatch center to facilitate
emergency calls. NMAA reported in October 2004 that this capacity was being
built, but it had not happened as of September 2005. NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 17; email from Hayder Alwardi, NMAA, 22 September
2005.
[61] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 30-31.
[62] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 30-31.
[63] NMAA, “Iraq Mine
Action,” www.iraqmineaction.org, accessed 14 August 2005.
[64] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 20-21.
[65] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 31-34.
[66] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 35.
[67] Email from Hayder Alwardi,
NMAA, 22 September 2005
[68] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004 p. 21.
[69] Email from Kent Paulusson,
UNDP, 22 June 2005.
[70] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 36; email from Hayder Alwardi, NMAA, 20 May
2005.
[71] NMAA, “Vision
2020” October 2004, p. 36.
[72] Email from William Barron,
VVAF, 4 October 2005.
[73] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 38.
[74] Several unsuccessful
attempts have been made to import TMFDB into IMSMA. It was decided that,
although the TMFDB is a very valuable source for assessing the contamination
problem and can serve as a starting point for survey tasks, it should not be
imported into IMSMA as the systems have different purposes. The objective of
the TMFDB is to capture any conceivable hazard with little regard for accuracy
and reliability, in order to give advice to military patrols, whereas IMSMA
attempts to capture accurate information on hazards for the purpose of planning,
prioritizing and assigning resources to clear the hazards. NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 40-41.
[75] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 42.
[76] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 42.
[77] Email from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 27 September 2005.
[78] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 995-6.
[79] Email from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 27 September 2005.
[80] ILIS (VVAF), Monthly
Activity Report (Special Update), 15 August 2005.
[81] Email from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 1 October 2005.
[82] ILIS (VVAF), “Monthly
Activity Report,” August 2005.
[83] Email from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 14 September 2005.
[84] ILIS (VVAF), “Monthly
Activity Report,” August 2005.
[85] ILIS (VVAF), “Monthly
Activity Report,” August 2005.
[86] Email from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 14 September 2005. “Recent” casualties
refer to incidents occurring in the 24 months prior to the date of survey,
therefore from September 2002 onwards. VVAF/UNDP (John C. Brown), “Iraq
Landmine Impact Survey Data, Contaminated and Impacted Communities of Three
Southern Governorates,” May 2005, p. 3.
[87] John C. Brown, ILIS (VVAF),
“UXO/mine contamination and community impact in northern Iraq – A
first cut statistical descriptive of contamination and its impact in four
districts in Erbil Governorate,” December 2004.
[88] ILIS (VVAF), “Monthly
Activity Report (Special Update),” 15 August 2005.
[89] ILIS (VVAF), “Monthly
Activity Report (Special Update),” 15 August 2005.
[90] Email from Pippa Norman,
Operations Coordinator, ArmorGroup Mine Action, 16 September 2005.
[91] For details, see Landmine
Monitor Report 2004, p. 995.
[92] Emails from John C. Brown,
ILIS Survey Team Leader, 27 May and 27 September 2005.
[93] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 20.
[94] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 5-6; email from Salomon Schreuder, UNDP Iraq, 3
October 2005.
[95] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 5.
[96] Figures provided by Lance J.
Malin, NMAA RONCO, 21 September 2005. The “explosive ordnance”
includes both UXO and items from small stockpiles. Email from Lance J. Malin, 2
October 2005.
[97] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, p. 28.
[98] John C. Brown, ILIS (VVAF),
“UXO/mine contamination and community impact in northern Iraq - A first
cut statistical descriptive of contamination and its impact in four districts in
Erbil Governorate,” December 2004; email from John C. Brown, ILIS Survey
Team Leader, 27 September 2005.
[99] For more details, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1000-1001.
[100] All information in this
section on MAG is from emails from Matt Willson, Project Coordinator for the
Middle East, MAG, 20 June and 5 September 2005.
[101] For each sector, one or
two international Technical Field Managers are deployed to oversee technical
operations and four supervisors. The supervisors manage two or three MATs, each
consisting of 19 staff: one team leader, three sub-team leaders, 12 deminers,
one medic and two drivers.
[102] All information in this
section on NPA was provided by Sherko Rashid, Program Manager, NPA Northern
Iraq, 31 August 2005.
[103] Exchange rate of US$1 =
NOK6.7399, US Federal Reserve, Average Foreign Exchange Rates for 2004,
www.federalreserve.gov/release.
[104] Email from Pippa Norman,
ArmorGroup Mine Action, 16 September 2005.
[105] Email from Lance J.
Malin, NMAA, RONCO, 2 June 2005; email from Stacy Smith, RONCO, Washington, 16
August 2005. There were 27 dogs in the program that had not completed
training.
[106] Email from Stacy Smith,
RONCO, Washington, 16 August 2005.
[107] Email from Stacy Smith,
RONCO, Washington, 16 August 2005.
[108] Email from Stacy Smith,
RONCO, Washington, 16 August 2005.
[109] Email from Stacy Smith,
RONCO, Washington, 16 August 2005.
[110] Email from Stacy Smith,
RONCO, Washington, 16 August 2005.
[111] Email from Khabat
Zangana, Director, Khabat Zangana Company, 21 September 2005.
[112] For more details on their
activities, see previous Landmine Monitor reports for 2004 and 2003.
[113] Email from Hayder
Alwardi, NMAA, 22 September 2005.
[114] Email from William
Barron, VVAF, 4 October 2005.
[115] The cost of the demining
operations by the two groups was reported to be €192,800 ($239,805).
“Spanish Contribution to Mine Action (2004),” document sent by Luis
Gómez Noguiera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor (MAC),
27 September 2005.
[116] “Slovak Unit in
Iraq Swept 588,000 Square Meters of Mines in 5 Months,” Sita
(Bratislava), 2 August 2005.
[117] “Ukrainian
Peacekeepers Destroy Arms Cache of Hussein's Former Army In Iraq,”
Ukrainian News Agency (Kiev), 29 July 2005.
[118] “Bosnian
peacekeepers arrive in Iraq,” Onasa (Sarajevo), 10 June 2005.
[119] Email from Lance J.
Malin, NMAA, RONCO, 2 June 2005; email from Stacy Smith, RONCO, Washington, 16
August 2005; email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior
Demining Advisor, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of
State, 4 October 2005. RONCO provided training to IMCO to create an initial
100-person staff of deminers, MDD teams and administrative support personnel.
The training was conducted between October 2003 and February 2004.
[120] Email to Landmine Monitor
(MAC) from H. Murphey McCloy, US Department of State, 4 October 2005.
[121] Email from Lance J.
Malin, NMAA, RONCO, 2 June 2005; email from Stacy Smith, RONCO, Washington, 16
August 2005.
[122] Emails from Franck
McAreavey, Program Manager, HELP, 13 May and 30 August 2005. An evaluation was
conducted in June 2005, commissioned by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which subsequently committed its support for 2006 and beyond.
[123] Email from Maddalena
Maiuro, Mine Action Unit Assistant, INTERSOS, 21 July 2005; email from Marco
Buono, Mine Action Unit Director, INTERSOS, 1 September 2005; email from Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP Iraq, 3 October 2005.
[124] Email from Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP Iraq, 3 October 2005; email from Brian Nelson Smith, Program
Manager, DDG Iraq, 10 July 2005.
[125] Email from Brian Nelson
Smith, Program Manager, DDG Iraq, 10 July 2005.
[126] NPA, “2003-2004
Final report, Emergency Mine Action Programme, Baghdad, Iraq,” 22 July
2005.
[127] Email from Kent
Paulusson, UNDP, 29 August 2005; email from Salomon Schreuder, UNDP Iraq, 3
October 2005.
[128] Email from Steve Saffin,
MineTech, 2 September 2005.
[129] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[130] NMAA, “Results of a
Needs and Capacities Assessment Workshop for Mine Risk Education in Iraq,”
Baghdad, November 2004, p. 15.
[131] Interview with Jenny
Reeves, MAG, Geneva, 12 April 2005.
[132] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[133] Email received from
Patrizia DiGiovanni, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF Iraq Support Center in
Amman, 17 July 2005.
[134] UNAMI website,
www.uniraq.org/clusters/cluster7.asp, accessed 1 July 2005.
[135] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[136] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[137] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[138] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[139] Email from Matt Willson,
MAG, 20 June 2005.
[140] NMAA, “Results of a
Needs and Capacities Assessment Workshop for Mine Risk Education in Iraq,”
Baghdad, November 2004, p. 17.
[141] Email from Matt Willson,
MAG, 20 June 2005.
[142] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[143] Interview with Jenny
Reeves, MAG, Geneva, 12 April 2005.
[144] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[145] Email from Pia Cantini,
Intersos, 16 July 2005.
[146] ICRC, “Special
Report: Mine Action 2004,” Geneva, April 2005, p. 38.
[147] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[148] Email from Nathalie
Claraz, MRE Coordinator, HI, 8 July 2005; information provided to Landmine
Monitor by NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005.
[149] Email from Lance J.
Malin, NMAA, RONCO, 2 June 2005; email from Stacy Smith, RONCO, Washington, 16
August 2005; email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from H. Murphey McCloy, US
Department of State, 4 October 2005.
[150] NMAA, “Iraq Mine
Action,” www.iraqmineaction.org, accessed 29
September 2005.
[151] Mine Action Investments
Database; email from Hanne Elmelund Gam, Department of Humanitarian & NGO
Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 July 2005. Average foreign exchange
rate for 2004: US$1= DKK5.9891, “List of Exchange Rates (annual),” 3
January 2005.
[152] UNDP, “Funding by
donor,” www.undp.org, accessed 10 August
2005.
[153] Emails to Landmine
Monitor from Amb. Gerard Chesnel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2005, and
from Anne Villeneuve, HI, June-July 2005. Average foreign exchange rate for
2004: €1 = US$1.2438, used throughout this report. “List of Exchange
Rates (annual),” 3 January 2005.
[154] Article 7 Report, Form J,
15 April 2005; email from Dirk Roland Haupt, Federal Foreign Office, 25 July
2005.
[155] Fax to Landmine Monitor
from Lt. Col. Vassilis Makris, Ministry of Defense, 9 August 2005.
[156] UNDP, “Funding by
donor,” www.undp.org, accessed 10 August
2005.
[157] Email to Landmine Monitor
from Freek Keppels, Arms Control and Arms Export Policy Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 4 August 2005.
[158] Email from May-Elin
Stener, Department for Global Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Average
foreign exchange rate for 2004: US$1 = NOK6.7399, “List of Exchange Rates
(annual),” 3 January 2005.
[159] South Korea contributed
$3 million for demining operations to the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund
in 2004. Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to
the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[160] Email from Markus Henrik,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 August 2005. Midpoint exchange rate for 2004:
US$1 = SK29, estimated by Landmine Monitor.
[161] “Spanish
Contribution to Mine Action (2004),” email from Luis Gómez
Noguiera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor (MAC), 27 September
2005.
[162] Email exchanges with SIDA
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Average foreign exchange rate for 2004:
US$1 = SEK7.348, “List of Exchange Rates (annual),” 3 January 2005.
[163] US Department of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction,” July 2005, pp. 20-21.
[164] Mine Action Support Group
(MASG) Newsletter, “Unofficial Minutes: MASG-Meeting 8 February
2005,” New York, January 2005, p. 23.
[165] NMAA, “Vision
2020,” October 2004, pp. 30-31.
[166] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, Program Specialist, Mine Action, UNDP
Country Office, Nicosia, 10 August 2005.
[167] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP Iraq Country Office, Nicosia, 10 August
2005.
[168] Landmine Monitor was told
this by Iraqi and international sources, both governmental and nongovernmental,
during August 2005.
[169] Statement by Behnam
Puttrus, Ministry of Planning, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December
2004.
[170] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Giorgio Raineri, Coordinator Humanitarian Office, Emergency, Milan, 11
August 2005.
[171] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Tim Carstairs, Director of Policy, MAG, 6 October 2004; email to
Landmine Monitor (HI) from Daniel Sissling, MAG, 22 August 2005. MAG was not
able to provide statistics for the full year due to the security situation.
MAG’s data is being transferred into IMSMA and is now handed over to RMAC.
Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 2 September 2005. MAG
does not collect data from the Emergency Surgical Hospital in Sulaymaniyah. MAG
recorded 40 casualties in Erbil but these statistics have not been included in
the total of new casualties in 2004.
[172] “IEDs Still Main
Killer of Troops,” Charlotte Observer, 12 June 2005.
[173] “TV crew members
killed by land mine in Iraq – Polish official,” Polish Radio
1, 7 May 2004.
[174] “Civilian truck
drivers from Florida, Georgia, killed in Iraq,” Associated Press,
22 June 2004.
[175] Kris Hundley,
“Money, and worries, in Iraq,” St. Petersburg Times, 5 July
2004. The date of the accident is not known.
[176] Figures derived from an
examination of official US Department of Defense casualty reports, www.defenselink.mil/releases/.
[177] Catherine Jewitt,
“Teenage soldier in Iraq blast horror,” Northern Echo, 23
March 2004.
[178] “Two Polish
servicemen die in Iraq,” PAP (news agency), 9 May 2004. The second
fatality was not mine-related. On 24 March and 8 May, two Polish soldiers were
also injured in Iraq in booby-trap explosions.
[179] “The commander of a
Ukrainian platoon in Iraq was killed by a remote-controlled land-mine blast
while collecting water,” CP (Kiev), 15 August 2004.
[180] “5 Ukrainian
Peacekeepers In Iraq Injured During Clashes With Militants On August 15,”
Ukrainian News (Kiev), 16 August 2004.
[181] “Three Italian
Troops Wounded In Iraq’s Nasiriyah,” ODC (Rome), 17 August
2004.
[182] For more information see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1005-1007.
[183] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP Iraq Country Office, Nicosia, 15 August
2005.
[184] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Daniel Sissling, MAG, 22 August 2005.
[185] “Turkish truck
driver killed by land mine in Iraq,” NTV television (Istanbul), 16
April 2005.
[186] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP Iraq Country Office, Nicosia, 11 August
2005.
[187] Department of Defense
casualty reports as of August 2005.
[188] “Illegal immigrants
killed in Greece-Turkey border minefield,” Associated Press, 4
April 2005; “Two killed in Evros minefield,”eKathimerini, English Edition, 5 April 2005. A Mauritanian and a
Tunisian were killed in the same incident.
[189] For more information, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1007.
[190] “Recent”
casualties refer to incidents occurring in the 24 months prior to the date of
survey, therefore from September 2002 onwards. VVAF/UNDP (John C. Brown),
“Iraq Landmine Impact Survey Data, Contaminated and Impacted Communities
of Three Southern Governorates,” May 2005, p. 3.
[191] Emails to Landmine
Monitor (HI) from John C. Brown, Iraq Country Team Leader, VVAF, 15 August and
17 August 2005; John C. Brown, “Monthly Activity Report – August
2005, pp. 3, 7, 14-18; John C. Brown, “Monthly Activity Report – 15
August 2005 (Special Update), pp. 1, 3-4; VVAF/UNDP (John C. Brown), “Iraq
Landmine Impact Survey, Contaminated and Impacted Communities of Three Southern
Governorates,” May 2005, pp. 4-13.
[192] “Less recent”
casualties refer to incidents occurring more than 24 months prior to the date of
survey.
[193] VVAF/UNDP (John C.
Brown), “Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, Contaminated and Impacted
Communities of Three Southern Governorates,” May 2005, p. 11.
[194] Email sent to Landmine
Monitor (HI) by John C. Brown, Iraq Country Team Leader, VVAF, 17 August
2005.
[195] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP Iraq Country Office, Nicosia, 26 July
2005.
[196] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Soran Hakim, MVA officer, Sulaymaniyah, 14 August 2005.
[197] NPA response to questions
sent by Sardasht Abdulrahman, Assistant to the Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs, sent to Landmine Monitor (HI), 16 August 2005.
[198] “Final Report of
the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization Year 2004,” undated, pp. 1,
7. This report was sent to Landmine Monitor (HI) by Ahmed al-Zubaidi, Director,
IHSCO, Baghdad, on 15 July 2005.
[199] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, Director, IHSCO, Baghdad, 10 August 2005; response
to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed al-Zubaidi, 10 August 2005.
[200] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Jennifer Reeves, Advisor to IHSCO, MAG, 24 August 2005.
[201] Landmine Monitor (HI)
interview with Moaffaq Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Head of the Iraqi Handicapped Society,
Geneva, 15 June 2005.
[202] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Vicky Robb, International Programs Director, Life for Relief and
Development, 21 August 2005.
[203] Statement by Behnam
Puttrus, Ministry of Planning, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December
2004.
[204] Emails to Landmine
Monitor (HI) from Ibrahim Baba-ali, UNDP Iraq Country office, Nicosia, 27 July
and 10 August 2005.
[205] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Lance J. Malin, NMAA, RONCO, Baghdad, 28 July 2005.
[206] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Ibrahim Baba-ali, UNDP Iraq Country office, Nicosia, 26 July 2005.
[207] Medact, “Enduring
effects of war, health in Iraq 2004,” London, 2004, pp. 1, 3, 6-12.
[208] Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation/UNDP, “Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004, Volume
II: Analytical Report,” Baghdad, 2005, p. 81.
[209] Landmine Monitor (HI)
interview with Moaffaq Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Iraqi Handicapped Society, Geneva, 15
June 2005.
[210] Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation/UNDP, “Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004, Volume
II: Analytical Report,” Baghdad, 2005, p. 37.
[211] John C. Brown, ILIS
(VVAF), “UXO/Mine Contamination and Community Impact in Northern Iraq, A
First-Cut Statistical Descriptive of Contamination and its Impact in Four
Districts in Erbil Governorate,” 2005, p. 20.
[212] VVAF/UNDP (John C.
Brown), “Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, Contaminated and Impacted
Communities of Three Southern Governorates,” May 2005, pp. 19-20.
[213] ICRC, “Annual
Report 2004,” Geneva, June 2005, pp. 281-282; email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Katarina Ritz, ICRC Iraq, Amman, 11 August 2005.
[214] Emails to Landmine
Monitor (HI) from Giorgio Raineri, Emergency, Milan, 5 July and 11 August
2005.
[215] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Hawar Mustafa, General Manager and Faris Hama,
Rehabilitation Manager, Emergency, Sulaymaniyah, 21 July 2005; information sent
to Landmine Monitor (HI) by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP Iraq Country office, Nicosia,
26 July, 11 August, and 3 October 2005.
[216] Landmine Monitor (HI)
interview with Moaffaq Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Head of the Iraqi Handicapped Society,
Geneva, 15 June 2005.
[217] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1008.
[218] ICRC Physical
Rehabilitation Program, “Annual Report 2004,” Geneva, July 2005, p.
38.
[219] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 1007-1008.
[220] Medact, “Enduring
effects of war, health in Iraq 2004,” London, 2004, p. 4.
[221] Landmine Monitor (HI)
interview with Moaffaq Tawfiq al-Khafaji, 15 June 2005; email to Landmine
Monitor (HI) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP Iraq Country office, Nicosia, 26 July
2005
[222] ICRC Physical
Rehabilitation Program, “Annual Report 2004,” Geneva, July 2005, pp.
38-39, 44; ICRC, “Annual Report 2004,” Geneva, June 2005, p.
282.
[223] Landmine Monitor (HI)
interview with Werner Nijman, Country Director, HI, Brussels, 29 June 2005;
email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Giorgio Raineri, Emergency, Milan, 5 July
2005; email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, Program Specialist -
Mine Action, UNDP Iraq Country office, Nicosia, 26 July 2005. For more
information, see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1009.
[224] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Hawar Mustafa and Faris Hama, Emergency, Sulaymaniyah,
21 July 2005; email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Giorgio Raineri, Coordinator
Humanitarian Office, Emergency, Milan, 11 August 2005. See also Standing Tall
Australia and Mines Action Canada, “101 Great Ideas for the Socio-Economic
Reintegration of Mine Survivors,” June 2005, p. 50.
[225] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Majid A. Dawoud, Director, Diana Prosthetic Limbs
Organization, Diana, 29 July 2005.
[226] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Hamid M. Tahir, Director, Prosthetic Limbs and
Rehabilitation Center, Dohuk, 28 July 2005; email from Salomon Schreuder, UNDP
Iraq Senior Mine Action Advisor, 3 October 2005. See also Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1009.
[227] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Aras Ibrahim, Executive Director, KORD, Sulaymaniyah,
19 July 2005; KORD response to questions sent by Sardasht Abdulrahman, Assistant
to the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, received by Landmine Monitor (HI),
16 August 2005.
[228] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Aras Ibrahim, KORD, Sulaymaniyah, 2 October 2005.
[229] HI, “Programme
d’Assistance aux Blessés de Guerre et aux Personnes
handicapées,” 1 June 2003-29 February 2004, Lyon, p. 10; email to
Landmine Monitor (HI) from Anne Grenaudier, Desk Officer, HI, Lyon, 5 July
2005.
[230] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Lena Eskeland, Mine Action Coordinator, Norwegian Red Cross, Oslo, 25
July 2005. The 2004 statistics for these two centers are included in the total
ICRC statistics for Iraq.
[231] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Nicolas Heeren, Director of Programs, HI, Lyon, 1 August 2005.
[232] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Noori Sheikh Razza Koyek, Director, Rozh Society,
Sulaymaniyah, 26 August 2005.
[233] “Special Appeal for
Iraq: The Adopt-A-Minefield Special Appeal for Iraq Raised over $100,000 to
Clear Landmines and Help Survivors,” 4 March 2005, www.landmines.org.uk/Iraq+Appeal,
accessed 18 August 2005.
[234] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Kaja Wislinska, Mercy Corps, Sulaymaniyah, 1 August 2005.
[235] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Vicky Robb, International Programs Director, Life for Relief and
Development, Southfield, 3 August 2005.
[236] Landmine Monitor (HI)
interview with Moaffaq Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Iraqi Handicapped Society, Geneva, 15
June 2005.
[237] “Senate Prepares To
OK, Send To President Appropriations Bill That Includes Leahy Amendment To Name
Iraqi War Victims Fund For Slain Aid Worker Marla Ruzicka,” 10 May 2005,
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200505/051005a.html;
see also
www.civicworldwide.org/content.jsp?content_KEY=548[238] For more information, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1010.
[239] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Sardasht Abdulrahman, Assistant to the Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs, Sulaymaniyah, 16 August 2005.
[240] Article 14 and Article
26, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period,” 8 March 2004, www.cpa-iraq.org. See also Landmine
Monitor Report 2004, p. 1011.
[241] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Sardasht Abdulrahman, Assistant to the Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs, Sulaymaniyah, 16 August 2005.
[242] USAID, “Iraq
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Relief,” 13 April 2004, weekly update #
27, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 12, www.usaid.gov/iraq/updates/apr04/iraq_fs27_041304.pdf.
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