Key developments since May 2004: The civil war intensified, including
widespread use of landmines and improvised explosive devices by both sides,
particularly after King Gyanendra seized power in February 2005. One of the
localized civilian militias known as Village Defense Forces said it laid 1,500
mines in its area of operation. From 8-9 September 2004, the Nepal Campaign to
Ban Landmines hosted a seminar attended by high level representatives of the
three leading political parties that concluded with a declaration calling on
Nepal to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. NCBL recorded from media reports that
the Royal Nepalese Army disposed of or removed explosive devices in 46 districts
in 2004. In 2004, UNICEF and its partners helped establish a Mine Risk
Education Working Group.
Mine Ban Policy
The Kingdom of Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has
provided very mixed signals about its support for a mine ban, its reasons for
not acceding to date, and its intention to join the treaty at some
point.[1 ]
Fighting in Nepal’s decade-long civil war between the government and
the rebels of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) intensified in 2004, and
even more dramatically after 1 February 2005, when King Gyanendra dismissed the
government, assumed total executive authority, declared a nationwide state of
emergency, and suspended fundamental human rights while detaining hundreds of
political leaders and activists. The King has not expressed a view on banning
antipersonnel mines.
Nepal did not participate as an observer in the First Review Conference of
the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in November-December 2004, or the intersessional
Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in June 2005. Previously, it
attended intersessional meetings in February and June 2004, and annual Meetings
of States Parties in 1999, 2000 and 2002. After voting in support of every
annual United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for universalization
of the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997, Nepal was absent from the vote on UNGA
Resolution 59/84 on 3 December 2004.
Nepal is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its
Amended Protocol II.
From 8-9 September 2004, the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) hosted a
seminar attended by high level representatives of the three leading political
parties. In a keynote address to the seminar, Bharat Mohan Adhikari, then
Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal, said, “The worst aspect of the landmine is
that it maims and kills innocent and non-combatant people including children and
women indiscriminately. It disturbs peace. It is a very inhumane and
indiscriminate lethal weapon. Therefore, the demand to ban landmines is highly
justifiable and humanitarian. Every civilized person should be in favor of
banning landmines.”[2 ]
The leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (United
Marxist-Leninist)—CPN (UML)—Jhalanath Khanal, told the seminar that
the landmine “is an inhumane weapon....Therefore, Nepal should participate
in the mine ban campaign with zeal. Nepal must be a party to the Ottawa
Convention.”[3 ]The leader of
the Nepali Congress (Democratic) and former president of the National
Assembly’s Social Justice Committee, Jeevan Prem Shrestha, said,
“The issue of acceding to the Ottawa Convention is a positive step...If
peace talks between the government and the Maoists take place, we need to
include as an agenda item a code of conduct to guarantee a halt to the use of
landmines.”[4]
The seminar concluded with a six-point declaration endorsed by all
participants that called on Nepal to accede to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[5 ]Although the seminar
demonstrated positive support by much of Nepal’s political leadership
toward the ban treaty, the political situation in 2005 negated the ability of
these politicians to have any impact on the issue.
Despite increased conflict and an uncertain political environment, the Nepal
Campaign to Ban Landmines continued to engage in various activities to encourage
more support for the antipersonnel mine ban by the government, the political
opposition, grassroots and media. During the October 2004 Mine Ban Treaty
Awareness Week, NCBL activists collected 25,000 signatures in just three hours
in the capital of Kathmandu.[6 ]NCBL
presented the petition to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuwa on 13 October 2004,
and held a press conference the following
day.[7]
After a deadly incident in June 2005 (see below), the Kathmandu Post
published an editorial calling on the government to stop using mines and
accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, and calling on Maoist rebels to “stop using
landmines anywhere including public
roads.”[8 ]
Use
Government forces and Maoist rebels have used antipersonnel landmines and
improvised explosive devises (IEDs) in the internal conflict which began in
early 1996. According to the UN, “The use of explosive devices by both
parties to the conflict has resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries
annually, both to combatants and to
civilians.”[9 ]While both
sides appeared to refrain from mine and IED use during a January-August 2003
cease-fire, the subsequent resumption of hostilities has seen renewed and
intensified mine warfare by both sides, which escalated further after King
Gyanendra seized power in February 2005.
Government Forces
Landmine Monitor first reported indicators of antipersonnel mine use by
government security forces in 1999, but government and Army officials did not
openly acknowledge such use until 2002. It appears that mine use by security
forces—including the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), Nepal Police and Armed
Police Force—has expanded in 2004 and 2005. In April 2004, a military
spokesman stated that the RNA had deployed 9,500 mines in the
conflict.[10 ]
Representatives of the RNA have stated that landmines are laid for defensive
purposes at security positions susceptible to Maoist attacks, especially
military posts, but also barracks, police stations and other key facilities.
The UN has noted that security forces have been “reported to be laying
mines as defensive perimeters around military installations and infrastructure
such as bridges, dams and pylons, as well as around potential vantage points
above military
installations.”[11]
Military officials have said that the RNA uses mines systematically and with
careful marking, and that only RNA military engineers are permitted to deploy
landmines.[12 ]In August 2005, the
United Nations reported: “The Government has claimed that the Royal Nepal
Army has planted mines only around army posts using safety procedures and using
adequate marking. However, there are counterclaims that the RNA does not always
fence the area, does not always notify the local villagers of this threat, does
not always mark the minefield and if it moves on, does not always detonate,
disable or remove the mines before leaving. Anecdotal evidence would suggest
that other components of the security forces, such as the armed police, are more
likely to use IEDs than mines for defensive perimeters, and are less likely to
map or to mark them.”[13 ]
Major Chandra Kumar Chanda told the NCBL’s September 2004 seminar,
“We plant mines in remote places where there are fewer than 50-60 soldiers
and around repeater stations of Nepal Telecom and Nepal Television which are
vulnerable to sudden attacks.... We have planted all mines systematically. We
never scatter or plant mines
recklessly.”[14 ]
Major Chanda further said, “We are using mines which are command
detonated. They don’t go off even if you press on them. They explode
only when we want or when we press the switch.” He claimed that civilians
do not fall victim to mines laid by the RNA. He said, “We keep a record
of every single mine planted. ‘M’ [in English] is marked where
mines are laid. Notices are hung in such a way that people can easily see
them.” However, Chandra went on to reveal that “repeater stations
are built on difficult and sloping hill tops. Mines were planted, but
landslides swept them away. Mines are small ... and are easily carried away
during landslides. When people come into contact with them while collecting
fodder, they go off. We are exploring ways to prevent
it.”[15]
The UN has said, “There are concerns that mines laid around structures
on high ground, such as pylons, might be subject to landslides and thus another
hazard to pedestrians and vehicle
traffic.”[16]
As Chandra’s statement indicates, Nepal is using regular blast
antipersonnel mines as well as command-detonated mines. Military officials have
acknowledged that Nepal has both domestically produced and imported
antipersonnel mines, including blast, fragmentation and command-detonated
types.[17 ]
In 2004, the Nepal government began encouraging and arming localized
civilian militias, known as “Maoist Defense Groups” or
“Village Defense Forces.” In May 2005, a Village Defense Force in
Paklihawa, Nawalparasi district, admitted to mining the village tract under its
area of operation against Maoist incursion, planting as many as 170 homemade
mines in each ward. The group said it planted a total of 1,500 mines. Its
chairperson said the mines “can be exploded at any time by pressing
switches.”[18 ]According to
the chairperson, raw materials from India were used to construct the devices in
the village. Another report claimed the villagers made both victim-activated
and command-detonated types with components obtained from
India.[19 ]
Non-State Armed Groups
Rebels of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)—CPN/M—have made
and used homemade mines or improvised explosive devices in increasing numbers
since the start of the conflict. The UN stated in August 2005, “Initial
surveillance indicates that the majority of casualties are due to an extensive
use by the CPN/M of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rather than to mines
and IEDs used by the security
forces.”[20 ]According to
media reports and reports collected by NCBL, mine/IED incidents attributed to
the Maoists took place in 73 out of 75 districts of Nepal in
2004.[21 ]In October 2003, the
Maoist leader Prachanda claimed that “successful ambushes and mining
almost on a daily basis have put the enemy in total
disarray.”[22 ]
The Maoist rebels primarily use command-detonated explosive devices.
According to an RNA officer, the rebels have developed radio-controlled
explosives, which have no tell-tale wires and are harder to detect
visually.[23 ]The UN has reported,
“Very few devices used by the CPN/M appear to be victim activated with the
exception of explosive devices attached to banners or effigies...Socket bombs
tend to be the key unexploded ordnance (UXO) post engagement causing risk to
civilian populations, in particular to children. Socket bombs are improvised
hand grenades made out of galvanised pipe sockets. CPN/M also makes use of
larger IEDs such as pipe bombs, pressure-cooker bombs and bucket bombs to
destroy buildings, pylons, telecom towers and other structures, as well as in
road-side ambushes of military and civilian vehicles, including buses and
ambulances. Other CPM/N IEDs include ‘Claymore’-type devices and
devices such as packet bombs, which are carried in plastic bags and which can be
thrown over walls. Most of these devices appear to be detonated on command
through use of timers, radio signals or other
devices.”[24 ]
Even when using command-detonated devices, the rebels have frequently killed
and injured civilians in areas near targeted military personnel. In a widely
condemned incident on 6 June 2005, the Maoist rebels publicly apologized for
detonating an explosive under a bridge that destroyed a bus in Chitwan district,
killing 39 civilians and injuring another 72. Maoist leader Prachanda described
the incident as “a serious mistake.” The explosive was laid as part
of a general prohibition (bandh) on travel called for and enforced by the
Maoists.[25 ]
There have been reports that child combatants forcibly recruited by the
Maoists have been made to plant mines, and that some of the children have been
killed or injured while mine-laying.[26 ]A senior Maoist commander told Human Right Watch researchers that he had
mobilized everyone in his area for an offensive, from the ages of five to 70.
When asked what the commander planned to do with the five-year-old children, he
said they would be positioned next to the roads with detonators to explode
command-detonated mines.[27 ]
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
In June 2003, RNA Brigadier General Kul Bahadur Khadka confirmed that Nepal
produced antipersonnel mines.[28 ]The government has not provided any information on the types of mines
produced, or the location of manufacturing
facilities.[29 ]A former government
official told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that landmines are produced at the
weapons factory at Sunchari in Makwanpur District south of
Kathmandu.[30 ]
Nepal is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. According to the
Army, Nepal imported mines from India, China and the former Soviet Union, mostly
in the 1980s.[31 ]While the size
and composition of the antipersonnel stocks held by Nepalese security forces is
not known, the Army has acknowledged using M14 and POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines,
as well as Claymore-type antipersonnel
mines.[32 ]The media has also
reported that security forces use PMD-6 and Type-69 antipersonnel
mines.[33 ]
Maoist rebels have produced significant quantities of homemade mines and
IEDs. Since the resumption of hostilities in 2003, security forces have seized
several rebel facilities for manufacturing weapons, including
mines.[34 ]The RNA website lists
daily reports on its collection of IEDs from
rebels.[35 ]The rebels reportedly
have obtained explosives and components to make mines and IEDs from sources in
Nepal, India and Tibet.[36 ]Child
soldiers forcibly recruited by the Maoists have reportedly been killed while
manufacturing IEDs at rebel training
camps.[37 ]
Landmine and UXO Problem
Contamination from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Nepal derives from
activities detailed in the earlier section in this report on Use. Landmines are
found near military installations and around state infrastructure. Army
officials claim the mines are command-detonated, that maps are kept, and that
there are warning signs. However, it is admitted that mines placed on steep
terrain may be swept away by landslides, and “When people come into
contact with them while collecting fodder, they go
off.”[38 ]Aerial bombs
dropped by the RNA, which failed to detonate on impact, have added UXO
contamination in some areas.[39]
Civilians are also at risk from and have become casualties of mines and IEDs
used by Maoist rebels against security
forces.[40 ]Locations where armed
clashes have occurred between Maoist and government forces may contain mines or
UXO.[41 ]
No surveys or assessments of the mine problem are known to have been
conducted in Nepal to identify mined areas.
Mine Action
There is no formal mine action program in Nepal. In 2004 and early 2005,
the UK supported the Royal Nepalese Army with training in clearing mines and
UXO. UK training support was suspended following King Gyanendra’s
assumption of total executive authority on 1 February
2005.[42 ]However, in August 2005,
it was reported that the UK would shortly deliver a further shipment of
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment to the RNA under the heading of
humanitarian aid.[43]
Formal records of mines defused or destroyed are not available. From media
reports, the NCBL recorded that the Royal Nepalese Army disposed of or removed
mines, IEDs and UXO during 90 reported instances of EOD operations in 46
districts in 2004.[44 ]According to
NCBL, there are also unconfirmed reports of civilians seeking to deactivate
explosive devices on their own.
Mine Risk Education
There is no governmental body coordinating MRE activities in Nepal. In
2004, UNICEF and partners helped establish an MRE Working Group, comprising the
key organizations concerned about the increasing number of deaths and injuries
from explosions caused by IEDs, UXO and mines. The working group includes
members of the Save the Children Alliance, Handicap International, World
Education, CARE, World Vision, International Labour Organization and five
national organizations, including NCBL, Porters’ Progress, Child Workers
of Nepal, Nepal Red Cross Society and Sahara. One aim of the working group is
to ensure the development of an integrated social mobilization campaign
comprising MRE messages in agreement with Integrated Mine Action Standards
(IMAS).[45]
The MRE Working Group, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
UNICEF, World Education, NCBL and Sahara, with the support of Save the Children
Norway, were involved in MRE initiatives in 2004. The 14th Battalion of the
Royal Nepalese Army, which has responsibility for training in mine-laying,
disposal and EOD, also reportedly provides training in
MRE.[46]
NCBL provided limited MRE to 480 people living in the conflict districts of
Ramechhap, Dhading, Rukum, Salyan and Sindhupalchok prior to May 2004. A
further 522 people participated in 10 district-level mine risk education
programs, carried out in Rukum, Ramechhap, Morang, Salyan, Dhading, Dolakha,
Banke, Kavrepalanchok, Sindhupalchok and Jajarkot districts between May 2004 and
February 2005.[47 ]Participants
included local community leaders, officials from district development committees
and village development committees, and national and international
organizations, including the National Human Rights Commission, Nepal Red Cross
Society, German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Nepal Bar Association
and Federation of Nepalese Journalists.
Some 21,000 students and teachers from 100 schools in 10 districts
participated in MRE sessions during 2004 and to May 2005, facilitated by NCBL.
This initiative targeted both primary and secondary schools, and took place
during school hours, with students receiving MRE brochures; the brochures were
also distributed to local journalists, NGOs, representatives of the army and
police forces, district government officials and officials from the Ministry of
Education.[48 ]
Following fighting between Maoists and the security forces in Khara, Rukum
district, the Army and the police distributed brochures to students in schools;
the brochures explain what IEDs or UXO look like, and request the students to
inform the Army of suspect devices rather than touching these
themselves.[49 ]
ICRC is developing basic capacity within NRCS to implement MRE in areas
where there is a threat from mines/UXO/IEDs. This means integration of a basic
mine action training/coordination capacity into headquarters, and strengthening
delivery capacity in the most affected districts. Through already existing
programs—like youth and first aid emergency response—basic
mine/UXO/IED risk education will be disseminated in the most affected
areas.[50]
In June 2004, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) facilitated a workshop for the MRE Working Group, with the aim of
introducing participants to the key concepts of mine action and MRE. Working
group members developed two posters to warn children of the dangers, which were
extensively field tested and published. The posters were used to check whether
local communities felt comfortable displaying such material, or whether this
might cause them problems with the CPN/M or security forces. In some districts,
there were indeed problems in displaying the material. The posters comprise one
component of a “Schools as Zones of Peace” package piloted by World
Education in schools and in non-formal education
settings.[51 ]It was concluded that
future MRE initiatives should be placed within existing outreach and development
programming, rather than as separate
programs.[52]
In May 2005, with support from the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD),
radio and television MRE spots were broadcast nationwide for a six-month period.
A district-level MRE program was also developed with FSD support, for schools in
25 districts; 30,000 handbills, 3,000 appeals, 4,000 posters, 5,000 stickers and
80,000 picture brochures were
distributed.[53]
The MRE Working Group identified challenges to implementing an effective MRE
program in Nepal.[54 ]Cooperation,
or at least the absence of hostility, from both the security forces
and the Maoists is seen as essential. The security forces
are unlikely to welcome the terms “mine action” or
“mine risk education,” as this would appear to imply that the
program is focusing only on security-force
munitions, and not on Maoist-planted mines and IEDs.
A further problem is the lack of civilian mine
clearance organizations in Nepal. The MRE
Working Group is investigating organizations that would be seen as
“honest brokers” by both sides, and who could act
as intermediaries to deliver requests for clearance. Traditional warning
signs, such as the skull and crossbones, are not well
recognized in Nepal, and do not represent danger to most
people in the countryside. It will be necessary to identify local
“danger” signs and link these to MRE.
The high level of illiteracy and diversity of indigenous languages also
present challenges to MRE, as does the scarcity of schools (which might act as
venues for MRE) in conflict-affected areas. Many villages lack electricity, and
some are beyond the reach of national radio. Remote areas make face-to-face MRE
challenging and
time-consuming.[55 ]
UNICEF supported a GICHD needs assessment mission for MRE in November and
December 2004. The GICHD consultant also worked with members of the MRE Working
Group to develop a draft strategic framework for MRE in Nepal.
UNICEF received funding from the UK Department for International Development
to build the capacity of the MRE Working Group, and to extend its work on mine
risk education. In September 2005, UNICEF Nepal appointed a mine action focal
point within its office to cooperate with the working
group.[56 ]An urgent priority was
the development of an “MRE emergency kit,” which can be
pre-positioned and used after major engagements where there is high UXO
contamination.[57]
Funding and Assistance
In 2004 Canada contributed C$19,607 ($15,063) to the NCBL for
advocacy.[58 ]The UK Department for
International Development provided $140,000 to UNICEF to support capacity
development in mine action for April 2004-March
2005.[59 ]
Landmine/UXO/IED Casualties
There is no official mechanism for collecting data and no official
information is publicly available on mine/UXO/IED casualties in Nepal; however,
various sources provide an indication of the extent of the problem.
In 2004, the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines recorded 1,445 casualties from
landmines, UXO and IEDs, including 389 people killed and 1,056 injured; 707 were
civilians, including 134 children and 83
women.[60 ]Activities at the time
of incidents included collecting scrap metal and wires, handling UXO, traveling
on foot or bicycle, collecting firewood, playing and grazing
cattle.[61 ]Another analysis of
media for the period January to June 2004 indicates that of 572 conflict-related
casualties, 132 resulted from 27 antipersonnel or antivehicle landmine
incidents; 45 people were killed and 87
injured.[62 ]
In 2004, reported incidents include at least two security personnel killed
and 16 injured during operations to remove or deactivate landmines and
IEDs.[63 ]
Casualties continue to be reported in 2005, with NCBL recording 562
landmine, UXO and IED casualties to June 2005, including 156 people killed and
406 injured; 413 casualties were civilians, including 79 women and 56
children.[64 ]
On 9 April, two Russian tourists were injured when their vehicle hit a
landmine on the Chehere Road, about 75 kilometers from
Kathmandu.[65]
The total number of landmine casualties in Nepal is not known. UNICEF is
currently working with major Nepali news organizations to gather all media
reports on incidents involving explosions since 1 January 2002, for the purpose
of recording all relevant data to assist in planning an appropriate response to
the landmine problem.[66]
In September 2005, Handicap International conducted a feasibility study for
surveillance of casualties and explosive
incidents.[67 ]There has been no
comprehensive analysis of mine/UXO/IED incidents and casualties to determine
which groups are most at risk. NCBL analysis of 21 reported incidents between
January and March 2005 indicates that 12 resulted from deliberate handling, and
nine from inadvertently activating a device or being in its proximity. These
findings suggest a need for basic safety advice on what to do upon spotting a
suspect UXO/IED or mine.[68]
Survivor Assistance
The government reportedly provides emergency evacuation after an incident,
free medical and prosthetic treatment, and financial, administrative and
logistical support to hospitals; however, the assistance available is reportedly
inadequate to meet the needs.[69 ]Eight hospitals provide assistance to mine/UXO/IED casualties, including
Bheri Zonal Hospital, Bir Hospital, Tribhuvan Teaching Hospital, Dipendra Police
Hospital, Birendra Police Hospital, Pokhara Zonal Hospital, B.P. Memorial
Hospital and Patan Hospital. Hospitals provide free treatment, medicines and
food to those hospitalized. However, even with this assistance, mine survivors
are reportedly still facing many problems, including a lack of available beds in
government hospitals, a lack of physiotherapy and other rehabilitation
facilities, poor quality orthopedic devices, and a lack of opportunities for
social and economic reintegration. Some survivors have reportedly been
hospitalized for more than a year, and others do not want to return home even
after receiving treatment because of security fears, placing a further strain on
hospital facilities.[70]
In 2004, ICRC reimbursed the cost of transport or surgery for more than 100
people injured in the conflict, and provided medicines and other supplies to
medical facilities in Kathmandu and Negalpani. ICRC organized a symposium on
war surgery for 150 surgeons and seminars on the medical care of war-injured for
health professionals. In 2004, 201 war-injured people received treatment in two
ICRC-assisted hospitals.[71 ]
The Disabled Relief Fund (DRF) provides prosthetic/orthotic devices and
assistive aids through the Nepal Orthopedic Appliance Center in Bhrikutimandap
(Kathmandu). The center, which was upgraded with the support of Handicap
International, assists about 600 people a year. In 2004, the center planned to
distribute 48 prostheses, 250 wheelchairs, 15 tricycles, 137 crutches, 250 canes
for the blind and 62 other assistive
aids.[72 ]
In May 2004, ICRC initiated a new physical rehabilitation program to assist
the Green Pasture Hospital and Rehabilitation Center in Pokhara. Under the
program and cooperation with the Nepal Red Cross Society, ICRC supplied
materials, components and equipment, and provided training for prosthetic
technicians. In 2004, ICRC reimbursed the cost of treatment for 78 war-disabled
people, and also covered the costs of transportation, lodging and food during
treatment. In 2004, the center produced and/or distributed 66 prostheses, one
orthosis, 88 crutches and one wheelchair; 16 percent were for
war-disabled.[73]
The Indian NGO Bhagwan Mahaveer Viklang Sahayata Samiti (BMVSS) produces the
Jaipur Foot prosthesis, especially targeting amputees with limited resources,
and has distributed 200 assistive devices in Nepal to
2005.[74 ]
Other prosthetic facilities are available in Kathmandu, but many mine
survivors cannot afford the cost of transport, accommodation and food during the
seven days required for
treatment.[75]
Handicap International supports 47 local NGOs in 12 districts on
disability-related issues—to provide rehabilitation to individuals with
disabilities, and raise awareness and advocate on the rights and needs of
persons with disabilities―including through a community-based approach to
disability in development, and the provision of specialized services (including
physical rehabilitation and improving accessibility to
services).[76 ]
NCBL supports the schooling costs of 55 young girls affected by the conflict
in 2004/2005; some are mine/IED/UXO survivors, or the children of survivors.
Two mine survivors from Nepal participated in the Survivors Summit and First
Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2004.
Disability Policy and Practice
The 1982 Disabled Persons (Protection and Welfare) Act and the 1994 Disabled
Persons (Protection and Welfare) Rules protect the rights of persons with
disabilities to transportation, employment, education and other state services.
However, reportedly the legislation is not fully implemented or enforced, and
persons with disabilities are subject to discrimination. The Ministry of Women,
Children and Social Welfare is responsible for issues relating to persons with
disabilities.[77]
The National Coordination Committee has developed a national policy on
disability; however, it has not yet been approved by the
government.[78 ]
[1 ]For more information, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1073-1075. This details Nepal’s
many statements and actions in support of an antipersonnel mine ban, even as
security forces increased their use of the weapon.
[2 ]Statement by Bharat Mohan
Adhikari, Deputy Prime Minister, NCBL Seminar on a Ban on Landmines: Challenges
and Possibilities, Kathmandu, 8-9 September 2004.
[3 ]Statement by Jhalanath Khanal,
Leader of CPN (UML) and former Minister, NCBL Seminar on a Ban on Landmines:
Challenges and Possibilities, Kathmandu, 8-9 September 2004.
[4]Statement by Jeevan Prem
Shrestha, Chief Party Secretary, Nepali Congress (Democratic), NCBL Seminar on a
Ban on Landmines: Challenges and Possibilities, Kathmandu, 8-9 September
2004.
[5 ]NCBL Seminar on a Ban on
Landmines: Challenges and Possibilities, Kathmandu, 8-9 September 2004, report
available online, www.nepal.icbl.org/summaryreport/summaryreport.html.
Participants included: Bharat Mohan Adhikari, Deputy Prime Minister; Jhalanath
Khanal, Leader of the CPN (UML); Jeevan Prem Shrestha, Leader of Nepali Congress
(Democratic); Roshan Karki, former Parliamentarian and Spokesperson, Nepal
Democratic Party; Chakra Prashad Bastola, Former Minister and Leader of Nepali
Congress; a representative from the Royal Nepalese Army Headquarters; human
rights organizations; a constitutional commission member; representatives from
NCBL.
[6 ]NCBL stationed volunteers at a
half dozen key road junctions with educational placards and 10-meter-square
pieces of paper for people to sign, while over 100 youth cycled through the city
carrying mine ban slogans.
[7]See NCBL report online,
www.nepal.icbl.org/MBT/awareness_week_2004.htm.
[8 ]“Ban landmines,”
Kathmandu Post, 8 June 2005.
[9 ]United Nations, “Nepal
CAP,” draft report dated 22 August 2005, p. 30.
[10 ]NCBL/Landmine Action UK
interview with Maj. Gen. Kiran Shamsher Thapa, Royal Nepalese Army (RNA),
Kathmandu, 1 April 2004.
[11]United Nations, “Nepal
CAP,” draft report dated 22 August 2005, p. 30.
[12 ]NCBL/Landmine Action UK
interview with Maj. Gen. Kiran Shamsher Thapa, RNA, Kathmandu, 1 April 2004;
NCBL telephone interview with Brig. Gen. Deepak Gurung, Spokesperson, RNA,
Kathmandu, 28 March 2005.
[13 ]United Nations, “Nepal
CAP,” draft report dated 22 August 2005, p. 30.
[14 ]Statement by Maj. Chandra
Kumar Chanda, RNA, NCBL Seminar on a Ban on Landmines: Challenges and
Possibilities, Kathmandu, 8-9 September 2004.
[15]Statement by Maj. Chandra
Kumar Chanda, RNA, NCBL Seminar on a Ban on Landmines: Challenges and
Possibilities, Kathmandu, 8-9 September 2004.
[16]United Nations, “Nepal
CAP,” draft report dated 22 August 2005, p. 30.
[17 ]Interview with Col. Deepak
Gurung, RNA, 13 February 2004. See also quotes by Col. Deepak Gurung in the
Nepali Times Weekly, 21-27 November 2003.
[18 ]Chetan Adhikari,
“Nepalese villagers plant mines to trap Maoists,” Kantipur
Daily/Kantipuronline.com, 31 May 2005.
[19 ]“Vigilante landmines
terrify villagers,” Kathmandu Post, 31 May 2005, www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.html?&nid=41532;
see also, Amnesty International, “Nepal: Fractured Country, Shattered
Lives,” June 2005, p. 6 (AI Index: 31/063/2005).
[20 ]United Nations, “Nepal
CAP,” draft report dated 22 August 2005, p. 30.
[21 ]This includes mine/IED
explosions, confiscation of mines/IEDs, or deactivation of alleged Maoist
planted mines/IEDs. NCBL, “The Growing Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part
(V),” database, January to December 2004. This is a database maintained
by NCBL of landmine incidents reported by Nepali- and English-language media
over a five-year period.
[22 ]“Occasional Bulletin
of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist),” No. 6, 25 October 2003,
www.insof.org/cpnm/minfobulletin/info_bu_6.htm.
[23 ]NCBL/Geneva Call meeting
with Maj. Narendra Chanda, Dhading district, 12 July 2005.
[24 ]United Nations, “Nepal
CAP,” draft report dated 22 August 2005, p. 30.
[25 ]“Nepal rebels
‘regret’ bus deaths, launch probe,” Reuters
(Kathmandu), 7 June 2005; “Nepal rebels ‘regret’ bus
attack,” BBC Radio, 7 June 2005; Amnesty International,
“Nepal: Fractured Country, Shattered Lives,” June 2005, p.10 (AI
Index: 31/063/2005).
[26 ]NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database, January to December
2004.
[27 ]Human Rights Watch interview
with Senior Maoist Commander, Bardia district, March 2005.
[28 ]He made the remarks during a
meeting with ICBL and NCBL representatives. ICBL Non-State Actors Working Group
Press Statement, Nepal Mission, 15 June 2003. Landmine Monitor had previously
reported allegations of Nepalese production, but the Army denied it as recently
as December 2002. See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 656.
[29 ]Some sources have speculated
that production took place at Swyambhu or Sundarijal, but Brig. Gen. Kul Bahadur
Khadka said that was not the case, indicating there was a factory in the area
near Army headquarters. Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from NCBL, 16 July
2003.
[30 ]Interview with confidential
source, 20 August 2005.
[31 ]Interview with Col. Deepak
Gurung, RNA, 13 February 2004. See also quotes by Col. Deepak Gurung in
Nepali Times Weekly, 21-27 November 2003.
[32 ]Interview with Col. Deepak
Gurung, RNA, 13 February 2004. See also quotes by Col. Deepak Gurung in
Nepali Times Weekly, 21-27 November 2003.
[33 ]Nepal National
Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 17, 11 April 2004; Nepali Times Weekly, 21-27
November 2004; Himalayan Times, 3 February 2004.
[34 ]NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database, January to December
2004. See also, “Maoist training center destroyed,” Kathmandu
Post, 11 July 2005. www.kantipuronline.com[35 ]Royal Nepalese Army website,
www.rna.mil.np/news.html[36 ]For Nepal and India, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1079. Tibetan authorities arrested
seven people, including four Nepali businessmen from remote Lumdek village, for
allegedly supplying arms and explosives to the Maoists. Kathmandu Post,
23 February 2004.
[37 ]NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database, January to December
2004.
[38 ]Statement by Maj. Chandra
Kumar Chanda, RNA, “NCBL Seminar on a Ban on Landmines: Challenges and
Possibilities,” Kathmandu, 8-9 September 2004. See also Landmine
Monitor 2004, p. 1079.
[39]NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database, January to December
2004.
[40 ]Group discussion during
training on MRE for 10 districts, organized by NCBL, Kathmandu, 15 December
2004.
[41 ]Interview with Dev Shankar
Paudyal, former parliamentarian, Ramechhap district, 3 July 2005.
[42 ]Interview with Amb. Keith
Bloomfield, British Embassy, Kathmandu, 1 April 2005.
[43]“UK bomb disposal kit
soon,” Himalayan News Service (Kathmandu), 12 August 2005, www.thehimalayan times.com.
[44 ]NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database, January to December
2004.
[45]Email from Susan Aitkin,
Chief, Communication, Advocacy and Lifeskills Section, UNICEF Nepal, 15 August
2005.
[46]Telephone interview with
Col. Dhani Das Karki, RNA, Kathmandu, 5 May 2005.
[47 ]Information provided by
Purna Shova Chitrakar, NCBL, 28 June 2005.
[48 ]Information provided by
Purna Shova Chitrakar, NCBL, 28 June 2005.
[49 ]Information provided by
Purna Shova Chitrakar, NCBL, 28 June 2005.
[50]UN, “Consolidated
Appeal for Nepal - 2005/06,” Kathmandu, 10 August 2005, p. 32. This is
part of a larger ICRC/NRCS plan that also includes ensuring that casualties have
access to the orthopedic center located at Green Pasture Hospital in Pokhara,
and developing coordination with other organizations planning or implementing
mine action in Nepal.
[51 ]Findings reported by members
of the MRE Working Group. Email from Susan Aitkin, Chief, Communication,
Advocacy and Lifeskills Section, UNICEF Nepal, 15 August 2005.
[52]Information taken from the
draft strategic framework developed by the MRE Working Group. Email from Susan
Aitkin, Chief, Communication, Advocacy and Lifeskills Section, UNICEF Nepal, 15
August 2005.
[53]Information provided by
Purna Shova Chitrakar, NCBL, 28 June 2005.
[54 ]As identified by the MRE
working group and detailed in UN, “Consolidated Appeal for Nepal -
2005/06,” Kathmandu, 10 August 2005, p. 32.
[55 ]UN, “Consolidated
Appeal for Nepal - 2005/06,” Kathmandu, 10 August 2005, p. 32.
[56 ]Interview with Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, in Geneva, 19 September 2005.
[57]Email from Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, 30 June 2005.
[58 ]Mine Action Investments
database; emails from Elvan Isikozlu, Mine Action Team, Foreign Affairs Canada,
June-August 2005. Average exchange rate for 2004: US$1 = C$1.3017. US Federal
Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2005.
[59 ]Interview with Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, in Geneva, 19 September 2005.
[60 ]NCBL collects data from
interviews with members of parliament, government officials, army and police
personnel, local political leaders, human rights activists, journalists, media,
survivors, local people and other organizations. The totals include casualties
caused by bombs, grenades, command-detonated devices, and other weapons not
prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. For more details, see www.nepal.icbl.org/.
[61 ]The information comes from
an analysis of local media reports by NCBL and information from its network
members, researchers and different political parties.
[62 ]Email from Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, 7 September 2004. Not the official view of UNICEF.
[63 ]NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database, January to December
2004.
[64 ]NCBL data collected from
interviews with members of parliament, government officials, army and police
personnel, local political leaders, human rights activists, journalists, media,
survivors, local people and other organizations.
[65]“Nepal landmine blasts
kill 6, injures 28, including 2 Russians,” PTI, Kathmandu, 10 April
2005.
[66]Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Susan Aitkin, UNICEF Nepal, 2 September 2005.
[67 ]Interview with Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, in Geneva, 19 September 2005.
[68]Information provided by
Purna Shova Chitrakar, NCBL, 28 June 2005.
[69 ]NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database, January to December
2004.
[70]NCBL and Landmine Action UK
interview with Durga Prasad Pradhan, Director, Bheri Zonal Hospital, Nepaljung,
30 March 2005; for more information, see also Landmine Monitor Report
2004, pp. 1081-1082.
[71 ]ICRC, “Annual Report
2004,” Geneva, June 2005, pp. 157-158.
[72 ]“DRF Activities
Presentation,” 8 April 2004, http://disabled.8k.com/activity.html,
accessed 16 August 2005.
[73]ICRC Physical Rehabilitation
Program, “Annual Report 2004,” Geneva, July 2005, pp. 30, 44.
[74 ]“Jaipur foot fitments
in foreign countries,” www.jaipurfoot.org/05_fcamp.asp,
accessed 16 August 2005.
[75]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1082.
[76 ]Email from Jean-Bertrand
Lebrun, Program Director, HI Nepal, 14 September 2004.
[77]US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004: Nepal,”
Washington DC, 28 February 2005; see also Asia-Pacific Development Center on
Disability, “Country Profile: Kingdom of Nepal,” www.apcdproject.org/countryprofile/nepal/,
accessed 5 September 2005.
[78 ]“Government Policy and
National Plan towards Persons with Disabilities,”
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