Table of Contents

Country Reports

LM Report 2006

Sudan

Key developments since May 2005: Sudan cited a stockpile of 14,485 antipersonnel mines, adding 5,000 SPLA mines to the previous total; it intends to retain 10,000 of these mines for training purposes. It is continuing to do an inventory of stockpiled mines. On 24 December 2005, a national mine action authority and mine action center were created, and a South Sudan mine action center. Demining organizations cleared almost three times as much land in 2005 as in 2004, with similar survey and clearance capacity. Over 1.3 square kilometers of mined area were cleared. In 2005, some US$61.5 million was estimated spent on mine action (including mine action support to peacekeeping). MRE activities increased significantly and expanded to new areas of Sudan; 316,188 people were reached in 2005 with special emphasis on returnees. There were at least 79 casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance in 2005, more than in 2004; in 2006 there were at least 29 casualties by 21 May.

Background

Following a three-year peace process, the Government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. An interim implementation period of six years will last until July 2011, when a referendum on self-determination for the south will be held.

Sudan is now ruled by the Government of National Unity (GONU)—an entity containing the former ruling party, the National Congress, SPLM/A and others—and a semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan (GOSS). On 24 March 2005, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1590 to monitor implementation of the CPA and establish a peacekeeping mission called UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). UNMIS has been tasked with assisting the CPA parties to engage in mine action.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 October 2003. The treaty entered into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement incorporates previous agreements between the government and SPLM/A that explicitly prohibit use of all landmines. An agreement reached on 31 December 2004 states that the “laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited.”^[1] Under a previous memorandum of understanding on cessation of hostilities reached in October 2002, both parties agreed to “cease laying of landmines.”^[2] The government and SPLM/A also agreed to stop using mines in the January 2002 Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement.^[3]

Sudan has not yet taken any domestic legal measures specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty and enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibitions.^[4]

On 17 February 2006, Sudan submitted an Article 7 transparency report covering the period from 1 October 2004 to 30 April 2005.^[5] Later in 2006, it provided an updated Article 7 report, covering 1 May 2005 to 31 December 2005.^[6] Previously, Sudan prepared an initial Article 7 report, dated 1 October 2004. The Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit received this initial report, but Sudan has apparently never officially submitted it to the UN, which posts all Article 7 reports on a public website.^[7]

The Government of National Unity participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, with a delegation headed by the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs. Sudan made a statement during the General Exchange of Views and also intervened to discuss its stockpile destruction and victim assistance activities.

In June 2005 and May 2006, a delegation representing the new government participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva, and made statements to the Standing Committees on mine clearance, victim assistance, and general status and operation of the convention.^[8]

Non-State Armed Groups Ban Policy

Prior to becoming a part of the Government of National Unity in 2005, the SPLM/A committed to a ban on the use of antipersonnel mines on several occasions.^[9]

The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed a humanitarian cease-fire for Darfur with the Government of Sudan in April 2004. This agreement requires a halt in mine use and requires the marking of any mined areas. The rebel groups and the Sudanese government must ensure that all forces under their control comply with the agreement.^[10]

In June 2005, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), composed of SPLM/A and smaller northern-based parties and armed groups, signed a peace agreement for the non-SPLM/A NDA members, which left the status of NDA armed groups until a later time, and did not contain any mention of landmines.^[11]

Production, Trade and Stockpiling

Sudan has repeatedly stated that it has not produced, imported or exported antipersonnel mines. Past editions of Landmine Monitor have noted no evidence of production of antipersonnel mines by Sudan, but have cited allegations of transfer to militant groups in neighboring countries.^[12] With respect to importation, Sudan has listed 12 mine types from at least seven countries in stockpiles held by the Army or SPLA.^[13]

In its February 2006 Article 7 report, Sudan declared a total of 14,485 antipersonnel mines of eight types held in the stockpiles of the Army and the SPLA. This included the 9,485 mines listed in Sudan’s initial Article 7 report (Soviet PMN, POMZ-2 and PMD-6, Italian TS-50, Chinese Type 72A and Indian M14), plus 5,000 mines in the SPLA stockpile (Chinese Type 72A, Indian M14, Soviet POMZ-2, Israeli No.4 and Belgian PRB M35).^[14] The number of each type of mine has not been recorded.

The February report said that Sudan is still working “to ascertain reliable information regarding stockpiled antipersonnel mines,” and stated, “More detailed information on locations, types and quantities will be provided in the 2006 Article 7 report.”^[15] Annex 9 of the report indicated 12 mine types in the stocks of the Army and SPLA, which would indicate four mine types have yet to be accounted for.^[16] No additional details on locations, types or quantities of stockpiled mines were provided in the updated 2006 report.

The first two Article 7 reports stated that 5,000 mines of various types will be retained for training purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty by the Engineer Corps of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and that further details on numbers and types will be provided in the next Article 7 report.^[17] However, the updated 2006 report stated that in addition to the 5,000 mines to be retained by the Sudan Armed Forces, all of the 5,000 mines identified as held by Government of Southern Sudan People’s Army would be retained by its Engineer Corps.^[18] In September 2003, the SPLM/A said that, “it should be recognized that only antipersonnel mines rendered inoperable are to be used for training in mine clearance or other activities.”^[19]

This combined total of 10,000 retained mines will be among the highest kept by any State Party. Sudan has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in November-December 2004. Sudan also did not utilize the expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines, as agreed at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005.

Sudan’s treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction is 1 April 2008. The latest Article 7 report notes that no destruction has yet taken place, though all of Sudan’s Article 7 reports have stated that a destruction program is being formulated.^[20] Sudan did not present an update on its stockpile destruction plans during the May 2006 intersessional meetings. In May 2005, the National Mine Action Office director told Landmine Monitor that the stockpile is stored in different military areas. He said that identifying the mines for collection and destruction would take some time.^[21]

Use

Landmine Monitor has not received any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government, SPLA or other forces anywhere in Sudan since early 2004. During the May 2006 intersessional meetings, Sudan stated that mines were not being used by anyone anywhere in Sudan, including in Darfur, and that they had been removed as a weapon of struggle.^[22]

Antipersonnel mines were used extensively by all sides in Sudan’s two decades of civil conflict with the SPLM/A in southern Sudan, and in the three so-called conflict areas in northern Sudan (the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Blue Nile). Mines were also allegedly used in recent years along Sudan’s borders with Chad, Eritrea, Libya and Uganda.^[23]

In April 2006, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden reportedly instructed the mujahideen in Sudan to begin stockpiling landmines and other weapons for long-term war in Darfur.^[24]

Landmine and ERW Problem

The problem of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Sudan is the result of more than 20 years of internal conflict.^[25] Antivehicle mines were emplaced on roads by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army to restrict movement of Government of Sudan forces and access to towns they controlled, while the GOS used antipersonnel landmines defensively to protect its garrison towns and to prohibit movement of insurgent troops.^[26]

The mine action program continued to deal with the problems caused by both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). Large quantities of AXO and UXO have been found around abandoned camps and garrisons but also outside military compounds such as bunkers in villages, schools and on roadsides. Ammunition is often sensitive due to its age and poor storage conditions.^[27]

However, the true extent of the impact of Sudan’s mine and ERW problem remains unknown, as no in-depth countrywide survey has taken place so far. Although the mine action program has grown significantly since signature of the CPA on 9 January 2005, and survey teams are generating increasing amounts of data on the presence of mines and ERW, the focus remains on demining main roads. As a consequence, the majority of areas not on main traffic routes remain to be surveyed.^[28] By the end of April 2006, the Sudan mine action program had recorded 1,023 dangerous areas, and more than 11,000 kilometers of major supply roads were suspected to be mined.^[29]

It is estimated that mines or ERW may affect 21 of the country’s 26 states, but reliable information is currently available only for 10 of those states. Mines and ERW affect the following states in particular: Western Equatoria, Southern Kordofan, Upper Nile, Kassala, Red Sea, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Blue Nile, Bahr al-Jebel, Eastern Equatoria and Jongli, and also in the Nuba Mountains area. In addition, the country’s borders with Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and Uganda are considered mine-affected.^[30]

The UN and national authorities have claimed that mines or ERW affect, to some extent, a third of the country, with the vast majority located in southern and central Sudan, where most of the fighting between the GOS and the SPLA took place. However, the only evidence for this assertion is that locations where there are known dangerous areas are found in 21 states to some extent, which in their entirety represent slightly more than one third of the country’s geographic area. Such areas are among the poorest, where people generally rely on the land for their livelihood.^[31] Data collected so far has indicated that there are few minefields located around towns. Locations such as separation/disengagement lines, wells, bridges and military bases are suspected to be mine-affected.^[32]

Another concern for mine action is the large numbers of people displaced by the conflict who are now returning to their home areas. Of the estimated 600,000 Sudanese refugees in camps in the eight neighboring countries, some 150,000 are believed to have returned since 2005, mainly from Kenya and Ethiopia through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation program. An additional unknown number of refugees have spontaneously returned. However, the tensions with the Lord’s Resistance Army along the borders with the DRC and Uganda have slowed down the process. Refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are at risk both during their return, as the roads they use may be mined, and when they resettle in communities affected by landmines and ERW.^[33]

With considerable numbers of IDPs and refugees planning to return, mainly to the southern region, mines and ERW are also inhibiting factors for agricultural production, food security, economic activities and freedom of movement once people have resettled in their communities. According to the UN, mines and ERW have continued to pose a “great” risk to vulnerable people, and to emergency humanitarian assistance, deployment and activities of peacekeepers, long-term reconstruction and development activities. As the number of returnees increases, the pressure on safe agricultural land and safe roads will continue to rise. Furthermore, the local economy will stagnate until regional roads have been made safe for commerce.^[34]

The presence of mines on roads in the north and south is said to have led to severe restrictions on emergency and development aid reaching needy communities and has consequently increased the cost of food and non-food items. The World Food Programme estimated in a 2005 report that mines and UXO were directly affecting the food security of two million people.^[35]

However, according to the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) Deputy Programme Manager, “UXO is a problem, mines are not a problem in Sudan, except in areas where fighting was more intense and locations where the population is exercising a pressure on the land, such as Kassala, Malakal, or the Nuba Mountains.” In this regard, he believes that there is a disconnect between perception and reality as far as the mine threat is concerned, with the problem resulting more from a fear of mines than from the presence of the mines themselves.^[36] Indeed, fear of landmines is the second risk factor (after security) cited by refugees and IDPs as having an impact on their return.^[37] It has also spread among agricultural communities, where it has reportedly caused some farmers not to cultivate their land and herders to refrain from using pasture to graze their cattle.^[38]

The Darfur region, for example, is affected by UXO rather than mines, and no mines have been recorded over the two last years, although mines were reported to have severely injured a number of aid workers in 2004.^[39] The State Minister of Interior claimed in May 2006 that, “despite the three-year-long conflict in the Darfur region of the Sudan, no group had used antipersonnel mines.”^[40] UNMAO pointed out, however, that even a few mines in an area can have a major impact, requiring the allocation of significant resources.^[41]

In the Nuba Mountains, where demining operations started in 2002, activities have been more oriented to development than post-conflict reconstruction. Minefields have more of a human impact than a developmental one, as there are sufficient areas for cultivation available. Clearance of roads has been the priority to allow access and the return of IDPs. UXO and AXO have a bigger impact, as they can be found around villages and therefore jeopardize the resettlement of refugees and IDPs.^[42]

In May 2006, the UNMAO Programme Manager shared his concerns related to the eastern part of the country along the border with Ethiopia. Eight mine incidents were reported in the Kassala area during only the first quarter of 2006. UNMAO personnel have not been granted access to large areas in the east of the country by the GOS, and, as a result, the threat in those areas remains unknown.^[43]

The CPA required both parties to surrender maps indicating where mines have been laid.^[44] The Sudan Armed Forces provided maps and sketches for certain areas. The SPLA did not systematically map and record mines laid, and consequently it has worked more on the basis of collective memory to provide information on mine emplacement.^[45] Data available often was found to be unreliable and contradictory. Over the course of the 25-year war, commanders inevitably changed and areas were sometimes mined, cleared and re-mined.^[46]

Some 1,800 mine and ERW casualties have been reported and recorded in Sudan over the past five years; most of the casualties occurred in vehicles traveling along mined roads or as a result of individuals handling or tampering with UXO. In the Nuba Mountains (where the most accurate data has been obtained), 45 percent of casualties were from UXO, 38 percent from antivehicle mines and 17 percent from antipersonnel mines.^[47] This may substantially understate the true number, as many of the casualties are unlikely to reach hospitals due to long distances, scarce facilities and lack of transport. In general, it is believed that people living near dangerous areas are aware of the threat and use paths they believe to be safe. However, the huge amounts of ERW endanger children who may tamper with them.^[48]

Mine Action Program

National Mine Action Authority: Sudan’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was officially launched on 7 March 2006 in Khartoum. At the launch ceremony, the President of Sudan, Omer Hassan al-Bashir, described the establishment of the NMAA as one of the first fruits of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and a strong indication of the commitment and determination of the Republic of Sudan to address its mine and ERW contamination. The First Vice President of Sudan, Lt. Gen. Silva Kair Miar Madit, closed the ceremony, pledging that in addition to the efforts of the Government of National Unity, the Government of South Sudan would take all necessary measures in support of the NMAA.^[49]

The NMAA had already been mandated by a Presidential Decree of 24 December 2005.^[50] The NMAA is composed of a National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), a General Secretariat, a National Mine Action Center (based in Khartoum) and a South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center (to be based in Juba). The NMAC is co-chaired by the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and the Minister of Defense, with the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs designated as its Secretary-General. The committee is composed of representatives from 13 ministries of the GONU, two representatives from the GOSS and one representative from the SPLA. The Secretary-General of the committee will be supported in his work by the General Commissioner of the Humanitarian Aid Commission, the Director of the National Mine Action Center and the Director of the South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center.^[51]

In accordance with the 2005 presidential decree, the NMAC is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and any other treaties on mine action ratified by the government. It is responsible for approving mine action strategies, policies, plans and budgets at the national level, as well as for the overall management of mine action. The NMAC has the task of overseeing the National Mine Action Center, South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center and mine action sub-offices. The NMAC is also responsible for approving and endorsing workplans, programs and projects of UN agencies, and international and national NGOs active in mine action.^[52]

Following its creation, the NMAC was due to meet at the end of April 2006 in Juba, the “capital” of South Sudan, where practical arrangements and a timeframe for implementation of the National Mine Action Authority were to be discussed.^[53] Subsequently, the meeting was rescheduled for Khartoum in May; NMAC’s second meeting will take place in Juba.^[54]

In May 2006, the Secretary General of the NMAA appointed a liaison officer within the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to ensure coordination between the different ministries, between the two mine action centers, and between the mine action centers and the NMAA. The newly appointed liaison officer was due to attend the Senior Mine Action Manager’s Course at James Madison University in the US in June 2006.^[55]

As a result of the 2005 Decree, the former mine action coordination structures in Sudan―the National Mine Action Office in the North and the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate in the South―became de facto the National Mine Action Center and the South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center. Under the new structure, the National Mine Action Technical Committee and the New Sudan Authority on Landmines, which were supposed to serve as mine action authorities in the north and the south, have disappeared.^[56]

Mine Action Centers: The National Mine Action Center is responsible for ensuring effective coordination of mine action activities in the country, implementing policies and strategies approved by the NMAA, developing and promoting implementation of national mine action standards in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and identifying and tasking mine action responsibilities and activities in accordance with national mine action priorities.

According to Article 10 of the presidential decree, the South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center has the same responsibilities as the National Mine Action Center, but must report to it.^[57] The Director of the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate was, however, unhappy with this requirement, believing this Decree not to be in line with the CPA that initially foresaw two mine action authorities. He claimed that the 2005 Decree was not voted on by the national assembly and therefore the old structure should be followed, whereby two distinct directorates, one north and one south, work in coordination and cooperation with the UN. He further stated his view that the use of the term “regional” is inappropriate considering that the Mine Action Center based in Khartoum is called “national.”^[58] The Director of the National Mine Action Center, on the other hand, believes that as long as strategies and objectives are agreed by the NMAA (which represents the GONU), there is no need for two distinct centers but rather one main center to act as a focal point to ensure coordination of activities and channeling of donor funding.^[59]

According to the UN, which supported the development of the NMAA, the new structure is in line with the CPA’s “one country, two systems” approach that foresaw a mine action structure consisting of two mine action authorities (north and south) that would work together and coordinate their mine action activities as well as work in close cooperation with UNMAO.^[60]

Article 12 of the 2005 Decree refers to three different sources of finance: resources allocated by the government, contributions from donor countries and others, and any other financial sources approved by the NMAC.^[61] The President of Sudan announced at the launch of the National Authority that the GONU had included mine action in its national budget for 2006 and that it would allocate funds for mine action in the coming years.^[62] In May 2006, the Deputy Minister of Interior confirmed that, “Sudan has allocated funds in the national budget for 2006 to support mine action efforts, and this commitment will continue in the years to come.”^[63] However, the amount of these allocations was not known as of June 2006.

In 2006, six sub-offices were to be created within the national mine action structure, located in Wau, Yei, Kadugli, Damazin, Malakal, and either Rumbek or Kassala. The US Department of State planned to supply the sub-offices with material and equipment through a US$424,000 grant.^[64] Under this plan, the National Mine Action Center and the South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center would each be staffed with an operations officer, a victim assistance and mine risk education officer, an administration and finance officer, and an information management officer. Additional operations and quality assurance officers would be deployed in each sub-office. Personnel would be paid through the GONU and GOSS budgets. In May, the National Mine Action Center had already received equipment from the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The Swedish government confirmed it would equip the South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center with computers and vehicles worth $190,000.^[65]

The Role of the UN: The UN mine action program in Sudan is coordinated by the UN Mine Action Office as an integral component of the UN Mission in Sudan. UNMAO is responsible for coordinating UN mine action activities, providing mine action support to UN peacekeeping operation, and building national and institutional mine action capacities. UNMAO comprises the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNICEF, UNDP, World Food Programme and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNMAO’s mandate is “to assist the parties to the CPA in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination.”^[66] The UN mine action program in Sudan is supported by more than 50 international staff.^[67]

UNMAO has been responsible for ensuring that all mine action activities throughout the country are conducted to humanitarian standards. In 2005, UNMAO developed the Sudanese Technical Standards and Guidelines, based on IMAS, that cover demining, mine risk education and information management. As of March 2006, accreditation of demining operators for 2006 was ongoing.^[68]

UNMAO has planned to continue its assistance to the NMAA and the centers by providing training and support until the end of the six-year interim period set by the CPA, which is 2011. By that date, UNMAO expects to have fully handed over to the NMAA the necessary functions to execute the mine action program. The UNMAO and the mine action centers intended to design a transitional plan at the NMAC meeting in Khartoum in May 2006; this would include provision of training and support to ensure the progressive transfer of capacities from UNMAO to the NMAA, with UNMAO progressively reducing its capacities.^[69]

The Mine Action Steering Committee, composed of UN agencies involved in mine action and chaired by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), was established in September 2005 to clarify agency roles, to function as a policy-making body for mine action in Sudan, and to set strategic priorities for the allocation of mine action resources.^[70] In November 2005, the SRSG clarified that UNMAS is the focal point for all mine action activities and reaffirmed UNMIS’ mandate for humanitarian demining: UNMIS must respond to the need for increasing support to humanitarian demining more broadly, not restrict itself to mission priorities. Previously, UNMAS considered that it was being regarded merely as a subcontractor by UNMIS and not a coordination body for mine action, as UNMIS via the UNMAO was contracting out mine action activities through commercial contracts (for example, with RONCO, Mechem and FSD). In addition, instead of receiving consolidated mine action priorities from UNMIS, UNMAS was being tasked by the military section of the UN Mission, which impeded the effective prioritization of mine action as priorities were being received from different directions at different times.^[71]

The SRSG noted the importance of undertaking consultations with local actors and authorities and called for the issues raised in these consultations to be reflected in the Steering Committee meeting in May 2006. A subcommittee was created in Juba to discuss these topics with UN agency staff in the south. ^[72]

In 2005, a memorandum of understanding was signed between UNMAO and World Food Programme in order to establish coordination and prioritization mechanisms between the two agencies, as well as obligations and responsibilities in terms of standards and quality assurance of clearance.^[73] A similar memorandum was due to be signed between UNMAO and UNHCR in 2006.^[74]

UNDP has been in charge of capacity-building of the NMAA and the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL), of peacebuilding, and of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. In 2005, UNDP supported the mine action authorities as well as the SCBL with material and equipment. UNDP also supported the training of the two national mine action directors in the Senior Mine Action Manager’s Course at James Madison University in the US. The deputy director was also funded to attend the middle manager’s course in Bangkok, Thailand. Senior personnel went on a one-week joint mine action exchange program in Jordan. The recruitment of an international junior program officer for the north and a technical advisor for the south was ongoing as of mid-May 2006.^[75]

The World Food Programme (WFP) started an Emergency Road Repair and Demining project in 2003 in south Sudan to reduce transport costs and dependency on air transport from Kenya. Priorities, which were set in collaboration with John Garang, the late SPLA/M leader, focused on linking south and north Sudan on the two sides of the Nile, as well as to the DRC, Kenya and Uganda. In 2005-2006, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) were WFP’s three partners for demining. From 2004 to 2006, total project costs for road repair and demining had reached $206 million, of which $10 million had already been spent on demining (executed mainly by FSD between 2004 and 2006). Another $15 million just for demining was needed to conclude the Road Repair and Demining project. However, as of March 2006, a shortfall of $80 million was compromising the completion of the third and last phase of the project.^[76] On 24 May 2006, WFP formally advised FSD to demobilize all its teams and assets, and to close the road clearance project, because it was unable to access funding.^[77] However, in June 2006, GOSS showed interest in funding the road clearance project and WFP believed that World Bank funds would be available later. WFP was therefore confident that the project would resume, possibly in October 2006.^[78]

As part of its mandate to ensure safe return and resettlement of IDPs and refugees, UNHCR, with its partners MAG and NPA, conducted survey and clearance of areas to be used under the repatriation program, such as roads, resettlement areas and “way-stations”―rest areas for refugees and IDPs along the routes used for repatriation.^[79]

Among the 10,000 UNMIS peacekeepers deployed in Sudan, five demining companies were created within the battalions from Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan, Egypt and Cambodia. After UNMAO conducted pre-deployment visits to each country in 2005, it was agreed that the Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Egyptian and Cambodian demining companies would need further training, and that equipment would be required to conform with the Sudanese Technical Standards and Guidelines. Each battalion subsequently procured the necessary equipment and UN mine action advisors provided additional in-country training. As of mid-May 2006, the Egyptian and Bangladeshi demining companies had received full accreditation and were deployed on humanitarian or UNMIS tasks. The Cambodian, Kenyan and Pakistani companies were still undergoing on-site assessment before receiving full accreditation.^[80]

UNMAO has been using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) since 2003, and IMSMA terminals have been installed in the Khartoum, Juba and Kadugli mine action offices. The installation of version 3.1 of IMSMA had been prevented by US economic sanctions. Following a visit by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GIHCD) to the US embassy in Khartoum in April 2006, the embassy gave its support for the release of the software and awaited an official request from the GOS that could be forwarded to Washington DC for consideration.^[81]

UNMAO has used IMSMA to store data on survey, clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance activities. However, delays in transferring the data from sub-offices to the regional IMSMA cells, as well as a lack of systematic reporting from operators, lack of training of data entry officers and the absence of an IMSMA officer in South Sudan since November 2005, have all contributed to delays in updating the database.^[82]

Accreditation and quality assurance has been conducted by UNMAO with 11 staff (five in the south, one in Khartoum, four in the north, and one medical officer). Cleared land is formally handed over to the community by means of a certificate and a walk over the cleared site by the deminers, the quality assurance officer and the landowner or community representative. With road clearance, the completion document is handed over to the contractor that will rebuild the road. The UNMAO Programme Manager signs every completion report.^[83]

Strategic Planning and Progress

The National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the National Policy Framework were endorsed by the GOS and the SPLM in July and August 2004. Although the mine action strategy remained the basis for mine action in Sudan as of May 2006, both documents were due to be revised by the NMAC in the light of political developments and mine action achievements since the signature of the CPA in December 2004. Based on the revised mine action strategy, a two-year plan for the period 2006 to 2008 will be developed. Revision and endorsement of both the Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Policy Framework were due to take place at the NMAC meeting to be held in Khartoum at the end of May 2006.

As reported by Sudan at the June 2005 Standing Committee meetings, the specific goals outlined in the strategy included:

• Clearance of routes for humanitarian aid, returnees and resettlement areas by the end of 2006;
• Completion of technical survey of all medium and high priority mine/ERW-contaminated areas by December 2008;
• Clearance of medium and high priority minefields and battle areas by December 2011; and,
• Recording and permanent marking of low priority minefields and battle areas by December 2008.^[84]

It was claimed that the revised strategy would take into consideration the CPA, the creation of the NMAA in December 2005, as well as the political situation in Darfur and in the east of the country. The strategy was also said to give greater attention to capacity-building and take into consideration the existing demining assets. Targets would remain unchanged, but geographic priorities would be amended based on available survey data. The NMAA was reportedly willing to move up in the list of priorities the northern states such as South Kordofan, Upper Nile, Blue Nile and Kassala. Concerns regarding those areas arose after a number of mine and/or ERW incidents were reported during the first quarter of 2006 (however, UNMAO previously reported that access to some of those areas was not facilitated by the GOS).^[85]

The priorities of the 2005 mine action program were jointly formulated by the national mine action authorities and UN agencies. They included emergency survey, marking and targeted clearance of immediate hazard areas such as roads, schools, and housing, as well as route verification, targeted mine risk education and building both institutional and operational capacities.^[86] The Deputy Programme Manager reported that in 2005, UNMAO concentrated on demining for the safe deployment of the peacekeeping mission with a lesser focus on humanitarian demining, due to a lack of capacity and funding.^[87] The lesser amount of humanitarian demining conducted was in response to urgent requirements to verify and open primary routes as well as emergency survey and clearance in support of other humanitarian activities.^[88]

Priorities for 2006 remained the same as the previous year: emergency survey, route verification, marking, destruction of stockpiles and targeted clearance, providing mine risk education and building the capacities of both national structures and implementing partners.^[89] The objective was to ensure that humanitarian demining covered the six sectors (Juba, Rumbek/Wau, Malakal, Nuba Mountains, Damazin and Abyei), in addition to Darfur and Kassala where mine and ERW contamination is suspected or confirmed. Those activities were planned to facilitate the safe return of refugees and IDPs, free movement of the population, and the safe implementation of humanitarian aid and development activities including UN peacekeeping.^[90] In March 2006, UNMAO estimated that routes and tracks in north Darfur would have been verified and each track would be open within the coming two months; in May, the work was ongoing.^[91] It was also expected that by the end of 2006, all main road corridors would be open and all main towns would be accessible by road with the exception of Malakal, which is surrounded by a swamp. ^[92]

The road from Juba to Yei was still not fully reconstructed as of May 2006, after more than one year of various survey and clearance operations. Clearing mined areas around three bridges located 40 miles from Juba was a complicated and slow process as demining took place in areas with heavy vegetation, difficult terrain and no information available on the location of the threat. Initial clearance opened the way for peacekeeping forces in December 2005. However, in order for bridges to be rebuilt to allow trucks to cross, wider verges needed to be cleared. At different times during 2005 and 2006, Mechem, RONCO, FSD and NPA all conducted survey and/or clearance on the former battleground area.^[93]

Mine action operations in Sudan have been impeded or compromised by several factors. According to UNMAO and operators, a central problem has been the lack of reliable information to prioritize actions and plan operations effectively. The little information and data given by both parties to the conflict appeared to be wrong or incomplete, leading survey and clearance teams either to miss areas containing mines and ERW or to spend time conducting survey and clearance in areas with no threat.^[94]

Security has also slowed down operations, especially in the south. Following an ambush that led to the death of two FSD deminers on 31 October 2005 on the Nimule to Juba road, the whole area located south of the road linking Yei to Juba was classified as Security Phase 4 by the UN Department for Safety and Security, which implied that transportation should be made in convoys and assisted by armed security personnel (either peacekeepers, members of the SPLA or the SAF). This considerably complicated and delayed demining operations in those areas.^[95] In March 2006, two FSD demining team members were kidnapped in Darfur and released 10 days later.^[96]

Although travel permits are no longer required for UN personnel and partner organizations, and air transport and usable roads have increased, the size of the country, bureaucracy and weather (heavy rainy from June to September) have been inhibiting factors for logistics and the recruitment of personnel for Sudan and thus implementation of demining activities.^[97]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 April 2014. With the creation of the National Mine Action Authority, Sudan has set the legislative framework for mine action that will enable the creation of capacities in order to further coordinate and manage mine action. However, the terms for the implementation of the NMAA strategies and policies remain to be defined. Also, challenges remain before the NMAA becomes fully operational and can take over the management and implementation of the mine action program in Sudan. These include finding the money to fund clearance, recruiting and training two dozen staff, and agreeing on priorities. Therefore, an effective national mine action structure is not yet in place to ensure that Sudan fulfills its legal obligations under the treaty.

Demining

International NGOs working in Sudan in 2005 were DanChurchAid (DCA), Norwegian People’s Aid, Mines Advisory Group, Landmine Action UK (LA-UK), HALO Trust and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action. National mine action NGOs included Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL), JASMAR, Friends of Peace and Development Organization, Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service and the Sudan Landmine Response (SLR in the south and SLIRI/Sudanese Landmine Information and Response Initiative in the north). Commercial companies involved in mine action in 2005-2006 were RONCO Consulting Corporation and Mechem International. The Strategy Framework for Mine Action required that international NGOs operate in partnership with local NGOs.^[98]

In early 2006, the UNMAO Programme Manager advised demining operators “not to overstretch their capacities but rather to get programs running,” meaning that operators should limit the number of projects they were implementing, while building a solid capacity. His view was that operators have been underestimating the complexity of working in Sudan, facing major challenges in logistics and human resources, and therefore facing delays in becoming fully operational.^[99] In addition, a lack of management and/or lack of technical expertise among certain operators added to erroneous assessment of equipment needed, considerably slowing down the pace of clearance and survey operations.^[100]

In 2005, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) granted $300,000 to support a Joint Integrated Demining Unit, made of 140 personnel from the SAF and the SPLA, with equipment and training in humanitarian demining at the Mine Action Training Center in Nairobi, Kenya. By the end of May 2006, both SPLA and SAF trainees had been nominated and started two months of training. However, as of mid-May 2006 no funds had been found for the operational costs of the demining units from August 2006 when the training ends to December 2006. UNDP planned to recruit two technical advisors to support the demining units.^[101]

Identification of Mined Areas: Surveys and Assessments

Identification of mined areas in Sudan remains incomplete. Of the 40 survey teams required by the mine action program in 2005, only 14 were operational as of March 2006. This was considered insufficient by UNMAO to assess the extent of mine and ERW contamination in Sudan.^[102] In 2005 and 2006, the demining community was making particular efforts to identify the most cost-effective way to gather information on dangerous areas (DAs), as well as to deal with the most pressing mine and ERW threats. Given the nature of mined areas in Sudan (mines were typically laid without following any pattern) and of the information initially available (often scarce and contradictory), technical survey was considered by some as too consuming of time and resources.^[103]

Road survey became more methodical during the reporting period. For example, standard survey forms have been developed; it was agreed that communities should be systematically involved, and information from more than one commander from the SPLA or the former GOS forces should be sought systematically. Over the course of what was a long war, a single frontline might have been subject to several battles, and mines were often laid, moved and re-laid, thereby requiring the involvement of more than one commander in identifying DAs.^[104]

Despite these limitations in 2005, 301 new DAs were identified, totaling over 30 square kilometers, and 72 of the DAs were cleared. During the first quarter of 2006, a further 176 DAs were discovered (totaling 558 square kilometers). Large DAs were identified during the first quarter of 2006 in Bahr al-Ghazal, Blue Nile, Red Sea and Kassala states, where demining activities have intensified. In total, as of April 2006, 1,023 DAs had been identified of which 270 had already been cleared.^[105]

However, according to the UNMAO Information Officer in Khartoum, DAs are any type of suspected hazardous area, including suspected mined areas, ammunition dumps, UXO spots and confrontation areas. The numbers and sizes come from various sources such as survey organizations, local authorities, individuals and NGOs; these cannot be relied upon for planning and reporting. ^[106]

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) had five survey teams tasked by UNMAO as of March 2006. One Rapid Response Survey Team (RRST) was deployed in Darfur, and two survey teams were operational in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. Two general survey teams combined with an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity were working in Bahr al-Jebel. Another RRST team was deployed in April 2006 in Malakal as part of a contract with the UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program; however, due to the rainy season the team had to suspend work until September 2006. FSD was contracted by UNMAO to develop a new program in May with the support of the European Commission and the Netherlands, which combined survey, EOD and clearance in Kassala. However, because of restrictions by the SAF in May 2006, the teams could not access those areas and were moved south along the eastern border area of Sudan.^[107]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted road survey for WFP from July 2005 until February 2006; 182 kilometers of road from Rumbek to Shambe and 130 kilometers of the Rumbek-Wau road as far as Tonj were surveyed. As of March 2006, survey of the road was continuing to Wau and then to Abyei, while demining and MRE teams were starting to clear dangerous areas previously identified. In 2005, UNHCR tasked MAG to survey and clear 13 kilometers of road from the DRC border at New Laso towards Yei to allow repatriation of refugees to Sudan. In 2006, MAG was contracted by the Survey Action Center (SAC) to implement a pilot Landmine Impact Survey.^[108]

In 2005, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had two general survey teams working in Yei county and Pagak town, in eastern Upper Nile. However, the security situation in Western Equatoria has severely hampered the capacity of the teams to deploy. From the end of 2005 until March 2006, around 60 DAs reports had been collected. NPA indicated that the main focus for survey in 2006 would be roads.^[109]

In 2005, SAC initiated a Landmine Impact Survey in collaboration with UNMAO and the national mine action authorities. The survey aimed to support the elaboration of a national strategy to minimize the impact of mines and ERW on communities in Sudan. In March 2006, SAC started a pilot project in partnership with MAG in Eastern Equatoria in the south and Blue Nile in the north. Upon completion of the pilot phase, SAC, UNMAO and the mine action centers will undertake a complete review of the pilot survey and decide whether to continue in the rest of the country. The survey of Eastern Equatoria, started in April 2006, was expected to take seven and a half months. The survey of Blue Nile was expected to start in October 2006, once the rainy season was over. At the end of April 2006, preliminary opinion collection had been completed in two of the eight counties in Eastern Equatoria, and MAG/SAC were recruiting staff for the survey teams. Standing operating procedures for the survey had been drafted by the MAG survey team and submitted to MAG’s senior management for approval.^[110]

The NGO SLIRI/SLR conducted two surveys in 2003-2004: an impact survey in the south and a “mini-Landmine Impact Survey” in the Nuba Mountains. Results of the impact survey in the south were made available in July 2005, after the SPLA lifted the restrictions it had imposed upon dissemination.^[111] However, data gathered by SLR in the south was not entered into the IMSMA database as it was thought to be incomplete. As a result, the survey data has not yet been used by the demining community.^[112]

Data gathered through the mini-Landmine Impact Survey in the Nuba Mountains identified communities impacted by mines and UXO. The results have been used as a basis for planning; however, as the data was thought to be rather general, further area reduction techniques are needed to better define the boundaries of a mined area.^[113]

HALO Trust signed an operating partnership agreement with SLR on 15 June 2005. In September, HALO deployed vehicles, equipment and international staff to SLR’s headquarters in Yei. Training of existing and newly recruited SLR staff on survey and EOD/battle area clearance (BAC) was carried out in October and November 2005, allowing for verification of survey data on DAs identified by SLR in 2003 through 2005. The survey was ongoing in 2006 in conjunction with the establishment of SLR-HALO clearance capacity.^[114] In March, HALO awaited registration as a demining organization in Sudan.^[115] As of June 2006, SLR-HALO had secured funding support from the US Department of State for one survey team, and from DFID for two clearance teams of 24 personnel each to expand capacity in Bahr al-Ghazal and Western Equatoria. Additional funding for a further three clearance teams and two EOD/battle area clearance teams was sought.^[116]

Danish Demining Group (DDG) started operating in south Sudan in February 2006 under an ECHO program. A second program was signed with UNHCR in May 2006. Under both projects DDG was planning to deploy two survey and EOD teams (each with two expatriates and 32 local staff) and two MRE teams. DDG was tasked by UNHCR on areas that will serve repatriation efforts. DDG hoped to have its teams operational around mid-September.^[117]

Marking and Fencing

Marking of mined areas is far from complete in Sudan. In most cases where DAs have been marked, this was done by survey teams painting rocks red. As of March 2006, the 50,000 mine warning signs planned by UNMAO had not been produced due to lack of funding.^[118]

Mine and ERW Clearance

According to UNMAO, in 2005 demining organizations cleared 1,367,276 square meters of mined areas, and Mechem verified 390 kilometers of road.^[119] As a result of survey, FSD handed over an additional 246 kilometers of “low-risk” road.^[120] This represented a significant increase compared to 2004, when only half a square kilometer of mined area was cleared and 106 kilometers of road were verified.^[121] In 2005, a total of 366 antipersonnel mines, 87 antivehicle mines, 14,354 items of UXO and 56,398 items of AXO were destroyed. As in 2004, all items removed were not destroyed, due to a shortage of explosives; an additional 110 antipersonnel mines, 137 antivehicle mines and 24,517 pieces of UXO were only removed and left for later destruction.^[122]

Area Cleared (square meters) and Mines/AXO/UXO Destroyed or Removed by Organizations in Sudan in 2005^[123]

Organizations	DCA	FSD (UNOPS)	FSD (WFP)	LA-UK	MAG	NPA	Mechem	RONCO	Total
Area cleared	30,503	45,354	305,342	30,480	32,001	82,350	52,545	788,701	1,367,276
Devices destroyed:
Antipersonnel mines	34	65	6	13	142	10	9	87	366
Antivehicle mines	0	21	4	0	8	5	10	39	87
UXO	277	8,233	398	59	271	138	147	4,831	14,354
Small arms ammunition rounds	3,588	49,625	0	0	0	0	0	3,185	56,398
Devices removed:
Antipersonnel mines	0	54	4	3	0	39	0	10	110
Antivehicle mines	0	41	45	0	25	9	4	13	137
UXO	8	614	623	0	165	19,009	3	4,095	24,517

According to UNMAO records, in 2005 clearance operations in Sudan took place in Bahr al-Ghazal (456,119 square meters), Kordofan (239,991 square meters), Upper Nile (122,258 square meters), Darfur (31,429 square meters) and Equatoria (517,479 square meters).^[124] Land cleared was mainly roads, but also areas for resettlement of refugees and IDPs, government building and schools. There are disparities between clearance and survey figures reported by UNMAO and those reported by the operators; UNMAO reports via IMSMA only square meters that have been verified through quality assurance.^[125] Also, in 2005 there were delays in survey and clearance data reaching IMSMA terminals.

No widespread village demining was observed in Sudan over the reporting period,^[126] though operators observed that villagers move UXO in order to cultivate their land.^[127]

During the first quarter of 2006, demining operators cleared 1,614,122 square meters of mined area; 386 antipersonnel mines, 30 antivehicle mines, 37,523 AXO and 2,777 UXO were cleared and destroyed. An additional 14 antipersonnel mines, 6 antivehicle mines and 8,294 UXO were cleared for later destruction. Mechem verified 196 kilometers of road.^[128] The apparent increase in productivity has been ascribed to land cleared in 2005 being quality assured only in early 2006 and then entered into IMSMA.^[129]

As a result of clearance and survey operations, UNMAO reported that from the start of demining in 2002 to April 2006, a total of 4,004,912 square meters had been cleared.^[130]

On 4 April 2006, UNMAO declared it possible to drive from Khartoum to Kampala, and thus drive north and south on the west side of the Nile river, via Kadugli, Abyei, Gogrial, Wau, Rumbek and Yei, without the threat of landmines or ERW. However, clearance has only been undertaken on an eight-meter-wide corridor of road, to allow humanitarian traffic.^[131]

DanChurchAid has been working in the Nuba Mountains since 2002. As of March 2005, it had one EOD team and two manual clearance teams (two more teams were dismantled in June 2005 when the contract with UNOPS terminated). DanChurchAid was given four new demining tasks by the UNMAO in 2005 that were later suspended either because the teams had no access to water or because MEDEVAC could not be provided. In 2005, teams cleared 29,112 square meters of mined area and 3,265 meters of road destroying 77 UXO and seven antipersonnel mines.^[132]

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (SFD) was contracted in 2005 to conduct road clearance as part of WFP’s emergency road repair and mine clearance program. In 2005, FSD was working toward Juba from three different positions: Yei, Kapoeta (on the border with Kenya) and Nimule (on the border with Uganda). FSD operations in 2005 were disrupted by the kidnapping in mid-September of two staff by the Lord’s Resistance Army (they were later released) and the killing of two staff in an ambush on 31 October 2005, after which travel was restricted by the UN and FSD operations halted for two months due to lack of armed security forces. By the end of 2005, FSD had managed to survey and clear the roads from Kapoeta to Idolo, Nimule to Moli (on the road to Juba) and Yei to Laniya. ^[133]

In 2006, as a result of survey, FSD handed over 246 kilometers of low-risk road (roads without DAs) to contractors. As of 18 March 2006, FSD/WFP clearance teams had released more than three square kilometers of high-risk road corridors, clearing 123,420 square meters. In addition, battle area clearance was conducted over an area of 261,737 square meters. In total, 68 antipersonnel mines, 83 antivehicle mines and 2,340 UXO were destroyed.^[134] When FSD closed its road clearance project in May 2006, at WFP’s request, due to lack of funding, the contracts of some 200 trained Sudanese deminers and most international demining staff were terminated; however, it was later expected that FSD would resume the project in October 2006.^[135] As of March 2006, one FSD clearance team was tasked by UNMAO to work on the edge of the Juba airport strip and two manual clearance teams were working in Abyei. Survey/EOD and clearance in Kassala was due to start in May, with ECHO funding.^[136]

As of March 2006, FSD/WFP had three survey teams working along the Jonglei canal on the road from Bor to Malakal (nearing completion), on the Nimule to Juba road (nearing completion), while the Tori to Juba road was just completed. FSD/WFP had four clearance assets (three manual and one mechanical using the Scanjack ground preparation machine) clearing dangerous areas previously identified on the Juba to Bor, the Idolo to Juba and the Moli to Juba roads; Army personnel making up the fourth clearance team were recalled by the GOS in January 2006.^[137]

Landmine Action UK (LA-UK) started to work in the Nuba Mountains in 2002, and during 2005 and 2006 conducted mine clearance, battle area clearance and EOD, in partnership with SLIRI. Given the paucity of mine contamination in the Nuba Mountains, in March 2006 LA-UK was attempting to shift the emphasis of the demining program toward more EOD tasks, as the threat from ERW in that area is greater than that from mines. The return of IDPs and refugees to the area also required EOD in order to free areas for the local population as well as to build confidence. In 2005-2006, LA-UK worked on one minefield in Kauda and two minefields in Kacha. Under a US Department of State-funded project, from April 2005 until end of March 2006, two EOD teams worked in Damazin and on the border with Ethiopia in Blue Nile state.^[138] In 2005, LA-UK reported clearance of 76,546 square meters of land, destroying 29 antipersonnel mines and 111 UXO; 30 antipersonnel mines and two UXO were also cleared but stored for later destruction. LA-UK was due to remain engaged in clearance activities until the end of its demining contract in August 2006.^[139] 

Mines Advisory Group started a small arms and light weapons destruction project in July 2005 in Central Equatoria, funded by the US Department of State. One EOD team was deployed, focusing on abandoned stockpiles, bunkers and caches. By the end of 2005, some 15,900 items of ERW were collected and destroyed and 10 missiles were disposed of in the Kajo-Kaji area. As of March 2006, a second EOD team was being trained. In collaboration with UNHCR, MAG demining teams cleared 64,296 square meters on roads in Central and Eastern Equatoria. The teams also moved to Kapoeta for one month to conduct battle area clearance. As a result, 110 UXO, nine antivehicle mines and 82 items of small arms ammunition were found and destroyed.

MAG planned to train and deploy one demining team for nine months in Eastern Equatoria from April 2006, with ECHO funding. EuropeAid funding was provided for two other mine action teams, which were due to start in 2006 with one community liaison/mine risk education team. In April 2006, the two MAG clearance teams funded by DfID started working in the Blue Nile state in the area of Kamuk. MAG expected to deploy one multi-skilled demining team to support the development work of a consortium of three NGOs (Islamic Relief, Save the Children and the Spanish Red Cross) in the Blue Nile.^[140] During the first half of 2006, MAG fielded survey, road assessment, mine risk education and clearance teams in support of the World Food Programme in the south.^[141]

Norwegian People’s Aid carried out manual, mechanical and EOD clearance in 2005 with two manual clearance teams, one EOD team, one Vehicle Mounted Large Loops (VMLL) and one mechanical team (using MineWolf). As part of emergency clearance following survey, NPA completed 52 DAs, clearing 32 antipersonnel mines, two antivehicle mines and 5,729 UXO. In 2005, manual clearance covered 165,460 square meters of mine-affected land, removing and destroying five antipersonnel mines and 37 UXO. Mechanical clearance covered 246,800 square meters, removing five antipersonnel mines and one UXO. Through VMLL some 40,401 square meters were verified. In addition, during 33 EOD tasks 56 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines and 30,292 UXO were cleared and destroyed. Clearance took place in Yei County, Pagak, eastern Upper Nile, and on the contention line on the road from Yei to Juba. NPA received independent funding, so has been self-tasked. Types of land cleared in 2005 were said to be schools and agricultural land.^[142]

Mechem has been tasked by UNMAO since March 2004 to verify and clear an eight-meter wide corridor along the middle of roads to allow safe deployment of peacekeeping forces. By August 2005, Mechem had verified the Narush-Kapoeta road, Juba-Rumbek road, and Yei to Juba and Malakal-Melut roads, clearing 603,592 square meters, 12 antipersonnel mines, 50 antivehicle mines and 192 UXO. Under a second contract starting in September 2005, 766 kilometers of road were verified by April 2006, and 2,184,416 square meters, two antipersonnel mines, 10 antivehicle mines and nine UXO were cleared as of May 2005 by three road survey, verification and clearance teams. Verification included the Tonj-Wau, Wau-Gogrial, Gogrial-Wunrok, Juba-Mile, Juba-Ronkon and Ronkon-Mundri roads. A third team covered the Kadugli to Talawdi, Abyei-Wunrok and Damazin-Kurmuk roads. As of April 2006, the teams were working on the road from Talawdi to Malakal, Juba to Pibor/Pochala and Wau to Aweil. Each team used MEDDS (Mechem Explosives and Drug Detecting System) and MVMMDS (Mechem Vehicle Mounted Mine Detecting System), followed by mine detection dogs and manual clearance. As of April 2006, 24 deminers were employed.^[143]

RONCO was tasked in May 2005 by UNMAO to support the deployment of peacekeeping operations in Sudan. In June, RONCO trained three Sudanese teams in EOD and battle area clearance for UNMAO tasks in both Rumbek and Malakal.  RONCO was then tasked in July to train and deploy teams in Juba, Wau and Damazin.  Survey, ground preparation, battle area clearance, mine detection dogs and mine risk education (MRE) capacities were added in Juba and Damazin, and one survey team was deployed to Wau in October 2005.  The Damazin MRE team was situated in Malakal by 2006.  By January 2006, RONCO had 17 teams working on UNMAO tasks throughout Sudan.^[144] Between June 2005 and March 2006, some 69,124 square meters of mined area were cleared, while battle area clearance covered 2,081,406 square meters; 181,048 mines and ERW were destroyed.^[145]

Deminer Safety: There were two demining accidents in 2005, with three deminers injured (two deminers from the WFP/FSD road survey and clearance team in August, and one NPA deminer on 26 November). Insurance of deminers is obligatory and is a prerequisite for an organization’s accreditation by UNMAO.^[146]

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education activities and MRE capacity expanded substantially in Sudan in 2005. By the end of February 2006, 571,074 people had received some form of MRE in 12 out of 26 affected states since 1999.^[147] In 2005, 307,205 people―over half the total since 1999―received MRE.^[148]

Sudan included MRE in its Article 7 report submitted in February 2006, including events later than the report’s stated reporting period (1 October 2004 to 30 April 2005).^[149]

Agencies implementing MRE in Sudan in 2005 included three international NGOs (DanChurchAid, MAG, and Save the Children US), RONCO, and five national NGOs (Friends of Peace and Development Organization, JASMAR, OSIL, SLR/SLIRI, and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society). Other mine action agencies undertook ad hoc MRE/community liaison in the course of clearance or survey activities. MRE was also provided to Sudanese refugees living in neighboring countries, by Handicap International in Kenya and by a local partner of UNHCR in Ethiopia.^[150]

RONCO provided MRE for the first time in Sudan, as did Handicap International in Kenya; also in 2005, JASMAR started implementing MRE as an independent NGO (not as a counterpart, as previously) and UNHCR began providing MRE through partner organizations for the first time.^[151] DanChurchAid, MAG and Friends of Peace and Development Organization expanded their MRE activities significantly.^[152]

As of April 2006, there were 33 MRE teams with 105 trainers working in affected communities in north and south Sudan; 130 MRE community volunteers in affected communities in the Nuba Mountains were trained, as were some 300 teachers delivering MRE within the school system. More than 500,000 MRE materials were developed and distributed among at-risk groups, and MRE messages were disseminated through theater and radio in certain areas.^[153] For Darfur, UNICEF trained 250 teachers to integrate MRE into regular school activities.^[154]

MRE activities continued in the Nuba Mountains and south Sudan, and started in 2005 in IDP camps in Khartoum, Blue Nile state, Kosti, Bahr al-Jebel state, Malakal and Bor, with limited MRE activities also in two Darfur states.^[155] UNMAO has reported that most known casualties occur in vehicles traveling along mined roads, or to individuals handling and/or accidentally initiating UXO, and that most casualties are male.^[156] Therefore, MRE in 2005-2006 focused on emergency activities for highly at-risk populations, particularly IDPs in greater Khartoum and enroute to central and south Sudan, and young and adult males who are most likely to tamper with UXO. Data collection to date has been insufficient, according to UNICEF. However, MRE and survey teams may soon generate data that helps to better understand risk-taking activities leading to mine/ERW accidents. ^[157]

UNICEF is the focal agency for MRE in Sudan, working closely with the mine action offices in the south and north, government authorities such as the Ministry of Education, and with NGOs.  UNMAO has four international and five national MRE coordinators; disruption caused by previous staff turnover had ceased in 2005-2006.^[158] In 2005, UNMAO started accrediting MRE operators. From November 2005 to May 2006, UNMAO trained 100 trainers and briefed 745 personnel in mine/ERW safety.^[159]

National standards and guidelines for MRE were updated in September 2005 and are in line with IMAS. A long-term MRE strategy has not been developed, but operational planning includes transition from emergency to more sustainable approaches starting in 2007.^[160]

Providing MRE to the estimated 680,000 IDPs and refugees poses a particular challenge in Sudan. The UNICEF MRE coordinator sees an increase in the number of casualties linked to the increasing rate of return, but data collection has not been systematic enough to measure this properly.^[161] MAG has noted security issues, the wide variety of languages and the long distances, coupled with poor infrastructure, as challenges to its MRE/community liaison work in Sudan.^[162] 

Funding and Assistance

There is no single comprehensive record of mine action funding for Sudan; UNMAO is attempting to gain a comprehensive funding picture by collecting as much information as possible from UN agencies and NGOs.^[163]

Landmine Monitor estimated the total reported expenditure for mine action in Sudan in 2005 to be approximately $61.5 million, made up of contributions reported by donors plus $14,251,585 from UN peacekeeping assessed funds for calendar year 2005―which are not reported as mine action contributions by donor states.^[164]

Landmine Monitor identified contributions in 2005 totaling $46,914,250 for mine action in Sudan, from 14 governments and the European Commission (EC). In 2004, 12 governments and the EC provided $14,973,429.^[165] The steep rise in donor funding in 2005 can be in part attributed to the contribution of ¥2,100,078,619 ($19,072,551) reported by Japan for 2005 (an increase of some $17.8 million from ¥136,800,000, $1,264,909, in 2004). Donors in 2005 included:

• Canada: C$2,192,035 ($1,809,356), consisting of C$1,614,000 ($1,332,233) to UNMAS for integrated mine action and C$578,035 ($477,123) for mine clearance;^[166]
• Denmark: DKK5 million ($833,987) to DanChurchAid for integrated mine action including clearance and MRE;^[167]
• EC: €4,299,946 ($5,353,003), consisting of, €2,000,000 ($2,489,800) to LA-UK for survey and demining, €300,000 ($373,470) to LA-UK for demining, €1,499,946 ($1,867,283) to MAG for demining, and €500,000 ($622,450) to UNMAS for demining;^[168]
• Finland: €100,000 ($124,490) to HALO for mine clearance and weapons and ammunition disposal;^[169]
• Germany: €1,985,189 ($2,471,362), consisting of €616,442 ($767,409) to UNMAS/FSD for demining and technical survey in south Sudan and Nuba Mountains, €232,883 ($289,916) to UNMAS DanChurchAid for demining in Nuba Mountains, €700,234 ($871,721) to DanChurchAid for demining in Nuba Mountains, €339,335 ($422,438) to NPA for demining, and €96,295 ($119,878) to Landmine Action for mine detectors;^[170]
• Italy: €1,522,500 ($1,895,360), consisting of €242,500 ($301,888) to UNMAS for emergency mine action and €1,280,000 ($1,593,472) for mine clearance by WFP;^[171]
• Japan: ¥2,100,078,619 ($19,072,551), consisting of ¥169,243,852 ($1,537,043) to UNMIS for materials including 60 landmine detection devices, ¥769,997,910 ($6,992,988) to UNMAS emergency mine/UXO survey, clearance and MRE, ¥32,487,510 ($295,046) to UNMAS for emergency survey, mine clearance and EOD, ¥58,978,400 ($535,632) to UNHCR for mine clearance and MRE for returnees, and ¥1,069,370,947 ($9,711,842) to WFP for road rehabilitation;^[172]
• Netherlands: €3,365,242 ($4,189,390), consisting of €65,242 ($81,220) to HALO for mine clearance and MRE, €300,000 ($373,470) to NPA for mine clearance and MRE, €2,100,000 ($2,614,290) to UNMAS for mine clearance and MRE, €500,000 ($622,450) to WFP for mine clearance and MRE, and €400,000 ($497,960) to UNDP for capacity-building;^[173]
• New Zealand: NZ$350,000 ($246,715) to UNMAS through NZAID;^[174]
• Norway: NOK22,060,000 ($3,424,828) for mine action, consisting of NOK20,000,000 ($3,105,011) to NPA and NOK2,060,000 ($319,816) to DanChurchAid;^[175]
• Sweden: SEK7,315,000 ($979,119) as in-kind contribution of medical equipment and VHF radios;^[176]
• Switzerland: CHF300,000 ($240,790) to the WFP for mine clearance;^[177]
• UK: £2,065,000 ($3,758,300) consisting of £1,815,000 (US$3,303,300) assumed to have been allocated to mine clearance, technical assistance, coordination and capacity building, and £250,000 ($455,000) to MAG for integrated demining.^[178]
• US: $2,500,000 from the Department of State, including funding to LA-UK, MAG and NPA for mine clearance, and to HALO to support SLR headquarters.^[179]

Included in Landmine Monitor’s total of contributions for mine action in Sudan in 2005 is $15,000 which UNMAS reports having received from Portugal.^[180] This was expended on technical assistance, coordination and capacity-building.^[181] UNMAS reported receiving voluntary contributions totaling $15,584,359, earmarked for Sudan in 2005 from seven countries―in comparison to $6,077,799 received in 2004 as voluntary contributions from seven countries. UNMAS secured funds of $14,251,585 from the peacekeeping assessed budget of UNMIS for calendar year 2005, compared to $2,147,180 in calendar year 2004.^[182]

Expenditure: As noted earlier, the total funding requirement was approximately $83 million.^[183] At the end of 2005, however, only $22 million had been contributed by donors; another $19 million was secured from UNMIS, totaling some $41 million, less than half the required budget.^[184] In June 2005, the Steering Committee on Mine Action received a briefing on the “serious shortfall” in funding for the Sudan demining program.^[185]

UNMAS expended some $30.6 million on mine action in Sudan in 2005, consisting of funding from contributions through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance and UN peacekeeping assessed funds; this expenditure represents an increase of almost 70 percent from about $9.5 million in 2004.

UNMAS allocated $26,173,487 to UNOPS in 2005 from both voluntary contributions and peacekeeper assessed funds. Support to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, capacity-building, mine and road clearance, technical survey and MRE accounted for 74 percent of expenditure in 2005, and the remaining 26 percent was spent on coordination.^[186]

For 2006, the mine action program in Sudan sought over $82 million to implement its workplan (including $28 million for peacekeeping operations). As of 8 May, donors had contributed $18 million, while approximately $7 million had come from the UNMIS assessed budget, totaling $25 million.^[187]

In mid-June 2006, Japan announced that it would contribute $1,745,436 (approximately ¥193.74 million) to mine action in Sudan through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security for an 18-month victim assistance and MRE project.^[188]

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2005, there were at least 79 new mine/UXO casualties (16 killed and 63 injured) in Sudan. Seventy-seven of the casualties were recorded on the UNMAO database, including 14 people killed and 63 injured; at least 20 were children and three were female. The vast majority of casualties were civilians; only one was military. Antipersonnel mines caused eight casualties, antivehicle mines caused two casualties, UXO caused 20, and the cause of 47 casualties is unknown. This represented a slight increase from 71 mine/UXO casualties (20 killed, 51 injured) reported in 2004.^[189] This increase is partly due to improved data collection and better access in some areas.^[190] Most casualties were recorded in the Southern Kordofan state, with 48 (62 percent) of the total casualties. The IMSMA database additionally contains casualities recorded in Northern Darfur (eight), Buheyrat (six), Western Bahr al-Ghazal (six), Kassala (three), Upper Nile (three), and one each in Blue Nile, Bahr al-Jebel and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal.^[191] Landmine Monitor noted two additional casualties: on 16 April 2005, UXO killed two children in West Darfur.^[192]

In accidents during demining operations, two FSD deminers were injured by an antipersonnel mine on 22 August,^[193] and one NPA deminer was injured on 26 November.^[194]

There is no mechanism of systematic and nationwide data collection for mine/UXO casualties in Sudan. Data collection does take place in the states of Khartoum, Upper Nile, Blue Nile, Bahr al-Jebel and Kassala, or in the Nuba Mountains.^[195] In the south, there is no “formalised system of regular inspection of hospital record or information exchange with health based NGOs or refugee/IDR agencies.... Furthermore, in medical records there is often no distinction made between landmine victims and casualties through other causes....”^[196] The US Department of State estimated that approximately 75 civilians were injured or killed by landmines in the south, “although some observers believed the number to be much higher since only a small percentage of deaths were actually reported to the UN.”^[197]

In eastern Sudan, it is believed that there are near-daily mine incidents in the states of Kassala, Gedaref and Sinnar along Sudan’s heavily mined borders with Eritrea and Ethiopia, but most of these casualties have not been recorded due to the lack of a data collection mechanism and restrictions on UNMAO movement. Casualties likely increased in 2005 due to increased tensions in the area. In May 2006, UNMAO was said to be trying to set up a data collection mechanism via the hospital network in eastern Sudan.^[198] According to the Sudan Red Crescent (SRC), there are approximately 1,000 mine survivors in Kassala.^[199]

Information from SLIRI/SLR has not been included in the UNMAO database, despite an agreement to release information collected in SPLM/A controlled areas.^[200] In 2005, the data collection capacities of both SLR and SLIRI were hampered by financial and organizational restraints. Since the beginning of 2006, HALO and SLR have carried out verification of the SLR mine incident data, as most of the data collected was not entered into electronic database formats and forms were incomplete.^[201] SLIRI ceased its data collection on 1 December 2005. Until then, SLIRI recorded 54 casualties for 2005 (13 killed, 41 injured; five female and 22 children under 15 years). Antipersonnel mines caused 25 casualties and antivehicle mines caused 29. Casualties occurred in Kassala (19), Upper Nile (17), Bahr al-Ghazal (10), and three each in Blue Nile, Bahr al-Jebel and Southern Kordofan. The most common causes of casualties were playing/recreation (19), tending livestock (12) and traveling (11).^[202]

In Lebanon, a Sudanese citizen was injured by UXO in December 2005.^[203]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. The UNMAO IMSMA database in Khartoum contained 29 new mine/UXO casualties as of 21 May, including at least eight children and one woman. The casualties occurred in Kassala (eight), Bahr al-Jebel (six), Upper Nile (six), Buheyrat (five), Northern Darfur (two) and one each in Warab and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Ten casualties were caused by UXO, eight by antivehicle mines, three by antipersonnel mines and eight unknown.^[204]

In the east, UNMAO recorded at least 12 mine/UXO casualties between 1 April and 5 May 2006 via its hospital network, including two killed and 10 injured; at least three were children. Antivehicle mines caused two incidents and one was caused by an antipersonnel mine. Eight casualties occurred while traveling, two while tending animals, one while playing and one unknown.^[205] On 9 March 2006, a landmine killed one child and injured four more in Malakal in southern Sudan. Reportedly, this was the eleventh incident in Malakal in eight months; these incidents resulted in 15 people killed and at least 20 injured, mostly children.^[206]

The total number of mine/UXO casualties in Sudan remains unknown. Estimates by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care and the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics indicate that there have been 10,000 mine/ERW casualties.^[207] As of April 2006, a total of 2,215 mine/UXO casualties had been recorded by UNMAO.^[208] The majority of reported casualties occurred in six states: Southern Kordofan (580 casualties), Kassala (394), Blue Nile (319), Western Bahr al-Ghazal (273), Bahr al-Jebel (194) and Upper Nile (161).^{[209 ]} Most casualties were male (89.4 percent) and 13 percent were children. Activities at the time of the incident include traveling (31 percent), military activity (25 percent), collecting water, food or wood or tending to livestock (13 percent) and farming (five percent).^[210]

Only 28 cases of tampering with UXO have been recorded in IMSMA, although it is thought that this might change as IDPs and refugees continue to settle in south Sudan.^[211] According to UNMAO, more cases have not been recorded because of a lack of data collection capacity and because the information is “largely based on anecdotal evidence.”^[212]

SLIRI and SLR recorded approximately 6,000 landmine/UXO incidents, including 3,500 in GOS-controlled areas, from data collected around its operations centers.^[213] As of March 2006, SLR-HALO verified 1,215 casualties, including 424 killed and 791 injured in eight areas (Kapoeta, Kauda, Kurmuk, Panyagor, Rumbek, Tamburo, Yambio and Yei). The majority (884) were UXO casualties, 265 were antipersonnel mine casualties, and 66 were antivehicle mine casualties. Children under 18 years constituted 9.4 percent of casualties (114), 86 percent of casualties were male (1,046) and 14 percent female (169). Rumbek counted the most casualties (261), followed by Panyagor (224), Yambio (178), Tamburo (170), Kapoeta (139), Yei (118), Kauda (109) and Kurmuk (16).^[214]

Survivor Assistance

At the First Review Conference, Sudan was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[215] Sudan participated in the Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa, held in Nairobi from 31 May to 2 June 2005. Sudan participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties; five of the twelve members of the delegation were people with disabilities.

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Sudan presented detailed information on the current situation of mine victim assistance, its objectives for the period 2005 to 2009, and plans to achieve these objectives. Objectives, as presented in the Zagreb Progress Report, include establishing a comprehensive nationwide injury surveillance, monitoring, reporting and referral system; developing the capacity of emergency medical evacuation facilities and transport; strengthening the capacity of physical rehabilitation services; developing and implementing psychosocial and community reintegration programs for landmine survivors and people with disabilities; developing and implementing education, vocational training and socioeconomic reintegration programs in highly affected areas; and implementing comprehensive national disability legislation.^[216]

At the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in May 2006, the Sudan delegation included a victim assistance expert. Sudan used voluntary Form J to provide detailed information on victim assistance in both Article 7 reports submitted in 2006.^[217]

Under the National Mine Action Authority, the National Mine Action Committee is in charge of victim assistance. The NMAC and the Regional Mine Action Center in south Sudan implement and/or coordinate victim assistance activities with the technical assistance of UNMAO. In the new structure, the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) will coordinate victim assistance issues within the NMAA Victim Assistance Working Group, with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education as active members of the working group.^[218] The working group is scheduled to develop a victim assistance strategy for 2007-2011 and a workplan for 2007 by the end of 2006.^[219]

UNMAO, with UNMAS as the lead agency for victim assistance, is not directly involved in the implementation of victim assistance initiatives. In 2005, it held regular victim assistance coordination meetings, assisted resource mobilization and developed the project proposal for the Human Security Trust Fund (HSTF).^[220] Under HSTF, UNMAS is responsible for the coordination and facilitation of a strategic plan and needs assessment for victim assistance; UNDP will implement the socioeconomic reintegration and vocational training component, with UNICEF in charge of MRE. The project was approved and scheduled to start in June 2006 for a period of 18 months. The project will initially focus on central and southern Sudan, including Juba, Damazin, Wau, Kadugli and Malakal.^[221] UNMAO has a victim assistance associate in Khartoum who is working with the relevant government ministries, UN agencies and local and international NGOs to develop a plan of action for victim assistance and programs to assist mine survivors. Since September 2005, two victim assistance/MRE officers have been based in the UNMAO regional offices in Juba and Kadugli. However, there is little coordination between the different stakeholders and a lack of capacity to implement victim assistance programs, especially in the south.^[222]

At the beginning of May 2006, the first national coordination meeting on victim assistance was attended by relevant stakeholders.^[223] Two priority areas were identified: improved coordination and a strengthened victim assistance network, and improved surveillance and data collection capacity.^[224]

Emergency and Continuing Medical Care: Years of conflict have seriously damaged the healthcare system in Sudan. In general, assistance available for landmine casualties from both the government and NGOs has been irregular and insufficient to address the magnitude of the problem. In Sudan, there are less than two doctors and eight nurses and midwives for every 10,000 people.^[225] In south Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, only very basic healthcare facilities exist; the health system has been dependent on international NGOs and facilities require resources due to the lack of a healthcare budget, medical equipment, trained staff, and health and information management systems. There are 19 district hospitals in the south with surgical capabilities; each serves a population of between 75,000 and 100,000 people.^[226] However, only Maridi, Yei, Wau, Juba and Rumbek have the capacity to perform amputations and corrective services. In some cases, military hospitals provide services to civilians, but these are not free of charge.^[227] For many people living in remote areas, the nearest medical facility is located a long distance away. Some mine casualties are transported for hours and sometimes days on animals, bicycles, carts or homemade stretchers to the nearest public health facility. In Kassala state, 84 percent of registered mine/UXO casualties were more than 50 kilometers from the nearest health facility, and 14 percent of casualties were carried to the facility on foot.^[228] Reportedly, 55 percent of casualties received their first medical assistance within two hours, but it took five hours or longer for 20 percent of casualties to reach the first medical facility.^[229] A sample of casualties recorded in the IMSMA database indicates that 80 percent of those killed died at the scene of the incident, while 10 percent died in a health facility.^[230] Most emergency aid providers have shifted the focus of their programs to Darfur, leaving a vacuum in south Sudan.^[231]

Medair provides emergency evacuation to al-Obeid, Khartoum and Kenya, and operates a network of health centers and health units, and a mobile health clinic to reach remote communities in the Nuba Mountains. It provides emergency medical assistance via mobile response teams in south Sudan.^[232] In 2005, Medair assisted 20 mine survivors in its primary health care centers.^[233]

Until 28 February 2006, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Operation Lifeline Sudan operated a medical emergency air evacuation service to Lopiding hospital in Kenya.^[234] UNMIS provides ad hoc medical airlifts to Juba Teaching Hospital. UNMIS is scheduled to construct a hospital in Juba providing medical care to landmine casualties, but officially this facility will not be accessible to non-UN staff.^[235]

ICRC’s medical assistance has included support to two referral hospitals, the ICRC Lopiding surgical hospital in Lokichokio in northern Kenya, and the government-run Juba Teaching Hospital in southern Sudan, as well as to other primary healthcare facilities. On 30 June 2006, after 19 years, the ICRC handed over Lopiding hospital to the Kenyan Ministry of Health, to be used as a subdistrict hospital for Turkana district. ICRC plans to continue supporting Juba until at least the end of 2007.^[236]

The Lopiding hospital performed 3,276 operations (including 20 mine/UXO casualties) in 2005. Between January and April 2006, it performed 311 operations (three on mine/UXO casualties). In 2005, Juba hospital performed 4,631 operations (including 24 mine/UXO casualties). As of May 2006, 649 operations were carried out, including one for a mine/UXO casualty. ^[237] On 28-29 November 2005, ICRC organized a war surgery seminar for 200 surgeons and doctors, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the Sudan Medical Association and the Sudanese Association of Orthopedic Surgeons.^[238]

Other organizations supporting or providing healthcare in the south included Comitato Collaborazione Medica, Médecins du Monde, International Rescue Committee, World Health Organization (WHO), World Vision, German Emergency Doctors, Médecins Sans Frontières, Save the Children, Merlin and UNICEF. The national NGO Sudan Medical Care (SMC) operates about 50 primary health units and 11 primary health centers in five districts in the south.^[239] The International Sisterhood Charity Organization also provides emergency care in Juba and has limited data collection capacity in Red Sea, Gedaref and Kassala.^[240]

Physical rehabilitation: Rehabilitation services are available in Sudan, but access can be restricted due to long distances from services, poor roads, security concerns and poverty. People must wait approximately seven weeks to four months to receive rehabilitative care, but artificial limbs have been free for mine/UXO survivors since 2003.^[241] WHO has estimated that there are approximately 80,000 people in Sudan who need physical rehabilitation services, including 20,000 amputees due to conflict-related injuries.^[242]

The National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics, affiliated to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care, has been the main provider of physical rehabilitation services in Khartoum and at five satellite centers in Damazin, Dongola, Kadugli, Kassala and Nyala. In south Sudan, rehabilitation services have only been available in Juba and Rumbek; until May 2006 physical rehabilitation needs in southern Sudan were mainly covered by the ICRC center in Lopiding hospital in Kenya. The lack of transport and accommodation, and the cost of transport, are often prohibitive for people seeking physical rehabilitation in southern Sudan.

In 2005, NAPO saw its staff reduced to 140, with only 16 rehabilitation workers available in mine-affected areas.^[243] As of April 2006, 9,344 people were registered at NAPO, including 618 landmine/UXO survivors. NAPO has had limited capacity to deal with upper limb amputees. The Khartoum center was reportedly operating at capacity and survivors had to wait about four months for services.^[244] In 2005, NAPO provided rehabilitation services for 1,195 new patients, 25 percent of whom were war injured and mine survivors.^[245] The Khartoum center fitted 683 prostheses and 1,114 orthoses, and distributed 1,698 crutches; the five satellite centers not under ICRC support produced 345 devices (259 prostheses and 86 orthoses).^[246] NAPO’s services were free of charge; however, the cost of transportation and accommodation was not covered, leaving proper rehabilitative care beyond the reach of many in need. ICRC provided transport by plane to the Nyala center for treatment.^[247]

ICRC will continue to support NAPO’s Khartoum Center and the Nyala satellite, as well as the Nile Assistance for the Disabled (NAD) in Juba, until at least 31 December 2006, but has started a phasing-out process. To ensure continued services, the Ministry of Finance has allocated $57,000 to NAPO for raw materials.^[248] In 2005, with ICRC support, 1,355 people were assisted (including 31 mine/UXO survivors) in Khartoum, and 80 in Nyala (including nine mine/UXO survivors).^[249]

In 2005, the Lopiding orthopedic center fitted 455 prostheses and orthoses (53 for mine/UXO survivors). In the first quarter of 2006, 110 people received prosthetic devices (including four mine/UXO survivors). ICRC has also provided on-the-job training for technicians. From July 2006, ICRC will be responsible for the accommodation, travel and food of all southern Sudanese patients fitted in Juba. ICRC has been dealing with the capacity challenges by sending five Lopiding-trained technicians to the Nile Assistance for the Disabled rehabilitation center in Juba, as well as by training national NAPO/ICRC staff. By 2007, ICRC will build a new rehabilitation center in Juba.^[250] Handicap International is scheduled to support the NAPO satellite centers in Damazin, Kadugli and Kassala by the end of 2006.^[251]

In 2005, the Nile Assistance for the Disabled (NAD) rehabilitation center in Juba assisted 413 amputees and 173 paralyzed persons, including 269 mine/UXO survivors (214 men and 55 women); it produced and repaired a wide range of mobility devices. Services and prosthetics were free of charge, but tricycles and wheelchairs were not.^[252] It is expected that the number of patients will triple with the closure of the Lopiding rehabilitation center; NAD has already seen an increase in patients after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. To expand its facilities and in view of the bigger geographic spread of the patients and the return of IDPs and refugees, NAD wants to activate two mobile orthopedic workshops.^[253]

The US NGO Medical Care Development International provided physical rehabilitation services at an orthopedic workshop and rehabilitation center in Rumbek for disabled war victims from Rumbek and Bahr al-Ghazal. Renovations and new services to meet the full spectrum of medical, technical and socioeconomic needs of people with disabilities in southern Sudan have been carried out in partnership with African Expeditions, ICRC and Comitato Collaborazione Medica. The first phase was scheduled to end on 31 July 2006, but an extension until 15 June 2009 was anticipated. In 2005, the Rumbek rehabilitation center had assisted 424 people (including 10 mine survivors) and undertaken community-based assessments for another 1,361. The center also produced 87 prostheses, 68 orthoses, 197 pairs of leprosy sandals and 154 mobility aids.^[254]

As well as providing physical rehabilitation, the Rumbek Rehabilitation Project has established a database of people with disabilities, to help clinical teams refer people to a socioeconomic integration program.^[255] The main achievement of 2005 was the expansion of these outreach activities, despite security limitations and difficulties in transporting the people to the main center. In 2005, 62 people received vocational training and eight have found sustainable employment. Apprenticeships in horticulture were available through a food-for-work program for people with disabilities run by the World Food Programme. The project was funded mainly by PACT Kenya through USAID, Leahy War Victims Fund, OMEGA Initiative and in-kind contributions.^[256]

At the military’s new al-Amal hospital, rehabilitation and vocational training center, located 40 kilometers outside of Khartoum, only the physical rehabilitation center was active as of April 2006. In 2005 approximately 230 disabled received prostheses, and 17 received rehabilitation for paralysis. The center provided services to all disabled free of charge.^[257]

Help Handicapped International, which operates the Jaipur Foot Center in Khartoum, had fitted over 6,000 prosthetic devices as of 30 May 2006. The proposal to open an additional center in Omdurman was accepted by the government; construction work was scheduled to start in the second half of 2006; the proposal for an additional mobile clinic to reach rural areas is still under consideration.^[258]

Other organizations offering services included: Roots Organization for Development; Usratuna (Our Family), an Italian-run rehabilitation center for children in Juba, housing approximately 60 children up to 18-years-old referred by ICRC and NAD; and the SPLM/A-run Rehabilitation Program for Disabled Persons South Sudan (RPDP), which facilitates access to rehabilitation for persons with disabilities.^[259]

In January 2005, ICRC started Sudan’s first internationally recognized diploma course in prosthetics and orthotics. Twelve students from the six satellite center areas were selected to participate in the three-year program. After graduating, the technicians are expected to work in the centers for six years.^[260] In 2005, the ICRC sponsored three technicians to attend a three-year course in prosthetics and orthotics at the Tanzanian Training Center for Orthopedic Technologists. Two physiotherapists and 17 orthopedic technicians will be trained to reinforce Sudanese capacity following the closure of the Lopiding center, including five technicians receiving IPSO Category II training abroad, and two receiving Category II lower limb training in Sudan.^[261]

Reportedly, HI planned to start a three-year physiotherapy diploma course using an internationally recognized curriculum.^[262]

Psychosocial Support and Socioeconomic Reintegration

Psychosocial support services have been limited and vary in quality and quantity.^[263] Hospitals and health centers have few staff trained in psychosocial support and discrimination issues. Landmine survivors and other people with disabilities are seldom included in decision-making processes, and teachers are not trained to respond to children with disabilities. There are limited opportunities for socioeconomic reintegration and virtually no vocational training facilities in mine-affected areas. Job placement and recruitment services do not ensure access to employment for people with disabilities. Most of the vocational training centers are linked to rehabilitation centers. There are vocational training centers in the larger towns, but they do not specifically target mine/UXO survivors or people with disabilities. Approximately 45 percent of survivors either lost or changed their job after the incident. In south Sudan, social and economic reintegration programs are generally in the hands of local organizations with very little capacity. Psychosocial projects mainly target war victims in general; they are usually designed per age group, with most programs targeting young people.^[264]

The Organization for Care of War Disabled and Protection from Landmines (ABRAR) assists war victims, including landmine survivors, through medical care, physiotherapy, psychosocial support, vocational training, a sports program, legal aid, advocacy, and awareness raising. In 2005, 340 people with disabilities were registered. ABRAR provided referral services to an average of 10-12 people per day. Twenty mine/UXO survivors benefited from computer training and several others received vocational training; 18 mine survivors were assisted in micro-credit projects and 48 others received medical training.^[265] ABRAR also conducted a project where university art students visited mine survivors in their villages to paint their experiences, and fill out IMSMA forms. The artwork was then sold to fund ABRAR’s micro-credit schemes. The Arab Gulf Fund also provided funding for small loans distributed by ABRAR to 218 women and children—including the families of mine survivors or people killed in a mine incident—in camps for displaced people. This project was scheduled to finish at the end of 2005, but continued with the remaining funds as of April 2006.^[266]

Peace and Tolerance International Organization (PTIO) provides training on limb loss and war trauma to reach survivors living in remote areas in Juba and other parts of the south, and Gedaref in the east. The program trained 150 people and assisted 200 mine/UXO survivors in 2005.^[267] The Mine Combat Organization provides information on available victim assistance services, undertakes limited data collection, provides limited financial support to landmine survivors, and assists survivors in seeking employment.^[268]

The Ministry of Social Welfare in the South operates the Child Trauma Care Center in Juba with UNICEF support, to provide psychosocial support and capacity-building and conflict resolution skills for child war victims, including landmine survivors. In 2005, the center provided psychosocial support to 300 children and trained 650 children, teachers, social workers and parents on how to deal with traumatic situations.^[269]

Other organizations providing psychosocial and other support to people with disabilities in Sudan included Action on Disability and Development, Rufaida Health Foundation, Rehabilitation Program for Disabled Persons South Sudan, Save the Children US, the Widows, Orphans, Disabled Rehabilitation Association for New Sudan, War Child, Darfur Organization for the Disabled, Kassala Society for the Disabled, Right to Play Juba, Save the Children UK and Transcultural Psychosocial Organization.^[270]

Organizations dealing with vocational training in the south have been the International Rescue Committee, NPA, War Victim Association and Association for the Disabled, Woman’s Self-Help and Developing Organization, REJAF Education Center for the Blind, Humanitarian Aid and Development and Don Bosco Vocational Training Center. Facilities providing socioeconomic opportunities for mine survivors in the north included the Elaman Elmahadi University, University of Sudan and National Vocational Training Institute.^[271]

Other organizations assisting people with disabilities have included: in the south, the Diocese of Rumbek, Malteser, Sudan Association of the Disabled, Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association, Sudanese Disabled Rehabilitation and Development Association, South Sudan Disabled Persons Association and Sudan Evangelical Mission; and in the north, Sudan People Support Association.^[272]

Disability Policy and Practice

The 2002 Act of The Authority of Prosthetic and Orthotics for the Handicapped Persons and the 1984 Sudan Law for Disability are intended to protect the rights of people with disabilities, including an acceptable level of care, and access to services, education and employment; however, the laws have reportedly not been consistently implemented or monitored, particularly in the south. In the north, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care has been the focal point for disability issues. Education and road transportation is free for people with disabilities and landmine survivors reportedly have access to free medical treatment in the public and NGO hospitals in Sudan. A presidential decision protects the jobs of government employees who are mine survivors.^[273] In 2005, the Minister of Industry announced that all organizations with five percent disabled staff would get special tax exemptions.^[274]

Further disability legislation will be based on the UN Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities.^[275]

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Sudan stated that it would strengthen the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care’s “capacity to monitor the nation-wide implementation of public policies that guaranteed the rights of landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities.”^[276]

UNMAO is a member of the High Council for Disability.^[277] The UNMAO Victim Assistance Associate reached an agreement with the Ministry of Health to incorporate IMSMA casualty report forms into standard questionnaires in hospitals, to enable the creation of a database of landmine casualties and other people with disabilities. Staff training had not taken place due to lack of funding.^[278]

UNMAO, together with Rufaida Health Foundation and ABRAR, also reached an agreement with the Ministry of Health to include landmine survivors and their families under the national health insurance scheme. As of 2005, all registered landmine survivors and their families were entitled to free basic medical care. As of April 2006, 107 mine/UXO survivors and their families, recorded in IMSMA, had received coverage.^[279]

In 2005, ABRAR, with the support of UNMAO conducted 10 workshops to raise awareness and advocate for the implementation of the Sudan Law for Disability. ABRAR sent landmine survivors to several capacity-building workshops and a summer camp organized by Landmine Survivors Network.^[280]

---

[1] “Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) during the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods,” Section 8.6.1, Naivasha, Kenya, 31 December 2004.
[2] “Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army,” Point 3, 15 October 2002. This memorandum followed the Machakos Protocol, signed on 20 July 2002, calling for preparations to implement a comprehensive cease-fire as soon as possible.
[3] “Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement,” Article II, Section 3.b., and Article III, Section 4, Burgenstock (NW), Switzerland, 19 January 2002. The latter states, “The laying of mines of whatever type shall be prohibited.”
[4] In its Article 7 report submitted in February 2006, and in an undated update submitted later in 2006, Sudan did not report any national implementation measures specific to the treaty, though it lists various mine action structures and other steps taken to address Sudan’s mine problem. Article 7 Reports, Form A, 17 February 2006, covering October 2004-April 2005, and undated 2006 update covering May-December 2005.
[5] The UN website for Article 7 reports (disarmament.un.org/MineBan.nsf) lists the date of submission as 17 February 2006, though the report itself says 30 April 2005. It is labeled by Sudan as “Updated Article 7 Report (01 October 2004-30 April 2005).”
[6] This report, titled “Updated Article 7 Report (01 May-31 December 2005),” is not dated, and had not been posted to the UN website as of 11 July 2006. Landmine Monitor received a copy of the report in early July 2006.
[7] The initial report, which was due on 28 September 2004, did not indicate the time period covered.
[8] In May 2006, Sudan also spoke during the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, but the remarks addressed only mine clearance activities.
[9] These included the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment to ban antipersonnel landmines and cooperate in mine action on 4 October 2001, and the cease-fire agreements prohibiting use of landmines reached in January 2002, October 2002 and December 2004, as well as the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In September 2003, the SPLM/A stated its policy: “No victim activated explosive devices are to be used or produced or transferred. All antipersonnel mines and victim activated improvised explosive devices are to be destroyed.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 528.
[10] “Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur,” (N’Djamena Agreement), Articles 2, 4 and 6, N’Djamena, Chad, 8 April 2004.
[11] “Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the National Democratic Alliance,” Cairo, 16 June 2005.
[12] See for example Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 223.
[13] Article 7 Report, Annex 9, 17 February 2006. The same information is in the updated 2006 Article 7 report.
[14] Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 October 2004. The stock figures are at odds with past statements by the government and SPLM/A. In July 2005, the deputy director of the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate, Felix Yuggu Lo-Kakku, told Landmine Monitor that the SPLA does not have any stocks to destroy: “SPLA do not have any stockpile of its own. All stockpiles come from mines captured from government forces.” In the past, the government often stated that it possessed no antipersonnel mine stockpiles and that it destroyed all mines recovered from rebel forces or collected during demining. In June 2004, Sudanese officials said the stock consisted only of a “small number” of mines for training. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 529.
[15] Article 7 Report, Form B, 17 February 2006. The initial report on 1 October 2004 also said that accurate numbers for each type would be provided in the updated report.
[16] Article 7 Report, Annex 9, 17 February 2006. The four types in the annex, but not yet accounted for as stockpiled mines are Italian Valmara 69 and MAUS mines, Chinese Type 58 and Egyptian T/79.
[17] Article 7 Reports, Form D, 1 October 2004 and 17 February 2006.
[18] Article 7 Report, Form D, undated but covering 1 May 2005-31 December 2005.
[19] “Recommendations of Workshop Discussions,” Mine Ban Education Workshop in Southern Sudan, New Site, Kapoeta County, Southern Sudan, 29 September–1 October 2003.
[20] Article 7 Report, Forms D and F, undated but covering 1 May 2005-31 December 2005; Article 7 Report, Form F, 17 February 2006; Article 7 Report, 1 October 2004.
[21] Interview with Hamid Ahmed Abdelaleem, Director, National Mine Action Office, Khartoum, 28 May 2005.
[22] Oral statement by Sudan, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006 (notes by Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch (HRW)). Sudan said this was a success for the ICBL and Geneva Call.
[23] Landmine Monitor received allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government-supported militias in Upper Nile as late as April 2004. An SLA commander in North Darfur said the SLA had captured a Sudanese government cache of landmines when it overran a government army position in early 2004. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 753-755. For descriptions of past use and denials of use, see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, pp. 535-537; Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 576; Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 224-227; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 183-186; Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 172-173.
[24] Edited translation of an audiotape attributed to Osama bin Laden, parts of which were aired by Aljazeera on 23 April 2006. It is not known where or when the recording was made. Also reported in Nicholas Kristof, “Osama’s Crusade in Darfur,” New York Times, 25 April 2006.
[25] Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
[26] Interview with Paul Heslop, Deputy Programme Manager/Chief of Staff, UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO), Khartoum, 18 March 2006.
[27] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2006; interview with Jan Bosman, Operations Officer, UNMAO, Kadugli, 16 March 2006.
[28] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2006.
[29] UNMAO, “Mine Action in Sudan,” presentation for the official launch ceremony of the National Mine Action Authority on 7 March 2006, provided to Landmine Monitor on 19 March 2006; email from Mohammad Kabir, Chief of Information, UNMAO, Khartoum, 16 May 2006.
[30] UNMAO, “Mine Action in Sudan,” presentation, Khartoum, 7 March 2006.
[31] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 313.
[32] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2006.
[33] Interview with Steve Robinson, Mine Action Advisor, UNHCR, Nairobi, 8 March 2006.
[34] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” Khartoum, 2006, p. 1; UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 313.
[35] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” Khartoum, 2006, p. 1.
[36] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2006.
[37] Interview with Steve Robinson, UNHCR, Nairobi, 8 March 2006.
[38] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” Khartoum, 2006, p. 1.
[39] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[40] Statement by Aleu Ayieny Aleu, State Minister of Interior and Member of the National Mine Action Authority, Government of Sudan, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[41] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[42] Interview with Michael Dibdin, EOD Technical Advisor, DanChurchAid, Umm Serdiba, 14 March 2006.
[43] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, Director/Programme Manager, UNMAO, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[44] “Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) during the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods,” Section 8.6.1, Naivasha, Kenya, 31 December 2004. Under Section 8.5, both parties must “provide maps and sketches... including all necessary information about roads, tracks, passages, minefields, and command posts.”
[45] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006; interview with Paul Eldred, Operations Officer, UNMAO, Juba, 10 March 2006.
[46] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2006.
[47] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” Khartoum, 2006, p. 1; UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 313.
[48] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 532.
[49] “Brief Report on the Official Launch of the Establishment of the National Mine Action Authority,” UNDP Sudan, 7 March 2006.
[50] Presidential Decree No. 299 on the Formation of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), in accordance with Article 58 (1) of the Interim Constitution for the year 2005, and Chapter VI (8.6.6) of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 24 December 2005, draft unofficial translation.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Presidential Decree No. 299, 24 December 2005, draft unofficial translation.
[53] Interview with Qadeem Tariq, Senior Technical Advisor, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2006.
[54] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, and Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Interview with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2006. For more information on the previous structure of the mine action program, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 533-535.
[57] Presidential Decree No. 299, 24 December 2005, draft unofficial translation.
[58] Interview with Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Director, New Sudan Mine Action Directorate, Khartoum, 2 March 2006.
[59] Interview with Hamid Ahmed Abdelaleem, NMAC, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[60] Interview with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2006. See CPA, chapter VI – Security arrangement - § 8.6.5-8.6.6.
[61] Presidential Decree No. 299, 24 December 2005, draft unofficial translation.
[62] “Brief Report on the Official Launch of the Establishment of the National Mine Action Authority,” UNDP Sudan, 7 March 2006.
[63] Statement by Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[64] Email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 28 June 2006.
[65] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, and Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[66] UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), para. 4c, New York, 24 March 2005.
[67] UNMAO, “Structure of UN mine action office in Sudan,” provided to Landmine Monitor on 19 March 2006.
[68] Interview with Doug Ware, Quality Assurance Officer, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[69] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[70] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” Khartoum, 2006, p. 2.
[71] Minutes of the second Mine Action Steering Committee meeting, Khartoum, 1 November 2005, provided to Landmine Monitor on 19 March 2006.
[72] Minutes of the third Mine Action Steering Committee meeting, Khartoum, 26 January 2006.
[73] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[74] Interview with Takuto Kubo, External Relations Officer, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[75] Interviews with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 8 May and 4 July 2006.
[76] Interview with Arnt Breivik, Coordinator South Sudan, WFP, Juba, 9 March 2006; email from Stephen Pantling, Mine Action Officer, WFP, 18 May 2006.
[77] Email from Mal Ralston, Programme Manager, FSD/WFP Road Clearance Project-South Sudan, 20 June 2006; emails from Stephen Pantling, WFP, 20 and 21 June 2006.
[78] Emails from Stephen Pantling, WFP, 20 and 21 June 2006.
[79] Interview with Steve Robinson, UNHCR, Nairobi, 8 March 2006.
[80] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006; interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, and Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[81] Interviews with Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006; interview with Alan Arnold, IMSMA Program Manager, GICHD, Geneva, 12 May 2006.
[82] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 8 May 2006; email from Edward Meaby, Programme Manager, NPA, 8 May 2006; email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 16 May 2006.
[83] Interview with Mark Connelly, Quality Assurance Officer, UNMAO, Juba, 10 March 2006, and email, 16 May 2006.
[84] Presentation by Sudan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 14 June 2005.
[85] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[86] Article 7 Report, Form A, 17 February 2006.
[87] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[88] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 313.
[89] Presentation by UNMAO at the ceremony to officially launch the NMAA, Khartoum, 7 March 2006.
[90] UNMAS, “Appeal 2006,” New York, p. 55.
[91] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[92] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[93] Interview with Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 10 March 2006.
[94] For example, interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006; interview with Willie Venter, Survey Supervisor, FSD, Wau, 12 March 2006; interview with Robbie Christopher, Quality Assurance Officer, UNMAO, Wau, 12 March 2006.
[95] Interview with Mal Ralston, FSD/WFP, Nairobi, 20 March 2006; interview with Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 10 March 2006.
[96] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[97] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[98] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Khartoum, 2 July 2005.
[99] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[100] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[101] Interviews with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March, and Geneva, 8 May 2006; and email, 24 May 2006.
[102] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[103] For instance, interview with Nicholas Martin, Road Survey Officer, FSD/UNOPS, Kadugli, 15 March 2006.
[104] Interview with Mal Ralston, FSD/WFP, Nairobi, 20 March 2006.
[105] Emails from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 15 April and 16 May 2006.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Interview with Michael John Storey, Operations Manager, FSD, Khartoum, 19 March 2006 and email, 22 June 2006; interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[108] Interview with Abigail Hartley, Country Programme Manager, MAG, Nairobi, 20 March 2006.
[109] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Edward Meaby, NPA, 27 April 2006.
[110] SAC, “LIS monthly progress report, April 2006,” May 2006; email from Damien Vallette d’Osia, Program Director, SAC, 14 May 2006.
[111] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 537.
[112] Interview with Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 10 March 2006; interview with Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[113] Interview with Jan Bosman, UNMAO, Kadugli, 16 March 2006; interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[114] SLIRI/SLR/ HALO Trust, “Operating Partnership for Humanitarian Mine Action in Sudan,” Briefing Note, March 2006.
[115] Interview with Dave Tooke, Programme Manager, and Dan Ayliffe, Desk Officer, LA-UK, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[116] Email from Tim Porter, Africa Desk, HALO Trust, 20 June 2006.
[117] Emails from Nick Bateman, Representative for the Horn and East Africa, DDG, Nairobi, 21-22 June 2006.
[118] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[119] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 15 April 2006.
[120] Interview with Mal Ralston, FSD/WFP, 20 March 2006; and email, 2 May 2006; interview with Stephen Pantling, WFP, Juba, 9 March 2006.
[121] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 538.
[122] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 15 April 2006.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006. Therefore, an area cleared by an operator in 2005 and verified by UNMAO quality assurance in 2006 will only appear as a 2006 result.
[126] Interview with Paul Heslop, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[127] For example, interview with Michael Dibdin, DanChurchAid, Umm Serdiba, 14 March 2006.
[128] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 15 April 2006.
[129] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[130] UNMAO, “Mine Action in Sudan Newsletter,” March/April 2006, Issue 8, p. 3.
[131] “Mine Action in Sudan Newsletter,” March/April 2006, Issue 8, p. 1.
[132] Those figures only refer to the operations conducted by mine clearance teams and did not take into account EOD figures.
[133] Interview with Mal Ralston, FSD/WFP, Nairobi, 20 March 2006; interview with Stephen Pantling, WFP, Juba, 9 March 2006.
[134] Interview with Mal Ralston, FSD/WFP, Nairobi, 20 March 2006; and email, 2 May 2006; interview with Stephen Pantling, WFP, Juba, 9 March 2006.
[135] Email from Mal Ralston, FSD/WFP, 20 June 2006.
[136] Interview with Michael John Storey, FSD, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[137] Interview with Mal Ralston, FSD/WFP, Nairobi, 20 March 2006; interview with Stephen Pantling, WFP, Juba, 9 March 2006.
[138] Interview with Dave Tooke and Dan Ayliffe, LA-UK, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[139] Email from Dan Ayliffe, LA-UK, 2 May 2006.
[140] Interview with Abigail Hartley, MAG, Nairobi, 20 March 2006.
[141] Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 5 July 2006.
[142] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Edward Meaby, NPA, 27 April 2006, and email, 8 May 2006.
[143] Email from Jacob Kotze, Project Manager, Mechem, 30 April 2006; email from Niel Viljoen, Liaison Officer, Mechem, 20 May 2006.
[144] Interview with Etzel Fergusson, Program Manager, and Chad Clifton, Assistant Program Manager, RONCO, Khartoum, 17 March 2006; email from Chad Clifton, RONCO, 6 May 2006.
[145] Email from Stacy Smith, Communications Manager, RONCO, 8 May 2006.
[146] Interview with Doug Ware, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2006.
[147] UNMAO, “Mine Action in Sudan Newsletter,” January/February 2006, p. 2; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 760-762.
[148] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 3.
[149] Article 7 Report, Form I, 17 February 2006.
[150] See reports on Ethiopia and Kenya in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
[151] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 3.
[152] Email from Sharif Baaser, MRE coordinator, UNMAO/UNICEF Sudan, 23 April 2006.
[153] Presentation by Sharif Baaser, UNMAO/UNICEF, Sudan, at launch of the NMAA, Khartoum, 7 March 2006.
[154] Email from Sharif Baaser, UNMAO/UNICEF, Khartoum, 23 April 2006.
[155] Ibid.
[156] UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 1.
[157] UNICEF, “A summary report on UNICEF, support to MRE activities in 2005,” Khartoum.
[158] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 541.
[159] Email from Rob Gaylard, Landmine Safety Training Officer, UNMAO, 4 May 2006.
[160] Email from Sharif Baaser, UNMAO/UNICEF, Khartoum, 23 April 2006.
[161] Interview with Sharif Baaser, UNMAO/UNICEF, Khartoum, 22 March 2006.
[162] Email from Abigail Hartley, MAG, Nairobi, 24 April 2006.
[163] Email from Takuto Kubo, UNMAO, 20 August 2005; UNMAO, “Mine Action in Sudan Newsletter,” Issue 4, April/May 2005, p. 3; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 542.
[164] Landmine Monitor’s estimate of total expenditure includes $61,169 donated by Finland to UNICEF and $300,000 donated by Italy to UNICEF; these contributions were used for MRE in Sudan. UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2005,” provided by UNMAO on 19 March 2006.
[165] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005 pp. 542-543.
[166] Mine Action Investments database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[167] Mine Action Investments database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = DKK5.9953. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[168] Email from Laura Liguori, Security Policy Unit, Conventional Disarmament, EC, 20 June 2006. No disbursement of EC funding for Sudan was recorded by UNMAO in 2005. “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2005.” However some of the contributions reported by the EC for 2005 appear to be recorded as contributions since 1 January 2006 in UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2006: As of 8 May 2006.” Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[169] Mine Action Investments database; email from Paula Sirkiä, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 March 2006; in addition $61,169 to UNICEF for MRE has been added to the total for Sudan. Finland reported contributing €200,000 ($248,980) to UNICEF for MRE in Africa, for Sudan and Eritrea. Finland’s contribution to UNICEF for Sudan is taken from: UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2005.”
[170] Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database.
[171] Emails from Manfredo Capozza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2006. An additional $300,000 from Italy to UNICEF for Sudan has been included in the total as reported in UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2005.” In 2005, Italy funded UNICEF programs in Sudan, including MRE, to a total of €1,650,000, Embassy of Italy in Khartoum, “Italian cooperation activities in Sudan 2005,” www.italian-embassy.org.ae, accessed 18 May 2006.
[172] Emails from Kitagawa Yasu, Japan International Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated information received by JCBL from Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11 May 2005, and Non-proliferation and Science Department, April 11, 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1= ¥110.11. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[173] Email from Ellen Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006. The Netherlands also contributed €57,953 ($72,146) to LA-UK for MRE in Sudan, Eritrea and Angola.
[174] Email from Helen Fawthorpe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006; email from Megan McCoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: NZ$1 = US$0.7049. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. New Zealand reported this amount as core funding to UNMAS. UNMAS reported receiving $249,200 for Sudan. UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 61.
[175] Email from Annette A. Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = NOK 6.4412. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[176] Sweden Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March-May 2006; UNMAS “Annual Report 2005,” p. 68. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = SEK7.4710. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[177] Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[178] Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 20 March 2006. UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2005,” provided to Landmine Monitor on 19 March 2006. UNMAS reported a total of $4,628,818 from UK through VTF for Sudan in UNMAS “Annual Report 2005,” p. 61. This amount has not been included in the total funding calculation.
[179] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2005, email from Angela L. Jeffries, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, 8 June 2006; email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., US Department of State, 28 June 2006.
[180] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 61. This amount has been included in the total of donor contributions.
[181] UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2005,” provided to Landmine Monitor on 19 March 2006.
[182] Email from Sevil Alirzayeva, Trust Fund Manager, UNMAS, 15 June 2006. UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 68; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2004,” p. 36. The amount reported by UNMAS shows finances for the 2005 calendar year and represents half of the 2004/05 peacekeeping budget year and half of 2005/06 budget year; see UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 59. UN budget estimates included the provision of $10,074,300 for the 2004/05 financial period and $18,428,900 for 2005/06. UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General, “Budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2006,” (A/60/190), 3 August 2005, pp. 94-95; UNGA, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, “Budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2006,” (A/60/428), 13 October 2005, p. 12.
[183] UNMAO, “Mine Action in Sudan Newsletter,” Issue 6, July 2005, p. 3.
[184] UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2005,” provided to Landmine Monitor on 19 March 2006. These amounts are assumed to include peacekeeping assessed funds for 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006.
[185] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 11; UNMAS, “Update,” MASG Newsletter, New York, July 2006, p. 7.
[186] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 68; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2004,” p. 36.
[187] Presentation by UNMAO at the ceremony to officially launch the NMAA, Khartoum, 7 March 2006; UNMAO, “Donor contribution tracking sheet, Mine action sector/Work Plan 2006 as of 8 May 2006,” provided to Landmine Monitor on 10 May 2006. The UNMIS assessed budget contribution covers the period from January to June 2006.
[188] Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Assistance for ‘Crossing the Bridge of Peace: Victim Assistance and Mine Risk Education for Human Security in Sudan’ Project,” 12 June 2006; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 54; email from Mayumi Watabe, Human Security Unit, UN OCHA, 15 June 2006.
[189] Emails from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 16 and 21 May 2006.
[190] Interview with Takuto Kubo, UNMAO, Khartoum, 28 February 2006.
[191] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 16 May 2006.
[192] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Sudan,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006.
[193] Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Philippe Chabasse, team leader – Sudan exploratory mission, HI, 26 August 2005.
[194] Response to Landmine Monitor MA Questionnaire by Edward Meaby, NPA, 27 April 2006.
[195] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, “Victim Assistance Objectives of the State Parties that have the responsibility for significant number of landmine survivors,” Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 192.
[196] Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Office (SSRMAO), “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, p. 6.
[197] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Sudan,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006.
[198] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 12 May 2006; interview with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 9 May 2006.
[199] Interview with Abdul Latif Matin, Operation Analyst, UNMAO, Kassala, 28 May 2005; interview with Sadiq Abdallah, Landmine Coordinator, and Osman Jaffer al-Alwi, Director, Sudanese Red Crescent, Kassala, 28 May 2005.
[200] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 12 May 2006; interview with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 9 May 2006.
[201] Email from Daniel Kerr, Program Manager, HALO, Juba, 22 February 2006.
[202] Email from Dan Ayliffe, LA-UK, London, 9 May 2006. The subtotals add up to 55 not the 54 reported.
[203] Jessy Chahine, “Old bombs continue to maim as support for de-mining dwindles,” Daily Star (Beirut), 16 December 2005.
[204] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 21 May 2006.
[205] Analysis of IMSMA data sheets provided to Landmine Monitor (HI) by Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 12 May 2006.
[206] “Sudan landmine blast prompts threat to UN team,” Reuters (Malakal), 9 March 2006.
[207] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 191.
[208] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 12 May 2006. An additional 450 incident reports have not been entered into IMSMA as the information was incomplete.
[209 ] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” (internal document), Khartoum, March 2006, p. 9. Other casualties were reported in Warab (99), East Equatoria (45), Red Sea (41), Jongli (38), al-Buhairat (33), West Equatoria (13), North Bahr al-Ghazal (10), North Darfur (nine), Unity (five), and South Darfur (one). The database did not include all reported incidents in Darfur and West Kordofan.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Interview with Sharif Baaser, UNMAO, Khartoum, 22 March 2006.
[212] Email from Sharif Baaser, UNMAO, Khartoum, 15 May 2006.
[213] Interview with Mohamed Fawz Mohamed, SLIRI, Khartoum, 21 May 2005; see also www.landmineaction.org, accessed 28 July 2005. SLIRI was not authorized to release its data for the south until 29 July 2005. Email from Patrick McLeish, LA-UK, Khartoum, 2 August 2005. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 545.
[214] Email from Daniel Kerr, HALO, Juba, 22 February 2006.
[215] UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33.
[216] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 191-199.
[217] Article 7 reports, Form J, 17 February 2006 (covering October 2004-April 2005), and undated 2006 update (covering May-December 2005).
[218] Email from Shaza Nagm Eldin, Victim Assistance Coordinator, UNMAO, Khartoum, 25 April 2006.
[219] Interview with Yousif Mohamed Osman, Planning and Training Director, NAPO, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[220] Email from Sharif Baaser, UNMAO, Khartoum, 15 May 2006; UNMAO, “Annual Report 2005,” Khartoum, p. 3.
[221] Email from Shaza Nagm Eldin, UNMAO, Khartoum, 25 April 2006; interview with Jim Pansegrouw, UNMAO, Geneva, 12 May 2006; interview with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 9 May 2006.
[222] Interview with Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, RMAC-South Sudan, Juba, 16 March 2006; email from Bojan Vukovic, MRE/VA Officer, SSRMAO, Juba, 8 May 2006; SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, p. 6.
[223] SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, p. 6.
[224] Interview with Qadeem Tariq, UNDP, Geneva, 9 May 2006.
[225] WHO, Sudan Health Sector Needs Assessment, “UN Work Plan for the Sudan 2006,” p. 28; Ismail Bushara and El-Sheikh Badr, “Mapping of Human Resources For Health Sudan, Final Report,” WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office, December 2005, p. 13.
[226] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 192-193.
[227] SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, pp. 8, 11.
[228] Article 7 Report, Form J, 17 February 2006.
[229] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 192.
[230] Data analysis provided to Landmine Monitor by Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 26 May 2005; interview with Abdul Latif Matin, UNMAO, Kassala, 28 May 2005; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 765-766.
[231] SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, pp. 8, 10.
[232] Email from Francis Woods, Logistics Manager, Medair, Lokichokio, 1 May 2006.
[233] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Francis Woods, Medair, Nairobi, 27 April 2006.
[234] Email from Pierre Gratzl, Rehabilitation Department, ICRC, Khartoum, 18 May 2006.
[235] SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, pp. 8, 10. For details of the Sudanese Red Crescent, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 547.
[236] Email from Pierre Gratzl, ICRC, Khartoum, 18 May 2006; email from Kathleen Lawand, ICRC, 26 June 2006.
[237] Email from Pierre Gratzl, ICRC, Khartoum, 18 May 2006.
[238] ICRC, “Sudan: War-surgery seminar,” 28 November 2005.
[239] Article 7 Report, Form J, 17 February 2006; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 547; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 766.
[240] Interview with Angelina Batikayo, General Secretary, International Sisterhood Charity Organization, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[241] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 194-195; email from Pierre Gratzl, ICRC, Khartoum, 18 May 2006.
[242] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program, “Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, draft received 19 May 2006, p. 15.
[243] Interview with Yousif Mohamed Osman, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[244] Email from Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO, Khartoum, 3 May 2006; documents provided at interview with Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[245] Interview with Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO, Khartoum, 27 February 2006, and email, 3 May 2006.
[246] Email from Pierre Gratzl, ICRC, Khartoum, 18 May 2006.
[247] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 549.
[248] Email from Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO, Khartoum, 3 May 2006.
[249] Email from Pierre Gratzl, ICRC, Khartoum, 18 May 2006.
[250] Ibid; interview with Didier Reck, Head of Physical Rehabilitation Program, ICRC, Khartoum, 22 March 2006; interview with Abderrahman Banoune, ‘Flying’ Outreach Officer, ICRC, Khartoum, 15 March 2006.
[251] Email from Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO, Khartoum, 3 May 2006.
[252] Interview with Babista Allane, Physiotherapist and Orthopedist, Stella Lado, Social Worker, and Lagu Simon, Assistant Physiotherapist, NAD, Juba, 14 March 2006.
[253] SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, pp. 12-13.
[254] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Suzanne Lazarus, International Health Program Associate, MCDI, Silver Spring (MD), 17 May 2006.
[255] Email from Suzanne Lazarus, MCDI, Silver Spring, 18 May 2006.
[256] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Suzanne Lazarus, MCDI, Silver Spring, 17 May 2006.
[257] Interview with Gen. Abdelhaleem Abbas, Director, al-Amal Rehabilitation Center, Jabal Awlia, 8 March 2006. The location of the hospital center limits access for many people.
[258] Email from Help Handicapped International, Mumbai, 30 May 2006.
[259] Interview with Bertha Antonietta, Director, Usratuna, Juba, 15 March 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 549.
[260] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 549.
[261] Email from Pierre Gratzl, ICRC, Khartoum, 18 May 2006.
[262] Email from Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO, Khartoum, 3 May 2006.
[263] SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, p. 15.
[264] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 196, 197; SSRMAO, “Victim Assistance Assets Survey,” Juba, October 2005, pp. 15-16.
[265] Email from Kardox Kessler, Consultant, ABRAR, Khartoum, 8 May 2006.
[266] Email from Shaza Nagm Eldin, UNMAO, Khartoum, 25 April 2006.
[267] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Yousif I. al-Zubair, Secretary General, PTIO, Khartoum, 15 May 2006.
[268] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 550.
[269] Interview with Jim John, Director General, Ministry of Social Development, Juba, 15 March 2006.
[270] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 550-552.
[271] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 767.
[272] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 551.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Email from Shaza Nagm Eldin, UNMAO, Khartoum, 26 April 2006.
[275] Presentation by Sudan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[276] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 199.
[277] Presentation by Sudan, Workshop on Advancing Victim Assistance in Africa, Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005.
[278] Email from Shaza Nagm Eldin, UNMAO, Khartoum, 26 April 2006.
[279] Ibid.
[280] Email from Hiba al-Hassan, Liaison Officer, ABRAR, Khartoum, 26 April 2006.