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United States

Last Updated: 27 August 2013

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The US has acknowledged the “important contributions” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but also led unsuccessful efforts to create an alternate international law to regulate and not ban cluster munitions through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), to which it is party. The US opposed the negotiation of a legally binding instrument in the CCW until June 2007 when the Oslo Process to create the Convention on Cluster Munitions was underway.[1] It subsequently became one of the most ardent supporters of a CCW protocol, working intensively to forge agreement on a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[2] The US said it was “deeply disappointed” at the CCW’s failure in November 2011 to conclude the draft protocol, but the administration of President Barack Obama has not said if it will review its policy on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions now that it has been affirmed as the sole international law specifically addressing cluster munitions.[3]

The Obama administration has continued to implement a cluster munition policy created under President George W. Bush in July 2008. Under the 2008 Department of Defense (DoD) policy, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO).[4] Until 2018, any use of cluster munitions that exceed the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[5] The 10-year transition period was seen as “necessary to develop the new technology, get it into production, and to substitute, improve, or replace existing stocks.”[6] Under the policy, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” must be removed from active inventories as soon as possible (but not later than 19 June 2009) and demilitarized as soon as practicable.[7] In November 2011, the US stated that it would continue to implement the 2008 DoD policy on cluster munitions.[8]

The US did not directly participate, not even as an observer, in the diplomatic Oslo Process in 2007 and 2008 that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks from late 2010 through 2011 show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the Oslo Process to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[9] The diplomatic cables also show how the US has worked extensively to influence national implementation legislation and interpretation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including on issues of foreign stockpiling and transit[10] (see section on Foreign stockpiling and transit below). In a February 2009 cable, the US commended Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre for the “successful conclusion” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11] In at least one instance, a US cluster munition manufacturer exerted pressure on a foreign government not to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[12]

The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012.

When reports emerged of civilian casualties caused by use of cluster munitions by Syrian forces in October 2012, the then-Permanent Representative of the US to the UN, Ambassador Susan Rice, tweeted that the cluster munition use was an example of “atrocities” by the Syrian regime.[13] The US voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 15 May 2013 that strongly condemned, “the use by the Syrian authorities of…cluster munitions.”[14] In April 2011, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the use of cluster munitions by Libyan government forces in Misrata.

In a 17 July 2013 letter to President Obama, senior US Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), as well as Representative James McGovern (D-MA), described the US government’s cluster munitions policy as “outdated” and urged that it be “immediately” and “expeditiously” reviewed to put the US “on a path to join the international Convention on Cluster Munitions.” The letter urges a review of the DoD’s policy on cluster munitions and states, “Rather than waiting until 2018, as is current DOD policy, we believe the U.S. military should immediately halt the use of cluster munitions that have an unexploded ordnance rate of greater than one percent.”[15]

On 28 February 2013, Senators Feinstein and Leahy reintroduced the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, Bill S. 419, to limit the use of cluster munitions to munitions that have a 99% or higher reliability rate, prohibit use of cluster munitions in areas where civilians are known to be present, and require a clearance plan if the US uses cluster munitions.[16] On 28 February 2013, Representative McGovern re-introduced an identical companion bill in the House as H.R. 881.[17]

On 19 June 2013, Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA) introduced the Designating Requirements On Notification of Executive-ordered Strikes Act of 2013 or DRONES Act, which includes provisions requiring that US cluster munitions have a less than 1% dud rate and be used only against military targets and not in areas inhabited by civilians. It contains the same language on cluster munitions as the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act described above. In addition, the bill would prohibit the President from authorizing the use of cluster munitions if they would be “reasonably likely to unintentionally harm any citizen of the United States or citizen of a strategic treaty ally of the United States.”[18]

Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and other civil society groups in the US have continued to take action in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions through the US Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions. On 1 August 2013, the US campaign sent a letter to US Secretary of State John Kerry urging a review of US policy on cluster munitions, stating “It’s time for the United States to assume a leadership role, join the conversation, and take significant action” on cluster munitions. It urged that the current 2018 policy date for instituting a ban on nearly all cluster munitions be brought forward and called for the US to “examine the need for the exception in the policy that allows continued use of cluster munitions that have a less than one percent unexploded ordnance rate during military operations.”[19]

The US has not joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but in late 2009 the Obama administration began a comprehensive review of US policy on banning antipersonnel mines and accession to the treaty. In the nearly four years since the policy review commenced, the US has become a regular observer at Mine Ban Treaty meetings, but the policy review still had not concluded as of July 2013.

Use

The US used cluster munitions in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); and Iraq (2003).[20]

In June 2010, Amnesty International (AI) published a series of photographs and stated that it appeared to confirm US use of at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” in al-Majalah in the al-Mahfad district of Abyan governorate of Yemen on 17 December 2009.[21] A US Department of State cable dated 21 December 2009 acknowledged the US played a role in the 17 December strike.[22] Neither the US nor Yemeni government has publicly responded to the Yemen use allegations.[23]

The July 2013 letter by Senators Feinstein and Leahy refers the Yemen strike and reported civilian casualties. It notes that “current DOD policy requires Combatant Commanders to approve the use of cluster munitions that exceed a one percent unexploded ordnance rate” and requests that DOD provide “detailed information on the use of cluster munitions since the implementation of current DOD policy” issued in June 2008.[24] As noted above, the letter also called for an immediate halt to the use of cluster munitions with a failure rate of more than 1%.

Production

In 2001, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a policy memorandum stating that all submunitions reaching the “full rate” production decision by fiscal year 2005 and beyond must have a failure rate of less than 1%.[25] The US has not budgeted any money for producing new cluster munitions since 2007.[26] Research and development activities continue at the applied research level for the purposes of improving the reliability of existing submunitions as well as the development of new types of submunitions. These activities are in programs being conducted by the Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[27]

The US has in the past licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Transfer

While the historical record is incomplete, in the past the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom (UK).[28] In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided the Monitor with information showing an export to the US in 1991 of one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb.[29]

The US first instituted a moratorium on the export or transfer of cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO standard in a 2007 appropriations (budget) bill at the initiative of Senator Leahy. The moratorium was extended the following year as the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, but again the restrictions only applied to that fiscal year.[30]

The 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act contained similar restrictions as the previous appropriations bills; it prohibited the provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”[31]

The same export moratorium language was included in the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act signed into law by President Obama on 16 December 2009.[32] Similar export moratorium language was included in the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) signed into law on 23 December 2011,[33] the 2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution signed into law on 28 September 2012,[34] and the 2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act.[35]

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the US agency that administers weapons transfers, “At present the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW). The CBU-107 Passive Attack Weapon, which contains non-explosive rods, is not captured by the ban.”[36]

Recent US exports of cluster munitions include sales to the UAE (announced in September 2006 of 780 M30 GMLRS rockets),[37] India (announced in September 2008 of 510 CBU-105 SFW),[38] Saudi Arabia (announced in June 2011 of 404 CBU-105D/B SFW),[39] Taiwan (announced in September 2011 of 64 CBU-105 SFW),[40] and the Republic of Korea (announced June 2012 of 367 CBU-105D/B SFW).[41]

On 26 April 2013, Representative Gerald Connolly (D-MA) introduced H.R. 1793 or the “Global Partnerships Act of 2013.”[42] The bill contains language identical to export moratorium on cluster munitions that in the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) and adds that any “agreement applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must require the recipient to “immediately recover any unexploded submunitions, and to give assistance as necessary to any civilian injuries, that follow the use of such weapons in any area in which civilians are present.”

Stockpiling

In 2009, a US Department of State official said, “The current stockpile is huge; the DoD currently holds more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions. Using our current demilitarization capabilities, it will cost $2.2 billion to destroy this stockpile.”[43] At the CCW Fourth Review Conference in November 2011, the US delegate stated that the US stockpile includes “more than 6 million cluster munitions,” which indicates that the stockpile may be larger than previously reported.[44]

An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the DoD provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.[45]

US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[46]

Type

Number of submunitions per munition

Munitions in active inventory

Submunitions in active inventory

Munitions in total inventory

Submunitions in total inventory

Rocket

ATACMS 1

950

1,091

1,036,450

1,304

1,238,800

ATACMS 1A

400

405

162,000

502

200,800

M26 MLRS

644

369,576

238,006,944

439,194

282,840,936

M26A1 MLRS

518

4,128

2,138,304

4,128

2,138,304

M261 MPSM

9

74,591

671,319

83,589

752,301

Total

449,791

242,015,017

528,717

287,171,141

Projectile

M449 APICM

60

27

1,620

40

2,400

M449A1 APICM

60

24

1,440

49

2,940

M483/M483A1

88

3,336,866

293,644,208

3,947,773

347,404,024

M864

72

748,009

53,856,648

759,741

54,701,352

M444

18

30,148

542,664

134,344

2,418,192

Total

4,115,074

348,046,580

4,841,947

404,528,908

Bomb

Mk-20 Rockeye

247

58,762

14,514,214

58,762

14,514,214

CBU-87 CEM

202

99,282

20,054,964

99,282

20,054,964

CBU-103 CEM WCMD

202

10,226

2,065,652

10,226

2,065,652

CBU-97 SFW

10

214

2,140

214

2,140

CBU-105 SFW WCMD

10

1,986

19,860

1,986

19,860

CBU-105 SFW P3I WCMD

10

899

8,990

899

8,990

AGM-154A JSOW-A

145

669

97,005

1,116

161,820

Total

172,038

36,762,825

172,485

36,827,640

 

Grand Total

4,736,903

626,824,422

5,543,149

728,527,689

In a February 2011 presentation to CCW delegates, the US stated that “around two million” cluster munitions would be captured by a CCW proposal for a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US DoD in a report to Congress in late 2004.

The October 2004 DoD report to Congress provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types that contain about 728 million submunitions.[47] However, this figure does not appear to be a full accounting of cluster munitions available to US forces. The number apparently does not include cluster munitions that are located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[48]

The DoD had not publicly reported on the removal of excess cluster munitions from stocks by June 2009, as called for in the July 2008 policy. The July 2013 letter to President Obama from Senators Feinstein and Leahy notes that the 2008 policy “requires the Services and Combatant Commands to initiate the removal from active inventory all cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements” and requests that the DoD provide “an unclassified report detailing the number of cluster munitions that have been removed from the active stockpile, as well as how many remain.”[49]

Since 2000, the US has destroyed 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) on average per year at an average annual cost of $7.2 million. For fiscal year 2012, the funding for the destruction of non-missile cluster munitions and submunitions consumes 24% of the annual budget allocation for the destruction of conventional ammunitions.[50]

Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The army has requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[51]

Foreign stockpiling and transit

It appears that the US has taken action to remove its stockpiles from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[52] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[53]

US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in a number of countries, including Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar and perhaps Kuwait:

·         According to a December 2008 cable, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[54]

·         According to a December 2008 cable, Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany.[55]

·         According to a cable detailing the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the “U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG),” until US cluster munitions are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime, “they are considered to be under U.S. title, and U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[56]

·         In a November 2008 cable, the US identified Italy, Spain, and Qatar as states of particular concern with respect to interoperability since “they are states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[57]

·         A December 2008 cable states that Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them.”[58]

·         According to a May 2007 cable, the US might be storing clusters munitions in Kuwait.[59]

 



[1] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in November 2006, the US position was that it was unnecessary to talk about new rules of international humanitarian law. Instead, it said that states should apply existing laws “rigorously” and focus on the implementation of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, to which it is party. See Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.

[2] Throughout the negotiations, the US supported the main tenants of the proposed protocol, including an exemption for cluster munitions meeting a manufacturer-stated 1% failure rate and several optional safeguards; a prohibition on use and transfer of all cluster munitions produced before 1980; and a 12-year transition period during which states could continue to use all cluster munitions.

[3] Permanent Mission of the US to the UN in Geneva press statement, “U.S. Deeply Disappointed by CCW’s Failure to Conclude Protocol on Cluster Munitions,” Geneva, 25 November 2011, www.geneva.usmission.gov/2011/11/25/u-s-deeply-disappointed-by-ccws-failure-to-conclude-procotol-on-cluster-munitions/.

[4] The memorandum on Department of Defense (DoD) policy is dated 19 June but was not formally released until 9 July 2008. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, www.defense.gov/news/d20080709cmpolicy.pdf.

[5] The policy requires cluster munitions used after 2018 to meet a 1% UXO rate not only in testing but in actual use during combat operations within the variety of operational environments in which US forces intend to use the weapon. Combatant Commander is the title of a major military leader of US Armed Forces, either of a large geographical region or of a particular military function, formerly known as a commander-in-chief.

[6] Statement by Stephen Mathias, “United States Intervention on Technical Improvements,” CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 15 July 2008.

[7] Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, www.defense.gov/news/d20080709cmpolicy.pdf. The US has not reported any details on the removal of stocks, or whether the undertaking has been completed.

[8] Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, p. 5, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22907.pdf.

[9] For detail on US policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.

[10] As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions originating from 100 locations for the period from 2003 to 2010. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reviewed a total of 57 US diplomatic cables on cluster munitions from 24 locations cables released by Wikileaks as of early August 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/search.php?q=cluster+munitions&qo=0&qc=0&qto=2010-02-28.

[11] Describing the Oslo Process as “an impressive effort,” the cable notes that “U.S. concerns over interoperability were dismissed as alarmist and it took high-level USG intervention to ensure that the treaty did not harm our ability to operate with NATO allies.” “Part III: Norwegian FM [Foreign Minister] Støre: The World at His Feet,” US Department of State cable 09OSLO116 dated 13 February 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09OSLO116.html.

[12] In a November 2008 cable released by Wikileaks, the US embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, reported that a team from the US defense firm Textron Systems met with Bulgarian officials in 2008 to urge Bulgaria not to sign the convention. “Bulgaria to Sign Oslo Convention but Will Remain Interoperable,” US Department of State cable 08SOFIA748 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08SOFIA748.html.

[13] Susan Rice @AmbassadorRice, “Regime atrocities—aerial bombardments, cluster bombs, shelling—are mounting in #Syria & threatening the security of the entire region,” 24 October 2012, www.twitter.com/AmbassadorRice/status/261192284362653696.

[14] “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/67/L.63, 15 May 2013, www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/ga11372.doc.htm.

[16] The draft legislation was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, 2013 (S. 419), www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s419.

[17] The draft legislation was referred to the House Armed Services Committee. Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, 2013 (H.R. 881), www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr881.

[18] The bill was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Select Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Foreign Affairs, for further consideration. Designating Requirements on Notification of Executive-ordered Strikes Act of 2013, (H.R. 2438), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr2438ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr2438ih.pdf.

[19] US Campaign to Ban Landmines press release, “Convention on Cluster Munitions celebrates 3rd Anniversary,” 1 August 2013, www.uscbl.org/fileadmin/content/images/Press_Releases/August_1__2013_FINAL_USCBL_Press_Release.pdf.

[20] For historical details on the use of cluster munitions by the US, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), p. 256.

[21] The remnants in the photographs included images of the propulsion system, a BLU-97 submunition, and the payload ejection system, the latter of which is unique to the TLAM-D cruise missile. AI, “Images of Missile and Cluster Munitions Point to US Role in Fatal Attack in Yemen,” 7 June 2010, www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/yemen-images-missile-and-cluster-munitions-point-us-role-fatal-attack-2010-06-04. See also “U.S. missiles killed civilians in Yemen, rights group says,” CNN, 7 June 2010, edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/06/07/yemen.missiles/index.html.

[22] The cable said that Yemeni government officials “continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S.” “ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] looks ahead following CT operations, but perhaps not far enough,” US Department of State cable SANAA 02230 dated 21 December 2009, released by Wikileaks on 4 December 2010, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09SANAA2251&q=munitions.

[23] The CMC officially requested the US to confirm or deny this reported use of US-manufactured cluster munitions in Yemen but received no response. CMC press release, “US: Confirm or deny use of cluster munitions in Yemen,” 8 June 2010.

[25] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001. In other words, submunitions that reach “full rate production,” i.e. production for use in combat, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 must meet the new standard. According to an October 2004 Pentagon report to Congress on cluster munitions, submunitions procured in past years are exempt from the policy, but “[f]uture submunitions must comply with the desired goal of 99% or higher submunition functioning rate or must receive a waiver.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004, p. ii.

[26] For details on the production of cluster munitions by the US from 2005 to 2007, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 257–258; and ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada: October 2010), p. 263.

[27] For example, see US Air Force, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number PE 0602602F: Conventional Munitions,” February 2011, p. 6; US Army, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602624A: Weapons and Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 5; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602000D8Z: Joint Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 13.

[28] US-supplied cluster munitions have been used in combat by Colombia, by Israel in Lebanon and Syria, by Morocco in Western Sahara and possibly Mauritania, by the UK, and the Netherlands in the former Yugoslavia, and by the UK in Iraq. In July 2013, mine clearance operators in Yemen shared photographic evidence with the Monitor of cluster munition remnants, including several types of US-manufactured submunitions, in Sadaa governorate in northwestern Yemen near the border with Saudi Arabia. The contamination apparently dates from conflict in 2009–2010 between the government of Yemen and rebel Houthi forces, but it is not possible to determine definitively the actor responsible for the use.

[29] Monitor notes on Chilean Air Force document signed by Chair of the Joint Chief of Staff of the Air Force, “Exports of Cluster Bombs authorized in the years 19912001,” dated 23 June 2009, taken during Monitor meeting with Juan Pablo Jara, Desk Officer, Ministry of National Defense, Santiago, 11 April 2012.

[30] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr2764enr/pdf/BILLS-110hr2764enr.pdf.

[31] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1105enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr1105enr.pdf.

[32] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ117/pdf/PLAW-111publ117.pdf.

[33] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2055enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr2055enr.pdf.

[34] Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 (P.L. 112-175), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hjres117enr/pdf/BILLS-112hjres117enr.pdf.

[35] Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ6/pdf/PLAW-113publ6.pdf.

[36] DSCA, “Guidance on the Sale of Cluster Munitions, DSCA Policy 11-33,” Memorandum, 19 May 2011, Washington, DC, www.dsca.osd.mil/samm/PolicyMemos/2011/DSCA%2011-33.pdf.

[37] DSCA press release, “United Arab Emirates – High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems,” Transmittal No. 06-55, 21 September 2006, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36-b/2006/UAE_06-55.pdf.

[38] DSCA press release, “India – CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 08-105, 30 September 2008, Washington, DC, www.asdnews.com/news-17936/India_-_CBU-105_Sensor_Fuzed_Weapons.htm.

[39] DSCA press release, “Saudi Arabia – CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 10-03, Washington, DC, 13 June 2011, www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2011/Saudi_Arabia_10-03.pdf.

[40] These were to be included as associated parts in the sale of F-16A/B aircraft. DSCA news release “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – Retrofit of F-16A/B Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 11-39, 21 September 2011, www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36-b/2011/TECRO_11-39.pdf.

[41] DSCA press release, “Republic of Korea – CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 12-23, Washington, DC, 4 June 2012, www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2012/Korea_12.23.pdf.

[42] It was referred the same day to the House committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Rules, and Ways and Means.

[43] Statement by Harold Hongju Koh, US Department of State, Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to CCW Protocol V, Geneva, 9 November 2009.

[44] Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/AA39A701F5D863C9C1257965003B6737/$file/4thRevCon_USA_Rev2.pdf.

[45] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[46] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. This accounting appears to exclude holdings of TLAM-D cruise missiles, a weapon found on some US Navy surface and submarines, which deliver BLU-97 submunitions. US Navy Fact File, “Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2. The 2004 DoD report also does not include artillery-fired SADARM cluster munitions (thought to number 715).

[47] Ibid. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[48] Under this program, munitions are stored in foreign countries, but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and allied forces in the event of hostilities. In 1994, the stockpile, including WRSA, consisted of 8.9 million cluster munitions containing nearly 1 billion submunitions. See US Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, “Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Study,” April 1996.

[50] Figures and averages are compiled from annual editions of Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2012.

[51] Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” February 2011, pp. 729–730.

[52] Section 8 of the UK’s legislation states that its foreign secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In November 2011, UK officials stated that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory. Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1 November 2011), Column 589W, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111101/text/111101w0004.htm - 1111024001854.

[53] The official stated: “After the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Norway discussed with the USA the issue of their stockpile of cluster munitions on Norwegian territory. Norway offered to destroy these cluster munitions together with our own stockpiles. However, the USA decided to remove their stocks, something which happened during the spring of 2010.” Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2012. According to a US cable dated 17 December 2008, the US stockpile in Norway was thought to consist of “2,544 rounds” of “D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)” and “2,528 rounds” of “D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM.” See “Norway Raises Question Concerning US Cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08OSLO676 dated 17 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08OSLO676&q=cluster munitions.

[54] “Demarche to Afghanistan on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 2 December 2010, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08STATE134777&q=cluster munitions.

[55] A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, then-Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM [Cluster Munitions] in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” See “MFA Gives Reassurances on Stockpiling of US Cluster Munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08BERLIN1609&q=cluster munitions. See also “Demarche to Germany Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125631 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08STATE125631&q=cluster munitions.

[56] “Cluster Munitions: Israeli’s Operational Defensive Capabilities Crisis,” US Department of State cable 08TELAVIV1012 dated 7 May 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08TELAVIV1012.

[57] “Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions, US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08STATE125632&q=cluster munitions.

[58] “Consultations with Japan on Implementing the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08TOKYO3532&q=cluster munitions.

[59] The cable contains the text of a message sent from a US military advisor to UAE authorities concerning a transfer of “ammunition immediately via US Air Force aircraft from Kuwait stockpile to Lebanon.” About the items to be transferred, the cable states: “The United States will not approve any cluster munitions or white phosphorus.” See “Follow-up on UAE Response to Lebanese Request for Emergency Aid, US Department of State cable 07ABUDHABI876 dated 24 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07ABUDHABI876&q=cluster munitions.