Contamination and Impact

Iraq is massively contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led Coalition, and the conflict that has continued, albeit less intensely, ever since. Attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have occurred regularly against civilians, the military, and the police in 2010 and 2011, with much of the ordnance used having been plundered from the huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. A joint report by UNICEF and UNDP in 2009 observed the task of clearance “might take decades to complete.”[1]

Mines

Iraq has a level of mine contamination that is among the world’s highest, although the precise extent is not yet known. The first phase of the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2004–2006 and published in August 2007, found 1,622 communities affected by 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering an estimated 1,730km² of land. Five governorates could not be surveyed because of insecurity. A second phase survey of these five governorates completed fieldwork in 2010,[2] but no estimate of the area of contamination had been released as of August 2011.

In the meantime, a non-technical survey of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 70.03km², 84% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (450.1km²) identified by the ILIS. [3]

However, there is known to be substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent conflicts and was therefore not reported in the ILIS, which was based on community interviews.[4] Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total an area of 6,370km².[5] Iraq’s initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report claimed that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another one million mines ahead of both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.[6] In addition, security forces continue to find substantial caches of abandoned mines.[7]

Cluster munition remnants

The precise extent of cluster munition remnants in Iraq is unknown, but significant. A 2009 UNDP/UNICEF report commented that the highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War.[8] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[9] Cluster munitions remnants are a feature of many of the clearance tasks being undertaken to open up access to oilfields and develop infrastructure as well as for humanitarian clearance.[10]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has also found cluster munition remnants in the Iraqi Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. Coalition forces launched cluster strikes around Dohuk in 1991 to support a Kurdish uprising against the government and left contamination that has posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[11] In 2010, a MAG survey of Dibis, an area northwest of Kirkuk, identified 20 previously unknown cluster strikes with contamination from unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-63 submunitions.[12]

Other explosive remnants of war

Iraq has extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining from past conflicts and continues to accumulate contamination from continuing conflicts in the north, where Iranian and Turkish aircraft and artillery have bombarded areas suspected to house Kurdish non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in 2010 and 2011.[13] Moreover, Iraqi civilians continued to run the gauntlet of around 100 IED detonations each month in 2010[14] and security forces continue to find substantial caches of weapons and ordnance accumulated by NSAGs.[15]

UXO contamination includes a variety of munitions, including air-dropped bombs and rockets, ground artillery, grenades, mortars, napalm, and depleted uranium (DU) ordnance, including “bunker-buster” bombs and tank-fired shells used by US and British forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[16] Britain acknowledged in 2010 that it used 1.9 metric tonnes of DU ammunition during the 2003 war.[17] In addition to the hazard posed by UXO in general, DU munitions have been claimed to be responsible for high levels of radiation found in scrap yards around Baghdad and Basra and which was reported in a joint study by the ministries of health, environment, and science.[18]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Mine action in Iraq has two distinct components. In the three northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government, mine action is managed in Erbil and Dohuk governorates by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) and in Sulaymaniyah governorate by the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA). In central and southern Iraq, responsibility for mine action was transferred in 2008 to the Ministry of Environment, which set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) to replace the National Mine Action Authority that had been attached to the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation but had become inactive and was closed down by the government in mid-2007.[19]

The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a mine action database. The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south.[20] However, the DMA’s role has been weakened by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate, political uncertainties about the direction of mine action, and fragile cooperation between key government ministries.[21]

In December 2008, the Ministry of Defense imposed a ban on civilian mine/UXO clearance pending a review of security issues relating to the mine action sector, including vetting operators. In August 2009, the ban was lifted and ministries of defense and environment signed a memorandum of understanding which identified the responsibilities of each and provided a basis for proceeding with the preparation of a 10-year strategic plan to be implemented in three phases covering 2010–2012, 2012–2015, and 2015–2019.[22]

The “Mine Action Strategy 2010 to 2012,” published by the Ministry of Environment in February 2010, set out a vision of “an Iraqi society free from the fear and impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war” and identified broad strategic goals for mine action, RE, victim assistance, and data management. It also outlined the role of key government ministries in mine action. It said the Ministry of Defense would be responsible for “Planning and Implementation of: Survey; Demarcation, and clearance of minefields.” The document said this “includes the operations implemented by International and National companies in which the MoD [Ministry of Defense] will be part of their administrative boards through a liaison officer.”[23] In practice, mine action in 2010 continued on a largely ad hoc basis without central coordination or direction.[24]

 A joint UNICEF/UNDP report in 2009 observed “a final decision on where the responsibilities for mine action within government will be vested should now be taken in order that Mine Action in Iraq can be properly structured and that all international civilian and commercial demining operations will be well regulated and supported by Iraqi authorities.”[25] A succession of interministerial meetings convened in 2009 and 2010 to consider coordination and management of mine action but, as of August 2011, that process had yet to reach a conclusion.[26]

Land Release

In the three northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government, mine action in 2010 released a little less land overall than in 2009 as a result of reduced battle area clearance (BAC), but reported a fourfold increase in the numbers destroyed of mines and UXO.[27]

In central and southern Iraq, however, the DMA, Ministry of Defense, and other operators did not provide sufficient data to make a meaningful determination of the total amount of land released through clearance or survey in 2010. Operations recovered some momentum after stalling in 2009 as a result of a suspension imposed by the Ministry of Defense on security grounds that remained in place until August 2009. However, clearance appears to have continued without central coordination or control and the UN expressed concern over the quality of some of the clearance.[28]

Commercial operations appear to have accelerated, particularly as a result of moves to open up access to oilfields and restore infrastructure. Humanitarian mine clearance, however, appears to be confined to Kurdish governorates of the north. In the south, humanitarian mine action capacity contracted with the shut-down of Rafidain Demining Organization (RDO) in July 2010,[29] and the main remaining actors, DDG and IMCO, only conducted BAC.[30] Civil defense units are reportedly active,[31] but the extent of their capacity and operations is unknown.

Five-year summary of clearance

Survey in 2010

In July 2010, IKMAA completed a 14-month “Preliminary Technical Survey,” which it described as “an advance form of non-technical survey,” and at the end of December 2010 it approved the survey report. This put the total of CHAs in its two governorates of Erbil and Dohuk at 70.03km². IKMAA commented this in effect cancelled 380.1km², or 84% of the SHAs identified in those governorates by the ILIS.[32]

Also in the north, MAG surveyed Dibis, an area near Kirkuk city previously inaccessible because of insecurity, and reported identifying 20 cluster munition strikes and a minefield but gave no further details.[33]

Military engineers started a general survey in 2011 intended to identify major minefields. By August 2011, its surveyors had completed Diyala and Maysan governorates and started on Wasit and Basra governorates, all four governorates lying along the border with Iran.[34]

The lack of up-to-date information on mine/ERW contamination prompted the UN and operators to plan a non-technical survey of southern Thi Qar governorate, drawing on the resources of DDG, IMCO, G4S, Arabian Gulf, and Al-Safsafa as well as Civil Defense and with technical support from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). The Thi Qar survey is intended to serve as a pilot for survey of other governorates.[35]

Mine and battle clearance in 2010

Mined area clearance in the three northern Kurdish governorates rose slightly in 2010, but the items destroyed was four times larger than the previous year. IKMAA, with 120 deminers in 15 manual clearance teams supported by mechanical assets and four mine detection dog (MDD) teams, reported a sharp rise in productivity, helped by better use of different detectors technologies and a toolbox approach to deploying assets.[36] The GDMA, which has 10 teams for technical survey and contracts clearance to local operators, reported the same level of mined area clearance in 2010 undertaken mainly for oil companies.[37]

MAG, after reduced funding and manpower cuts in 2009, had funding to increase its mine action teams from 11 to 17, with 170 deminers, and to add an additional mechanical team and another MDD team. In addition to mine and BAC, EOD teams cleared more than 70,000 items of UXO in roving tasks.[38]

In central and southern Iraq, the increased momentum to restore oil production saw a surge in work for commercial companies in 2010−2011. But despite Iraq’s status as one of the most mine- and ERW-affected countries in the world, growth of both commercial and humanitarian demining activity continued to be constrained by convoluted bureaucratic procedures and severe delays in processing applications for accreditation and visas. As a result, G4S was the only international commercial company accredited for mine action in most of 2010, until Sharjah-based Ta’az Group gained its accreditation in August 2010. MineTech worked in Iraq in support of Arabian Gulf.[39]

National companies Arabian Gulf and Al-Safsafah did not report on their activities. G4S, with 342 personnel as of August 2011, had one oil industry contract in the first nine months of 2010 resulting in BAC of 16.46km² and destruction of 445 ERW. In the year since September 2010, G4S had one quality assurance contract and three clearance contracts from international oil companies for BAC, mainly of oilfield access routes, camp sites, production and treatment facilities and pipelines, resulting in clearance of a total of 58.95km² and destruction of 1,489 ERW.[40]

Ta’az Demining, with 18 10-person BAC teams and three 10-person demining teams based in Basra, conducted a quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) contract for ENI in Az Zubayr oilfield in September 2010 and started another contract for Gazprom for QA/QC of a 18km² site. In 2011, it undertook a series of oil industry jobs including a QA/QC contract on 0.75km² of North Rumailah oilfield for Saipem which resulted in clearance of 181 unexploded BLU M-42 and M-61 submunitions, as well as mortar and artillery AXO. As of August 2011, it was conducting BAC for Shell on 3.6km² of Majnoon oilfield.[41]

Mine clearance in central and southern Iraq is undertaken largely by the army, which has 14 engineering regiments and two explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) companies in each regiment, totaling some 2,000 EOD/mine clearance personnel. The Ministry of Defense reported conducting 21.96km² of manual mine clearance and 87.3km² of BAC in 2010.[42] Tasks undertaken in 2010−2011 included clearance for the oil industry, utilities, and infrastructure and resulted in the opening of four border crossing-points into Iran.[43]

Humanitarian clearance operations in central and south Iraq were limited to DDG, IMCO, and the ICRC, while NPA worked with RMAC South to build capacity for coordination, tasking, and data management. DDG, with 72 EOD/BAC personnel and 28 support staff, shifted the focus of its operations towards tackling tasks identified by communities and on the basis of social impact rather than size of contaminated area. To support this focus, DDG trained seven mixed gender community liaison teams in 2010, which it described as “the cornerstone” of its planning and prioritization processes.[44] IMCO had 96 operators supported by a mechanical team (one flail) and 11 MDDs, undertaking a range of survey, clearance, and QA tasks. In 2011, it envisaged expanding capacity and the scope of its operations.[45] The ICRC operated with one two-strong EOD team based in Amara doing roving community clearance as well as some community liaison and RE.[46]

Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2010[47]

N/A = Not applicable; N/R = Not reported

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

Three years after it adhered to the treaty, Iraq has still to demonstrate how it expects to progress towards fulfilling its international legal obligations. Mine action continued to be held back by lack of precise data on the mine threat and political uncertainties have impeded the development of an effective institutional framework for mine action or a strategic plan for fulfilling its treaty obligations.[48]

Only in three northern Iraqi governorates, where mine action is under the management of IKMAA and GDMA, has there been concerted action to deal with the mine threat. In central and southern Iraq, most of the reported commercial and humanitarian clearance consists of BAC of unexploded submunitions and other UXO. The army has embarked on survey of the mine threat and as of mid-2011 was the only operator in central and southern Iraq to be tackling it. Until Iraq gives clear political and institutional direction to mine action, the outlook for progress towards meeting its Article 5 obligations is at best uncertain.

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2010

Clearance of cluster munition remnants, a major threat to communities and obstacle to economic development, was recorded in the course of a variety of activities including commercial and humanitarian BAC and roving EOD operations.

MAG reported clearing 2.1km² of cluster munitions hazards in 2010 resulting in the destruction of 1,255 submunitions. This included clearance of two areas totaling 0.2km² at Kherava, northeast of Mosul.[49] DDG reported 1,009 unexploded submunitions destroyed as a result of its BAC operations in 2010 out of a total of 3,028 destroyed.[50]

Quality management

GDMA, with 22 personnel working on QA and 10 on QC, reported making 2,118 visits to monitor clearance operations at 152 mined areas and checking 0.5km² of cleared land. It passed 145 of these tasks, but called for re-clearing of 276,062m².[51] IKMAA has a QA/QC department whose monitors made 1,202 inspections, visiting 23 clearance sites and sampling 11,853m² of cleared land.[52]

Safety of demining personnel

A MAG deminer was killed by the detonation of a submunition in June 2010.[53] GDMA reported four accidents in 2010 but gave no details.[54]

Iranian artillery shelling of border areas caused interruptions to the operations of two IKMAA manual teams in Choman district, requiring them to leave the minefields for safety reasons and then resume work when the situation allowed.[55]

UNICEF observed that the major predicament for its RE program was “the volatile and unstable security situation throughout Iraq and especially in the most affected regions by Mines, UXOs and ERWs severely hampering and affecting the efforts of Mine Action actors in Iraq.”[56]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

UNICEF coordinates national and international NGOs in providing RE in support of IKMAA and GDMA in the north and the DMA in central and south Iraq. Its main partners in 2010 included HI, IHSCO, Iraq Red Crescent Society, the ICRC, and demining operators, including MAG, IMCO, and NPA.[57]

Iraq’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2010–2012 calls for “a comprehensive national mine risk education program to raise awareness in order to reduce risks and adopt safe behavior among the population.”[58] UNICEF and other RE organizations accordingly developed an RE strategy in 2011 that sets uniform standards and guidelines for the whole country. On the basis of the strategy, UNICEF and its partners worked in 2011 on including RE in the national school curriculum.[59] UNICEF also supported a community-based RE program targeting 30 villages in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah and working with community focal points to develop risk reduction strategies, including community mapping and RE delivery. [60]

IKMAA had two three-person RE teams in 2010, one in Erbil and the other in Dohuk, holding direct RE sessions for populations at risk, notably shepherds, nomads, and children, and organizing the broadcast of RE messages on local radio and television. The teams also delivered RE through community liaison supporting mine clearance operations.[61] IKMAA’s Public Information section published information on all mine/ERW related accidents in local media printed and distributed posters. RE teams support for mine action teams resulted in clearance of more than 1,200 items of UXO.[62]