Contamination and Impact

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) experienced the heaviest aerial bombardment in history during the Indochina War of the 1960s and 1970s, which left it with the world’s worst contamination from unexploded submunitions. The extraordinary intensity of that bombing has tended to obscure the extent of other forms of contamination left by the war on the ground and Lao PDR also has extensive air-dropped and ground-fired unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

After more than 12 years of UXO/mine action, Lao PDR still lacks a credible estimate of the total area contaminated in the country, the amount of land that has been cleared, or even the extent of land designated a priority for clearance. Its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report cites an estimate of contamination that is “within 87,000km².”[1] The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) says that 10 of Lao PDR’s 17 provinces are “severely contaminated” by explosive remnants or war (ERW), affecting up to a quarter of all villages.[2] A 2002 evaluation by the Japan International Cooperation Agency estimated that 236.8km² of potential agricultural land was contaminated by UXO.[3]

UNDP has declared that “UXO/Mine Action is the absolute pre-condition for the socio-economic development of Lao PDR.”[4] UNDP reports that as a result of submunition contamination “economic opportunities in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity considered main engines of growth for the Lao PDR are restricted, complicated and made more expensive.”[5]

Cluster munition remnants

The United States (US) dropped more than two million tons (two billion kg) of bombs between 1964 and 1973,[6] including more than 270 million submunitions. There is no reliable estimate of the extent of contamination from unexploded submunitions. However, analysis of US bombing records has identified close to 70,000 cluster munition strikes and local research putting the average strike “footprint” at a “generous” 125,000m² has yielded a rough estimate of cluster contamination of 8,750km², about one-tenth of officially cited estimates of overall ERW contamination.[7]

Clearance teams have found 19 types of submunition.[8] Unexploded submunitions accounted for half of all items cleared in 2010.[9] UXO Lao, Lao PDR’s largest clearance operator, reported in 2011 that during 15 years of operations, submunitions accounted for a little under half (49%) of the items cleared.[10]

The critical impact of submunitions (known locally as bombies) has given rise to calls for a clearance strategy that gives priority to tackling cluster munition remnants,[11] which the NRA identifies as the most common form of remaining ERW contamination and responsible for close to 30% of all incidents.[12] Submunitions are said to be the type of ERW most feared by the population.[13]

Other explosive remnants of war

Clearance operators have encountered at least 186 types of munitions in Lao PDR, but the extent of residual contamination from other ERW is not known.[14] A partial survey by Handicap International (HI) published in 1997, although acknowledged as out of date, continues to be used as a primary source of reference.[15] It found that 15 of the country’s then-18 provinces—all those it surveyed—had districts significantly or severely affected by UXO. These reportedly range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 2,000lb general-purpose bombs and sometimes bigger items.[16] Other major causes of incidents are artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, and air-dropped bombs.[17]

Mines

All sides in the war laid antipersonnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. The HI survey found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages,[18] and clearance operators have estimated Lao PDR may have 1,000 mined areas.[19] The remote location of most of these areas means that mines had little impact, accounting for only 0.3% of the total items cleared in 2010.[20]

Official figures presented in 2010 show mines are responsible for 17% of victims since 1998, almost as many as bombies (20%), but few mine victims have been reported in recent years.[21] The NRA has, however, recognized that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”[22]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid-2006, has an interministerial board chaired by the deputy prime minister and composed of representatives from 10 government ministries.[23] A decree issued in June 2011 appointed a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for rural development and poverty alleviation to be Vice-Chair of the Board together with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.[24]

The NRA’s role includes setting policy, coordinating, and regulating the sector, accrediting operators, setting standards, and conducting quality management. It also has the mandate to serve as the technical focal point for matters relating to international weapons treaties.[25] The NRA has two sections: Operations, with units handling clearance, mine/ERW risk education (RE), victim assistance, and information management; and Policy, Administration and Standards. With US Department of State funding, ArmorGroup North America provided a technical advisor supporting quality management and operations.[26]

UXO Lao, a civilian government body, had primary responsibility for coordinating and regulating all UXO/mine action, including clearance, until 2004, and remains the largest clearance operator in Lao PDR, working in nine provinces.[27]

Lao PDR embarked in 2010 on “Safe Path Forward 2,” a plan for 2010−2020 which identified six goals:[28]

·         to reduce the number of casualties from 300 a year to less than 75 a year;

·         to ensure medical and rehabilitation needs of survivors are met in line with obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions;

·         to release priority land and clear UXO in accordance with national standards and treaty obligations;

·         to ensure effective leadership, coordination and implementation of the national program;

·         to establish sustainable national capacity integrated fully into the regular set-up of the government; and

·         to meet international treaty obligations.

The NRA also started work on an additional 10-year strategy that would “set out concrete and measurable steps, actions and targets to be completed during that time period in its practical implementation of the Convention.” A “concept paper” set out three strategic objectives for clearance, casualty reduction, and victim assistance identical to those in Safe Path Forward 2, but also calls for clearer identification of priority land, the setting of measurable targets, and accelerated clearance. It says the NRA will develop annual work plans setting out annual priorities and targets “in order to provide more detail and to account for up-to-date information and new developments that could impact prioritization.” It also says “the Government of Laos will assume funding responsibilities for certain elements of implementation as defined in the workplans.”[29]

Evaluations

A Post-Clearance Impact Assessment commissioned by the NRA and published in 2011 found that UXO clearance strategies have contributed to Lao PDR’s ninth Millennium Development Goal of enhancing clearance and reducing the impact of UXO, as well as increasing people’s sense of security. However, it states that the slow pace of clearance and the system of task selection make the clearance strategy “less relevant to district, community and household needs in terms of contributing to poverty reduction and reducing risk of exposure to UXO as people are compelled to use contaminated land.”[30]

The assessment observes that the present quota system, under which only a certain number of households per village benefit from clearance in a single year, aims to provide many villages with some level of service but results in expensive clearance assets paying repeated visits to the same village and “it is not possible to state that any villages or districts are ‘impact free’.”[31]

The assessment points to a contradiction in the clearance strategy trying to help the poor and effective post-clearance use of land. Poor people are not owners of good quality land, are less likely to seek clearance services and lack resources to maximize the benefits of clearance, the study says. As a result, the system of task selection “tends to favour the relatively well-off” and “marginalizes the poorest sections of the population even further.” Clearance of community assets is requested by local authorities but community participation in the process of selecting clearance tasks appears to be “very limited,” the study finds.[32]

A community-based approach in which operators, when they deploy to a locality, clear all contamination or at least all cluster munition contamination (which causes most non-tampering casualties) “is likely to make a greater contribution to poverty reduction.” The report observes that most clearance tasks are Priority 1 or Priority 2 under the Safe Path Forward 2.[33] It suggests instead that a combination of Priority 1 tasks with some Priority 3 infrastructure tasks, such as village roads, would facilitate development.[34]

A report released by NPA in November 2010 assessing how Lao PDR could meet its Convention on Cluster Munitions obligations observed that “a) the work can be done efficiently and it will not take hundreds of years; and b) there is a need for a renewed focus on gathering and assessing available data, structured and relevant survey methods must be developed and used and clearance standards appropriate to the context must be elaborated.”[35]

The report notes that operators do not target cluster munition strikes but regard all threats equally, and that current clearance strategies do not really assist in removing bomb strikes as clearance polygons relate more to development priorities than to the strikes. It suggests that “by dividing the problem into a cluster munition problem and a UXO problem the threat can be more appropriately identified and the response can, as a result, be more efficient and effective.” The report calls for a general cluster munition assessment to be conducted, followed by non-technical survey to understand the “footprint” of cluster strikes and technical survey aiming to reduce confirmed hazardous areas to defined tasks. It suggests clearance should focus on cluster munition remnants, clearance assets should be deployed only in relation to cluster strikes, and operators should adopt the principle of clearing the whole strike, not only what has been requested for development or other purposes.[36]

Land Release

The pace of land released by clearance and technical survey in Lao PDR dropped in 2010 for the second consecutive year to 40.62km², only marginally less than the 41.14km² released in 2009 but still far behind 2008 (58km²) and trailing even 2006 and 2007. Moreover the number of bombies and items of ERW destroyed in 2010 was well below the number destroyed in 2001.[37] Although commercial companies’ clearance increased by more than half to 4.98km² it remained less than a quarter of the level achieved in 2008 as a result of still depressed demand from mining companies hit by the financial crisis. However, clearance by humanitarian operators also dropped by more than 10% to 30km² in 2010 from 33.82 km² the previous year.[38]

The slow rate of progress has prompted calls for accelerated clearance. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Duangchay Phichit, who chairs the NRA Board, commented in early 2011 that “UXO clearance in Laos still does not respond to the needs of our country. We plan to alleviate poverty by 2020 but if UXO clearance does not speed up, it will hinder our efforts to reach our development goals.”[39]

Discussions between the NRA and the Army General Staff in 2011 paved the way for active military involvement in mine action as a partner in clearance for a proposed US$7 billion, five-year project to build a railway between the capital Vientiane and the Chinese border. Initial planning provides for the clearance work to be divided into three parts with the Army responsible for two of them and the NRA responsible for management of the third.[40] The Army received a three-week course by five Indian Army combat engineers starting in February 2011 in Vientiane.[41]

Five-year summary of clearance[42]

Survey in 2010

Land released by survey increased 42% in 2010, but the total remained modest at 5.64km² (compared with 3.95km² in 2009) and one operator, UXO Lao, accounted for 93% of what was released.

NRA resumed preparing for a District Focused Approach (DFA) survey, which started in 2010 but was delayed by Lao PDR’s preparations for hosting the first Convention on Cluster Munitions Meeting of States Parties in November 2010. The NRA planned pilot surveys by three operators in three districts, including HI in Nong district, Savannakhet province (105 villages); MAG in Boualapha district, Khammouane province (81 villages); and NPA in Ta-Oy district, Salavan province (56 villages). The NRA did not expect the survey to locate all contamination but to identify all areas of concern to each district, particularly areas of cluster munition contamination. It is planned that the survey will eventually be extended to cover 85 UXO-contaminated districts in Lao PDR.[43]

The NRA conducted a series of workshops in April and May introducing the DFA to districts selected for pilot surveys and training for survey teams in July. It expected survey work in the three pilot districts to start in August 2011 and to take six to nine months to complete; in the meantime, the NRA would expand the workshops to additional provinces.[44]

Battle area and roving clearance in 2010

UXO Lao, much the biggest operator with more than 1,000 staff, conducted more roving tasks in 2010 than in the previous year, but NRA data shows it cleared 15% less area.[45] UXO Lao said the pace of clearance had slowed in 2010 as a result of clearing more remote tasks and because an upgrade in its detector software to support deeper searches had resulted in detecting more small metal fragments.[46]

MAG, the biggest of the international NGOs operated in Khammouane and Xieng Khouang provinces with 261 staff in 2010, including 221 active deminers, saw a 16% dip in area clearance to 6.17km²—also citing the problem of encountering more metal fragments together with more difficult terrain on which teams worked.[47] HI, the smallest of the clearance NGOs with 29 active deminers working in two teams in Savannakhet province, cleared 3.6km² and conducted roving tasks five to seven days a month. It planned to expand in 2011 by adding one team for area clearance and another team to work permanently on roving explosive ordnance disposal.[48]

NPA, which started clearance operations with three teams in Saravane and Sekong provinces in the last quarter of 2009, added five more teams in 2010—expanding operations into Attapeu province and finishing the year with 129 active deminers. NPA planned to add eight more teams in 2011. NPA trialed, and won NRA endorsement for, land release survey procedures for mapping the footprint of cluster munition strikes, a methodology that is expected to produce a more precise estimate of contaminated areas and lead to more effective use of clearance assets. NPA has also conducted trials with signature detectors that help to screen out metal fragments and are expected to help accelerate clearance.[49]

SODI completed its first full year of operations in Bolikhamxay province where it is undertaking integrated clearance and poverty alleviation in Khamkeut district bordering Vietnam, aiming to eliminate the impact of ERW in five to seven years. In addition to area clearance, SODI operates a mobile team undertaking small area and roving tasks. Under a Village Assisted Clearance (VAC) program, SODI employs local residents close to large area tasks to clear brush and also trains a fixed number of villagers to operate detectors, each working with two assistants who dig out the location of signals. SODI reports the VAC program increases efficiency and cost effectiveness and provides a basis for clearance of residual ERW contamination after the program ends sometime in 2014–2016.[50]

Battle area clearance in 2010[51]

In addition to area clearance, operators cleared more than 33,000 ERW in the course of roving operations in 2010, including 14,417 unexploded submunitions. MAG increased the number of roving tasks by half compared with 2009 to 742, during which it destroyed 7,883 items of UXO.[52] However, UXO Lao’s plans to set up 27 roving teams to cover every poor or very poor district in 12 provinces in line with the recommendations of a 2008 UNDP-commissioned evaluation remained on hold in 2010 because of lack of donor support.[53]

Roving clearance operations 2010[54]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

With clearance progressing at a rate of approximately 40km² a year and many thousands of square kilometers of contamination, it is apparent Lao PDR will not meet its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline. In accordance with its treaty obligations, however, Lao PDR told the first Intersessional Meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that operators were researching new technologies and survey and clearance methodologies to try to accelerate clearance.[55] The NRA started work in 2011 on a 10-year plan for practical steps and targets for implementing its Convention on Cluster Munitions obligations to be implemented in two phases from 2011−2015 and 2016−2020.[56]

Quality management

The NRA has a technical advisor, provided by ArmorGroup North America and funded by the US government, responsible for developing quality assurance.[57] UXO Lao set up three mobile quality management teams—each covering three provinces—for the north, center, and south of the country;[58] they became operational in early 2010, receiving support from two technical advisors provided by Switzerland and a third provided by ArmorGroup North America.[59]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

The NRA’s Technical Working Group on Mine Risk Education coordinates planning and implementation of risk education which in 2010 was delivered in nine of the worst-affected provinces in Lao PDR by six organizations: World Education (WE), CARE, and four clearance operators, UXO Lao, MAG, HI, and SODI.[60] Four other organizations started delivering RE in 2010, including Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Spirit of Soccer, Empower for All, and Norwegian Church Aid.[61]

RE activities targeted four high-risk groups: farmers, scrap metal collectors, scrap metal dealers, and children in high-risk areas.[62] The NRA organized an “Annual Review” of RE in November 2010[63] and at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional meeting in June 2011 it reported that RE strategies “are evolving, from the provision of traditional awareness‐raising sessions on the consequences of unexploded ordnance to more complex and targeted processes focused on behavior change. Such processes involve data analysis to identify high‐risk groups, development of new MRE materials (in local languages where appropriate), community liaison, development of government policies on scrap metal, as well as teacher training programmes and the growing involvement of Buddhist monks.”[64] From June 2011, NRA initiated a survey of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices to assess the effectiveness of RE materials and strategies.[65]

WE submitted a strategic plan for sustainable RE in primary schools to the Ministry of Education, integrating UXO lessons into the national curriculum.[66] UXO Lao and clearance NGOs delivered RE in the course of their community awareness programs. MAG worked with CRS developing an integrated program focusing on livelihoods, education, and scrap metal collection and helped the NRA to produce RE materials in both Lao and Vietnamese aimed at scrap dealers and collectors.[67] SODI started RE activities in Bolikhamxay province in 2010 and planned to set up a specialized RE team in 2011.[68]

HI conducted roving RE through briefings and house-to-house visits in target villages in Vilabuly and Sepon districts.[69] It also conducted a household garden project targeting scrap metal dealers and providing 30 families with instruction and resources intended to help them develop a sustainable alternative source of livelihood.[70]