+   *    +     +     
About Us 
The Issues 
Our Research Products 
Order Publications 
Multimedia 
Press Room 
Resources for Monitor Researchers 
ARCHIVES HOME PAGE 
    >
Email Notification Receive notifications when this Country Profile is updated.

Sections



Send us your feedback on this profile

Send the Monitor your feedback by filling out this form. Responses will be channeled to editors, but will not be available online. Click if you would like to send an attachment. If you are using webmail, send attachments to .

United States

Last Updated: 08 September 2011

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In 2008, then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates explained the US decision not to join, stating, “The elimination of cluster munitions from our stockpiles would put the lives of our soldiers and those of our coalition partners at risk. There are no substitute munitions, and some of the possible alternatives could actually increase the damage that results from an attack.”[1] 

Under the current July 2008 Department of Defense policy, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO).[2] Until 2018, use of cluster munitions that exceed the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[3] A 10-year transition period was seen as “necessary to develop the new technology, get it into production, and to substitute, improve, or replace existing stocks.”[4] Also, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” were to be removed from active inventories as soon as possible, but not later than 19 June 2009. These excess cluster munitions will be demilitarized as soon as practicable.[5]

The administration of President Barack Obama has embraced the July 2008 cluster munition policy and has been working extensively to achieve a new protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) regulating some cluster munitions (See CCW section below). In March 2010, Senators Feinstein and Leahy, along with 20 other senators, and Representative Jim McGovern, reintroduced the “Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act.” The Act would limit the use and transfer of cluster munitions to those munitions that have a 99% or higher reliability rate, and would prohibit use of cluster munitions in areas where civilians are known to be present. It would also require the president to submit a plan to Congress for cleanup of cluster munition remnants if the US used cluster munitions.[6] The act had not been reported out of committee as of July 2011, although it continued to gather support in the Senate and House of Representatives. 

The US did not directly participate, even as an observer, in the diplomatic Oslo Process in 2007 and 2008 that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in late 2010 and the first half of 2011 show how the US attempted to influence its allies and partners during the Oslo Process.[7] For example, US officials sought assurances from the highest levels of the Afghan government that Afghanistan would not join the convention, but President Karzai instructed Afghan officials to sign at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in December 2008.[8] Twelve US diplomatic cables from the period from January 2007 to November 2008 show how the US sought to influence Japan’s engagement in the Oslo Process.[9]

During the Oslo Process the US worked hard to influence the outcome of the negotiations and address its concerns, primarily on the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations among the US and States Parties to the convention).[10] The US diplomatic cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US sought to influence the draft text of the convention through its allies and how it has sought to interpret key provisions of the convention since its adoption. For example, in a December 2008 diplomatic demarche to Afghanistan, the State Department stated, “The United States reads the phrase ‘military cooperation and operations’ in Article 21 to include all preparations for future military operations, transit of cluster munitions through the territory of a State Party, and storage and use of cluster munitions on the territory of a State Party.”[11]

The US has not engaged in any meetings related to the convention, including in 2010 and first half of 2011. It was invited to, but did not attend the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010.

Civil society groups in the US have continued to take action in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[12]

The US has not joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but in late 2009 the Obama administration began a comprehensive review of US policy on banning antipersonnel mines and accession to the treaty. Nearly two years after the policy review commenced, it had not concluded as of August 2011. 

Convention on Conventional Weapons

The US is party to the CCW and its Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. The US continued to play a leading role in the CCW deliberations on cluster munitions in 2010 and in the first half 2011. 

In November 2010, the US reiterated its commitment to conclude a legally-binding instrument on cluster munitions that covers, in their view, a large proportion of cluster munitions not captured by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It supported continued CCW work on cluster munitions in 2011 and said, “We are closer to reaching agreement on admittedly difficult decisions.” However, in its statement the US representative noted that it viewed the Fourth Review Conference of CCW in November 2011 as the “end game” for CCW negotiations on cluster munitions.[13] In March 2011, the US continued to insist that a draft protocol that would provide a “substantial and immediate impact on the ground is an essential and achievable goal.”[14]

In November 2010, the US delegation claimed that the draft protocol under consideration at the time would require it to destroy nearly 50% of its stockpiles.[15] By the session in February 2011, the US clarified that a prohibition on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980 as proposed by the meeting chair, would capture “over 40 percent” of its current stockpiles and total nearly 2.8 million cluster munitions.[16] 

Throughout the CCW deliberations in 2010 and 2011, the US has worked intensively, including in private and during intersessional periods between meetings, to forge a compromise for a CCW protocol on cluster munitions.  It has worked to develop, as it put it in September 2010, “meaningful requirements” while accommodating proposals for a transition period, opposing a deadline for stockpile destruction, and opposing a broad definition of “cluster munition victim.” Also at this time, the US asked for “a little bit of homage to reality” from states regarding the immediate and significant humanitarian benefits of the protocol.[17]

In March 2011, the US stated that a protocol that contains an immediate prohibition on all cluster munitions produced before January 1980, contains a deadline for the clearance of cluster munition remnants, and a requirement that parties at all times use only cluster munitions with lowest possible UXO rate would “provide substantial and immediate impact on the ground.”  However, during the same session, it noted that a transition period was essential for implementation.[18]

Use

The US used cluster munitions in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); and Iraq (2003).[19] The US has apparently not used cluster munitions in Afghanistan since 2002 or in Iraq since 2003.  

In June 2010, Amnesty International (AI) published a series of photographs and stated that it appears the US used at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” in al-Ma’jalah in the al-Mahfad district of Abyan governorate of Yemen on 17 December 2009.[20] Neither the US nor Yemeni governments have publicly responded to AI’s allegations. An August 2010 New York Times story on US military involvement in Yemen referred to the AI report on the cruise missile cluster munition attack, noting that a “Navy ship offshore had fired the weapon in the attack.” [21] On 8 June 2010, the CMC called on the US to confirm or deny this reported use of US-manufactured cluster munitions in Yemen, but there has been no response.[22]

In December 2010, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable dated 21 December 2009 that acknowledged the US had a role in the 17 December strike, and said that Yemeni government officials:

…continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S.[23]

Production

In 2001, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a policy memorandum stating that all submunitions reaching the “full rate” production decision by fiscal year 2005 and beyond must have a failure rate of less than 1%.[24]  The US has not budgeted any money for producing new cluster munitions since 2007.[25]  Research and development activities, at the applied research level, for improving the reliability of existing submunitions as well as the development of new types of submunitions continue with programs being conducted by the Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[26] 

Transfer

The omnibus budget bill (HR 1105) signed into law on 11 March 2009 by President Obama contains a provision banning nearly all cluster bomb exports by the US.[27] The legislation also requires the receiving country to agree that cluster munitions “will not be used where civilians are known to be present.”[28] 

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual.  According to this policy, the US can only export cluster munitions that leave behind less than 1% of UXO. According to the US agency that administers weapons transfers, “At present the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW). The CBU-107 Passive Attack Weapon, which contains non-explosive rods, is not captured by the ban.”[29]

The most recent US exports of cluster munitions include sales to the United Arab Emirates[30] (announced September 2006 of 780 M30 GMLRS rockets), India[31] (announced September 2008 of 510 CBU-105 SFW), and most recently to Saudi Arabia (announced in June 2011 of 404 CBU-105D/B SFW). It is not known if these weapons have been delivered to the recipient countries yet.[32]

While the historical record is incomplete, the US has transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom (UK).

Seven signatories of the Convention on Cluster Munitions have declared that they possess or have already destroyed US-produced cluster munitions, including Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK.

The US also licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Stockpiling

In November 2009, a US Department of State official said, “The current stockpile is huge; the Department of Defense currently holds more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions.  Using our current demilitarization capabilities, it will cost $2.2 billion to destroy this stockpile.”[33]

An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the Department of Defense provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.[34]

US Stockpile of Cluster Munitions (as of 2004)[35]

Type

Number of Submunitions Per Munition

Munitions in Active Inventory

Submunitions in Active Inventory

Munitions in Total Inventory

Submunitions in Total Inventory

Rocket

ATACMS 1

950

1,091

1,036,450

1,304

1,238,800

ATACMS 1A

400

405

162,000

502

200,800

M26 MLRS

644

369,576

238,006,944

439,194

282,840,936

M26A1 MLRS

518

4,128

2,138,304

4,128

2,138,304

M261 MPSM

9

74,591

671,319

83,589

752,301

Totals

449,791

242,015,017

528,717

287,171,141

Projectile

M449 APICM

60

27

1,620

40

2,400

M449A1 APICM

60

24

1,440

49

2,940

M483/M483A1

88

3,336,866

293,644,208

3,947,773

347,404,024

M864

72

748,009

53,856,648

759,741

54,701,352

M444

18

30,148

542,664

134,344

2,418,192

Totals

4,115,074

348,046,580

4,841,947

404,528,908

Bomb

Mk-20 Rockeye

247

58,762

14,514,214

58,762

14,514,214

CBU-87 CEM

202

99,282

20,054,964

99,282

20,054,964

CBU-103 CEM WCMD

202

10,226

2,065,652

10,226

2,065,652

CBU-97 SFW

10

214

2,140

214

2,140

CBU-105 SFW WCMD

10

1,986

19,860

1,986

19,860

CBU-105 SFW P3I WCMD

10

899

8,990

899

8,990

AGM-154A JSOW-A

145

669

97,005

1,116

161,820

Totals

172,038

36,762,825

172,485

36,827,640

 

Grand Total

4,736,903

626,824,422

5,543,149

728,527,689

In February 2011, the US stated that “around two million” cluster munitions would be captured by a CCW proposal for a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation.  Several of the types, such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1 were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.

The October 2004 Department of Defense report to US Congress provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types that contain about 728 million submunitions.[36] However, this figure does not appear to be a full accounting of cluster munitions available to US forces. The tally apparently does not include cluster munitions that are located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[37]

The Department of Defense had not publicly reported on the removal of excess cluster munitions from stocks by June 2009, as called for in the July 2008 policy. But it appears that action has been taken. For example, the UK government told parliamentarians that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.”[38] In December 2010, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and titled “US-UK Cluster Munitions Dialogue,” which reported on a proposal that would provide a temporary exception to this timeline for new cluster munitions that the US brought to British territory after the 2013 deadline.[39]

Since 2000, the US has destroyed on average 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) per year at an average annual cost of $7.2 million. For fiscal year 2012, the funding for the destruction of non-missile cluster munitions and submunitions consumes 24% of the annual budget allocation for the destruction of conventional ammunitions.[40] 

Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The army has requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[41]

 



[1] Letter from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to Sen. Patrick Leahy, 12 September 2008.

[2] The policy memorandum was dated 19 June, but not formally released until 9 July 2008. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, www.defenselink.mil.  

[3] The new policy requires cluster munitions used after 2018 to meet a 1% UXO rate not only in testing, but in actual use during combat operations within the variety of operational environments in which US forces intend to use the weapon. Combatant Commander is the title of a major military leader of US Armed Forces, either of a large geographical region or of a particular military function, formerly known as a commander-in-chief.

[4] Statement by Stephen Mathias, “United States Intervention on Technical Improvements,” CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 15 July 2008.

[5] Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, www.defenselink.mil.  The US has not reported any details on the removal of stocks, or whether the undertaking has been completed.

[6] Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2009, S. 416 and H. 981. It was first introduced in February 2007, and reintroduced in February 2009.

[7] As of early August 2011, Wikileaks had made public a total of 57 US diplomatic cables originating from 24 locations, all relating to US concerns over the Oslo Process initiative. See www.cablegatesearch.net.

[8] “Afghan Views on Cluster Munitions and Oslo Process, US Department of State cable 0STATE167308 dated 12 February 2008, released by Wikileaks on 20 May 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net; and “Demarche to Afghanistan on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.wikileaks.ch.

[9] See www.cablegatesearch.net.

[10] For detail on US policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.

[11] “Demarche to Afghanistan on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.wikileaks.ch.

[12] For example, US civil society groups organized several events to commemorate the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force. In Portland, Oregon, campaigners held a drumming event in the park to celebrate the occasion, and the West Virginia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Proud Students Against Landmines and Cluster Bombs made presentations to city and state government leaders, encouraging them to sign the People’s Treaty on cluster munitions.

[13] Statement by US, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2010. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

[14] Statement by US, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 28 March 2011. Notes by AOAV.

[15] Statement by US, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[16] Statement by US, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 21 February 2011. Notes by AOAV.

[17] Statement by US, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 September 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[18] Statement by US, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 28 March 2011. Notes by AOAV.

[19]  For historical details on the use of cluster munitions by the US, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 262–263.

[20] The remnants in the photographs included images of the propulsion system, a BLU-97 submunition, and the payload ejection system, the latter of which is unique to the TLAM-D cruise missile. AI, “Images of Missile and Cluster Munitions Point to US Role in Fatal Attack in Yemen,” 7 June 2010, www.amnesty.org.  See also, “U.S. missiles killed civilians in Yemen, rights group says,” CNN, 7 June 2010.

[21] Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and Robert F. Worth, “Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents,” New York Times, 14 August 2010, www.nytimes.com.

[22] CMC, “US: Confirm or deny use of cluster munitions in Yemen,” Press release, 8 June 2010, www.stopclustermunitions.org. 

[23] “ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] looks ahead following CT operations, but perhaps not far enough,” US Department of State cable SANAA02230 dated 21 December 2009, released by Wikileaks on 4 December 2010, www.guardian.co.uk.

[24] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001. In other words, submunitions that reach “full rate production,” i.e. production for use in combat, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 must meet the new standard. According to an October 2004 Pentagon report to Congress on cluster munitions, submunitions procured in past years are exempt from the policy, but “[f]uture submunitions must comply with the desired goal of 99% or higher submunition functioning rate or must receive a waiver.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004, p. ii.

[25] For detail on the production of cluster munitions by the US from 2005 to 3007, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 257–258; and ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada: October 2010), p. 263.

[26] For example, see US Air Force, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number PE 0602602F: Conventional Munitions,” February 2011, p. 6;  US Army, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602624A: Weapons and Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 5; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602000D8Z: Joint Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 13.

[27] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105), became Public Law No. 111-8, 11 March 2009. See also, Sen. Patrick Leahy and Sen. Dianne Feinstein, “FY2009 Omnibus Bill Includes Leahy-Feinstein Provision to Prohibit Sale or Transfer of Most U.S. Cluster Munitions,” Press release, 12 March 2009, Washington, DC, feinstein.senate.gov. The sponsors of the provision characterized it as a permanent ban on exports. This view has been disputed by others, who have said that it can only apply to the one-year period funded in the bill.  Sen. Leahy included the provision again in the fiscal year 2011 appropriations bill, which had not yet been acted on by Congress as the Monitor went to print. A one-year US export ban was first enacted in a budget bill in December 2007, and extended the following year.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764), 110th Congress, 2007. In September 2008, Congress passed a continuing resolution to extend the Consolidated Appropriations Act, and thus the moratorium, through 6 March 2009.

[28] US-supplied cluster munitions have been used in combat by Israel in Lebanon and Syria, by Morocco in Western Sahara and possibly Mauritania, by the UK, and the Netherlands in the former Yugoslavia, and by the UK in Iraq.

[29] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Guidance on the Sale of Cluster Munitions, DSCA Policy 11-33,” Memorandum, 19 May 2011, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil.

[30] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency Press release, “United Arab Emirates: High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems,” Transmittal No. 06-55, 21 September 2006, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil. While the export of these cluster munitions is not allowed under the ban legislation, an Army officer told the trade publication Inside the Army in 2009 that the deal was signed in 2007, well before the export ban legislation was introduced, and that the army obtained legal opinions that confirm the validity of the final sale. It is not publicly known how or when this situation was resolved.

[31] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency Press release, “India: CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 08-105, 30 September 2008, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil.

[32] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency Press release, “Saudi Arabia: CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 10-03, 13 June 2011, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil.

[33] Statement by Harold Hongju Koh, US Department of State, Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to CCW Protocol V, 9 November 2009, geneva.usmission.gov.

[34] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[35] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004.

[36] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[37] Under this program, munitions are stored in foreign countries, but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and allied forces in the event of hostilities. The 2004 Department of Defense report also does not include SADARM cluster munitions (thought to number 715) and an unknown number of TLAM-D cruise missiles with conventional submunitions. In 1994, the stockpile, including WRSA, consisted of 8.9 million cluster munitions containing nearly 1 billion submunitions, see US Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, “Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Study,” April 1996.

[38] Statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.

[39] “U.S.-UK Cluster Munitions Dialogue,” US Department of State cable 09STATE52368 dated 21 May 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010. See David de Sola, “UK offered exceptions for U.S. cluster munitions despite treaty,” CNN, 3 December 2010, edition.cnn.com.

[40] Figures and averages are compiled from annual editions of Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2012.

[41] Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” February 2011, pp. 729–730.