Contamination and Impact

Cambodia is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s. The precise extent of contamination is not known. An ongoing two-year Baseline Survey (BLS), due for completion before the end of 2012, estimated total mine and ERW contamination at 1,624km² after surveying 89 out of 124 districts.[1]

Mines

Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand, which accounted for more than 90% of casualties in the three years to 2009. Contamination includes the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt installed by the Vietnamese-backed government in the mid-1980s to block insurgent infiltration, which ranks among the densest contamination in the world; it reportedly has up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.[2]

Cambodia’s 2009 Article 5 deadline extension request estimated mined areas needing clearance at 648.8km² and the National Mine Action Strategy released in 2010 identified a further 1,097.8 km² of suspected land to be released “through baseline survey and technical survey.”[3] The total estimate of contamination, however, has risen sharply as a result of the BLS showing an extensive residual problem of scattered or nuisance mines. By July 2012, the ongoing BLS mentioned above reported more than 945km² affected to some degree by antipersonnel mines (see Survey section below), of which 614km² was scattered mines. A further 63.1km² was identified as contaminated only by antivehicle mines.[4] 

Antivehicle mine incidents have highlighted the threat posed by these devices, which caused twice as many casualties as did antipersonnel mines in 2011. That danger has increased as population pressures increase demand for land and increasingly heavy farm vehicles are used along old roads, some of them abandoned in the years of conflict.[5]

Casualties by device in 2009–2011[6]

* Included four people killed and 12 injured by cluster submunition remnants in 2011.

** In addition, three people were killed and three injured in 2011 by unidentified devices.

Cluster munition remnants

The United States (US) dropped at least 26 million explosive submunitions on Cambodia during the Vietnam War, mostly in eastern and northeastern areas bordering the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam. The bombing is estimated to have left between 1.9 million and 5.8 million cluster munition remnants, including unexploded BLU-24, BLU-26, BLU-36, BLU-42, BLU-43, BLU-49, and BLU-61 submunitions.[7] 

Cross-border shelling by Thailand in April 2011 of Cambodia’s northern province, Preah Vihear, resulted in additional submunition contamination. An assessment by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) immediately after the shelling identified 12 strike sites and contamination by unexploded M42, M46, and M85 submunitions over an area of approximately 1.5km², impacting four villages and affecting between 5,000 and 10,000 people.[8] NPA said evidence in the area suggested about one in five of the submunitions had failed to detonate.[9]

The BLS, as of early July 2012, had identified 708 areas suspected to be contaminated by cluster munitions covering an area of 327.4km².[10] An ERW survey conducted by CMAC with support from NPA in eastern Cambodia, focusing particularly on determining the extent of cluster munition remnants contamination more precisely than the BLS, had confirmed hazardous areas of 3.9km² and identified suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) of 12.2km² as of early September 2012.[11]

The Cambodia Mine/Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 16 submunition casualties in 2011, including four fatalities.[12]

Other explosive remnants of war

By July 2012, the BLS had identified 227.67km² affected by ERW, not including cluster munitions.[13] The US also dropped more than a million tons (one billion kilograms) of general purpose bombs during the Vietnam War, mostly in eastern Cambodia. In other parts of the country, operators encounter mainly land-fired ordnance, including artillery shells, rockets, and mortars.[14] ERW now account for just over half the casualties caused by all types of explosive ordnance in Cambodia.[15]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to the CMAC.[16] The CMAA’s responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, quality control, as well as coordinating mine/ERW risk education (RE) and victim assistance.[17] Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA president, and a senior government minister, Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers, Prak Sokhonn, who is CMAA vice-president, leads the dialogue with donors as the chair of a Mine Action Technical Working Group.[18]

The CMAA’s management is overseen by its Secretary-General, Chum Bun Rong, who was appointed in December 2008.[19] A subdecree (No. 92), issued in August 2009, specifies that CMAA has five departments: regulation and monitoring, socio-economic planning and database management, mine victim assistance, public relations, and general administration.[20]

A National Mine Action Strategy 2010−2019 (NMAS), drawn up by the CMAA and UNDP and approved by the government in November 2010, sets four main goals:[21]

·         reduce mine/ERW casualties and other negative impacts by allocating demining assets to the most impacted communities and promoting RE;

·         contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction by supporting local, subnational, and national development priorities, supporting access to care for survivors and securing the land rights of intended beneficiaries of clearance;

·         promote international and regional disarmament and stability by supporting the Mine Ban Treaty and adhering to the Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V on explosive remnants of war; and

·         ensure sustainable national capacities to adequately address the residual mine/ERW contamination by reviewing the institutional framework to address the residual problem, plugging gaps, and maintaining sustainable capacity.

CMAA introduced “Partnership Principles” in April 2011 intended to guide relations and improve coordination with donor governments and “to make mine action a driver of growth and poverty reduction within the context of the (2009−2013 National Strategic Development Plan).” The principles state “no mine action programme, project, annual workplan or new initiative should be implemented without prior agreement from the CMAA.” The government, recognizing the impact of mine action on development, “will commit annually a heightened level of support from its own budget resources.” The seven donors that signed the principles, dated 4 April 2011, were Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), and the UN. Austria signed the principles in 2012.[22]

Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in Cambodia’s eight most mine-affected provinces are responsible for preparing annual clearance task lists, working with local authorities to identify community priorities and in consultation with operators. The task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Councils and the CMAA. In provinces without MAPUs, mine action is coordinated with provincial authorities. In practice, however, MAPUs have approved many clearance tasks that were decided by operators consulting bilaterally with donors.

The CMAA approved new guidelines and criteria for planning and prioritization in September 2011 for implementation from the start of 2012. The new guidelines seek to integrate clearance more closely with broader commune development plans. They specify that priority is given to clearing hazardous area polygons identified by the BLS and where there have been casualties in the past five years. The guidelines also include a provision for the CMAA to give guidance and direction to the relevant MAPU on the criteria that define clearance priorities.[23]

UNDP supports the CMAA through a “Clearing for Results” program. The first project expired at the end of March 2010 and was replaced from 1 January 2011 by a second project still funded and advised by UNDP but under national management. Project priorities included strengthening CMAA management and technical capacity, conducting the BLS, and promoting cost-effective approaches to land release through competitive bidding for clearance contracts.[24]

CMAA awarded four contracts under “Clearing for Results” in 2011 worth a total of US$2.8 million and projected spending $2.9 million in 2012, including $502,000 for the BLS. The contracts awarded in 2011 included:[25]

·         CMAC: two contracts for clearance and technical survey in Banteay Meanchey and Battambang provinces worth $1 million each covering 4km² and 4.5km² respectively.

·         The RCAF’s National Center for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC): one contract worth $380,000 to clear 1.2km² of Pailin between July 2011 and April 2012, its first involvement in CMAA-coordinated mine action.

·         HALO Trust: one $400,000 contract to provide seven survey teams for the second phase of the BLS.[26]

NPA continues to provide support to CMAA’s database, funding seven national staff under a three-year agreement ending in 2014.[27]

Land Release

Demining operators increased the amount of land released through clearance and survey by nearly one-quarter in 2011 despite a tougher financial environment. Total land released by four humanitarian demining operators and RCAF’s National Center for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC) amounted to 64.52km², of which CMAC reportedly accounted for 51.99km² or 80%.[28] CMAC reported that its total land release included 9.51km² of land released by technical survey and “other” forms of area reduction.[29]

Five-year summary of clearance

The figures have been disaggregated between mine and battle area clearance by the Monitor, and do not include release by technical survey, as CMAA does not perform this task in its reporting.

Survey in 2011

By the end of June 2012, operators had completed surveying 89 of the 124 districts to be covered by the BLS. Survey teams were working in 19 districts and funding was being sought for the remaining 16 districts. The CMAA had planned for the survey to be complete by October 2012 and to present a report to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva at the end of November. Despite delays over funding, the CMAA still expected to complete the survey and prepare a revised work plan on the basis of it by the end of the year.[30]

By the end of June 2012, the survey had recorded dense antipersonnel mine contamination over 50km² and scattered antipersonnel mine contamination over 614km² of “land that is not in productive use.” The BLS land classification matrix states that clearance assets should be deployed on such land only in cases “where there is a development justification.” A further 281km² was contaminated by a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The BLS found almost 60km² of previously suspect land had no verifiable mine threat.[31] It also classified 708 SHAs covering an area of 327km² as B1.2, meaning land where there is “bombing data or evidence that an area contains cluster munitions or bombies [small unexploded bombs].”[32]

CMAC deployed between six and 16 survey teams at different times of the year, depending on availability of funding, and as a result of shortfalls it demobilized some teams and assigned others to different tasks.[33] In addition to the BLS, NPA conducted a survey focused on determining the extent of contamination by cluster munition remnants in eastern provinces, working with three international staff and 71 nationals, including six CMAC survey teams, reduced in March 2012 to four.[34] 

HALO completed 14 districts for the BLS, deploying seven survey teams under a CMAA “Clearing for Results” contract between May and December, covering 1,042 villages and surveying 1,825 SHAs. HALO also operated two survey/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams which surveyed 104 SHAs with a total area of 12.9km².[35] Survey teams from the UK NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) worked in four districts of Pursat province in 2011.[36]

Mine clearance in 2011

Total mined area clearance in 2011 amounted to almost 38km² in 2011, a one-quarter increase on the 30km² reported by operators in 2010. In addition to CMAC, HALO, MAG, and NPMEC, the CMAA also for the first time reported clearance by Cambodian Self Help Demining (CSHD).[37]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2011[38]

CMAC, the biggest demining operator, reported manually clearing 25.32km² in 2011, 14% more than in 2010, despite what it said was the most difficult year for funding in the last decade.[39] Although Japan approved an equipment grant worth US$16.8 million, including brush cutters and global positioning system technology, CMAC faced shortfalls and delays in funding that held up clearance projects and caused fluctuations in demining team deployments. CMAC reported 2,017 staff actively employed at the start of 2011, dropping to 1,387 in April, and then finishing the year with 1,715 personnel. In addition to mined area clearance, CMAC also cleared 17.14km² of battle area in eastern Cambodia and nearly 70,000 items of UXO through roving EOD. In addition, CMAC, working in partnership with Golden West, recovered 10 tons of UXO and AXO in underwater operations in the Tonle Sap river.[40] 

HALO also reduced capacity as a result of reduced funding, dropping from 1,100 employees at the end of 2010 to around 578 in 2011 and operating on average six demining teams less each month than in 2010. Despite the personnel cuts, HALO reported a 53% rise in the area it demined, largely achieved by clearing significantly more antivehicle mined areas (5km² in 2011 compared with 1.8km² in 2010) while clearing almost the same amount of antipersonnel mined areas (3.87km², down from 3.99km² in 2010). HALO’s work plan for 2012 provided for a similar focus on antivehicle mines, proposing total clearance of 12.72km² of which 8.23km² would be antivehicle mined areas.[41]

MAG also reported a 42% rise in clearance to 2.34km² in 2011, helped by increased funding. The funding increase allowed a staff increase to a total of 338 at the end of the year and an increase in the number of demining teams from nine to 13; the teams worked in western provinces along with four mechanical teams and one mine-detection dog team. MAG discontinued two EOD teams which had been operating in eastern Cambodia in May 2011 but continued with two roving teams in the west, completing a total of 1,464 tasks which destroyed 8,352 items of UXO.[42]

Despite the financial constraints facing donor-dependent humanitarian demining organizations in 2011, the CMAA awarded a US$380,000 contract funded by the UNDP’s “Clearing for Results” program to the armed forces’ NPMEC, which completed clearance of 0.89km².[43] In 2011, NPMEC accredited another five demining platoons and an EOD team, bringing their total accredited strength to nine demining platoons and two EOD teams.[44]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009), Cambodia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020.

Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2010−2019 states that “For the purpose of the Extension Request, Cambodia will require demining operations over the next 10 years to clear some 648.8km² of mine affected land and to release 1,097.8km² of suspected land through baseline survey and technical survey.”[45] Partial results of the BLS, however, suggest a bigger clearance task than that predicted in the Extension Request. As of the end of June 2012, survey had still to be completed in 35 of the 124 districts covered by the BLS, but results received already showed a total area of more than 945km² affected by antipersonnel mines (see Survey section above).[46]

Cambodia has asserted that such figures cannot be compared to the estimate of 648.8km² because the different BLS land categories may include antivehicle mines and ERW.[47] Still, mined area clearance, although nearly one-quarter higher in 2011 than the previous year at 36.88km², continues to lag behind the clearance targets presented in Cambodia’s extension request, which predicted 40.18km² for 2011.[48]

An additional complication for Cambodia has been heightened insecurity along its border with Thailand, including cross-border clashes in April 2011, which has led to interruption of demining in some border areas, including parts of the K5 mine belt.[49] 

Quality management

The CMAA is responsible for quality management, operating six quality assurance (QA) teams: two teams are based in Battambang, two in Bantheay Meanchey, one in Siem Reap, and one in Kampong Cham, concentrating on clearance operations. The CMAA also has two QA teams monitoring the BLS. It set up two more quality control teams in February 2012 to focus on land releases by technical survey in order to assure safety and help maintain public confidence, one in Battambang province and the other in Bantheay Meanchey province.[50]

Safety of demining personnel

HALO reported one demining accident resulting in injury in 2011 but the deminer subsequently returned to work.[51]

Risk Education

CMAA is responsible for planning, coordinating and overseeing mine/ERW risk education (RE) which is conducted by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, CMAC along with clearance operators, the National Police, as well as by the Cambodian Red Cross and NGOs, including HI-Belgium and Spirit of Soccer. At the provincial level, the Provincial Mine Action Committee prioritizes and coordinates messages.[52]

CMAC delivered RE through networks of community-based mine risk reduction and UXO risk reduction teams. CMAC reported that these teams made more than 12,000 presentations during 2011 and also helped generate requests for spot clearance.[53] HALO operated one RE team in 2011 which made 44 presentations supporting the BLS.[54] MAG delivers Risk Reduction Education (RRE) through community liaison teams, increasing the number of these teams from six to eight during 2011 and conducting 221 sessions. MAG’s two EOD teams also provided basic RE in the course of roving operations.[55]