Contamination and Impact

The precise extent of Colombia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem, which is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups (NSAGs), remains unclear. In its latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, Colombia describes a complex situation with a substantial humanitarian impact resulting from antipersonnel mines and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid by NSAGs.[1] Contamination also arises from abandoned or illegal ammunition storage areas, clashes between NSAGs and the Colombian armed forces, and aerial bombing.[2] Explosive devices and other ERW are found in former battle areas, bombing sites, drug routes, and areas where the government is trying to destroy coca plantations.[3]

In 2011, the Presidential Programme for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) received reports on 1,094 “events”,[4] which include accidents from mines, IEDs and unexploded ordnance (UXO), mined areas, suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), and military demining operations. This compares to an increase of 334 in 2010 and 169 in 2009. Each event is recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at PAICMA and is marked for further investigation to confirm the suspicion.[5]

People living in both rural and urban areas are killed and injured by victim-activated IEDs, unexploded or abandoned munitions, and inappropriately stored ordnance.[6] Civilian personnel hired to manually destroy coca plantations, commonly known as “coca eradicators,” represent one of the highest risk groups in Colombia. Drug traffickers use mines as booby-traps to protect the crops.[7] In 2011, 19 coca eradicators, hired as temporary workers by the Illicit Crops Eradication Department, were injured and two killed while destroying coca plantations.[8]

Colombia’s database is populated with a large number of unconfirmed reports of accidents, incidents, and contamination. Colombia only started conducting non-technical survey (NTS) in 2010 after standard operating procedures (SOPs) were adopted, based on the 08.20 International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) series released in July 2009. NTS in Colombia successfully cancel “suspicions” (see the Non-technical survey section below) and provide more of an indication of the quality of the database than of contamination.[9]

Mines

Given the irregular nature of mine-laying and the continued use of mines, especially improvised mines, it is impossible to obtain a static picture of contamination. Colombia stated that a lack of reliable information prevented it from including a complete operational plan in its Article 5 deadline extension request.[10]

The Organization of American States (OAS) has reported that no mined areas have been found in Colombia that could be considered as high- or medium-density minefields. Nuisance mines have been found in schools, water sources, or stream crossings in order to allegedly intimidate or displace the local population. The limited humanitarian demining so far conducted by the Engineer Humanitarian Demining Battalion (BIDES) has found only small numbers of mines in each contaminated area.[11]

Nonetheless, the national database contains information indicating that 31 of the 32 departments may be mine-affected. The most affected departments are believed to be Antioquia, Caquetá, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Tolima.[12] Since NSAGs use mines in unpredictable ways and some areas of the country are not accessible, PAICMA has been unable to conduct a nationwide survey to determine the true extent of the problem.[13]

Colombia does not include any coca plantations in its list of confirmed mined areas because not every coca field is a minefield. PAICMA records every accident/incident report related to eradication and schedules further investigation when security conditions allow in order to ensure that no mines have been left behind.[14]

Cluster munition remnants

Contamination in Columbia may include cluster munition remnants. In March 2010, Colombia reported using cluster munitions to target isolated airstrips used by NSAGs in minimally populated areas, without stating the specific time and location.[15] In December 2010, the Colombian Air Force made a presentation on past use and destruction of cluster munitions, claiming that cluster munitions were last used in October 2006.[16] PAICMA reported no cluster munitions were found in 2011.[17] A case against Colombia is before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights relating to the use of cluster bombs by the Colombian Air Force on 13 December 1998 on the hamlet of Santo Domingo, in the municipality of Tame, Arauca department.[18]

Other explosive remnants of war

The precise extent to which Colombia is affected by ERW is not known. In 2011, 3% of all recorded victims were from incidents involving ERW.[19] For the period 2002–2010 it was estimated that 5% of all explosive ordnance incidents resulting in injury or death were caused by UXO.[20]The ICRC, however, based on its victim surveillance system and its integration into IMSMA, believes the true rate may be closer to 40%.[21]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Established on 30 July 2002 under Law No. 759/2002, the National Intersectoral Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP), is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

The Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA), the technical secretary of CINAMAP, is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2009–2019 Integrated Mine Action Plan, with the overall strategy to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in affected communities.[22]

Since 2010, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has been assisting PAICMA in integrating mine clearance NGOs into the national mine action framework with an emphasis on national standards, operational coordination systems, and quality management systems to monitor NGOs. In 2011, in consultation with PAICMA, it was determined that a major restructuring of PAICMA was needed in order to improve coordination. In 2012, UNMAS took the lead in implementing an internal quality management system for PAICMA.[23] UNMAS also assists PAICMA and the OAS in finalizing the accreditation and monitoring procedures and processes and will provide technical assistance as required for clearance operations.[24]

The OAS, in an agreement with the government of Colombia, serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS is responsible for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system on behalf of the government’s decision-making body for humanitarian demining (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario, commonly called “the Instancia Interinstitucional”), and reports to PAICMA.[25] The OAS is an advisor to the Instancia Interinstitucional (see below) in the accreditation of NGOs in Colombia. This includes evaluation of their structure, staff capacity, SOPs and training. The OAS monitoring section, which is based on Colombian national standards, evaluates the NGOs and recommends to the Instancia Interinstitucional whether an NGO should be accredited. The Instancia Interinstitucional, which reports to CINAMAP, is composed of the representatives from PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, and the military Inspector General.[26] UNMAS is an observer at the Instancia Interinstitucional.[27] As of 30 June 2011, the OAS had equipped and certified 27 teams with 360 deminers, and provided administrative and logistical assistance to sustain clearance operations.[28]

Demining law and standards[29]

Mine action in Colombia is a heavily regulated framework based on laws passed by Congress, opinions issued by the Attorney General, and decisions of the Constitutional Court. The legal framework was established within the security context of Colombia and with input from stakeholders.

Congress passed Law No. 1421 in December 2010 allowing NGOs to carry out humanitarian demining.[30] This law was the first step of a complex process that would take almost two years before it became operational in June 2012.  

In October 2011, in support of Law No. 1421, Decree No. 3750 established internal rules and procedures of the Instancia Interinstitucional to ensure that civilian humanitarian demining activities are conducted in accordance with international standards as mandated by Article 5 in the Mine Ban Treaty. The Instancia Interinstitucional will be responsible for approving demining tasks for NGOs based on local priorities and humanitarian principles after the NGOs are accredited.

Further progress towards NGOs becoming operational was made in July 2012 when, following on Decree No. 3750 on Rules and Procedures, PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense and the Commando General (General Command) introduced six of the 17 national standards that will regulate demining in Colombia to stakeholders. The six national standards, with technical assistance from UNMAS, cover tasking, non-technical survey, technical survey, accreditation, and manual demining.[31] The accreditation process also includes confirmation of adequate employment contracts, insurance policies, appropriate personal protective equipment, and daily coordination with security authorities.

In January 2012, in an unexpected development, the Procuraduría General de la Nación[32] issued a legal opinion surprisingly claiming that humanitarian demining in Colombia was a violation of international humanitarian law, as it would put deminers in danger.[33] As a consequence of the opinion, HALO Trust discontinued its non-technical survey work, and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) suspended their operations in Colombia due to the uncertainty caused by the opinion.[34]

At a meeting of CINAMAP on 16 May, after five months of discussion among PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, and the Procuraduría, PAICMA announced the Procuraduría would issue a new directive on NGO demining. The new directive, issued in June 2012, urged caution in tasking clearance in dangerous areas and recommended that the army both increase its humanitarian demining capacity and adopt the same national standards for humanitarian demining as apply to NGOs. The directive also allowed NGO demining to proceed. Under the directive, PAICMA is required to submit semi-annual reports to the Procuraduría. The Procuraduría also intends to follow up and eventually participate in the process.[35] By 22 June 2012, HALO had submitted its paperwork for desk accreditation. Following field accreditation, CINAMAP will assign tasks and HALO will be able to start demining.[36]PAICMA expected that more NGOs will apply for accreditation by the end of the year.[37]

Land Release

Non-technical survey

PAICMA coordinates non-technical survey (NTS) by allocating events in the national database for each municipality to the army battalion and HALO Trust, the only two entities that conducted NTS in Colombia in 2011. In Colombia, non-technical surveys do not cancel unconfirmed reports. Instead, unconfirmed reports are cancelled through general assessment, which generate “suspicions,” which are reports that require further investigation. Also, “suspicions” do not include information on the size of the affected area in the report. NTS teams are tasked by PAICMA to investigate each “suspicion” to determine whether there is evidence to define a dangerous area or to cancel the “suspicion”. Once a dangerous area has been defined, it is then tasked for technical survey.[38]

The surveys are providing initial indicators of the quality of the information in the national database that constitute events as well as what comprises a suspect hazardous area (SHA) and confirmed mined area in the Colombia context.

In 2009, the BIDES was clearing suspected mined areas ranging from 20,000 to 50,000m². In 2011, most confirmed mined areas ranged from 2,000–3,000m² and many were even smaller. The OAS attributes this to better surveying. According to the OAS in 2010, 93 SHAs covering 997,651m² were surveyed and 82% were released without clearance. In 2011, 274 SHAs covering 1,371,800m² were canceled and released.[39] In 2010–2011, HALO cancelled 90% of the “events” from the PAICMA database concerning areas the organization visited.[40]

In its Article 7 transparency report covering 2011, Colombia reported that the army and HALO Trust had conducted NTS on a total of 133 hazardous areas. Of the areas surveyed, 15 were canceled (total area: 142,872m²) while the remaining 118 were “confirmed” as SHAs covering 427,355m². The average size of a canceled hazardous area (7,937m²) was twice the size of a confirmed area (3,716m²). The 133 hazardous areas ranged in size from 5m² to 63,693m², though only eight measured more than 11,000m². The smallest confirmed hazardous area (CHA) was 183m².[41]

The OAS monitors survey operations and reviews all survey reports for accuracy and completeness as part of the monitoring process for demining.[42]

HALO Trust[43]

In March 2010–October 2011, in coordination with PAICMA, HALO Trust investigated 779 IMSMA events in the municipalities of Abejorral, Argelia, Cocorná, Nariño, San Luis, San Rafael, and Sonsón, all in the department of Antioquia. Of these 779 events, 78 were confirmed as hazardous areas and 701 (90%) were recommended for cancelation.[44]

As a result of the poor quality of much of the IMSMA data concerning events, HALO decided it was essential to visit all 459 veredas[45] where the 779 events were located and collect information at the ground level. In total, HALO assessed that 359 veredas did not contain landmines, 55 veredas contained one or more mined areas and 45 veredas were listed as having insufficient information to confirm or cancel an area based on the presence of landmines.

After the survey, HALO developed clearance plans for 78 CHAs. The average size of a CHA in the seven municipalities surveyed is 6,000m², each containing, on average, fewer than two mines. HALO estimates the 78 contaminated areas could be cleared by 90 deminers within 18 to 24 months.[46]

HALO discontinued its surveys in late 2011 after the director of PAICMA determined that HALO should first be accredited before continuing to survey, in order to avoid future problems for PAICMA.[47]

Mine clearance in 2011

Humanitarian demining in Colombia is conducted only in safe areas where the army is not involved in operations against non-state armed groups (NSAGs).[48] BIDES has commenced clearance in 12[49] of the 14 municipalities designated as priorities in the 2011–2013 operational plan, as set out in Colombia’s Article 5 deadline extension request.

In 2011, the Battalion cleared 74 “mined areas” covering 329,950m² in five departments and nine municipalities, finding 194 IEDs and nine items of UXO. No mines were found. Of the 74 areas cleared, 32 covering 110,092m² did not contain any hazards while another eight contaminated areas contained only one UXO. In 2010–2011, a combined 39% of the mined areas cleared and 25% of the land contained no hazards, including a 37,000m² area cleared in Meta department in 2011.[50] On 31 March 2012, US support for the Demining Battalion through the OAS ended until the US Congress authorized more funding. In April 2012, Canada provided stop-gap funding for operations, but clearance operations and NTS were suspended in May and June. On 1 July 2012, after the US Congress authorized US$1.9 million of new funding through the OAS, the Demining Battalion resumed operations.[51]

Humanitarian mine clearance completed in 2011[52]

On 12 March 2012, Colombia declared the municipality of San Carlos to be free from the suspicion of landmines, a category unique to Colombia and not found in the International Mine Action Standards, after it had cleared 15 SHAs covering 88,318m². Of the 660 municipalities out of 1,100 suspected to contain SHAs, San Carlos, in the department of Antioquia, was the first municipality to be declared free of SHAs.[53]

As of December 2011, the Humanitarian Demining Battalion consisted of nine platoons with 41 deminers and three national supervisors each, for a total of 369 deminers and 27 supervisors. The platoons operate independently as squads or teams of 12 to 15 deminers, for a total of 27 teams. PAICMA and the Ministry of Defense are in discussions about increasing the number of teams in 2013, which depend on the Ministry of Defense being allocated additional funding from the national budget.[54] In both opinions on humanitarian demining, the Ombudsman in the Procuraduría  recommended that the army increase the number of demining teams in the national interest of the country.[55] In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request of August 2010, Colombia reported plans to increase the number of demining platoons from 9 to 14 in 2013.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.

On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, and then on 5 August 2010 submitted a revised request. The major differences between the original and revised requests were the decrease in the predicted number of NGO demining teams in 2014–2020 from 85 to 49, and the reduction in required funds for the same period of almost $150 million. The operational plan plus the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 remained at 17 NGO teams and $25 million. During this period the government of Colombia planned to contribute $21 million for 14 demining platoons.[56] As of July 2012, the army had nine demining platoons and the NGOs did not have any due to the work stoppage caused by the Attorney’s report that delayed accreditation and deployment of NGOs and the deliberate decision-making process at CINAMAP. The Attorney’s report also postponed commitments from donors to fund humanitarian demining.

The extension request predicts that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.”[57] Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan is a central component of the extension request. It was planned to address dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 mine-suspected municipalities with contamination covering an estimated 15km² in five of the 32 departments, by 2013.[58]Although demining platoons have commenced operations in 13 municipalities, the overall targets for clearance capacity by the end of 2013 for the army and NGOs are unlikely to be met.

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of NGOs.[59]Based on the decision of States Parties in approving Colombia’s extension request, Colombia will submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2013.[60]

Clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2011

No cluster munition remnants were found or destroyed in 2010 or 2011.[61]

Quality management

OAS Program for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA) is the body with responsibility for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system for accredited demining organizations in Colombia. The OAS also investigates demining accidents, verifies community liaison activities and does quality assurance on non-technical surveys.[62]

 In 2011, PAICMA formalized the quality management role of the OAS in accreditation, monitoring, and quality control of NGOs clearing mines in Colombia. In response, the OAS established the External Monitoring Component to assist in implementing the quality management system and planned to hire 24 personnel in 2012 to support the component. External monitoring responsibilities in Colombia are defined in the relevant national standard, which was approved in April 2012.[63] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) will accompany and advise the OAS Colombia External Monitoring Component in the various phases of accreditation, QA/QC processes, and ensure the required standards are in place.[64]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Coca eradicators

One of the most vulnerable groups in Colombia, based on casualty rates, are those killed or injured by mines while manually clearing coca plantations with hoes. In October 2011, ICBL conducted an advocacy mission to Colombia to address the rights of the injured coca eradicators and explore ways with the government of Colombia to better protect the eradicators while clearing coca plants. The ICBL recommended that the government of Colombia completely clear contaminated areas before sending in coca eradicators to remove coca plants.

In December 2011, the Procuraduría, the same office that issued two opinions on humanitarian demining in Colombia, had indicated it was preparing an opinion on coca eradicators and demining.[65] It again informed CINAMAP on 16 May that it was preparing an opinion, but as of 10 July 2012, PAICMA had not received one.[66] In October 2011, the Colombian National Public Defender’s Office had already advised the government that the recruitment of civilians for the manual eradication program should be suspended.[67]

There were 58 casualties among coca eradicators in 2010 and 54 in 2009.[68]In 2011, PAICMA reported 21 casualties from mines during coca eradication.[69]It is not certain why there were so many fewer casualties in 2011, although far fewer hectares of plantations were cleared of coca than in 2010.[70]The decrease in casualties did not address ICBL’s overall concerns.

In May 2012, PAICMA replied to the ICBL mission report by saying the coca eradicators are recruited through job advertisements and sign labor contracts before beginning the work. Risk education is provided to all coca eradicators and the coca eradicators are under the protection of the armed forces. PAICMA further added that coca eradicators injured by mines are eligible for assistance under Article 3 of Law No. 1448 of 2010 that defines a victim from conflict, but there is, as yet, no mechanism to register coca eradicators as victims; PAICMA does enter the victim data into the National Information System for Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims.[71] On 15 June 2012, seven coca eradicators between 19 and 52 years of age were injured and one was killed while manually conducting eradication as a result of an incident involving an antipersonnel landmine in the municipality of Roberto Payán in Nariño department.[72]

Risk Education

The ongoing conflict has posed an array of challenges and problems in Colombia.[73] The national government chairs a coordination meeting on mine/ERW risk education (RE) that includes both national and international stakeholders. Its participants include the Colombia Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM), Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC), Colombian Red Cross, ICRC, UNICEF, UNDP, Fundación Restrepo Barco, OAS, National Learning Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA), the Ministry of National Education, PAICMA and representatives from the departments of Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo. This group provides guidance to PAICMA on the national strategy for RE and the guide to RE in Colombia.[74] UNMAS attends the meeting as an observer.[75] The strategy is partly the result of a Constitutional Court ruling in 2004 that said the government of Colombia must provide humanitarian assistance to all internally displaced persons.[76]

UNICEF’s strategic focus is to promote national guidelines for RE strategies and to partner with national NGOs for community-based activities. In collaboration with PAICMA and the Ministry of Education, UNICEF promotes RE as part of the school curriculum. UNICEF also provides technical and financial support on Mine Risk Education and to the Risk Education section at PAICMA.[77]

In 2011, UNICEF, through its partners, provided RE to 24,331 people (including 17,914 children) who live in affected areas in the departments of Arauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Putumayo. Approximately 18% of the participating population belongs to indigenous groups and 12% are Afro-Colombians. Additionally, 870 teachers in the departments of Chocó, Cauca, Nariño, Sucre/Bolívar have been trained in RE. In 2012, the RE programme continued to be developed in the departments of Arauca, Meta, Norte de Santander, Putumayo and Córdoba and will continue to be developed in other territories prioritized by UNICEF. The main implementing partners include Corporación Paz y Democracia and the CCCM.[78] In 2012, UNICEF planned to start building a quality assurance model for RE operators.[79]

In 2010–2011, Geneva Call piloted a project in Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo to determine what approaches to take in RE among indigenous people. Primarily, Geneva Call concluded that a one-size-fits-all approach to an ethnic-based RE program would not work because “every people has its own mental, spiritual and organizational structure.” This was illustrated when one group suggested the land should be included as a victim along with individuals, families and communities. An external assessment of the project concluded there was great value and strength in indigenous organizations recognizing the impact of the conflict on their culture and livelihoods and that the process started by Geneva Call should continue.[80] The project trained 86 RE trainers (27% women) from six different indigenous organizations, who reached out to 5,700 persons (43% women) in highly conflict affected areas. The second phase of the project was initiated in early 2012 and aims at leaving indigenous organizations with the capacity installed by training persons to be trainers of future RE trainers.[81]

The ICRC has integrated weapons contamination into all assessment and planning procedures. It implemented an integrated safe behavior program whereby it incorporated RE, victims’ rights, and first aid in community-based activities.[82]

In 2011, the ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross conducted 423 workshops on safe behaviors for 10,500 community members and local authorities. The workshops focused on how to avoid accidents involving IEDs and ERW. The ICRC also explains to communities, local authorities and health services how to provide care for victims of violence (including victims of weapon contamination) and the rights such victims have. Additionally, to reduce risk, the ICRC provided various projects that provide alternatives to risk-taking for communities living in contaminated areas and where clearance is not possible. For example, the ICRC constructed a temporary school to accommodate children unable to attend their regular school due to the threat of IEDs and mines.[83]

The OAS conducted RE in Antioquia, Bolivar, Caldas, Meta, Nariño, Santander, and Tolima through home visits and education centers.[84]

CCCM, with the support of the US State Department, carries out RE in the departments of Arauca and Norte de Santander. This process complements the intervention made with the support of UNICEF Colombia. Some of its results include 81 people trained as RE facilitators in rural communities and 2,051 children trained in safe behaviors.[85]