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Georgia

Last Updated: 17 December 2012

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Georgia is contaminated with mines around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflicts with the breakaway republics of Abkhazia[1] and South Ossetia.

Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the residual mine problem has not been reported publicly.[2] According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009 suspected mined areas were located at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[3] Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010, which identified eight suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 13 districts, the latter of which totaled more than 4.5km2 in estimated area.[4] Of these 15 areas, 10 have been identified as having a direct humanitarian impact, five of which had been cleared by the HALO Trust as of August 2012.[5] It is not known if any of the other five active military areas have been cleared.

There is also an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[6]

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is a mountainous region of approximately 70,000 people. Since the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, South Ossetia has been difficult to access. According to HALO, there has been persistent low-level mine-laying, primarily in areas between Georgian- and South Ossetian-controlled villages. Although HALO has been unable to gain sufficient access to South Ossetia to assess the mine threat fully, it notes that at least 15 mine casualties were reported there in 2008–2010.[7] HALO has planned to conduct a non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but it had not been granted access to the area as of July 2012.[8]

Cluster munition remnants

There may be a small residual threat from cluster munition remnants in the South Ossetia region of Georgia. Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which Georgian and Russian forces both used cluster munitions. After the conflict, HALO conducted a survey in Georgian-controlled territory to identify the level of contamination, which estimated that some 37km2 were contaminated with unexploded submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[9] HALO reported completion of clearance of unexploded submunitions in its tasked areas in December 2009.[10] NPA completed clearance of its tasked areas in May 2010.[11]

 According to the international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), the Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC) conducted several risk-assessment missions in 2010 to survey potential new hazardous areas; this included one mission in October 2010 to Perevi village in Georgian-controlled territory at the western border with South Ossetia. The ERWCC reportedly found evidence of the use of cluster munitions as well as the presence of other ERW in the area and recommended follow-up action in clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.[12] Based on interviews it conducted with villagers on the Georgian side, a news channel in Russia specializing in the Caucasus region claimed there were no residual effects from the bombing.[13] 

Around the same time as the ERWCC interviews in Perevei in December 2010, a landowner on his property near Zemo Nikozi village in Shida Kartli, the region bordering South Ossetia, discovered a Urugan rocket with 9N-210 submunitions remaining inside the carrier. The Ministry of Internal Affairs dealt with the rocket in January 2011. In May 2011, once the snows had melted, HALO conducted subsurface clearance around the location of the rocket over some four hectares, but no further ordnance was found.[14] The ERWCC claimed to have identified cluster contamination during its risk assessment missions in 2010 that might lead to clearance operations, but it has never presented the evidence to HALO. HALO believes there may be unexploded submunitions in South Ossetia but until it is able to conduct a survey, it is not certain of the presence of remaining contamination.[15]

Despite fears of cluster munition remnants in Poti military harbor, none was found during demining operations by NPA in 2009.[16]

Other explosive remnants of war

Georgia has an ERW problem as a result of the armed conflict with Russia in August 2008. Following the conflict, there was evidence of a problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO) in South Ossetia, although its precise extent remains unclear.

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2012

National Mine Action Authority

None

National mine action center

Subdivision (DELTA) under the Ministry of Defense

International demining operators

HALO Trust

National demining operators

Georgian Armed Forces; Ministry of Internal Affairs

In 2008, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and iMMAP to establish the ERWCC.[17] On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Defence issued a decree instructing that mine action be included as part of the State Military Scientific Technical Center, or “DELTA,” an entity within the ministry. The agreement with iMMAP ended on 31 March 2011 and the ERWCC took ownership of the mine action program.[18]

Through the iMMAP project, ERWCC became the Georgian Mine Action Authority tasked to coordinate and execute ERW mitigation. iMMAP conducted training on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) for the QA/QC section of the ERWCC staff, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict with Russia. The lead NATO members of the project have been the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania. In 2012, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish a long-term local capability and capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[19] The project aims to train 66 personnel from the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade in humanitarian demining, battle area clearance (BAC), and explosive ordnance disposal. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers will be given additional training in technical survey, site management, QC, and QA. The contract for training was awarded to the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) in an internationally competitive bidding process. The training took place in the ANAMA training center in Goygol, Azerbaijan in March–October 2011.[20]

Land Release

Mine clearance in 2011

In 2011, HALO cleared 688,252m2 of mined area, finding and destroying 2,498 antipersonnel mines and one antivehicle mine. The majority of the mines were found around the former Soviet military base at Sagaredjo. The base was heavily mined with an inner perimeter of PMN-2s, while PFM-1s were scattered outside the outer fence of the base. The majority of the mines found were PFM-1s. Although the outer perimeter of the base is quite large, HALO was able to define the inner perimeter very clearly by finding the fences and clearing them from the outer fence until no more PFM-1s were found. As a result, the cleared area seems relatively small compared to the number of mines found. HALO reported the Sagaredjo minefields were some of the densest mined areas they have found in Georgia.[21]

In June to September 2011, with funding from the United States (US) Department of State, HALO destroyed eight PFM-1 antipersonnel mines in a minefield in Omalo, a village in Tusheti National Park close to Georgia's northern border with Russia.[22] HALO also completed clearance in minefields at Mtskheta and Telavi in 2010 and 2011 with funding from the government of Japan’s Grassroots Grant Program and the US Department of State.[23] 

During mine clearance operations at Sagaredjo and Telavi airbases, HALO also conducted 645,215m2 of BAC during which 340 ERW were found. No unexploded submunition was found. HALO has reported there are very few remaining BAC tasks in Georgia and the Georgian Ministry of Defense did not request HALO to clear any battle areas in 2011 or 2012 through August.[24] In 2012, HALO completed the clearance of the Akhalkalaki and Sagaredjo minefields in large abandoned military bases; these were the fourth and fifth Soviet legacy minefields cleared by HALO in Georgia.[25]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated area in 2011

No clearance of submunitions was conducted in 2011. The remaining suspected cluster munition contamination is in South Ossetia, which since the conflict with Russia in 2008 has not been accessible to the Georgian authorities.

Quality management

The ERWCC under the control of DELTA conducts QA and QC.[26]

Risk Education

The ERWCC has reported conducting community liaison attached to its QC activities as well as implementing a project with UNICEF/the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office along the Abkhazia/Georgia border. It reports that ICBL Georgia has also conducted a number of community liaison interventions covering affected areas.[27]

The HALO Trust ended formal risk education (RE) in 2009, having run a program across Shida Kartli following the 2008 war, and consequently it does what current RE provision there is in Georgia. HALO includes RE as part of its community liaison and mine clearance operations when beginning to clear a new minefield.[28]

 



[1] See the Profile for Abkhazia for further details on contamination in Abkhazia.

[2] Maps of contaminated areas are available at, http://www.immap.org/index.php?do=maps&cat=4.

[3] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[4] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 March 2010.

[5] HALO, “Georgia: The problem,” undated but accessed 17 August 2012; and email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 29 August 2012.

[6] Interview with George Dolidze, Director, Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[7] BBC, “Regions and territories: South Ossetia,” 30 November 2011; and HALO Trust, “Georgia: The problem.” No information is available on casualties in South Ossetia in 2011.

[8] Email from Tom Meredith, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 3 July 2012.

[9] ERWCC, “Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC) in Facts and Figures,” November 2009, p. 17, www.erwcc.org.ge.

[11] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 27 May 2010.

[12] Emil M. Hasanov and Petri Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011.

[13] CaucasianKnot, “Border village of Perevi, Georgia,” YouTube, 12 January 2011.

[14] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 27 July 2011.

[15] Ibid., 30 August 2012.

[16] NPA, “Poti Harbour Survey Technical Report, 3rd to 24th of January 2009,” p. 5.

[17] iMMAP, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” Press release, 25 February 2009; and Emil M. Hasanov  and Petri Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011.

[18] Emil M. Hasanov  and Petri Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011; and Decree #897 issued by the Minister of Defense, 30 December 2010.

[19] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012.

[21] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 30 August 2012.

[23] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 3 July 2012.

[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 21 August 2012.

[25] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 3 July 2012.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 21 August 2012.

[27] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 27 July 2011.

[28] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 21 August 2012.