+   *    +     +     
About Us 
The Issues 
Our Research Products 
Order Publications 
Multimedia 
Press Room 
Resources for Monitor Researchers 
ARCHIVES HOME PAGE 
    >
Email Notification Receive notifications when this Country Profile is updated.

Sections



Send us your feedback on this profile

Send the Monitor your feedback by filling out this form. Responses will be channeled to editors, but will not be available online. Click if you would like to send an attachment. If you are using webmail, send attachments to .

Libya

Last Updated: 28 November 2013

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Libya is contaminated with mines, cluster munition remnants, and a wide array of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of internal and international armed conflict in 2011, as well as earlier conflicts with neighboring countries. As of mid-2012, ERW were believed to pose the main threat to the population.[1]

Mines

Before the 2011 conflict, Libya faced contamination from mines left by the desert battles of World War II and by conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980−1987, which resulted in mines being laid on those borders. Its border with Tunisia is also affected. In the aftermath of the 2011 conflict, it emerged that mines had also been emplaced around a number of sensitive locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.[2]

The conflict in 2011 that resulted in the overthrow of Colonel Muammur Qaddafi was marked by use of antipersonnel and/or antivehicle mines by government and rebel forces. The only reported instance of mine use by rebels occurred in Ajdabiya, but other locations where pro-government elements laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains.[3] The most commonly-used type of antipersonnel mine was the low-metal content Brazilian T-AB1 mine, but evidence has also been found of Belgian NR 413 stake and bounding fragmentation mines (PRB NR 442). Antivehicle mines used by government forces have included Chinese Type 72SP and Type 84 mines (scattered by rockets over the port city of Misrata), Belgian PRB-M3 and PRB-M3A1 antivehicle mines, as well as minimum-metal mines. Sea mines were also used by government forces in the port of Misrata.[4]

Cluster munition remnants

The 2011 conflict saw use of at least three types of cluster munitions. These include the Chinese dual-purpose Type 84 cluster munition, which also functions as an antivehicle mine, and the Spanish MAT-120, which holds 21 submunitions. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has reported tackling Russian PTAB cluster bombs[5] and international media reported the presence of a fourth cluster-munition type that has remained unidentified.[6] The extent of contamination by submunitions is unknown.

In addition to items used in hostilities, demining organizations have encountered both Type 84s and MAT-120s as a result of destruction of ammunition storage areas. “Street museums” set up by local residents in Misrata and other locations displayed cluster munitions among a wide array of other items of ordnance, but by March 2012 the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT) reported all but one major museum in Misrata had shut down.[7]

There may also be some residual contamination from World War II. On 27 November 2009, a commercial oil company survey crew in Libya found remnants of a German World War II-era “butterfly bomb” (an early version of a cluster bomb). Subsequently, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expert identified six more such cluster munition remnants.[8]

Other explosive remnants of war

Libya emerged from the conflict with extensive contamination by a wide array of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO), although the precise extent is unknown. Heavy contamination by UXO or AXO has been reported around towns that became battle grounds between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces stretching from the western Nafusa mountains to Zintan (southwest of Tripoli); in and around Misrata, Zlitan, and Bani Walid to the east and southeast of Tripoli; Sirte, Ras Lanuf, Brega, and near Ajdabiya, all along the coast of the Gulf of Sidra; as well as Benghazi and Tobruk near the border with Egypt.[9]

International organizations have reported encountering air-dropped bombs of up to 3,000kg; 107mm (Radima), 122mm (GRAD), and 130mm rockets; surface-to-air missiles; sea mines and torpedoes as well as rocket-propelled grenades; a variety of mortar, tank, and artillery shells; and small arms and anti-aircraft ammunition.[10] International NGOs engaged in urban clearance reportedly found much less UXO in some areas (Misrata) than might have been expected from the intensity of fighting.[11]

NATO said its forces used 7,642 air-to-surface weapons during its seven-month air operation lasting until the end of October 2011[12] and in 2012 gave the UN detailed coordinates of 313 sites of possible UXO, including strikes by aircraft (303), helicopters (six), and naval warships (four), although it failed to provide details of the specific ordnance used or fuzing mechanisms and render-safe procedures.[13] EOD teams have reported clearing a number of large NATO bombs, including one of 900kg.[14]

Additional contamination resulted from air strikes on ammunition storage areas which scattered UXO over surrounding areas and from sabotage by retreating pro-Qaddafi forces.[15] Schools and hospitals, precisely because they were not targeted by NATO, were often used by pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces, which left large amounts of AXO and UXO behind when they departed.[16]

Libya’s transitional authorities and demining organizations also faced a challenge securing huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Qaddafi regime which provided a source of explosives for use in improvised devices.[17] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) concluded that the “vast” hazard presented by uncontrolled ammunition, weapons, and ERW in Libya will require “concerted efforts for decades to come and significant financial support ranging in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.”[18]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2013

National Mine Action Authority

Ministry of Defense

Mine action center

Libyan Mine Action Center (LMAC)

International demining operators

NGO: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Handicap International (HI), MAG, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Santa Barbara Foundation (SBF) and Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

Commercial: Mechem, Ukroboronservices

National demining operators

Free Field Foundation (3F), Libyan Organization for Demining and Development, Salama, volunteer organizations

International risk education operators

FSD, HI, ICRC, MAG

National risk education operators

Libyan Red Crescent Society, Aman Foundation, Boy Scouts

 

Under the former regime of Col. Qaddafi, the Ministry of Defense and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, each had responsibilities for various aspects of mine action. The Ministry of Defense reportedly cleared areas serving either a military or civilian development purpose. The Civil Protection Unit is said to have carried out clearance in affected communities.[19]

Since the change of regime, mine action has felt the effects of wider political turmoil as well as competing claims of a role in the sector by multiple institutions. Principal among these is LMAC, mandated by a decision of the Minister of Defense in December 2011 to coordinate mine action, support efforts to control ammunition storage areas (ASAs), and decommission weapons, while the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army has jurisdiction over arms and ammunition and a role coordinating a range of operations.[20] Other institutions include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National Programme for Demining and Rehabilitation of Lands, which was set up in 2004 and revived by the ministry after the change of regime, and the Ministry of Interior’s National Safety Authority, which before the revolution was responsible for EOD.[21]

As fighting between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces gathered momentum, JMACT became operational in April 2011, liaising closely with the Chief of General Staff of the Army and working in partnership with international NGOs, initially from Benghazi, but later from a main office in Tripoli with sub-offices in Benghazi and Misrata. As demining operators became established in Libya, JMACT provided initial coordination, directing teams to areas needing clearance and collecting operational reports from partners, including DCA, DDG, HI, Information Management and Mine Action Programs, the ICRC, MAG, NPA, FSD, and UNICEF.[22]

LMAC was reportedly in existence as early as May 2011, comprising some personnel who reportedly had been involved previously in mine action and who now are engaged in organizing the monitoring of some ammunition storage areas seized from the government.[23] Germany provided funding to support LMAC in establishing a head office in Tripoli with regional branches in Benghazi, Zintan, Misrata, and Sabha,[24] becoming the main focal point for humanitarian demining NGOs in the course of 2012, but mine action sector sources said the breakdown of centralized government as a result of the regime change in 2011 has limited the extent of LMAC authority outside Tripoli.[25] In 2012, LMAC continued to report to the Ministry of Defense and was engaged mainly in registering and coordinating international and national operators, some operational planning and information management.[26]

Land Release

Incomplete reporting and lack of consistency in available data make it difficult to determine accurately the extent of clearance or items destroyed. Operators reported little clearance of landmines in 2012, reflecting the focus on the greater threat posed by other ERW, stockpiles of ordnance, and the widespread access to small arms and ammunition since the conflict of 2011–2012. Most mine action appeared to be a mixture of surface battle-area clearance (BAC) and emergency spot clearance.

Mine action activities by international operators continued to be restricted geographically as a result of the political transition in Libya and the sensitivity of local authorities and militias to allowing access to some affected areas. Against this background, little survey of mine and ERW contamination has taken place since the change of regime in Libya. UNMAS commissioned six international personnel to undertake a series of quick assessments of ERW contamination in 2012 but did not release any findings.[27] Difficulties experienced by some operators obtaining explosives for demolitions also meant that the number of items destroyed were significantly fewer than the number cleared and resulted in cleared items being stored in secured areas pending bulk demolitions. HI reported clearing a total of 33,641 items of UXO in 2012, but destroyed less than a quarter of that number.[28]

 Libyan volunteer groups reportedly conducted most of the ERW clearance in 2011–2012 and some were still active in 2013, particularly around Benghazi in eastern Libya, but no details of their identity or activities was available. UNMAS recorded 11 international organizations engaged in mine action in 2012, including two commercial operators, but the scope of their activities was restricted by the lack of a clear institutional framework for mine action and regional political tensions.

LMAC recorded BAC over 7.55km2 in 2012 together with destruction of 9,887 mines (antipersonnel and antivehicle) and 134,525 items of UXO, more than double the items destroyed in the previous year.[29] UNMAS reported separately that operations by 11 international organizations resulted in destroying a total of 9,664 antipersonnel mines, of which 9,647 antipersonnel mines were attributed to one operator, SBF. UNMAS said operators also destroyed 221 antivehicle mines, but most destroyed items were projectiles, including mortars, artillery shells and rockets, and small arms ammunition.[30]

SBF, working with local partner, the AMAN Foundation, reportedly destroyed 6,523 antipersonnel mines from an area of 29,147m2 that formed a narrow perimeter around Mitiga airport, and released a further 190,630m2 on that task through technical survey. SBF and its partner also cleared 316,630m2 of battle area at Ghod Roman, destroying 2,819 items of UXO. SBF had appealed for US$240,000 in 2013, in addition to confirmed funding of $680,000, to clear 400,000m2 of battle area in 2013 but in September 2013 it suspended operations because of lack of funding.[31]

In 2012, DCA operated with three EOD teams which worked in Dafniya, Zliten, Misrata, and Bani Walid conducting BAC and spot clearance, but it withdrew from Bani Walid in February 2012 after two incidents when teams were stopped by unidentified armed personnel. Although DCA has not conducted mine clearance, it was asked to verify an area of Zliten where volunteers had cleared a large mine belt. In 2013, it has continued working in Misrata where it also planned to conduct an armed violence reduction program, including a project for ammunition storage.[32]

HI operated in 2012 with 25 staff in four EOD teams, two deployed in Misrata and two in Sirte, conducting a mixture of BAC, spot clearance, and ammunition stockpile destruction. HI reported releasing a total of 21.67km2, but it was not immediately clear how much was through full clearance, visual inspection, or non-technical survey. In November 2012, HI started clearing the Misrata ASA and expected to continue working there throughout 2013. It also planned to seek funding for a mine clearance project in Misrata and to conduct assessments in other locations to be determined in line with LMAC priorities. HI also put emphasis on small arms and light weapons risk reduction through education programs in Tripoli, Misrata, and Sirte.[33]

MAG, among the biggest operators with 108 EOD personnel, conducted a range of survey and clearance tasks in 2012 including ASAs at Ajdabiya and Misrata as well as tasks around Zintan, Sirte, and Azizyah, where it was subcontracted to Sterling International. A total of 1.5km2 was released through technical survey at Sirte, Misrata, and Zintan. In 2013, MAG has focused on clearing UXO from storage areas and nearby communities and expanded its mechanical capacity to increase efficiency in conducting these tasks. It has also provided interim safe storage areas for weapons and ammunition and supported training for military and police in ammunition storage management.[34]

Among the commercial operators, UNMAS contracted Ukroboronservices of Ukraine to clear ERW to provide safe working areas at an ASA in Hun (southeast of Tripoli), destroy unserviceable ammunition, and place other ammunition stocks in explosive storage houses rehabilitated to provide safe storage. A second commercial company, Mechem, was contracted to provide three BAC teams and three EOD teams to conduct visual BAC and EOD at ASAs and other locations with explosive hazards. One of the EOD teams was assigned to support police and army engineers in and around Tripoli.[35]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2012[36]

Operator

Mined area cleared (m2)

Battle area cleared (km2)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

DCA

0

3.03

0

22

2,596

0

DDG

0

0

0

0

496

0

Demira

0

1.63

0

0

6,529

0

FSD

0

5.11

10

0

1,773

0

HI

0

0

0

0

7,093

162

MAG[37]

0

2.53

1

29

128,975

109

Mechem

0

0.96

1

69

89,034

0

SBF

29,147

0.32

9,647

0

2,819

0

Total

29,147

13.58

9,659

120

239,315

271

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2011

Pro-Qaddafi forces used cluster munitions in a number of locations, most visibly in the port city of Misrata in April 2011.[38] DCA reported clearance of mortar-delivered MAT-120 cluster munitions in Misrata[39] while Type-84 antivehicle submunitions were found by DCA in Dafniya and by FSD in Sirte.[40] Submunition remnants have made up a relatively small proportion of the ERW encountered by operators (see table above), but it appears that some reported UXO clearance included submunitions.

Safety of demining personnel

A DCA international deminer was killed by a Type-84 submunition in Dafniya in March 2012 in the course of clearing buildings of ERW.[41]

 



[2] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011.

[3] Ibid.; and email from Jenny Reeves, Weapons Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.

[4] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, Communications Officer, JMACT, Tripoli, 20 March 2012; HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,”19 July 2011; Colin King, “Landmines in Libya,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011; and C. J. Chivers, “Land Mines Descend on Misrata’s Port, Endangering Libyan City’s Supply Route,” New York Times, 6 May 2011.

[5] Email from Nina Seecharan, Desk Officer for Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya, MAG, 5 March 2012.

[6] C. J. Chivers, “Name the Cluster Bomb, an Update,” New York Times, 2 February 2012.

[7] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012.

[8] Daily report by Jan-Ole Robertz, EOD Technical Advisor, Countermine Libya, 27 November 2009.

[9] HRW, “Government Use of Landmines Confirmed,” 31 March 2011; and HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,”19 July 2011.

[10] See, for example, JMACT Weekly Report #3, 6 June 2011; HRW, “Libya fails to secure arms depots,” 9 September 2011; and email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 5 March 2012.

[11] Robert Keeley, “Urban land release in Libya: BAC and Land Release in Urban Areas,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 16.2, Summer 2012, p. 35.

[12] HRW, “Unacknowledged deaths,” 14 May 2012, p. 6. NATO reported that bombs of 500lb or less accounted for 82% of the ordnance used, 500 to 1,000lb bombs for over 7%, and 1,000 to 2,000lbs for about 10%.

[13] C. J. Chivers, “List of Unexploded Arms in Libya Is Seen as Limited,” The New York Times, 25 June 2012.

[14] JMACT, Weekly Report #20, 10 October 2011; and email from Jenny Reeves, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.

[15] JMACT, Weekly Report #3, 6 June 2011.

[16] Andy Smith, “UNMAS in Libya, another critical failure,” Landmines and Humanitarian Mine Action (website), updated July 2012.

[17] Interview with Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies Director, HRW, Geneva, 4 January 2012; and Adrian King, “Conflict in Libya and the Future Risk to the Demining Community,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011.

[18] UNMAS, “2013 Portfolio of Humanitarian Mine Action Arms and Ammunition Management Projects,” 8 July 2013, p. 5.

[19] Interview with Dr. Taher Siala, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Tripoli, 12 May 2005.

[20] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012; interview with Max Dyck, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012; and email from Stephen Bryant, Programme Manager, NPA, Libya, 23 July 2012.

[21] Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Libya, 20 July 2013.

[22] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012, and interview with Max Dyck, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012.

[23] Andy Smith, “UNMAS in Libya – another critical failure,” Landmines and Humanitarian Action, updated July 2012.

[24]Libya: Securing weapons and destroying land mines, munitions and explosive remnants of war,” German Federal Foreign Office website, last updated 30 December 2011.

[25] Telephone interview with international mine action operator in Libya requesting anonymity, 30 July 2012.

[26] Email from Stephen Bryant, NPA, Libya, 23 July 2012.

[27] Interview with Max Dyck, JMACT, Tripoli, 25 August 2013.

[28] Interviews with mine action operators, Tripoli and Misrata, 24 August–1 September 2012; and email from Cat Smith, HI, 23 July 2013.

[29] LMAC response to Monitor questions, received by email from Jennifer Reeves, Capacity Building Advisor to LMAC, GIZ, 30 October 2013.

[30] Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS, 20 July 2013.

[31] Emails from Lutz Kosewsky, former Program Manager, SBF, 25 October 2013; and UNMAS, “2013 Portfolio of Humanitarian Mine Action Arms and Ammunition Management Projects,” 8 July 2013, p. 23.

[32] Interviews with Knut Furunes, DCA, Misrata, 28 August 2012, and by telephone, 9 October 2013 and emails from Hasan Sleiman, Programme Officer, DCA, 30 September 2013.

[33] Interview with Paul McCulloch, HI, Misrata, 28 August 2012; and email from Cat Smith, HI, 23 July 15 September 2013.

[34] Interview with Djadranka Gillesen, Country Director, MAG, Tripoli, 27 August 2012; and email from Jacqui Brownhill, MAG, 29 October 2013.

[35] Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS, 20 July 2013.

[36] Compiled by the Monitor from data provided by email from Jenny Reeves, GIZ, on behalf of LMAC, 30 October 2013; Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS, 20 July 2013; Lutz Kosewsky, SBF, 25 October 2013; Knut Furunes, DCA, 9 October 2013; and Jacqui Brownhill, MAG, 29 October 2013.

[37] MAG reported it cleared 94 missiles, 183,547 small arms ammunition, and 362 man portable air-defense systems components. Email from Jacqui Brownhill, MAG, 14 November 2013.

[38] C J Chivers, “Landmines Descend on Misurata’s Port, Endangering Libyan City’s Supply Route,” The New York Times, 6 May 2011; HRW Libya: cluster munitions strike Misrata,” 15 April 2011.

[39] Andy Mattingly, “DCA resumes clearance work in Libya,” DCA website, 9 September 2011.

[40] Marcus Rhinelander, “Deadly cluster bomb thought to have killed Estonian mine expert,” Libya Herald, 11 March 2012.

[41]DCA staff killed in explosion in Libya,” DCA website, 5 March 2012; and email from Richard McCormack, Head of Mine Action Unit, DCA, 3 August 2012.