Contamination and Impact

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), mostly in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Contamination posed a major obstacle to resettlement of nearly 300,000 people who were left displaced at the end of the conflict and to economic and social rehabilitation of the north.[1]

As of July 2010, Sri Lanka had identified 1,469 hazardous areas affected by mines and ERW covering a total of 537.7km², but 23 northern areas that had not been opened up to demining operators by the military remained to be assessed, including 17 in Mullaitivu district, four in Mannar district, and two in Vavuniya district.[2] The Jaffna peninsula, a focal point of fighting for many years, had 3.2km² of confirmed minefields and 17.3km² of confirmed hazardous areas contaminated by ERW.[3]

Mines

Both sides made extensive use of landmines, including belts of Pakistani-made P4 MK1 mines laid by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and long defensive lines using a mixture of mines and booby-traps laid by the LTTE defending approaches to the northern town of Kilinochchi. The LTTE also left extensive nuisance mining in many northern districts, particularly in areas of intense fighting and often emplaced as its fighters retreated in the face of army offensives.[4]

Operators encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including antipersonnel mines with antitilting and anticlearance mechanisms, and often containing a larger explosive charge (up to 140g) than Pakistani-made P4 MK1 mines (30g). They also encountered tripwire-activated claymore mines, and to a lesser extent antivehicle mines.[5] According to HALO Trust, evidence from survey and subsequent clearance operations confirmed what had been suspected, that the LTTE significantly increased production of mines since conflict escalated in 2006. The majority of new mines were based on the basic Jony 99 or Rangan 99 type.[6]

Cluster munition remnants

A UN spokesperson alleged the government had used cluster munitions in a bombardment in February 2009,[7] but after further investigation retracted the statement.[8] At a workshop on international law organized by UNICEF on 27 October 2009, the SLA’s commander categorically denied having used cluster munitions during the conflict.[9] In clearance operations since the end of the conflict operators say they have not encountered cluster munition remnants.[10]

Other explosive remnants of war

Renewed conflict in 2006 is believed to have resulted in extensive new UXO contamination, particularly in the northern Vanni region, as a result of government use of air- and ground-delivered ordnance and LTTE artillery attacks, which reached a peak in 2009 as government forces sought to capture the last LTTE positions.^[11] Both the SLA and operators reported finding caches of mines and AXO. Operators also reported encountering mortars, grenades, air-delivered rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices or booby-traps, including mortar shells rigged with trip-wires and sometimes linked to mines.^[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Management of mine action entered a transition phase in 2009 spurred by the end of the conflict with the LTTE in May which created new political and humanitarian imperatives. The Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province (PTF) led by Basil Rajapakse, a member of parliament and senior advisor to the president, emerged as the highest authority setting the strategy for mine action. After the end of fighting in May 2009, the PTF decided mine action priorities and allocated operators areas for survey and clearance. In 2010, the PTF retained ultimate authority for mine action but focused mainly on overall strategy.

In 2009, the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development continued as the lead ministry for mine action, supported by UNDP. It acted as chair of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), which comprises all stakeholders, including government departments, operators, and donors. The NSCMA met once in 2009 in May and again in February 2010 but appeared set to increase the frequency of its meetings and to limit the scope of participation to government and UN agencies.[13]

UNDP provided support through a project office in Colombo and through District Mine Action Offices in Vavuniya and Jaffna and sub-offices in Batticaloa and Mannar.[14] UNDP had worked without international technical advisors (TAs) in Sri Lanka since November 2006, but a Vavuniya-based TA started work in November 2009 and a second TA started in Jaffna in February 2010.[15] UNDP’s agreement with the Ministry of Nation Building, under which it supported preparatory arrangements towards the set up of the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) (including the placement of government staff in key mine action positions at the national and district levels and their related operations costs), expired at the end of 2009 and was extended in January 2010 which included a grant of some US$40,000 to support national staff and mine action operations in 2009–2010.[16]

The government proposed the setting up of a transitional NMAC in 2009 to act as its coordinating body for mine action with responsibility for accreditation, national mine action standards, data management, and operational coordination. The NMAC was initially located within the Ministry of Nation Building until the ministry was dissolved and in mid-2010 it was placed under the newly created Ministry of Economic Development.[17] The NMAC had eight staff as of July 2010 but expected the number to rise to 13 by the end of the year.[18] The cabinet approved creation of the NMAC in July 2010.[19]

UNDP’s grant included support for hiring six national staff for the NMAC. UNDP planned to recruit an international TA in 2010 to be based in Colombo to advise the NMAC on management coordination, strategic planning, resource mobilization, and all aspects of demining operations.[20] UNDP said it will “continue to work with the government during the initial stages of the establishment of NMAC and will eventually follow a phase-out strategy over the next two years.”[21]

In addition, according to UNDP steps were underway as of July 2010 to bring the SLA Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), under the purview of the Ministry of Economic Development, with the intention of bringing the unit under civilian management but with continuing technical support from the SLA.[22]

Until May 2009, UNDP maintained the Sri Lanka Mined Area Database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at its office in Colombo. In May 2009, the database was transferred to the field.[23] In 2010, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and UNDP started verifying the database as a prelude to introducing IMSMA New Generation, expected to start in September 2010. Verification found the data from Jaffna and Kilinochchi in good condition but found problems, including significant duplication, in data from Vavuniya, Trincomalee, and the national database.[24]

Recent program evaluations

A review of mine action programs receiving Norwegian support, conducted by an independent contractor in February–March 2009 (before the conflict with the LTTE had ended), found the national mine action program “in some disarray.” The report observed that “the mine action program in Sri Lanka is not presently planned according to good practice standards and processes. The Ministry of Nation Building and the UNDP as its counterpart had little capacity and competence and the mine action database (IMSMA) had not been updated and consequently not used for strategic planning.”[25] UNDP disputed the findings, observing that the IMSMA database had been updated and synchronized and was used for planning and other purposes, including tasking and monitoring.[26] The review concluded that “the planning, prioritisation and tasking of national authorities leave much to be desired and this has a real and negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the mine action work.”[27]

Land Release

Sri Lanka reported the release of a total of 897.41km² during 2009, but 81% of this was a result of cancellation by non-technical survey or general assessment.[28] Despite constraints on all forms of mine action as a result of the intensified conflict from 2008 until May 2009, minefield clearance accelerated sharply in the second half of 2009 and by the end of the year had dramatically exceeded clearance in any previous year, although the amount of battle area cleared was lower than in the previous two years. Based on discussions with demining operators, it appears likely that significant quantities of battle area clearance (BAC) have been wrongly reported as mine clearance.

The acceleration in demining in the second half of 2009 was made possible by the defeat of the LTTE in May and driven by government urgency to resettle some 280,000 people displaced by the fighting in the north. The PTF observed in July 2009 that demining was “the foremost operation in order to enable resettlement and other development initiatives.”[29] By the end of 2008, demining operators had largely completed clearance of tasks assigned in eastern Sri Lanka and Jaffna and some operators cut back staff.[30] In mid-2009, the PTF opened up areas of northern Sri Lanka for demining and operators rapidly expanded capacity to meet the government’s demand for survey and clearance.

According to HALO, the annual statistics for 2009 only reflect the equivalent of about six months’ work. Some donors did not commit funding for demining until better access was granted and resettlement from the camps commenced. The consequence for demining agencies was that they were unable to scale up sufficiently until well into the second half of the year. For three months (July to August) most demining agencies were tasked to clear in the (relatively small) Mannar “rice-bowl” area. Access to the Vanni region (proper) was only afforded to HALO (and later DDG) from September 2009. This is reflected in the dramatically increased clearance results from early 2010 (by which time work had commenced on some of the larger minefields identified as causing greatest impact on resettlement).[31] 

Five-year summary of land release by clearance

Survey in 2009

Government efforts to resettle northern internally displaced persons (IDPs) as fast as possible put operators under pressure to accelerate survey and release of land. DDG reported assessing the whole of the 670km² Poonakary division but found most of it free of contamination. In the remaining suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), however, DDG reported contamination was so dense it would likely take years to clear.[32]

The depopulated state of northern areas affected by conflict posed a number of difficulties for the conduct of non-technical survey or general assessment. Operators relied heavily on knowledge of the progress of conflict in particular areas among SLA personnel and on physical evidence of conflict.[33] Where non-technical survey did not produce enough evidence to release land, UNDP said clearance teams were sent to do technical survey or full clearance. As much of the area assessed or non-technically surveyed in 2009 was largely depopulated, UNDP and operators considered it would be necessary to send non-technical survey teams to some areas three to six months after they had been resettled to update survey findings with the benefit of local knowledge.[34]

The United States Department of State, responding to a request by HALO, supplied high resolution satellite imagery of hundreds of square kilometers of northern Sri Lanka which enabled operators to obtain precise mapping of major LTTE defensive positions and to assist the classification of land and prioritization of clearance. HALO believed the satellite imagery represented “a major leap for survey and coordination of demining in general.”[35]

Mine clearance in 2009

The NSCMA reported a dramatic increase in total mined area clearance in 2009 to 62.23km², up from 4.33km² in 2008. This included more than 44km² attributed to the SLA’s HDU, which was reported to have manually cleared 2km² in 2008.[36] Clearance by seven NGOs also rose sharply to 17.79km² in 2009 compared with 2.33km² the previous year.[37] However, the government did not require operators to distinguish between manual and BAC in reporting on operations in the second half of 2009. As a result the manual clearance total is thought to include significant amounts of BAC, and the BAC results may not show the full extent of that activity.[38]

The HDU provides the biggest demining capacity, operating with a maximum of 1,290 deminers and 60 flail operators, but, as of March 2010 750 deminers were assigned to humanitarian demining under the Ministry of Nation Building, mostly in Mannar district. The remainder were operating under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and the SLA.[39] HDU mechanical capacity was increased to a total of 29 Bozena flails in 2009,[40] including 10 that were provided by international funding, and the remainder of which were bought by the Sri Lankan government at a cost of $13 million.[41] The SLA said it used flails to help define the perimeters of mined areas before deploying manual demining teams for clearance. In 2010, the HDU also took delivery of 50 large-loop detectors provided by China, bringing its total number of these detectors to 75.[42]

Tasks undertaken by the HDU in 2009 included extensive clearance of roads, including 62km of the A9 road linking the south with Jaffna, closed for many years because of conflict with the LTTE; religious sites; a radio transmission complex; areas needed for infrastructure, such as power lines and railways; and land needed for agriculture.[43]

By the start of 2009, civilian demining organizations had sharply reduced their human resources after completing tasks in Jaffna or eastern Sri Lanka and while authorities had stopped assigning new areas for clearance as conflict escalated in the north.

With the defeat of the LTTE, the government called for rapid clearance of areas previously closed to operators to facilitate IDP resettlement. FSD, which had engaged less than 100 nationals in 2008, increased its operation to 288 staff with nine teams by the end of 2009 supported by four flails and a heavy roller.[44] HALO similarly increased human resources from 30 at the start of 2009 to 426 by the end of the year and 600 by April 2010.[45] MAG expanded from one mine action team to 10 and from two mechanical teams to seven, with plans to also increase its mechanical assets.[46]

Mine clearance in 2009[47]

* In July 2010, DDG reported clearance of 3,985,728m² of mined area in 2009, with the destruction of 3,374 antipersonnel mines.[48]

** In July 2010, HALO reported clearance of 0.26km² in 2009, with the destruction of 3,929 antipersonnel mines.[49]

*** In May 2010, MAG reported clearance of a total of 5,626,200m² in mine and BAC in 2009.[50]

**** In June 2010, Sarvatra reported clearance of 0.75km² of mined area in 2009, destroying 5,531 antipersonnel mines and 635 items of UXO in the course of mine clearance.[51]

Battle area clearance in 2009

The total BAC of almost 107.6km² reportedfor 2009 was more than one-third down from 2008, largely as a result of a drop in the amount of BAC conducted by the SLA from 121km² in 2008 to 55.36km² in 2009. However, it is thought some BAC in 2009 may have been reported as minefield clearance (see Mine clearance in 2009 section above).

BAC by NGOs was up 20% from the previous year. However, HALO noted that it engaged in BAC as a necessary first step because of the lack of information available to survey teams prior to return of the population to areas of conflict. As the pace of resettlement accelerated in 2009–2010 HALO said it was increasingly difficult to justify BAC and reverted increasingly to a combination of mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs conducted in cooperation with the SLA.[52]

Battle area clearance in 2009[53]

* In July 2010, DDG reported clearance of 0.47km² of battle area in 2009, with the destruction of 3,382 items of UXO.^[54]

** In July 2010, HALO reported clearance of 13.54km², with the destruction of 1,417 ERW.[55]

Community liaison

Demining organizations were not permitted by the government to conduct risk education (RE) anywhere in the country, but could undertake community liaison within their operating areas and in support of demining.[56] Operators including FSD, MAG, HALO, and Sarvatra, undertook community liaison as part of the hazard assessments they conducted in their operating areas to tap any available community knowledge for the assessment of contamination, to promote awareness of the mine/ERW threat, and to strengthen the channel for reporting of any hazards.[57]

Quality management

Quality assurance (QA) of demining operations in 2009 was conducted by eight staff operating from UNDP sub-offices in Vavuniya (five staff) and Jaffna (three staff). By July 2010, UNDP had 28 staff for QA and was preparing to open sub-offices in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu.[58]

Safety of demining personnel

An expatriate FSD advisor was killed in May 2010 when ordnance he was handling detonated. FSD said two national staff were injured “in a related incident.”[59]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Conflict between the government and LTTE brought formal mine/ERW RE programs to a standstill in the northern Vanni region (Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi) until November 2009, but it continued in Mannar, Mullaitivu, and the eastern provinces through a variety of channels. These included training of education staff including school-principals, in-service advisers, and teachers, and RE programs conducted by national NGOs Community Trust Fund (CTF), Sarvodaya, EHED-Caritas, and Social Organizations Networking for Development (SOND). RE reportedly reached 252,953 people over the year, mainly in Menik Farm, Vavuniya, Mannar, and Jaffna. Plans to include RE in the national school curriculum were accepted by the Secretary of Education but were not implemented in 2009.[60] Lessons and additional teaching materials were developed in a workshop held in May 2010.[61]

In October 2009, the PTF requested that UNICEF conduct an emergency RE program that was initially planned for two months from the last week of October until the end of January 2010, targeting Tamil communities displaced by fighting. In that period, RE reached more than 114,000 people and Internews project public service announcements were broadcast on three major Tamil radio stations almost every hour after the news.[62]

Most elements of the program continued until July 2010. It involved direct community-based RE, RE in schools, and dissemination of information through the mass media. In addition to CTF, Sarvodaya, EHED-Caritas, and SOND, Internews, a US-based NGO supporting media in emergency situations, became involved, broadcasting reports and public service announcements on ERW hazards.[63] International demining NGOs also provided emergency RE in newly resettled areas.

In 2010, the program expanded further with the participation of a national NGO, the Rural Development Fund. In the first five months of the year, the program delivered RE to 185,604 people, mostly in Jaffna, Vavuniya, and Mannar, but also in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. The government reached an agreement with Internews in June 2010 authorizing it to conduct road shows going from village to village and visiting schools. UNICEF also trained six RE teams with a total of 64 people from the HDU, mostly Sinhala-speaking. By June 2010, the teams still did not have their own vehicles and UNICEF requested them to set up mine sign gardens—exhibitions of mine/ERW safety messages located along major roads and intended to inform tens of thousands of Sinhala tourists that have been traveling north to Jaffna since the end of fighting opened road access.[64]