Contamination and Impact

Iraq is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War (first Gulf War), and the conflict that has continued since the 2003 invasion by the United States-led Coalition. Since then, attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices have occurred regularly against civilians, the military, and the police, with much of the ordnance used having been plundered from the huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. A joint report by UNICEF and UNDP in 2009 observed the task of clearance “might take decades to complete.”[1]

Mines

The first phase of the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2004–2006 and published in August 2007, found 1,622 communities affected by 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering an estimated 1,730km² of land. Five governorates could not be surveyed because of insecurity. Moreover, there is substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent conflicts; this is not reported in the ILIS, which was based on community interviews.[2]

A second phase of the ILIS, covering the remaining five governorates, started in 2008 and community surveys were completed in 2010.[3] Preliminary results as of September 2009 had indicated that of nearly 3,000 communities visited only 86 remained contaminated. More than 1,000 communities were previously affected, but contamination had since been cleared by local actors (for example militias or police), military forces, and/or humanitarian demining operators.[4]

Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total an area of 6,370km².[5] Iraq’s initial Article 7 transparency report claims that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another 1 million mines ahead of both the first Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.[6]

Cluster munition remnants

A 2009 UNDP/UNICEF report commented that “landmines are only a part—and a minor one at that—of Iraq’s total explosive remnants of war problems, however. Far larger are the dangers posed by the millions of cluster bombs … used, as well as unexploded ordnance and abandoned munitions.” The report notes the highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War.[7] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munitions contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[8]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG), however, has also found cluster munition remnants in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq that were dropped in 1991 to support a Kurdish uprising against the government and have posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[9]

Other explosive remnants of war

Iraq also has extensive UXO remaining from past conflicts and continues to accumulate contamination from continuing conflicts in the north, where Iranian and Turkish aircraft and artillery bombarded areas suspected to house Kurdish non-state armed groups in 2010.[10]

UXO contamination includes a variety of munitions, including air-dropped bombs and rockets, ground artillery, grenades, mortars, napalm, and depleted uranium (DU) ordnance, including bunker buster bombs and tank-fired shells that were used by US and British forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[11] In addition to the hazard posed by UXO in general, the DU munitions are thought to be responsible for high levels of radiation found in scrap yards around Baghdad and Basra and which was reported in a joint study by the ministries of health, environment, and science.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

After the US-led invasion of Iraq, mine action was assigned to the Ministry of Planning, overseeing a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) set up as regulator and coordinator. By 2007, however, this mechanism had become inactive and the government shut it down in June 2007. Responsibility for mine action was transferred to the Ministry of Environment (MoE), which took over in March 2008 and set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in place of the NMAA.[13]

The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a database. As of March 2010, the DMA had some 90 staff.[14] The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south. However, the DMA’s development has been hampered by the lack of any regulatory framework establishing its mandate.[15]

A “Mine Action Strategy 2010 to 2012” published by the MoE in February 2010 said the Ministry of Defense would be responsible for “Planning and Implementation of: Survey; Demarcation, and clearance of minefields.” The document said this “includes the operations implemented by International and National companies in which the MoD will be part of their administrative boards through a liaison officer.”[16]

An inter-ministerial coordination mechanism involving senior representatives of the ministries of defense, interior, and environment convened “on an ad hoc basis” in September 2009. The committee was designed to function as a policy-making body, with the DMA acting as the implementing body coordinating mine action. The committee met again in March 2010, but in August 2010 the Prime Minister issued a directive establishing a coordination committee for mine action including these three ministries together with the Ministry of Agriculture and representation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).[17] 

In December 2008, the Ministry of Defense imposed a ban on mine/UXO clearance pending a review of security issues relating to the mine action sector and to vet operators. In August 2009, the ministries of defense and environment signed a Memorandum of Understanding which identified the responsibilities of each and provided a basis for proceeding with the preparation of a 10-year strategic plan to be implemented in three phases covering 2010–2012, 2012–2015, and 2015–2019.[18]

The MoE distinguished two types of demining activities: investment projects and non-investment projects. Investment (commercial) projects would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. If the Ministry of Defense was unable to implement a project, the MoE, acting as consultant, would prepare tenders for survey, clearance, and quality assurance (QA) of the project. The MoE would also initially refer non-investment projects to the Ministry of Defense and if it did not want to take control the MoE would proceed, assigning the work to NGOs and commercial companies. The MoE planned to subcontract QA to an NGO or commercial company that was not engaged in clearance in Iraq. UXO clearance within cities would come under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and clearance outside cities would fall under the Ministry of Defense.[19]

The DMA had an annual budget of US$12 million to $15 million a year earmarked largely for humanitarian demining, although it had not been able to spend this amount. The DMA was asking governorates to identify their priorities for clearance. It also encouraged governorates to set up NGOs to undertake demining, with salaries paid by the MoE, as a means of generating employment and local ownership.[20]

Mine action in the northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah continued to function semi-autonomously under the Kurdish Regional Government and managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) in Dahuk and Erbil, and the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA) in Sulaymaniyah and parts of Kirkuk and Diyala governorates. Both organizations accredit operators in their area of responsibility. The KRG passed a law merging IKMAA and the GDMA in April 2007 but the merger had not taken place as of August 2010.[21]

Land Release

The only reported clearance and release of mine and UXO-contaminated land in 2009 occurred in the northern Kurdish governorates under the control of IKMAA and the GDMA. Despite the far-reaching impact of ERW on the security, social welfare, and economic development of all Iraq, clearance operations in the center and south were halted by a suspension of operations imposed by the Ministry of Defense on 23 December 2008. The ministry halted operations on grounds of security and in order to vet personnel engaged by demining operators who would therefore have access to mines and/or explosive ordnance.[22] The Ministry of Defense partially lifted the suspension in May 2009 to allow operators to conduct non-technical survey and risk education, but the ban on clearance and demolitions of cleared items remained in place until August 2009. Even then, however, operations were restricted to accredited organizations, a process that proved slow, and no demolitions of cleared items by any organization except the military was possible until May 2010.[23]

In the north, IKMAA operated with 14 demining teams and two battle area clearance (BAC) teams,[24] while the GDMA coordinated operations by seven commercial companies,[25] as well as MAG and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).[26] MAG, with 13 demining teams,[27] and NPA were the only international NGOs conducting clearance in the Kurdish governorates in 2009, but NPA ceased its operations there by the end of the year and in 2010 was preparing to start a new demining operation in the south.[28] The GDMA accredited three more commercial companies in 2010: Madol, Onest, and Paraw.[29]

Among the NGOs operating in central and southern Iraq, Danish Demining Group (DDG) had 12 16-person demining and BAC teams and supported Rafidain Demining Organization while the Iraq Mine Clearance Organization received support from RONCO. International commercial operators active in Iraq in 2009 included G4S (six 12-person demining teams, six 12-person BAC teams, and a seven-person QA/survey team); MineTech International; and RONCO (13 international staff in program and operations management and 110 national demining/BAC/explosive ordnance disposal staff).[30] Two Iraqi commercial companies, Arabian Gulf Company and Alsafsafa Company, were registered in Basra.[31] Alsafsafa reported that it had 10 demining teams and had “cleaned” an area of 176,800m² on behalf of Baker Hughes, a US contractor working for South Oil Company.[32]

Five-year summary of land cancellation and release[33]

Survey in 2009

Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), funded by the US Department of State, completed the impact survey of five governorates by 25 survey teams in June 2010.[34] These areas could not be surveyed because of insecurity when iMMAP carried out the first phase of the ILIS in 13 other governorates in 2004–2006. Detailed analysis of the survey results was still underway as of August 2010, but iMMAP expected survey findings to be released within the third quarter of 2010.[35]

Basra-based DDG surveyed 397 tasks covering 14.45km² and identified almost 16,000 ERW but in view of the restrictions imposed on clearance and explosive ordnance disposal none of this land was released.[36]

In 2009, the GDMA started a re-survey of Sulaymaniyah and the Garmyan area bordering the former Green Line—the former frontline between Kurdish forces and former President Saddam Hussein’s army—with three survey teams to update information collected by the ILIS in 2007 and a UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) general survey completed in 2002. The survey covered a total area of 163km² and resulted in release of 3.7km². Technical survey of 87 mined areas covering 3.3km² resulted in cancellation of 0.78km².[37]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2009

The only humanitarian mine/UXO clearance in 2009 occurred in northern Iraq’s Kurdish governorates. The GDMA reported clearance of 197 mined areas and 7.5km² in 2009, almost one-quarter more area than in 2008. In addition, operators verified 24.18km² for oil companies. The GDMA noted it had received good financial support from the KRG,[38] which provided a budget of $18 million for mine action, risk education, and victim assistance.[39]

IKMAA, with 14 mine clearance and two BAC teams working at the end of 2009, reported clearing slightly less (14%) mined area and more than one-third less battle area than the previous year, although it added six demining teams in Dahuk governorate and added  five HSTAMID dual sensor detectors to its equipment inventory. The lower productivity appears at least partially due to requests from the government for support to oil exploration companies, electricity network rehabilitation projects, and construction projects, which it said usually necessitated taking teams off IKMAA-priority tasks.[40]

MAG faced funding constraints that led to a reduction in the number of demining, small arms and light weapons disposal, and community liaison teams and resulted in a one-third drop in area cleared in 2009, but it also reported improved coordination with IKMAA and the GDMA resulting in better focus on priority tasks. Although Iraq’s unexploded submunitions are concentrated in southern and central areas, MAG reported clearing submunitions in the north in 2009 and in Dahuk governorate in 2010.[41]

Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2009[42]

* The figure includes 75 submunitions destroyed in the course of mine clearance operations.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 11 February 2018. 

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report expressed concern that mine action had not received enough  attention and stated “at the current slow pace of demining operations, it is clear the goal of an ‘Iraq free of the impact of mines and unexploded ordnance’ will not be reached by the 2018 Mine Ban Convention deadline.”[43] The possibility of fulfilling its treaty obligations has been further compromised by the Ministry of Defense’s suspension of all clearance outside the Kurdish governorates imposed on 23 December 2008 and in force until 31 August 2009.

UNICEF and UNDP had emphasized that “it is clear that the current demining capacities in Iraq are far from meeting the requirements of the Mine Ban Convention” and called for “the urgent development of a nation-wide Mine Action Programme. This much-needed capacity increase can only be met by inviting international de-mining organizations to work in Iraq, as well as developing national Iraqi organizations and/or allocating and training more military resources for this purpose.”[44] Organizations seeking registration and accreditation to work in Iraq, however, have found procedures complex, unpredictable, and slow.[45]

Quality management

The GDMA worked with one QA officer, a deputy, and 20 QA monitors who accredited demining organizations and their machinery, conducted minefield assessments, and investigated accidents. In 2009, the monitors halted operations on 12 tasks because of safety concerns. The monitors sampled 460,367m² on 4.67km² of completed minefields, reporting 28 cases of critical non-conformity, finding 21 mines and 25 items of UXO on supposedly completed sites. As a result, monitors ordered an area of 214,162m² to be re-cleared before land was again sampled and released to landowners.[46]

Safety of demining personnel

The GDMA reported two serious accidents in its area of responsibility in 2009. A planning officer for NPA lost a hand in a mine accident, and a deminer for Khabat Zangana Company lost a leg in a mine explosion while walking in an unmarked area.[47]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) was implemented by international and national NGOs, coordinated by UNICEF, acting in support of IKMAA and the GDMA in the north, and by the DMA in the center and south.

UNICEF was working with the DMA, the GDMA, and IKMAA on finalizing a national strategy for RE in 2010, holding a workshop on strategy, standards, and guidelines in June 2010 involving implementing partners and representatives of government ministries. However, the program was said to face an array of major challenges from poor funding (and decreasing government allocations) for RE, limited local human and other resources, slow accreditation procedures, lack of government policy enforcing the roles of concerned ministries, and continuous changes at the policy-making level.[48]

IKMAA had two three-person RE teams, one in Erbil and the other in Dohuk, holding direct RE sessions for populations at risk, notably shepherds, nomads, and children, and organizing the broadcast of RE messages on local radio and television. The teams also delivered RE through community liaison supporting mine clearance operations. Among other risk reduction measures, IKMAA also reported marking an area of 48,190m² as part of an operation to open an access corridor for an oil company.[49]

MAG, accredited by both IKMAA and the GDMA, ran a training of trainers program for teachers in primary schools in coordination with the KRG’s Ministry of Education and also delivered this course to religious and village leaders to reach people outside the school system. Its community liaison teams also delivered RE to affected communities and vulnerable groups such as internally displace persons, nomads, shepherds, and women and children.[50] Handicap International (HI) was accredited by IKMAA in June 2010 and set up a program funded by UNICEF to operate two RE teams in Dahuk and Erbil.[51]

There are currently nine RE teams working under the DMA and the Regional Mine Action Center to deliver RE in the most affected communities in central and southern Iraq. UNICEF has also supported the development and reproduction of various RE materials including posters, leaflets, banners, and indoor games.[52]