Casualties[1]

Casualties in 2009

In 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified 78 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties. This represented a dramatic decrease (70%) in the number of registered annual casualties as compared with the 263 casualties identified in 2008.[2] In northern Iraq, the reduced number of casualties was explained by the end of drought conditions, which had caused increased population movements in the region.[3] In southern and central Iraq, where “most casualties go unreported,” it was unlikely to be related to an actual decline in casualties but rather to a decline in the collection and management of casualty data.[4]

In 2009, children made up 38% (23 of 61) of civilian casualties, 11 of whom were killed, 11 injured, and one for whom the outcome of the incident was unknown. Just five of the casualties were military and two were deminers who were injured.[5] Males made up the vast majority of casualties (91% of the casualties for which the gender was identified); just five female casualties were confirmed.[6] This was similar to previous years in which most registered casualties were civilian males.[7] As in previous years, most casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Dahuk, in northern Iraq, since there was no data collection mechanism in southern or central Iraq.

The total number of casualties in Iraq is unknown. As of August 2007, there had been 21,492 casualties registered in the five National Mine Action Authority databases since 2001 (including casualties occurring before this time) but these figures were known to be incomplete and unverified. A large number of the casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah governorate (12,573).[8] While updated national casualty totals were unavailable, a 2009 pilot survey and anecdotal evidence provided some sense of the magnitude of the problem. In two of the 36 districts in southern and central Iraq, 417 previously unregistered casualties (117 killed and 300 injured) were identified in a period of ten days.[9] In the village of Said Jabar, near Basra, more than 400 of the 2,500 residents (16% of the population) had been injured or killed by mines/ERW.[10]

By the end of 2009, there had been at least 388 cluster munition casualties during use (128 killed and 260 injured). Another 1,672 casualties of cluster munition remnants were reported (747 killed, 921 injured, and four unknown) and unexploded submunitions caused another 934 casualties with no further details on use (410 killed, 507 injured, and 17 unknown).[11] However, due to the level of contamination, it is estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions, including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes.[12]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown but there are at least several thousand.

In 2009, there were no national efforts to assess the needs of survivors.[13] The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) carried out a pilot survey in two districts, one in the central governorate of Wasit and the other in the southern governorate of Basra, both on the Iranian border. The survey collected information on injury types and services needed. It was planned to expand the survey to all parts of the country, pending funding and an improved security situation, and to use results to develop a national victim assistance plan.[14] Service providers reported collecting information on survivor needs from their beneficiaries.[15]

Victim assistance coordination[16]

In 2009, coordination of victim assistance continued in northern Iraq. Four meetings were held during the year, led by UNDP and involving the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA), the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA), the Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization (WHO), and NGOs. Meeting outcomes included the development of an annual plan for victim assistance with monitoring to prevent duplication by victim assistance stakeholders.[17] As of the end of 2009, despite plans to merge IKMAA and the GDMA, the two entities remained separate.[18] In central and southern Iraq, coordination remained weak with no coordinating mechanism, though the Victim Assistance Officer at the DMA met with representatives from the Ministry of Health and the Regional Mine Action Center to discuss victim assistance initiatives.[19] In March 2010, a national conference was held on victim assistance, the first of its kind, to discuss the development of a victim assistance strategy. Participants included government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs, and disabled persons’ organizations; just one landmine survivor participated.[20]

In central and southern Iraq, the Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation, within the Ministry of Health, dealt with the coordination of physical rehabilitation issues, however, there was no equivalent for northern Iraq. The ICRC remained the only mechanism to coordinate rehabilitation at the national level.[21]

As of the end of 2009, a national strategic plan for victim assistance had not been developed.[22] The Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012 included as its third objective to “establish an integrated and capable program for mine/UXO victims rehabilitation and reintegration in the society.” Activities planned include a field survey in 15 provinces to register survivors, building a database using data obtained from field surveys and police stations, developing and disseminating a victim registration system, providing prosthetics to 20% of survivors, and providing vocational rehabilitation and appropriate employment opportunities to 10% of survivors.[23]

Iraq provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009 and provided casualty data through Form J of its Article 7 report.[24]

Survivor Inclusion

Survivors were not systematically included in the coordination of victim assistance;[25] they were involved in the implementation of victim assistance activities through NGOs.[26]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[27]

In 2009, there was an increase in access to victim assistance services, particularly physical rehabilitation, mostly due to a somewhat improved security situation[28] and also as an outcome of consistent support from the joint WHO-UNDP capacity-building project in northern Iraq and ICRC support throughout the country.[29] However, this increase must be seen in a context of an ongoing armed conflict in which the vast majority of survivors still had limited or no access to victim assistance services of any kind, particularly in central and southern Iraq.[30] It was believed that victim assistance services in northern Iraq would not be sustainable without continued international support.[31]

There was a slight improvement in access to emergency care with improvements seen in the emergency response of medical professionals in northern Iraq[32] and as a result of increased ICRC efforts to provide emergency care training and medical supplies to hospitals throughout the country.[33]

In the 13 ICRC-supported orthopedic centers, there was a 25% increase in prosthetics production, but this was not enough to address the needs of all survivors. There was also a significant increase in new patients accessing services, indicating that more people were able to gain access to rehabilitation centers. The increase in new patients was greater than the increase in production and wait lists increased in most centers. The construction of a new orthopedic center in Nasiriyah, in southeastern Iraq, was completed but not yet operational by the end of 2009; it was expected to increase access to services in 2010.[34]

The joint WHO-UNDP capacity-building project included a component to strengthen psychological support in northern Iraq but no improvements were seen in this area in 2009.[35]

Within the Iraqi government, victim assistance continued to be seen as a medical issue and throughout 2009, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs remained inactive in addressing the economic inclusion of survivors.[36] Some slight improvements were seen in the availability of economic inclusion initiatives in northern Iraq, as a result of NGO activities.[37]

The law prohibited discrimination of persons with disabilities but this was not enforced.[38] Legal reforms to improve the protection of rights for persons with disabilities were not seen to be a government priority and did not advance in 2009.[39]

As of the end of 2009, Iraq had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.