Contamination and Impact

Mines

The precise extent of Colombia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem remains unclear. The government of Colombia has identified 35 military bases as affected by mines, of which 34 had been cleared as of August 2010 from some 160,000m² of area.[1] The national database contains information that 31 of the 32 departments may be mine-affected. Based on the 13,234 events recorded in the national database as of August 2010 there has been at least one event in 65% of the municipios (municipalities) and almost 50%
of the events are concentrated in just 49 of the 1,066 municipalities in the country. Additionally, 58% of the events have been recorded in six of the 32 departments (Antioquia, Meta, Bolívar, Caquetá, Norte de Santander, and Arauca).[2]

However, given the irregular nature of mine-laying, the continued use of mines makes it impossible to get a static picture of contamination. Colombia stated that the lack of information prevented it from including a complete operational plan in its Article 5 deadline extension request.[3]

The army reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are found along routes used by government forces and around NSAG bases, in rural areas, around schools, houses, national parks, indigenous communities’ land, and coca production sites.[4] An analysis of mined areas by the Organization of American States (OAS) suggests that NSAGs typically place improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in separate locations approximately 5m apart and connected by plastic wires that cannot be detected by conventional mine detection equipment.[5] The OAS, however, believes that although these devices have been widely emplaced by NSAGs, better information is needed for planning survey and clearance operations. The OAS believes it is imperative that good non-technical survey with land release and overall mine assessment and planning be a priority in Colombia.[6]

In May 2010, the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) estimated that there were about 10,900 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)—only 29% of which had geo-reference coordinates—that required further survey and possibly clearance in 601 (55%) of the 1,098 municipalities. According to PAICMA, most mined areas are only identified after an incident occurs.[7] There are no records, or even reliable estimates, of the number and exact location of mined areas laid by NSAGs. SHAs are generally in isolated locations scattered across the affected departments, and the security situation is so precarious that there is no guarantee that cleared areas can be released as safe areas.[8]

HALO Trust, which has a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with PAICMA to survey 11 municipalities, has found that minefields in Colombia tend to be laid in low densities though they can be accurately defined and delineated through good survey. The mines are improvised from ordinary items ranging from glass bottles to plastic jerrycans to larger devices such as gas canisters.[9] As of August 2010 HALO had found one minefield for every four recorded SHAs. It estimates that if the same ratio was applied across Colombia the true number of SHAs may be less than 3,000. Based on extensive assessments in Antioquia, Bolívar, and Sucre departments with a concentration in the seven municipalities of Argelia, Nariño, Sonsón, Cocorná, San Luis, San Rafael, and Abejorral in southeast Antioquia where the government has been in control from two to four years, HALO found mines tended to be placed on tracks to areas previously occupied or transited by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC), or around key locations, such as schools, which were previously occupied by NSAGs. As of 23 August 2010, HALO had surveyed 135 village administration areas (mostly on foot), with results showing the average minefield is 7,300m².[10]

Based on information from the army and PAICMA that the location of most mines is related to strategic purposes—transit routes, sites suitable for ambushes, protecting camps, and illicit crops—Mines Advisory Group (MAG) believes the most suitable land release strategies are community liaison (CL) and non-technical and technical surveys, followed by small rapid response teams to deal with mines, IEDs, and UXO. MAG believes it will be essential to maintain CL throughout all phases of surveying and clearance as the community must have the right to give its opinion as to whether or not it is safe to undertake demining operations in each location.[11] In HALO’s view, the extent of the mine contamination, considering the high number of casualties as an indicator of danger and risk, limits the amount of assistance that can safely be provided to internally displaced persons (IDPs) after they return.[12]  

High casualty rates among coca eradicators in Nudo de Paramillo in the Cordillera Occidental mountain range, the Catatumbo forest reserves in Norte de Santander department, the foothills of the Andes mountains in northwestern Arauca, and several locations in southeastern Colombia indicate additional locations and risks.[13]

Notwithstanding these views and the lack of complete data on the problem, Colombia estimated it would clear 48km² through mechanical and manual clearance, and release another 73km² through non-technical survey in 2011–2020.[14]

Explosive remnants of war

Although the precise extent to which Colombia is affected by ERW is not known, it is estimated that 5% of all mine/ERW incidents resulting in injury or death are caused by UXO.[15] In the 23 municipalities in which MAG is operating in Antioquia and Chocó all but one are contaminated by ERW.[16]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP), established on 8 October 2001, is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

PAICMA is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2009–2019 Integrated Mine Action Plan, of which the overall strategy is to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in affected communities.[17]

Information management

The database at PAICMA contains information from as far back as 1990. So-called events—a generic term specific to mine action in Colombia that encompasses “incidents,” “accidents,” “suspected hazardous areas,” “UXO,” “deactivation” of devices, and “military demining”—have occurred in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments, the only exception being the Caribbean archipelago department of Providencia, San Andrés, and Santa Catalina.[18] In June 2009, at a workshop in Bogotá bringing together PAICMA, the Colombian army, NGOs, and donors, it was reported that although a considerable amount of data is available, it often cannot be corroborated, collated, or integrated across information management systems.[19] In August 2010, PAICMA reported that with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), progress was being made in the design and implementation of an information management model appropriate to the situation in Colombia.[20]

Demining capacity

Since the initiation of mine action in Colombia the army has been the sole operator for clearing not only the 35 mined military bases, but also for demining in affected communities that they can access safely. Since the beginning of 2009, Colombia has been assessing a legal framework to allow civilian organizations to conduct mine clearance operations. In August 2009, then-Vice-President Francisco Santos Calderón told a workshop sponsored by the NGO Geneva Call that humanitarian demining with civilian organizations was new to Colombia and that it required careful planning as well as a regulatory framework to address such issues as safety of the civilian population and staff, approval of operational areas, sustainability, logistics, funding, accreditation, monitoring, and the use of explosives to destroy landmines.[21]

Colombia’s Article 5 deadline extension request envisions civilian entities conducting mine clearance in 2010–2020. The clearance targets in the extension request are based on increasing military platoons from eight in 2010 to 25 in 2020 and civilian teams from two in 2011 to 49 in 2020.[22] As of August 2010, however, Congress had not passed a law allowing civilian demining organizations to operate in Colombia.[23]

In March 2010, UNMAS and UNDP both hired technical advisors to assist the mine action program.[24]

Land Release

Since 2005, Colombia has reported clearance of 454,454m² of contaminated land at 30 military bases and in 24 communities, with 2009 the most productive year to date. In 2009, 16 military bases and SHAs in 22 communities covering a total of 170,218m² were cleared. With the increase in demining teams in the Colombian army from four to eight, humanitarian clearance by June 2010 had exceeded the clearance output at the military bases. PAICMA reported that as of June 2010, 34 of the 35 bases had been cleared. It is planned the remaining base will be cleared by the end of 2010.[25]

Summary of clearance of military bases: 2005 to June 2010[26]

Summary of land release of humanitarian demining: 2005 to June 2010[27]

Survey in 2009

In the absence of a well-defined landmine problem, surveys and assessments initiated in 2009 have added to the growing body of knowledge and understanding about the mine and ERW problem in Colombia. In March 2010, PAICMA estimated that about 10,900 SHAs required further survey and possibly clearance.[28]

Landmine impact survey

In December 2008, the European Commission (EC) awarded a contract to an international consortium consisting of universities in Belgium and Colombia and three companies, one in Spain and two in the United Kingdom, to conduct a pilot study of the socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO on affected communities in Colombia.[29] Although it is called a Landmine Impact Survey, Colombia has adopted methodologies and processes not used in other such surveys and thus cannot be equated to the branded Landmine Impact Survey.[30]

As a pilot project, one of the purposes of the survey was to identify a systematic data collection methodology that could be used to survey all of the mine/ERW-suspected areas of the country. The areas to survey were selected on the basis of being a representative sample of the landmine problem in Colombia rather than areas with the most incidents found in the database.[31] In July 2009, PAICMA identified the southeast of the Antioquia department; Catatumbo in Norte de Santander department close to the Venezuelan border; Montes de María (a mountainous region on the Caribbean coast); and the western region of Nariño department as the four areas where the survey would begin in September 2009.^[32] Data collection began in November 2009 and ended in June 2010. The survey identified 59 impacted communities from the 697 communities surveyed. The survey found landmines primarily blocked farmland, roads, hunting, and foraging areas. The survey identified 17 victims in the two years prior to the survey. Security issues are said to have limited the scope of the survey in Catatumbo and Nariño.[33]

Preliminary survey results as July 2010[34]

The survey was not without its problems and challenges. Surveys were not conducted at the same administrative level in all areas. Depending on access, the survey was conducted in the capital city of the municipality, at the populated centers (“centros poblados”) level, or the vereda level, the lowest level, equivalent to a village.[35]

Lack of access to SHAs due to fear or actual security threats resulted in high area estimates of contaminated areas, although measuring SHAs was not a priority of the survey. Often the survey teams could not get within 500m of the SHA. Coordinates of the SHAs were not taken.

According to the director of PAICMA, during the pilot survey the surveyors and community interviewees were very cautious in deciding whether to make a visit for a survey. In some instances in Norte de Santander and Nariño departments the survey teams elected not to go to certain locations. Moreover, due to security concerns the survey was eventually abandoned in Nariño.[36]

Non-technical survey

It is reported that three platoons from the Colombian army cancelled 7.97km² of land in 2009.[37]

The mined areas at the six bases of Cerro Luna, El Hobo, La Fortaleza, Argelia, La Riqueza, and Yatacue were cancelled after non-technical survey.[38] According to Guillermo Leal, South America Regional Coordinator for the OAS Integrated Mine Action Program (Programa de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), it is likely that mines were never laid in these locations.[39] Pablo Parra, PAICMA’s Mine Action Advisor, thought no landmines were found in these six locations because years ago the base commanders had ordered that the mines be removed but never reported it.[40]

HALO has an MoU with PAICMA to conduct non-technical survey in 11 municipalities in Antioquia department and Montes de María (an area which spans Bolívar and Sucre departments). In accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), during non-technical survey HALO delineates and maps a polygon within the SHA to establish the borders of the mine threat, thereby creating a confirmed hazardous area (CHA). As noted above, preliminary survey results, which show no pattern of mine-laying, have led HALO to conclude that full clearance of a CHA will typically be necessary.[41]

Survey in 2009[42]

N/R = Not reported

MAG has an MoU with PAICMA to conduct non-technical survey in as many as 10 municipalities in Antioquia and Chocó departments. MAG planned to begin survey before the end of 2010.[43]

Mine clearance in 2009

As of June 2010, the Demining Battalion of the Military Forces had manually cleared 34 of the 35 military bases including 16 in 2009, destroying in the process 1,779 antipersonnel mines.[44] As of August 2010, the only remaining military base was El Tigre, which will be cleared by the end of 2010.[45] The Demining Battalion also cleared 22 communities in 2009 where NSAGs had laid mines to facilitate the return of IDPs and the economic development of the community.[46] As of June 2010, the Humanitarian Demining Battalion consisted of eight squads, each with 24 deminers, making a total capacity of 192 deminers. The army planned to add one more squad before the end of the year.[47]

Mine clearance of military bases: 2009 through June 2010[48]

In 2009, the Demining Battalion of the Military Forces, in coordination with PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, Acción Social), local authorities, and local community leaders, completed humanitarian demining in 22 communities in San Carlos and San Francisco municipalities in Antioquia; Samaniego municipality in Nariño; El Dorado municipality in Meta; and Chaparral municipality in Tolima over a total of 106,037m² of land. Humanitarian demining sites are selected based on development priorities, the likelihood of IDPs returning home after clearance, and safety. During clearance operations 114 IEDs functioning as landmines (the OAS no longer uses the term landmine to describe the problem in Colombia)[49] and 45 items of UXO were found and destroyed.[50]

Clearance is followed by activities to facilitate the return of IDPs. With support from the national and local governments infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads, education, and health is rebuilt. Additionally, the OAS and NGOs provide agricultural inputs through micro projects to rehabilitate the cleared areas.[51]

 Humanitarian mine clearance in 2009[52]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2011. On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a ten-year extension to its deadline and then on 5 August 2010 submitted a revised request. The major differences between the original and the revised extension request were the decrease in the number of NGO demining teams from 85 to 49 in 2014–2020, and required funds needed during the same period decreased by almost US$150 million. The operational plan and the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 however remained at 17 NGO teams and $25 million. During this period the government of Colombia would contribute $21 million for 14 demining squads.[53]

The extension request predicts that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.”[54] Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan is a central component of the extension request. Colombia had cleared 34 of the 35 mined military bases as of June 2010, and planned to clear the remaining base by the end of 2010, in advance of its treaty-mandated deadline.[55] Fifteen out of 660 possibly mine-affected municipalities in five of the 32 departments, covering an estimated 15km², have been identified as priority for clearance by 2013.[56]

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of civilian demining organizations.[57]

Village demining

German Valencia, a representative of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca, ACIN), an organization of indigenous people in the department of Cauca, reported at a workshop in Bogotá that local communities have their own demining teams but lacked formal training. He also reported that as a result of indigenous groups conducting demining in Cauca, armed groups had responded by killing six people. Nonetheless, a representative of the Awa, an indigenous people severely impacted by mines in Nariño and Amazonas departments, thought civilians should conduct demining rather than the military.[58]

MAG has an MoU with PAICMA to begin training the Indigenous Guard (Guarda Indígena) in Cauca in the steps leading up to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) level 1 (recognition, marking, safe movement, and safe storage of explosives).[59]

Community liaison

Community liaison is an important component of the mine action program in Colombia. The Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM), Corporación Paz y Democracia, Fundación Restrepo Barco, Tierra de Paz, Pastoral Social, and the OAS have been engaged in community liaison for many years.[60]

MAG, in partnership with CCCM and a local NGO in Antioquia, Paz y Democracia, started a community liaison project in August 2009 in 14 municipalities. As of August 2010, it was being implemented in 23 municipalities in Antioquia and Chocó departments delivering risk education (RE), developing focal points, determining the most vulnerable groups, and engaging communities and local authorities in assessing the possibility of further mine action in the current political and security context in the two departments.[61]

Several representatives at a conference sponsored by Geneva Call in August 2009 on “integral” mine action called for more community involvement in identifying clearance priorities and the recruitment of deminers from local communities.[62]

Quality management

OAS AICMA is the monitoring body for humanitarian demining, with responsibility for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system for all accredited demining organizations. The OAS monitors humanitarian demining operations to ensure procedures are consistent in all demining organizations and that they conform to national and international mine action standards. The OAS also investigates demining accidents and verifies community liaison activities.[63]

During 2009, officers from the Brazilian army ran the quality management program and trained and supervised 21 members of the Colombian army that conducted quality control in military bases and in clearance operations around mine-affected communities.

Safety of demining and survey personnel

Violence or the fear of violence is prevalent in rural Colombia where landmines are used by NSAGs.[64] Deminers, survey, and RE teams and the local population are all affected to one degree or another.[65]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

In 2009, the government, national NGOs, the Colombian Red Cross, and the ICRC conducted RE in 16 departments and 50 municipalities in coordination with PAICMA. Support was provided by UNICEF.[66] According to CCCM, there is considerable focus on RE because there are many regions and areas in the country where demining is not possible.[67] Pending clearance, it is necessary to implement “interim” activities that seek to protect civilians from death and injury and to facilitate safe access to food, water, land, and other basic necessities of life in contaminated areas.[68]

One area where demining is limited is southern Colombia. PAICMA commissioned an external evaluation of the two-year Pastoral Social RE project, which operated in five departments in southern Colombia. The evaluation concluded that combining RE, psychosocial assistance, and human rights was an innovative approach to RE and should be replicated in other regions in the country. However, it was recommended that project length should be longer than two years to achieve full impact. One of the project’s strengths was its direct intervention in areas where incidents had occurred rather than requiring participants to travel to the nearest town or urban area for RE. The evaluation found that 70% of the targeted population was knowledgeable about the threat of mines.[69]

Antioquia is the only department to take an active role in RE; it has contributed funding to RE projects and produced materials.[70] Since January 2010, the Colombian Red Cross has undertaken a total of 41 activities directly benefiting 967 members of vulnerable communities and during the same period the ICRC has carried out 60 prevention activities on safe behavior and victims’ rights with 1,741 community members and municipal authorities in conflict areas affected by weapon contamination.[71]

PAICMA and the National Park Service held eight RE workshops for 292 park employees, and 16 parks incorporated risks associated with landmines into their security plans.[72] A four-day international seminar on RE funded by the EC to build capacity in Colombia was held in May 2009. Almost 20 organizations and more than 100 people participated.[73]

Conducting RE during an ongoing conflict has posed an array of challenges and problems in Colombia, including armed confrontation, lack of access, sometimes due to disability, difficulty in attending RE programs because of cost and threats from NSAGs, political bias in RE programs, lack of context and analysis in RE materials, and sessions on the level of risk from the armed conflict, poor training of facilitators, and facilitators from outside the area who lack knowledge of local conditions.[74]

MAG, undertaking RE through its national partners in 23 municipalities in two departments, reported that it is addressing some of the challenges in delivering RE by selecting trusted residents with no political affiliation with any NSAG from the municipalities in which they will work; ensuring sufficient funds for the facilitators to be able to travel to the most affected communities; regularly reviewing internal security policies and guidelines in light of the changing nature of the conflict; developing materials to IMAS which have been field-trialed; and implementing an external quality control and quality assurance system, including a monitoring visit to facilitator at least once every two months in the field.[75]

In April 2010, PAICMA said RE materials were being developed to address the dangers coca eradicators face in destroying coca crops.[76] Casualty rates among coca eradicators are said to be very high compared to other groups.[77]